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The trouble with truthmakers
Pacific philosophical quarterly (1997)
  • Damian Cox

This paper argues that theories of truth which seek to specify the ontological ground of true statements by appealing to an ontology of truth-makers face a severe and possibly insurmountable obstacle in the form of logically complex statements. I argue that there is no apparent way to develop an account of logically complex truth within the confines of a modest and plausible ontology of truth-makers and to this end criticize independent attempts by Armstrong and Pendlebury to develop such an account.

  • true statement,
  • truth-maker,
  • complex truth
Publication Date
January 1, 1997
Publisher Statement
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© Copyright University of Southern California, 1997.

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Citation Information
Damian Cox. "The trouble with truthmakers" Pacific philosophical quarterly Vol. 78 (1997)
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