The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible "Semisubstantive" Constitutional Rules

Dan Coenen
THE PROS AND CONS OF POLITICALLY REVERSIBLE “SEMISUBSTANTIVE” CONSTITUTIONAL RULES

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Most observers of constitutional adjudication believe that it works in an all-or-nothing way. On this view, the substance of challenged rules is of decisive importance, so that political decisionmakers may resuscitate invalidated laws only by way of constitutional amendment. This conception of constitutional law is incomplete. In fact, courts often use so-called “semisubstantive” doctrines that focus on the processes that nonjudicial officials have used in adopting constitutionally problematic rules. When a court strikes down a rule by using a motive-centered or legislative-findings doctrine, for example, political decisionmakers may revive that very rule without need for a constitutional amendment. For such an effort to succeed, however, those decisionmakers must comply with special, deliberation-enhancing procedural requirements crafted by courts to ensure that constitutional concerns receive fair attention in the lawmaking process.

Is semisubstantive review legitimate and sensible? In this article, the author disentangles—and then responds to—each of ten critiques that judges and scholars have directed at semisubstantive decisionmaking. While acknowledging that most of these critiques have some merit, the author concludes that courts should continue to deploy semisubstantive doctrines as one, but not the only, tool of constitutional review. This approach, it is argued, serves a worthy aim. It protects constitutional values in a meaningful way, while taking due account of the salience of republican self-rule.
INTRODUCTION

The “unelected federal judiciary” has taken blows from many critics, including unelected federal judges themselves. Most complaints proceed from the premise that courts make constitutional rulings that “withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy” by “placing them beyond the reach of majorities.” On this view, the substance of the challenged rule or practice is all-important. Teacher-led prayers in classrooms violate the Establishment Clause. Racially segregated education runs afoul of the equal protection guarantee. And bans on pre-viability abortions offend protections of liberty embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Judicially recognized limits of this kind are “hard and fast” because the only way elected officials may undo them is by amending the Constitution.

1E.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Unelected federal judges have been usurping [Congress’] lawmaking power.”). See also We Need to Pray for our Elected Officials, THE PANTAGRH, Feb. 12, 2004, at A10 (“It’s certainly too bad that our nation has degenerated to the point that unelected officials in our government, especially in the judicial department and the higher court federal judge system, usurp authority that is unconstitutional and biased against religion.”).
3Id. (suggesting that the “very purpose” of having constitutional rights is “to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts”).
It is not surprising that democracy-minded critics of the courts focus on these substance-centered prohibitions. These prohibitions, after all, block elected decisionmakers from achieving legal outcomes that even large majorities of their constituents deem important. It is for this reason that American constitutional law has a strong “countermajoritarian” cast.\(^8\)

Many constitutional rulings, however, do not concern only the substantive action the government has taken. Rather, courts sometimes apply so-called “semisubstantive” doctrines, which take account of both the challenged rule’s substance and the process that brought the rule into effect. Consider the following examples:

1. In *Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett*,\(^9\) the Court overturned Congress’s effort to invoke Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity with regard to money-damages claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In doing so, however, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that such an abrogation could take place. Instead, it found that Congress had not “documented” constitutional violations that were sufficiently widespread to trigger its remedial Section 5 power.\(^10\) The implication of the Court’s analysis was clear: If Congress could and did provide proper documentation, a new law that exactly replicated the one struck down in Garrett would survive constitutional attack.\(^11\)

2. In *City of Indianapolis v. Edmond*,\(^12\) the Supreme Court invalidated a municipal program under which all passing vehicles were stopped at fixed police checkpoints in an effort to thwart illegal drug use. In distinguishing earlier

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\(^10\)Id. at 372.


\(^12\)531 U.S. 32 (2000).
Fourth Amendment authorities that upheld similar “special needs” searches, the Court deemed it determinative that local lawmakers’ “primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Again, the implication of the Court’s reasoning was clear: If the city reinstituted an identical checkpoint program, but did so for the proper purpose of getting dangerous drug-using drivers off the road, it would seem that the new program would pass constitutional muster. Indeed, the majority in *Edmond* acknowledged that “a program impelled by licit purposes is permitted, even though the challenged conduct may be outwardly similar.”

3. In *Quill Corp. v. North Dakota*, the Court considered whether a state could constitutionally extend sales-tax collection obligations to “a vendor whose only contacts with [it] are by mail or common carrier.” The Court overturned the challenged program, but was careful to base its ruling on the dormant Commerce Clause, and not the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The upshot was that the Court’s ruling—like all dormant Commerce Clause rulings—became reversible by way of ordinary congressional legislation, so that joint action by state and federal lawmakers could reinstate exactly the same rule the Court had just struck down. Indeed, the Court trumpeted:

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13 Id. at 37.
14 Accord, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, *Programmatic Purpose, Subjective Intent, and Objective Intent: What is the Proper Role of “Purpose” Analysis To Measure the Reasonableness of a Search or Seizure*, 76 Miss. L.J. i, vii (2006) (“Nothing in the *Edmond* Court’s analysis would prevent Indianapolis from simply re-labeling its program and conducting the same screening for drugs.”).
15 *Edmond*, 531 U.S. at 47. See also id. at 37 (distinguishing early ruling that upheld fixed checkpoints in *Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz*, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), on the ground that that program “aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road”); id. at 47 n.2 (“[W]e need not decide whether the State may establish a checkpoint program with the primary purpose of checking . . . driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics.”); id. at 55-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]f the Indianapolis police had assigned a different purpose to their activity here, but in no way changed what was done on the ground to individual motorists, it might well be valid.”).
17 Id. at 311.
18 Id. at 318.
this feature of its work, proclaiming that “Congress is now free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”

In each of these cases, governmental processes had dispositive significance. None of the cases, however, involved the application of traditional procedural-due-process principles, because those principles focus on process-related requirements in the adjudicative setting. Put another way, the Court in Garrett, Edmond, and Quill did not direct attention to the processes by which discrete disputes were resolved; instead, it directed attention to the processes by which lawmakers promulgated rules of broad application because the substance of those rules raised a constitutional red flag. As a consequence, in each of these cases, the Court made only a provisional move. By focusing on the process that led to the law’s enactment, the Court signaled that exactly the same law or practice that the Court had found objectionable would survive constitutional attack if political authorities, in a second go-round, avoided the initial process error. Congress might make the findings deemed essential in Garrett; after Edmond, the City Council might reinstitute drug checkpoints by acting without an impermissible motive; and Congress might bless state efforts to impose the same nexus-stretching taxing scheme deemed unlawful in Quill. In short, process mattered no less than substance in these cases, which is why they involved “semisubstantive,” rather than fully substantive, doctrines of constitutional law.

Semisubstantive rules take many forms. Indeed, in earlier work I have catalogued nine separate semisubstantive techniques, each of which has given rise to multiple sub-doctrines. All of these rules share a democracy-

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20 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.

21 This type of review has received many names, such as “structural due process,” Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); “due process of lawmaking,” Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); and “Type III judicial review,” Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term – Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80 (1991). I prefer “semisubstantive review” because (1) it directs attention to the substantive constitutional constraints that such review implicates, and (2) other labels—particularly incorporating the term “due process”—improperly imply that this form of review derives exclusively or primarily from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. But see infra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.

22 The doctrinal categories are: (1) rules of clarity; (2) form-based deliberation rules; (3) proper-findings-and-study rules; (4) representation-reinforcing structural rules; (5) time-driven second-look rules; (6) thoughtful-treatment-of-the-area rules; (7) constitutional common-law and common-law-like rules; (8) proper-purpose rules; and (9) constitutional “who” rules. See generally Coenen, supra note 7, at 1587-1805 (providing descriptions and examples of each form).
forcing, dialogic quality. In essence, non-judicial authorities can dodge the constitutional trap if, but only if, they act in a way that gives focused attention to the important constitutional values raised by the challenged practice.

To be sure, semisubstantive rules do not stand alone in constitutional law because non-semisubstantive “hard and fast” rules continue to apply in many settings. In addition, semisubstantive review does not rear its head every time parties present constitutional claims; instead, it tends to surface only when particularly significant constitutional values are at play. None of this changes the fact, however, that semisubstantive review has deep roots and broad effects within American law.

Given the pervasiveness of semisubstantive decisionmaking, a simple question suggests itself: Is this form of judicial intervention legitimate and advisable? No thorough treatment of this issue now exists, although commentators have raised many questions about this style of review.

23See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 82 (1996) (noting that semisubstantive doctrines can “require[] state officials to set out criteria on their own and . . . in that way [be] democracy-forcing”; adding that these rules are “intended to catalyze and improve, rather than to preempt, democratic processes”). It is important to recognize that semisubstantive review involves only one of several ways in which courts involve other arms of government in the elaboration of constitutional law. For a helpful review of different dialogic approaches, see Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential Theories of Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2006). For a brief effort to locate semisubstantive decisionmaking in the broader context of constitutional law in general and dialogic techniques in particular see Coenen, supra note 7, at 1579-81.

24See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1834; see also supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (discussing school-prayer, race-segregation, and abortion cases).

25See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1586. Some commentators have argued for a more across-the-board approach, at least with respect to certain forms of semisubstantive doctrines. For a recent proposal that would render findings-and-study rules applicable to all federal legislation (not just legislation that raises particularly significant constitutional problems), see Victor Goldfeld, Note, Ensuring Minimal Deliberation Through Judicial Review of Congressional Processes, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 367 (2004). For an argument that all judicial rulings of constitutional law should be reversible by ordinary legislation, see Kenneth Ward, Legislative Overrides as a Check on Judicial Review (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For one effort to build on the use of semisubstantive review in a particular doctrinal context, see David D. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1292-99 (2002) (advocating that courts “search for ways” to develop Constitution-based rules of criminal procedure that “minimize the dangers of intruding into decisions normally left to the political branches,” including through use of rules “reversible” by the political branches,” id. at 1293-94).

26This style of decisionmaking also pervades constitutional law on the international stage. In Great Britain, Canada, and New Zealand, for example, “legislatures [possess] the power to have the final word on what the law is,” following judicial determinations of unconstitutionality. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 746 (2001). See generally id. at 742-56.
During the 1980s, for example, Professor Tushnet voiced doubts about the semisubstantive methodology. His comments, however, focused on worries that this style of decisionmaking might emerge as a grand theory of constitutional law—a role for such decisionmaking neither claimed by the Court nor advocated in this article. Other treatments have aimed at smaller targets. Professors Frickey and Smith have suggested, for example, that the sort of findings-related intervention exemplified by Garrett reflects an inattentiveness to the practical operation of a 535-member, two-house, committee-driven, logrolling-oriented Congress. These texts and others illuminate particular pathways for challenging semisubstantive decisionmaking. None of them, however, provides anything that approaches a comprehensive catalogue of problems, much less a systematic set of responses.

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[27] Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue 201-13 (1988). Professor Tushnet argued that semisubstantive review is “beset by several difficulties.” Id. at 206. He further noted that “proponents of structural review have failed to confine the Court’s discretion both in deciding when to invoke structural review and in deciding when its requirements are satisfied.” Id. at 208. He finally concluded that “[s]tructural review may fail as a theory.” Id. at 213. In the text, I specifically reference Professor Tushnet’s work “[d]uring the 1980s,” because in later years he seems to have seen greater value in judicial use of these doctrines. See Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1871, 1872 (2001) (“Normatively, a combination of full democratic choice coupled with subconstitutional doctrines to ensure that such choice is informed, carefully made, and the like, might be more attractive than a system in which democratic choice is limited substantively by courts.”).

[28] See supra note 27.

[29] Over the years, some commentators have endorsed politically reversible judicial review as a general theory, at least in specified fields, such as substantive due process. See generally Calabresi, supra note 21; Daniel O. Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Judicial Finality, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 9 (1985); Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1162 (1977). See also Ward, supra note 25, at 1 (advocating an approach to judicial review that would “allow Congress and the President to override judicial precedent by ordinary legislation”).

[30] See Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1755 (2002) (finding that the Court’s approach “lacks an adequate conceptualization of legislative actors, has an excessively narrow definition of the legislative record, and appears to reflect an inaccurate view of deliberation and the legislative process”). Other commentators have criticized findings-based rulings as well. See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 328, 331 (2001) (stating that the Court’s approach “is fundamentally ill-advised”); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 90-91 (2001) (asserting that Court’s approach “demonstrates judicial suspicion of congressional motives” and has “no support in precedent or in constitutional text or structure”); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 80 (2001) (“[Court’s] record requirement could not reasonably have been anticipated at the moment of legislative deliberation.”). See also Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 412-20 (describing objections to court-imposed “legislative due process” rules).
This article offers a wide-ranging evaluation of the integrity and wisdom of semisubstantive rules. In Part I, I document the nature and scope of this style of decisionmaking, including by offering a typology of semisubstantive doctrines built around so-called “how,” “why,” “when,” and “who” rules. In Part II, I turn to the merits of the semisubstantive methodology by evaluating ten separate critiques. Although most of these challenges have force, I conclude that none of them justifies abandonment of this style of constitutional decisionmaking. There is much to be said, both pro and con, about the merits of semisubstantive review. In the end, however, I conclude that nonexclusive use of these rules provides a valuable mechanism for promoting interbranch and federal-state dialogue while giving substantive constitutional values their due.\footnote{For a truncated enumeration of arguments for semisubstantive review, see Coenen, supra note 7, at 1834-45.}

I. THE FORMS OF SEMISUBSTANTIVE REVIEW

The Supreme Court has never sought to catalogue the many sorts of semisubstantive rules that it uses in constitutional cases. Close analysis reveals, however, that these rules may be gathered into groupings that reflect the how, why, when, and who of the lawmaking process.

“How” rules, such as the rule of Garrett, evaluate the manner in which a law came into being, including by looking at whether the lawmaking body made a focused assessment of the constitutional issues at stake. “Why” rules, such as the Fourth Amendment doctrine of Edmond, consider whether an impermissible motive tainted the lawmaking process. “When” rules focus on the impact of time in assessing constitutionality; in particular, an encounter with a law promulgated long ago may lead judges to force a legislative reappraisal in the absence of recent efforts at repeal or reform. “Who” rules focus on whether the best decisionmaker—a nationally minded Congress, rather than a locally minded state legislature, as in Quill, for example—has signed off on the challenged practice. Judicial use of each of these doctrines leaves the door open for the political branches to put in place legal rules that would not satisfy the courts if enacted by way of ordinary lawmaking processes.

A. Constitutional “How” Rules

“How” rules do not deem determinative the “what” of a challenged law—that is, the content of the law’s substantive restriction. Rather, they focus on how the law came to be. As a result, as with other semisubstantive doctrines, when a court invalidates a law (or deems it inapplicable to the
situation at hand) by using a constitutional “how” rule, the legislature remains free to readopt it (or render it applicable to the situation at hand) if it corrects judicially identified shortcomings in the lawmaking process.\(^{32}\)

How-based review often entails judicial use of constitutionally inspired “clear statement” rules,\(^{33}\) as illustrated by *Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers*.\(^{34}\) There, the Court considered whether the Army Corps of Engineers had acted properly when it blocked the filling of a local rain-collecting sand and gravel pit.\(^{35}\) In taking this action, the Corps relied on its “Migratory Bird Rule,” which in essence required federal approval to tamper with any body of water frequented by migrating ducks and geese.\(^{36}\) The landowners’ challenge raised two questions: (1) whether the Corps had exceeded its statutory authority under the Clean Water Act to regulate “waters of the United States” by interpreting the Act to cover “isolated, intrastate” ponds and (2) whether Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to grant the agency this scope of regulatory jurisdiction.\(^{37}\)

The Court determined that the Corps’ view of its authority reached too far as a matter of statutory law, thereby avoiding the constitutional question.\(^{38}\) In steering this course, the Court relied on the principle that “[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”\(^{39}\) The Court also cited a second clear-statement rule that focused on the constitutional importance of state autonomy. According to the Court, judicial concerns are “heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power.”\(^{40}\) Because “[p]ermitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats . . . would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use”\(^{41}\)—and because Congress had not expressed a “clear” desire “to

\(^{32}\) See Coenen, *supra* note 11, at 1287 (describing constitutional “how” rules).

\(^{33}\) See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, Elizabeth Garrett, *Legislation and Statutory Interpretation* 355-82 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing substantive canons, including those that “correlate with basic values embedded in the Constitution,” *id.* at 357; considering in detail preference for avoiding serious constitutional questions, as well as federalism-driven canons, some of which seem designed to ensure that “Congress . . . deliberate carefully about . . . intrusions upon core state functions”).

\(^{34}\) 531 U.S. 159 (2001).

\(^{35}\) *Id.* at 162.

\(^{36}\) *Id.* at 163-65.

\(^{37}\) *Id.* at 163-66, 169.

\(^{38}\) *Id.* at 162.

\(^{39}\) *Id.* at 172.

\(^{40}\) *Id.* at 173.

\(^{41}\) *Id.* at 174.
readjust the federal-state balance in this manner”—the Court overturned the Corps’ federal licensing scheme.\textsuperscript{42}

In relying on Congress’s lack of clarity with regard to authorizing the Migratory Bird Rule, the Court protected the constitutional value of federalism. At the same time, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that Congress could reinstate the rule, so long as it abided by the Court’s how-based mandate that it speak in unambiguous terms. In this way, the Court protected an important substantive constitutional value while permitting Congress to continue to explore justifiability of this form of federal regulation.

A different sort of “how” rule proved decisive in \textit{Thompson v. Oklahoma}.\textsuperscript{43} That case presented the question whether the execution of murderers who were younger than sixteen at the time of the offense violated the Eighth Amendment.\textsuperscript{44} Three members of the Court, led by Justice Scalia, concluded that no constitutional rule barred the death sentence in these circumstances, in part because many states had long authorized the practice.\textsuperscript{45} Four members of the Court, led by Justice Stevens, reasoned that “evolving standards of decency” rendered this sort of state action unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{46} Justice O’Connor supplied the decisive vote to block the execution by relying on a how-based semisubstantive rationale.\textsuperscript{47}

Accepting the premise of Justice Stevens’s approach, Justice O’Connor first noted that an emerging national consensus might preclude the execution of Thompson and others like him.\textsuperscript{48} Unsatisfied with the evidence on that point,\textsuperscript{49} however, she took an admittedly “unusual” approach to the case.\textsuperscript{50} Justice O’Connor emphasized that the Oklahoma legislature had never directly approved the execution of juvenile offenders in a focused way.\textsuperscript{51} Instead, the defendant was death-eligible because of the joint operation of two separate provisions—one that authorized the death penalty for adult offenders, and another that permitted trying juvenile offenders as adults for a variety of crimes.\textsuperscript{52} In Justice O’Connor’s view, imposing the death sentence in these circumstances offended the Court’s “important and

\textsuperscript{42}Id. at 172, 174.  
\textsuperscript{43}487 U.S. 815 (1988).  
\textsuperscript{44}Id. at 818-19.  
\textsuperscript{45}Id. at 859-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
\textsuperscript{46}Id. at 821 (plurality opinion).  
\textsuperscript{47}Id. at 848-59 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did not participate in the Thompson decision.  
\textsuperscript{48}Id. at 848-49.  
\textsuperscript{49}Id. at 849.  
\textsuperscript{50}Id. at 858.  
\textsuperscript{51}Id. at 857.  
\textsuperscript{52}Id.
consistent” demand “for special care and deliberation in decisions that may lead to the imposition of that sanction.”

As she explained:

Because it proceeded in this manner, there is a considerable risk that the Oklahoma Legislature either did not realize that its actions would have the effect of rendering 15-year-old defendants death eligible or did not give the question the serious consideration that would have been reflected in the explicit choice of some minimum age for death eligibility.

Put another way, the state could not impose a death sentence in Thompson because its legislature had not acted with sufficient particularity and care. For Justice O’Connor (herself a former state senator), how the legislature had proceeded was determinative, regardless of whether the execution of youthful murderers was substantively prohibited by the Eighth Amendment in a hard-and-fast way.

Justice Scalia rejected this rationale in no-nonsense terms. He observed that he knew of “no authority whatsoever for our specifying the precise form that state legislation must take, as opposed to its constitutionally required content.” In his view, Justice O’Connor’s “brand new principle” was a “loose cannon” that struck at the heart of state sovereignty. But Justice Scalia’s critique fell on deaf ears; Justice O’Connor’s semisubstantive methodology in fact provided the key fifth vote for overturning Thompson’s death sentence.

As illustrated by Garrett, some “how” rules target statutes put in place without adequate findings or study. In United States v. Lopez, for example, the Court invalidated a federal ban on gun possession near schools on the ground that it reached beyond Congress’s commerce power. In doing so, the Court noted that the legislative record contained no explanation of the connection between this form of gun possession and the operation of interstate markets. The Court acknowledged that “Congress

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53Id. at 856.
54Id. at 857.
56Thompson, 487 U.S. at 876 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57Id. at 877.
59Id. at 551-52.
60Id. at 551.
normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. Yet it also observed that “we of course consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding effect on interstate commerce.” Applying these principles, the Court declared: “[T]o the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.”

Some findings-or-study rules involve individual rights, rather than federal powers. In Reno v. ACLU, for example, the Court considered whether the Communications Decency Act’s broad restriction on “indecent” Internet speech ran afoul of the First Amendment. The Court’s analysis focused on whether this prohibition was “carefully tailored” with respect to the goal of protecting minors in light of the possible adequacy of less restrictive regulatory approaches. In the end, the Court found a First Amendment violation, emphasizing that “[p]articularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the Congress, or even hearings

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61 Id. at 562.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 563. Building on Lopez, many lower court judges deemed the presence or absence of findings decisive in assessing commerce-power cases. See, e.g., United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 292 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (voting to invalidate federal ban on machine gun possession as exceeding Congress’s commerce power; noting, however, that “I would view this case differently if Congress as a whole or even one of the responsible congressional committees had made a finding that intrastate machine gun possession, by facilitating the commission of certain crimes, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997). See also id. at 279 (majority opinion) (reasoning that “unlike the situation in Lopez, there are legislative findings,” although made in connection with earlier firearms legislation). In its post-Lopez decision in United States v. Morrison, a five-Justice majority of the Court invalidated a law that created a federal action for sex-based violence notwithstanding the existence of extrusive congressional findings that such action, in the aggregate, substantially harms interstate commerce. 529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 614 (2000). The four dissenters sought to distinguish Lopez on precisely this ground. Id. at 628-29 (Souter, J., dissenting). And the majority itself did not foreclose the possibility that congressional findings might prove important in other commerce-power cases, particularly cases not involving violent crime. As the Court noted, “the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.” Id. at 614 (emphasis added). The majority also declined to “adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity” for analysis under the affecting-commerce prong of the commerce-power, id. at 613, thereby giving the Court “room to give weight to the presence or absence of legislative findings in some future commerce power cases.” Coenen, supra note 11, at 1322.

64 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
65 Id. at 879.
66 Id. at 871.
addressing the special problems of the CDA, we are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all.\textsuperscript{67} This First Amendment findings-or-study rule does not stand alone. In an earlier decision invalidating a broad “dial-a-porn” prohibition, the Court likewise reasoned that “the congressional record contains no legislative findings that would justify us in concluding that there is no constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total ban, to achieve the Government’s interest in protecting minors.”\textsuperscript{68}

Two other constitutional “how” rules sometimes make an appearance. On occasion, courts apply constitutionally inspired rules that are legislatively reversible because of their “common-law-like” nature. By way of example, rules that limit what instructions and inquiries judges may pose to deadlocked criminal juries appear to meet this description.\textsuperscript{69} In other cases, courts deploy so-called “form-based rules.”\textsuperscript{70} In applying the dormant Commerce Clause, for example, the Court has routinely invalidated tax breaks that favor local businesses without questioning the constitutionality of affirmative subsidies that have identical economic effects.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{67}Id. at 879.
\textsuperscript{68}Sable Commc’ns of Ca., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989). Something like the flipside of this reasoning played a role in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in \textit{Ashcroft v. ACLU}, 535 U.S. 564, 591 (2002) (\textit{Ashcroft I}). There, four members of the Court voted to uphold more limited internet-pornography legislation passed in the wake of \textit{Reno}. \textit{Id}. at 566. In his critical, fifth-vote concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy observed: Congress and the President were aware of our decision, and we should assume that in seeking to comply with it they have given careful consideration to the constitutionality of the new enactment. For these reasons, even if this facial challenge appears to have considerable merit, the Judiciary must proceed with caution and identify overbreadth with care before invalidating the Act.

\textit{Id}. at 591-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Notwithstanding its rejection of an overbreadth challenge in \textit{Ashcroft I}, the Court later, in \textit{Ashcroft v. ACLU}, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (\textit{Ashcroft II}), upheld a District Court’s preliminary injunction of the Act based on findings that a less restrictive alternative, in the form of parental installation of filtering software, remained available. In dissent, Justice Breyer asked pointedly: “[W]hat has happened to the ‘constructive discourse between our courts and our legislatures’ that ‘is an integral and admirable part of the constitutional design’?” \textit{Id}. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting \textit{Blakely v. Washington}, 542 U.S. 296, 326 (2004)). As Justice Breyer elaborated, “Congress read \textit{Reno} with care. It dedicated itself to the task of drafting a statute that would meet each and every criticism of the predecessor statute that this Court set forth in \textit{Reno} . . . . What else was Congress supposed to do?” \textit{Id}. at 690.

\textsuperscript{69}See Coenen, \textit{supra} note 7, at 1738 (discussing cases).
\textsuperscript{70}Id. at 1642. \textit{See generally id}. at 1640-55.
\textsuperscript{71}For some additional rules of this nature, see \textit{Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation}, 546 U.S. 95, 109-114 (2005) (holding that application of rules designed to protect sovereignty of Native American tribes hinges on whether “legal incidence” of state sales-
breaks and subsidies has its roots in semisubstantive reasoning. As one court has explained, because an outright subsidy “involves the direct transfer of public monies,” it is “subject to heightened political visibility” and resulting incentives for care when the legislature acts.  

B. Constitutional “Why” Rules

Many doctrines of constitutional law focus on the purpose with which the lawgiver acted. In Washington v. Davis, for example, the Court held that even facially neutral laws will trigger heightened scrutiny if they are adopted with the purpose of disadvantaging a racial minority or other protected group. In similar fashion, the Establishment Clause mandates invalidation of laws enacted with a sectarian motive. As illustrated by Edmond, the Fourth Amendment has spawned its own semisubstantive “why” rule. Still other motive-centered doctrines lurk in the Court’s free speech, free exercise, dormant Commerce Clause, and Bill of Attainder cases, as well as in other constitutional fields.

Rules of this kind are semisubstantive in nature for a simple reason: Their logic dictates that exactly the same law will or will not be constitutional depending on the mental process that led to its adoption. Hunter v. Underwood illustrates the point. There, the Court encountered

related fuel tax, as revealed by statutory phrasing, falls on off-reservation distribution, rather than on-reservation purchases, and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 460 (1995) (“[I]f a State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the impost is on Indians or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to amend its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence.”).

72 Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 901 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (M.D. La. 1995). Another sort of “how” rule is the “thoughtful treatment of the area” rule. Coenen, supra note 7, at 1727-34 (discussing thoughtful-treatment rules with regard to death-penalty, speech-licensing, vagueness, and punitive-damages law). For one example, see Sklansky, supra note 25, at 1275 (noting that “[i]n a few limited areas, the court has indicated that searches and seizures may satisfy the Fourth Amendment in part because they are carried out pursuant to formal regulations”; discussing inventory and administrative searches as examples).


74 Id. at 242.


76 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.

77 See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1759-61.

78 See id. at 1761 & nn.786 & 788.


an Alabama law that disenfranchised any person who had committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court struck down this facially neutral exclusion on equal protection grounds because it had been promulgated with the purpose of keeping African-Americans off the voting rolls. In invalidating the measure, however, the Court was careful to leave open the question “whether [it] would be valid if enacted today without any impermissible motivation.” The Court thus shifted the “burden of inertia” back to state lawmakers who might try to put the provision back in place, but only if they could do so in a process purged of racial bias.

C. Constitutional “When” Rules

Thoughtful commentators have raised the question whether courts, at least sometimes, should force legislatures to reconsider long-surviving statutes that appear to have outlived their usefulness. More particularly, if old statutes implicate particularly significant constitutional concerns, courts might invoke semisubstantive “when” rules to force a legislative reappraisal. Are courts open to using this technique? Some cases suggest they may be.

In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court confronted a state ban on contraceptive use, which had been adopted in 1879 based in part on the view that nonreproductive sexual intercourse is morally wrong. This potential justification for the law was brushed aside by the Court in Griswold because (according to Justice White’s concurrence) counsel in the case offered “no serious contention that Connecticut thinks the use of . . . contraception immoral.” This mode of analysis raises an obvious question: What if, following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Connecticut statute, state legislators re-enacted the same law and specifically relied on the immorality of nonprocreative sex? In effect, by dismissing this justification as out-of-date, the Court left open the possibility that the state could reinstate the statute and defend it on this previously unconsidered ground. Put another way, the Court invited the legislature to revive an old justification for an old statute.

81 Id. at 223.
82 Id. at 233.
83 Id.
84 See infra notes 279-280 and accompanying text.
85 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 135 (1999) (“[I]t is possible that a code can become so out of phase with everything else in the law that a forced legislative reconsideration becomes appropriate.”).
86 See generally Coenen, supra note 7, at 1698-1726.
87 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88 See Tribe, supra note 21, at 298-303 (discussing this aspect of Griswold).
89 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring).
statute, but only if a new legislature in new conditions concluded that the justification had merit.\textsuperscript{90}

Related to this type of no-longer-advanced-justification reasoning is the “concept of desuetude,”\textsuperscript{91} which courts sometimes use to invalidate laws that have generated few prosecutions over an extended period of time.\textsuperscript{92} This doctrine has not taken firm hold in American jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{93} Professor Sunstein has suggested, however, that it provides the best way to view the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the state sodomy ban at issue in \textit{Lawrence v. Texas}.\textsuperscript{94} As he put the point in discussing the interpretive philosophy he describes as “minimalism”:

Minimalists insist that the real problem in \textit{Lawrence}, and in many other cases involving sexual privacy, was \textit{procedural}. In the last decades, sodomy prosecutions have been rare and unpredictable, simply because the public would not stand for many of them. Emphasizing this point, minimalists contend that \textit{Lawrence}, and many of the Court’s privacy decisions, should be understood as an American variation on the old English idea of \textit{desuetude}. According to that idea, laws lapse, and can no longer be enforced, when their enforcement has already become exceedingly rare because the principle behind them has become hopelessly out of step with people’s convictions.\textsuperscript{95}

As Professor Bickel explained many years earlier, the effect of a ruling based on the doctrine of desuetude is not to foreclose democratic action. Rather, it is to “turn the thrust of forces favoring and opposing the present objective of the statute toward the legislature, where the power of at least initial decision properly belongs in our system.”\textsuperscript{96} In other words, popular

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{90}For another case of this sort, see \textit{Cleveland Board Of Education v. LaFleur}, 414 U.S. 632, 641 n.9 (1974) (invalidating ban on teaching by women who were more than four months pregnant where the rule’s defenders did not contend that its original purpose of shielding schoolchildren from visibly pregnant women could support the challenged policy in the present day).
\item \textsuperscript{91}\textit{Bickel, supra} note 8, at 148 (1962).
\item \textsuperscript{92}See generally Coenen, \textit{supra} note 7, at 1704-08.
\item \textsuperscript{94}539 U.S. 558 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{95}CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES, WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 97 (2005). See also Sunstein, \textit{supra} note 23, at 68 (asserting that Court’s earlier sodomy case, \textit{Bowers v. Hardwick}, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), “should have been decided...the other way and very narrowly—as a case involving the old and nicely minimalist idea, with democratic foundations, of desuetude”).
\item \textsuperscript{96}\textit{Bickel, supra} note 8, at 148.
\end{itemize}
forces—if strong enough—can breathe new life into an old provision by pushing political authorities to return it to active duty.97

“When” rules—like “what” and “how” rules—protect fundamental constitutional values because they result in the invalidation of constitutionally troublesome laws. At the same time, this form of invalidation invites a legislative reprise so long as lawmakers act with care. In voting to strike down New York’s ban on assisted suicide, for example, Judge Calabresi took precisely this approach. He began by explaining that “[t]he statutes at issue were born in another age” and that “the bases of [them] have been deeply eroded over the last hundred and fifty years.”98 For these reasons, he declared that the assisted-suicide ban could not continue to operate. At the same time, he chose to “leave open the question of whether, if the state of New York were to enact new laws prohibiting assisted suicide (laws that either are less absolute in their application or are identical to those before us), such laws would stand or fall.”99

The Supreme Court ultimately upheld assisted suicide restrictions, with its principal decision coming in a case from Washington State.100 Even as the Court sustained the Washington statute, however, it made a nod in the direction of constitutional “when” rules. In particular, the Court emphasized that “[t]hough deeply rooted, the States’ assisted suicide bans have in recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed.”101 The Court also catalogued recent developments in Washington itself, noting the state’s focused reevaluation of its assisted suicide ban in 1975 and its considered exclusion of the practice from actions authorized by the state’s Natural Death Act twenty years later.102 Given these elements of the Court’s reasoning, the question arises whether it would have jettisoned the Washington law had no such recent reappraisals occurred. There is no way to know the answer to this question. Were the Court to give these matters decisive weight, however, it would be applying a semisubstantive “when” rule.103

97A related time-tied style of judicial intervention is illustrated by the Court’s death penalty decisions. In particular, when the Court invalidated every death penalty statute in the nation in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), it did so in light of “evolving standards of decency” as required by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). This result, however, triggered a widespread re-examination of the death penalty, culminating in its reenactment in many states and the Court’s upholding of that action in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
99Id. at 735.
101Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
102Id. at 716-17.
103For a twist on the typical application of “when” rules, see generally Nickolai G. Levin,
D. Constitutional “Who” Rules

Finally, there are constitutional “who” rules, which steer policy choices from one nonjudicial decisionmaker to another. Quill and other dormant Commerce Clause cases illustrate this approach by requiring congressional—rather than merely state—endorsement of laws that threaten the free flow of interstate and international commerce. Another leading who-rule case is Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong. There, the Court invalidated a ban on government employment of resident aliens that had been promulgated by the Federal Civil Service Commission. In the course of its decision, the Court first identified the interests advanced in support of the prohibition, which included maximizing the President’s power in treaty negotiations and encouraging aliens to become American citizens. According to the Court, these interests might have supported the rule had it come from Congress or the President. The Civil Service Commission, however, was not the proper body to assess these considerations because it had no responsibility for foreign affairs or naturalization policies. Put more bluntly, given the important equal protection values at stake in the case, the Court concluded that the Commission was not a proper “who” for the purpose of promulgating the hiring ban.

Justice Powell’s decisive opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke brought a similar style of analysis to bear. In voting to strike down a state medical school’s affirmative-action admissions program, he reasoned in part that non-judicial efforts aimed at remedying

Constitutional Statutory Synthesis, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 1281 (2003) (arguing that applications of statutes should change as constitutional doctrine changes, without necessitating judicial negation of such statutes).

See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.


Id. at 116-17.

Id. at 104.

Id. at 105.

Id. at 114.

Id. “Who” rules sometimes come to the fore in joint operation with other semisubstantive doctrines. In Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for example, the Court noted its view that an administrative interpretation of a statute that comes too close to the outer bounds of congressional power would require a clear indication from Congress that such a result was intended. 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2000). See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text. Although the Court in Solid Waste Agency thus protected federalism values by relying on a clear-statement “how” rule, it did so in a way that effectively shifted policymaking authority from one set of decisionmakers (that is, an executive agency) to another (that is, Congress).

past constitutional wrongs should come from broadly accountable state authorities, rather than “isolated” university officials.\textsuperscript{112} This result made sense, according to Justice Powell, because university officials have responsibility for “education, not the formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality.”\textsuperscript{113} In his view, “isolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria.”\textsuperscript{114}

As \textit{Mow Sun Wong} and \textit{Bakke} show, “who” rules differ from other semisubstantive doctrines because they do not result in a remand to the same decisionmaker who propounded the suspect policy in the first place. Instead, they channel authority to a different set of decisionmakers who are perceived to be more deliberative, more competent, or more accountable. As with other semisubstantive doctrines, however, “who” rules permit political actors to put back in place the identical rule that the Court has struck down. Indeed, with little delay, President Ford reinstated by executive order the very same alien hiring ban that the Court had invalidated in \textit{Mow Sun Wong}.\textsuperscript{115} Subsequent judicial decisions upholding this action powerfully illustrate the self-limiting and dialogic nature of semisubstantive constitutional doctrines.\textsuperscript{116}

\section*{II. The Merits of Semisubstantive Rules}

Legal analysts have not systematically examined the legitimacy and wisdom of semisubstantive rules. Some judicial opinions—such as Justice Scalia’s dissent in \textit{Thompson}—suggest lines of criticism,\textsuperscript{117} and academic commentators have raised many challenges as well.\textsuperscript{118} Different observers are sure to characterize available critiques in different ways. According to my count, however, there are ten key assertions: (1) there is no legitimate constitutional source for semisubstantive rules; (2) at the least, these rules are at odds with an “originalist” methodology; (3) these rules are not confinable because they lack a limiting principle; (4) semisubstantive rules threaten legislative processes in a manner inconsistent with the separation of powers and our legal traditions; (5) such rules encourage judicial overreaching by giving a false impression of judicial restraint; (6) these

\textsuperscript{112}Id. at 309.
\textsuperscript{113}Id.
\textsuperscript{114}Id.
\textsuperscript{116}See, e.g., \textit{Mow Sun Wong} v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 1980); \textit{Vergara} v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1978).
\textsuperscript{117}See supra notes 45, 56-57 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{118}See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
rules invite judicial corruption of otherwise useful restraints like the vagueness doctrine; (7) the employment of semisubstantive rules is inherently futile; (8) the use of these rules risks underenforcement of constitutional norms; (9) semisubstantive rules reflect unrealistic assumptions about political processes; and (10) semisubstantive rules, in any event, lack a proper precedential pedigree.

In the pages that follow, I elaborate and evaluate each of these lines of challenge. The task is large, and much must go unsaid. In particular, semisubstantive doctrines differ from one another in important ways, and this treatment focuses on relevant differences only in some respects. Even so, what is said here supports the case that courts should continue to use a wide range of semisubstantive safeguards as one vehicle for vindicating substantive constitutional protections.

I turn now to the ten critiques.

A. Argument 1 (Illegitimacy): Semisubstantive rules are illegitimate because they lack a proper source in constitutional text or accepted postulates of constitutional decisionmaking.

Among the many questions raised about semisubstantive rules, the most fundamental is the first. The question is: Where do these rules come from? The answer is almost tautological: Semisubstantive safeguards emanate from those substantive rights that they seek to safeguard in semisubstantive ways. There is, of course, no “semisubstantive rules” clause in the Constitution, although there are Due Process Clauses that might serve to justify use of these process-centered doctrines. Some cases, 

\[119\] In an earlier article, I identified most of these critiques in an abbreviated form. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1845-50. In a responsive essay, Professor Tushnet observed that “a more complete understanding of [these] doctrines will require us to grapple with . . . objections that Professor Coenen mentions largely in passing.” Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2001). Professor Tushnet was right. Hence, this article. 

\[120\] I note, however, that those respects are significant. In particular, I give focused attention to both constitutional “who” rules and semisubstantive findings-and-study rules in assessing Argument #9. See infra notes 295-324 and accompanying text. It also bears emphasis that some semisubstantive doctrines cut across different substantive areas of constitutional law. Legislative findings rules, for example, have surfaced in cases involving the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the commerce power, and the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1718-27. It is always open to argument whether such rules should apply in some substantive contexts, but not in others. 

\[121\] It bears emphasis, in this regard, that the courts have invalidated many legislative acts on the ground that those acts do not comport with so-called “substantive due process.” See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992) (”[I]t is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of
however, raise questions about the due-process rationale and—even more important—there is no need to travel the due-process route. The reason why is simple: the substantive rights at issue in constitutional cases adequately justify application of semisubstantive constitutional rules.

In all of the cases we have looked at, this connection is self-evident. *Reno v. ACLU* is a free speech case; *Griswold* concerns the right of privacy; *Bakke* involves equal protection; and so on. There is no express reference to semisubstantive rules in the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. But so what? There is nothing in the language of those amendments about such settled constitutional concepts as “public forums,” multi-factor or “total deprivation” regulatory-takings review, or “suspect classifications” and differing tiers of judicial scrutiny. The fact is that the terse texts of the Constitution must be—and thus have been—elaborated through the development of subsidiary doctrines built on the deeper values that underlie those texts. Many of these doctrines have a

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“prophylactic” quality in the sense that they protect potentially underenforced constitutional values in a practical way.\textsuperscript{130} So it is with semisubstantive rules.

Consider the basic notion of “heightened scrutiny” that pervades First Amendment, right-to-privacy, and both classification-based and fundamental-rights equal protection jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{131} The Constitution itself nowhere refers to heightened scrutiny. Given the settled recognition of this style of review, however, the Supreme Court has had no choice but to develop sensible sub-rules to give the notion meaning and effect. As a result, the Court has created rubrics—focusing on such matters as “important” or “compelling” government interests, “less restrictive alternatives,” and “narrowly tailored” laws—that accommodate constitutional doctrine to underlying policy and institutional concerns.\textsuperscript{132} In turn, the Court must give content to these sub-rules, and there is no apparent reason why that content may not take the form of semisubstantive doctrines. If the Court insists, for example, that legislative means must be “carefully tailored” to take account of legislative ends,\textsuperscript{133} there is no reason why courts must measure carefulness solely by looking to substantive outcomes, without considering actual procedural carefulness itself.\textsuperscript{134} From this vantage point, rules that focus on things like legislative thoroughness, legislative purpose, and recent legislative reexaminations make good sense.

A critic of semisubstantive rules might question this logic by pointing to important features of the constitutional text. The objector could note that the Framers endorsed specialized decisionmaking processes for only certain purposes—for example, by requiring a two-thirds Senate vote to convict in an impeachment proceeding or to bring a treaty into effect.\textsuperscript{135} For the

\textsuperscript{130}See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190 (1988).


\textsuperscript{132}Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004) (noting that the Court had previously held the CDA unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), “because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest and because less restrictive alternatives were available”).

\textsuperscript{133}Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871 (1997) (questioning whether CDA had been “carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials”).

\textsuperscript{134}The rhetoric of several equal-protection cases dovetails with this conclusion. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982) (reasoning that purpose of heightened scrutiny is to foster “reasoned analysis”); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 214 (1977) (invalidating law that discriminated on the basis of sex when “nothing . . . suggests a reasoned congressional judgment” was made).

\textsuperscript{135}See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3 (impeachment); id. art. II, § 2 (treaties). See also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 380 (suggesting that Speech or Debate Clause may “preclude judicial supervision of congressional proceedings”); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 94 (“Nothing in the Constitution dictates the sources of information that legislators may consider
skeptic, these provisions create room for a negative-implication argument against semisubstantive rules. After all, if the Constitution’s text dictates the use of specialized decisionmaking structures in impeachment, treaty-ratification, and other distinctive contexts, how can courts demand the use of similarly specialized, but unenumerated, decisionmaking structures in other settings? *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*!136

The *expressio unius* argument has, at first blush, an enticing quality. On close inspection, however, it tells us precious little about semisubstantive judicial review. To begin with, the Constitution’s specialized process terms—such as its two-thirds voting requirements—concern the operation of only the national government; thus, even if the argument has merit, it provides no obstacle to identifying semisubstantive rules that apply to the states. Even more important, the *expressio unius* rule does not carry water with regard to the national government itself. To be sure, that principle would present a problem if, for example, the Court tried to say that all exercises of the commerce power must receive a two-thirds Senate vote to safeguard federalism values. The semisubstantive rules the Court has wielded in the past, however, are a distant cry from this sort of jarringly odd, strictly numerical, and obviously counter-textual would-be constitutional doctrine.

The Court, for example, has suggested that the presence of legislative studies may prove decisive in cases that present commerce-power-based regulation of highly localized, noncommercial activities.137 Such a rule of basic attentiveness is far removed from any hypothetical two-thirds Senate vote requirement. Indeed, when Congress makes no effort to tie ostensibly noncommercial, regulatory programs to the vitality of interstate commerce, there is reason to say that this manner of proceeding violates basic dictates of constitutional structure. As the lower court observed in *Lopez*:

> Courts cannot properly perform their duty to determine if there is any rational basis for a Congressional finding [of a substantial effect on interstate commerce] if neither the legislative history nor the statute itself reveals any such relevant finding. And, in such a situation there is nothing to indicate that Congress itself consciously fixed, as opposed to simply disregarded, the boundary

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136*[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.* BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 1999). See also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793 n.9 (1995) (discussing interaction of *expressio unius* principle and the Qualifications Clause).

137*See supra* notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
line between the commerce power and the reserved power of the states.138

The *expressio unius* argument is even more strained in its application to semisubstantive rules derived from the Bill of Rights. The whole point of the constitutional amendments, after all, is to alter the effect of the original Constitution. It follows that semisubstantive rules fairly derived from the Bill of Rights—such as the findings-and-study rule of *Reno v. ACLU* 139—necessarily supersede whatever inferences one might otherwise draw from Articles I through VI. At the least, the trumping effect of the amendments should not give way to attenuated inferences drawn from sources as far removed in subject matter as the Treaty and Impeachment Clauses.140

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138United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also David S. Bogen, *The Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry into the Limits of Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause*, 8 Wake Forest L. Rev. 187, 198 (1972) (anticipating and arguing for such a findings requirement “where the relationship of the law to interstate commerce is not readily apparent”; reasoning that this requirement “could assist in focusing Congressional concern on the proper issues”). Indeed, the text of the Constitution itself provides some basis for reaching the same conclusion. The law in Lopez, and others like it, after all, can be constitutional only if they are “necessary and proper for carrying into execution” the commerce power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It is not self-evident that a law—and particularly a law that bears no plain relation to commerce—constitutes a “proper” exercise of the commerce power when Congress itself has not identified the connection to commerce on which its assertion of authority purportedly rests.


140Another text-based critique of subjecting Congress to semisubstantive rules directed at federal lawmakers (or at least to some of these rules) stems from the Constitution’s injunction that “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. As Professors Bryant and Simeone have written: “The Supreme Court has long read the Rules and Journals Clauses as providing Congress broad discretion to determine how to report and record its consideration of proposed legislation.” Bryant & Simeone, *supra* note 30, at 376. See also Goldfeld, *supra* note 25, at 417 (noting, but rejecting, this argument); cf. Adrian Vermeule, *The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure*, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361, 366 (2004) (describing Rules of Proceedings Clause as “in effect, a delegation of rule-designing authority from constitutional framers in the initial period to legislators in subsequent periods”). The answer to this suggestion is that Congress’s rulemaking powers, like all of its powers, are limited by the Bill of Rights and other applicable constitutional inhibitions. What if, for example, the House issued a “Rule” for its “Proceedings” that barred speeches from the floor except when made by white, protestant males in support of policies favored by the President? This rule would be invalid because it offends constitutional inhibitions on government conduct that trump the rule-making power. By symmetry of logic, if there are constitutional inhibitions that, in specified areas, mandate semisubstantive doctrines, then those inhibitions must limit the rulemaking power as well. Just as surely as the “plenary” commerce power, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824), is hemmed in by constitutional limitations derived from outside Article I, Section 8, so too the congressional rulemaking power is hemmed in by constitutional limits that spring from sources outside Article I, Section 5.
B. Argument 2 (Counter-Originalist Nature): Semisubstantive decisionmaking contravenes an “originalist” interpretive approach.

Is judicial recognition of semisubstantive rules consistent with the specialized interpretive philosophy known as “originalism”? The proper meaning of this term, and its rightful role in constitutional discourse, are subjects well beyond the scope of this article. There is reason to believe, however, that many self-styled originalists might embrace some—if not many—semisubstantive rules.

In The Federalist No. 81, for example, Alexander Hamilton asserted that the Constitution should operate as “the standard of construction for the laws” so as to guard against the operation of “unjust and partial” enactments. These passages give support to constitutionally inspired clear-statement rules of statutory interpretation. Early decisionmaking by the Supreme Court reflects this same process-sensitive approach. Sources from the founding period thus seem to endorse one prominent form of semisubstantive constitutional decisionmaking.

The Federalist does not speak of such phenomena as findings-based review or constitutional “who” rules. It does, however, repeatedly emphasize the centrality of the values that give rise to these doctrines. For Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, a properly functioning republic did not require “an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breese of passion, or to every transient impulse” of popular majorities. To the contrary, “the republican principle” embraced by the Framers “demands . . . that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct” of government. For this reason, elected representatives were to give legislative proposals “cool and sedate reflection” so that “temporary delusion” and “momentary inclination”—including those resulting from “cabals of the representative body”—would not find their way into binding enactments. Of particular importance, the judiciary had a key role to play in “guard[ing] the constitution and the rights of individuals from . . . ill humors . . . of the people themselves . . . which, though they speedily give place to better

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142 The Federalist No. 78, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
143 See infra notes 152-154, 191, 329 and accompanying text.
146 Id. at 482-83.
147 The Federalist No. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
148 Id.
information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency in the mean
time to occasion dangerous innovations in government, and serious
oppressions of the minor party."\textsuperscript{149} The overarching message of these
materials is loud and clear:

The oftener a measure is brought under examination, the greater
the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the
less must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of
due deliberation, or of those misteps [sic] which proceed from the
contagion of some common passion or interest.\textsuperscript{150}

Some originalists might find little support for semisubstantive rules in
passages of this ilk. Their point would be that, while deliberation-
Enhancement was an aim of the Framers, there is no evidence that they
intended to promote this goal with semisubstantive judicial interventions.
This line of reasoning, however, may give too little weight to the original
understandings that courts would extrapolate rules from underlying
constitutional premises.\textsuperscript{151} In its seminal decision in \textit{McCulloch v.
Maryland},\textsuperscript{152} for example, the Court concluded that a state could not tax the
National Bank by relying on values of national autonomy “interwoven with
[the] web” of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{153} Notably, if Congress had clearly
authorized state taxation of federal banks in the wake of \textit{McCulloch}, there

\textsuperscript{149}Id.
\textsuperscript{150}The Federalist No. 73, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). Some
commentators have reflected on these passages in ways that lend support to semisubstantive
rules. In particular, such rules might well insulate legislators “from popular reaction for a
period of time sufficient to change public opinion for the better without denying the public’s
ultimate right to judge.” Sotirios A. Barber, Judicial Review and The Federalist, 55 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 836, 845 (1988). See also Milner Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities,
59 Iowa L. Rev. 1059, 1069 (1974) (describing Court’s role as largely one of “producing[an]
intermediate stop which would allow an opportunity for reason and justice to reassert
themselves”; quoting Judge Wyzanski as describing judicial review as a “device to appeal
from Philip drunk to Philip sober”). A classic treatment of the centrality of “deliberative
democracy,” including its roots in the framers’ thinking, is Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial
Constitution (1993). See id. at 21-23 (discussing connection of this outlook to The Federalist).
For an earlier effort by the author of this article to develop linkages between
semisubstantive decisionmaking and “the discernible purposes and aspirations of the
Founders themselves,” see Coenen, supra note 7, at 1867-69.
\textsuperscript{151}For an early example of this style of extrapolation-based decisionmaking, see \textit{Ex Parte Craig}, 6 F. Cas. 710, 710-11 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827) (No. 3,321) (Washington, Circuit Justice)
(rejecting governmental power to seize money from accused counterfeiter because of risk that
resulting lack of funds would interfere with the accused’s ability to exercise Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel and to secure witnesses).
\textsuperscript{152}17 U.S. 316 (1819).
\textsuperscript{153}Id. at 426.
can be little doubt that the Court would have upheld this act of federal self-
abnegation. *McCulloch* itself thus exemplifies semisubstantive decisionmaking in the form of a constitutionally inspired “common-law-
like” rule.\(^{154}\)

There is another reason to question easy assumptions that semisubstantive decisionmaking runs afoul of an originalist outlook. As Professor Sunstein has observed: “The Constitution doesn’t set out a theory of interpretation; it doesn’t announce that judges should largely follow the original understanding.”\(^{155}\) This point raises a profound question: Where does originalism itself come from? The answer to this question is complicated, but one element of that answer seems clear: Defenders of the originalist methodology argue that it best comports with a proper focus on majoritarian decisionmaking in a self-governing republic. As Robert Bork has put the point, a “philosophy of originalism” is defensible because it provides “the only approach that can make judicial review democratically legitimate.”\(^{156}\) In other words, non-originalist styles of interpretation are properly rejected because they effectively permit unelected judges to wield non-democratic judgment in whatever field they choose to occupy.

If the value of preserving democratic self-government is a proper touchstone for evaluating styles of judicial review—as Judge Bork’s defense of originalism seems to suggest—the case for semisubstantive review may gain substantial force. The entire thrust of semisubstantive doctrines, after all, is to leave final decisionmaking authority in the hands of Congress and other democratically accountable institutions.\(^ {157}\) To be sure, these rules call on political decisionmakers to exercise heightened levels of care when they enter constitutional danger zones. But the essential role of the doctrines is to refine and focus, rather than to frustrate and defeat, democratic decisionmaking.\(^ {158}\)

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\(^{154}\)See *supra* note 69 and accompanying text.

\(^{155}\)Cass R. Sunstein, *Fighting for the Supreme Court*, *Harper’s Magazine*, Sept. 1, 2005, at 31. Professor Sunstein might add that if originalism itself is not reflected in the Constitution’s text, then it has legitimacy only if it can be properly extrapolated from extratextual premises and values. But if originalism is properly extrapolated from extratextual premises and values, then why not semisubstantive doctrines? In particular, why should courts not find merit in such doctrines given the deep original commitment to deliberative republican decisionmaking that these doctrines seek to foster? See *supra* notes 143-150 and accompanying text.


\(^{157}\)See *infra* notes 322-324 and accompanying text.

\(^{158}\)In any event, even if use of semisubstantive rules somehow threatens the value of democratic self-government, it certainly does so no more than the many hard-and-fast rules of constitutional law triggered by the originalist method. This is all the more true because even leading originalists acknowledge that their methodology will not provide clear answers in many cases because judges must inevitably extract from historical materials “the principles
The bottom line is that, if one genuinely seeks a constitutional methodology that celebrates democratic decisionmaking, it is hard to see why the semisubstantive approach does not fill the bill.\textsuperscript{159} In short, the ratifiers understood themselves” and then “apply those principles to unforeseen conditions.” Bork, supra note 156. One difficulty is that constitutional “principles” can be identified at many levels of generality. Critics of originalism say, for example, that originalists must reject the Court’s canonical decision in \textit{Brown v. Board of Education} because the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment had no intention to end school segregation. Sunstein, supra note 95, at 64. Some originalists respond by saying that those ratifiers simultaneously embraced the broader goal of achieving racial equality and that this more general goal should not be defeated by embracing a sub-principle that permits school segregation. Robert H. Bork, \textit{The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law} 81-82 (1990). This response, of course, illustrates the need for the exercise of judicial judgment in defining constitutional principles and in determining how clashing principles are to be reconciled. No less important, applying originalist principles to unforeseen conditions is in its nature a judgment-laden business. (If, for example, the Fourteenth Amendment, in keeping with its text, embodies a principle of equality that extends beyond race discrimination, might it not be that that principle should outlaw government discrimination based on sexual orientation if “unforeseen conditions” suggest that sexual orientation, like race, is genetically determined?) In short, originalist decisionmaking permits judges to displace many programs implemented by democratically chosen decisionmakers through the exercise of judicial translation. \textit{See, e.g.}, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that Government use of modern heat-sensing to gather information within a home is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). For this reason, the originalist methodology carries its own threat of judicial innovation and countermajoritarian results. And because originalist rulings are often hard-and-fast, the innovations and results that originalism triggers may well have more anti-democratic effects than outcomes produced by semisubstantive rules.

\textsuperscript{159} As Professor Neuborne has observed:

While critics of process-based review have correctly noted that the judiciary, in identifying the required process, makes covert value judgments only slightly less profound than those more openly expressed by substantive-review courts, genuine process-based judicial review nonetheless poses a lesser challenge to democratic political theory. To the extent that process-based review requires normative judgments, they are prior judgments about who should make a choice and how it should be made, rather than the ad hoc substitution of a judge’s substantive choices for those of the majority. Additionally, in many—perhaps most—settings, the impact of process-based review will be merely to remand an issue to one or another democratic forum for reconsideration in a procedurally correct manner. As such, it casts a suspensive veto that slows, but does not derail, majority will.

Burt Neuborne, \textit{Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States}, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 366 (1982); \textit{see also} Calabresi, supra note 85, at 136 (“Requiring a second look would not . . . amount to imposing the judge’s elite moral values on the polity. . . . In reality the only values imposed are constitutionally grounded ones that . . . require the legislature to speak openly and thoughtfully when rights are at stake.”); Harry H. Wellington, \textit{The Nature of Judicial Review}, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 505 (1982) (“Far from
semisubstantive technique, with its emphasis on facilitating majoritarian involvement in the reification of constitutional values, may be seen as fundamentally compatible with the same goal of democratic self-governance that underlies the “originalist” stance.

C. Argument 3 (Unprincipledness): Semisubstantive rules are ill-advised because they are not cabined by principle and thus are subject to judicial abuse.

In his opinion in Thompson, Justice Scalia suggested that Justice O’Connor’s approach to that case, and by implication other semisubstantive approaches as well, are inherently unprincipled. This sort of argument, long a feature of constitutional discourse, centers on the indeterminacy of legal doctrine and resulting opportunities for judicial excess.

With good reason, rule-of-law concerns sometimes steer courts away from pliable doctrines in favor of “bright line” rules. There is, however, a counter-tendency in our law. In the service of substantive constitutional values, courts often embrace doctrines that engender uncertainty and require elaboration in later rulings. Our greatest jurists have recognized the need foreclosing legislative choices, therefore, these doctrines shape the process by which legislative goals may be achieved.”).

161 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 521 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts which I believe and am constrained to say will be bad for the courts and worse for the country.”).
162 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing “legislative process requirement” in Commerce Clause context that “would function . . . under standards never expressed and more or less arbitrarily applied”).
163 See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling Justice O’Connor’s approach a “Solomonic solution” but emphasizing that “Solomon . . . was not subject to the constitutional constraints of the judicial department of a national government in a federal, democratic system”); see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 392 (noting that certain semisubstantive approaches do not offer “judicially manageable standards” and offer “maximum flexibility for the Supreme Court . . . [which] would clearly be subject to judicial abuse”).
164 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Brennan J., dissenting) (claiming the majority is formulating an “arbitrary ‘bright-line’ rule” to deal with automobile searches); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (“[T]he Warrant Clause places the line at the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion of police authority.”).
for courts to apply rules driven by “considerations of degree.”\textsuperscript{166} No less
important, the Framers themselves emphasized the inevitability that
constitutional doctrine would take shape over time as courts built judicial
precedent upon judicial precedent in keeping with the common-law
tradition.\textsuperscript{167} In short, any “unprincipledness” attack leveled against
semisubstantive rules turns on a principle of principledness that itself is
marked by significant indeterminacy.

Beyond this, critics may be gazing from the wrong vantage point if they
seek to find one clear principle that unifies all of the Court’s
semisubstantive jurisprudence. After years of looking, most of us would say
that there is no grand theory of constitutional law.\textsuperscript{168} And if there is no
grand theory of constitutional law, there probably can be no grand theory of
semisubstantive constitutional law either. Why should there be? To date,
different semisubstantive rules have emerged in different areas of law to
address different needs. Federalism-driven clear-statement rules,\textsuperscript{169} for
example, compensate for the Court’s nearly unwavering unwillingness to
declare that acts of Congress reach beyond the commerce power.\textsuperscript{170} So-called “Carolene
groups” clear-statement rules respond to the Framers’ concerns about factional oppression of vulnerable minorities.\textsuperscript{171} And the
“why” rule of Hunter reflects the fundamental Fourteenth Amendment goal
of stemming state-sponsored oppression of racial minorities.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{166} E.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
\textsuperscript{167} See The Federalist No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (describing the “considerable bulk” of judicial precedent which will have to be developed); see also David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principles, 112 Yale L.J. 1717, 1729 (2003) (asserting that “[t]o a large extent our constitutional law has . . . becom[e] a common law system in which cases are decided on the basis of precedents”).
\textsuperscript{168} See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1331, 1332 (1988) (“Constitutional law needs no grand theoretical foundation. None is likely ever to be forthcoming, and none is desirable.”); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1753, 1766 (1994) (“What theory could possibly provide a persuasive and coherent rationale for the entire body of American constitutional law as well as provide persuasive guidance for all future cases?”); Paul E. McGeal, Ambition’s Playground, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1107, 1108 (2000) (“Indeed, a rejection of grand constitutional theory can be inferred from aspects of the Constitution’s structure and history.”).
\textsuperscript{169} See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (discussing Solid Waste Agency case).
\textsuperscript{172} See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.
To be sure, a skeptic might cite this clutter of rules as reflecting the very problem Justice Scalia touched on in *Thompson*—namely, that semisubstantive safeguards can become a “loose cannon” in the hands of judges too ready to aim and fire.\(^{173}\) There are two parts to this worry—first, that courts might profligately erect semisubstantive rules all over the constitutional map,\(^{174}\) and second, that courts might apply any particular semisubstantive rule in an unpredictable, overreaching way.\(^{175}\) In *Thompson* itself, for example, Justice Scalia voiced concern that courts might, on Justice O’Connor’s rationale, countenance imposition of the death penalty only if it were mandated by public referenda, two-thirds majority legislative votes, or the enactment of bills printed in 10-point type.\(^{176}\)

These concerns, though understandable, do not undermine semisubstantive decisionmaking. As to the worry about judicial profligacy, it is no criticism to say that the Court has erected many semisubstantive rules if those rules advance constitutional values in a legitimate way. That structural rules often perform such work is suggested by the fact that the adoption and application of such rules often stir little or no opposition. *Hunter* was the product of a unanimous Court.\(^{177}\) So was *Reno v. ACLU*\(^{178}\) and the relevant section of the Court’s dial-a-porn decision in *Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC*.\(^{179}\) That the rules of these cases are simultaneously semisubstantive and uncontroversial suggests that abandoning them—and especially abandoning them wholesale—might well do more harm than good.

As to concerns about the overreaching character of particular semisubstantive doctrines, claimed reasons for castigation seem even more

\(^{174}\)See Calabresi, supra note 21, at 104 n.71 (describing criticism of Professor Bickel for advocating a judicial role that would too often allow judges to use legislative remands).
\(^{175}\)See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 392 (stating semisubstantive rules “would clearly be subject to judicial abuse”); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 143 (attacking semisubstantive rules as a “mode of review that defies predictability, provides minimal guidance to future courts and litigants, and . . . places judges in the position of second-guessing judgments of the political branches”); Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1723-26 (expressing concern about inability of Congress to anticipate highly exacting findings-based rule of *Garrett*).
\(^{176}\)487 U.S. at 875-76.
\(^{179}\)492 U.S. 115 (1989). See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Notably, Justice Scalia wrote separately in *Sable Communications* to emphasize that: “Neither due process nor the First Amendment requires legislation to be supported by committee reports, floor debates, or even consideration, but only a vote.” 492 U.S. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring). But no other member of the Court signed on to this disclaimer.
strained. Justice Scalia’s handwringing about the risk of typeface-size and supermajority-voting rules, for example, misses a key point. Not one of the semisubstantive doctrines that the Court actually has recognized imposes any numerically-driven procedural requirement of this sort.\textsuperscript{180} No less important, to those of us who are looking, such a requirement does not loom on the horizon either. Justice Scalia might respond that this historical pattern is inconsequential. Rather, to borrow from Hamlet, the \textit{principle} is the thing,\textsuperscript{181} and the problem is that there is no way to forge a workable doctrine that logically distinguishes permissible from impermissible semisubstantive interventions.

This criticism is itself subject to criticism on the ground that the level of predictability it demands is lacking in many fields of constitutional law.\textsuperscript{182} Put another way, if courts are willing to use open-textured approaches in non-semisubstantive decisionmaking, it is hard to see why a similar play in the joints is intolerable when courts use semisubstantive rules. In \textit{United States v. Lopez},\textsuperscript{183} for example, the Court found that Congress had overreached its commerce power by regulating a “noncommercial” subject, notwithstanding four dissenters’ insistence that this governing principle was too opaque.\textsuperscript{184} The majority, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, responded that:

\begin{quote}
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty. But, so long as Congress’s authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause always will engender “legal uncertainty.” . . . The Constitution mandates this uncertainty . . . .\textsuperscript{185}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{180}See also Goldfeld, \textit{supra} note 25, at 381 (conceding that “it would be foolish for a court to tell Congress that it must always hold at least one hour of floor debate for every proposal under consideration”).

\textsuperscript{181}See \textsc{William Shakespeare}, \textit{Hamlet}, act 2, sc. 2 (“[T]he play’s the thing.”).

\textsuperscript{182}Of course, Justice Scalia has been known to lament the lack of predictability in various areas of constitutional law. See, \textit{e.g.}, Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (collecting opinions criticizing \textit{Lemon} test). In general, however, his pleas have not carried the day. See, \textit{e.g.}, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that court was improvising “constitutional structure on the basis of currently perceived utility”).

\textsuperscript{183}514 U.S. 549 (1995).

\textsuperscript{184}Id. at 551, 627-29.

\textsuperscript{185}Id. at 566.
Indeterminacy, in short, is rampant in constitutional law. Given this reality, it hardly seems right to single out semisubstantive rules for critique on indeterminacy grounds.

In any event, the field of semisubstantive rules is not devoid of limiting principles—and this is true whether one looks at those rules in joint or several fashion. In many semisubstantive decisions, the Court has worked hard to identify confining elements of decision. In *Gregory v. Ashcroft,*\(^{186}\) for example, the Court deemed the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act inapplicable to state judges by applying a semisubstantive federalism-driven super-clear-statement rule of statutory interpretation; in doing so, however, the Court took pains to link that rule to those state “political functions” already made the subject of special judicial deference in pre-existing alienage-discrimination rulings.\(^{187}\) In *Mow Sun Wong*\(^{188}\) the Court again drew on this “political functions” principle—normally of significance in evaluating state alienage-based discrimination—in applying a constitutional “who” rule to a federal ban on hiring noncitizens.\(^{189}\) One might decry the “political functions” principle applied in these cases as unduly loosey-goosey. Such an attack, however, does not target semisubstantive rules; instead it takes aim at a principle developed long ago as the Court forged constitutional doctrine to deal with alienage-based discrimination.\(^{190}\) To say that semisubstantive rules are unprincipled because preexisting doctrinal categories are unprincipled is to offer no criticism properly directed at semisubstantive rules themselves.

Other limiting principles operate in this field. One is that legislative ambiguity properly justifies the use of constitutionally driven clear-statement rules, just as surely as it brings into play any number of other rules of statutory interpretation.\(^{191}\) In recent years, leading scholars have shown


\(^{187}\)Id. at 461-63 (“This plain statement rule is . . . an acknowledgement that the States retain substantial sovereign power under our constitutional scheme. . . . These [alienage-discrimination] cases stand in recognition of the authority . . . of the States to determine qualifications of their most important government officials.”).

\(^{188}\)Id. at 102-03 & 103 n.22.


that many rules of statutory construction advance “public values.” Against this backdrop, it seems entirely sensible that the Court has forged interpretive rules distinctively responsive to those public values that are constitutional in character.

Apart from clear-statement rules, the Court has brought semisubstantive analysis to bear primarily in cases that involve fundamental rights or suspect classifications. A quick protest might be lodged that these terms are so amorphous that they do not supply a meaningful constraint. These terms, however, have pre-existing meanings in our law, even if those meanings may be shadowy at the edges. Again, the key point is that any challenge to a fundamental-rights/suspect-classification limit on semisubstantive rules is not an attack on semisubstantive rules themselves; instead, it is an attack on doctrinal concepts long recognized outside the semisubstantive-safeguards realm.

What is more, the Court has signaled that this fundamental-rights/suspect-classification limitation does have a confining effect. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, the Court refused to endorse a strong semisubstantive challenge directed at a flaky federal statute that resulted from congressional misunderstandings triggered by self-serving interest group misrepresentations. The Court took a hands-off approach to the case, even in the face of severe process problems, because the challenge was mounted under only the minimal-scrutiny prong of equal-protection analysis. In other words, the Court forewent a semisubstantive invalidation—despite powerful pleas for a process-remedying intervention—because no “fundamental right” or “suspect classification” was in view.

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193See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.


195See supra notes 124-134 and accompanying text.

196449 U.S. 166 (1980).

197See id. at 189-194 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (positing that challenged legislation was, among other things, supported by misatements that were “frequent and unrebutted”).

198Id. at 175 (“[T]he Court in cases involving social and economic benefits has consistently refused to invalidate on equal protection grounds legislation which it simply deemed unwise or unartfully drawn.”).

199Id. at 174-75.
The Court not only has developed principles that limit the settings in which semisubstantive rules operate; it also has suggested principles that restrict the permissible nature of procedural requirements imposed by these doctrines. To return to Justice Scalia’s dissent in *Thompson*, all of the semisubstantive safeguards the Court has recognized to date are far removed from the imposition of a two-thirds-vote requirement (an approach that would undermine, rather than reinforce, the basic principle of majority rule); a popular-referendum requirement (an approach that would engender both disruptive delay and heightened cost in violation of the Madisonian emphasis on representative government200); or a 10-point-type requirement for proposed bills (an approach that smacks of hypertechnicality and inattention to actual levels of legislative care). In essence, the semisubstantive rules actually fashioned by the Court focus on forcing policymakers to use decisionmaking procedures (like preenactment study, sunset-like requirements, or budgeted spending) (1) that policymakers frequently utilize anyway, (2) that are widely recognized as playing a valuable deliberation-enhancing role, and (3) that operate within the overarching context of representative and majoritarian decisionmaking. In addition, the Court has required special procedures, primarily (if not only) in instances where they operate to serve a particular constitutional end in a plainly logical way.201

Finally, semisubstantive invalidations do not tie the policymaker’s hands forever, or even for a single day. Rather, these doctrines in their nature invite an override by the political branches of what is, by definition, only a provisional judicial ruling.202 Those who attack semisubstantive rules as unprincipled must recognize and respond to their self-limiting character. The key point is clear: Constitutional doctrines that give political officials—rather than judicial officials—the last word on how to resolve hotly contested constitutional questions seem distinctly undeserving of labels such as unconstrained, uncontrollable, and overreaching.203

201 *See, e.g.*, supra notes 39-42, 141-142, 169-170, 186-187 and accompanying text (discussing clear-statement rule designed to protect federalism values that otherwise might receive too little judicial protection).
202 *See, e.g.*, supra notes 97, 115 and accompanying text (describing reactions to *Mow Sun Wong* and *Furman* cases).
203 *See, e.g.*, Kent Roach, *Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian Legislature*, 80 CAN. L. REV. 481, 532 (2001) (suggesting that a “dialogic approach” to constitutional decisionmaking “diminishes perhaps to the point of evaporation” the tension between democracy and judicial review”). Indeed, there is much to be said for just the opposite idea—namely, that semisubstantive rules serve a critical purpose by summoning political decisionmakers, and the people themselves, to participate actively in the elaboration of constitutional restraints. *See, e.g.*, NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, *THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION* 229 (2004) (arguing against judicial monopoly in constitutional
D. Argument 4 (Intrusiveness): Semisubstantive rules—as both a practical and a historical matter—are unduly invasive and disdainful of legislative autonomy because they interfere directly with legislative processes.

Justice Scalia attacked Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Thompson not only because he saw it as inviting an unpredictable variety of judicial interventions; he also worried that her approach entailed judicial “interference in the States’ legislative processes, the heart of their sovereignty.” In his view, this process-centered approach was “more disdainful” of “States’ rights” than even the hard-and-fast substantive-result-centered approach of the Thompson plurality. Others have voiced similar concerns. In his dissent in the Lopez case, for example, Justice Souter wrote that “review [of congressional enactments] for deliberateness would be as patently unconstitutional as an Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this Court.”

There is something to these concerns. As early as 1810, in Fletcher v. Peck, the Supreme Court declared that “the invalidity of a law cannot be questioned because undue influence may have been used in obtaining it.”

interpretation on the ground that, under such a system, the people will not accept the authority of the Constitution or of judicial interpretations of it); id. at 237-38 (emphasizing value of colloquies with regard to constitutional meaning); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 926 (1987) (“'[D]ue process of lawmaking’ has the potential to strengthen the democratic process.”).


205 Id.

206 Id.

207 See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 848 (4th Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (“[A] judicial mandate that Congress construct a proper paper trail [would] ill befit the dignity of the legislature.”); Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 382 (“Court has held that judicial intrusion into congressional procedures is inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to legislative independence” even when faced with credible evidence of legislative abuse.); see also Colker & Brudney, supra note 30, at 142 (arguing that new legislative record rules will create “combative relationship between Congress and the States”); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1117, 1153 (1978) (“[T]he constitutional common law might well precipitate a clash of will between Congress and the Court. Far from reducing friction, the proposal seems calculated to increase it.”).

208 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 598 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 370 (identifying “significant separation-of-powers concerns, as well as practical concerns about the consequences of subjecting the flexible lawmaking process to the rigid judicial process”).

209 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 123 (1810). See generally 194 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 247 (1998) (“One of the doctrines definitely established in the law is that if a statute appears on its face to be constitutional and valid, the court cannot inquire into
Building on this notion, American courts generally have eschewed the invalidation of legislative actions on the process-based grounds that they resulted from “fraud, bribery, and corruption.” In a like vein, following the lead of Field v. Clark, many courts have shied away from policing legislative adherence to internal procedures through use of the so-called “enrolled-bill rule.” The thrust of these doctrines is to immunize statutes from invalidation on the ground that they spring from tainted legislative processes. Arguing by analogy, Justice Scalia and analysts like him might well assert that semisubstantive doctrines violate a strong tradition of judicial noninterference in the internal operations of political decisionmakers.

Advocates of this position, however, must confront a difficulty that Justice Scalia himself has highlighted in other settings—namely, the difficulty of identifying the proper level of generality at which to describe the relevant tradition. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Scalia staked the claim that, at least in some contexts, traditions are best characterized at their greatest level of specificity. Building on this thinking, the tradition reflected in the fraud-and-bribery principle and the endorsed-bill rule does not extend to semisubstantive doctrines for at least two reasons. First, semisubstantive doctrines—in contrast to the rules of Fletcher and Field—focus on vindicating particular text-based substantive constitutional guaranties. Second, semisubstantive rules seek to vindicate these

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211Lynn v. Polk, 76 Tenn. 121, 1881 WL 4428, at *69 (1881).
212143 U.S. 649 (1892).
213The enrolled-bill rule “provides that an act ratified by the presiding officers of the legislature, approved by the [executive], and enrolled in the proper . . . office is conclusively presumed to have been properly passed, and such an act is not subject to impeachment by evidence outside the act as enrolled to show it was not passed in compliance with law.” 73 AM. JUR. 2D STATUTES § 44 (2001). See Field, 143 U.S. at 668-73 (holding that even if enrolled bill omits portions of legislation actually passed by both houses of Congress, signature by President and leaders of both houses renders statute unimpeachable); Williams v. MacFeeley, 197 S.E. 225, 228-29 (Ga. 1938) (applying rule); Commonwealth v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 170 S.W. 171, 172 (Ky. App. 1914) (same). Some jurisdictions follow a less restrictive but still deferential approach known as the “journal entry rule.” Under this view the enrolled bill acts as prima facie evidence of the regular enactment, but the courts are permitted to have recourse to the legislative journals in order to ascertain whether the law has been passed in accordance with constitutional requirements. 73 AM. JUR. 2D STATUTES § 43 (2001); see, e.g., Amos v. Mosley, 77 So. 619, 621 (Fla. 1917) (applying rule).
215Id. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
216In contrast, more general procedural requirements apply to all legislation. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4 (1892) (refusing to look behind legislative journals to determine whether speaker had properly counted quorum as reflected in journals); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669 (1892) (rejecting, on enrolled-bill principles, argument that statute which omitted a section actually passed by both houses of Congress did not become law by
guarantees in ways distinctively responsive to the particular constitutional values at stake. For these reasons, semisubstantive rules do not involve a license for courts to police the honesty, integrity and professionalism of legislatures in a free-form across-the-board way. The principles of Fletcher and Field thus bear in only the most generalized manner on the normative claims of semisubstantive constitutional rules.

In addition, while the fraud-or-bribery and enrolled-bill-rule decisions represent a tradition of judicial noninterference with legislative processes, there is a deep-rooted counter-tradition in our law. The case for motive-based analysis, for example, reaches as far back as McCulloch v. Maryland. So too with “constitutional . . . common-law-like rules” which find expression not only in McCulloch but in well-aged dormant Commerce Clause decisions as well. Clear statement rules were invoked during the era of Chief Justice Marshall, and constitutional sunset doctrines surfaced as early as the 1930s. More fundamentally, the entire

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217 See supra notes 32-116, 123 and accompanying text.
218 See also Brest, supra note 79, at 101:

In Fletcher the question that the Court refused to ask was: what did the decisionmakers desire to achieve in terms of personal benefits (for example, lining their pockets) by the act of voting? The inquiry [in “why” rule cases] bears closer resemblance to the traditional search for legislative purpose as an aid to statutory interpretation: what effects did the decisionmakers desire to achieve by the operation of their decision? These inquiries differ functionally as well as formally, for the methods for proving corruption entail a judicial intrusion into the political processes that is largely absent in the latter inquiry.

Id. at 101.

219 See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 376-78 (pointing to Field as evidence that Court has traditionally stayed clear of intruding into Congress’s legislative process).
220 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 387 (1819) (suggesting recognition of a judicial duty to intervene when Congress invokes an enumerated power as a “pretext” to regulate local matters); see also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367 (1915) (invalidating facially neutral law with regard to literacy tests on the ground that its purpose was to disenfranchise African Americans).
221 Coenen, supra note 7, at 1735-55; see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1975).
222 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
224 See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[W]here fundamental principles are overthrown . . . the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness.”).
225 See generally Coenen, supra note 7, at 1709, 1721-22 (discussing time-tied second-look doctrines and constitutional sunset rules, including in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)).
theory of representation-reinforcement review—which has long pervaded our constitutional discourse—focuses on “the process by which the laws that govern society are made.” And, both the Supreme Court and other courts have found constitutional violations based on the process, rather than the content, of legislative action on many occasions.

If the tradition-based attack on semisubstantive rules is subject to serious criticism, so too is the companion pragmatic argument that these rules intrude in an undue and disrespectful way on legislative autonomy. Intrusiveness, of course, is in the eye of the beholder. To many beholders, however, Justice Scalia was surely wrong to say that the structural approach taken by Justice O’Connor in Thompson was more invasive with regard to legislative integrity than the substantive approach taken by the Court’s plurality. Under the plurality’s analysis, after all, Oklahoma had no choice whatsoever. It could not—no matter what steps it took—choose to execute 15-year-old offenders. Justice O’Connor, in contrast, gave the state an option. To be sure, it was an unpleasant option from the perspective of both the state and Justice Scalia. But it was an option. After Thompson, Oklahoma did not have to legislate in “the precise form” spelled out by Justice O’Connor. It did not have to do anything. But if the state wanted to reinstate capital punishment for 15-year-olds, Justice O’Connor’s approach permitted it to try to do so, while the plurality’s approach flatly foreclosed the effort. In these circumstances, there is every reason to say that Justice

226ELY, supra note 8, at 74 (emphasis added).
227See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983) (invalidating one-House congressional veto as non-compliant with Article I bicameralism and presentment requirements); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-91 (1978) (refusing to find repeal of substantive legislation by subsequent appropriations legislation, and considering House and Senate rules declaring out of order any provision of appropriations legislation that changes existing law); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) (holding that Congress used improper procedures to exclude a representative); Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 706-12 (1966) (finding that subcommittee conducted a legislative investigation unauthorized by congressional rules); Christofel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 87-88 (1949) (holding, in prosecution for perjury before House Committee, that defendant could raise lack of quorum as a defense); see also Linde, supra note 21, at 248 (“The Supreme Court holds Congress to its own rules in the case of investigations.”). State courts sometimes intervene on process-centered grounds as well—for example, by enforcing constitutional provisions that require laws to deal with only one subject. See, e.g., Dep’t of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455, 459 (Fla. 1982) (describing state constitutional requirement that certain appropriations laws contain provisions on no other subject). See generally Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 722 n.144 (“The single-subject rule might seem mere formalism, but it could well have the useful effects of forcing the legislature to place unrelated issues in separate bills, rather than combine them for logrolling purposes.”); Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MICH. L. REV. 389 (1958) (examining single-subject rule).
O'Connor—contrary to Justice Scalia’s objection—was following “an approach much more respectful of States’ rights than the plurality.”

More than six decades ago, Professors Bickel and Wellington made this same point, observing that “a candid avowal that a matter . . . is being sent back for a second reading, so to speak, is much more compatible with due respect for the peculiar powers and competencies of both [legislative and judicial] institutions,” than an irreversible, hard-and-fast invalidation of the challenged law. The key point is that semisubstantive decisionmaking has a built-in self-limiting quality. As we have seen, the Court often employs rules that conclusively foreclose results that elected policymakers want to reach. It seems strange to say that these “look never again” rules interfere less with legislative integrity than do “look again” rules that specifically invite legislative majorities to overturn the judiciary’s action.

E. Argument 5 (Manipulability): Semisubstantive rules are distinctively abusable because courts can manipulate them to achieve substantive outcomes without seeming to do so.

A fifth argument against semisubstantive rules stems from concerns about judicial opportunism. The fear is that these rules, when placed in the hands of tactically minded judges, “can be used as a ‘subterfuge’ to ‘rig’ a desired substantive outcome.” Professor Tushnet has expressed this worry in the following terms:

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229Id. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 551 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] holding that the classification was not adequately preceded by a consideration of less drastic alternatives or adequately explained by a statement of legislative purpose would be far less intrusive than a final determination that the substance of the decision is not ‘narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.’”); id. at 552 (“[T]here can be no separation-of-powers objection to a more tentative holding of unconstitutionality based on a failure to follow procedures that guarantee the kind of deliberation that a fundamental constitutional issue of this kind obviously merits.”); BICKEL, supra note 8, at 206 (describing semisubstantive interventions and other “passive devices” as “lesser rational alternatives to an otherwise unavoidable principled judgment” because “they work relatively no binding interference with the democratic process”); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 2 Tul. L. Rev. 1065, 1109 (1998) (deeming motive-based semisubstantive review “‘intrinsically less intrusive than substantive judicial review’”); Linde, supra note 21, at 243 (“It is far more cause for resentment to invalidate the substance of a policy that the politically accountable branches and their constituents support than to invalidate a lawmaking procedure that can be repeated correctly, yet we take substantive judicial review for granted.”); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (skipping “substantive” equal protection inquiry because a “narrower inquiry discloses that essential procedures have not been followed”).


231See supra notes 7, 24 and accompanying text.

232TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1686; see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 391-392
(expressing concern over obviously value-laden judgments hidden behind so-called procedural semisubstantive rulings); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 153 ("Judicial weighing of adequacy of . . . legislative record . . . is vulnerable to politicized application."); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules of Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 636-37 (1992) (noting "concern that the Court’s new canons represent a form of judicial activism that is particularly questionable because it is backdoor" and that the Court may not have "avoided the countermajoritarian difficulty but only deepened it by engaging in under-the-table constitutional lawmaking"); id. at 646 (fearing that "a lack of recognition and candor about what the Court has done recently with quasi-constitutional law has submerged a variety of hotly contestable normative and empirical issues" and expressing concern about "judicial modesty cloaking judicial activism"); Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 397, 449 (2005) ("[T]he use of the [avoidance] canon seems ripe for strategic judicial behavior based on the political environment at the time the Court is deciding."); id. at 446 (arguing that avoidance canon "does not promote judicial restraint"); Richard Neely, Obsolete Statutes, Structural Due Process, and the Power of Courts to Demand a Second Legislative Look, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 271, 281 (1982) (reviewing Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982)) ("The primary objection then to a 'structural due process' review power is that the power will be used in an unprincipled way, by power-hungry judges, increasing in effect the junta-like component of American government."); Tushnet, supra note 123, at 2792 (noting that provisional review may "degenerate into—or may be disguises for—strong-form review").

Related to concerns about judicial subterfuge is an argument that attacks the lack of fair notice offered by semisubstantive rules. Professors Frickey and Smith argue that the “Court imposed these requirements retroactively . . . when Congress had no notice of the necessity of generating a carefully crafted legislative history.” Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1723. Focusing on Garrett, they note that even though “the Court faced congressional findings of pervasive discrimination against the disabled and an elaborate legislative history recounting instances of such discrimination,” it “applied to the legislative history a . . . shredding technique, . . . in which the evidence was examined in segmented fashion rather than for its cumulative impact.” Id. at 1725-26. Worse yet, the Court would only accept evidence set forth in the official legislative history, id. at 1726, while declining to look at even a highly informative task force report that was drafted at the request of a House Subcommittee. Id. at 1735. In the same vein, Professors Colker and Brudney fault the Court for requiring Congress to effectively use a “crystal ball.” Colker & Brudney, supra note 30, at 85. The Justices’ approach, they say, “effectively penalizes the enacting Congress for failing to create a detailed legislative record, even though such a record requirement could not reasonably have been anticipated at the moment of legislative deliberation and enactment.” Id. See also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 135 (arguing that the Court’s second-guessing of legislative procedural choices is “particularly pernicious due to its failure to provide guidance on what legislative modes would be found adequate”). At least three responses to these commentators are available: (1) They seem to overlook the fact that judicial invalidation of legislation often occurs pursuant of newly articulated constitutional rules, including when hard-and-fast judicial decisionmaking occurs; (2) they may overstate fair notice concerns because Congress can always “play it safe” by anticipating serious process-based review (which, Congress—in light of Garrett—surely should and will do in the future when acting pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment section five power); and (3) these arguments do not seem to be directed at semisubstantive rules in general (or not even at legislative findings rules in general), but instead at only special applications of those rules,
In the real world of politics we can predict with great accuracy what the effect of suspensory decisions will be. Sometimes we can predict that the statute will not be reenacted, in which case structural review has given the reality of constraint on legislatures and the illusion of freedom for legislatures to do what they want. Clever judges will invoke structural review when they predict that the legislature will be unable to enact legislation that contravenes the judges’ personal preferences; they will invoke other modes of review in other cases.\textsuperscript{233}

On its face, this passage suggests that semisubstantive rules may encourage judicial mendacity—a serious problem in its own right. An even graver problem involves the abuse of judicial power that this prevarication will facilitate. If in fact “[c]lever judges” often look to use constitutional law to advance “personal preferences,” we may assume they are inhibited from doing so primarily because the outright invalidation of laws risks intense clashes with policymaking authorities.\textsuperscript{234} On Professor Tushnet’s analysis, judges might well sidestep this deterrent—while nonetheless achieving “the reality of constraint”—by using semisubstantive rules to create “the illusion of freedom for legislatures to do what they want.”\textsuperscript{235} These rules, in short, threaten to operate as a sort of stealth bomber in the service of a powerful, but otherwise pent-up, tendency toward judicial overreaching.\textsuperscript{236}

particularly in the Garrett case.

\textsuperscript{233}Tushnet, supra note 27, at 211.

\textsuperscript{234}See Ely, supra note 8, at 47 (“Thus we are told that the Court’s essentially anti-democratic character keeps it constantly in jeopardy of destruction: it knows that frequent judicial intervention in the political process would generate such widespread political reaction that the Court would be destroyed in its wake.”).

\textsuperscript{235}Tushnet, supra note 27, at 211; see Schrock & Welsh, supra note 207, at 1125 (“It is thus possible for a Court, animated by realism, to be constitutionally cautious but subconstitutionally activist, even adventurist.”). Professors Eskridge and Frickey have made a related point in discussing clear-statement rules of statutory interpretation:

Because the Court sees itself as using up political capital every time it invalidates a statute, it thinks twice about exercising judicial review. To the extent the Court does not see itself as being “on the spot” when it interprets statutes, it may believe it has more freedom to interpret statutes to thwart legislative expectations than it does to strike them down.

Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 232, at 637.

\textsuperscript{236}See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 613-14 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (identifying risk that findings requirements may be used as a “covert” form of merits-based review). Christine Bateup makes a related argument. She says that, even if judges act without manipulative intent, legislatures will often be unable to reinstate semisubstantively
Professor Tushnet’s stated concerns about judicial dissembling, and expanded opportunities for judicial overreaching, are subject to challenge on a variety of grounds. First, the argument seems to assume that judges often misrepresent the actual reasoning behind their decisions. Many of us will be skeptical of this view, for we believe that judges, by and large, are both honest and committed to the essential features of the rule of law. To embrace this sanguine outlook is not to say that judges never act strategically. It is only to say that most judges, most of the time, state their reasons accurately in the written opinions to which they place their names. And if this is so, there is limited cause for concern about “subterfuge” and “illusion” effectuated by way of semisubstantive doctrines.

It is also doubtful, as the subterfuge argument seems to posit, that semisubstantive doctrines are distinctively subject to judicial misuse. In particular, why should we expect potential critics to roll over if courts make a manipulative mockery of these tools of decision? Indeed, those who watch for overreaching by judges can decry not only judicial activism, but the combination of judicial activism and judicial deception, if and when judges pretend to pursue “the reality of constraint” in the sheep’s clothing of semisubstantive decisionmaking. Perhaps this is why there is no strong evidence that courts in the past have used semisubstantive rules in manipulative ways.

This absence of evidence may also reflect the powerful practical disincentive for using semisubstantive rules if the real goal is to achieve preferred substantive outcomes. The problem is that—despite Professor Tushnet’s prognostications to the contrary—the strategic use of semisubstantive doctrines “lacks reliability.” At the time of Furman v.
Georgia, for example, many thought that that decision, despite its semisubstantive bent, spelled the end of the death penalty in this country. Their predictions, to put it mildly, proved inaccurate. Only four years after Furman, the Court rejected Eighth Amendment attacks on the death penalty after many state legislatures made careful reappraisals of their capital sentencing schemes and reasserted the importance of this form of punishment.

Difficulties in predicting legislative reactions to provisional rulings are heightened by the fact that the very cases in which courts employ semisubstantive techniques—typically those cases that involve “suspect classifications” or “fundamental rights”—often spark the highest levels of political passion. Moreover, no one can suggest that semisubstantive rulings always lead to de facto invalidations; the nearly-immediate resuscitation of the alien-hiring ban struck down in Mow Sun Wong puts the lie to any such claim.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty with the strategic-manipulability objection is that it pays no heed to the passage of time. It may be—as Professor Tushnet has claimed—that courts often can predict how a then-sitting legislature will react to any particular semisubstantive invalidation. Even if they can, however, political tides ebb and flow. As a result, any semisubstantive invalidation is likely to achieve the desired substantive outcome only if the composition of the then-sitting political body remains

misjudge or distort the impact of a Court pronouncement, and guesses about that impact are treacherous sources of precepts for Court behavior.

See, e.g., CALABRESE, supra note 85, at 201 n.41 (“Furman was perceived by many to mean that no capital punishment statute . . . would be constitutionally acceptable.”).

Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See generally BICKEL, supra note 8, at 206 (“[T]here are dozens of instances, in the federal context, of congressional reversal of the Court, and many more instances of the most fruitful interplay between the Court and the legislature or the executive, following colloquies initiated by the Justices.”).

For example, recent partial-birth-abortion litigation has involved hotly contested issues regarding the constitutional right-to-choose principle first embraced in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the Court invalidated Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion law. Id. at 936-38. In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor anticipated that legislatures could and would attempt to correct the deficiencies in the Nebraska statute, and there was no suggestion that she was engaging in any subterfuge when she made these remarks. See id at 950-51 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In fact, Congress quickly responded to Stenberg by enacting a national partial-birth-abortion law, and the Court upheld this new legislation in part because Congress made new and explicit findings about whether there was any medical need for the outlawed procedure. Gonzales v. Carhart, ___ U.S. __; 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1638 (2007) (noting that Congress found medical consensus that procedure was never medically necessary).

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
unchanged. For this reason, a court interested in advancing its own substantive agenda for anything more than the short term is likely to eschew a semisubstantive approach.

The critic might respond to these observations by noting that political-agenda-pursuing judges will use semisubstantive rulings because, even if their prognostications of legislative acquiescence prove misplaced, they can jump back in and knock out the reenacted program with an outright substantive invalidation. There are too many practical difficulties with this chain of reasoning, however, to believe that judges often use it. A program reenacted after a semisubstantive invalidation, for example, may not become the subject of a legal challenge for some time. If the strategically minded court is the Supreme Court, for example, any such challenge will come before it (at least as an ordinary matter) only after years of processing in subordinate tribunals. Whether the strategically minded court is the Supreme Court or a lower court, the passage of time often will generate new judicial appointees (or a new set of panel members in the case of intermediate appellate courts), who may well not share their predecessors’ substantive agendas. And even if a reenacted statute quickly finds its way back to the same court that earlier had undone on semisubstantive grounds, a recent legislative endorsement undertaken in response to an express judicial invitation hardly provides the ideal condition for an outright judicial invalidation. Put another way, if a court (and particularly, the Supreme Court) invites a dialogue with the political branches, it had better be prepared to listen to the response it receives; otherwise, it risks endangering the goodwill on which all of its authority ultimately depends.

F. Argument 6 (Doctrinal Distortion): Semisubstantive decisionmaking has the “vice” of the “passive virtues” because it invites distortion of otherwise-useful substantive constitutional doctrines.

During the early 1960s, Professor Bickel made the case that the Supreme Court should cleave to the “passive virtues,” working hard to avoid head-on conflicts with the political branches over the constitutionality


246 See Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 610 (1983) (“[T]he courts need to remember that confrontation with the policy-makers puts the delicate nature of the separation of powers to great stress.”). See id. (“[T]he independent judiciary can remain that way only if the other branches accept the importance of its independence.”).

247 BICKEL, supra note 8, at 111.
of government programs. Methods for averting confrontation included broad use of discretionary justiciability rules, an open-stanced willingness to decline statutory jurisdiction, increased deployment of the nondelegation principle, and (of particular importance for present purposes) ready invocation of the vagueness and desuetude-statute rules.

In a famous article, Professor Gunther responded that these “passive virtues” were fraught with “subtle vices.” The Gunther critique had three main parts. First, he argued that Professor Bickel had tossed aside a “principled concern with threshold questions” in favor of an expediency-driven “free-wheeling” style of inviting legislative second looks. Next, Professor Gunther urged that this “passive virtues” approach did not so much encourage judicial restraint as foster judicial dishonesty and abdication. Finally, Professor Gunther blasted Professor Bickel for advocating the payment of these costs to gain only a paltry benefit: the sometime avoidance of a supposed judicial “legitimation” of troubling government programs not subject to principled invalidation. In short, according to Professor Gunther, Professor Bickel offered the Court too much discretion to take too little action to secure no meaningful advantage.

The full force of Professor Gunther’s argument cannot be captured in one paragraph. But precisely because it is so powerful, that critique provides the platform for an argument against semisubstantive rules under reasoning that goes something like this: Semisubstantive rules, by definition, involve second-look remands to government policymakers, and the encouragement of such remands was at the heart of Professor Bickel’s agenda; Professor Gunther challenged the Bickel program with a ravaging brilliance; thus semisubstantive rules must go.

This line of logic, while superficially appealing, fails because there is a broken link in its chain of inferences. The problem is that Professor Gunther went after Professor Bickel’s larger project; he did not go after semisubstantive rules. Another, separate problem is that the great bulk of Professor Gunther’s treatment of Bickelian doctrines dealt with matters of jurisdiction and justiciability. That treatment may

\footnotesize{249 See id. at 112.
250 Id. at 183.
251 Id. at 127.
252 Id. at 159-61.
253 Id. at 147-56.
254 Gunther, supra note 239.
255 Id. at 17.
256 Id. at 25. See id. at 21 (“Bickel invites … risks by viewing narrow constitutional doctrines such as vagueness as essentially unprincipled means to avoid premature hardening of substantive constitutional limitations.”).
257 Id. at 22-24.
258 Id. at 5-9.
259 Another, separate problem is that the great bulk of Professor Gunther’s treatment of Bickelian doctrines dealt with matters of jurisdiction and justiciability. That treatment may}
Gunther voiced no objection to the vagueness doctrine or its “instrumentalist purposes.” Rather, he challenged Professor Bickel’s enthusiasm for using this doctrine and others as mere “devices” and “unprincipled means” to “avoid legitimation at all costs.” To criticize the unprincipled use of a rule is not to criticize the rule itself. In other words, Professor Gunther’s critique casts no doubt on any semisubstantive doctrine (including the vagueness rule) that is applied in a properly principled manner.

Building on the work of Professor Gunther, then-Professor (and now-Judge) Guido Calabresi raised a related set of questions about constitutionally inspired semisubstantive doctrines. In doing so, he wrote:

Vagueness, delegation of authority, desuetude, yes, even ‘interpretation of statutes,’ are doctrines and notions that have a meaning and function of their own. Vagueness and desuetude, for example, are designed to require that actors be warned of the possible consequences of their actions before they act. . . . When such doctrines and notions are used not to achieve these tasks but rather to require or induce legislatures to take a second look, they are altered and become incapable of achieving their original functions. . . . Gunther was worried about such false use of doctrines, even in paraconstitutional cases. His worry [was] that this would lead to a ‘virulent variety of free-wheeling interventionism’ and involve the courts in dangerous subterfuges . . . .

Judge Calabresi rightly noted that the “false use” of doctrine is not a good thing. But any “false use” criticism requires a clear understanding of what a
“true use” is. The Court, for example, has made it clear that the vagueness rule involves far more than ensuring “that actors be warned of the possible consequences of their actions.”\textsuperscript{266} Indeed, Judge Calabresi himself went on to recognize that it is “correct and uncontroversial” to view the doctrine as “a temporizing device” that pushes political actors to take a “second look” at policies that are both ambiguously articulated and constitutionally problematic.\textsuperscript{267} If this is true, inclusion of the vagueness doctrine in the semisubstantive-rule tool kit poses no difficulty. After all, if the vagueness doctrine has a process-tied purpose, its use for process-tied reasons cannot be decried as using “tricks.”\textsuperscript{268}

There is a broader point to make about Judge Calabresi’s expression of concern about constitutionally driven semisubstantive rules. The point is that he considered these rules from the distinctive perspective of exploring the specialized subject of his provocative book—that is, the subject of how to deal with the continued operation of numerous unrepealed statutes long since made antiquated by changed conditions.\textsuperscript{269} The core of Judge Calabresi’s argument was that the use of constitutionally driven semisubstantive rules provides a crudely underinclusive way to deal with this problem, especially because many outdated statutes do not present serious substantive constitutional difficulties.\textsuperscript{270} Judge Calabresi’s “underinclusiveness” argument may make sense, but it does not undermine the argument for constitutionally driven semisubstantive rules. The reason why is that the unifying purpose of these rules is not to get rid of archaic statutes.\textsuperscript{271} If there is a need for a legal tool to clear away a sprawling underbrush of outdated enactments, such a tool should be forged. But the creation or non-creation of such a rule does not bear on the legitimacy of semisubstantive doctrines that have an independently valuable role to play as a specialized part of our constitutional law. Indeed, as we have seen in examining assisted-suicide laws, Judge Calabresi himself embraced with enthusiasm constitutionally driven semisubstantive decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{272}

\textsuperscript{266}Id. at 19.
\textsuperscript{267}Id. at 17.
\textsuperscript{268}Id. at 20.
\textsuperscript{269}See generally id. at 1-3 (outlining overarching concerns that gave rise to the book).
\textsuperscript{270}Id. at 20.
\textsuperscript{271}Id. at 22-23. Indeed, eight of the nine doctrines of semisubstantive constitutional law have nothing to do with a statute’s outdatedness. See supra note 22 (itemizing nine doctrines).
\textsuperscript{272}See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 732-35 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring)). In particular, he warmly embraced Constitution-driven semisubstantive reasoning in voting to invalidate an assisted suicide ban enacted in “another age,” long before the development modern medicine and moral outlooks that bear upon the subject. Id. at 732. As he explained:

When legislation comes close to violating \textit{fundamental substantive constitutional law}
In sum, the Gunther and Calabresi analyses provide no problem for semisubstantive rules. The probing work of these analysts hits around our subject. In the end, however, that work exposes semisubstantive doctrines only to smoke, and not to fire.

G. Argument 7 (Futility): Structural rules are rules of futility—and not legitimate constitutional rules at all—because policymakers are free simply to readopt any program invalidated pursuant to such a rule.

Arguments 1 through 6 proceed from the premise that structural rules empower courts to do too much. Argument 7, in contrast, posits that these rules empower courts to do too little. In particular, it has been said that “structural review is not constitutional review at all” because “it imposes no substantive limitations on legislative activity.” This critique begs the question. Nothing in the Constitution says that that document imposes only “substantive limitations on legislative activity.” Indeed, two key provisions speak of “due process of law,” while other guarantees that are typically seen as substantive in nature have spawned all sorts of process-centered doctrines. Against this doctrinal backdrop, it rings hollow to assert that structural review in its nature “conflicts with the premises of constitutional theory.”

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rights or to running counter to the requirements of Equal Protection, . . . there is . . . a long tradition of constitutional holdings that inertia will not do. In such instances, courts have asserted the right to strike down statutes and, before ruling on the ultimate validity of that legislation, to demand a present and positive acknowledgment of the values that the legislators wish to further through the legislation in issue.

Id. at 735 (emphasis added). In short, Judge Calabresi himself came to embrace the use of time-tied rules, at least in this instance, as a vehicle for protecting substantive constitutional values.

273 TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 211. See also Daniel v. Family Secur. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949) (“[A] judiciary must judge by results, not by the varied factors which may have determined legislators’ votes.”).

274 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV. See supra note 21.

275 In public-official defamation cases, for example, many procedural rules serve to protect First Amendment values. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (on motion for summary judgment, lower courts must inquire into convincing clarity of actual malice); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (noting plaintiff has burden of proof in cases governed by New York Times or Gertz); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500-03 (1984) (requiring appellate courts to review de novo whether evidence of actual malice was clear and convincing); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (evidence must show statement was made with actual malice).

276 TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 211.
It is particularly inaccurate—indeed, inaccurate in the extreme—to describe semisubstantive review as entailing “futility.” As Professor Eisenberg has observed in discussing constitutional “why” rules:

[Some lawmakers], after being informed that they initially acted unconstitutionally, may refuse to vote for reenactment. [And] if a statute is invalidated on judicial review, the legislature often will decline or fail to consider a new law. In many situations, therefore, judicial action on the basis of motive results in an effective, not a futile, invalidation.\(^{278}\)

At a minimum, remands to the legislature have the powerful effect of shifting the “burden of inertia.”\(^{279}\) They also have practical impacts because (as we have seen) members of legislative bodies come and go over time.\(^{280}\)


\(^{279}\)Farber & Frickey, *supra* note 203, at 918 n.253 (arguing that “merely shifting the burden of inertia in the policymaking process itself can be significant” because proponents of the invalidated law must bear the burden of lobbying Congress; because it is easier to defeat legislation than obtain its passage, a remand to Congress “may as a practical matter result in a policy’s ultimate demise”); see also Robert A. Burt, *The Constitution in Conflict* 365 (1992) (“Legislation is always easier to block than to enact” and “this provides significant added protection to the party who stands to gain from legislative inaction . . . .”).

\(^{280}\)See, e.g., Email from Hans Linde to author (Aug. 16, 2002) (on file with author) (“I do not agree that invalidating an action that can be repeated under more respectable premises is a waste of time. Chances are that an election will have intervened, or that there is a change in other decisionmakers. . . .”). This point seems to answer any argument that interest group pressures all but ensure that “remanding an issue to the legislature is futile because the mechanistic process of legislation eliminates the possibility of a thoughtful legislative response.” Farber & Frickey, *supra* note 203, at 876. What is more, this is the case even if one deems interest-group pressures as decisive in the lawmaking process. Why? Because due to time’s passage, a judicially ordered second look may protect constitutional values by mandating an affirmative override of them by a legislature whose members represent interests quite different from the interests represented by the members of the initially enacting legislature. Professors Farber and Frickey make this point in forceful terms:

To be sure, judicial invalidation under this approach constitutes only a suspensive veto. Yet even that shifts the burden of inertia to those seeking to reimpose the invalidated decision, highlights the perceived unfairness of the decision, and because of the passage of time, often presents the issue to a legislature constituted somewhat differently from the one that made the original decision. Considering the ease of killing legislation and the difficulty of passing it, these consequences of a suspensive veto are significant.

*Id.* at 923.
What is more, these rules always carry with them judicial instructions that may focus, deepen or otherwise reshape political-branch decisionmaking. Indeed, some semisubstantial rulings create very high odds of enduring practical consequences; rules focused on forcing reassessments of statutes that appear to have outlived their usefulness illustrate the point.

All of these observations show why lawmakers often will not automatically respond to suspensive interventions with program reenactments. But even if the futility argument did have empirical validity that argument would be open to serious challenge on the ground that there is value in proper process itself. Do we really want courts to turn a blind eye when they learn that a state’s facially neutral voter disenfranchisement rule was the product of rank racist hatred? Do we really want courts to stand idly by when they discover that a sloppily slapped-together affirmative action program came about due to a spoils system based on skin color? In cases of this nature, even if reenactment of the program is predictable, concerns about the integrity and legitimacy of

\[281\] See, e.g., Ward, supra note 25, at 17-18 (arguing that political allies of the Court “will often have sufficient strength to deter elected officials from reversing a judicial decision that vindicates the Constitution,” especially after a judicial decision “signals a conflict of constitutional magnitude”). Judge Calabresi has expressed worry that second-look rulings may shape legislative behavior in negative ways. He supposes, for example, that some state legislators made post-Furman votes for the death penalty on the ground of political expediency because they assumed the courts would strike down any newly enacted law. Calabresi, supra note 85, at 26-27. This concern, however, is speculative and probably overdrawn. In any event, the proper solution to this problem, if it exists, is not for judges to scrap semisubstantive rules altogether, but for legislators to act responsibly. If judges want a sober second look, they should tell legislators exactly that, and legislators in turn should not assume that judges do not mean what they say.

\[282\] Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1874 (noting strong possibility of law-reform effects worked by time-tied “when” rules).

\[283\] See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 923-24 (noting President Eisenhower’s failure to secure congressional reinstatement of travel ban struck down in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)); Bickel, supra note 8, at 166 (“The Court’s action in remanding the issue to Congress [in Kent] bore some fruit. Hearings and quite extensive consideration followed, and a relatively moderate and well-drawn bill passed the House. In the Senate there were hearings and a number of bills, but in the end no legislation, at least not yet.”). Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 337, 377-78, 416 (1991) (noting infrequency with which judicial interpretations of statutes are overridden by Congress). If further evidence of non-futility is needed, it is supplied by the experience of other nations. See Bateup, supra note 23, at 1120 (suggesting that override power available to the legislative branch, under the Canadian Constitution, “has rarely been employed”); Ward, supra note 25, at 20 n.61 (agreeing that the legislative override in Canada “has not played a significant role” and collecting authorities).


\[285\] In City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989), a plurality of the Court detected just such a risk, although three dissents argued vigorously that they were wrong.
government behavior push hard for at least a thoughtful reconsideration. Just as rules of procedural due process in the adjudicative context have an “intrinsic value” apart from “the right to secure a different outcome,” semisubstantive safeguards have a role to play in “generating the feeling, so important to popular government, that justice has been done.”

H. Argument 8 (Constitutional Underenforcement): Semisubstantive rules will induce courts to underenforce constitutional norms.

The futile-gesture argument suggests that judges who wield semisubstantive doctrines do too little because they do nothing at all. As we have seen, this logic is faulty. There is, however, a related argument that raises a greater concern. That argument posits that semisubstantive safeguards may cause courts to under-judge. The idea is that the availability of semisubstantive rules will lead judicial authorities to use these rules to the exclusion of hard-and-fast substantive doctrines that form the proper core of constitutional law. In other words, because semisubstantive doctrines are available, judges will use them too much, use substantive rules too little, and thus underenforce important constitutional norms.

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286TRIBE, supra note 19, at 666.
288See supra notes 277-283 and accompanying text.
289See Calabresi, supra note 21, at 104 n.71 (“When he first described such a scheme of judicial review, Bickel was criticized for providing too narrow and conservative a role for the judiciary.”); Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 391-92 (“If due process of lawmaking was employed only where strict scrutiny otherwise applied, it might end up displacing substantive judicial review altogether.”); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 207, at 1149 (noting “scruples about . . . possible devaluation of the Constitution, . . . inherent in constitutional common law”); cf. Bateup, supra note 23, at 1130 (expressing worry about the way in which semisubstantive rules and substantive rules of judicial decisionmaking interact, particularly as to when courts should use one technique or the other).
290See, e.g., Schrock & Welsh, supra note 207, at 1165 (“[A]ct of subconstitutionalizing rights places them on a less firm foundation, since a common law rule is reversible by Congress, while a constitutional rule is not.”); see also Calabresi, supra note 21, at 135-36 (“I would avoid the application of [hard-and-fast] protections to even such popular, open-ended concepts as the ‘right to privacy.’”); Sandalow, supra note 29, at 1190 (arguing that felt need to use judicial review to protect minorities should be tempered with an understanding that “the political process leading to [legislative] decisions contains prodigious internal safeguards for [minorities’] interests,” particularly in the “effect upon the political process of the extraordinary variety of interest groups . . . and the crosscutting loyalties and identifications that exist among the members of such groups”). Professors Buzbee and Schapiro argue that the Court “should take responsibility for the decision and not attempt to shift the blame to Congress” by using semisubstantive rules. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 143. See also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 375 (arguing Court has duty to
This argument has force if its basic premise is true, for constitutional rules should be suspect if in fact they lead to an unwarranted dilution of constitutional rights. There is, however, a difficulty with the argument because its underlying premise is doubtful. To begin with, the underenforcement argument seems to posit—contrary to the history most of us remember—that judges have a disinclination to use hard-and-fast rules of constitutional decisionmaking. \(^{291}\) In fact, the present-day Court uses hard-and-fast rules with regularity despite the ready availability of semisubstantive doctrinal alternatives. \(^{292}\) No less important, the availability of semisubstantive rules may well cause courts to vindicate constitutional norms by way of a second-look approach when those norms would otherwise go wholly unprotected. \(^{293}\) Put another way, the use of semisubstantive review may induce courts to give constitutional rights a measure of protection they would not receive if only hard-and-fast rules were on the scene. Indeed, for this reason, the availability of semisubstantive rules may well cause courts to avoid underenforcing constitutional protections.

How all of this comes out in the wash is not apparent. But there is little reason to suppose that, all things considered, judicial use of semisubstantive doctrines will cause an underenforcement of constitutional rights. \(^{294}\)
I. Argument 9 (Flawed Premises): Semisubstantive rules—or at least many of them—rest on simplistic or contrived notions about the nature of lawmaking processes.

Rules that target political processes should reflect political realities. Do semisubstantive doctrines comport with this notion? Some commentators have claimed they do not. Professor Tushnet for example, has urged that the Court ignored political realities in issuing such structural decisions as *Bakke* and *Mow Sun Wong*.²⁹⁵ In the latter case, he says, the Court erred in assuming that the federal Civil Service Commission myopically focused on employment-efficiency issues, while paying no attention whatsoever to foreign policy concerns. The problem with this reasoning, Professor Tushnet says, is that the outlawed rule was “undoubtedly produced after a study by members of the Commission’s staff, who most certainly consulted both formally and informally with members of other staffs knowledgeable about foreign policy.”²⁹⁶ Likewise, he asserts that Justice Powell erred in assuming in *Bakke* that the Cal-Davis admissions program “was paid not the slightest bit of attention” by the politically accountable California legislature when that legislature had an obvious interest in overseeing key affirmative action decisions made by college administrators.²⁹⁷ Thus, each of these rulings, he concludes, “is predicated on a vision of an imaginary policymaking process.”²⁹⁸

At the outset, it bears noting that Professor Tushnet’s comments are directed only at “who” rules and, for that matter, at only two who-rule cases; those comments thus cast no shadow over other semisubstantive doctrines. No less important, Professor Tushnet’s critique of *Mow Sun Wong* and *Bakke* is itself overdrawn. For example, in pooh-poohing the up-the-chain-

²⁹⁵Tushnet, *supra* note 27, at 207; see *supra* notes 105-114 and accompanying text (discussing Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977), and Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)).
²⁹⁶Tushnet, *supra* note 27, at 206.
²⁹⁷Id. at 207.
²⁹⁸Id.
of-command “who” rule of Bakke, Professor Tushnet asserts that state legislators—no less than University officials—“are insulated from political accountability” because “incumbents have an automatic electoral advantage against opponents.” But state legislators (unlike University officials) are subject to election, and their “electoral advantage” is not an electoral lock (particularly if they take unpopular positions on the concededly “sensitive” and “controversial” issues raised by affirmative action programs). Even more important, Professor Tushnet’s minimization of the differing levels of accountability of agencies and legislatures ignores elementary principles of political science. Those principles, after all, leave no doubt that “constituent and contributor interests do influence legislators” in a way they do not influence appointed officials because “reelection is an important motive.”

In any event, one can embrace Professor Tushnet’s premises without endorsing his conclusions. It is true that policymaking systems are “complex” and that different decisionmaking units—for example, the Civil Service Commission and the President in one instance, or the California legislature and the state Board of Regents in another—are not sealed off from another with hermetic neatness. It is also the case, however, that different decisionmaking bodies do have different competencies, different constituencies, and different capacities for deliberation, representation, and accountability. With regard to Mow Sun Wong, for example, even Professor Tushnet concedes that the “Commission’s staff process would probably give more weight to personnel considerations and less to foreign policy considerations than the President’s staff processes.”

But if that is true, the Court’s who-based reasoning in the case is defensible for that very reason.

Finally, it is important not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Proper development of semisubstantive safeguards—like proper development of all constitutional rules—necessarily will turn on contextual decisions made by conscientious judges confronted with an unfolding series of cases. If, in this process, it appears that a particular semisubstantive “who” rule “misconceives the policymaking process,” the proper response is not to junk “who” rules altogether. Instead, the proper response is to reshape those rules to bring them more in line with policymaking realities.

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299 Id.
300 Id. at 207-08.
301 Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 900.
302 TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 207.
303 Id. at 207 n.48.
304 See Coenen, supra note 11, at 1371-75 (discussing frequency with which Rehnquist Court has shown openness to applying “who” rules).
305 TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 206.
This same point helps to diminish the force of attacks on findings-and-study-based “how” rules, such as the rule deployed in Garrett.306 In recent years, a cottage industry of criticism directed at these rules has sprung up in the law journals.307 One complaint is that findings-and-study rules mistakenly equate legislatures with administrative agencies.308 The overarching point is that so-called “hard look” rules have long and properly been directed at administrative agencies in light of their distinctive characteristics—such as a lack of electoral accountability and a duty to implement statutory mandates—that legislative bodies do not share.309 These reasons for applying hard-look rules to agencies do not apply to legislatures. Thus (so the argument goes) it makes no sense to apply these sorts of rules in policing the enactment of a statute.

Semisubstantive findings-and-study rules, however, may benefit lawmaking processes even if the challenges faced by legislatures differ greatly from the challenges faced by agencies.310 Heart disease and

306See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
307See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 332-39, 383-86 (noting that formal legislative record does not reveal proper reliance upon informal and extra-record sources such as views of constituents, ex parte communications with interest groups, information gathered by congressional agencies); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 96 (“No set of compiled written materials will provide a comprehensive record of what influenced legislative action.”); Colker & Brudney, supra note 30, at 117 (asserting that semisubstantive rules “[fail] to appreciate the skill and sophistication that Congress brings” in legislation “through a range of informal contacts”). Of particular significance, Professor Frickey—who serves as something of a jedi-master in this field—has stepped back from his earlier optimism about findings-and-study rules to take a far more skeptical stance. Compare Frickey & Smith, supra note 11 at 1733-36 (listing a myriad of problems with findings-and-study rules), with Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 926 (“Due process of lawmaking has the potential to strengthen the democratic process.”); Frickey, supra note 227, at 697-98. For some less critical appraisals, see Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 757, 760 (1996) (suggesting that findings-and-study rules may “facilitate the exercise of judicial review and improve interbranch communication’); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 731, 733-34 (1996) (noting rule’s potential to increase accountability and help in vindicating otherwise underenforced constitutional norms).
308See Krent, supra note 307, at 746 (“Treating Congress as a glorified administrative agency cuts against our system of government, which embraces the norm of majoritarian rule through the democratic process.”). See also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 331 (“[T]he reasons that justify ‘on-the-record’ review in the administrative [agency] context . . . do not apply to the legislative branch.”); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 120 (arguing that legislative record review is similar to administrative action review, but even “more probing”).
310See, e.g., Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (justifying findings-and-study approach in part based on “the unfortunate fact that Congress
headaches are very different things. This fact does not mean, however, that aspirin cannot work effectively against both conditions. Put another way, the question is not whether agencies and legislatures are different. The question is whether, even though they are different, findings-and-study rules (that target legislatures only when specialized constitutional dangers are present) have a useful role to play in safeguarding constitutional values. And there are a variety of reasons to conclude they do.  

Critics of findings-and-study rules also focus on the many impediments that get in the way of legislative consideration of constitutional concerns. In their view, it makes little sense to remand matters to legislatures so that they can reconsider constitutional difficulties when legislatures by nature lack adeptness in processing constitutional arguments. No one contends, however, that findings-and-study rules are a lawmaking panacea. Rather, their function is to poke and to nudge. It may be—as critics assert—that most legislative findings concerning constitutional matters end up being written by committee personnel who are excessively responsive to interest group demands. Even if this is the case, however, at least some people at
some level in the lawmaking process are giving some attention to constitutional values. Critics also argue that most representatives could care less about findings and studies because ensuring reelection, fundraising, and vote-trading dominate their thoughts. Even so, shining a light on enduring principles may influence at least some legislators’ thinking. It also will send a proper message to lawmakers that, in all their work, they must keep the Constitution in view.

Finally, it may be that legislative findings have a busy-work quality. At the least, however, findings-and-study rules often generate the practical consequence of triggering the remand of a previously enacted law to the legislature for a second look. When semisubstantive rules have this effect, they couple bi-temporalism with bicameralism in a way that impedes precisely the sort of “rash and hasty” decisionmaking that most concerned the Framers. What is more, in the face of a judicial remand, elected officials cannot simply ignore what the court has done. Proponents of the scuttled legislation will have to consider why the court demanded further action; otherwise they can have no assurance that their efforts at reinstating

because such groups are able to get language into legislative history that they are unable to get into statutory language”).


316 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword, The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1979) (emphasizing that legislatures “see their primary function in terms of registering the actual, current preferences of the people—what they want and what they believe should be done”); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 587, 606 (1983) (“[F]or the most part the legislators are motivated by a desire to enact any particular piece of legislation that fills the perceived needs of the moment.”); id. at 588 (adding that legislatures are not “institutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values”).

317 Findings-and-study rules may serve other purposes as well. See, e.g., Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 369 (“Placing a floor on the level of deliberation required to enact a law could help improve the quality of . . . political accountability.”). See also supra note 203 (noting possible benefits of diminishing tensions between Congress and the Courts and of enhancing the quality of judicial review by supplying useful information).

318 Sunstein, supra note 294, at 76 (1985) (claiming that, if representatives were forced to act in Madisonian mold, they would, at most, produce “‘boilerplate’- rationalizations designed to placate the courts—rather than a genuine critical inquiry into issues of value and fact”).

the law will prove effective.\textsuperscript{320} Political-branch adversaries of the legislation are also sure to take heed of the court’s directives. Those directives after all, will point out difficulties with the provisionally invalidated measure (as well as potential obstacles to its successful reenactment), thus “call[ing] forth . . . opposition” and providing that opposition with useful tools of argument.\textsuperscript{321} In short, a judicial remand inevitably requires reconsideration after the passage of time, while creating some measure of heightened focus on constitutional complications as that reconsideration occurs. It seems plausible to conclude that, at least sometimes, these conditions will cause legislatures to resurrect provisionally invalidated laws only if especially powerful justifications for reviving them exist.\textsuperscript{322}

Legislative findings-and-study rules cannot purge passions and raw politics from all instances of legislative behavior. At the same time, it is hard to see what better tools courts can use to push along the sort of meaningful deliberation the Framers envisioned when pressing risks to basic rights or constitutional structures appear.\textsuperscript{323} In the end, critiques of findings-and-study rules both ask too much of, and fear too much from, this form of semisubstantive review. Legislative findings-and-study rules do not seek to move the earth. Rather, they operate in modest fashion, in a limited number of settings, to tilt lawmaking processes in such a direction that they will take some account of important constitutional values.\textsuperscript{324} In this way, findings-and-study rules promote—in a distinctively self-limiting and minimally disruptive way—the most salient purposes of our constitutional plan.

\textsuperscript{320}See supra notes 11, 14-15, 19-20 and accompanying text.  
\textsuperscript{321}Email from Hans Linde to author (Aug. 16, 2002) (on file with author) (making this observation in the context of discussing “why” rules).  
\textsuperscript{322}It is true, of course, that in some circumstances, an “especially powerful justification” will not exist, but that instead, reenactment of the same or a similar law will result from the exertion of raw political power of self-interest groups. Even in these cases, however, shifting the burden of inertia onto the backs of those groups will at least ensure that the law that is reenacted in response to distinctively powerful democratic forces. And if no genuinely public-regarding justification for the law is identifiable, it remains open to courts to invalidate the law pursuant to due-process or equal-protection rationality review. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 29 (describing rationality review as requirement that “public measures must be a minimally reasonable effort to promote some public value”).  
\textsuperscript{323}See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text (collecting passages on this point from The Federalist).  
\textsuperscript{324}See supra notes 313-315 and accompanying text.
J. Argument 10 (Novelty): Structural rules should be viewed as suspect and unstable because they depart from the path ordinarily traveled in the formulation of constitutional law.

If this article has accomplished nothing else, it has dismantled any challenge to semisubstantive rules based on the notion that they are new and exotic. In fact, semisubstantive rules draw strong support from related principles—like First Amendment procedural rules and means-driven doctrines—that are settled features of the constitutional landscape. Even more important, many semisubstantive tools of decisionmaking—such as motive-based doctrines, clear statement rules, and constitutional common law—have roots that reach back to the earliest days of the Republic.

Most important of all, semisubstantive interventions are both numerous and increasingly common in the Supreme Court’s modern-day work. The Courts’ many structural decisions thus work hand in hand to lend precedential support to one another. That there are four major strains of semisubstantive decisionmaking, each of which has multiple subcomponents, explodes the notion that this style of review is nothing more than a party-crashing interloper at the table of constitutional law.

CONCLUSION

Semisubstantive reasoning pervades constitutional law. Given this reality, analysts must begin to give these doctrines more systematic attention than they have received in the past. In this article, I have tried to push this process forward by exploring the many normative questions to which these rules give rise. In the future, much debate about the wisdom, legitimacy,
and proper shape of semisubstantive doctrines is certain to occur. But if moderation is a virtue, as our greatest philosophers have taught, there is at least something to be said for the provisional, politically reversible style of decisionmaking represented by this body of doctrine.

What I have written about semisubstantive rules I offer in the spirit of tentativeness that a still-unfolding evaluation of a still-unfolding phenomenon deserves. But about one thing my conclusions are not tentative at all. Courts will continue to encounter invitations to take semisubstantive approaches to cases that come in many forms. As judges grapple with these cases, they can only profit from what this Article invites others to help elaborate—a systematic evaluation of semisubstantive safeguards of constitutional limits on government power.

332 See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics 111 (H. Rackham trans., 1962) (n.d.) (stating “that moral virtue is a mean, and in what sense this is so, namely that it is a mean between two vices, one of excess and the other of defect; and that it is such a mean because it aims at hitting the middle point in feelings and in actions”).