Power in Coalition: Strategies for Strong Unions and Social Change

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What is This?

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In The New Jim Crow, civil rights lawyer and Ohio State University law professor Michelle Alexander examines the legal and social framework that supports the regime of mass incarceration of black men in the United States. As Alexander carefully recounts, beginning in the early 1980s with President Reagan’s declaration of a “War on Drugs,” a number of policy initiatives, Supreme Court decisions, and vested interests, aided and abetted by political divisiveness and public apathy, coalesced to create the social, legal, and political environment that has supported mass incarceration ever since. Alexander’s analysis reveals disturbing parallels between the racial caste systems of slavery, Jim Crow, and today’s mass incarceration of black men in our country. In the end, however, Alexander shies away from proposing a potentially successful strategy for redressing the dilemma she so carefully depicts. Rather, she “punts,” or “cops out,” as we would have said in earlier eras.

Alexander begins her analysis with a brief history of the several hundred years of variously oppressive race relations between whites and blacks in the United States. Quite correctly, Alexander observes that this history may be fruitfully understood as a sequence of renascent forms of social control re-fashioned to the new tenor of the times. Thus, Alexander traces the history of American political rhetoric in the latter half of the twentieth century where “law and order” comes to constitute code for “the race problem” and a policy of malign neglect toward African Americans is transmuted into an active political strategy devised to develop Republican political dominance in the southern states. Ultimately, as we know, the twin themes of crime and welfare propelled Ronald Reagan into the presidency. Searching for a follow-up initiative to define his early presidency, Reagan settled on increased attention to street crime, especially drug law enforcement. In short, the War on Drugs was not some disembodied social agenda, nor was it driven by public demand, as only two percent of Americans believed crime was an important issue at the time. Rather, as Alexander shows, the War on Drugs was a direct outgrowth of race-based politics and therefore the fact that it has had a disproportionate impact on young black men should come as no surprise.

Alexander next turns her attention to the interwoven details of the social, legal, and political fabric that wrap the War on Drugs in supportive garb. As Alexander recites, the War on Drugs is the cornerstone on which the current regime of race-based mass incarceration rests because: (a) convictions for drug offenses are the single most important cause of the explosion in incarceration rates since 1980, and (b) black Americans are disproportionately arrested, convicted, and subjected to lengthy sentences for drug offenses when compared to white Americans, even though drug use rates among white Americans have been consistently shown to be higher than for black Americans. Thus, any practices or policies that support the execution of the War on Drugs support the continuation of our movement toward mass incarceration of an entire category of Americans. Among the many developments Alexander reviews, one may note: changes in Supreme Court doctrine with respect to police stops, warrantless searches, consent searches, and suspicionless police sweeps for drug activity; federal initiatives to offer grants to support narcotics task forces; the development and expansion of modern drug forfeiture laws which permitted state and local law enforcement agencies to keep the vast majority of seized cash and assets in drug raids; and the legislative enactment of mandatory minimum and “three strikes” sentencing schemes, and their ready
acceptance by the Supreme Court. Alexander is at her masterful best when elucidating in concise form the emergence of each of these trends and their consequent impact on increased arrest, conviction, and incarceration for primarily young black men over the last thirty years. She is, of course, quite correct to be indignant about the fact that the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of forty years imprisonment for possession and an attempt to sell nine ounces of marijuana in 1982 (Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370).

Moreover, as Alexander further explains, the debilitating impact of our country’s War on Drugs does not end once a person convicted for a drug offense serves his or her sentence. Rather, an increasingly long and punitive list of collateral consequences now extends a person’s assignment to second-class status nearly permanently. Thus, offenders may be ineligible (for life) for federally-funded health and welfare benefits, food stamps, public housing, and federal educational assistance; denied admission and licensure to many forms of employment and professional occupations; denied the ability to enlist in the military, purchase a firearm, obtain a federal security clearance, and restricted from voting. The result, as Alexander compellingly depicts, is not that drug law offenders face “problems of reentry into society” as the current rhetoric of criminal justice exhorts, but rather that convicted offenders are “boxed in” (by having to admit their conviction on forms) and thereby forced out, often permanently, from many legitimate relationships with society. Alexander’s analysis of these developments is pithy and nearly flawless. She falters occasionally, however, when she attempts to place some of these events in a political context and chart the political landscape that will need to emerge to put an end to The New Jim Crow.

Alexander begins her final chapter by discussing what she calls the “relative quiet” of the civil rights community in the face of the mass incarceration of the people of color she describes. She wonders—given the magnitude and unfairness of the present system—why the War on Drugs has not become “. . .the top priority of every civil rights organization in the country” (p. 212). In answering her own question, Alexander notes that subsequent to Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 civil rights organizations became increasingly professionalized—primarily by lawyers. Consequently, many of the civil rights issues were framed in legal terms, pursued in the legal arena, and reduced to legally achievable solutions. By doing so, Alexander believes that the civil rights advocacy groups disconnected themselves from the community and relinquished the grassroots source of their moral strength. They also foresaw the goal of actively mobilizing public opinion against the oppressive laws and social conditions they deplored.

In the end, Alexander offers a number of what she calls “conversation starters.” First, she states unequivocally that “tinkering” with the present arrangements will not likely achieve notable results; rather, she believes we must end the War on Drugs. Second, in doing so, Alexander suggests we must talk explicitly about race and oppose the tendency to obfuscate the situation with a retreat into denial behind the official veil of colorblindness. Third, Alexander suggests that it may be time for civil rights groups to step away from affirmative action because of its tendency to shield the racial caste system from scrutiny and redress. Finally, Alexander questions the success of the African American strategy to infiltrate elite institutions, including President Obama’s ascendance to the presidency, and thereby let civil rights “trickle down” to the mass of the black community.

In lieu of these traditional approaches, unfortunately, Alexander offers little but platitudes, wishful bromides, and clichés. Thus, for example, she suggests that “. . . [blacks and whites alike] must lay down our racial bribes, join hands with people of all colors who are not content to wait for change to trickle down, and say to those who would stand in our way: Accept all of us or none” (p. 245). However, as sociologists everywhere recognize, to make a job “everyone’s” responsibility is to make it “no one’s” responsibility. Apparently without irony, Alexander also soberly advises us that, “All of this is easier said than done” (p. 247). For a lawyer who has retreated from the entrenched fray of overturning the Supreme Court’s precedents on sentencing, which she abhors, her call upon the civil rights community to re-frame itself and get to work is not
a call to arms but an invitation to snore. In sum, like many other indignant analyses of the highly objectionable War on Drugs offered over the last thirty years, Alexander’s superb historical and legal review evades the hard work of developing a potentially effective strategy for mobilizing progressive social action that is required.


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Rarely in our society do we speak of an event or phenomenon without quantifying it. If something is a problem, we want to know how big of a problem it is. If something is beneficial, we want to know just how much it will help. From advertisements that tout their product as 50 percent better than the leading competitor, to nightly newscasts that frighten us with figures of increasing disease and crime rates, our intellectual appetites crave answers that we can sink our teeth into. Numbers have proven to be the food of choice.

Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict is a captivating chronicle of our attempts to bring order to the chaotic world around us by categorization and quantification. At the most basic level this book is a collection of excellent essays each with a unique contribution. Individual essays explore the intriguing worlds of human trafficking, drug cartels, terrorism, and the human tragedies of war. Yet each piece in the collection also speaks to larger linkages that unify and give purpose to the collection. Themes connecting the assorted topics include the difficulties in obtaining reliable estimates, the dangers of misrepresenting the underlying phenomenon, and the creation and consequences of political agendas formed upon these fictional foundations. The final result is a product that intrigues and informs the reader from cover to cover.

The foundation of this book is built upon the human need to understand the world around us with science being the tool we use to form such understanding. Unfortunately, numbers are too often mistaken for hard science regardless of their origin or accuracy. Moreover, many key issues we seek to study are not simply quantified. Indeed, as noted by Peter Andreas and Kelly Greenhill in the first chapter, many of the activities we are most interested in examining are purposefully hidden from us by their actors (e.g., organized crime, drug dealing, war crimes, etc.) The necessary result being that the numbers reported are rarely, if ever, an accurate assessment of the phenomenon. Rather, the numbers we so dearly hold to be true are at best a scientific guess, and at worst, a mere illusion.

While it is not necessarily wrong to estimate, or as we often say in my field, “guestimate,” Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts clearly depicts how estimates are often not presented as such but rather are formulated as fact. Once breathing, the numbers take on a life of their own such that they are oft repeated, republished, and ultimately reified as fact even when one is hard-pressed to find a legitimate genesis. This particular issue is nicely highlighted in Chapter Two, “The Politics of Measuring Illicit Flows and Policy Effectiveness” by Peter Andreas, as the author searches for the source of a figure placing the profits of the internet pornography market at $20 billion-a-year. One agency cites another with that agency in turn citing another and so on and so forth. In the end, no official source is ever found.

Moreover, Lara J. Nettelfield posits in Chapter Seven, “Research and Repercussions of Death Tolls,” that once a number has achieved general acceptance anyone who challenges its origin may be cast a villain. Using the original estimate of 200,000 to 250,000 killed in the Bosnian war, the author reveals that when more accurate counts became available that lowered the death toll substantially, those reporting the new, more accurate numbers were criticized for attempting to minimize the importance of the war and its human loss.
Of perhaps even greater importance than the creation of a number is its consequence. As noted by W.I. and D.S. Thomas, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (1928, pp. 571–72). This "reality" created by numbers then leads to public policy responses such that if a number is overinflated the policy response is often too severe, and if it is underreported or "absent" from the data the response is inadequate. Although some might argue that overestimation is not necessarily a "bad thing" as it can lead to a more rapid policy response to an issue, such fabrication must necessarily have consequences. As highlighted by Kelly Greenhill in Chapter Six, "Counting the Cost," one potential consequence is the loss of public and political trust if numbers seem too illogical. On the other hand, if trust is gained, scarce resources could be misallocated based on purposeful misrepresentations.

Furthermore, if a policy response is indeed called for, then we must of course also measure how successful the policy has been at addressing the given problem. Herein lies another opportunity for ambiguity. As duly noted by Sue Eckert and Thomas Biersteker in Chapter 10, "(Mis)Measuring Success in Countering the Financing of Terrorism," when the behavior to be thwarted is criminal, much of the information upon which an assessment of effectiveness might be based is "classified." Thus, similar to the shadows in which the counting of crime occurs, the success of efforts to prevent or reduce it remain cloaked as well.

The above summary offers but a mere glimpse into the rich and meaningful information provided in this book. In my opinion, Andreas and Greenhill have compiled a compelling set of readings that will interest sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and criminologists alike. One might even hope that this novel collection would find its way into the hands of journalists who so often report the numbers, and the average citizen who is the unwitting consumer. However, I end with a caution: although the title "Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts" is indeed "sexy," the book is not for adult entertainment but rather mature audiences. By mature, I mean those ready to open their minds to question the reality in which they live, and to be educated rather than remain eager consumers of numbers.

Reference


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International migration, long neglected as a salient feature of globalization, is increasingly becoming the object of study for scholars interested in understanding some of the most vexing issues confronting contemporary societies, including state sovereignty, notions of citizenship, and belongingness and human rights. As migration patterns have become more globalized, the determinants and consequences of these flows have become more complex, and scholars are reconsidering some of the fundamental ideas and categories upon which the field of migration studies has been constructed. As a result, migration studies is experiencing an especially dynamic period, with an array of new concepts and analytical frameworks that attempt to make sense of migration in globalizing world.

This volume highlights several of the key trends in the field and points to some new directions for research. Cédric Audebert and Mohamed Kamel Doraï assemble a collection of papers from an international conference organized by the Migrinter research center at the University of Poitiers and the HumanitarianNet European network in 2006. The volume is organized around four themes.

Part I includes three chapters that address the issues of migrant settlement, integration, and social cohesion in host societies. The
opening chapter by Rinus Penninx provides an overview of research on migrant integration in Europe since the 1970s, focusing exclusively on research conducted by the IMISCOE research network. In a particularly interesting chapter, Roger Waldinger uses data from the 2003 International Social Survey Program module on national identity to compare public opinions of immigrants in the United States and France. He finds some insightful differences between publics but also an interesting similarity in the politics of immigration in the two countries: “left and right fundamentally agree on the need to keep external boundaries controlled” (p. 59). The following chapter by Sari Hanafi concludes this section with a discussion of the Danish cartoon controversy in 2006 and the perception of Muslim immigrants in Western societies. Hanafi uses the Danish cartoon controversy as an example of how cultural hegemony works against migrants in Western countries.

The second part of the book consists of three chapters that deal with migrant transnationalism. Thomas Faist opens this section with a wide-ranging essay on the topic, arguing that transnationalist approaches offer a “counter-balance” (p. 101) to macro-level perspectives of migration while allowing for critical inquiry into the cross-national social processes that underlie global social hierarchies. The following chapter by Alessandro Monsutti takes a critical approach to transnational studies, pointing out the difference between “an intellectual flirtation” and a “genuine theoretical enrichment capable of leading to a new ethnographic practice” (p. 121). This section is concluded with an especially eclectic chapter by Stéphane de Tapia, who describes the many aspects of time and space in the concept of transnationalism, emphasizes pitfalls in “the language of migration” (p. 128), and describes the links between transnationalism studies and a few strands of French migration research.

Two chapters in Part III discuss the issue of migration and development. Ronald Skeldon covers most of the key issues on this topic in a very limited space, including remittances, diasporas, and the brain drain. Skeldon provides a balanced overview, arguing that migration is an “integral part of the development process” but that “we should be well-aware of its limitations” (p. 156). Patrick Gonin approaches the migration-development nexus by describing migrants as “frontier runners” (p. 161) that move and settle in host countries in order to build capacity and resources for development in their origin country. In doing so, Gonin contends that migrants become “circulating people with multiple and accepted territorialities” (p. 177).

Part IV consists of two chapters on forced migration. The chapter by Michel Agier describes an increasingly close, and contradictory, association between management of refugees and asylum seekers, on the one hand, and humanitarian action, on the other hand. Agier takes a particularly critical stance against the UNHCR, arguing that it has produced a situation in which the “dominant figure today is that of the failed asylum seeker. . .the last stage in abandoning the stateless” (p. 188). The following chapter by Veronique Lassailly-Jacob focuses on forced migration in Africa, a “new but overlooked category of refugees” (p. 191). Lassailly-Jacob pays special attention to Eritrean refugees in Sudan and Mozambican refugees in Zambia and shows that there are incongruities in host country laws on asylum in the two countries and between UNHCR and national asylum policies.

Overall, the volume falls short in its attempt to provide a “comprehensive state of the art” (p. 203). As is the case with many edited collections, it is difficult to integrate a series of conference papers into a coherent whole and this collection is no exception. Audebert and Doraï’s introduction and conclusion do lend some unity to the volume, but the discontinuities between chapters are too much to overcome. Each chapter is relatively accessible, but as a whole, the volume is very uneven in terms of quality, rigor, and originality. Very little of the material is particularly groundbreaking, and some of it is indeed quite derivative. This book will be of interest mainly to English and French-speaking audiences in Europe desiring an overview of some of the more important topics in migration studies from a predominantly European perspective.
While the title of this edited volume initially invokes more cinematic than social science stimuli, it is the usefulness of these concepts for interdisciplinary theory and research that is the interest of the authors. With the increasing popular use of the terms diaspora and transnationalism and the widening of their empirical scope, the phenomena covered and the conceptual boundaries of each concept have become increasingly blurred. However, according to the editors, the goal of this volume is not to address the definitional conceptual debate, but rather to argue that the meaning of diaspora and transnationalism must be inferred from their use. This begs the question, however, about what defines their explanatory power in social science research. For the editors the best criteria for the academic value of these concepts lies in their capacity to trigger new research perspectives and questions—criteria this multi-author edited volume is unable to attain fully, in part due the lack of comparability and validity in definitions and processes across the contributed chapters.

Based on a European University Institute conference, the book is organized in three main sections: (1) interpreting of the two concepts, (2) new theoretical approaches and research questions, and (3) methodological problems and innovations. A key conclusion from the overview chapter by Thomas Faist, co-editor, is that the meanings of diaspora and transnationalism often overlap and espouse similarities, but sometimes refer to divergent perspectives. However, he suggests that a strength of diaspora studies and migrant transnationalism is its reflectivity of agency and processes, which can inform understanding of broader issues of social change.

Turning first to the topic of interpreting the concepts, in her chapter of the dynamics of migrants’ transnational formation, Janine Dahinden argues that diaspora and transnationalism are socially constructed concepts that connect with nomadic versus normative forms of cross-border movements and ties. Transnationalism, she suggests, is characterized by migrant circulation movement (behaviors) across borders, while diaspora is characterized by the ties of migrants to their collectives while being settled in countries of immigration. However, diaspora can be a murky concept, particularly in articulating the ideas and theory of immigrant incorporation. For example, does it follow that diaspora and transnationalism migrants are characterized by distinctive sets of identities and incorporation patterns in host countries? Agnieszka Weinar’s analysis of how the concept diaspora is used in policy discourses within the European Union immigration policy finds that both diasporas and migrant destination communities are discussed as emerging agents of development, perhaps demonstrating the merger rather than uniqueness of these terms as they are applied to understanding broader policy transformations in Europe.

Transitioning to theoretical approaches, the book includes chapters which focus on macro-social structural perspectives and chapters which focus on micro-individual agency perspectives. Moreover, the focus shifts from theoretical perspectives on determinants of diasporas and transnationalism to consequences for both nation-states and for individuals and families. This is broad theoretical terrain which cannot be easily integrated. One of the theoretical issues discussed is the distinction between nationalist versus globalistic approaches to framing questions and explanations about the consequences of diaspora and transnationalism for nation-states. Using political participation as a focus, nationalist framing focuses on impacts on state-of-origin political institutions, such as questions of diaspora and immigrant communities that lobby host states to adopt particular stances and policies toward political issues in the homeland. On the other hand a globalistic framing might focus on collective actor migrants as agents of democratization who challenge political sovereignty across national boundaries. In this example a distinction between diaspora
and transnational migrants may be less important theoretically. The five theory chapters included in this book provide an overview of the disciplinary diversity in theoretical approaches and research questions about diaspora and transnationalism, including Myra Waterbury’s insightful analysis of conditions under which states engage populations abroad and the impact this has on citizenship.

According to the editors, a key methodological question for diaspora and transnational research is: How can transnational perspectives overcome methodological nationalism in the social sciences—the tendency to treat the “container” of the nation-state as a quasi-national social and political configuration? In the chapters included here the answer to this question is through the systematic use of multi-sites designs, the use of network methodology, the use of quantitative surveys as a means to assess associations, and exploring the value of internet research designs. For example, the idea of diaspora and transnationalism two-way flows, whether symmetric or asymmetric regarding the types of resources exchanged and power applied, is fundamental in both the use of home and destination area matched-sample methodology, as illustrated in Valentina Mazzucato’s chapter, and the use of ego-centered networks among individual overseas Chinese scientists, as illustrated in Koen Jonker’s analysis. A conclusion is that the methodology of cross-boundary analysis, whether embedded in transnational or diaspora studies, needs to be distinguishable from cross-country comparative research that focuses on nation-states as units of analysis.

The concluding chapter by co-editor Rainer Bauböck is not a traditional edited volume integrative essay, which he indicates is not possible given the conceptual, theoretical, disciplinary, and methodological heterogeneity of the contributions. Rather, Bauböck focuses on his discipline of political theory in an insightful elaboration of transnational citizenship, including dual citizenship, in the context of increasing international migration and national political structural transitions.

In summary this is a useful volume which provides a rich overview that covers a lot of issues about the diversity in diaspora and transnational studies. However, this diversity also reveals the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological fragmentation which may be indicative of an early developmental stage in this research field, or larger fissions in systematic scholarship. The lack of a strong integrative concluding essay leaves the interpretation an open question. One apparent conclusion is that diaspora and transnationalism studies would benefit from theoretical approaches that more systematically link agency with social structures.

For this reviewer, a demographer, what is striking is the lack of systematic articulation of this area of study to demographic migration theoretical frameworks and quantitative empirical literature on the selection into and explanations for diaspora-related migration streams, repeat international migration behaviors, and the considerable population science scholarship on straight-line versus limited or segmented immigrant assimilation/incorporation into host country institutions.


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At the heart of this volume of selected essays by Asef Bayat, are questions of political agency and the manifest forms it takes “on the ground in Middle Eastern cities.”

Bayat has been a long-standing critic of dominant narratives of the Middle East as a region caught between authoritarian regimes and militant Islam, where “ordinary people” are depicted as either passive victims or perpetrators of violence. Discourses on war and conflict tend to privilege spectacular images of victimhood and high-profile politics. Bayat has sought to develop alternative formulations which highlight the many shifting ways “ordinary people” experience, negotiate, and contest hegemonic systems of power in their day-to-day lives. In Life as Politics, he brings together some of the empirical cases and theoretical positions with
which he has been engaged throughout his scholarship. The main theme which weaves together the various chapters of the book, is how the mundane practices of the “urban subaltern” both undermine state authority and erode the power of religious institutions, in ways that are often invisible or unrecognized by the power elite, as well as scholars in the region.

When *Life as Politics* was published in 2010, Asef Bayat’s arguments on grassroots dynamism as the harbinger of democratic transformations in the Arab world seemed a utopian hope. Barely a year later, as events of the 2011 Arab Spring continue to unfold, his critical insights on everyday forms and spaces of political activity in the region have become prescient.

As Bayat reminds us in his introductory chapter, perceptions of stasis and lack of political agency to challenge the status quo in the region have generated “democracy promotion industry” in recent decades, advocating “change from the outside, by way of economic, political, and even military pressure” (p. 3). But the problem, he argues, is not simply a matter of how the region has been perceived from the “outside” by vested interests. Equally important is the way this perception has been reinforced by existing scholarship in the region, which draws upon concepts and theories developed predominantly in Western contexts. When viewed from the prism of conventional social science concepts, the bottom-up dynamics which are transforming large cities, through a myriad of daily struggles, by variegated actors, remain unnoticed. Hence any attempt to understand how “ordinary people are changing the Middle East” must develop a novel conceptual vocabulary which captures ongoing changes on the ground, which involve individual and collective direct action, and yet do not involve collective demand-making and effective political leadership of the sort associated with social movements in the conventional sense of the term. To illustrate, he discusses the strategies of “quiet encroachment” used by the urban poor, such as running their own parking services (Chapter Four). His other examples include Muslim women wearing hijab in ways which express their individual femininity (Chapter Five) and Egyptian or Iranian youth creating their own “blended” cultures of Islamic pop or practices of “distance dating” on the web (Chapters Six and Seven). Bayat discusses each of these cases as “fluid and unstructured forms of activism” which are “largely unlawful” and run the “risk of harassment, insecurity and repression” (p. 93). But he forewarns against overestimating them as “contentious acts of defiance” or attributing to them “political resistance” (pp. 54–55). He suggests that the dynamics of non-movements invoke metaphors of cancer, often not becoming visible to authorities until the point of no return has been reached (p. 81). Their significance resides not in challenging dominant authority directly, but in “generating a new reality on the ground, at the grass roots level” (p. 93).

In the second part of the book, Bayat brings together a series of essays which highlight the significance of “Street Politics or Politics of the Street” in the region. Once again, the author uses a range of empirical examples from his own work as well as relevant research in the region to interrogate “how particular spatial forms shape, galvanize, and accommodate insurgent sentiments and solidarities” (p. 162). Thus he dwells upon the centrality of Enghelab Square during the collective protests of 1977 in Tehran (Chapter Eight); the urban ecology of Islamic militancy (Chapter Nine); the “geography of coexistence” among Coptic and Muslim families in the Cairo’s Shubra neighborhood (Chapter Ten); and the changing significance of the Arab Street as site of dissent (Chapter Eleven).

What makes *Life as Politics* a fascinating book is the freshness of Bayat’s insights on the varied repertoires and spaces of popular agency in large cities of the region, and their immediate relevance in the context of unfolding events during the Arab Spring of
2011. These events have been dubbed the revolution of “shahab al-Facebook” (“the youth of Facebook”) and also the revolution of al-Jazeera. But the demonstrations so vividly on display on Cairo’s Tahrir Square—thanks to TV satellite channels and internet sites like Google Maps and YouTube—have also revealed, once again, the importance of physical space in the operation of power and the “constitution of insurgent sentiments and solidarities” as Bayat puts it. Reading his piece on Tehran’s Enghelab Square as a “contentious space” and its centrality in the drama of events which led to the Iranian revolution, allows us to recognize how Cairo’s Midan-el-Tahrir was transformed during the course of recent events. The Midan shifted from being simply a location of where millions of protestors gathered to express their demands, to becoming an integral part of the protestors’ struggle for legitimacy and visibility.

For all its fascinations, Life as Politics is essentially a collection of vignettes from Asef Bayat’s voluminous scholarly output. It demonstrates the breadth of issues and conceptual debates he has been engaged with over the years, but not the cumulative depth of his broader scholarship. The urgency of recent events in Arab cities has underscored the significance of Bayat’s alternative conceptualizations—such as “social nonmovements,” “quiet encroachment of the ordinary,” “post-Islamism”—in understanding bottom-up politics in the region. At the same time, these events have opened new avenues of interrogation, ranging from the emergent forms of public contestation in the era of mass-produced signs and fortified enclaves, to the variable dynamics of unfolding protests in divergent national contexts. No doubt, Asef Bayat will be following these interrogation marks in his future work, offering new lines of thinking for those of us who have learned to appreciate the originality of his scholarship.


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This collection of essays resulted from a conference convened to honor the work of Margaret Stacey, who retired from the University of Warwick in 1989. Stacey’s work on gender, health and healing and her advocacy on behalf of women and children are well known. After her retirement from Warwick, she was very active in bringing the suffering of war and collective violence to the attention of scholars and policy makers. The aspirations of the editors and the contributors for this book to honor this remarkable woman are admirable, although the book ended up as a disjointed set of essays of varying quality that do not address the themes laid out in the introduction in any systematic way.

The book consists of eight chapters and an introduction. The chapters have different objectives. Some provide a review of key concepts within a disciplinary field, others present new data based on interviews or field observations, and the last chapter is a meditation on peace in relation to such forms of suffering as hunger and environmental disasters. Though each paper might be said to deal with issues of war, violence, gender, and health, there is no sense of a collective project. Authors of individual chapters make little attempt to relate their own understanding of these issues to those of other contributors, nor are the specific issues raised in the introduction addressed by the individual essays.

The introduction outlines themes that are now well recognized in the literature on social suffering, such as the relation between ordinary suffering and extreme suffering or intended and unintended suffering. The editors ask: should there be a hierarchy of suffering, and how does one find meaning in adverse events? There is also a brief discussion on medical innovations during wars
and the tension between experimental and therapeutic aspects of medicine. While some of the observations are interesting, the introduction does not give us a systematic survey of the field since there are huge gaps in the discussion. No reference is made to colonial wars or to the changing nature of war after 9/11. The only justification offered for the selection of the chapters included in the volume is that they cover various regions of the world, showing that war and collective violence as well as the neglect of violence done to women are “global” in character.

Some of the individual essays make valuable points and can be read with profit. Thus, Cynthia Cockburn’s lucid and honest portrayal of her attempts to map women’s networks engaged in peace activities, and in fostering an antimilitaristic ethos is an important addition to the literature on feminist advocacy against war. Some of the tougher questions on women’s participation in war and the torture machine are, however, not addressed since these were not within the scope of the essay. Srila Roy’s discussion of the South Asian literature on violence, testimony and trauma is well written. It raises interesting issues about the applicability of trauma theory to cultures with a different ideology of language, or to women caught in routine violence. The discussion would have been enriched by looking directly at the work on the critique of trauma theories within humanitarian discourses as well as the anthropological literature on domestic violence. Astier Almedon, Evelyn Brensinger, and Gordon Adam provide a complex discussion of theories of resilience. They argue that sometimes psychiatric interventions can become the problem rather than the solution—for example, in some contexts symptoms of PTSD might be signs of resilience rather than of disease requiring therapeutic interventions. The essay is, however, uneven: some claims about the role of media in bolstering community resilience, for example, remain at the level of speculation. For instance, in the case of the democracy movement in Nepal, the authors argue that, “Individual resilience, along with widespread skepticism about the King’s motives, was present in the population. But without radio’s ability to provide a coherent alternative argument, and its mass reach, it is unlikely that community resilience could have formed so quickly and that the ten-year civil war would have ended comparatively peacefully” (p. 139). While media along with other public speech plays an important role in mobilization, such notions of resilience ignore the long processes of less visible forms of mobilization that were at play in Nepal much before the overthrow of monarchy—nor does it capture the fact that political violence in less spectacular forms has continued in Nepal as paralyzing power struggles between Maoist and non-Maoist parties have stalled the political process of Constitution-making.

The more empirical papers in the volume examine particular conflicts—Northern Ireland, Gujarat, Uganda, Sahrawi refugee camps—and come to similar conclusions about the neglect of a gender perspective in the analysis of these conflicts. As in many other cases reported in the literature the silencing of rape victims is a major issue. The most interesting argument is in the essay by Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, who contests the idealization of the Sahrawi refugee camps as free of violence against women. The author contends that kin-based violence, such as killing “deviant” women for family honor or confining, in medical facilities, women who have become pregnant through unions that are not approved, is prevalent in the camps but ignored in international policy or activist discourse. Although Fiddian-Qasmiyeh could only persuade three or four women to talk to her on these matters despite the one hundred interviews she conducted, this is a pertinent question for refugee camps everywhere since kinship itself becomes reconfigured in such environments. As for the other essays, we learn some useful facts from them but the claims to rethink social theory are largely exaggerated. In some cases, as in Rubina Jasani’s description of the ethical dilemmas she faced as a graduate student caught in a difficult situation of widespread suspicion against Muslims in Gujarat after the post-Godhra violence, one wishes that she had received better guidance into the literature on anthropology and ethics. Her dilemmas are real, but these questions have been widely discussed in the literature to which she barely refers. Overall, there are some good individual essays,
which could have been published as independent papers in journals. The book as a whole disappoints this reader.


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This collection of papers from the 2007 British Sociological Association conference comes with a rather disarming health warning: ‘Oh no! Not a conference volume!’ While the editors suggest that such pessimism is actually misplaced and the book has intrinsic merit, one is never quite sure that the ‘excitement of a real, live conference’ has in fact been captured or developed in the cold light of day. That the sociological questions addressed in this volume supposedly grew ‘between the paving slabs of the university precinct and blossomed in the urban air of the dockside campus’ also perfectly encapsulates the tensions that run through British, and perhaps most, sociology today. The early theoretical, foundational, disciplinary-focused contributions such as those of John Scott, Michael Rustin, and Gregor McLennan provide a solid basis for the more substantive chapters by Bruno Latour, Erika Cudworth, and David Inglis. These, in turn, make way for the playfulness of the later chapters, for example, David Beer and Roger Burrows on the sociology of The Wire. Unfortunately, the relationship between the ‘paving slabs’ and the ‘blossom’ was perhaps always too much for this rather slim volume to successfully traverse. Somewhere in the midst of this ‘state of sociology’ agenda lay the unspoken question: who is the intended audience for this text? One can only assume it is fellow sociologists. In which case there is an obvious irony in that the editors have committed one of the supposed cardinal sins of sociology today, that of being too self-referential.

The fractal nature of current sociological concerns is captured in the book’s central contention that there is a basic division between “subjects” and “objects” in sociology’s new social connections. As such, a bifurcated tone runs through most of the papers and the volume as a whole. For example, it is found in Scott’s discussion of the status of sociology as a discipline and/or knowledge, Latour’s claimed dissolution of the natural/social, and Saskia Sassen’s view that new global “assemblages” are displacing the traditional nation-state. In comparison, the chapters by Inglis, Gayle Letherby, Joyce Canaan, and Max Farrar address far more parochial challenges, such as the lack of historical depth, the advocacy of the biographical approaches, critical pedagogy, and the reflexive nature of doing “public” sociology in the British context. Unfortunately, as represented here, British sociology might appear to be struggling to be heard or make an impact beyond the local conflicts and endeavours of these particular sociologist-activists. Indeed, the character of British sociology appears to be somewhat “middle-brow” and reserved, especially when seen alongside the expansive and global claims of the keynote contributors.

Wittingly or unwittingly, this text represents the key rupture between the internal intellectual development of sociology as a discipline and its external, moving set of referents in the shape of “others”—other disciplines, nature, national boundaries, students, or simply world events. It is an example of the Janus-faced nature of contemporary sociology, as seen through the looking glass and wherein the objectification of the discipline is only made possible by taking the role of one of these “others.” As a result, the critical and subjective nature of sociological being, the sociological imagination, is ultimately obscured to the point that, by the conclusion of the volume, anything and everything becomes “sociology”—including The Wire and most reality TV.

Capturing the sense of occasion, even carnival, of a sociology conference was never going to be easy for the editors of this volume. Such events tend to generate an atmosphere more akin to a religious congregation than a discerning readership. Yet one gets the feeling that it is only the former that is the intended audience for this particular text. Perhaps, in the words of an old adage, “you
really had to be there” to appreciate where this collection of papers is coming from. The frisson of the event certainly appears to have escaped in the passage of time and we are left with what amounts to a “record” of some interesting papers on what are by now already well-visited issues concerning the nature of sociology today. The lively discussions and debates that these papers undoubtedly generated in the conference itself are not evident in this text. The general optimism of the editors appears to be a consequence of their success in hosting what was by all measures and accounts a successful conference. However, this text also bears witness to the fact that the progeny of such events do not always live up to their parental expectations.

Overall, there was perhaps a better case for suggesting that this text actually explores the misrecognition of sociology today. That is, the diversity of current sociology lends itself to both adherents and confounders either “bigging up” or “dissing down” the discipline and thereby failing to capture the real gift of sociology, which is the sociological imagination itself. In this respect British sociology is particularly well-placed, as were the editors of this volume who are situated in one of the “subaltern” institutions, “to tell it like it really is.” Instead, what we have is basically a testament to an event that was, when the dust settled, a sociology conference.


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Do opera fans listen to Katy Perry or do they reject pop music as a mark of distinction? Cultural sociologists have taken up the “cultural omnivore” question since the early 1990s following Richard Peterson and Roger Kern’s finding that individuals with high cultural capital listened to popular music as well as highbrow genres. The “discovery” of omnivores challenged the universality of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory and marked a fresh line of research in cultural sociology. The authors in Social Status and Cultural Consumption analyze consumption patterns in the United States, France, Chile, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Great Britain to bring a much needed comparative perspective to the enduring issues raised by Bourdieu, Peterson, and others.

Tak Wing Chan’s opening essay makes an argument, carried through the remaining chapters, against two equally unsatisfying modes of cultural analysis. Individualization arguments, represented in the work of Anthony Giddens, posit that advanced capitalism has uncoupled social structure from cultural consumption. Homology arguments, represented by Bourdieu, convey an overdetermined and overly tight correspondence between social hierarchy and patterns of cultural consumption. The authors’ survey data locate a fruitful place in the middle of these poles, one populated by (among others) American paucivores, high-status moviegoers in Chile, and Hungarian pop univores.

Florencia Torche’s study of Chilean cultural consumption patterns exemplifies the volume’s overall strength in explaining the relationship between cultural consumption and social structure. Torche’s data and analysis reveal that Chilean movie lovers are not low-status univores lacking in economic and cultural capital. Movie attendance is a marker of high status, carries much more esteem than attendance at a live theater or dance performance, and is strongly stratified by status, income, and education. Also, these Chilean movie aficionados, unlike their U.S. or European counterparts, are not cultural omnivores. Torche contends that state subsidies for theater and other highbrow arts can help explain why the Chilean case contrasts with findings from other nations in terms of the markers of cultural capital, but remains consistent with the book’s overall portrait of social status as determinative of cultural consumption patterns.

The central strength of the book is its global and comparative analysis of cultural omnivorosity, but the collection has a more ambitious goal of resuscitating the Weberian distinction between status and class. The authors’ research agendas orbit around this common theme, thereby giving the volume

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a strong sense of coherence. But, like a cook who insists that every dish contain a particular spice, the repetition of the "class versus status" argument gives the essays a flavor that does not always complement what is on the plate. The *a priori* assumptions about the class/status distinction create an inevitable reification with one side positioned as the winner over the other (and Weber, somehow, always finds a way to win). The essays, however, complicate the class/status distinction more than they show the supremacy of one over the other in explaining consumption. Erzsebet Bukodi’s analysis of arts consumption in Hungary, for example, notes education as the most important variable in explaining cultural consumption. Gerbert Kraaykamp, Koen van Eijck, and Wout Utlee’s study of the Netherlands found highbrow cultural consumption sharply stratified by income and education. In the end, many of the findings scattered throughout the volume support, rather than undermine, Bourdieu’s theorization of class and culture.

Of the essays in the collection, Arthur Alderson, Isaac Heacock, and Azamat Junisbaev’s analysis of music consumption in the United States makes the most persuasive case to separate analytically class from status. From General Social Survey data on the listening patterns for opera, classical, jazz, and musicals, Alderson et al.’s study identifies three classes of musical consumer: inactives, omnivores, and paucivores (who occupy a middle ground between the low cultural consumption of the inactives and the voracious consumption of the omnivores). Their regression analyses show no strict correspondence between social class and musical consumption, suggesting that the practices of musical consumers owe more to status variables compared to economic ones. Despite compelling statistical evidence, the authors’ claims about class and status often slip from an analytic distinction used to make sense of a narrowed set of regional data (e.g., four music genres) to a general claim about the relationship between culture and status. Like other essays in the volume, the authors’ study has great force in middle-range debates about cultural omnivoroussness, but is on comparatively weaker footing when it wades into Weber, Marx, and Bourdieu’s grand theories of class and status.

Richard “Pete” Peterson had a tremendous influence on American cultural theory, and his 2010 death was a serious loss to sociology and musicology. Chan’s edited volume is a testament to the enduring importance of Peterson’s “cultural omnivore” concept. The collection of essays in *Social Status and Cultural Consumption* makes a substantial contribution to the scholarship on cultural consumption. The presentation of the quantitative data is both accessible and thorough, with approximately twenty figures and fifty tables supplementing solid explanations of methodological techniques such as latent class cluster analysis and multinomial logistic regression. The direct, clear, and accessible writing style makes this an ideal text for a cultural sociology graduate seminar or an advanced undergraduate course.


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*Fighting for Girls* is a wonderful collection of works drawn from strong theoretical traditions: feminist criminology, constructionist, and critical criminologies. The authors of the various chapters pose significant challenges to the widely-held notion that girls are more violent today than they were in the past and that this is primarily due to their attempts to be more like boys. Meda Chesney-Lind and Nikki Jones organize the collection in a clear fashion that concisely presents the data regarding girls’ violence, the institutional context of girls’ violence, and explanations and implications of girls’ violence.

The data related to girls’ violence reveal a trend of increased violence in young girls; however, this is a misrepresentation of the facts. The truth is that there is increased law enforcement related to person offenses, and this is catching more young females in the criminal justice net. With mandatory arrest for domestic violence and zero-tolerance
policies toward fighting in schools, girls are landing more frequently in the system, but that does not equate with being more violent than they have been in the past. Another consequence of these policies is the disproportionate arrest and incarceration of African American young women, who are overrepresented in detention facilities.

In Chapter One, Mike Males explores the popular response to the myth of girls’ violence, and the dangers of our inability to be critical of these ideas and develop policies applicable to adolescent girls. Numerous data sources provide empirical evidence that girls’ involvement in index crimes has actually decreased significantly over the past twenty years. The only crime where there has been an increase in girls’ commissions is misdemeanor assaults, and in fact, there has been an increase in this crime for boys and adults as well. A possible explanation involves the mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence and zero-tolerance policies for schools. Eve Buzawa and David Hirschel, in Chapter Two, explore how these policies have increased youth exposure to the criminal justice system. They present data that show differences in assault rates and arrest rates. Juveniles were much more likely to be arrested for assaulting adults, while adults were much less likely to be arrested for assaulting juveniles, thus raising questions about the implementation of the policies. In Chapter Three, Chesney-Lind examines data that reveal an increased arrest and incarceration rate for adolescent minority girls in recent years, while there is no similar increase for their male counterparts or for adolescent females in the middle-class majority. She argues that no attention has been given to the context surrounding violence by these young women or the disparities in the criminal justice system’s response to their behavior.

When exploring the institutional context of girls’ violence and concerns, various authors argue that girls have not become more violent, but the contexts in which they live, go to school, spend time with peers, and so on, have become more disorganized and oppressive, and this leads to more reactive behavior on the part of the young women. The girls are exposed to more violence around them, and they understand that they are more vulnerable to violence themselves in these environments. In Chapter Four, Melissa Dichter, Julie Cederbaum, and Anne Teitelman present a remarkably comprehensive literature review that reveals a frightening picture of how adolescent girls are at much greater risk of violence in dating relationships, problems associated with teen pregnancy, sexually transmitted illnesses, and perceived power held by adolescent males who control condom use.

Chesney-Lind, Merry Morash, and Katherine Irwin explore in Chapter Five the gendered nature of relational aggression. They argue that much of the new focus on bullying among adolescent girls and boys has combined all varieties of aggression into one category that fails to distinguish gender differences. It also fails to recognize the variations between direct and indirect aggression, physical and non-physical aggression, one-time and continuous events, and levels of severity. The policing of all forms of aggression as equal results in girls, who more frequently engage in relational aggression, finding themselves more often receiving the sanctions of the school system and the police due to zero-tolerance and mandatory arrest policies. Building on the role relationships play in the lives of young girls, in Chapter Six, Judith Ryder highlights attachment theory’s interpretation of young women’s interpersonal and context-specific violence. She reveals that girls’ definitions of violence were quite different from the mainstream definition of violence, and consequently, the programs into which they were funneled for assistance did little to respond to their needs.

Sibylle Artz and Diana Nicholson, in Chapter Seven, present a longitudinal examination of the impact of school context on the probability of violent/aggressive behavior among adolescent girls. They found that in positive, smaller, single-sex settings where students are engaged with their classmates and school, aggressive behavior declines compared to the larger, more heterogeneous, complex public school environment. Marion Brown extends this examination in Chapter Eight with a look at group homes and finds that they often encourage the violence which they seek to eliminate. She found that frustration with rules and surveillance leads to continued aggression in these environments.
The final part of the book, explanations and implications of girls’ violence, stresses the macro-level factors impacting the lives of adolescent girls and the necessity for scholars to explore these contexts and make the media aware of the real picture. In Chapter Nine, Jones examines growing up in the inner-city neighborhood and how for most young people this becomes an exercise in survival, where strategies such as situational avoidance and relational isolation are employed. Morash, Suyeon Park, and Jung-mi Kim present findings in Chapter Ten drawn from their analysis of longitudinal data to examine the effects of individual, family, and community variables on the choices of adolescent females to engage in violent activities. They found that the strongest predictors of future violent behavior for adolescent females were early running away, a lack of hope for their future, a lack of parental support, failing to complete school, and neighborhood and school context.

Finally, in the epilogue, Walter DeKeseredy revisits the big picture, reminding us of the power of the media to create a moral panic (girls gone wild!), and the criminal justice system’s power to reinforce the patriarchal control over girls and women. He reminds us that we must reflect on the context of violent behavior, and that we must conduct research that sheds light on the reality of what is going on in girls’ lives. We need to be proactive about getting the word out to the public through various media outlets, to try to shift the focus to where it should be on these topics. Fighting for Girls does just that. It is an excellent collection of scholarship to redirect our attention to the reality of adolescent girls’ lives and the real issues that beg for our attention and social change: homelessness, high infant mortality rates, high rates of assault on females, and illiteracy—just to name a few.


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Multifaceted Identity of Interethnic Young People: Chameleon Identities is a study of identity choices among South Asian/white individuals in the United Kingdom. The term “South Asian” refers here to peoples with ancestry from the Indian subcontinent, including India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Sultana Choudhry situates her study primarily in the social psychology literature and in the growing body of social science literature on mixed race or, to use the author’s preferred term, “interethnic” people in the Anglophone world. In focusing on South Asian/white interethnics, the author begins to fill a gap in both literatures. She rightly points out that there is a relative dearth of research on South Asian/white interethnics in Britain, despite the fact that they comprise a substantial proportion of interethnics in a society in which interethnic births are on the rise.

This is a multi-method study, incorporating semi-structured interviews, discourse analysis, retrospective diary accounts of factors that influenced respondents’ ethnic identity choices and a survey of 87 interethnics of a variety of ethnoracial combinations. While the majority of respondents were interethnic, some phases of the study include monoethnic respondents, including some parents of the interethnic respondents.

While I applaud this use of multiple methods, I found the description of methods at once confusing and overly detailed. Because numerous samples engaged with varying methods are presented in the text separately, it is difficult to discern just how many respondents by age and ethnicity actually were interviewed or surveyed. A summary table of the sample would have helped immensely in following the narrative description of the results. Moreover, the very long descriptions of the rationale behind what are accepted techniques of qualitative
research are more appropriate to a dissertation or methods-centered book. While appreciated, they belong here in an appendix.

The author claims to make three theoretical contributions: one, that identities are fluid rather than fixed; two, that children of interethnic unions are not necessarily conflicted about their subject position; and three, that these individuals in fact “are more successful than others because of the ways in which they utilise their interethnic backgrounds” (p. 5).

I have several criticisms of these claims. These first two “theoretical contributions” are not contributions in so far as claims to the contextual, situational quality of identity choices are a theoretical breakthrough several decades old in the social sciences (think Mead, Cooley, Goffman, etc.). Moreover, that the identity choices made by the children of interethnic unions are also contextual and situational, and that these people are not necessarily “mixed up” because of it, has been empirically demonstrated by numerous researchers, and especially so over the last two decades. This book does not break new theoretical ground. What this study does contribute is further evidence that such processes are also at work in the identity decisions made by South Asian/white interethnic people in the United Kingdom. Its contribution lies in researching this understudied population.

And while this is a contribution, it would be strengthened considerably with a sustained attempt to ground the book’s questions in historical and social context. To offer one example, Choudhry often mentions the “marginal man” thesis proposed by Robert Park in 1928 and elaborated by his student, Everett Stonequist, in the 1930s, as a claim her results challenge. My major quarrel with this usage is that there is little attempt to describe the ways in which a theory developed with special reference (in Stonequist’s case) to the U.S. context in a particularly rigid racial formation (one that was invested in strictly curtailing racial boundary crossings, especially between blacks and whites, and legally denying their existence in order to maintain racial segregation in nearly all aspects of life) might need to be modified to explain the situation of South Asian/whites in the United Kingdom in the early twenty-first century.

What is it about the patterns of incorporation and exclusion of South Asians living in Britain—the ways that ethnoracial categories are constructed and in which ethnoracial divisions have been mapped onto social space—that makes the denotation of this population make sense? If it is true (and most research suggests that it is) that “there is a potential tension between an individual’s ideas and assertion of ethnic identity and the wider society’s collective attributions” (p. 4), of what might these likely tensions for South Asian/white interethnics consist and why? What can the study of the identity choices of these interethnics tell us about the nature of racial domination in Britain in the contemporary period? Most of this context is left unspecified and so the implications of the findings of the study are left disconnected from broader processes of ethnoracial formation.

The final claim the author makes about the significance of the study—that interethnic peoples are more successful than others—is, to put it bluntly, baffling. The question immediately arises, successful in what way: financially, psychologically, occupationally, something else? Unfortunately, that question is not satisfactorily answered. The author makes vague reference to “successful interethnic figures in all works of life” (p. 191) and then diverges into a discussion of Barack Obama’s successful bid for the U.S. Presidency that credits his and other interethnics’ success to their interethnic heritage and their multifaceted fluid entities. In other parts of the book, the author suggests that it is the strategic way in which interethnics “adopt a particular identity/personality to suit the situation they find themselves in and to negotiate challenges such as racism with a greater degree of success than other ethnic minorities” (p. 6). But this claim is merely asserted, not demonstrated. To support such a claim, one would need to compare systematically the ways that other ethnic minorities attempt to negotiate these same challenges and clearly articulate what constitutes success in doing so. To make such statements without the requisite research to support them tends to reinforce shibboleths about a kind of multiracial exceptionalism.
As a college student in the mid-1990s, Anastasia Curwood happened upon some old letters her grandparents had written to each other in the 1930s and 40s. Fascinated by the intimate window into one African American middle-class marriage and curious to understand how her grandparents’ marriage was influenced by the social, cultural, and political currents of their day, she embarked on a research project that resulted in this slim but engaging volume. In *Stormy Weather*, Curwood explores marriages among the African American middle class in the period between WWI and WWII, years that gave rise not only to the new, more militant racial politics of African Americans who described themselves as “New Negroes,” but also witnessed cultural shifts in sexual practices and gender roles that extended well beyond the African American community. Curwood aims to uncover both how changing ideas about sex and gender and the new racial politics affected African American men and women as they navigated their intimate relationships. She offers a fascinating, if somewhat limited, portrait of black elites struggling to build relationships that would participate in the political project of advancing the race, and provide them with romantic love, support, and intimacy.

Based on letters between couples, published prescriptive literature, and African American popular cultural products, *Stormy Weather* first outlines how ideas about marriage among the black middle class changed in the years between WWI and WWII and offers a description of the ideal New Negro husband and wife. Curwood then focuses on the relationship between her grandparents and other black middle-class couples—such as John and Lugenia Hope, Marcus and Amy Garvey, and Robert and Katherine Flippen—to highlight how their personal relationships were influenced by larger ideological, political, and economic structures.

Throughout the book, Curwood seeks to reveal the internal dimensions of private life, to offer a history that highlights the emotional experience of these couples. She focuses the book on black middle-class marriages in part because she could not find sources that would enable her to reconstruct the emotional lives of black working-class couples in the same way. In focusing on the interior lives of blacks, Curwood criticizes historical scholarship which, she charges, typically discusses African Americans only as victims of racism or as activists against it. Her approach is a welcome addition to the literature on twentieth century African American black life, but her blanket condemnation of historical scholarship ignores quite a few works that go well beyond the “racial protocol” approach she critiques (Tera Hunter’s *To Joy My Freedom* and Gretchen Lemke-Santangelo’s *Abiding Courage* come immediately to mind). Neither does Curwood address sociological literature that offers a window into the private life of African Americans or that has explored the contours and meanings of marriage in the United States.

The couples Curwood writes about faced many daunting challenges, from trying to retain their middle-class status and remain financially stable during the Great Depression, to navigating shifting sexual cultures while insisting upon their sexual respectability. But no conflict loomed larger than that over gender roles and what functions husbands and wives should play in an ideal New Negro marriage. Curwood suggests that both New Negro men and women explicitly understood marriage to have the political function of uplifting the race by creating stable, respectable families who could provide a model for poorer blacks and a supportive partnership for engaging in “race work.” But they differed dramatically on how those political goals should be achieved. Many middle-class men, Curwood demonstrates, believed the ideal New Negro husband should be the primary breadwinner.
and should have authority over his wife and children. They sought patriarchal families under male domination. Their wives, however, wanted to expand beyond their domestic roles to advance the race through their own professional endeavors. Many of these women not only needed to make money to contribute to the household income, but they also wanted to be active in their communities. The ideals for New Negro wives and husbands, in other words, came into conflict in ways that often created marital tension. Curwood’s grandmother’s desire to work in a settlement home and a nursery school angered her grandfather, who wanted his wife to stay home, or at the most, to do domestic work rather than have a career.

This example—of Curwood’s grandfather encouraging his wife to be a domestic rather than a professional—illustrates some of the challenges of the approach Curwood uses here. As she admits, her grandfather’s preference was not typical; most of these middle-class men did not want their wives to be domestic servants, in part because that would make them vulnerable to sexual exploitation by white men. Curwood’s grandfather was insecure and was always striving to limit and control his much better educated wife. He abused his wife and eventually took his own life. Their story is illuminating and powerful, but it is not always generalizable. And this tension—between the unique and the typical—emerges at several points in this book. In the most problematic case, Curwood delves into the writings of Jean Toomer as an example of black middle-class men’s ideas about the proper role of a New Negro husband. Yet Toomer was a misogynist who believed that men were biologically superior to women. Curwood calls him “retrograde” and “regressive.” He was ambivalent about his own racial identity and his own marriages were to white women, not to middle-class black women. His rantings about the importance of men being in charge of the household, whether they were the breadwinners or not, does not necessarily reveal much about the cultural values and ideas of the black middle class during this period.

In the end, one of the greatest strengths of *Stormy Weather*—the wonderful and rich story of Curwood’s grandparents’ marriage—is also one of the book’s major limitations. In focusing so intently on the experience of middle-class blacks, Curwood does not fully address the ways in which their marriages differed from or were similar to those of other groups at the time. And by looking only at the interwar years, Curwood chooses not to carry this story forward to shed light on what today has become a marriage crisis among the black middle class, as fewer are choosing to marry and those who do divorce at higher rates than whites. One hopes that Curwood will write a sequel to continue this fascinating story of how middle-class blacks have understood marriage and navigated this most intimate of relationships.


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Over the past several months, the attention of the South African public and watchers of events in the country has been riveted by revelations from the ongoing trial of Julius Malema, president of the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League. Prosecutors accuse Mr. Malema, 30, of fomenting racial hatred against Afrikaners. Malema counters that he is doing nothing of the sort, but merely championing the ideals of what he describes as the “revolution.” Mr. Malema has always divided opinion across South Africa’s racial, political, and generational spectra; yet, only a few people could have anticipated the degree of interest and emotional intensity that his trial in a Johannesburg High Court has provoked.

In a sense, the trial and surrounding political drama is a reminder of how much South Africa still has to do to live up to its auto-identification as a “rainbow nation.” Poignantly, it is also a distraction from the serious economic and security challenges facing the country. In privileging the theme of power relations and how they structure ethnic identity, Rebecca Davies does a brilliant job
of bringing these two themes into equal and timely focus. She accomplishes this by taking the road relatively less traveled—analyzing, at least primarily, the travails and conceits of Afrikaner nationalism, as opposed to the travails of the black majority in the aftermath of the end of apartheid. But the focus on Afrikaner nationalism or identity politics is, it seems to me, merely instrumental. The quarry the author is really stalking is ethnicity or ethnic identity, in so far as it imbricates with class and power, hence the placement of the analysis in the book on a Gramscian theoretical fulcrum. Pace current literature on the subject, the author avoids a characterization of ethnicity as a fixed essence. Rather, ethnicity is a continuum which tends to vary in salience, intensity, and meaning to grapple with its subtleties is to apprehend how social groups behave in real historical conditions.

The author uses what she describes as “the construction of the Afrikaner nationalist project” to elucidate this point about the versatility of ethnic categorization and mobilization. To capture the complexity of Afrikaner identity (a phenomenon that may appear monolithic to the unsuspecting outsider) she introduces three different definitions: the ascriptive, the auxiliary, and self-identification. The idea here is to show that, contra widespread assumption, Afrikaner identity itself has always been, for want of a better word, “constructed.” If Afrikanerdom ever attained any of the cogency that outsiders tend to ascribe to it—Davies describes it as “little but a fiction held together by a potent mix of respect for both ideological dogma and material interests” (p. 37)—it was only in fits and starts. She gives a convincing account of an ever elusive volk unity in which class and racial (“white” versus “colored”) tensions remained salient, and political domination and the “apartheid dividend” were the only elements impeding serious dissent.

Yet, in my opinion, significant as the foregoing is, it is by no means the most important insight in the book. That special honor goes to the way in which the author manages to embed the events and processes which she describes within a global matrix. In her analysis of the making of Afrikaner nationalism, Davies argues that “at the close of the apartheid era, Afrikanerdom was not so much coming apart at the seams as embarking on a fundamental process of restructuring” (p. 43). Part of that restructuring was the famous not-so-secret pact between labor, state and business that resulted in the termination of minority white rule and the transfer of power to a democratically elected African National Congress. While subsequent scholarly analysis has been quick to zero in on the role of labor, especially the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the state in that consensus, there persists a tendency to either downplay or misdiagnose the role of business.

Davies uses this oversight to establish a larger point, which is that, by and large, Afrikaner-ness specifically, and identity politics in general, unfold in the shadows of capital, and a signal failure of much of the relevant literature has been its inattention to “the structural background of the global economy.” It is difficult to dispute this line of argument. The finger of predatory liberalism has been obvious in the pie of every economic regime across the world, especially societies of the Global South caught in the throes of transitioning from various forms of authoritarianism to variants of liberal democracy. Davies’ point is that neoliberalism was present at the birth of the new multi-racial regime in South Africa, and deserves to be listed among the various explanations for the persisting failure of political change to herald economic transformation. Rather than lament the failure of an apparently eager South African political class to deliver on the promise of the “revolution,” Davies argues that instead, we should be mindful of the anti-transformational spirit of the elite consensus that birthed the new nation.

Now, if I had my way, Julius Malema would go to jail. Not for inciting hatred. You have to wonder whether hate speech is not, in itself, ultimately a good thing for democracies. But that is an issue for another day. The reason why Malema deserves a stint in prison is that his visceral demagoguery is diverting attention away from South Africa’s economic problems, emblemized by its high levels of inequality. Whereas Malema would appear to blame “race” for South Africa’s continuing problems, Davies’ tightly-argued book challenges us to place race in a context in which...
Seduced by the promise of the knowledge economy, an inordinate amount of academic and policy-maker attention has been focused in recent years on good jobs and the expanding number of professional and associate professional jobs. This task is important if it debunks the “new world of work/new economy” theses. Equally, however, there is a need to acknowledge and examine the expanding number of jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, particularly in routine services. These “bad jobs” have low skill, pay and prospects, and often become a job-trap for migrant and female workers. This second task is one that now exercises the efforts of a growing number of researchers both in the United States and Europe. Ariel Ducey’s effort is an important contribution because it critically examines a commonly held belief among these researchers that training offers a route out of these jobs into something better.

The context of Ducey’s research mirrors the wider debates about good and bad jobs. She notes that health care is the largest employer in New York City and that six out of the ten occupations predicted to have the largest job growth in the United States are also in health care—with almost all requiring sub-baccalaureate qualifications. It is one group of these front-line health care workers that Ducey primarily focuses on—nursing assistants. These workers mop floors, and bathe, dress and feed patients and are, as one of them succinctly put it, “professional butt cleaners” (p. 24).

Data are drawn from three qualitative studies of: acute care units and nursing homes, a hospital, and training providers. Fieldwork consisted of observation and interviews. Although the interview sample was non-representative, as might be expected in this industry, most of the subjects were women, mainly from ethnic minorities and often migrant (although it would have been useful for a distinction to have been made between “migrant” transitory workers and “immigrant” workers intending to settle permanently in the United States and who can have very different job orientations and aspirations).

A healthy sociological tradition still exists in the United States of giving voice to workers and, following this tradition, Ducey duly delivers. Her focus is the “human experience” (p. 20) and on every page, these workers vividly recount their struggles to get in, get on and just get by in their jobs. These jobs require hard and dirty work, often without breaks, have poorly enforced job descriptions and are undervalued, making workers feel worthless, as well as low paid. For employers, publicly-funded training was a way to plug perceived skills gaps in the workforce. For workers it was posited as creating qualification routes into better jobs in health care and so was supported by the union as a response to employee demands for better pay and prospects. It also offered the union an organizing tool with which to attract new members and demonstrate union capacity to “add value” (p. 5) to the industry.

Most training centered on soft skills development, customer service skills, or in program-specific IT training, usually in new computerized billing systems or on minor technical tasks such as taking bloods. Although offered as a way for workers to “survive and thrive in a market-driven health care sector” (pp. 84–85), this training, while important, proved insufficient. It alone could not deliver better skilled, better paid, more meaningful jobs. Cost-cutting with lay-offs, staff shortages and heavier workloads remained. Indeed the training provided multitasking rather than upskilling and enabled management to use workers more flexibly to multitask. As one nursing assistant said, it allowed the organization to “dump on us more” (p. 92). Plus, what was dumped on them was not fundamentally different: the new tasks were still routine. Multiskilling “did not create ‘complex jobs’. . .In
health care, the bar for entry into the workforce has been raised [through credentialism]. . .but the nature of the work has not changed” (p. 105). Moreover, wage levels declined as credentials rose. Healthcare providers do spend big bucks but more often on new IT billing systems than on improving the wages of their front line staff. Job losses, argued to be prevented by training, were in fact limited by the union securing public subsidies for the hospitals and being able to insert job security clauses into labor contracts. What the training did do however was to turn attention for the problems of the industry away from unhelpful job design, poor management and limited resources and onto the workers—or rather workers’ perceived unhelpful attitudes. If they could only change these attitudes through soft skills training, all would be right. As one training consultant admitted: “It’s easier to train than to analyse the problem” (p.135).

Stylistically, Ducey’s continual use of the first person can be irksome and results in the argument seeming idiosyncratic rather than, as it actually is, generalizable. Moreover the punch line is given away too early in the book so that the author continually returns to the same point, just from multiple starting places. At times it is difficult to discern the sequencing of events and specific context, causes and consequences. Judicious editing to create a single narrative arc would have created a more powerful delivery. Nevertheless, the key finding—that, in the U.S. context at least, more training does not deliver better jobs or even save existing jobs—makes uncomfortable reading for those who see skills as the answer to poor job quality.

In this respect, Ducey’s study adds to a growing awareness that improving the supply of skills does not ensure that these skills are deployed by employers in ways that are beneficial to employees—or unions—those who have invested time and resources in developing them. But if skills are not the answer, routes other than training need to be found, and Ducey calls for a fundamental overhaul of workplace organization and management and the funding of U.S. healthcare. Along the way Ducey captures a picture of struggling but dedicated and decent workers who already go the extra mile for their patients, and so for their employers, and who simply want—and deserve—better (working) lives.

Religion, more aptly religiosity, has a long and recognizable history in the social sciences as an innately collective phenomenon. As such, social theorists recognized early on the power of religion in framing social life (Durkheim [1897] 1951; Weber [1930] 1992). Similarly, the family has and continues to serve as an immediate and undeniable contributor to the social experience. This volume of works edited by Christopher Ellison and Robert Hummer admirably and ambitiously tackles these major institutions within society and provides fertile ground for scholars across specialties to recognize the reciprocal and cyclical nature of religion, family, and health.

The book, a compilation of research from an impressive body of scholars, highlights the roles of major institutions in society in shaping individual lives but extends far beyond that. The book reminds us that religion, regardless of its presence in an individual’s life, has far-reaching implications for society. The first chapters set the reader out on the right sociological foot and illustrate how the institution of religion shapes our conception of how the family is formed and maintained. In doing so, the book describes how social structure embeds itself early in life and affects us throughout the life course whether we (and our individual agency) like it or not.

The authors of the 21 chapters analyze an array of longitudinal and cross-sectional data sources, each moving the empirical and theoretical social world of religion forward by using available population-level information. Some of these sources are quite unique and underexplored in the existing literature, such as a fascinating, albeit small,
national sample of Arab Americans discussed in Chapter 11.

Insights abound throughout the text and range from substantive considerations surrounding the impact of religious denomination on adolescent sexual behaviors to important methodological considerations and data collection of relevant information necessary for population-level research. The book reveals that most large national surveys do not consistently collect measures of religiosity, which places restrictions on our knowledge of the enduring and changing effects of religion on social life. While numerous authors call for improvements in this area, we come away from the book without many strategies focused on how this data gap can be addressed, especially in times of shrinking research budgets.

The compilation of work makes clear, however, that the effects of religion on family formation and health vary enormously across important social characteristics such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status; religious groups such as Mormons, Catholics, Jews, and Muslims; and in the behavior under study such as timing of first birth, parenting, sexually risky behaviors, and cause-specific mortality. This creates empirical complexity and also a fair amount of intrigue, leaving the reader with a multitude of interesting leads to explore.

Part Two of the volume is dedicated to health outcomes and is an important addition to existing yet incomplete bodies of work studying the relationship between religion and health. Notably, Chapter 13 provides precise conceptual frameworks for future investigations of the relationships between religiosity and health. The chapter establishes a clearer set of potential pathways—including selection, causation, and mediating and moderating mechanisms—than existed previously and that can be used in future work to explain relationships between religion and health.

The health chapters highlight that more thought should center on how studies measure and interpret religiosity. Generally, health studies use self-reported indicators of religious service attendance but multiple authors raise the question of whether other measures, including spirituality or religious meaning, may be more insightful indicators of religious life, specifically in how it forms and what it means over the life course. This measurement concern is exemplified in a chapter examining Jewish identity and health (Chapter 17). In the chapter, the authors find that the more closely one adheres to the tenets of their faith, the healthier that person is. Simply measuring how often those persons attend synagogue would lose important information.

Many of these health chapters conclude with important food for thought moving forward, including a more sustained effort toward examining the potential negative impacts of religiosity on health outcomes should one choose to rely on religious faith rather than seek effective treatment options. Equally important, how might changes in religiosity over the life course impact one’s experience of health? If an individual becomes more religious as an adult, for example, does that confer the same general benefits to health compared to someone who has been devout throughout a lifetime? These are important questions for health as we flesh out how, and to what extent, religion protects health and extends life.

Examining each chapter in the volume in detail provides countless unique insights as well as consistent messages. Scholars of religion have increasingly realized the salience of the family in understanding how groups form and maintain belief systems, and scholars of the family in turn recognize the importance of religious meaning in forming and maintaining domestic life. More recently, scholars of health have come to realize the powerful effects of religiosity on various health and mortality outcomes. The book builds on each of these separate areas and provides much needed improvement and clarification. Upon completing the book, the reader is left with a satisfactory challenge implied throughout but largely unmet in this volume—considering how religiosity and family combine and interact to affect health and well-being. This challenge is most obviously directed at scholars of health, but the research community should do well not to ignore the enormous potential of collaboration across specialties and disciplines in future investigations. The volume by Ellison and Hummer speaks to this and other challenges and is telling us to get to work.
Checking your email may appear as natural as eating an apple, but the decades of intensive labor, research, and skill that went into making this possible are, to the contrary, anything but simple and easy. In 1950, in order to check one’s email (if email or the internet had existed) one would have had to write an entire computer language, in mathematical notation, which could then be translated into binary code for a computer—usually the size of at least one room and involving up to 30,000 vacuum tubes—and demand anywhere from 70 to 100 human operators to work the cable-and-plug panels. Usually within the first ten minutes a tube would blow or a “bug” would be found, and the entire process would be reviewed. The problem with computing (unlike being human) is that errors are intolerable. In The Computer Boys Take Over: Computers, Programmers, and the Politics of Technical Expertise, Nathan Ensmenger offers an in-depth and well-researched analysis of the difficulties faced in the early decades of digital computer programming.

As early as the 1950s, digital computers were seen as the promise of the future, but contrary to popular myths of computers and their unprecedented progress, major challenges and roadblocks have complicated this history. Primarily, Ensmenger shows, a constant perceived and real “crisis” in the number of people who knew how to operate these (then) gigantic machines has haunted the background of computer programming for over half a century. After WWII many research and development think tanks (RAND and IBM) employed women to operate the cable-and-plug panels. Their role as the first female “human computers,” or “coders,” is both unique and a result of cultural stereotypes. The “ENIAC girls” (as they were referred to) followed instructions written by men. The task was given to women because it was then seen as secondary, “soft,” and purely mechanical. However, coding soon proved to be much more complex and demanding, at which point the computer boys would take over.

From the start, the “hard” intellectual, scientific, and analytical aspects of computer programming were allocated to men. It was also deemed “a black art,” an arcane practice where the success of a programmer depended on his “individual ability and idiosyncratic style” (p. 67). Three pivotal pioneers include Vannevar Bush who, in the 1920s worked in the electrical engineering department at MIT (there was no official computer science program until 1969) building a theory of the “differential analyzer,” one of many, but the most well-known, analog computer developed at MIT in the interwar period (p. 120). In 1937, Alan Turing introduced the “Universal Turing Machine.” By treating the computer as an abstraction and mathematical construct, Turing posed that anything that could be “physically computed could be computed by a Universal Turing Machine” (p. 128). And in the 1940s, John von Neumann published a report on the Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer (EDVAC) that provided a description of the machine as the world’s first stored-program computer. Unlike previous programmable machines, his did not distinguish between data and instructions, thereby granting the machine the intelligence and autonomy to modify its own instructions, in effect allowing the “computer to program itself” (p. 33). This “von Neumann architecture,” Ensmenger explains, quickly became the “logical basis for almost all computers designed in subsequent decades” (p. 128).

While mapping out the early history of computer programming, Ensmenger also discusses the rise of computer science in the 1960s alongside the development of organizations like the Association for Computing

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Machinery (ACM). Early on, the field of computer science needed legitimation within the academy. Thus standards and testing procedures were simultaneously developed by the “computer scientist,” as well as defined what (he) should be able to do (p. 117). By the 1960s, many realized “coding” was not as mechanical as it was once presumed to be, and thus no longer fit for women. As a result, men were primarily recruited and sought to fill the gap and need for computer programmers and scientists. These “computer boys” were not only being employed as programmers, but standardized tests were implicitly biased toward men, favoring programmers with backgrounds in math and engineering, and stereotypically “masculine” qualities (p. 76). This growing breed, because of their unique skills and distinct working styles, came to be a threat to traditional business hierarchies and management.

At the same time, the introduction of compiler and assembly languages appeared temporarily to alleviate this threat. Assembly languages, similar to compilers and subroutines, functioned like a middleman, canceling the need for intricate and highly complex mathematical programming. Instead, with assembly languages, programmers could code in alphanumeric language or terms more familiar to them. While programming still required skill and intelligence, languages such as FORTRAN developed in the 1950s (p. 90) and COBOL developed in 1959, opened the doors to many who were not trained in math or engineering (pp. 89, 93). For example, instead of computing a mathematical algorithm that looks something like: $Z(t) = A_i X_i^2 + B_i Y_i$, a COBOL programmer—a language created specifically for businesses—would work with a line of code that looked like: “MULTIPLY NUMBER-OVTIME-HRS BY OVTIME-PAY-RATE GIVING OVTIME-PAY-TOTAL” (p. 96). FORTRAN and COBOL were just the start of many thousands of compiler and assembly languages that permanently revolutionized computing, becoming a permanent middle layer—what we now call “software”—between the machine’s digital computations and the human. Nonetheless, adept programmers need skill and continue through today to be in high demand.

Today people work with computers in fields ranging from engineering, architecture, molecular biology, anthropology, ecology, physics, cognitive science, economics, and medicine. One would be hard pressed to find a professional field that did not rely on computers, at least to some extent. Outside of work, computing is also the norm, making life easier and more fun. And yet, many of the challenges and difficulties faced in the early decades are rarely remembered as we casually check our email or download a movie. The Computer Boys Take Over offers a detailed account of the rise of computer programming, the history of software, and how these histories have come to play such a central role in the so-called “ease” with which we compute today.


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Thomas Espenshade and Alexandria Radford have written a tremendous, encyclopedic text on the relationship between race, class, admissions, and campus life at elite colleges and universities. If you want to know how many white applicants participated in extracurricular activities compared to non-whites, the predicted probability of being accepted by a school based on race and class, the percentage of black students from multiracial or immigrant families, what percentage of students date within or outside their race, or just about anything else on the topic of class, race, and college, chances are there is a table or chart for you in this book. One will learn a tremendous amount simply by wading through this text. But it is not clear what can be said in general.

The book follows students through the college process—from the applicant pool to admissions to the college experience. The findings will be somewhat familiar to readers. Espenshade and Radford report a strong
“Asian penalty” in college admissions processes—though comparatively more qualified, Asians are significantly less likely to be accepted. By contrast, the likelihood of blacks being accepted is far higher than for any other racial group. The predicted probability of a lower-class black student being accepted into an elite private university is .87, compared to .65 for Hispanics, .58 for Asians, and a staggeringly low .08 for whites. Given their priorities, colleges can only afford to meet their financial and racial diversity goals through the overlap of these two interests. Once in college, Espenshade and Radford show that the experience for black students is hardly a smooth one. Half of the black students are in the bottom 20 percent of their class rank. Perhaps more happily, black students are likely to socialize with others of a different race. Whites, by contrast, are the most likely to socialize within their racial group (p. 223).

To say that such findings are familiar is not to say they are unimportant—Espenshade and Radford confirm and at times amend the considerable literature on race, class, and college. Providing such a range of information in a single volume makes the text an essential reference for those working on race, class, and education. At times the mass of information is overwhelming, as facts and figures rain down without much time taken to structure them in a coherent line of argument. In some instances the data presented require far more explanation. Table 3.4 is the worst offender, where we are presented with odds ratios that approach 1,000,000 (and others which strangely round to 0.00). In a model with 80 independent variables and 977 cases where many of their measures are so highly correlated with one another (SAT-I and ACT), this table is full of impossible results that require elaboration or elimination.

Espenshade and Radford structure their work around answers to three sets of questions: (1) to what extent does elite higher education promote social mobility, (2) how is affirmative action used and what are its consequences, and (3) once in college, what is the character and experience of campus life?

To answer such questions Espenshade and Radford constructed The National Study of College Experience (NSCE). Their data are comprised of individual student information on all applicants for admissions to ten colleges and universities. These schools provided demographic, application, and financial aid information for classes entering in the fall of 1983, 1993, and 1997. In addition, a survey was sent to a sample of the 1997 applicants about their experiences in college, pre-college experiences, and demographic and background characteristics.

The colleges selected were all part of the College and Beyond database. Given such overlap, readers should not be surprised to find that much of the terrain has been covered before in the “River Trilogy” (Bowen and Bok 1998; Massey et al. 2003; Charles et al. 2009). The data and questions are similar, and the findings largely consistent. Yet each book is different enough to make them all essential parts of a broader literature. Whereas Bowen and Bok provide a spirited defense of affirmative action programs, Espenshade and Radford provide a slightly more sober yet powerful evaluation. Thinking counterfactually, they ask what the consequences of eliminating affirmative action might be on the demographic composition of incoming college classes. What if we were to simply consider class? Or give greater weights to low-income students? Or use SAT scores as a single metric? Espenshade and Radford argue that all of these alternative programs would lead to a decline in the racial diversity of campuses. Following Glenn Loury, they suggest that instead of focusing on admissions into college, we might instead improve preparation for college, engaging in “developmental” affirmative action.

Espenshade and Radford have almost nothing to say about gender, problematic given the growing overrepresentation of women in colleges. Though they gathered data on historically black colleges and universities, we hear nothing from these data. The reader must have a keen eye for whether the reported data are from 1997, or from 1993 and 1997, or 1997 and 1993 and 1983. Espenshade and Radford might have exploited such a range of data to tell us more about how increases in inequality, growing college costs, and the growth of affirmative action programs between 1983 and 1997 influenced applicant pools, or incoming classes, or...
college experience. Regardless, Espenshade and Radford have done scholars an enormous service by gathering so much information in one place.

References


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Lynching is one of several forms within the sad repertoire of informal collective violence. Ivan Evans extends our knowledge of differences among these, and the conditions under which some rather than others emerge and then later fade away, by examining the “lynch culture” of “the South” of the United States in comparison with South Africa, where ethnic violence remained private. His time-period is the era of “segregation” in the last half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. While extending the theoretical understanding of forms and contexts of private violence, Evans also usefully provides much thick historical description in support of his arguments. In particular, he addresses the contrasting effects on informal violence across the two regions of labor controls, the legal system, and religion.

Evans situate his work within the micro-tradition of Southern United States/South Africa comparisons, summarizing available conceptualizations and adding further layers. The account is unbalanced in its coverage since Evans is hamstrung by the limited South African historical work—which his book considerably redresses. However, his emphasis on the historical rather than the sociological means the book is rather disconnected from relevant theory.

Private white-on-black violence was common to both racial orders and arose through appropriative employment relations coupled with asymmetrical power relationships. Had he wished to generalize more, Evans could have shown how these two emblematic racial orders compare with other racial orders across many colonial or settler situations. Moreover, in order to keep tightly focused, complexities within his two study areas are largely ignored, in particular the important role in South African ethnic relations of Indians and Coloureds. A lynch culture involves the public spectacle of collective and ritualistic hunting and killing: “. . .the rites of passage that human sacrifice entailed suppressed the inequalities that divided whites and guided the frenzied but strangely worshipful mob through a choreography that culminated in the supreme suspension of time, the ritual death of a sacrificial and vulnerable victim” (p. 25)—even though the crowds did not understand this “religious” transference of their violent impulses.

Intriguingly, although Evans does not assuage his reader’s curiosity, lynching existed before the defeat of the South, although previously 85 percent were against whites. Afterwards, there was an abrupt switch to white-on-black violence, although some whites continued to be targeted. Lynching emerged as other means of social control of blacks became constrained during the short-lived Reconstruction era, with struggles becoming deflected onto civil society and sanctioned by ideology. “Lost causism in the South provided the glue to hold together a demoralised white community that was divided by class, anxious about its women, and fearful of the social and political equality that would flow from the emancipation of African Americans” (p. 248). These sentiments were harnessed to keep the white working class supine by white elites reigning over King Cotton—indeed, where there was a range of employers, violence was less extreme. The employment situation in South
Africa was more complex as “Employers in the three sectors demanded divergent forms of labour control that precluded all employers from rallying to an overtly violent regime of labor regulation. Mine owners cherished a system of circulatory migrant labor; industrialists factored a settled urban population which the majority of farmers pinned their fortunes to a system of labor tenancy” (p. 242).

Northern reconstruction efforts were quickly repelled through a “white backlash” which left the South to shape its own fate. While federal policing did subsequently exercise its muscle in the South (as in anti-bootlegging) it did not address ethnic violence until the 1960s. By then employers had developed a distaste for violence since their operations depended on an engaged black labor force. Therefore the lynch culture faded but never entirely ended: instead it transmuted into the more institutionalized forms of capital punishment, incarceration and street policing. Evans interestingly records for each region, but does not elucidate the commonness of the trajectory, a phase when there was an interracial populist movement uniting ethnicities’ interests before this was quickly defeated.

Evans superbly identifies three themes common in both regions’ ideologies: “‘lost causism’; government intervention in the economy, paternalism” (p. 246). However, he then seems to lose his interpretive nerve and lamely suggests that “...these were not only and perhaps not even the most important elements of segregationalist ideology but they suffice to convey the contrasting ideological meanings that marked the bureaucratic and lynch cultures of violence” (p. 246).

Despite his superb development of his three themes, Evans advances a list of other topics yet to be considered “...residential segregation, the desegregation of education, affirmative action policies, the changing relationship between race and class, and the changing meaning of ‘whiteness’” (p. 251). To this could be added the nationally-versus locally-controlled structures of police organization, the different relationships with their wider national settings of the racial orders (the North in the United States and “reserves” in South Africa), the patterns of ownership of the means of violence, and different forms of social cohesion. In sum, while Evans’ scholarship provides very useful additional historical material, the long list of differences undermines the comparative structural analysis.

Evans’ opening comments point to differences in national contrition, with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission having endeavored to heal some of the wounds of South Africa’s past whereas the United States has still to come to terms with its. But there is the huge irony, that since the period covered in his book, and against the thrust of Evans’ argument, there has been the spread of a form of lynching (especially “necklacing”) within contemporary South Africa black settlements which is directed at criminals, “traitors” or immigrants, and which had been preceded by largely non-violent mass ethnic clearing of urban blacks and vicious large-scale ANC/IFP conflicts.

Finally, it is a pity that the volume is marred by several proofing errors. Author “Etherington” becomes “Hetherington” in the same passage, and worse, both make it to the index. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is lauded for banging up criminals when its function was to exculpate criminals if they offered up “the truth,” and in fact was bitterly criticized for not bringing criminals to trial. Why such a brief statistical time series on numbers of lynchings was presented on page five is unclear when longer time series are referred to in the book. Two rather different interpretations of the peak for lynching (1897 or 1918) are offered within three pages of each other.

Evans greatly advances analytically acute historical work on these two racial orders, but also shows that there is so much more to be researched.
Cities have become key sites for the analysis of justice and injustice. This is because cities seem to concentrate injustice along class, racial, and ethnic lines, and at the same time seem to hold out the best hope for combating (or at least reducing) these same forms of injustice. A city offers a kind of laboratory for studying the impacts of policy, of economic growth and decline, and of social movements on complex populations and challenging socio-economic problems. In *The Just City*, Susan S. Fainstein draws on her work of more than three decades on equity, urban planning and development to consider the prospects for more just urban processes and outcomes. This clearly-argued and thoughtful book adds to efforts to contextualize theories of justice in real political, economic and spatial settings—where philosophies of justice meet difficult social realities, and where law is not the only tool for the definition and pursuit of justice.

The conceptual debates that frame this subject are now familiar. Fainstein offers a further go-round of Rawls, Nussbaum, Young, and Sen, with a twist of Harvey, before offering her own take on how to think about justice in the city. The analysis of urban justice and injustice, she contends, should focus on three critical issues: equity, diversity and democracy. This is intended to go beyond a concern with economic distribution to consider the claims of social difference and citizen engagement in any reckoning of what is more or less just. Justice in the city is not simply a question of who gets what, but of who gets in and who gets asked. These three criteria provide a basis for assessing the impacts of both city policy (on housing, public amenity, service provision, transport and infrastructure planning) and particular urban development projects. If the conceptual framework is an open one, Fainstein is circumspect about the range of her substantive analysis: “limited to what appears feasible within the present context of capitalist urbanization in wealthy, formally democratic, Western countries” (p. 5). She recognizes that such a focus is vulnerable to criticism, but is equally clear that there is no easy transfer of ideas and practice between rich-world cities, let alone from developed to developing city contexts. It is telling that, given Fainstein’s commitment to a planning politics of the possible, some of her proposals for more just urban development appear quixotic in the context of current regimes of city governance.

Fainstein’s empirical studies build on her long-term interests in the cities of New York, London, and Amsterdam. In each case she traces a record of urban development and policy since the 1970s, both at city level and in relation to specific large-scale projects. Over this period all three cities have seen pronounced cycles of economic decline and growth, reversals of what appeared to be chronic population decline, and demographic change shaped in significant ways by international in-migration. Applying her triad of equity, diversity and democracy to these stories leads to some surprising conclusions. New York’s Battery Park City can easily be taken to epitomize the “neoliberal” urban development trends of the 1980s: post-industrial, finance and leisure-oriented, waterfront, mega-project. Yet Fainstein argues that it produced certain positive outcomes in respect of equity and diversity, albeit in the absence of much meaningful democratic engagement. Its commercial and residential developments enhanced the city’s tax base while retention of the land in public ownership made for an ongoing source of city revenue. The fact that the development was built on landfill meant that upscale housing and offices did not involve direct displacement of existing populations, and the provision of new public spaces and amenities accessible to non-residents supported a more diverse mix of recreational users. The score-card is similarly mixed for London’s Docklands development. In this case, Fainstein points to the double-edge of diversity in thinking about the just city: gentrification increased the social diversity of the area, but was seen as a kind of dispossession by many of its established working-class residents.
The book concludes with a series of critical proposals for urban planning and policy. Fainstein has sought to remain even-handed in her treatment of the relative claims of equity, diversity and democracy, but it is the distributive politics of urban justice that opens onto the most concrete practical strategies. These include requirements for affordable provisions in all new housing developments; one-for-one replacement of public or affordable housing lost from the overall stock; relocation and compensation rights for those compulsorily displaced by re-development, whether renters or owners; incremental rather than comprehensive neighborhood re-development; and low-fares policies on public transport together with tolls and taxes on private motoring. Several of these measures have existed at times in these three cities; some have now disappeared, others are being eroded.

In the interest of diversity, Fainstein advocates a commitment to mixed land uses and inclusive zoning; the creation and protection of accessible and varied public spaces; and broader policies of affirmative action to promote equitable access to housing, education and employment. The political and planning strategies for ensuring democracy are harder to specify, and one has a sense of Fainstein’s wariness regarding the kinds of capture and the forms of exclusion to which processes of urban engagement and consultation are too often subject. She wants to see real participation in planning and development by local populations without making current residents the only or the loudest citizen voice in urban decision-making. This tension is endemic to the dual life of the city as a common property and a local landscape. The struggle for a more just city, the reader understands, is bound to be conflictual, and it will not always seem fair.


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There has been since the 1990s a tradition of putting together books which work with the different European migration patterns and which reflect in many ways the various traditions, diverse terminology as well as varied ways of collecting data on migration and ethnic minorities. This is an old issue in the realm of social sciences. However, the book under review also brings us new air because it is probably one of the first works which puts together the European landscape when working with “young adult migrants.” It also renders new paths by making a serious effort to review the classical sociological concept of social exclusion.

Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe is elaborated using the basis of a European research project of inclusion and exclusion of young adult migrants (or those of immigrant background) using selected national case studies of Estonia, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. It is clearly organized and written and shows a good quality of work, especially provided by the authors who are the editors of the book.

Their approach builds up the common grounded themes of an old debate around the immigration models in Europe, but they also capture it in a more general global context of the contemporary border. For example regarding the case of Southern Europe, they quote that Southern Europe has erected a symbolic fence as protection against the Global South. In this goal of tackling a serious cross-national comparison they locate the construction of numerous migration histories, different national discourses and heterogeneous political tones, multiple classifications of the foreigner, different education models, cultural tensions and European
politics. By focusing on the narrower objective of the book, on the process of social exclusion, the editors brilliantly include all the different theories of contemporary social exclusion. And they do that by not forgetting a wide range of elements which interfere in such processes, thereby presenting a very holistic view. The holistic tone is often repeated when showing how juridical, political, economic and cultural patterns are framing processes of inclusion and exclusion, keeping always in mind the different national contexts.

The well-known sociological debate on the systematic inequalities according to class, gender and ethnicities as an intertwined social fact is also considered. However, they also include the new social exclusion perspective related to the development of the two-thirds societies, where one-third is locked into poverty or near poverty. The integrationist perspective argues that the focus should not be only on differences between immigrants and nonimmigrants, but rather on the process of social exclusion. They do so by thinking of a process of losing ground in a number of different areas, such as the labor market, the social network, and political and cultural life.

The real fresh air of the book is placed into the youth analysis: in the links between the adolescent years and the transition to adulthood as a real emergent area of scholarship. The book, once again by being too holistic, not only pretends to reflect national conceptual schemes, but centers on problematic aspects associated with the ways in which issues of immigration and ethnic relations are couched in language. A crucial concern is put into the question of whether young adult immigrants (and their descendants) have radically different experiences from their peers in the ethnic majority population.

By addressing the youth, the book really addresses the meaning of the global generation, following Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (p. 44). Today young migrants could be marginalized from an economic social point of view, while they are not necessarily marginal from a cultural and political perspective, because they grow up in globalized societies, they use digital technologies, and they are conscious and aware of their empowerment challenges. This is now one of the open questions which remains—for how long we will have to wait to recognize the new role of this global youth in “Fortress Europe”?


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A visceral heaviness in my chest developed as I read the introduction to Terrorizing Women: Feminicide in the Américas, signifying the sociological, political, and human import of this well-written and thoughtfully organized edited volume. In mapping “cartographies of feminicide,” Rosa-Linda Fregoso and Cynthia Bejarano build a compelling analysis of contemporary feminicide in the Américas. The editors’ and contributors’ empirically-grounded theoretical innovations and the sheer breadth of this volume (which includes twenty-two contributions) qualify it as the most innovative and path-breaking body of scholarship on the topic of feminicide. Terrorizing Women is among the most illuminating collections on the study of contemporary violence as it intersects with gendered racism, the exploitation endemic to neoliberal capitalism, and the complicity of nation-states in rendering women’s bodies vulnerable to violence in the formal and informal markets of capital and misogyny.

I wrote this review just days after the home of Malú García Andrade (president of Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa/May Our Daughters Return Home, and the sister of Lilia Alejandra, killed in 2001) was set on fire while she attended an anti-feminicide protest and hunger strike in front of the offices of the Chihuahua State Attorney General in Ciudad Juárez. One day earlier, the home of Sara Reyes Salazar, mother of Josefina Reyes Salazar (a human rights activist killed in 2010), was burned down; only weeks earlier, three members of Sara’s family were abducted and later found dead. In the previous two months, women’s human rights
activists Marisela Escobedo Ortiz (of *Justicia para Nuestras Hijas* /Justice for Our Daughters) and mother of Rubi Frayre Escobedo, killed in 2008) and Susana Chavez Castillo (of *Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa*) were also murdered. Despite years of mobilization by a transnational coalition of activists whose demand is “¡Ni Una Más! (Not one more!),” feminicides in Ciudad Juarez, the state of Chihuahua, and across the Americas continue with chilling impunity. As feminicide escalates unabated, social researchers and advocates face an enormous challenge in making sense of the systematic and routine killing of women. This volume contributes significantly to that effort.

Moreover, this collection represents a coming together of “transnational” and “intersectional” feminist scholarship coupled with a radical shift in the locus of knowledge: by focusing on the region of the Americas and invoking the concept of transculturation, Fregoso and Bejarano frame the Global South as “a site of theory production” rather than as “an area to be studied” by experts in the Global North (pp. 4–5). As a result of their awareness that feminicide—the murder of women linked to racialized, gendered structures of capital, militarized power, and inequality—continues to escalate, Fregoso and Bejarano’s project is public (interdisciplinary) sociology at its best: as they note, one of the collection’s primary aims is “to contribute to the political and legal process of defining and advancing a human rights framing of feminicide” (p. 8). *Terrorizing Women* employs and transcends academic critique, includes the testimonies of “witness-survivors” (family members of victims), and explores a range of remedies to the vexing tragedies of feminicide occurring not only in Mexico, but across the Americas in Guatemala, Argentina, and Costa Rica.

Several chapters in *Terrorizing Women* demonstrate how antiracist feminist analysis enables a more complete theorization of global political economy. Many chapters in this volume (such as those by Mercedes Olivera, Julia Estela Monárez Fragos, and Alicia Schmidt Camacho) demonstrate how feminicide both represents and reproduces the disposability of racialized women laborers upon which deeply unequal systems of capital accumulation depend. In her essay, Olivera demonstrates how social violence in Mexico is a product of poverty, unemployment, the disintegration of the peasant economy, migration, women’s lack of land rights, and a nonfunctional justice system. Camacho examines feminicide as a brutal manifestation of the “feminization of the dispensable non-citizen” (p. 276) and as the “shadow supplement of a binational project to produce a feminized population without rights, readily appropriated for work and service in both legal and illicit labor markets” (p. 285) in both the United States and Mexico.

Essays by Ríta Laura Segato and by Héctor Domínguez-Ruvalcaba and Patricia Ravelo Blancas address what longstanding impunity reveals about feminicide in Ciudad Juárez and the state of Chihuahua. In her compelling analysis, Segato argues that the impunity of these crimes is the way into deciphering them, for “no crime committed by common outcasts would remain in complete impunity for this long” (p. 73). Feminicides are a form of expressive violence, enacted by a “second state,” that is “acting and shaping society from beneath the law” (p. 80) and establishing its sovereignty, patriarchal and regional totalitarianism, and territorial control by terrorizing the city’s women. Like Segato, Domínguez-Ruvalcaba and Blancas argue that “all recommendations with respect to the disappearances and deaths of women have to take the uselessness of the state as the starting point” (p. 195). As such, Domínguez-Ruvalcaba and Blancas urge us to rethink obsolete, state-centric mechanisms of accountability that target only the government as the object of scrutiny.

In addition to advancing a more sophisticated analysis of gender, racialization, and violence as constitutive of contemporary global political economy, this volume also contributes an understanding of the new civic networks and social movements that arise in response to feminicide. Such movements at times invoke legal instruments for seeking accountability and promoting women’s human rights, yet they also move “beyond the legal.” As Fregoso and Bejarano note, feminist scholars and activists possess an historically justifiable skepticism of the state’s willingness to “grant” women their full...
human rights, particularly in an era in which rights are being denationalized. As such, social movements are embracing approaches that center healing, justice, new cultures of citizenship, and the restoration of community. In place of a notion of human rights that relies on liberal individualism, Fregoso and Bejarano advance the concept of “human rights for living”: a model of human rights as substantive, indivisible, and which requires deep structural change for its realization. Feminicide, according to the contributors, exists as part of a broader matrix of human rights violations that traverse public and private domains, interconnected formal and informal economies, states and borders, sites of corporate and misogynist power, and militarized shadow states. Such violations include not only the rape, torture, and murder of women but also those which are directly sanctioned by the neoliberal state, such as hunger, poverty, and displacement. All in all, Terrorizing Women suggests that many paths—transnational, legal, community-based, and cultural—are being pursued in order to address and ultimately dismantle the corporate, state, and shadow state systems that enact private and public practices of feminicide.

Terrorizing Women signals that much scholarly and advocacy work on the topic of feminicide remains to be done. It begins the work of placing feminicide in comparative perspective (with a focus on the Américas), which is an important theoretical development, given that feminicide is a transnational phenomenon. And finally, as Fregoso and Bejarano note in their introduction, the relationship of structural violence against queer and transgender people to feminicide remains underexplored. This volume does not explicitly advance a sexual rights framing of feminicide, yet through its critical human rights framing, it offers an impressive theoretical and empirical foundation on which future research on the queer sexual politics of feminicide (and movements to end it) might build.
chapter, however, we see that family relations may vary across time for GLBT persons. Pugh finds two distinct periods of life—at the emergence of sexuality and as their lives settled in adulthood—where families were particularly significant for the GLBT elders from whom he collected life narratives. Other chapters consider a variety of dimensions of family including parent-child relations, GLBT partners/couples, and friends. These chapters move us past the image of the familially-exiled GLBT elder.

Second, this collection uniquely attends to the complex and difficult issues of care, care work, and support throughout many chapters. Much sociological work on care has focused on who does care work in the working family, and work in sexuality has focused heavily on care of those with HIV/AIDS. This volume extends our thinking about care work by implicitly and explicitly asking what care work GLBT elders do and receive. For example, Thomas Blank, Marysol Asencio, Lara Descartes, and Julie Griggs’ chapter asked aging men to consider the possibility of prostate cancer in focus groups. His participants articulated some concerns about medical care, imagined social support from family, but most interestingly, the authors say, “expressed romantic notions” (p. 24) of the ways in which long-term partners would be supportive and caring. Also, in the section on health, Tarynn Witten directly takes on the issue of end of life care for transgender elders. According to Witten, the difficulties that transgender people face follow them into late adulthood. End of life care is complicated by caregivers’ “continuing conflicts regarding gender transition begun earlier in life” (p. 47) and by institutional and legal heteronormativity. Finally, a last chapter considers care using personal narrative from the point of view of a gay son caring for his elderly mother. This chapter is the only one in the book that does not focus on GLBT elders.

This eclectic mix of chapters begins to allow us to see in more complex detail a population that has been fairly invisible. While this volume sheds light on many interesting and important phenomena for older GLBT adults, there are still some corners that remain in the dark. For instance, the volume focuses more on gay men than lesbians. Of the eight chapters, five are empirical accounts or case studies of gay men. None of the remaining three focus on lesbians but are data from lesbians and gay men, or transgender persons. A gendered perspective on GLBT aging is still needed. Another dark corner is sex itself. We hear very little of the role of intimate sexual behavior and experience for older GLBT people. The few bits we do hear about sexual experience (in Blank et al.’s chapter for example) suggest that it needs further study. Finally, more light would be shed on the older GLBT experience if we had data that allowed comparisons with other groups. Many of the chapters here imply a comparison to younger GLBT persons or to heterosexual elders, but there is little data to examine whether these comparisons hold up empirically. However, the chapters are extremely generative of possible future research in the intersecting areas of aging and sexuality, and it is likely that this book will spawn much of that research.


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In Who You Claim: Performing Gang Identity in School and on the Streets, Robert Garot uses an ethnomethodological approach to analyze the ways young men and women navigate identity, gang-involvement, and violence. In stark contrast to scholarly accounts that paint a portrait of gang members using broad categorical brush strokes (e.g., gang vs. non-gang, core vs. periphery, and so on), Garot provides a beautifully complex picture of youth identity and the countless ways in which it is created, maintained, and enacted. In Garot’s account, gang members are not bloodthirsty killers programmed by their loyalty to some monolithic organization. Rather, they are painstakingly “normal” human beings struggling to make their way through alienating schools and impoverished neighborhoods. The end result is

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a book that, like no other before it, describes how the rituals and identities of young people are responsible for the social phenomena we call “gangs.”

Who You Claim is based on interview and observational data from “Choices Alternative Academy” (CAA), an alternative school “designed for the baddest of the bad: the roughest kids in the toughest neighborhood” (p. 15). Garot spent four years interviewing more than 46 “consultants” (as he calls the interviewees and informants) and observing hallway, cafeteria, playground, and classroom dynamics. Garot’s methodological approach reflects this objective of unpacking gang identity and his use of primary “on-the-ground” and “in-the-class” data is as compelling as it is revealing.

The book is organized into two parts: one that focuses on alienation at school (Part I) and the other which focuses on gang identity outside of school (Part II). Part I sets the stage for the drama that unfolds in the rest of the book by describing the school and its cast of characters. For Garot, CAA is not some beacon of hope that might help troubled youth re-orient their identities towards more mainstream (read non-violent/non-gang) behaviors. On the contrary, the main function of CAA, Garot tells us, is control. The consultants’ actions are a form of resistance to the alienation of CAA, the apathy of teachers, and the indecipherable meaning and fickle enforcement of school rules. The “hidden curriculum” at CAA is about “fear,” and the ways in which teachers and administrators try to retain control of the student population (pp. 41–44). For example, in a chapter on student dress codes (Chapter Three), Garot describes how “arbitrary, inconsistent, and meaningless rules” give rise to student resistance and adaptations (p. 45). Rules invoked by administrators to promote student safety (i.e., minimize gang presence inside school) become battlegrounds upon which students struggle to express their individuality while teachers and administrators struggle to maintain authority and control.

The main argument unfolds in Part II, where Garot details the processes of identity formation, creation, and maintenance as they happen outside of CAA. Each of the chapters in Part II chronicles a unique dimension of gang identity and, more importantly, the precise ways in which they transpire on the street. Although the majority of the data were collected at CAA, Part II relies mainly on consultants’ accounts of how they negotiate and avoid violent encounters on the street. Much of the facework described by Garot chronicles how youth respond to questions of identity and how such identity work adapts to situational and contextual factors such as the clothes people are wearing (and how they are wearing them), the streets on which encounters unfold, the presence of third parties, and so on. The most pervasive questions posed to Garot’s consultants are “where you from?” and “who you claim?” (Chapters Four and Five). For the consultants, such questions are extremely potent “locally recognized interrogation devices and central practices for demonstrating gang identity” that force “the respondent to make an identity claim in terms of gang membership” (p. 71). Thus, the answers to such questions can determine the paths of action taken in street-level interactions, especially during potentially violent encounters (Chapter Six). Claiming to be from “somewhere”—a particular neighborhood—de facto associates that person with a particular gang ecology, regardless of whether or not the person actually considers themselves to be an associate of said gang. Neighborhood geography, group attachment, and individual identity create a deadly Venn Diagram in which young people must decide how to move away from the center and towards a safer social location given the situational specifics. Most often, the consultants respond by saying they are from “nowhere”—a telling response that denies one aspect of an individual’s identity (attachment to a community) for the sake of personal safety.

The empirical attention of Who You Claim is on the gang members themselves. And, without a doubt, Garot succeeds in revealing the complex nature of gang identity. Unfortunately, Garot does not afford the same complexity to other actors in his narrative—in particular, teachers. In fact, as compared to the multifaceted and spirited gang members, the teachers and administrators at CAA are portrayed as unidimensional, flat, and categorical. Without exception,
Garot describes teachers as oppressive authoritarians with little understanding or care for pedagogy and education. Apathy among teachers—especially those in schools such as CAA—is believable and even understandable. But I find it hard to believe that all (or most) of the teachers at CAA viewed their vocation purely in oppressive terms. Just as the identity of gang members emerges from encounters with other actors in the school environs, one might also reasonably expect that the identity of teachers would emerge in a similar dynamic manner. Though, admittedly, Garot’s objective is to study gang members and not teachers, such a flat analysis of teachers is quite out of character in this interaction-based study, especially because Garot’s own presence at CAA most likely linked him with staff and faculty.

This limitation not withstanding, *Who You Claim* is a “must-read” for scholars interested not just in gangs, but also in youth identity, education, urban neighborhoods, and violence more generally. This book is perhaps the first to accurately describe the minutiae of micro-level rituals that guide identity formation among gang youth. It is through such interactions that we learn that gang membership is not some catch-all master status in the lives of gang members. Gang membership is a fluid, dynamic, and spatially-situated aspect of identity that intersects with other dimensions of self. Gang members are, at the same time, residents of a neighborhood, students in a school, friends, family members, and so on. Trying to capture the idea of “gang membership” without such dynamism not only misses the empirical point, but also poorly represents what gang membership actually is.

During the past ten years, the French sociology of unelected political and administrative elites went through an important renewal. The works of Bruno Latour on the Conseil d’État, Dominique Schnapper on the Conseil constitutionnel, Sylvain Laurens on immigration officials, Emilie Biland-Curinier on local civil servants, Michel Offerlé on lobbying, Yves Dezalay on economic and legal advisors—and many others—have studied groups and institutions almost unanalyzed until then, and often approached them using innovative theoretical perspectives. In *The New Custodians of the State* (an adapted translation of his 2008 book, L’élite des politiques de l’État), William Genieys contributes to this exploration of neglected fields by focusing on social welfare and defense policymakers in France. However, the author does not take part in the ongoing discussions within the sociology of elites, but dialogues with older references and with the political science literature.

When he addresses French defense policies—following the seminal works of Samy Cohen and Bastien Irondelle—Genieys mainly tries to refute the military-industrial complex (MIC) paradigm, and demonstrate the lasting pertinence of Suzanne Keller’s description of some bureaucratic elites as “strategic.” The “programmatic elites” of the subtitle are in fact alliances of senior administrative, technical, and military officials consolidated around a specific project or policy program, whose destiny has become progressively bound with their own respective career or corps interests. The members of these coalitions use their highly specialized sectoral or multi-sector competences, their connections, and related legitimacy to gain autonomy, exert influence on the decision processes (notably by controlling some of their steps), oppose other
government elites, and resist the financial rationale of cost-reduction implemented through governance tools. Therefore, the model of action presented by Genieys seems to be less an analytical alternative to the MIC, as he claims, than an alternate strategy deployed by insiders with specific resources to counter—among others—the MIC itself (pp. 145 and 156).

The other part of the book is more systematically prosopographical: it analyzes the careers of the 133 civil servants who occupied senior administrative and/or top adviser positions in the national healthcare and family policy sectors during the 1981–1997 period, and more specifically the 36 of them who did it for the longest (more than three years) and became welfare experts. Among the latter, Genieys identifies three generations that rose in different political contexts: the “elders,” the “81 generation” linked with the Socialists’ first accession to power, and the “social policy managers” of the late-1980s and 1990s. Almost all of them were trained as generalists at the prestigious École nationale d’administration (ENA). But many members of the two younger groups subsequently joined the social affairs chamber of the Cour des comptes (which is in charge of the financial audit of France’s national public institutions) or the Inspection générale des affaires sociales (in charge of the control, audit and evaluation of social policies), where they acquired skills and positional resources that led to their functional politicization and sectoral specialization, and therefore to their appointment to executive positions.

Thus, welfare policy elites are described as having grown proactive: they no longer oppose the budgetary approach and managerial tools while negotiating with the finance ministry. Instead, they anticipate and integrate them in their proposals, so as to be the ones setting the contents of the sector’s agenda, if not the schedule. The book, however, does not explore the relation between this adaptation to new normative frameworks and the policies actually implemented during the following years—the welfare elites are defined as “new custodians of the State” because they have been able to maintain and even strengthen its (and therefore their) prerogative to conceive, enact, pursue, and control social policies. But with which orientation, exactly? Indeed the work of Bruno Palier on this question is quoted as a reference (pp. 50 and 115), although a more focused analysis relating the actors studied by Genieys with the measures they promoted would have usefully completed his book (as it does in the chapters about defense policymakers).

More generally, since the author’s demonstrations are sometimes repetitive, it is even more frustrating that some of his key points remain undeveloped, and lack further connections to the sociological literature. Several times, his analysis of “programmatic elites” recalls and illustrates the importance of the multipositionality of certain actors, the rise of project-oriented organizations and justificatory registers during the last decades, and the relevance of investigating meaning-making processes in order to understand the actions of policymakers. However, despite the fact that these issues are characteristic of the Bourdieusian and post-Bourdieuian approaches—and that Genieys himself acknowledges the centrality of Bourdieu’s work in his introductory theoretical essay (pp. 36 and 38) and further in the book (p. 81)—he never directly addresses them.

Nevertheless, The New Custodians of the State presents stimulating data and in-depth case studies that will interest both French scholars and Franco-American comparatists. The fewer relations and the lesser circulation of administrative elites within the private sector (because civil servants can always go back to their statutory posts, when they are removed from government-appointed positions), the role of serving in administrative jurisdictions or inspection corps in building a top public career, the little influence of think tanks on policy design, and the leadership disputes behind the wide array of services provided by a corporatist welfare system, are French characteristics that certainly will hold the attention of anybody eager to better understand la République.
The widespread appeal of Ulrich Beck's notion of the "risk society" has resulted in a large corpus of research that treats risk as a contemporary phenomenon—the by-product of certain changes in modernity during the latter portions of the twentieth century. However, as Saran Ghatak nicely demonstrates in his book, *Threat Perceptions*, the construction and governance of risk has a long and often dubious history that is inscribed in our current understandings of danger. In tracing the emergence of risk over the course of the nineteenth century United States, Ghatak brings a much needed historical sensibility to the study of risk, showing how controlling it has puzzled social scientists and policy makers for a long time.

Ghatak lays out two analytical goals for reconstructing the evolution of defining and controlling risk in the United States. First, Ghatak seeks to situate the current debates over risk within a broader historical perspective through a "history of the present." This is achieved with aplomb, as the book's major contribution is to get the reader thinking about risk and threat perception as not merely a symptom of modern governance, but a longstanding and persistent issue.

Ghatak's historical orientation forms the analytical foundation for his second goal, to show that risk is not a pre-existing reality but the result of simultaneous processes of social, juridical, and scientific construction. The complicated "tortuous ways" that risk has evolved are driven by the interaction between scientists and state institutions. Put differently, it is an emergent phenomenon born of historical contingency and alliances between researchers and policy makers. *Threat Perceptions* does a nice job in illuminating the animating issues for such alliances throughout different periods of risk governance. Yet, while Ghatak effectively calls our attention to these configurations, his largely descriptive analysis begs for more analytical rigor in teasing out the interactions and tensions among actors. The slim 131-page volume cannot bear the full weight of this second goal. Consequently, *Threat Perceptions* is an excellent primer on the history of risk—a good place to start for anyone interested in these issues, but only a start.

This is not to say that researchers interested in this topic will not find plenty of grist for the sociology mill in this short book. The six empirical chapters recount different moments and topics in the history of risk in the United States. The first four comprise a coherent narrative that traces the evolution of risk construction from dangerousness in the nineteenth century, to eugenics, to a psychopathological model, and finally to a model of actuarial justice (or, the emergence of standardized statistical instruments for measuring risk potential). These chapters flow seamlessly into one another, providing an excellent account of how danger and risk have changed over time. They also underscore the linkages between the different conceptualizations and eras, as *Threat Perceptions* distills the key intellectual and political issues of each period. Although ostensibly Ghatak is interested in both the scientific and policy sides of the construction of risk, his discussion, especially in the earlier chapters, is skewed heavily toward the social scientific dimensions. This imbalance somewhat muddies his analysis of interaction between science and politics that is at the core of the book's analytical intervention. Still, one would be hard pressed to find a book that encompasses a wide array of source material in such an economical fashion.

While fascinating, the final two empirical chapters on political dissent and terrorism sit a bit awkwardly in the book's overall narrative. This awkwardness is born both from their topics and their different emphases. Whereas the previous four chapters skew too heavily toward the intellectual foundations for risk, these two chapters focus almost exclusively on the policy and policing side of the equation. This is not to suggest that these chapters are weak or limited. Indeed, the materials contained therein deserve books of their own. But Ghatak's argument would...
be better served if these two contemporary chapters were more integrated with the historical narrative.

*Threat Perceptions* lays out an ambitious agenda, and while Ghatak synthesizes a breadth of material, it is never given its full analytical due. For example, in the chapter on eugenics Ghatak claims that the idea of defective delinquency provided a common meeting ground of the agenda of scientists, criminal justice professionals, lawyers and social reformers (p. 44). Yet he could do more to examine *how* and *why* it provided this common meeting ground. To understand how these alliances were formed, we need more contextualization of both the disciplinary projects of various groups and the political issues of governance among policy makers. We need more analysis on the “nexus between science and law” (p. 101), on how intellectuals tap into and interact with governing organizations to create the affinities that Ghatak describes. What we get instead is a largely descriptive narrative that identifies the major issues in the history of risk construction, but which fails to illuminate the nitty gritty processes out of which this history evolved.

Nevertheless, in the end, Ghatak effectively identifies the difficulties and tensions in trying to calculate rationally and prevent future dangers within a democratic society. And if this history tells us anything it is that preemptive strikes against risk have a dark side, having given birth to eugenics, McCarthyism, and the Patriot Act. Ghatak’s description of the corrosion of individual rights in the name of risk governance illuminates the persistent tension between controlling risk and democratic values. It is this critical, historical sensibility that is the book’s true contribution, providing a foundation for subsequent research into how the alliances formed between researchers and policy makers produce our often problematic responses to danger.

In this book, Walter F. Hatch entertains researchers of Japanese political economy and economic sociology by offering a new perspective drawn from network studies. The economic downfall of Japan from the early 1990s has led to much comment and debate among journalistic and academic writings. Most early works on Japanese political economy explained Japan’s economic success by the unique ways it operated capitalism. Facing the question of why the same Japanese operation failed later, endogenous or exogenous explanations have been attempted without much satisfaction. Hatch’s version is more systematic than other attempts, but it also leaves some questions behind.

Hatch characterizes Japanese capitalism as “selective relationalism” where political and economic exchanges occur exclusively among insiders of networks and elites who enjoy positional power in allocating resources such as information, capital, and technology. This relationalism has three legs, state-industry ties, business-business ties, and management-labor ties. Anyone who is familiar with studies on Japan’s political economy can envision each leg: alliance capitalism/reciprocal consent/administrative guidance/amatukudari-shingikai for bureaucrats-business ties, vertical and horizontal keiretsu and other enterprise networks for business-business ties, and permanent employment/seniority wages for management-labor ties. This popular postwar model began to face challenges in the late 1970s as rising opportunity costs outweighed savings in transaction costs. Japanese firms continued to invest but domestic productivity fell. Hatch attributes the increasing inefficiency of selective relationalism to the changing economic environment of technological uncertainty.

Japanese elites responded, according to author, by externalizing the system to the Asian region in the 1980s rather than
mending domestic selective relationalism. Government officials became cheerleaders for economic regionalization and offered Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Asian countries. Japanese manufacturers of electronics, machinery, and automobile parts established production networks based on a technological division of labor. As the bubble burst and the business rush to Asia was accelerated in the 1990s, Japanese officials characterized this dynamic process as a “flying geese” pattern of regional economic development led by Japan.

While Asian regionalization has been widely claimed to be market-led integration, Hatch emphasizes that this was driven by Japanese elites who wanted to prevent their relational capitalism from collapsing at home. In this sense, he terms the process “elite regionalism.” Finding a buffer in Asia, Hatch argues that Japanese economic reform in the 1990s was not real restructuring but rather mere distributional change. Reciprocal ties between regulators and the regulated continued, and business ties were maintained among core insiders. On the other hand, the cost of distributional change was placed on smaller companies and increasing non-regular and dispatched workers. Regionalization in Asia was accompanied by domestic polarization. In this sense, regionalism only postponed the reform of increasingly failing and innovation-resistant network capitalism in Japan. Therefore, the end of relational capitalism would be good for Japan’s future.

Why did Japanese elites not change selective relationalism despite the rising costs? Here, Hatch seeks answers from network studies. Change in the dense network structure of the Japanese has a high opportunity cost. Japanese elites did not want to change since innovation undermined the established relations and thus threatened their positional power.

This selective relationalism has been changing slowly since the late 1990s according to Hatch. A driver came from a crisis in the Japan-led regionalization. Local businessmen who were satisfied with profits now wanted technological independence and more local input—horizontal networks. Also China emerged as a regional hegemon replacing Japan as the hub of trade and production networks. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 also weakened Japan’s positional power as the IMF regained new influence. Japan’s ODA to Asia has also been in decline. The political power transfer to the Democratic Party of Japan in 2009 has been a facilitating factor for change. Although the author sees strong signs for structural change, readers may be skeptical in light of Japan’s response following the 2011 earthquake and the nuclear meltdown of the Fukushima power plant.

Hatch tries to build a theory that regionalization is the protective response of an advanced capitalist state to the forces of globalization. Here, he finds Germany in Europe similar to Japan in Asia, although he does not elaborate on how German elites have sought Europeanization to protect their corporate capitalism. With the same logic, is China regionalizing against the forces of globalization to protect its socialist market economy? Advocates of the Beijing Consensus for China’s development assistance model may well be motivated to protect their socialist market economy from Westernization. The thesis of regionalization as a buffer against globalization has been stated elsewhere. However, it needs to be verified through more empirical studies.

Recently, trade, production, and investment networks have been studied to show a deepening of regional integration in Asia. Taking the region as a unit of analysis, either Japan or China is often regarded as a node in whole network geography, so that the goals and motives of national elites forging network ties have not been sufficiently studied. This book fills this gap by focusing on the Japanese elites in the Japan-led regionalization. In addition, studying interactions between a domestic economy and its regionalization, as in this book, is critically important for this globalized world.

Nevertheless, this book has some pitfalls. While the author’s main thesis is Japan’s regionalization to trump globalization, he does not elaborate on how the forces of globalization have pressed Japan’s industries, businesses, and government elites. The Japanese form of relational capitalism is regarded as not suitable for an advanced economy in a globalized environment. Although it has become a cliché to maintain that an open
Gender inequalities are ubiquitous throughout human societies, historically and today. In spite of much research and theorizing on the causes and characteristics of these inequalities, empirical and theoretical puzzles remain. For example, why, in spite of huge changes toward gender equality, are the gender segregation of jobs and gendered pay gaps still so widespread? In *Women, Work, & Politics*, authors Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth suggest answers to such questions, including questions about how gender inequalities may be fundamentally changing today. They use ideas about markets, individual choice and bargaining to analyze the historical development and cross-national variations of gender inequalities today. They limit their analyses primarily to wealthy, Northern, industrial (or post-industrial) societies.

The authors develop a complex analysis that links individual and intra-household processes with large-scale institutional processes. They argue that gendered inequalities are the outcomes of countless decisions by individuals in their daily lives in families and on the job, as spouses, employees, employers and policy makers as they act in their own perceived interests. The resulting theoretical argument is presented in considerable detail and with admirable clarity. In addition, the authors use the theory to examine the relationships between fertility and labor market participation of women to explain present-day changes and cross-national differences in fertility rates and population growth. They also apply the theory to politics, looking at changes in the political alignments and voting patterns of different groups of women and their political participation in a variety of countries with different electoral systems.

The basic argument of this book is that power differences between women and men, as well as other gender inequalities, arise in bargaining processes within the family, which take place under specific economic, institutional, and ideological conditions. These conditions may change, contributing to changes in the relative bargaining power of women and men. Reciprocally, changes in intra-family bargaining may spark institutional and normative changes in the broader society. Wives and husbands bargain over the division of household labor, the distribution of family resources, whether the woman should take a paying job, and many other matters. Power in the bargaining process ultimately depends upon the individual’s ability to leave the family or marriage, and that depends most basically on outside resources, such as income from a job. The gender division of labor that assigns women to unpaid work leaves most full-time homemakers without outside resources and with little bargaining power. When jobs for women are scarce, marriage is often the best choice a woman has to ensure economic survival for herself and her children. As jobs have opened for women, more and more women have chosen to work for pay, changing the family bargaining situation to some extent. As a result, men do more household work than in the past, but not enough to bring gender equality in housework and caring tasks. Women who work for pay still do significantly more at home than do men. The gender pay gap and male dominance in the “better” jobs persist. To understand this, we have to look at employer decisions.
Employers’ hiring decisions are critical in consigning women to lower paid work than men. These are rational decisions: men’s labor is more valuable than women’s, especially in the private sector. The economy is divided into two production systems: one employs high-skill, specialized workers who become more valuable to employers over time, and the other system employs workers with general, unspecialized skills that do not build greater value with long job tenure. Employers in the high skill sector are reluctant to hire women because they expect women to leave the job for childbearing and caring work before employers can reap the benefits of their increased human capital. Thus, women are effectively barred from high paying jobs, which remain male dominated. Women do not have similar problems in the general skills sector which covers service and caring work, often in the public sector. This sector is also expanding and jobs are, or used to be, widely available for women. Thus, many women choose to work in this sector. The choices of both employers and women workers create a circular process from which there is no easy exit. The only solution, according to the authors, is to break the vicious circle by eliminating the domestic division of labor – men have to do half the housework.

This is only a brief summary of an ambitious project that makes an important contribution to efforts to understand the causes of gender inequalities and their persistence. The linking of individual decisions and family bargaining to their consequences for the larger society is admirable. Many of the analyses provide new insights into complex processes. The comparative analyses are excellent, demonstrating the complexity as well as the multiplicity of processes that maintain gendered inequalities.

But, does the book adequately explain the gender segregation of work and the ongoing pay gap? I am not satisfied that it does. In spite of its complexity, this argument misses or underplays some important elements in the reproduction of gender inequalities. It does not give enough attention to the ways in which gendered assumptions are fundamental to the organization of work and to images of adequate workers. Most paid work places are organized on the implicit assumption that workers have no obligations outside that workplace. The worker is unencumbered, and is probably a man with a woman to take care of the family and home. This is a gendered organization of work and it disadvantages those who must respond to other obligations, usually women.

Gender images and assumptions are more deeply embedded in workplace practices, including hiring and wage setting, than this theory allows. Although the authors talk about the importance of norms and values, they do not capture the ways in which gendered assumptions about the nature of women and men shape many choices. Men are seen as naturally dominant, potential decision-makers and leaders, while women are seen as naturally nurturing and caring. Such assumptions may not be consciously held, but research on women in organizations has repeatedly shown that such images frequently cast women in male-defined jobs as inappropriate or inadequate to the tasks, simply because they are women. It is reasonable to conclude that such images influence managers’ decisions.


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Waiting, the leitmotif of this work, interchangeably referred to as “limbo” and “timepass,” is cause as well as effect in youth culture and politics in India. It stems from a socio-historical condition and it ushers society into a new milieu. Biographically, it may seem transitory. Historically, it manages to be eternally defining the destiny of social actors. Craig Jeffrey develops an incisively detailed account of the empirical dimensions of waiting, by wishing away the inherent mind game and experiential complexities thereof. Timepass is not about the epistemological complexities of the term “waiting.” Instead, it is about understanding the rich lower middle class, their investment in the education of their children as a strategy to
navigate various fields, and their aspiration (and timepass) as a strategic tool of youth in a situation of educational decay, corruption, and unemployment. Jeffrey has moved onto the question of youth in a phased manner. It entails his doctoral research in 1996–97 on the socio-political strategy of rich Jat farmers, his “Bijnur research” in 2000–02 on educational transformation and the reproduction of inequalities, and in the third phase of his engagement with the field in 2004 when he undertook research on youth in the universities of Meerut district, Uttar Pradesh, India. This portrays the whole of research in which the theme of unemployed, educated youth, assailed by an administrative and educational decline—operating in the liminal limbo toward a future—is a small part. At one level, this work attempts to draw the micro-power politics (in a Foucauldian sense) to add an important chapter in the political sociology of India, and at another it seeks to make sense of the collective behavior of youth in the larger framework of society. The frame of reference is stratified inequalities, with social actors aspiring to succeed in the fields of competition, located in the “global south” with readjusted economic structure. “Waiting,” thus, assumes a significance greater than the semantic suggestion of the term.

The overall treatment is reminiscent of Mertonian functionalism in deliberating upon the intended and unintended consequences of youth’s timepass, and its bearing upon the social structure which already has latent as well as manifest inconsistencies. Curiously though, there is not even an oblique acknowledgement of functionalism. Instead, Jeffrey claims to pursue Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and thereby attempts to understand the regenerative strategies of classes while navigating fields. However, in order to understand the role of an individual’s agency in youth politics, he recognizes the need of adequate theoretical underpinnings. There is, albeit, no clear resolve toward that, and thus launches a theoretical anarchy. There is no clear answer as to what could help in comprehending the biographical peculiarities of the political animators in the universities of Meerut. A typical sociological anxiety is also a lack of clarity on the nature and scope of the Meerut research, whether it has a quantitative and/or qualitative orientation, and whether methods and techniques involved have yielded only ideas, or numbers, or mixed data. In spite of the apparent ethno-graphic flavor of the narrative and the slices of everyday life of youths, there is no clear statement on the possible social anthropological orientation in the background. The mention of non-participant observation and structured interviews as methods and techniques does not aid in understanding the larger orientation in the research. It could be possibly a heuristic methodological looseness for making the research possible. What is puzzling, however, is the total absence of a mention.

The most important attraction in this work is the central thesis emerging from the four chapters put together, excluding chapters on the introduction and conclusion. The background of the phenomenon of youth’s timepass has the emergence of rich Jat farmers and their political influence in the western Uttar Pradesh in north India, due to the agro-economic developments in the post-independent India. The economic reforms and rise of the lower caste appear to be causing an intensification of local Jat politics. Another strategic response to challenges is investment in the education of Jat children, culminating in increasing enrollment at the colleges and universities. On the other hand, educational decay and rising unemployment are the causal factors behind the creation of addas (places where youths hang out). This is where the phenomenon of timepass is most articulate. As an entirely masculine space, it enables political animators to mobilize their strength and engage with the state machinery, for both their own parochial interests (as political actors) and that of the larger society (as social reformers). Cutting across caste lines, the youth-in-waiting however reaffirm gender principles. And thus, addas also encourages mischief against women and is thereby a perceived socio-moral threat.

The book’s thesis runs the risk of narrow teleology, typically reminiscent of functionalist analyses in sociology, in spite of impressive details. Also, despite some grains of value-neutrality present in the analysis, there is an inclination toward anti-student politics. There is no critical reflection on the worldwide disdain of student politics in the
post-globalized world. It also neglects the potential ideological and emotional elements in youth activism, in universities as well as in society at large. In this regard, it is also problematic that the term ‘global south’ appears in a taken-for-granted fashion. Needless to say, the eclectic use of cinematic images of youth, with an emphasis on switching from “angry young man” to tapori (street-smart youth) in Indian cinema, scuttles a fuller comprehension of the phenomenon. Also, an exhaustive review of literature in the introduction, with little sub-thematic organization, serves less effectively.

Last but not least, due to the critical questions it raises, the book offers more than mere timepass for a reader interested in the discourse on youth politics in India, and the practical peculiarities of the lower middle class and their strategies of mobility. It invites the reader to steer clear of the hitherto dominant motif, characterized by the sociology of moral panic, in the discourses on youth in India. It is timely and relevant.


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Homeroom Security examines current school discipline. As bureaucratic institutions, schools are subject to rules and procedures that often lead to unintended negative consequences—the contemporary regime of discipline in America’s schools may be one example of such an irony. In the name of security, schools have instituted increasingly punitive forms of discipline, and control measures are increasingly present in schools. This book examines the unintended consequences of contemporary regimes of discipline in American public schools. In recent decades, many schools have increased control measures and penalties for rule transgression, including zero-tolerance policies and placement of school resource officers (SROs), metal detectors, and surveillance cameras in schools. Ironically, these punitive measures may undermine students’ perception of the legitimacy of the school behavioral standards.

The focus on punitive measures to control behavior in school leads to a variety of problems. Schools overreact to threats of violence, which by the most reliable data, have greatly declined in recent years. Disciplinary practices often have a “one size fits all” approach to all forms of school misbehavior, and to the extent that they are responses to extreme cases of rule transgression, the rules miss the boat with regard to addressing common forms of misbehavior in schools. The underlying reasons behind student misbehavior can be ignored, and students are exposed to a new regime of control, which stresses the importance of police and surveillance practices. Since youth primarily learn about civic engagement in schools, these attitudes will carry over into their adult lives and express themselves via the style of civic engagement they choose, if any. More directly punitive measures undermine the legitimacy of security practices in schools, and ultimately increase the very forms of misbehavior they were intended to mitigate.

The persistence of a punitive school environment runs counter to many of the participatory principles which maximize the bonds between students and their schools, and therefore contradicts the educational goals of school institutions. This has a negative effect on all students, though for minority and economically-disadvantaged students it is even more so, as vulnerable populations see their life chances damaged in punitive environments. There is an underlying social justice agenda in this text, one which repeatedly demonstrates how the most vulnerable youth (namely, those in minority and/or lower-income groups) are more likely to be harmed (and/or harmed worse) by the new school disciplinary practices, despite the fact that these security policies are designed to protect the educational rights of all students. Despite the fact that school security measures often violate students’ civil rights and create a negative environment in schools, these measures are often met with approval by those who carry out such measures on a daily basis: that is, well-intentioned teachers, administrators, security personnel, and SROs.
The empirical research supporting the text is derived from the author’s observations conducted at four U.S. high schools, two in a Mid-Atlantic state, and two in a Southwestern state. Of the schools studied, one in each pair was in a lower-income district with high levels of minority enrollment, and the others were located in mostly white, affluent areas. The text explores the rate of disciplinary offenses at the four schools, the practices through which rule transgressions were met, and the security measures in place in each school. Each of the schools faces challenges, including overcrowding, a growing student population, and pressure to perform well in fiscally difficult circumstances. On top of this, schools in the less affluent districts also deal with other challenges, such as neighborhood poverty, higher rates of crime, and gangs. Despite these differences, and perhaps unexpectedly, each of the four schools studied has remarkably similar security and punishment practices, although they may utilize different configurations of personnel in its administration.

Individual chapters within the text describe the disciplinary processes at the four schools studied, the advantages and disadvantages of SROs in schools, and the recent tendency for rule compliance in the name of safety to trump all other institutional goals, even the primary pedagogical ones. The tendency for schools to “teach to the rules,” is particularly problematic, as students learn undue compliance to authority. Although the overall findings of this book are often sobering and alarming, the author ends the book on a positive note. Recently, he was part of a state-level task force to implement improved disciplinary processes in schools, one which was oriented toward moving discipline toward evidence-based practices in line with the suggestions offered in this book. Thus, there seems to be some awareness in education circles that these measures may backfire, which is driving efforts to revise disciplinary processes. This is indeed reason for hope.

In this important text, the author has provided much of value, and the work deserves praise on a number of fronts: it is well-written; the author’s voice is lucid (noting Nicole L. Bracy as co-author on two chapters); the book is well-referenced and expertly situated within the relevant literatures; and, it is empirically grounded, with discussion based on methodologically sound observations in the field. The placement of the detailed methodology section as an appendix removes this specialized discussion from the main text, retaining accessibility for a non-specialized audience, while maintaining the rigor for the academic reader. This text would be useful in courses at the undergraduate and graduate level, including juvenile delinquency, youth and society, and the sociology of education. In courses in related disciplines, such as education or criminal justice studies, this book will undoubtedly be useful; and scholars of all the above-mentioned topics will find utility in this text. Beyond the ivory tower, a variety of popular readers will also find this book informative and accessible, including parents, teachers, school administrations, and criminal justice personnel.
prison-industrial complex to neoliberalism and Abu Ghraib. This expansive approach certainly makes the book ambitious and informative, although I do worry that undergraduate students would have a hard time retaining the book’s central argument, given that it may appear excessively broad to the casual reader. Most of the book focuses on obscure criminal cases or well-known events that have received extensive media coverage. In one chapter, Lancaster uses an autoethnographic method to describe his immersion in a sex abuse case involving one of his friends—a gay male junior high school teacher who was improbably accused and convicted of sex abuse. The details of the case, as Lancaster presents them, suggest that his friend was falsely accused, and the description of the events fits into Lancaster’s overall argument that a general presumption of guilt pervades many aspects of American life. This part of the book, where Lancaster focuses on how anxieties around sexuality have increasingly come to emphasize a “monstrous” sexual predator, is the strongest. Lancaster reveals the costs of this discourse: incendiary newscasts add to public fear and lead to calls for vengeance and punishment. Here, the book seems unquestionably queer and radical, in the best sense of those words, as Lancaster values rehabilitation over punishment and condemns prosecutorial solutions whereby large punishments are given to people who have committed relatively minor, sometimes even consensual, infractions.

Lancaster covers a significant amount of territory in this book, and while some may view the breadth of material as a strength, I found the argument to be overextended at times. The connection between moral panics and the global war on terror seemed particularly strained and tangential. Lancaster also casts a politics of victimization purely in negative terms, viewing it as contributing to punitive governance. This construction seems a bit neat, as history is replete with examples of social movements that have used victimization narratives without calling for punitive measures. Moreover, Lancaster is too dismissive of the gains made by victims’ rights groups, particularly domestic violence advocates. Indeed, he overlooks advocates who have opposed more punitive laws and have not relied on the criminal justice system to help disadvantaged groups, as these advocates have argued that punitive measures tend to reinforce power imbalances rather than undermine them. The book would have benefited from a more balanced approach in this regard, with Lancaster making greater use of the substantial body of work by feminists who have debated the best way to combat violence against women. Given that he focuses relatively little attention on the gender dynamic of moral panics, this book may appeal more to scholars interested in sexuality and queer theory than those concerned with gender and feminist research.

Lancaster is not unaware of the balance that can be struck between the presumption of innocence for the accused and the desire to be sympathetic to victims’ claims, but his continued emphasis on questioning victims’ unrealistic accusations could be viewed as reinforcing conservative attacks on a “culture of victims.” He suggests that people in the United States have come to love trauma and victimization, yet the degree to which Americans support or abhor victimization seems more debatable than Lancaster has presented it. One wonders, after all, what Lancaster would make of individuals who have clearly been victimized also taking great pains to distance themselves from a victim identity. In framing victimization politics as purely problematic, Lancaster has arguably reinforced a simplistic dichotomy whereby moving beyond trauma and recounting past victimization are framed in hierarchical, mutually exclusive ways.

Despite these theoretical concerns, I would certainly recommend *Sex Panic and the Punitive State*, especially for scholars interested in sexuality. Lancaster’s ability to connect contemporary sex panics with the U.S. crisis of mass incarceration makes a significant contribution to the sexualities literature. One has the sense that Lancaster, perhaps viewing conservatives as a lost cause, is primarily addressing liberals and progressives who have aided in the process of punitive governance, and thereby reinforced discourse that renders non-normative sexualities as evil or monstrous. As the number of people in our prisons remains appallingly high, Lancaster’s distrust of the crime control apparatus becomes an important and timely critique.
This book would work well for a sexualities or deviance course, particularly one that covers moral panics, and perhaps even for a course on the sociology of the family. Since undergraduate students may get much of their news from incendiary newscasts, and may come into frequent contact with media narratives that emphasize “evil” pedophiles and innocent children, this book would be especially useful for challenging some students’ taken-for-granted assumptions.


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Not so many years ago, sociological courses with the title “American Race Relations” had a predictable content. With rare exceptions, the focus was exclusively on the troubled history of blacks and whites in the United States, including slavery, Jim Crow, segregation, prejudice, and institutional discrimination. There were many topics to cover, but a few core principles provided structure and unity to the field. At present, sociological courses on American race and ethnic relations have become more expansive covering a broad array of peoples—American Indians, Latinos, Asian Americans, and Pacific Islanders—and themes, including diversity, multiculturalism, immigrants and the second generation, people of color, multiracialism, and even the meaning of whiteness.

These new topics and issues have been driven by demographic changes in the composition of American society (and the students in our classes) as well as by rapid change in the stratification and participation of minority groups in American society. If sociology students, and even their teachers, sometimes have difficulty grasping the overall structure and dynamics of contemporary American race and ethnic relations, the problem may be that social change has overwhelmed the traditional foundations of sociological theory and empirical generalizations in the field. Personally, I have struggled to keep my teaching on race, ethnicity, and immigration more than a series of unrelated discrete topics. Fortunately, a new book, The Diversity Paradox: Immigration and the Color Line in 21st Century America by Jennifer Lee and Frank D. Bean has arrived just in time.

The Diversity Paradox provides much needed clarity on the complex issues of the new (and old) diversity in American society. The primary focus of The Diversity Paradox is on the demography of racial/ethnic change, intermarriage, and multiraciality—the identification with two (or more) racial groups. Changes in Census 2000 (and in surveys and other statistical forms) have allowed respondents to “mark one or more” racial categories. Although mixed racial ancestry is not a new phenomenon, its formal inclusion in standard data sources has forced researchers to rethink the meaning and significance of divisions between the standard race categories. Although only two or three percent of Americans now claim multiple race identities, intermarriage rates of more than 50 percent among second-generation Latinos and Asians suggest that multiraciality is likely to rise rapidly in the coming decades.

Lee and Bean embed their empirical study in history and theory. The standard American race narrative denies multiraciality with the so-called “one drop rule” that forces all descendants of mixed ancestry into the minority population. The children of white slave owners born to black mothers become slaves. Even a trace of “black blood” (ancestry) in the Jim Crow era was stigmatized and was the basis of segregation and racially structured social, political, and legal institutions. Although these practices were almost universal for African Americans (most of whom have mixed racial ancestry), they were inconsistently applied to other minority groups, including American Indians, Latinos, Asians, and marginalized European groups. The descendants of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe were eventually considered white, and some other groups occasionally evaded being racially stigmatized. For example, Mexicans were able to avoid being classified as a racial group in the census, and the Chinese in Mississippi.
were eventually recognized as non-black even if they were not quite white. However, the maintenance of a white/nonwhite color line was the dominant pattern prior to the Civil Rights era. The color line sometimes required extraordinary leaps of (il)logic, such as the 1923 Supreme Court decision that Asian Indians were not white because of the common man’s understanding of whiteness.

The legal, political, and administrative supports for American Apartheid and the traditional racial classification began to unravel in the late twentieth century with the Civil Rights Movement and the political reforms of the 1960s and 1970s. These social changes coincided with (and helped to prompt) the renewal of mass immigration, particularly from Latin America and Asia. The diversity of new peoples and changed social mores also led to record levels of mixed marriages and persons of multiracial ancestry. Lee and Bean provide a thorough documentation of recent demographic changes and a clear and compelling synthesis of the research literature on the new American diversity.

Perhaps, the most important empirical contribution of this volume is the search for meaning of intermarriage and multiraciality through in-depth interviews with 36 intermarried couples and 46 multiracial adults. Although the authors appropriately caution against generalizing from such small samples, the findings are strikingly consistent. For intermarriages between Latinos and whites and between Asians and whites, “race” was a nonissue. Marriages between Latinos and whites and between Asians and whites were accepted by family and friends as perfectly normative. Multiracial Asians and Latinos had “ethnic options” in their identities. One interesting finding is that multiracial Latinos (and their parents) always emphasized their minority identity in schooling and job applications.

In stark contrast, black/white (and black/Asian and black/Latino) intermarriages consistently had “problems.” Families and friends generally disapproved of their marriages. Most whites and immigrants often saw marriage to a black person as a sign of downward mobility with negative effects on children. Anti-black prejudice was not just verbal, but also included acts of families “disowning” multiracial children. Disapproval was sometimes expressed by black family and friends who considered black men who marry out as disloyal or worse. Multiracial blacks did not have identity options—everyone considered them to be black. Lee and Bean conclude that the twenty-first century color line is not between white and nonwhite, but between black and nonblack.

In two chapters, Lee and Bean describe and model the geographical and temporal variations in intermarriage, multiracial identities, and a summary index of diversity. This topic is fraught with immense methodological and conceptual pitfalls. Because rates of intermarriage and multiracial identity are high for Asians and Latinos and low for blacks and whites, summary measures are heavily influenced by population composition. In addition to this “direct” effect on the levels of intermarriage, population composition has an effect via relative exposure of different groups to each other (Blau’s macro-structural theory), and perhaps another effect via cultural perceptions as the number of intergroup interactions increases. Lee and Bean are aware of these complex issues, but their analyses do not always reflect them. In spite of these minor limitations, The Diversity Paradox is an important theoretical and empirical contribution to the field.
mobilize activists to become involved in government. In Pittsburgh, an organization called Group Against Smog and Pollution (GASP) formed in 1969, was part of this new wave of environmentalism. In his excellent history, Longhurst focuses on GASP and its experience in battling air pollution in Pittsburgh. However, the book is far more than a case study of GASP, as the author puts the experience of the Pittsburgh movement in the broader context of citizen activism that was flourishing throughout the country.

GASP and other citizen environmentalist groups were part of a profound transformation to a new period of citizen involvement, which included active participation in the regulatory process. Longhurst explains how this era of citizen involvement was a direct response to legal changes that encouraged public participation. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the courts expanded the legal definition of standing from a requirement of direct economic interest in a matter before a court, to one of public interest in matters such as pollution. With this legal doctrine of citizen standing, the environmental movement had a powerful new tool. And beyond new opportunities to use the courts to protect the environment, activists gained standing more broadly in the “citizen organization’s ability to involve itself in public, political, or governmental affairs” (p. 7). In addition to the ability of citizens’ groups to file lawsuits, which encouraged the formation of new groups such as Clean Water Action, various federal laws also explicitly encouraged public participation. The federal Air Quality Act of 1967, for instance, required states to hold public hearings when they created new pollution laws in line with federal standards, and the National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA) encouraged the formation of local organizations. These laws were part of the changing political culture of the 1960s and 1970s, in which the language and ideas of “public involvement” and “participatory democracy” became widespread (p. 9).

In this context, environmental organizations formed throughout the country to battle problems such as air and water pollution. In Pittsburgh, where air pollution from industrial production was bad enough to earn the city a reputation as “the smoky city” as early as 1800 (p. 32), grievances were plentiful. In 1969, when the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Allegheny County held public hearings on revisions to the state air pollution law and county regulations, the NAPCA funded the Pittsburgh chapter of the League of Women Voters to organize and prepare citizens to participate in the hearings. The League, along with the local chapter of the Federation of American Scientists and the Western Pennsylvania Conservancy, held a series of seminars to prepare speakers for the hearings. In his opening chapter, Longhurst describes the result at the Allegheny County Air Pollution Advisory Committee meeting on September 24, 1969 as a public hearing “filled with acrimony, tears, and public denunciations” that attracted hundreds of citizens and ended up lasting three days rather than the few hours originally planned. After this dramatic event, GASP was formed as an ongoing organization of citizens who became heavily involved in providing oversight of pollution control efforts. When Allegheny County established its new air pollution code following the hearings, it created an Air Pollution Appeals and Variance Review, known as the Variance Board, and GASP became an active participant in the process.

Longhurst describes in great detail how GASP was able to have an important influence on the process of government regulation of pollution and to mobilize public involvement in Pittsburgh. The group benefited from the leadership and expertise of two types of activists: academics and professionals, largely men, who provided scientific and technical expertise, and middle-class women connected through a social network of women’s organizations. It was women, many of whom were homemakers married to academic or professional men, who formed the organizational backbone of GASP, and they used gendered language and tactics that were critical to the group’s success. For example, GASP funded its educational projects through the production and sale of cookbooks (“flour power”), and maternalist language in the group’s educational materials highlighted responsibility for the health and well-being of children. Although journalistic coverage of the women
focused on their gender and women activists were not always taken seriously, Longhurst argues that maternalism was nevertheless an effective “tool for access” that helped GASP gain support and influence.

Citizen Environmentalists is an exceedingly well-documented account of GASP and the broader citizen environmental movement, based on extensive documentary data as well as journalistic accounts and original interviews with activists. It provides an extremely valuable history, not only of GASP and the Pittsburgh movement, but of an important period in the development of American environmentalism. Longhurst shows how GASP had to confront many of the same problems as environmentalists across the country, including the perennial issue of “jobs versus the environment.” GASP did not ultimately succeed in creating adequate regulations to alleviate industrial pollution—the air in Pittsburgh cleared in large measure with the decline of the steel industry. Over 40 years after GASP’s founding, however, severe problems with air and water quality remain, and the organization is still active in trying to remedy those problems.

For sociologists of social movements, this captivating history of the environmental movement shows how citizen activism has made a difference and how it might continue to do so through groups such as GASP. Political opportunities were clearly critical in ushering in this new phase of American environmentalism, but it was the leadership, organization and rhetoric of environmental groups that mobilized citizens and forced some changes in public policy and culture. Hopefully, this history will help to inspire new studies of how local environmental groups are organizing to battle the devastating environmental problems that we all need to face.


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The current reform of pension systems world-wide is the topic of a number of scholars, policy makers and social policy analysts. This book, edited by Bernd Marin and Eszter Zólyomi, contributes to the gender sensitive debate on trends, outcomes and consequences of the present changes. Their analysis acknowledges the embeddedness of pension systems in the context of changes in work and family/partnership life as well as demographic changes (aging of the population). The contributing authors of the book, experts in the field of social policy, are in a good position to speak authoritatively about this matter and to estimate the challenges of retirement income security and poverty risks for men and women across Europe. In so doing, they present rich statistical and other relevant data relating to surveys conducted at the E.U. level and research done in different countries, and comment on trends in pension reforms and their impact on the lives of women. The book documents changes well and gives a general and comparative overview of the state of pension reforms in different countries while pointing to specific dilemmas and choices concerning gender equality.

Authors of chapters in Part II of the book recall the specific features of pension systems and their reforms, as well as other relevant changes in other analyzed countries (Poland, Austria, Finland, and Italy). Despite the focus on specific environments, more in-depth discussion of some points of general interest in these chapters contributes to the main aim of the book: understanding the position of women as a heterogeneous group in the world of work and pensions. These authors help us to understand a complex picture of different and changing European environments: from precarious work realities of

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women and men in Eastern Europe to challenges of part-time work and uncertain pension future in Central Europe, and problems of older women in the North not being able to cope with full-time working schedules. In these illustrative cases, the authors ask: What is bad in pension reforms and policies from the women’s point of view?

Analyzing pension policies at a time of profound societal, demographic and economic changes is a challenging task. In the last decades pension reforms have been considered inevitable, as the existing systems seem to be unsustainable. Pension reforms are a very sensitive political and social policy question. And increased precariousness of employment and intensification of work add to a feeling of uncertainty among the working population. The pension reforms themselves are seen as going in the direction of devolution of risk and responsibility for retirement savings. The authors are aware of the complexity of the task, and point to the multidimensional aspect of their analysis, where taking a number of situation-specific factors into account (such as gender, class, time horizon) is of utmost importance.

Complexity of the situation does not allow for easy or one-dimensional answers. The authors do not suggest such solutions. However, their analysis indicates that the optimal outcomes for women and men in retirement could be achieved based on the acknowledgement of the importance of different forms of work (paid and unpaid care work) and a more fair distribution of household and care work among men and women. As is noted in the book, changing and equalizing the working and living experiences of men and women today (women have never been more active in acquiring education and employment, and thus a more equal distribution of care should be foreseen) gives rise to an expected future where old women and men will have a more similar pension income than today.

Throughout the book the authors stress that gender specific and (for women) unfavorable consequences of pension policies are outcomes of the different work and life histories of women and men. As the outcomes of pension systems reflect the position of women and men in the labor market and in the society, gender inequalities cannot be resolved by redesigning only the pension system. Additionally, remedies for gender inequalities within the pension system could reinforce the traditional gender roles and thus preserve discrimination in the labor market. Thus equality in the labor market is even more crucial for the equality of pension systems that are today increasingly linked to individual work histories. For the time being, the authors suggest a gender sensitive approach in designing pension policies—use of gender neutral devices that will favor women as they, more than men, are involved in caring and unpaid household work, and that influences their work histories.

The authors pointed to some policies that formerly improved the position of women in retirement, but because of changes in the pension policies designs are no longer enhancing gender equality. An example is the much debated equalizing of retirement eligibility age for men and women. The apparently reduced benefits for women that were tailored to accommodate women’s dual role of worker and caregiver, are seen by the authors of the book to be emancipatory for women, as the remedies within a system do not alter it. Equalization is geared against maintaining the position in which women are expected and motivated to take over an unequal share of care responsibilities. Given the trends of changes in pension systems from benefit to individualized contribution-based pension systems, women will be worse off if they have several fewer years of contributions. However, generations of women who will not yet experience more equality in distribution of care, will be penalized by the dual burden of paid and unpaid work.

Although the editors could have avoided some unnecessary repetitions in the book, the structure of the book and the presentation of rich and relevant data (both in the main body of the book and in the annex) provides an interesting and well-documented study. The choice of specific topics (such as types of pension design choices, indexation, survivors’ pensions, poverty risk and others) makes sense for presenting changes in the world of pensions today with special attention to the interests of women. The value of the book lies in its presentation of an interesting explanatory socio-economic analysis of
the plethora of changes in the world of work and family. It is also a practical guide to policy makers regarding the features in designing pension policies to which one has to pay attention, in order to achieve not only prevention of poverty risks for all, but also gender fair results.


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In Wealth, Health, and Democracy in East Asia and Latin America, James McGuire offers a cogent and provocative argument about the connections between democracy and health in developing countries. McGuire focuses on the decline of infant mortality as his key indicator of public health and development achievement, arguing that avoiding premature death is key to “an individual’s capacity to live the life that he or she has reason to choose” (p. 1). Analyzing this focus consistently and systematically throughout the book, the author builds his core argument that provisions of relatively low-cost basic public health services are more important for lowering infant mortality than either the rate of economic growth or the amount of public health spending. What factors, then, would encourage the governments in developing countries to extend basic public health services to the populations that are most vulnerable to premature death?

McGuire contends that long-term democracy is an important factor, not only because democracy may generate electoral incentives for government to adopt pro-poor policies, but also democracy generally cultivates the political environment for the mobilization of issue networks as well as the political culture in which disadvantaged citizens come to expect and demand social equality and human rights.

Wealth, Health, and Democracy relies on both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The introductory chapter sets up the framework for how the book dialogues with the literatures on public health and comparative politics of development. Chapter Two offers a detailed quantitative analysis of 105 cases, followed by eight chapters of case studies (four developing countries in Latin America and four in Asia). The concluding chapter revisits the book’s major theoretical arguments.

The evidence that McGuire marshaled together in this study is truly impressive. The book’s massive amount of data on health policies and various health indicators makes it a goldmine for researchers interested in comparative politics and single cases alike. On the theoretical front, the book broadens the conventional framework of discussions on development; drawing on Amartya Sen, McGuire challenges scholars to conceptualize development not only in terms of economic growth, but also citizens’ capacities. In this light, the argument that democracy encourages certain health-promoting policies is particularly innovative, as it depicts authoritarian developmental states not as a necessary evil that citizens in developing countries have to endure for the sake of development, but as a fundamentally flawed engine for development itself.

While readers will appreciate the clarity of McGuire’s core arguments, they will also find it interesting that these arguments are nuanced and, in some cases, inadvertently qualified, in his case studies. On the ground, the connection between democracy and public health services appears to be more complicated and at times not entirely sustainable. For instance, in Taiwan, South Korea, and Chile, the author shows us that most of the basic health services responsible for bringing down infant mortality rates were established under authoritarian rules. (McGuire argues that, for Chile, the democratic years preceding Pinochet contributed to cultivating a certain political culture. But even if this were true, the same pattern does not exist in Taiwan or South Korea.) Conversely, in Indonesia, Suharto is depicted as a populist leader who was sympathetic to the rural poor, but ultimately did not do enough to provide basic health services to this population. The author explains this puzzle by invoking various factors, including the rural dwellers’
priorities, Indonesia’s geography, and institutional arrangements—factors that are not directly related to the absence of democracy. Furthermore, McGuire’s interesting historical studies reveal that, as much as democracy can empower the poor, democracy is equally likely to encourage the mobilization of the not-so-poor, which channels resources away from the poor while allowing the government to claim the credit for having responded to the will of the “people.” This empirical pattern suggests that it is the successful mobilization on behalf of the poor, not democracy per se, that may put pressure on the government to provide basic health services. This observation is important in and of itself, yet it is not fully incorporated into the book’s theoretical arguments.

McGuire’s book raises important questions for future scholars to consider, even if it does not fully address them. One such question relates to the “deviant” cases—countries that have successfully brought down infant mortality without having democratized (such as China), and countries that have democratized yet continue to suffer persistently high infant mortality (such as India). It would be unfair to question why the author did not incorporate these two cases into his study, but future research can benefit from extending and qualifying McGuire’s theory by considering these two rapidly-developing countries. Similarly, some readers may find it less than entirely satisfying that, as creative as the author is in applying Sen’s capacity theory to development theories, the book focuses on a single indicator, infant mortality, as the measure of citizens’ capacities. It may be fruitful for future studies to expand McGuire’s endeavor, exploring the potentially multifaceted role of citizens’ capacities in the reconceptualization of development.

Wealth, Health, and Democracy in East Asia and Latin America is a well-researched study that offers an innovative theoretical argument. It will no doubt be an important contribution to studies of public health and comparatives politics of development.

In Divergent Social Worlds, Ruth Peterson and Lauren Krivo address the important questions of whether, and why, there are differing crime levels based on the racial/ethnic composition of neighborhoods. The most striking characteristic of this book is the tour de force scholarship represented by the data collection undertaken. The authors attempted an incredibly daunting task: collecting crime data for neighborhoods (generally defined as census tracts) in nearly 100 large cities selected randomly. Such a data collection is unprecedented, and that collection effort alone is worth the price of admission. Anyone who has dealt with a police department in an effort to obtain data on crime events in neighborhoods understands the difficulty of collecting such data for one or two cities. To do so for over 90 cities is amazing.

The payoff of this large data collection is the important narrative that Peterson and Krivo are then able to weave. Although prior research has illuminated the neighborhood processes that occur within a single city, this study sheds light on how these processes differ across numerous cities. An important theme is the divergent worlds of whites and minority groups (particularly African Americans), and the consequences for levels of crime. Although the fact that minority groups live in more disadvantaged neighborhoods with more crime is not novel, the documentation of these facts is useful, and the narrative provides genuine insights. After an introductory chapter that provides a brief historical context for race relations in the United States, four analytic chapters explain this process.

The first analytic chapter describes the degree of segregation that exists between racial/ethnic groups in the United States, especially between whites and African Americans. Although pointing out the existence of such segregation is not novel, the...
relationship between it and distributions of disadvantage is striking. In particular, the figures plotting the distribution of violent and property crime rates for five classifications of neighborhoods based on racial/ethnic composition (mostly white, mostly African American, mostly Latino, minority-dominated, and integrated) are elegant in their simplicity. These graphs display in sharp relief the difference between white and African American neighborhoods, as there is almost no overlap in their violent crime rates (that is, the highest violent crime rates for white neighborhoods are about the same as the lowest violent crime rates for African American neighborhoods). In contrast, the figure for property crime shows much more overlap, which becomes an important part of their narrative.

The second analytic chapter describes the socio-economic differences between neighborhoods based on their racial/ethnic composition (here defined as majority white, Latino, African American, or minority, or integrated). Although neighborhood scholars will not be surprised to learn of sharp socio-economic differences across these racial/ethnic classifications, the authors again provide figures that visually depict these differences. Again, the simple elegance of these graphs highlights how the distribution of disadvantage in white neighborhoods has almost no overlap with that of primarily African American (or primarily Latino) neighborhoods. Visually observing such lack of overlap in the social worlds of these various groups makes the point better than any sophisticated statistical analysis.

With this preamble, the third analytic chapter focuses on the extent to which economic disadvantage is related to crime rates based on these neighborhood racial classifications. The authors present results from statistical models attempting to explain the level of violent or property crime in the tracts across these cities. The story told from these models is the relatively greater importance of economic disadvantage compared to race. For instance, they find that whereas a primarily black neighborhood will have a higher violent crime rate than a white neighborhood when each has average levels of disadvantage, the primarily black neighborhood has no more violence than a white neighborhood when each has high levels of disadvantage. Thus, high levels of disadvantage lead to higher levels of violence, regardless of the race of the residents. The pattern is even more striking in their models for property crime: higher levels of property crime in black neighborhoods are almost entirely explained by the other structural characteristics of these neighborhoods.

The fourth analytic chapter asks whether the spatial location of neighborhoods of varying racial/ethnic composition affects crime rates. A key finding from their models is that the presence of many white residents in nearby areas lowers the rate of crime in the tract of interest. Thus, the context around the neighborhood appears important for understanding violent crime rates. Their findings for property crime are even more pronounced: whereas they only find modest differences between black and white neighborhoods in their standard models, this relationship actually reverses when accounting for the proportion of white residents in nearby areas. That is, black neighborhoods surrounded by white neighborhoods actually have lower rates of property crime than those not surrounded by white neighborhoods.

Peterson and Krivo have provided a wonderful statement on the relationship between the socio-economic worlds in which different racial/ethnic groups in the United States live, and the levels of crime in those neighborhoods. This is not meant to be a final statement. Indeed, as is almost always the case with statistical analyses, debates ensue about modeling decisions, and what their consequences might be. The beauty in this case is that the data resource that the authors have given along with this book will allow those debates and discussions to be tested and carried out empirically. In the meantime, this book is a powerful statement on the differing social worlds of racial/ethnic groups in the United States, and the consequences for the amount of crime that members of these groups experience in their neighborhoods.
Poor people often regard their situation as the product of fate, luck, or Providence. To escape poverty, Susan Pick and Jenna Sirkin argue, people need to overcome this psychological inertia, and the fatalism and shame associated with it, and become actors who can make the choices necessary to improve their circumstances. “The roots of sustainable development lie...in the capacity of people to overcome their psychological, social and contextual barriers, to view the world through a new lens, as agents...of change. Personal and social change begins at the psychological level. People must learn to exercise control over their lives and make choices” (p. 3).

Unlike early modernization theorists who argued that the religion or culture in only a few societies prepared people to make the rational choices demanded by market-based society and development, Pick and Sirkin maintain that effective decision-making need not be a cultural given, rather it might be taught. Using principles based on the work of Amartya Sen, a recent Nobel laureate in economics, the authors have advanced a set of participatory education programs through the Mexican Institute for Family and Population Research (IMIFAP) that have empowered the poor and enhanced their ability to make choices about reproduction, health care, safety, and self-employment. The goal of these programs, which are based on the idea that “I can, I will, take charge of my life,” is to increase the decision-making capabilities of the participants, help them to overcome fatalism and shame, which is endemic among the poor in Mexico and many other countries, and to make them more effective decision-makers and consumers. The authors argue that if individuals learn to demand more of people in households, bureaucracies, and markets, they can improve their place in the world. There is some evidence that this is true. When women and men are empowered, they often insist on safer sex and fewer children, which can reduce family size. If they make better choices about health care, safety, education, and self-employment, they can improve their economic opportunities. And if they simultaneously reduce family size and increase incomes, they might escape from the kind of low-level equilibrium trap that ensnares many poor households. Richard Nelson in 1956 argued that development would be difficult to achieve if economic growth was accompanied by rapid population growth. By analogy, large family size can constrain, not enhance, the economic opportunities and circumstances of poor households. But if they can reduce family size, they have the opportunity to escape the kind of low-level equilibrium trap that Nelson described.

The authors’ decade-long experience with diverse “Programming for Choice” education classes provides evidence that the classes have increased the decision-making capabilities of tens of thousands of poor people across Mexico and other Latin American countries. However, they do not demonstrate that the kind of individual agency which provides real benefits to people in intimate settings can translate into the kind of collective agency to alter the bureaucratic, economic, and cultural institutions that shape inequality and encourage fatalism in the first place. In fact, the authors seem reluctant to make this connection, arguing that while “[i]t is fundamental to sustainable development, empowerment based solely on external...motivations may reinforce dependency, rather than personal agency, because of the external locus of control” (p. 243).

Of course, this approach contrasts sharply with many other theorists of social change, who have argued that external organization at the local, national, and global level can help people not only to overcome their psychological aversion to change but also develop a sense of collective agency to help them challenge the economic, political, and cultural institutions that obstruct change. Although individual empowerment may help poor people make more effective choices, has it made it possible for them to “break the poverty cycle” and reduce inequality, as Pick and Sirkin suggest? Perhaps, but they provide little empirical
evidence that it has. A realistic assessment would require some attention to the wider social developments that have affected poverty and inequality in Mexico during the last 20 years. The introduction of the North America Free Trade Agreement, successive peso crises, falling farm prices, restrictions on immigration to the United States, the assassination of political leaders, and ongoing drug wars have all constrained the capabilities and choices of poor people in Mexico and reshaped the contours of poverty and inequality. Have the people who have been empowered by participatory education programs, of the kind advanced by the authors and IMIFAP, managed to overcome these structural constraints on their choices? The authors do not provide an answer, though it is central to their argument. Still, while I am skeptical of the authors’ claim that participatory education and individual empowerment provide the key to breaking the cycle of poverty, I think it may well unlock some of the doors that confine poor people.


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In 1975 on her way to achieving Phi Beta Kappa in three years at Harvard, Mary Barbara Pickering wrote “The Creative Absolutism of Raoul Spifame” as her 109-page honors thesis. (Spifame [d. 1563] is so obscure that even the 11th Edition of the Britannica does not mention him. Only Gerard de Nerval’s “The King of Bedlam” [1839] has kept his memory dimly alive [Nerval 1999: 6–20].) Pickering then spent considerable time burying herself in French archives, until finally (in 1988) finishing a six-volume Harvard history dissertation called Auguste Comte: His Life and Works, 1798-1842. She meanwhile had taught at Pace University and then returned to her childhood stomping ground, with a job at San Jose State, where she has been ever since. Pickering thus broke every rule in the Handbook of Upwardly Mobile Academics: she spent years in foreign archives sifting through materials nobody else reads; she wrote a gigantic dissertation; she became expert on one man’s work, a theorist who is little read today, despite his name being universally known; and she then consecrated her entire professional career to the construction of a monumental biography of his time and work which is unlikely to be read by philosophers (who now disregard Comte), by sociologists (who do not read multi-volume biographies of anybody), by historians (who do not hold Comte in high regard, either), or by the laity, who know nothing about him. Why would she behave in this way, assuming she is not mad?

Because at some point Mary Pickering decided to become the world’s most accomplished biographer of a major figure in the history of social theory, and she knew it would take a while to achieve that, which she has now done. Beginning in 1993, when Cambridge University Press published the first volume of the biography (776 pages), Pickering laid out a plan of attack upon Comte’s world to which she has remained steadfastly committed. If every social scientist with the slightest interest in the past would study her resulting work, the level of discourse about their collective past would be elevated to such an extent that one could reasonably speak of a pre-Pickering and post-Pickering understanding of Comte, positivism, Saint-Simon, and the miasma that was French intellectual life during his heyday. While Michael Burawoy recently asked in these pages “Who now reads Comte?,” the simple response should now become “Those who read Pickering” (Burawoy 2011: 396).

The first volume of this stupendous study (which includes a 31-page bibliography) takes Comte from birth (January 19, 1798) through 1842 when he completed his six-volume Cours de philosophie positive. Pickering opens the volume with Comte’s remark at 27 to a friend, “The essence of my life is a novel, and an intense novel, which would appear truly extraordinary if I ever..."
published it under some assumed names” (Vol. I: 1). Pickering wrote the “novel” Comte could not, yet her care with factual detail recreates his “life and times” with such verisimilitude that we do not need Comte’s own version. The last 160 pages of the book are the best analysis available of the Cours, which include potent observations like this: “Comte would hardly recognize his version of positivism in these [current] definitions. They represent in fact the very approaches to which he was opposed” (Vol. I: 694). If there is a theme that Pickering never fails to sing, it is this: Comte as caricature has so overwhelmed the actual Comte whom she came to know during her 30-year investigation, that virtually every textbookish treatment is either wrong or uselessly distorting.

The second volume, released 16 years after the first, covers ground wholly unknown to modern sociology, taking the story to 1852. It offers such a cornucopia of cultural and biographical details pertaining to Comte’s many associates, enemies, lovers, acolytes, and friends that one quickly understands how correct he was in seeing his life as an improbable novel. Because we live in the Era of the Ascendant Woman (which Pickering herself represents so well), the only component of his life receiving attention has been Comte’s relationship with his wife, Caroline Massin, who was not, according to Pickering’s research, the whore as she is routinely described. Pickering is able to say with precision that Comte first used the word “altruism” in a series of lectures that Massin helped organize in April 1850, a concept central to his later notions of civilizational improvement. His later idolizing of Clotilde de Vaux, and through her the apotheosis of women in general, is also given very close attention in the second volume (Vol. II: 133–183). One reason Pickering decided to explore these relationships in as much detail as the archives allowed—aside from their intrinsic human interest—is because each illuminates Comte’s theorizing, while also converting our idea of him from the soulless mathematician and megalomaniacal rhetorician into a fully developed human male of the period, as loaded with foibles and confusions as anyone, yet intellectually equipped to generalize these quandaries into broad ideas for societal renewal. Seldom has a theorist found so much grist for his mill in the everyday occurrences of a perplexing life, and during a time of political turmoil.

This volume also includes a telling analysis of Comte’s role in the 1848 revolution in France: “A gifted teacher, Comte eagerly responded to artisans’ widespread desire for education” (Vol. II: 266). Pickering ends the volume by laying out the origins of Comte’s “religion of humanity” and the positivist movement as reflecting Comte’s writings and personality, far removed as it was from the positivist tradition of succeeding generations.

Focusing on events in French political life between 1851 and 1857, and how these helped transform Comte’s worldview, the last volume of Pickering’s monument to scholarship gives pride of place to the second of his masterpieces, the four-volume Système de politique positive (Vol. III: 159–393). Once again, the reader is treated to an explanation that is second to none, due especially to its detailed linking of day-to-day arguments among Comte’s associates with the larger political forces of the time. Perhaps because it was translated in 1875–77 by a team rather than by the inimitable Harriet Martineau, it has not enjoyed the celebrity of his earlier work, which Pickering regards as a great loss, since it is in the later work that Comte shows his global concerns for peace, harmony, interpersonal affection, and the human need for a system of belief that is post-dogmatic.

Comte thought so highly of Martineau’s loose translation and condensation of his Cours that he recommended her 1853 version over his original for prospective positivists (Vol III: 10). “The Elusive Disciple: Harriet Martineau” (Vol. III: 132–156) is but one of many tantalizing portions of this concluding volume. As with all her Comte archaeology, Pickering extracts a great deal from archived letters, diaries, and personal commentaries unavailable elsewhere. Typical of her labors is footnote 297 on p. 144, covering most of the page, which explains why Martineau was delighted to be the one to translate Comte into English, in that so many other notables (e.g., George Eliot) also desired to do so. This kind of synthesized, archive-based information is what gives Pickering’s
three volumes their unique value as scholarship, all the while telling a humanly enchanting tale of a great mind that fell apart as it struggled to create a sociologically-attuned utopia. Anyone who still believes that we have nothing left to learn from Comte simply has not found Mary Pickering.

References


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Mark Regnerus and Jeremy Uecker provide an overview of the sex lives of heterosexual, unmarried “emerging adults” (age 18–23). The volume appears written for lay or undergraduate audiences; writing is accessible, statistical analyses are relegated to appendices, and theory is not central. What nonetheless makes the book valuable for scholars is that the authors consider many related topics in an integrated way: who is sexually active, norms about when sex is all right, views about timing of marriage, gender differences in preferences for casual versus relational sex, and effects of casual and relational sex on women’s and men’s emotional well-being. Another plus of the book is that it includes analyses from two major national surveys (the Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health and the National Survey of Family Growth), from surveys covering students at multiple colleges and universities, and from qualitative interviews they conducted.

The book is loosely guided by two theoretical perspectives that the authors call “sexual economics” and “script” theory. “Sexual economics” emphasizes partner markets—competition between members of one’s own sex for access to partners of the other sex who can provide sexual pleasure, affection, economic resources, and/or someone to have children with. “Script theory” emphasizes culture and norms about sex.

We learn that those who start sex later than the norm are heterogeneous. They include very religious youth, those who have little opportunity for relationships because others do not find them attractive, and those from the upper-middle class who are risk-averse and have high educational expectations. Regarding the latter group, the authors find it paradoxical that those who could most afford a child financially tend to start sex relatively late and contracept assiduously thereafter, making them the least likely to have an unplanned pregnancy. They argue that one explanation is that youth with promising futures have a high incentive to avoid interrupting schooling or a career to care for a baby. Another explanation for this class gradient that they do not consider is that upper-middle class environments may more successfully inculcate the self-regulation needed for consistent contraception.

The most common sexual script is serial monogamy, combined with an aspiration to “settle down” to monogamous marriage eventually, albeit at ever later ages for successive cohorts. Many of those who are very religious and/or politically conservative have moral qualms about premarital sex, or at least feel that sex belongs in relationships. They keep more of their sex in relationships. Nonetheless, many of them selectively find reasons to rationalize violating rules they believe in. Their situation is discussed in a chapter on “red and blue” sex.

Another chapter considers the emotional consequences of sex, using depression as the outcome measure. They present evidence that having more numerous sexual partners outside relationships encourages depression in women, but not men. They draw on evolutionary psychology to argue that this gender difference reflects the fact that women are hardwired to avoid nonrelational sex. In my view, it is also possible that casual sex has
worse consequences for women than men because of the cultural double standard—the fact that women are judged more harshly than men for having nonrelational sex.

Their use of an economic, market perspective provides a compelling interpretation for one striking finding from college data. After controlling for many individual and school variables, they find that the higher the proportion of females in a student body, the more women have casual sex outside relationships, and the less women go on dates or have boyfriends. This finding suggests that, in settings where women are competing with many other women for male attention, women are more likely to give men whatever they want. And, the finding suggests that women “get less” (in dates or relationships) “for” sex when women are in greater supply, just as the market model predicts would be the case if casual sex was more greatly desired by men and relationships were more greatly desired by women.

My main criticism of the book is its treatment of the double standard. Instead of recognizing it as a socially constructed piece of culture that could be otherwise, they explicitly state that it cannot ever be changed. They see it as a logical deduction from the “sexual economics” theory when combined with the assumption that men want casual sex more than women. But the double standard cannot be logically derived from the market theoretical perspective (even if we grant their assumption that men like casual sex more than women). The market model does predict, as discussed above, that a larger supply of women (relative to men) decreases the “price” of sex for men. But this result of competition does not imply that men will morally disrespect women who, when they find themselves competing with more women for men, switch to offering sex with fewer requirements for commitment first. The authors are correct that many men do disrespect their partners if they provide casual sex. But saying that this disrespect is predicted by the market model is like saying that economic theory predicts the following: if three new restaurants open in a small town, customers will start seeing the restaurateurs and their now-lower-priced food to be immoral or disgusting.

While I applaud the authors’ attention to both markets and culture, I was left wanting more discussion of how the two perspectives are to be integrated. For example, when can norms about what is right reduce predatory behavior by men that market competition allows them to get away with? If markets yield certain behavior for long enough, do norms about appropriate scripts shift? Future sex research should tackle these issues. Regnerus and Uecker have provided a comprehensive and provocative contribution to the conversation.


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Without a European demos and polity, politicians and intellectuals are always likely to see in Europe and/or the European Union what national agendas make them see; but even the most detached scholars can be partial in this way. Early on in this scrupulous and readable monograph, Thomas Risse writes that “I am born with a German passport...” (p. 20), but he need not have: the spirit of postwar West German liberalism is discernible throughout, and comes sharply to the surface in the conclusion, where we learn that if liberal elites fail to fight for their vision of the European Union, “continental Europe will end up where the United Kingdom is now” (p. 251).

Before that, the book asks a number of pertinent questions, and tackles them with verve and perseverance. Is there a European identity? Is there a European public sphere? If there is such a public sphere, does it contribute to the formation of a European identity? What is the relationship between these factors and “the democratic legitimacy of the European project” (p. 4)? In searching for answers, Risse eschews some of the more metaphysical reflections on Europe in favor of an admirably sober set of materials—Eurobarometer-style attitude surveys, “media analyses” of the European press, and a bibliography that consists largely of
empirical political science. This both helps and hinders him; we do need an empirically plausible sense of the way these questions are played out in different European states, but Risse plays rather fast and loose with theory, his terminology sometimes glossing over important complications. Thus “the struggles over European identity” involve two main substantive concepts of Europe: “a modern EU Europe supported by the European elites...and embracing modern, democratic and humanistic values against a past of nationalism, militarism or Communism,” and “a Europe of white Christian peoples that sees itself as a distinct civilization...This European identity construction is less open to strangers and entails boundaries against Islam as well as Asian or African ‘cultures.’ The extreme version of this antimodern and antisecular identity construction is nationalist, xenophobic and racist” (p. 6). While there may be a distinction to make between an elite perspective on European identity and “mass public opinion,” Risse tends to run this together with others where a bit of cross-classification might have been helpful. For instance, he tends to see modern/antimodern and secular/religious as synonymous distinctions, while few sociologists of religion now do. And although Risse knows that the picture is not so simple—that, for instance, Catholic values have bolstered many elements of elite E.U. discourse—this broad distinction recurs throughout.

His justification for them is connected with his observations about the existence of a European public sphere. He argues that the increasing presence of the European Union in national politics has itself politicized European identity, and created a European public sphere (though not in the Habermasian sense), one in which the same questions are increasingly addressed in different states. Ironically, this politicization and Europeanization has produced an increasingly stark alternative in “mass public opinion,” between a secular, cosmopolitan, “political” Europe oriented to “the values of modernity,” listed here without comment as “enlightenment, democracy, human rights and peace” (p. 50), and a “cultural” Europe that is Christian, exclusionary and anti-Islamic. In seeing cause and effect this way, he is quite well served by his “social constructionist” approach (p. 20): the presence of the European Union as a set of institutional realities helps create the idea of Europe as a topic of debate, and as a possible object of attachment, though not one, he is keen to stress, that replaced national identity—the discussion here is about the Europeanization of remaining national identities. But social constructionism can be pushed too far, and I think that it is in the discussion of E.U. enlargement. For instance, he says that cosmopolitan Europeans construct a non-European other temporally, in the form of the nationalist, fascist or communist past, while culturalist exclusionary Europeans construct a non-European other spatially; there may well be something in this, but he claims that those who oppose Turkey’s E.U. membership on the grounds of its lacking the dual heritage of Christianity and enlightenment are appealing to “primordial constructions” (pp. 27 and 52), and resorting to nineteenth century nationalism projected onto a European canvas, when it may be said that their arguments are just as empirical-historical as are those of the cosmopolitans.

Finally, at one point the book refers to “attitudinal or behavioural consequences” (p. 45); in fact, it is all about attitudes, values, and public discourse. There is no discussion at all of behavioral consequences, but perhaps they ought to be borne in mind, because they complicate the picture of alternative forms of Europeanization painted here. The United Kingdom may be at the bottom of Risse’s cosmopolitanism league, but it is far easier to build a mosque there than it is in Germany or Switzerland, the U.K. government is—albeit naively—in favor of Turkish E.U. membership where Germany is less keen, and it is in modern, democratic France that President Sarkozy has told what they can and cannot wear in public.

These caveats aside, this is a noteworthy and largely fair-minded contribution; it deserves to be read and discussed.
Processes of globalization over the past three decades have ushered in a large volume of research on the implications of societal change for life experience and human development. A key issue in this area is that efforts to link the local with the global are not easily accomplished. By definition, large-scale social processes are not easily apprehended by observing or measuring individuals. Moreover, the large-scale processes of interest are typically multi-dimensional and dynamic, and as such place particular burdens on researchers and research designs to either measure and model the dynamism or make convincing interpretative (rhetorical?) claims. Given such difficulties, it is not surprising that *Youth in Transition* falls short in providing an integrative account of the micro-macro contexts that characterize the lives of youth in post-communist countries.

The book itself is comprised of nine chapters. After an introduction that situates the work in a socio-historical context, subsequent chapters focus on “labour markets,” “education,” “housing and family transitions and gender divisions,” “leisure,” and “politics.” Somewhat strangely, the flow of these chapters is interrupted by a chapter on “Individualisation and the reflexive self,” which is largely theoretical and when applied to post-communist youth entirely rhetorical, and by a chapter on “Class divisions” that seems to struggle to make a coherent point. As a book about everything in the lives of contemporary youth, *Youth in Transition* ultimately provides limited theoretical or analytic purchase on any of the key components.

It is tempting to conclude that the difficulty of the enterprise is what undermines the ultimate success of the research. Yet, I am not convinced this is the case. For *Youth in Transition*, an equally significant problem is that the research itself is uneven and scattered. For a book that “draws liberally from a series of investigations in which the author . . . was involved from the beginning of the 1990s and over the following 20 years” (p. 17), that involved “evidence from and about young people in a total of 12 different former communist countries” (p. 17), and involved “combinations of quantitative and qualitative evidence” (p. 18), it was typically difficult to understand exactly what research was done. Although there are lots of examples, one recurring crime was the presentation of tables that ended with the note “Source: see text” when there is little to no information in the text describing what actually was done (e.g., “Table 6.2 lists the ‘at least once a week’ rates for samples of 20-somethings in a variety of locations from 1997 onwards” (p. 127)). Similarly, narrative “life stories” (p. 18) are typically presented in “Boxes” of varying lengths and sometimes indicate the experience of a single individual without any contextualization or are boiled down into a series of de-individualized and de-contextualized quotes. It does not help for clarity that said “Boxes” are also used to report the work of other researchers, to describe key concepts from particular theorists, to describe laws or conventions, or simply to provide broad summaries of conditions in other countries. A style editor would have been useful. Both strategies do little to situate the actor in a social context and hence do not provide a tight lens on the variable life experiences of youth. Although I read the book twice, I could not tell anyone what the author actually did to study the lives of post-communist youth. To me, this is a real problem. Science requires clarity of methods, and the ability to understand evidence requires some knowledge of what actually was done to produce it. Such details are simply not included.

There is an equally compelling problem. The effort to unravel (or delineate) globalization effects is pursued through cross-national comparison. Yet, it did not appear that the author had done any fieldwork in the “Western” nations that are the explicit point of comparison and the acknowledged source of globalizing forces. (And a quick scan of the authors’ published work in the References suggested no such work.) This means that the author is entirely reliant on the research of others or secondary data. Given that the
methodological complications of vantage point are acknowledged, if not stressed, in the opening sentences of the book, it is not surprising that the comparative aspects of the book are often thin and disjointed.

Still, this is not an uninteresting book and someone interested in various features of adolescent lives in post-communist countries could learn a lot. It is true that the analyses are uneven but there is some payoff in the detail. Moreover, I do not have a problem with a book that falls short in advancing a coherent account of the social dynamics that are shaping the lives of contemporary youth. Grand theorizing has its limits, as C. Wright Mills articulated decades ago. As a study that compiles decades of qualitative research, the life histories are informative and tell compelling stories of life course dynamics in the context of large-scale social change. If anything, I wish there were more, or they were used more systematically. While the research may not be enough to build a coherent theory of globalization, social change, social structure and agency, and life course experience, it does inform the smaller question of the transition to adulthood in post-communist countries. If anything, I wish there were more, or they were used more systematically. While the research may not be enough to build a coherent theory of globalization, social change, social structure and agency, and life course experience, it does inform the smaller question of the transition to adulthood in post-communist countries. In an odd coda, I believe the author would agree with my assessment. Towards the end of the introductory chapter, the author ends with the conclusion: “The issue then becomes: exactly what are the global similarities and what are the differences as regards the situation, outlooks, and behaviour of young people? The material in this book is relevant, but inevitably inconclusive” (p. 14, with emphasis added). I could not have stated it better myself.


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I have lost track of how many social scientists I have heard complaining about Institutional Review Boards this past year. They seem to divide themselves into two groups: young people—assistant professors and graduate students—who are having trouble getting approval for their projects, and professors who have been tenured for a while and who announce, “I never could have gotten IRB approval” for that article or book that received so much praise.

Among sociologists in particular, IRBs are infamous. Audience laughter exploded when in his presidential address to the Law and Society Association, Malcolm Feeley observed (2007: 264) “...on my campus, the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects is known to graduate students as the Committee for the Prevention of Research on Human Subjects.” Laura Stark (2007: 777) observed, “[It was the closest thing I have seen to someone bringing down the house at an academic conference.” The audience apparently approved another of Feeley’s observations: “IRBs subject researchers to petty tyranny” (loc. cit.: 264). Since so many social scientists, especially qualitative researchers, agree that institutional review boards do more harm than good, why do they continue to be a mainstay on college campuses?

In Ethical Imperialism, a social history of IRB regulations, Zachary M. Schrag addresses a version of this question: Why do IRB regulations apply to the social sciences and whom do they serve? (As currently applied, the term “social science” includes history and journalism.) When he was writing his dissertation and eventual book on the construction of the Washington, D.C. metro, Schrag had been caught by one university’s insistence that its institutional review board had the responsibility of overseeing oral-history interviews. He was caught by another university’s board, when he wanted to explore an oral history of riot control. As Schrag saw it, “Because they require researchers to do no harm to the subjects of their research, these ethical codes would, if taken seriously, prevent me from holding people to account for their words and deeds, one of the historian’s highest duties” (pp. ix–x). But this scholarly book does not read like the result of anger. Rather, it is the dry and thoroughly researched story of how IRBs came to be, how they came to adopt rules designed for medical, biological, and psychological researchers and then to...
apply them to the social sciences, how those rules became institutionalized, and how the rules protect universities rather than the people who serve as subjects and informants in social science research.

Schrag explains how four waves of regulations unfolded. First in 1966, the Public Health Service instituted regulations for its (mainly) medical and psychological grantees, although by 1972 those regulations began to be applied to social scientists. In 1974, Congress passed the National Research Act, also aimed at abuses in medical and psychological research, but interpreted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in ways seemingly designed to prevent further congressional regulation. (This is well known in, for instance, the news industry. When fearful of more regulations, you must regulate yourself in a strict but acceptable fashion so as to forestall your would-be regulators.) A third regime, initiated by 1981 but using recommendations from a 1978 national commission, was supposedly designed to avoid inappropriate IRB oversight; however, this new “leniency” was short-lived. In the late 1990s, the biologist who headed the Office for Protection from Research Risks introduced the omnipresent threat of penalties for those universities whose researchers ignored or broke the rules. On and off, throughout the 44-year period that Schrag discusses, accomplished social scientists tried unsuccessfully to prevent the application of rules designed for medical and psychological research to their fields. Birds of quite different feathers flocked together either to try to influence government regulations or to defy them. It is a real treat to read how Ithiel DeSola Pool, James Davis, Albert Reiss, Howard Becker, Edna Bonacich and Jack Katz all more or less agreed that the regulations harm social science. Schrag expressed his conclusions in a milder manner, but his generalizations are nonetheless pointed: “the present system of IRB oversight is not based on empirical investigation of ethical abuses committed by social scientists,” “the system in general is weak on empirical evidence,” “policy makers failed to explore alternative measures,” social scientists were not represented on the bodies that made the rules, and “the extension of IRB oversight over most social science was largely unintentional, or at least so flawed that no one has been willing to take responsibility for it” (pp. 188–89).

Perhaps because he is an historian, Schrag does not attempt to draw more general conclusions about IRBs, but in recent years sociologists have done so. They have invoked different concepts. Carol Heimer and JuLeigh Petty (2010) have pointed toward bureaucratization, institutionalization, and the failure to distinguish between the regulation of research and the regulation of ethics. Ethics, they note, are contextual. Feeley (2007: 774) fears that IRB regulations invoke a “hyper-instrumentalism” that “would turn all legal analysis into cost-benefit analysis.” Jack Katz (2007: 805) is unabashedly political: “The impact of IRBs on critical social research must be appreciated not only as hindering some academic careers but as a significant turning point in American political history toward the repression of progressive inquiry and expression.”

I would use slightly different terms: IRB regulations and especially their application to social science are examples of an accountability regime, a politics of surveillance, control, and market management that disguises itself as the value-neutral and scientific administration of individuals and organizations that increasingly dominate American higher education. At colleges and universities, the accountability regime is itself replete of neoliberalism, an approach to socioeconomic policy that lauds the efficiency of private enterprise, promotes the effectiveness of managerial oversight by fostering individual and institutional accountability, and seeks to increase the role of the private sector in determining the political and economic priorities of the state. IRBs are just one piece of the new higher-education complex that has been mandating missions statements and strategic plans, encouraging profit from (copyrighted) research, assessing teaching practices, fiddling with faculty governance, and expanding the (largely powerless) contingent labor force (Tuchman 2009).

IRBs protect universities, not researchers, not the subjects or informants whom social scientists observe and interview. At my own university, I can think of graduate-student projects that (I believe) the IRB killed, because the research would have made the
university look bad. Both Schrag (2010) and Heimer and Petty (2010) offer good examples of research that was inappropriately modified. I suspect that many sociologists know of other examples where an IRB prevented potentially valuable research. Ultimately, in an accountability regime, bureaucracies protect themselves and document that they have done so. As Heimer and Petty put it, “the protection of organizational interests seems to have carried the day. A bureaucrized research ethics is essentially an ethics of documentation” (op. cit., 611). Among all of the documents that academics fill out, this set impedes research.

References


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For those who do not want to know the answer to the question posed in the title of this book, feel free to skip the first paragraph of this review. Others will probably not be surprised to learn that the author’s answer to that question in this short volume is an emphatic yes. Mark Sherry makes no attempt to write a dispassionate account of hate crimes and other forms of violence against people with disabilities. Rather, in five powerful chapters he seeks to convince readers that there is far more hatred directed toward disabled people, especially in the United States and in the United Kingdom, than is reflected in either formal statistics or in the minds of most non-disabled people.

Much of the book consists of examples of various types of crimes, violence, and general hatred directed toward people with a variety of disabili-
one or two examples (some of which are much too long—one does not need to read dozens of lines of vitriol from various blogs and websites to get the point). In addition, there is very little sociological analysis or explanation in the book. The author’s main goal seems to be to try to convince readers, over and over again, that there are more people than one might intuitively think who really do hate disabled people and who frequently act on the basis of this hatred. It would have been better to have focused more on trying to explain why these attitudes exist, and why this violence and abuse occurs, instead of presenting so many examples. Make no mistake, these disability hate crimes and acts of abuse and violence (as well as disablism—that is, prejudice against disabled people) are indeed horrific, and the author’s undisguised outrage is certainly justified, but readers do not need countless illustrations to become convinced of that.

Sherry laments the fact that too few acts of violence against people with disabilities are formally recognized as disability hate crimes. While this is no doubt true, this is also a problem for hate crimes in general, and a more fruitful approach might be to focus on what might be done to try to reduce violence and change negative attitudes rather than criticize prosecutors and other actors in the criminal justice system for not employing the disability hate crime classification more often. As the author himself makes clear, proving guilt when a person is charged with a hate crime is very difficult to do.

The author also points out that emotional and physical abuse, even if it does not typically result in a formal disability hate crime charge, sometimes occurs within families; moreover, in-group abuse among those with disabilities is by no means absent. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge Sherry’s point that disabled victims of abuse might not even recognize that they are being abused.

In the last chapter, responding to disability hate crimes, the author suggests that efforts to reduce the isolation and social exclusion of disabled people are important, as are legal and political strategies designed to empower disabled people. While offering some sensible suggestions, such as improving social services for people with disabilities and making it easier for abused disabled people to contact appropriate authorities, the discussion of necessary cultural, social structural, and public policy changes is somewhat truncated and vague. It is one thing to argue that it is important to change negative attitudes and stereotypes that, as Sherry makes clear throughout the book, countless numbers of non-disabled people have about people with disabilities, and quite another to specifically discuss how this might be done on a large scale. Can the civil rights movement in the United States serve as a model in this regard? Has legislation such as the Americans with Disabilities Act helped? What other social or legislative changes might be effective? In sum, although this book provides extensive examples of various forms of hatred and abuse directed at people with a wide variety of disabilities, a comprehensive analysis or explanation of why this happens, or what we might do to deal more effectively with this problem, is lacking.


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Our understanding of elites’ practices and culture is constrained by the difficulties of “studying up.” Sociologists seem to think nothing of invading the space of working-class people, observing behavior that is only public because privacy is a luxury ill-afforded. Invading the world of elites is a trickier proposition. Jessica Sherwood’s work is a valiant attempt to remedy this imbalance, but it is marred from the start by obstacles placed in her path not only by the elites themselves but by her own Institutional Review Board. Prevented from fully engaging with a country club, Sherwood resigned herself to an interview-only study. Perhaps unnerved by a too-timid IRB, Sherwood acknowledges she was careful not to antagonize any of her subjects, even stating she may have been “more meek in interviews.
than necessary.” Despite these methodological limitations, Sherwood manages to add to our understanding of elite practices and culture by focusing her attention on the “accounts” country club members give of their exclusive practices (of gender, race, and class). By having accounts at all, elites signal their general adherence to the greater ideology of meritocracy and democratic access; the specific accounts then serve to either justify or, in some cases, deny exclusivity.

This is a relatively easy book to digest, with examples clearly illustrating the particular types of accounts Sherwood presents. Because Sherwood includes an intersectional analysis (albeit lightly done), this book can be used in courses on race/ethnicity and gender as well as class and stratification. Students should appreciate the clarity of Sherwood’s writing and her tight and concise organization. The book is organized around three substantive chapters, dealing with, respectively, country club members’ accounts of class, racial/ethnic, and gender exclusions. Sherwood provides numerous clarifying examples in each chapter, often rich in detail and tone.

Unfortunately, the intersectional analysis promised by Sherwood falls victim to her neat order. I can too clearly envision a dissertation committee member (or editor) encouraging her to simplify when she should have been admonished to complicate. Intersectionality is messy, and separating issues of class, racial, and gender exclusion in distinct chapters makes it nearly impossible to properly engage in an intersectional analysis. Although there is some discussion of gender in the chapter on class, and race in the chapter on gender, this is too-little and too-far-between to support her claim that this is the first and only study of elites to employ intersectionality. But we all know how difficult intersectional analyses prove to be in practice. At least Sherwood keeps readers attuned to the multiple strands of exclusion that comprise the “matrix of privilege” in the title.

One of the strengths of limiting her research to accounts of exclusion is that Sherwood was able to describe and critique what she calls “the dominant inequality ideology,” or the idea that “the American Dream of meritocratic equal opportunity is a reality” (p. 128). Members tie themselves up in knots trying to explain to Sherwood why belonging to predominantly white, male-dominated clubs requiring substantial economic and/or cultural capital is not exclusive behavior (my favorite was the member who claimed that affording membership was simply a matter of prioritizing). Sherwood is correct to point out that the presence of these accounts is evidence of the power of the ideology (or else why bother to deny or justify?). A focus on accounts may be a clever way to turn an externally imposed limitation into a strength, but it also means that certain aspects of elite culture escape Sherwood’s attention. Readers interested in how elites use exclusive club memberships to construct and mobilize an upper class would do better to turn to Diana Kendall’s Members Only (2008) instead. Comparing the two, it is clear that Sherwood’s country club members are more upper-middle-class than upper-class. An interesting question then arises of whether a more elite group—one that did not “earn” their way into country club membership—would have tried so hard to account for exclusion. Does the dominant inequality ideology reflect the ideology of the professional-managerial class? Furthermore, it was sometimes unclear whether Sherwood’s data always supported her claims. For example, some of her interviewees justified exclusion on the basis of their “right” to exclude. It is a stretch to see this in the same category as those who justified exclusion on the basis of providing a place for their children to have fun in a protected environment, or denying that there was any exclusion in the first place.

Sherwood has done a good job turning around a limitation imposed on her by her institution’s IRB and the suspicion of the clubs to which she sought access, but this has come at a cost to what this study could have been. Established researchers like Kendall may be able to work through the system more effectively, but this is little consolation to social science research. “Studying up” is difficult enough without artificial obstacles being imposed by lawsuit-wary IRBs. Had Sherwood been able to observe the clubs firsthand, her intersectional analysis may have turned out to be a bit stronger, and contradictions between accounts and practices...
could have been identified. It is a shame to see social science research so intimidated. Although this is not a breakthrough book in stratification studies, it is a book worth incorporating into classroom teaching; well written, interesting, and clearly organized. It should provoke some good undergraduate classroom discussions about the reality of democratic access in the United States today and the ways in which inequalities are masked and privileges unmarked.

Reference


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Nearly a decade after his death, Pierre Bourdieu continues to inspire and to exasperate, and to do so in a wide range of sociological subfields as well as in several neighboring disciplines. Accordingly, through edited volumes and review articles, scholars have continued to take stock of Bourdieu’s impact on the sociological study of culture, education, religion, stratification, organizations, economies, and politics. In this tradition, Cultural Analysis and Bourdieu’s Legacy brings together British, American, and French scholars to review, deploy, and criticize Bourdieu’s approach to cultural sociology.

As editors Elizabeth Silva and Alan Warde point out in their introductory essay, “culture” here encompasses the broadest range of its meanings. Scholars in this collection examine artifacts, repertoires, and practices, as well as the social structures through which these are produced and reproduced. While some readers may find this volume somewhat diffuse in its diversity of topics, levels of analysis, and stances toward Bourdieu, a patient reading will be rewarded. Despite the inevitable review of concepts (capital, habitus, field) and criticisms (determinism, reductionism) that will be familiar to most cultural sociologists, a number of the essays suggest promising paths for future research, and as a whole the volume offers a revealing snapshot of the contested reception of Bourdieu’s work among cultural sociologists in several countries.

In their introduction, Silva and Warde describe the individual essays in the volume as falling into four (broadly delineated) position-takings vis-à-vis Bourdieu’s framework and methods: (1) defense; (2) partial appropriation; (3) critical revision; and (4) rejection. The essays that fall into the first two categories will be most useful to those (especially graduate students) seeking to familiarize themselves with Bourdieu’s framework and methods as well as with common appropriations of and criticisms of his approach. Among the defenders is Michael Grenfell, whose contribution, “Working with Habitus and Field: The Logic of Bourdieu’s Practice,” offers a useful discussion of the ways Bourdieu’s framework has been misappropriated (a categorization into which, incidentally, Grenfell would likely have to place several of the essays that follow his). Equally useful for the novice is Rick Fantasia’s fruitful application of Bourdieu’s model in a comparative study of the French gastronomic field at two critical moments in its history.

For those more familiar with Bourdieu’s approach to cultural analysis and his reception among cultural sociologists, however, the most thought-provoking essays in the volume will be those that take the strongest critical positions. For example, in his contribution on “Bourdieu, Ethics and Practice,” Andrew Sayer argues that the habitus concept, while indispensable, remains under theorized with regard to the place of ethics in human decision-making. It is true that Bourdieu pays comparatively little attention to the ethical dispositions of the habitus, although it is important to remember the extent to which judgments of taste (of the kind analyzed at length in Distinction) go hand-in-hand with judgments about the moral worth of those being judged. Similarly, Sayer’s claim that Bourdieu neglects the
operation of emotions in the responses of the habitus is perhaps overstated. In *Distinction, The State Nobility, and Masculine Domination*, for example, the emotion of shame plays a role in (dominated) actors’ responses to the perception that they are being judged. Thus as Frédéric Lebaron notes in his wide-ranging and insightful response to the contributions in this volume, “Bourdieu did account for aspects which Andrew Sayer accuses him of disregarding” (p. 148). However, “accounting for” these aspects of the habitus is not the same as offering detailed empirical studies of their operation in different social domains or examining a wider range of emotions than Bourdieu considered. As Lebaron also points out, “If one associates habitus not strictly with the reproduction of original conditions but also with adaptation and invention in new situations, the various empirical observations of concrete habitus and their changes open a large space for a sociological research programme” (p. 148).

Not all the contributors to this volume see the value of pursuing such a narrowly Bourdieu-inspired agenda. In an unusual and interesting contribution (invited by the editors), Michaële Lamont reflects on her intellectual trajectory into, through, and beyond Bourdieu’s sphere of influence. Lamont takes pains to point out that many European and North American colleagues have influenced her trajectory, but she nonetheless offers an illuminating account of her interactions with and intellectual relation to Bourdieu in particular. For Lamont, Bourdieu’s concepts, questions, and methods provided a point of departure rather than a complete research agenda to be executed in a new empirical setting. The story she tells here—of tutelage, inspiration, critique, and intellectual independence—is the kind rarely recounted in print by sociologists. It is useful not only for what it adds to the repertoire of possible stances toward Bourdieu represented in this edited volume, but also as a piece that could be shared usefully with graduate students as they try to imagine their own intellectual and professional trajectories.

Perhaps the volume’s most provocative essay comes from Antoine Hennion, a long-standing critic of Bourdieu’s sociology of culture. Hennion’s novel focus is the visual data—the pictures of various household interiors and their inhabitants—employed by Bourdieu in *Distinction* to support his arguments about the relation between consumption choices and classification processes. Hennion argues that when Bourdieu presents pictures of “typical” interiors associated with particular class fractions, he relies on precisely those skills of judgment that he purports to be revealing to the reader. It is through this unacknowledged, even hidden, “production work the sociologist does for the benefit of his readers,” Hennion asserts, that Bourdieu is “transforming into a universal knowledge the hypersensitivity of certain layers of the middle class to the subtle play of social differentiation” (p. 126). Although the concern to analyze the social production of the sociological text might have resonated with Bourdieu, he would hardly have embraced Hennion’s conclusions regarding the sociological significance of *Distinction*.

In a lecture on Manet that he gave in 1999 at the Collège de France, Bourdieu noted that sustained criticism of an institution is an important indicator of and contributor to its power in a field. To the extent that Bourdieu himself continues to draw not only praise and defense but also sustained criticism, even his strongest critics—perhaps especially his strongest critics—help to reinforce his powerful position in the field of cultural sociology.
Old labor focused on its internal resources and collective bargaining, backed by the power of the strike; coalitions (except, possibly, with other unions) were at best a distraction, and might be a detriment. The workplace focus was built into the law, which specified the subjects about which the employer was legally required to bargain (wages, hours, working conditions) and subjects about which the employer could refuse to bargain (dumping pollutants in the river from which workers and their kids got their water supply, refusing to hire black workers). An effective regulatory regime has to offer workers an incentive for staying inside the system; for a generation or more U.S. labor laws did so.

Neo-liberalism has changed all that. On the one hand, it has meant the de facto destruction of the laws which were supposed to protect labor rights. On the other hand, the force of the state, and the reorganization of capital, have created both rules and practices that make it increasingly difficult to hold corporations to account, and give business a host of new weapons to use (runaways, subcontracting, “replacement workers” [until 1980 called scabs] if there is a strike). Both the rise of neo-liberalism and the shift from internally to externally-focused labor are worldwide phenomena, not specific to the United States.

As a result, it is no longer possible for unions to rely exclusively on their internal resources. As Tattersall notes, “When union density was at its peak, unions exercised social and economic influence alone. Today, ‘the workers united’ are frequently defeated” (p. 2). Whether unions embrace coalitions enthusiastically or are driven to them reluctantly, over the last twenty years unions have increasingly relied on coalitions. Labor success depends on altering public perceptions, building public support, and changing political outcomes. If labor is to win, it cannot act alone, but must create connections with the so-called new social movements.

Both labor practitioners and labor-oriented academics stress the importance of coalitions, and there is a raft of literature celebrating coalitions, documenting their scope, and offering examples of best practices. Until recently, however, there has been almost no analysis of coalitions, of what makes them more and less likely to succeed, or even of the various dimensions of coalitions and the ways they vary from one situation to another.

Tattersall’s three case studies include a teacher union-led coalition in Australia, a protect-healthcare coalition in Canada, and a stop-Walmart/living-wage coalition in Chicago. In many books, the main interest is in the case studies; Tattersall’s strength is developing an analytic apparatus. The case studies are sometimes interesting, sometimes tedious (as they may have been to the participants themselves). I found the analytic categories and conclusions consistently stimulating even when I disagreed with them. Tattersall gives us multiple ways to think about coalitions, and reaches surprising conclusions that conflict with both the rhetoric and the practice of many of the groups that celebrate coalitions. The book is far too rich to cover more than a fraction of its arguments and insights here, but let me highlight four of its contributions.

First, the measure of a coalition’s success, Tattersall argues, depends not just on the social-change outcome, but also on how such victories are achieved. Some coalitions strengthen participants’ organizational capacity; others leave people burned out and partners feeling ill-treated. Coalitions do not need to be zero-sum, where one organization uses its limited energy and capacity to help another organization. Coalitions can instead be positive-sum, where at the end of a campaign to lower class sizes, teachers are more involved in their union and parent organizations are strengthened and energized.

Second, a counter-intuitive finding that makes a lot of sense is that “less is more.” “Defying the popular conception that long lists of coalition partners make for powerful alliances, across the case studies it was easier to build strong coalition relationships when coalition membership was restricted and there were fewer organizations making decisions and sharing resources” (p. 143). In the Chicago anti-Walmart/pro-living-wage campaign, for example, instead of putting the emphasis on assembling an impressive letterhead listing scores of participants, the coalition intentionally restricted itself to a handful of leaders who met regularly and built strong ties with each other.
Third, union leadership often insists on maintaining firm control of the coalition. I experience this in my own work in higher education, where the top leadership of the Massachusetts Teachers Association is worried that PHENOM, the Public Higher Education Network of Massachusetts, has been or will be taken over by students. (Students worry the coalition is faculty-staff dominated.) I and others argue that unless students have real power they will not be committed and involved; without student support, faculty will be dismissed as self-interested. Tattersall finds that “Across the case studies, unions gained more power from working in coalition when they had less direct control over the coalition” (p. 161).

Fourth, often coalitions—especially the broad coalitions involving a wide range of groups—can only agree on a negative message (stop Walmart). But the coalition message “was dramatically more powerful when it was positively framed” (p. 146), along the lines of “all big box retailers should pay a living wage.”

Power in Coalition is a call for both activists and academics to think analytically about coalitions, and it offers impressive insights into what sorts of coalitions work best in what sorts of circumstances.


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Globalization is often presented as a sweeping, almost self-driving, force fueled by macro-economic trends and technological innovation. In such accounts, it is easy to lose sight of the social actors who make globalization happen. These include not only corporations, governments, and financial institutions with disproportionate power to influence global agendas, but also social movement activists who practice globalization in rebellious ways. Making Transnational Feminism is a multi-sited ethnography that illuminates the latter dimension of global processes: the cross-border engagements of movement actors who challenge aspects of the new world order at the same time that they maneuver within its constraints. As author Millie Thayer puts it, “globalization may accelerate some forms of domination, but it also facilitates the linking and empowering of once-disconnected oppositional forces” (p. 8). This outlook is hopeful but not naïve, for Thayer deftly reveals the contradictions, tensions, and appropriations, as well as the emancipatory possibilities, that figure in transnational exchanges.

Based on participant observation, archival research, and in-depth interviews, Thayer meticulously charts how two women’s organizations in Northeastern Brazil emerged, developed, and changed in the context of a globalizing world. The organizations are SÓS Corpo (a feminist NGO concerned with women’s bodies and health) and Movimento de Mulheres Trabalhadoras Rurais (MMTR, a grassroots women’s organization of rural workers). Thayer’s strategic choice enabled her to explore the complex ways in which global flows influence and are affected by movement actors with asymmetrical power. We learn that both of these organizations challenge gender injustice and are part of overlapping “counterpublucs,” but they differ along various axes of inequality. SÓS Corpo is composed of urban, middle-class feminists and has extensive international linkages, and MMTR is a working-class organization from the rural sertão region, associated with the labor movement within Brazil, but largely cut off from global ties. Thayer shows how these organizations collaborated and navigated their power differences, while also negotiating inequalities and exercising various kinds of leverage in relation to other domestic and international social actors.

Among the social actors who influenced these organizations are global North donors supporting gender empowerment projects in the South. Thayer skillfully analyzes how relations with donors, particularly Northern feminists who administer gender programs, both enabled the growth of SÓS Corpo and facilitated specific projects of MMTR, but also posed taxing conditions that fostered intra- and inter-organization tensions. In the
case of SOS Corpo, which became especially dependent on international funding, these connections deeply shaped the workings and strategies of the group. Originally a collective, SOS Corpo morphed into a more formalized, specialized, and hierarchical NGO oriented to policy makers rather than to grassroots women. The book also tells of MMTR’s efforts to capture the interest of global donors while aiming to maintain its autonomy and identity as a working-class social movement organization.

Yet it is not only money that circulates. Another intriguing dimension of the book involves the flow of ideas and concepts, such as the notion of gender. Thayer raises the provocative question, “how did Joan Scott travel from Princeton to the sertão?” (p. 2). She refers to the impact that this U.S.-based scholar’s formulation of gender had on feminist discourse in Brazil. While at first sight this North-South discursive flow may seem colonizing, Thayer points to both the precedent of homegrown feminist struggles in Brazil and in Latin America, as well as the mutations that the concept of gender underwent when Brazilian feminists adopted it. Thayer proposes that this is not simply a case of an imported idea, but an example of the creative transformation and novel use of concepts as they move across borders. In this way, Brazilian feminists infused “gender” with notions of citizenship that were particularly salient in local democratization struggles.

The book shows the dynamic interplay between material and discursive ties, while also identifying the prevalence of cultural, political, or economic connections in different types of North-South and intra-country exchanges. In doing so, Thayer presents a conceptualization of the global that includes social relations across nation-states as well as within their borders. This contribution is partly rooted in Thayer’s innovative research approach, which goes beyond a comparative analysis. While the book offers detailed accounts of each selected organization, including their differences and similarities, Thayer centers attention on the “relations” they weave with each other and with various constituencies (p. 29). She demonstrates how “global processes are constituted by links among social actors based in particular local sites” (p. 25). In tracing these relationships, Thayer finds that “global flows passed through and between the two movement sites [she examined] as well as across national boundaries” (p. 19).

Another contribution of the book is the empirically-grounded concept of a “social movement market.” Thayer highlights the risks of commodification that funding imperatives and the logic of neoliberalism impose on movement organizations. The book shows how movement actors trade in political resources to advance their agendas and exercise power in their dealings with each other. Thayer closely examines these exchanges, distinguishing movement assets that are practical (e.g., money, experience, networks) from those that are symbolic (e.g., legitimacy, authority, authenticity). These resources can support social justice initiatives when animated by a collaborative spirit, and they somewhat help balance an unequal power field. Yet Thayer warns about the specter of neoliberal competition that can turn such strengths into mere exchangeable assets, undermining solidarity and obscuring the mutual relations that enable the development of valuable movement products.

On the whole, Making Transnational Feminism is an excellent addition to the literatures on gender, globalization, social movements, and Latin America. The arguments are historically situated within political and economic shifts in Brazil and beyond. The methods employed illustrate the value of qualitative research to the study of global issues, and the book’s methodological appendix offers an honest and insightful exploration of transnational fieldwork dilemmas. Throughout the volume, Thayer articulates subtle and contradictory dynamics aided by clear prose, sound organization, and useful tables and figures. This book promises to attract both scholarly audiences and activist-minded individuals who will find in its pages a wealth of analyses relevant to movement practices.
The grief of widows has been widely documented, in both scholarship and contemporary culture. First-person testimonials by esteemed writers like Joyce Carol Oates (2011) portray the searing emotional distress that women face when their husbands die. Empirical studies also reveal how women struggle yet ultimately achieve a sense of personal growth and independence following the deaths of their husbands. This female-focused approach to understanding spousal bereavement is justified, in part, on demographic grounds. Women are far more likely than men to outlive their spouse, given men’s elevated mortality risk and women’s tendency to marry men slightly older than themselves.

Although widowhood is widely regarded as a “women’s problem,” scholars generally acknowledge that spousal death may be even more distressing to men than women. Men typically are ill-prepared, both emotionally and practically, for the transition, and few have a support network of fellow widowers to whom to turn. Yet despite these broad assumptions that “widowers cope worse,” practitioners, scholars, and laypersons know relatively little about bereaved husbands. Deborah van den Hoonoaard’s engaging and thoughtful book, By Himself: The Older Man’s Experience of Widowhood, fills this important void.

Her book carefully and vividly describes the ways that older men adjust to spousal loss, and focuses on six key domains: psychological adjustment, relationships with adult children, dating and romantic relationships, relationships with friends, everyday social life and engagement, and household maintenance. The analysis is theoretically cohesive and draws heavily on symbolic interactionist perspectives; a key theme is that older widowers struggle to “do masculinity” as they cope with loss. In some cases, their reliance on typically “masculine” behaviors and practices bolsters their recovery from loss, in other cases it is an impediment. For example, the men take pride in knowing they were competent husbands and fathers, yet many also find that the overwhelming emotions associated with bereavement challenge their sense of masculinity and self-control. By Himself makes important contributions to the study of masculinity and bereavement, and answers essential questions about the ways that gender-typed socialization processes shape older men’s experiences with the bereavement transition.

Van den Hoonoaard conducted open-ended interviews with 26 widowers ages 60 and older, between 2000 and 2002. She drew her sample from two populations that differed starkly in terms of geography, religion, educational attainment, and in their approaches to dealing with loss. Nineteen men were recruited from urban and rural locations in one of Canada’s Atlantic provinces, and seven from retirement communities in Florida. In the former group, nearly all were of British descent, whereas the latter were Jewish men from the northeastern United States who had relocated to Florida upon retirement. These differences in cultural background shaped how these men thought about and “did” masculinity; the Canadian sample identified with a rugged, taciturn “rural masculinity on a symbolic level” (p. 10), whereas the widowers in the Florida sample were more likely to draw a sense of identity from their professional and financial successes, the accomplishments of their children, and their gift of gab—which proved to be a key resource as these men were better able to articulate their pain over the loss of their wife, and to navigate their new romantic relationships with neither embarrassment nor awkwardness.

The qualitative data are most intriguing when van den Hoonoaard discusses the men’s struggles with their interpersonal relationships. Most men were ambivalent about establishing new romantic relationships, and many found it difficult to maintain close, nurturing relationships with their children and friends—social ties that had been previously cultivated by their wives. The widowers, all ages 60 and older, tended to fall back...
into the language of their younger selves (i.e., “I’m a bachelor. . .”) when faced with the romantic overtures from eligible women in their communities. Most viewed repartnering as a natural part of being a widower, although many acknowledged that they did not want to be “tied down” to one woman. This same ambivalence and tension distinguished men’s relationships with their children. Many of the men reported mixed feelings, especially toward their daughters. They wanted (or expected) their daughters to take on many of the domestic tasks and responsibilities previously assumed by their wives, yet bristled when their daughters tried to take control of matters. Other men, still, were reluctant to reach out to their children for help, yet were hurt when their expectations for support from their children went unmet. In short, men’s adherence to traditional gender-typed expectations and behaviors posed obstacles as they sought to maintain quality relationships with significant others. In these chapters, van den Hoonaard movingly illustrates the downside of hegemonic masculinity for older widowers.

This book would be a welcome addition to graduate level courses on qualitative methodology, aging/life course, and masculinities. Van den Hoonaard clearly and honestly describes how she recruited and interviewed subjects, and thoughtfully reflects on the ways that her age and gender may have affected the content of the interviews. She notes that widowed men may attempt to “do masculinity” in the course of the interview, and may be reluctant to share their pain or feelings of insecurity in navigating their new lives as “single men.”

Some bereavement researchers may quibble with the relatively scant attention given to the vast empirical and theoretical work on grief and bereavement. Theories ranging from attachment theory, to stress and coping theories, to the more specific dual process model of bereavement—each of which has had a powerful influence on contemporary bereavement scholarship—are virtually absent from the text. Further, empirical researchers may question how widespread the documented patterns are, and may seek further information on the time course and duration of men’s loss-related adaptations. However, these omissions do not undermine van den Hoonaard’s contributions; throughout her analysis, she remains true to her roots in symbolic interactionism, and provides a cohesive interpretation of the men’s thoughts, feelings and behaviors. As van den Hoonaard herself states, the goals of By Himself are to understand “meaning rather than . . . rates,” and “social processes rather than . . . causal explanations.” The author succeeds in both of these aims.

Reference


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This is an historically embedded account of shifting ethnic and political identities in response to large social change. It discusses archival materials and historical developments in the tradition of social science history, while also providing an original ethnographic account of the birth, life, and death of a particular indigenous social movement organization. It uses social theory with sophistication to analyze documents and first-person accounts from the actors involved in the “Guerrero Council 500 Years of Indigenous Resistance.” While much has been written on Chiapas and Oaxaca, it concentrates on Guerrero, an important state with a long tradition of popular political opposition movements on which little has been published in English. Folkloric Poverty contains a historiography of anthropological studies of La Montaña region of Guerrero, where this reviewer has done fieldwork. Rather than parochial, this is a sociological case study of how government experts deal with ethnic minorities, and how changes in the political opportunity structure create new pan-ethnic identities under which to
mobilize. It details the claim-making and contentious politics of the Council under a neo-liberalizing regime. This book offers a fresh look at democratization, patron-client relations, authority legitimation practices, and other issues of interest for political sociologists and other social scientists.

As the book chronicles, in the 1920s the emerging Mexican government co-opted the image of the campesino (a poor and often indigenous farmer) as part of its nationalistic discourse and imagery while simultaneously favoring the industrialization of the urban and northern areas of the country. In the 1930s, Cárdenas incorporated indigenous farmers into the PRI national party by giving them land, and organizing them in a national confederation, thus solidifying their political identity as campesinos, and not as indigenous. In 1948, the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI) institutionalized a modernizing agenda that held indigenous groups as sources of pride and identity for the Mexican nation, while simultaneously aiming to assimilate existing indigenous peoples into a modern, urban, Spanish-speaking citizenry subject to the centralized Mexican state.

Intellectuals like Manuel Gamio, Andrés Molina Enríquez, and José Vasconcelos worried that cultural heterogeneity could compromise national unity. Contrary to biological views of race held elsewhere, they emphasized that the mixing of Spanish and indigenous elements would give rise to a mestizo (mixed) national culture. This could be seen as the Mexican version of the melting pot image, implying that “to remain an Indian was to remain a foreigner in Mexico” (p. 67). This process parallels the attempt of the French empire to integrate colonial people into its “civilizing” mission. Both instances are examples of modernizing projects aimed to change cultural practices to transcend the racial differences of conquered populations, and to transform marginal peasants into workers serving whatever economic model in which technocrats were invested.

Despite elite dreams to educate and assimilate them, many indigenous peoples still lived in the poorest and most remote areas of the country struggling for subsistence, given the low prices paid for their agricultural and other products. Echoing critiques of indigenismo made since the 1970s, Rebecca Overmyer-Velázquez uses the term “folkloric poverty” to describe the ethnocentric representation of the indigenous as isolated, poor, parochial, illiterate, and having limited command of Spanish. This is a myth the author challenges by showing how indigenous people have always had constant relationships—even if often exploitative ones—with non-indigenous people. Nevertheless, this myth justified the existence of the INI, and the continued discrimination, marginalization, and exploitation of indigenous peoples.

The main contribution of Overmyer-Velázquez’s work resides in documenting what has happened in Guerrero since the late 1980s. She argues that the adoption of neoliberalism in Mexico temporarily increased indigenous groups’ political voice. The simultaneous indigenous demands for autonomy and piecemeal help were compatible with neoliberalism and the tenets of Salinas’ Solidarity National Program. The participation of poor “folkloric” peasant communities provided some of the much-needed legitimation for Salinas following the 1998 election. Guerrero’s indigenous communities received money for needed projects without any long-term commitments from the government: a neopopulist solution to a neoliberal problem.

In the 1990s, neoliberal globalization brought other changes to Mexican indigenous movements. Borrowing official discourse on multiculturalism, human rights and international treaties on indigenous rights, there was a change from a campesino identity to an indigenous identity. Interestingly, indigenous movements sought autonomy within the Mexican nation-state. Indigenous movements, including the EZLN, saw themselves as indigenous but also as Mexicans. This national identification allowed organization around the pan-ethnic label of “indigenous.” In the case of Guerrero, Nahua, Mixteca, Tlapana, and Amuzgos tried to form coalitions to increase their political weight.

The end of the one-party system created many expectations by indigenous leaders. Yet the multi-party electoral game divided indigenous leaders, groups and towns. The
Council became an important broker between the government and indigenous towns. After a number of successes in getting funding for public projects, indigenous groups talked about this NGO as a “party,” and established patron-client relations the way they had done with the PRI and later with opposition parties.

The image of “folkloric poverty” draws the interest and sympathy of benevolent elites, human rights activists, anthropologists and international organizations. Yet assumptions of “folkloric poverty” limit indigenous self-representation, self-understanding, and the type of claims that indigenous people can make. The book includes examples of indigenous leaders whose “authenticity” was questioned once they spoke on national or international arenas: one indigenous leader reflected, “when an Indian puts on a tie, he stops being Indian” (p. 160). Thus successful leaders who transcended local concerns were often seen as traitors to the grassroots and their pueblo, meaning both “people” and “town” (p. 174). Folkloric Poverty underlines localism and so advocating for national policies is seen as an overextension where ethnic professionals should not speak in the name of indigenous people at large. Rather than gaining a larger voice at the national level, indigenous movements face a crisis inherent in the limits of their political identification. Therefore, like the post-revolutionary regime, Salinas and Fox were successful in mobilizing indigenous constituencies for legitimation and support without providing sustained benefits or relinquishing any power.


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Britain’s War on Poverty provides a detailed analysis of New Labour’s attempt to eliminate child poverty by 2019. The policy was inaugurated by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1999 and backed enthusiastically by his successor, Gordon Brown. Jane Waldfogel is a professor of social work and public policy at Columbia but has spent a considerable time at the Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion at the London School of Economics collaborating with British poverty researchers. A constant theme within her book is the contrasting fortunes of child poverty policies in Britain and in the United States.

The background to Blair and Brown’s “War on Poverty” was the increasing inequalities in Britain during the 1980s and 1990s and, in particular, the rapid increase in “workless households” headed mainly by single mothers. This had been accompanied by a plethora of research findings by British social scientists about the long-term negative effects of child poverty upon subsequent adult life chances.

The empirical core of the book is the chapters that deal with the three main elements in New Labour’s “War on Poverty.” These involved promoting paid employment (Waldfogel insists on calling this “work”), improving financial support for families with children, and investing in children themselves. The first involved “New Deal” welfare-to-work programs, the National Minimum Wage in 1999, and tax credits for families in paid employment. The second entailed improved child benefits paid (not to mothers as Waldfogel repeatedly claims) but to either parent or guardian of children aged 16 or younger. The final area involved both improved support for child care as well as more generous paid parental leave after the birth of children. However, the latter still contained very marked gender inequalities—mothers had far more generous entitlements than fathers—and were poor by Nordic standards.

How successful was this battery of policy initiatives? Waldfogel’s argument oscillates within her text between measures of relative and absolute change. In relative terms, the proportion of children in poverty in Britain fell from 26 percent in 1999 to 22 percent in 2004, but since then the proportion in poverty has increased once again. The initial reduction in relative poverty Waldfogel puts down to “an expanding economy,” however this expansion did not end in 2004 but rather accelerated until 2008, which leaves the causality unclear and, more seriously, throws doubt upon the assumed efficacy of the suite
of policy changes that are constantly trumpeted in her book. Indeed, those in direst poverty (those below 40 percent of median household incomes) increased significantly during the period. These households almost certainly contained a disproportionate number of children.

Waldfogel ignores the persistence throughout the period between 1997 and 2009 of marked regional and ethnic differences in child poverty in Britain. The latter is a particularly notable omission given the high proportion of children now born to international migrants and ethnic minority families and the enormous differences in female economic participation in the labor market between ethnic groups in Britain. It is also interesting that the author does not refer in any great detail to the health effects of poverty, both at the start of life and in adulthood. The reduction in health inequalities was a cornerstone of New Labour policy but the evidence overwhelmingly shows that these increased during the decade after 1999.

Waldfogel is also remarkably optimistic about the popularity of these welfare reforms within the wider population. The enormous welfare bill and perceived abuses cataloged repeatedly by the tabloid press such as the *Daily Mail*, the *Sun*, and the *Express* were powerful factors contributing to the defeat of the Labour Government at the 2010 British General Election. Indeed, the cuts to many of Labour’s welfare policies detailed at length by the author have not generated a great groundswell of popular dissatisfaction nor, interestingly, a great deal of fervor among Labour Members of Parliament over the last twelve months.

Overall, the book is well-written but suffers from a series of defects. The most glaring problem is the partisanship evident throughout. Alternative voices and views on welfare reform and the situation of children in disadvantaged families get short shrift. The evidence has been forced into a Labourist apologia. The tables are also often unclear as to precise sourcing and contain the rider that they were constructed by the author from official sources. This makes them impossible to verify or cross-check. The footnotes, albeit extensive, were too often unrelated to the argument and generally the reader is expected to take too much on trust.

The contrast with the United States is of interest but somewhat perverse. To compare Britain’s so-called “War on Poverty” with American experiences is to benchmark it against the worst example of poverty and systematic inequalities in any of the advanced economies. A more telling comparison would have been with countries such as Sweden, Finland or Germany, which have a far better record over a much longer period.

Finally, from the perspective of the “longue durée,” the small changes described by Waldfogel must be seen as relatively insignificant. Levels of poverty have increased significantly since the late 1960s and these minor fluctuations since 1999 represent but one episode within this broad conjunctural trajectory.
of the political party and the depoliticized
nation-state in contemporary democracies.
But the Chinese Communist Party was a Len-
inist party in a non-democracy. Wang is right
to say that even within the CCP “it is not easy
to carry on real debate” and “the CCP has
conducted no public debates about political
values or strategy” (p. 6) since the mid-
1970s. But the lively debates and deadly
struggles during the “line struggle” years
under Mao were not only about “serious the-
etrical considerations and policy deba-
te” (p. 6), as Wang described, but more about
power struggle and power consolidation that
were typical at the beginning of every dynas-
ty throughout Chinese history. The liveliness
of the party politics ended with Mao’s death
and Deng’s success in consolidating power
within the party, which allowed him to steer
the policies in a new direction over objections
by the Left.

The fact that “divisions...can only be
resolved within the power structures” (p. 6)
is not the result of depoliticized party politics
within the CCP, but the reason for it. It is not
a new phenomenon that emerged after neo-
liberalism (Wang’s real villain) had become
the new hegemony, but the reason that gave
it the hegemony. None of the examples of
“theoretical battles” cited by Wang, from
1927 to 1978, was actually settled by the vir-
tues of theoretical arguments, but by power
struggles with Mao outmaneuvering and
outlasting his opponents at every critical
juncture. His greatness as a theoretician was
only second to his real greatness as a fighter
and survivor, as are all great political leaders.

The rosy image that Wang projected onto
the CCP, where the vitality of the party poli-
tics was preserved by continued vigorous
debates on policies and strategies within the
party, is illusionary at best. The foundation
of the one-party system is the monopoly of
power. In order to maintain the monopoly
of power, oppositions have to be suppressed,
both within the party and without. The leftist
ideology during the Mao era was equally
hegemonic. Those who were labeled rightists
or capitalist-roaders, such as Deng Xiaoping,
were purged and sent to the countryside.
Therefore, it is not just under the neoliberal-
ism’s hegemony during the market reform
era that “the possibility of exploring the rela-
tionship between the party and democracy”
has been destroyed (p. 7). It has never been
seriously explored by either side.

Wang’s opposition to the hegemony of the
neoliberalist “radical privatization ideology”
seems also to color his analysis and interpre-
tation of the 1989 student movement. While
he criticizes the neoliberals for being “anti-
historical” in their commentaries on the
1989 movement, he commits the same sin of
tailoring history for his own arguments.
Granted that no one has a monopoly on the
interpretation of history, Wang’s determi-
ation that “state-led neoliberal economic poli-
cies led to the social upheaval” and “the
social mobilization of 1989 was based on pro-
tests against the uneven decentralization of
power and interests” (p. 34) would have to
be squared with the fact that the 1989 social
movement was first and foremost a student
movement, and measured against the com-
peting hypothesis that the movement was
the result of the temporary opening of the
political opportunity structure which was
brought about by the initial phase of the mar-
ket reform.

The political atmosphere on university
campuses in the late 1980s, right before the
1989 student movement, was the most open
and liberal in recent history. The students
were still guaranteed jobs after graduation
and were still widely referred to as “the cho-

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5 chen ones” (not in the Christian sense, but tian

zhijiaozi in Chinese). Their outcry against
official corruption and their zeal for democ-
racy demonstrated during the movement
were less because of personal injustices suf-
fered at the hands of the authorities, or rela-
tive deprivations caused by “the uneven
decentralization of power and interests.” If
anything, they were the privileged youth
on their way to become the new power elites.
What appealed to them were the concepts of
democracy and freedom, even though vague
and abstract to most of them. They
responded to the rally cry for democracy
and freedom with the typical zeal of the
youth of a certain age.

If one takes the value of democracy seri-
ously, then one must acknowledge that fund-
damentally, democracy itself is worth fight-
ing for, and the oppressed will not need
a more material grievance to push them
over the edge to join the protest. The question
of “why many state officials and government
cadres marched on Chang’an Avenue” (p. 33) towards the end of the movement, therefore, can be answered with the changing dynamics of authoritarian control. Once massive and prolonged student protests ripped open the tightly controlled social order, it became easier for other groups and other members of the population to mobilize and participate. It can be argued that it was exactly because of signs that broader groups might be heading for such a tipping point that the authorities decided to crack down hard on the protests and put an abrupt end to the social movement.

The 1989 student movement, therefore, can be regarded as a failed uprising that did not bring down the one-party system in China, compared to those which succeeded in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. There is nothing anti-historical about this comparison. Wang’s wish to “contextualize” the 1989 student movement within the much larger international anti-globalization movements that continued all the way to Seattle in 1999, Washington in 2000 and beyond, raises questions about his approach to history.

Wang’s predicament is understandable though. Facing the triumphant capitalism in the world and the hegemony of neoliberalism in China, it seems the only hope to fight the tide of globalization and “radical privatization” is the “reactivation” of the socialist tradition that “gave workers, peasants and other social collectivities some legitimate means to contest or negotiate the state’s corrupt or inegalitarian marketization procedures.” (p. 18). That is the “nostalgic” and “romanticized” attitude toward history which Wang himself rejects (p. 66).