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Contribution to Book
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
Combinatorial Auctions (2006)
  • Peter Cramton, University of Maryland
  • Yoav Shoham, Stanford University
  • Richard Steinberg, University of Cambridge
Abstract

The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enable price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the auction design and its performance in practice.

Publication Date
2006
Editor
Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg
Publisher
MIT Press
Citation Information
Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions" Cambridge, MACombinatorial Auctions (2006)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/cramton/38/