

University of Cyprus

---

From the Selected Works of Costas M. Constantinou

---

2010

# Sustaining Global Hope: Sovereignty, Power and the Transformation of Diplomacy

Costas M. Constantinou, *University of Cyprus*  
James Der Derian, *Brown University*



Available at: [https://works.bepress.com/costas\\_constantinou/2/](https://works.bepress.com/costas_constantinou/2/)

# Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	ix
<i>List of Contributors</i>	x
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
Sustaining Global Hope: Sovereignty, Power and the Transformation of Diplomacy <i>Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian</i>	
<b>Part I Re-Conceptualizing Diplomacy</b>	
1 The Promise of Sustainable Diplomacy: Refining the Praxis of Ecological Realism <i>David Joseph Wellman</i>	25
2 Diplomacy and Public Imagination <i>Hussein Banai</i>	46
3 Diplomacy, Spirituality, Alterity <i>Costas M. Constantinou</i>	67
<b>Part II Diplomatic Cultures, Exclusions and Transformations</b>	
4 Perforated Sovereignties, Agonistic Pluralism and the Durability of (Para)diplomacy <i>Noé Cornago</i>	89
5 Decolonizing Diplomacy: Reflections on African Estrangement and Exclusion <i>Sam Okoth Opondo</i>	109
6 Sustainability and Transformation in Diplomatic Culture: The Case of Eurocentrism <i>Iver B. Neumann</i>	128
<b>Part III Diplomatic Issues and Case Studies</b>	
7 Sustainable Public Diplomacy: Communicating about Identity, Interests and Terrorism <i>Anthony Deos and Geoffrey Allen Pigman</i>	151

viii *Contents*

8	Sustained Peacebuilding: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations and Researchers <i>Arne Strand</i>	173
9	Sustainable Diplomacy in the European Union <i>Mai'a K. Davis Cross</i>	192
10	Engaging the Enemy: An Essential Norm for Sustainable US Diplomacy <i>Geoffrey Wiseman</i>	213
11	Towards a Sustainable Diplomacy in Divided Korea <i>Roland Bleiker</i>	235
12	The US-Iranian conflict in Obama's New Era of Engagement: Smart Power or Sustainable Diplomacy? <i>Paul Sharp</i>	256
	<i>Index</i>	277

# Introduction

## Sustaining Global Hope: Sovereignty, Power and the Transformation of Diplomacy

*Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian*

Can diplomacy be saved? Can diplomacy save us?

Take a singular event highlighting hope and the possibility of redemption like the awarding of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize to US President Barack Obama. It does not constitute an epoch but it did signify a profound rupture from past practices. Lost in the controversy over the worthiness of the recipient and the debate about rewarding aspirations rather than actual accomplishments was the message itself: diplomacy would once again be in the service of peace and cooperation rather than of war and violence. Diplomacy was in the lede of the announcement:

The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2009 is to be awarded to President Barack Obama for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.

It was in the body:

Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play.

And it was in the finale:

His diplomacy is founded in the concept that those who are to lead the world must do so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared by the majority of the world's population.<sup>1</sup>

Obama's concept of diplomacy is not a new one. Nor is the rehabilitation of diplomacy an exclusive effort of the current US administration.

## 2 Introduction

Global publicity aside, it is doubtful that a single leader, well-intentioned or not, can consummate such a shift in the *Zeitgeist*. But after a decade of growing wary as well as weary of 'war on terror', unilateral foreign policies and preemptive exceptionalism (rendition, torture and global anomie), the diplomatic shift of the most powerful player in world politics can only be welcome. The question we wish to ask is how do we transform hope into action, opportunity into reality; how, in other words, to make the kind of diplomacy projected in the Nobel award sustainable?

We argue that diplomacy should not only be concerned with advocacy, policy implementation and public relations but also – and more crucially – with innovation and creativity, experimentation in finding ways and terms under which rival entities and ways of living can co-exist and flourish (including biodiversity and future generations). The major challenge with regard to diplomacy, and this book, is how to engender normative, yet pragmatic change, how to make possible a shift from practices concerned with preserving specific, and perhaps unsustainable, ways of living (such as preserving an ethnocentric or mono-cultural or consumerist or individualistic way of living) to practices that are more cosmopolitan and accommodating of alterity, practices that emphasize self-knowledge and are open to identity transformation.

Specifically, the diplomacy we outline entails at least two senses of sustainability, and the chapters that follow address one or both senses. The *first* sense concerns the 'durability' of diplomacy as opposed to the 'disposability' of diplomacy post- but also pre-9/11. Exhausting diplomatic options can be perceived as a delay in getting desired results and a form of appeasement to a party that displays unwillingness to accept another's specific demands and ultimatums. From this angle, using force may be viewed as a means of getting desired results more expediently, and that may sometimes be so, though at the cost of enhancing durable relationships with others. An anti-diplomatic tendency (Der Derian, 1992) can thus become dominant in the name of national and global security. By highlighting diplomatic sustainability we aim to support a diplomacy that is peace-preserving and peace-making though not necessarily pacifist (and of course we realize that the call to use force and its extent opens up wider debates about norms of legitimation that we cannot fully examine here but are examined elsewhere; e.g. Der Derian, 2009). To this end peace should be broadly conceived, not as the mere absence of war or violence but as a state of being that includes justice, security and solidarity.

*Secondly*, sustainability takes the viewpoint of the long-term reconciliation and/or coexistence of competing entities and ways of living. From this perspective diplomacy's role becomes that of a reflexive praxis. It includes

willingness to accommodate and learn from other ways of living but also to revise one's own way of living and doing things. The shift from national-interest diplomacy to regional- or global-interest diplomacy is substantial yet can also be rhetorical; thus the need to remain vigilant and critically reflexive about the discourse of sustainability, subalternity, humanitarianism, and other normatively loaded concepts. It certainly does not mean that the pursuit of a global interest is necessarily less violent than the pursuit of a national interest; but it does mean that the preservation of other ways of living is more likely to be acknowledged and supported within a more holistic, regional, or global-interest framework.

Perhaps the first step towards a sustainable diplomacy is to restore diplomacy as a virtue. If we are to follow Aristotelian terms (1934), to be a diplomat *ab initio* entails the notion of being a 'good diplomat' (the two are inseparable). The ethical imperative is not to take diplomats as they happen to be but as they ought to be if they are to realize their telos or functional excellence. The virtuous diplomat should not be an obedient servant but potentially a challenger and modifier of policies, including of the policy one is called to serve.

This is where Aristotelian virtue is complemented by Machiavellian virtuosity. Note Machiavelli's advice in his letter to Raffaello Girolami that in order to discharge his embassy to Spain *not just faithfully but adequately*, he needs to get to know not only the character of the sovereign to whom he is sent but also of the sovereign who sent him and skilfully adapt his practice in order to mediate between them (Machiavelli, 1522/2004, p. 41). The point is further exemplified in Bruno Latour's reflection on none other than the famous Talleyrand, specifically that the diplomat's role is that 'he imposes *on the very ones who sent him* [a] fundamental doubt about their own requirements' (Latour, 2004, p. 216). Diplomats may not always have the opportunity to do that; specific conditions of practising may not allow critique but only advocacy. Yet the point to make here is that besides implementing foreign policy objectives diplomats ought, on the basis of the diplomatic encounter, to raise questions and doubts, not only about the position of others, but about the position of their own government. In other words, the virtuous diplomat should be able to advise and experiment on what modifications are necessary to negotiate terms of amity, agreement or co-existence.

## Diplomacy in the twenty-first century

At the onset of the twenty-first century the prestige and practice of diplomacy had sunken lower than probably any time in recent history,

## 4 Introduction

and to that extent President Obama had an easy act to follow. In times of desperation – with or without glimpses of hope – temptation grows to compare the present condition to an imaginary past. High on the list of golden ages would be the so-called classical era of diplomacy when a corps of Great Ambassadors representing a condominium of Great Powers exercised Great Responsibility to bring a hundred years of peace; that is, of course, in certain territories of Europe and until the same corps also helped usher in the Great War. Closer scrutiny reveals more cracks in the mirror that we hold up to the present. ‘Civilizing processes’ cloaked hegemonic agendas and coercive treaty-making; universal reason, upon contact with alien beliefs, proved to be little more than a cultural norm of convenience framing negotiation; the lowest Machiavellian practices were justified in the name of the highest Kantian ends; and class conflict was displaced and magnified by imperialism into a global civil war, the consequences of which are still being felt in the international system. In the history of diplomacy there is as much if not more to disappoint as to celebrate.

Rather than gaze backward in fear or nostalgia, one can use historical insight to plot progress towards a new appreciation of diplomacy. Indeed, diplomacy needs and is bound to be re-appreciated in the post-Bush era. After a POTUS (President of the United States) who aspired to be LOTFW (Leader of the Free World) sent his highest diplomat, Secretary of State Colin Powell to obfuscate and misinform, if not lie to, the UN about WMD in Iraq, whose Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, advocated the decapitation (‘take the top ten floors off’) of the UN Secretariat Building in New York, diplomacy can *only* improve. In sharp contrast, Presidential-candidate Obama repeatedly voiced his willingness to talk to world leaders declared *persona non grata* by his opponent; in his first week as President, Obama made a commitment for ‘engaged diplomacy’; and in the first six months of his office, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled over 100,000 miles to 30 countries and held countless town hall meetings, to conduct ‘not just diplomacy between government officials [but] diplomacy between people’.<sup>2</sup> After eight years in which diplomacy was not just disengaged but disposable, as strange as it might sound, Obama appeared to offer a more realistic option. To follow on the main principles of one of the founding figures of classical realism, Hans Morgenthau (1985, pp. 584–6), diplomacy under Bush was infested with a crusading spirit that aimed at global salvation rather than the establishment or preservation of peace. What is more, and here we argue contra Morgenthau, it perpetuated the division of the world through the essentialist and simplistic categories of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, an

increasingly uneasy and often senseless binary for dealing with complex global problems such as security, the environment and financial crises.

Let us leave partisan politics aside and intuitively consider the future of diplomacy. Is diplomacy still a viable institution? Can it still inspire hope to resolve major problems and enhance global peace, security and solidarity? Writing about these issues in North America, the negatives scream at us from the headlines: failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a war against terror that we are told one day can be won, the next that it cannot; between a war in Iraq that was declared over, yet grinds on; and, more generally, between the way things are and the way we would wish them to be. Yet, when considering these issues from our first vantage point in Cyprus – a nation with its own ‘protracted problem’ and the gravestone of many an aspiring diplomat – one cannot but recall the faultline of diplomacy’s modern origins. From the orientalised Byzantine practice that Harold Nicolson saw as responsible for transmitting the ‘defects of duplicity and suspicion’ (Nicolson, 1954, p. 27; cf. Constantinou, 2000) to fifteenth-century Italian diplomats instructed to take their cook with them (to avoid poisoning) but leave the wife behind (to avoid loose lips), we should not be too quick to ascribe immaculate origins and practices to the art of diplomacy. No immaculate origins means no perfect futures either.

A negative spirit seems to rule the world of diplomacy and muzzle hope – which is why Obama’s message appeared so appealing to both US voters and Nobel Peace Prize jurists. Worse, this negative spirit seems to accelerate as the news cycle shrinks, as classical diplomacy gives way to its public form. Inordinate means are too often and too quickly applied to ill-conceived ends; hegemonic agendas pass off as humanitarian practices in the global media; strategies of sovereign power cause or exacerbate problems, overrule and spin off their lack of resolution. Great moments of hope, like 11/9, when hammer blows to the Berlin Wall marked a symbolic end to a half-century of Cold War diplomacy, are too easily reversed by global events of terror, like 9/11, when kamikaze aircraft piloted by jihadists crashed into the Twin Towers.

Yet disappointment with diplomacy is not a new phenomenon. Those versed in the literature of diplomatic studies recall the classic debate between ‘old’ and ‘new’ diplomacy, a contest with moral undertones recurring at different stages in history, and referring to calls for diplomatic change as well as reactions to such change. To be sure, the terms *old* and *new* diplomacy have their analytical limits and are perhaps overused in the literature; but the compelling need to account for – if not to demand – changes in diplomatic conduct is quite revealing of how

historically there existed periods of ethical and political uneasiness concerning diplomacy and its overall impact on those it was meant to serve.

A brief genealogy of modern, Western diplomacy may be useful to illustrate the point. In the literature, we are told that a characteristically *new* diplomacy came about following the disastrous religious wars in Europe and the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), that is in the form of the secularization of diplomatic discourse, the progressive monopolization of diplomacy by the nation state and the advent of *raison d'état* that replaced medieval universalism as the core moral principle of intrastate and interstate conduct. Another *new* arrived with French Revolutionary diplomacy, the dissatisfaction with and challenge against non-representative diplomacy (dynastic or aristocratic), and thus the call for diplomacy to be popularized and conducted in the name and interests of the 'people' rather than the person of the king as in the *ancien regime*. Another *new* diplomacy followed World War I and the Wilsonian challenge to secret and imperial diplomacy, criticized by the representatives of the old order as 'megaphone diplomacy' but aspects of which progressively led to decolonization and new state actors as well as the rise of global governmental organizations, like the League of Nations and the UN. And yet another *new* diplomacy came about more recently with the proliferation of multilateral or issue diplomacy; this has been lately combined with the rise of public diplomacy and the slow but increasing recognition of non-governmental organizations, civil society and people in general as diplomatic stakeholders. (For a range of debates on 'old' and 'new' diplomacy corresponding to different practices and historical periods, see Anderson, 1993; Der Derian, 1987; Eban, 1983; Garrison and Phipps, 1989; Gilbert, 1951; Nicolson, 1963; Reus-Smit, 1999; Riordan, 2003; Sofer, 1988).

The periodic advent of new diplomacies was accompanied each time with large doses of hope; invariably hope for peace, emancipation, security, prosperity, equality and other normative aspirations. Yet to assess why and how these hopes have been frustrated cannot be properly done without the recognition that the promise of diplomacy, just like any idea or practice, is contestable. What it means to practise diplomacy or be diplomatic remains an open question. Whose interests does diplomacy serve or should serve? Who has or ought to have the right to diplomacy? How does one represent and negotiate in the name of that right? How far are diplomatic methods and innovations the result of new social and economic orders rather than liberal or humanist ideals? All these are difficult questions, and though diplomatic theory has

sought to provide answers (e.g. Constantinou, 1996; Der Derian, 1987; Jönsson and Hall, 2005; Neumann, 2005; Sharp, 1997; Watson, 1982), what is perhaps most interesting and beneficial is not the response of this or that theoretical approach but the continuous posing of such questions in different, real-life diplomatic contexts where the implications of practice can more easily be assessed.

This is exactly what this book seeks to do. It proposes that if a worthy goal of diplomacy is the hope of mediating difference in ways that remain sensitive to the Self as well as to the Other (however these are defined), then the non-disposability, indeed the indispensability of such action, should be paramount, including sustained reflection on diplomatic means and ends as well as changes of value and meaning across contexts. Roughly, this is what we understand by a diplomacy that is sustainable; yet in recognition of conceptual contests and contextual shifts we have opted for the plural term *sustainable diplomacies*.

Some might wish it possible to put such a complex task more simply; others might find 'sustainable diplomacies' to be a less than felicitous concept. Indeed, being or becoming 'sustainable', associating individual and collective behaviour with 'sustainability' may have become the politically correct sound to make these days; but it would be wrong simply to view this as fashion, and thus to dismiss or diminish the value of what is essentially a wake up call for reflexive praxis. The term *sustainable diplomacy*, introduced in the work of David Wellman (2004 and further elaborated in Chapter 1 of this book), suggests the need to convert ecological discourse and religious texts into diplomatic policy and initiative aiming at 'a more intimate and profound understanding of the lives, beliefs and concerns of people "on the ground"' (Wellman, 2004, p. 4). This is the promise of diplomacy for Wellman, who argues that in fulfilling it there should be genuine space 'for NGOs, religious organizations and various peoples' movements to contribute to policy formation and act as diplomats in their own right'. Thus Wellman's is a proposition for inclusiveness, both of non-state *actors* commonly excluded from conventional interstate diplomacy and of *ideas*, like religious and ecological thought, when and where they are appropriate and meaningful to the mediation of inter-communal relations and the protection of ecosystems.

Sustainable diplomacy brings to the picture a new attitude, a new political vision, and it should be underlined here that sustainability is not just an environmental term. It is increasingly a cultural one, a way of doing things in different social contexts, preserving forms of life and being, while having the interests of both current and future generations

in mind. Not being a fixed term it can and has been used to spin the effects of policy or legitimate diplomatic action or inaction. Consider, for example, how the former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, employed the term 'sustained peace' and the need to bring about 'sustained peace' as a reason for *not* calling for the immediate cessation of violence during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

So, just like diplomatic practice, the use of the term *sustainable* and its offshoots should be constantly assessed as to their implications in different contexts. But the point remains that this new attitude and political vision calls upon theorists and practitioners to approach global problems through critical thinking and in more holistic terms: that is to say, with an eye on the complexity of local and global relationships that not only trouble a rigid 'us' vs. 'them' approach, but also expose hierarchies, exclusions, marginalizations and real or symbolic violence that purports to secure the Self and manage the Other. This vision utilizes what has been aptly described as 'diplomatic thinking', which itself produces a distinctly 'diplomatic understanding' of a situation, being the product of 'people who occupy and work in the space between those they represent' (Sharp, 2009 and also Chapter 12). It calls on sustainable diplomacy to work *within* but also *against* pronounced policy restraints

Our goal is to articulate a sustainable diplomacy that keeps alive the hope of mediating difference. To bring the study and practice closer to this end, we first need to revisit the unsustainable biases of the modern diplomatic system and then seek to retrieve sustainable forms and engaged practices of diplomacy. Through this we envision a sustainable diplomacy in which a wide range of actors, varying in identity, interests and power, mediate their differences through new techniques of interconnectivity, in line with developments outlined and elaborated in recent studies on the changing character of diplomatic practice (e.g. Betsill and Corell, 2008; Cooper, Hocking and Maley, 2008; Melissen, 2005; Minear and Smith, 2007; Riordan, 2003; Sharp, 1999).

## The modern diplomatic system and its biases

The modern diplomatic system first imposed in Europe and then worldwide an order that was highly exclusionary. The *ius legationis* (the right to send and receive embassies) came to be associated only with actors possessing *sovereign* statehood. Except for a few notable examples – like the Holy See after the unification of Italy in 1871 and before the Lateran Treaty in 1929 – for those not possessing territorial sovereignty the right to diplomacy was denied *unless* and *until* the governments of sovereign

states recognized them as such; that is, not just as a different entity or issue-specific group, but as a significant political actor that deserved diplomatic engagement rather than the mere exercise of governance. In other words, the mediation of difference was qualitatively different if one lacked diplomatic identity. It could be just (and not necessarily always) a question of simply debating how the law or the will of the sovereign was to be implemented, not a question of negotiating the law or seeking to reconcile opposing wills. In short, in the modern international system, the bestowal of diplomatic identity became a means of empowerment – its denial a means of disempowerment.

The restrictive tendency in the use of the diplomatic designation was indicative of an attempt by the more powerful rulers and institutions in Europe to extend their legal and political competencies at the expense of the less powerful. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) did not initiate but institutionalized the new political changes that began earlier on to challenge medieval and papal authority in Europe. The medieval diplomatic order was indeed hierarchical but more flexible in terms of ascribing diplomatic pedigree, including actors other than the powerful princes (Queller, 1967). Such was also the Roman diplomatic order, which even at its imperial apogee kept in service a range of legations (invariably dealing with negotiation, adjudication, supplication and religious ceremony) and crucially retained the *ius legationis* to subjugated cities, thus restricting the power of the Roman governor to regulate the affairs and well-being of foreign peoples. In other words, besides diplomatic relations with communities outside the empire, groups of people within the empire retained an institutionalized right to diplomacy, specifically to petition the emperor and renegotiate the implementation and terms of their subjection. So it is not at all surprising to find that in late medieval writings the *legatus* was still very broadly conceived, in the words of the jurist Guilielmus Durandus, as *quicumque ab alio missus*, meaning ‘anyone sent by another’.<sup>3</sup>

It is this broad understanding that received a serious blow first by pre-Westphalian state practice and then by diplomatic theory and law. Backed by state ordinances and policed by its functionaries, from the sixteenth century onwards ‘all diplomatic missions between French citizens and other states required the approval (*letters de créance*) of the French government – an approval that was only given if the embassy was actually on behalf of the state’ (Holszgreffe, 1989, p. 16). This was a practice that was progressively enforced by other European states as well, meaning that legates and ambassadors *from* and *to* cities, bishops, monasteries, vassals, assemblies, universities, syndicates, merchants, condottieres and

groups of citizens lost their diplomatic designation and became mere 'agents', 'procurators' and 'officials'.

Diplomatic writings and international law followed suit. The 'founding fathers' of international law, Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius, though writing in Latin and drawing numerous embassy examples from the diverse Roman practice of *legatio*, were both in the business of erasing diversity from modern diplomatic practice. Gentili acknowledges some of these practices in *De Legationibus*. He does this so as to avoid conceptual difficulties and being 'embarrassed by ambiguity in the term', but goes on to specify that 'the basis of the definition we are framing' is that the *legatus* is someone sent 'by the state ... in the name of the state, and as the representative of the state' (Gentili, 1594/1924, pp. 4, 7). Grotius exemplifies deep historical knowledge in the 'Ius Legationis' chapter of *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* yet remains silent of alternative cultures of diplomacy and treats the diversity of Roman and Greek diplomatic practices as inconsequential (Grotius, 1648/1925, pp. 438–49; further on this, see Constantinou, 1996).

To that extent, the right of embassy as developed in the modern Law of Nations became part of the discursive armoury that denied independence and legitimated control over people and territories. Both Gentili and Grotius are unequivocal that embassies should not be sent *by* or *to* a subject. At different historical periods the right of embassy was also denied to such diplomatic 'exceptions' that were not subjects, like outlaws, infidels and barbarians. We moreover come across patriarchal edicts like those of Lord Hankey, which forbade 'the use of the word "diplomacy" in speaking of the relations within the family circle of the British Empire' (quoted in Lloyd, 2000, p. 47). Thus the development of *ius legationis* as customary international law gave new legal parameters to those with interest and power to subjugate others; it normalized through the juridical absence of diplomacy relationships of subservience rather than of equality.

This has specific resonance to the colonization and subjugation of non-European peoples and the destruction or cooptation of their polities. Colonized subjects were often found lacking in Western civility and denied the diplomatic identity *ab initio*, as Sam Okoth Opondo shows in Chapter 5. Specifically, Opondo argues that non-state, non-Christian and non-governmental modes of encountering otherness in Africa were systematically erased by Western diplomacy, through its colonial officials and missionaries, and in favour of encounters that converted and normalized African subjectivity in order to properly deal with indigenous otherness. This strategic mediation of otherness created new

forms of estrangement on the ground. But it also produced caricatures of Western diplomacy like Emperor Bokasa, who followed Napoleonic protocol, or Idi Amin Dada denigrating English diplomacy as the king of Scotland, or lately the Lord's Resistance Army in a new mission to re-Christianize Africans.

The colonial encounter did, of course, display variety and did not always deny the native's diplomatic identity. When not, however, it still found ways to progressively scale it down or domesticate it. This ranged from selectivity in sending or receiving 'ambassadors' depending on the colonizer's control of territory (such as with the Asante); to the denial or sovereign interpretation of treaties signed with natives following the formal establishment of colonial rule (such as with the Maoris, Aborigines and American Natives); to the fixing or modifying of the designation 'ambassador', 'representative', 'commissioner', 'resident', etc. as a means of registering the right of interference or exposing a lack of autonomy or rewarding loyalty (such as with the Nepalese); to the increasing or decreasing of diplomatic protocol when dealing with rulers of colonized polities (such as the number of gun-salutes fired in their honour and used for ranking the rajas and maharajas under the British Raj).<sup>4</sup> All in all, this was diplomacy in the service of empire-building – through its practice or its denial. It was not a means to communicate with, understand and mediate the Other across cultural borders; a more progressive form of dealing with a complex world re-branded in the decolonization period as the 'new diplomacy' (Rossow, 1962).

Typically the launching of the campaign for aboriginal rights in Australia started with nothing less than the establishment of a Tent Embassy (originally a beach umbrella upgraded to a makeshift structure) outside the old Parliament House in Canberra in 1972. Unsurprisingly, the Australian government has not recognized the embassy's status, and its response has varied from early attempts at forceful removal and harassment to more recent 'benign' propositions of an 'aesthetic cleansing', trading off the 'removal of the embassy in return for permanent meeting rooms, memorial plaques and reconciliation paths' – all to no avail. The Tent Embassy reached an iconic status in Aboriginal political history as many activists 'attributed the raising of their political consciousness and education to the embassy' as well as learning through it about 'the nature of history itself, in terms of perspective, power and the ability for the powerful to impose their interpretation on the rest of us' (Dow, 2000). To have the symbolic right to employ the instruments of modern diplomacy was perceived as a sign of political respect to Aboriginal voices and demands as well as a means

of engaging in a non-hierarchical – if still asymmetric – dialogue. More recently, although the Australian government has not recognized it as a *de jure* embassy, it seems to have accepted it *de facto*, and it is now listed on the National Estate by the Australian Heritage Commission; perhaps a symbolic recognition of diplomacy-to-come.

The Western vision of modern diplomacy may be dominant but it is not unchallengeable, nor sealed off from revision by non-Western forces. Indeed, as Iver Neumann suggests in Chapter 6, the founding myths and narrative socializations of modern diplomacy may still be predominantly Christian and Eurocentric but they have been eased by hybridization. Other actors attempt to ‘insert [their] own founding myths into the diplomatic culture’, and in the specific context where this may appear necessary and functional, it is no longer an issue of contestation. In short, the Western diplomatic system and society of states have developed and are no longer as exclusionary as they used to be, at least with regard to sovereign state actors. Take, for example, Colonel Qaddafi: he can insert his own Bedouin imaginary into the official practice of modern diplomacy (a global theatre show of tents, camels and female bodyguards) and this has come to be accepted. For postcolonial diplomacy to be a credible proposition, it must appear to be inclusive of non-Western diplomatic norms as well. Though protocol is perhaps a soft issue, it still displays a willingness to be inclusive in high profile symbolic areas and a sign of the potential for change in diplomatic culture.

Furthermore, state sovereignty never held complete control over the modern diplomatic system. Sovereignty has been ‘perforated’ in various and complex ways, meaning that all kinds of non-state and sub-state actors have found ways to practise diplomacy despite their formal ban – be it mission sending, regional cooperation, treaty signing or legally opting out from specific national and international commitments. In the diplomatic studies literature, this has come to be known as ‘paradiplomacy’ (see Aldecoa and Keating, 1999 and Der Derian, 1987, pp. 5, 203), though there is also recognition that this term is conceptually unsatisfactory to the extent that it approaches ‘diplomacy’ as an essentially interstate affair. As Noé Cornago shows in Chapter 4, ‘paradiplomacy’ is a wide-ranging practice, an old as well as new reality and functional need. Paradoxically, conventional interstate diplomacy is sustained by the very thing it defines itself against, or distinguishes itself from, namely sub-state or non-state diplomacy, and this because it needs to find a way of dealing with the plurality of voices around the world and to mediate more effectively the multiple forms of estrangement, which are never just interstate. In short, the historical and contemporary

durability of paradiplomacy tells us something about both the practical limits of interstate diplomacy and the increasing recognition of those limits by the governments of states that either enhance or allow or are just unable to stop the use of paradiplomacy. Furthermore, local and international NGOs have recently entered into the picture to broaden our understanding of diplomatic stakeholders. As Arne Strand suggests in Chapter 8, with regard to 'sustained peacebuilding', what is required is 'a strategic and equal partnership between international and local NGOs and researchers' that seeks not merely to support peace settlements but to 'engender peace and embed a culture of peace on a daily basis'. Para-, sub-, intra-, supra- and trans-national diplomacy is as much the order of the day these days as is inter-national diplomacy.

Still, the normative and dominant claims about the monopolization of the *ius legationis* by the state means that students of diplomacy have inherited and largely taken for granted the conceptual fixations and biases of modern international law and practice. In doing so they often miss how institutionalized diplomacy is never just about regulating state relations or even only about regulating relations with foreigners, but that it also crucially involves the identification, representation and interpretation of *foreignness*. The latter is important because it enables and legitimates the application of *specific* ways and means of dealing with the abstracted Other rather than *different* ways and means. The diplomatic pedigree has value in determining how the Other is conceptualized and mediated, what freedoms, immunities and opportunities are available to the Other, what powers the Other has in regional and global forums, what is the status of agreements signed by the Other and so on and so forth.

### **From *raison d'état* to *modus vivendi***

This is not to suggest that the modern diplomatic system and Western diplomatic theory brought only biases and no insights for sustainable diplomacy. The problem is rather that such insights were either purposely ignored or selectively interpreted in ways that supported the dominant forms of statecraft and realpolitik rather than more sustainable forms of diplomacy.

Take, for example, the insights of one of the canonical figures of diplomatic theory and practice, Cardinal Richelieu, and how these insights are selectively recounted by a contemporary theorist and practitioner – for some the master diplomatist – namely Henry Kissinger (1994, pp. 56–77). Richelieu for Kissinger is important because he is seen as the pioneer and promoter of the principle of *raison d'état*. Kissinger

misses the impact of Richelieu's Italian predecessors, Machiavelli and Guiciardini, and their contributions in developing the notion of *ragione di stato* (Viroli, 1992), but this is perhaps less important for our purposes. What is most critical is that Kissinger's long meditation on Richelieu makes no mention whatsoever of what Richelieu himself considered as his main innovation, which was, as Richelieu says, 'up to then completely neglected': namely the principle of 'continuous negotiation' (Richelieu, 1688/1961, p. 94). Continuous negotiation seeks sustained engagement with the Other even while at war, Richelieu insists, rejecting thus political denigration and demonization even under the most severe of circumstances.

By ignoring this aspect of Richelieu's work, Kissinger promotes an absolutist and apologist form of modern diplomacy. Narrating the story of diplomacy as a celebration of 'great men' (many of whom bear an uncanny resemblance to Kissinger), Kissinger further conflates diplomacy with foreign policy. Even though a rigid distinction between the two can indeed be unhelpful, failure to make basic distinctions between the formulation and implementation of policy can be especially problematic when seeking to practise sustainable diplomacy. Suffice to recall that *raison d'état* was at the time a novel principle of French foreign policy whereas *continuous negotiation* was a novel principle of diplomacy meant to counterbalance isolated policy making and excess.

The importance of continuous and persistent negotiation is underscored in the chapters by Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, taking issue with criticisms that over-eagerness to engage in dialogue and over-extension in negotiation entail high risks for the foreign policy of great powers. Sharp shows in Chapter 12 that 'the determination to talk and the disposition to appease' are diplomatic values that need to be rescued and reflected upon. With regard to the first, it opens the door to possibilities that 'cannot exist or develop without [official or unofficial] talks', which should not be necessarily policy-driven or content-saturated. With regard to the second, the disposition to appease, Sharp seeks to rehabilitate the concept of appeasement by suggesting, controversially but persuasively, that diplomats ought to be able to consider and deliberate the unthinkable, to scrutinize all possible options brought to the negotiating table including those that one side or the other publicly declare as an anathema. This should not be read as a foreign policy concession but as a technical exercise whereby diplomats demonstrate to their masters 'the existence of multiple possible outcomes and the way in which it is conceivable that life, and lives, could continue under them'. This is especially useful, if not essential, in order to 'break the banks of the

relatively few channels down which foreign policies seem to have to flow in crises, to reduce the pressure on political leaders to follow this flow, and to dilute the reservoirs of public support for the various claims made to the effect that there are no alternatives to whatever course of action is being presented as necessary and unavoidable'. As Wiseman further explains in Chapter 10, continuous dialogue is a basic norm of diplomatic culture (on the normative and instrumental use of diplomatic culture see Bull, 1997; Der Derian, 1996; Wiseman, 2005). Wiseman rightly suggests that the norm of continuous dialogue 'carries with it the idea of *not* isolating adversarial states, the underlying assumption being that new, revolutionary, enemy and/or recalcitrant states will over time accept prevailing norms and standards of appropriate behaviour – become "socialized" – through sustained diplomatic encounters with the society of sovereign states' (see also Armstrong, 1993).

From this perspective, diplomacy cannot and should not escape its socializing disposition. In fact, in the history of diplomatic thought there are discussions on whether states or other diplomatic actors do indeed have not only a right but a duty to diplomacy, i.e. an obligation to receive embassies, including their representations, and not to unreasonably deny them (Grotius, 1646/1926, pp. 440–1). The problem, however, has been that during the expansion of Western power and rule this duty of diplomacy has been extended to the right of Western states to impose 'communication' or particular forms of diplomacy upon others and to progressively and legally justify the use of force if that right was denied (see, for example, Moser and Moser, 1993, pp. 7–11, with reference to the Chinese empire, and Vitoria, 1532/1995, p. 153, with reference to Native Americans). It is crucial, therefore, not to turn this highly important socializing mission of diplomacy into a civilizing one.

Continuous negotiation offers a counterbalance to the potential abuses of *raison d'état* that could pursue a policy of demonizing the enemy and rendering him incommunicado. And here, contra Richelieu, we must note that *raison d'état* is liable to serious moral questioning. It inspires an exclusive vision of diplomacy as statecraft, that is as a self-effacing and other-effacing practice, often likened to a chessboard or poker game, whereby the calculation of state power and interest is predominant and the moves conducted by Great Leaders and Great Diplomats range from pragmatic to visionary (for this kind of diplomacy and a plethora of examples, see Kissinger, 1994; for a critique, see Der Derian, 1995). One does not have to agree with the counter-reformation moralizing that inspired the early criticisms of *raison d'état*, like Giovanni Botero's *Della Ragione di Stato* (On the Reason of State), to concur with

the suggestion that social justice is an important dimension that the reason-of-state understanding systematically defers.

Although reason of state still predominates in the writings of celebrated diplomatic theorists as well as in the hagiographies of national diplomatic practice (written by politicians, advisors and careerists), it is also increasingly and persuasively criticized by practitioners who see its negative effects on the ground (e.g. Kiesling, 2006; Ross, 2007). Highly complex problems are further complicated, as Roland Bleiker shows in Chapter 11, by 'a state-based understanding of diplomacy and an inside-outside conception of security'. What is urgently required to reverse this is recognition of the 'interconnectedness of security issues' combined with more emphasis 'on the transformative potential entailed in day-to-day diplomatic activities' (see further Bleiker, 2005).

Critiques have also been produced from within the diplomatic theory literature, and notably in the so-called English School (Neumann, 2003; Sharp, 2003), and especially in the works of Herbert Butterfield (1954) and Adam Watson (1982). The potential negative effects of *raison d'état* on diplomatic practice have been often counterbalanced by reference to the diplomat's ability to act also on the basis of a *raison de système*. This views the professionalization of diplomacy as bringing about not only a national and privileged elite in crude pursuit of national interest but a cosmopolitan agency with a distinctive *esprit de corps* that allows diplomats to act often in solidarity with their non-national colleagues and with the conscious intention of reconciling complex interests and preserving the peaceful order. From this angle, diplomacy's value as an interstate process is less in the servile following of instructions or unconditional securing of foreign policy objectives but rather in the securing and effective functioning of the diplomatic system, which has to include the recognition and accommodation of the vital interests and needs of others.

This is certainly more successful in certain cases than others, as Mai'a Cross shows in Chapter 9 on the conditions of sustainable diplomacy within the EU. A factor that contributes to this is 'prolonged dialogue in which EU diplomats operate on the basis of achieving consensus, instead of hard-bargaining to "win" material benefits for their capitals'. This in turn leads EU diplomats to 'not only persuade each other but to also convince their capitals to redefine their interests and pursue outcomes that are beneficial to all member states'. The level of sustainable diplomacy is therefore very high within the EU system, something that has changed the EU network of diplomats from bureaucratic committees to influential epistemic communities (Cross, 2007).

However, the promise of diplomacy will remain limited if sustainable diplomacy is seen as a modernist liberal institution that can be practised only in certain quarters, e.g. only within the EU. It breeds arrogance that this is where the ultimate diplomatic culture exists and needs to be emulated, exported and, in the end, perhaps imposed. John Gray's critique of liberal institutions is pertinent here; specifically their self-perception 'that they are nearly universally mandated as conditions of human well-being in the late modern period [something that] neglects the variety of institutions within which a *modus vivendi* can be achieved in our time, and unduly privileges variations of western models' (Gray, 1995, p. viii). In a similar manner, the variety of institutions within which sustainable diplomacy can be practised should not be neglected. Seeing human beings and their communities as practitioners of cultures rather than 'individual specimens of generic humanity' may be a better and more 'diplomatic' means to understand their diverse positions and values on specific issues. This can create recognition that achieving one's 'rightful' ends is not always tenable nor should it be the primary end of diplomacy. A more pragmatic and less violent approach is to build relationships, devise terms of co-existence, and establish a *modus vivendi*, literally a mode of living.

Of course, the *modus vivendi* restrictively perceived is itself an instrument of statecraft through which states agree to differ and so temporarily find agreement in disagreement. This can have diverse implications: it can certainly freeze discord and bring about a period of peace and security (which can be welcome). But note that it can also prolong and support an unfair status quo, for example, if the *modus vivendi* concerns human rights violations or environmental abuse (meaning, in effect, that the *modus vivendi* has the potential of institutionalizing oppression). If seen through the prism of sustainability, however, the *modus vivendi* follows on continuous negotiation to develop conditions for social and political accommodation among people holding not just opposite views but irreconcilable values. Sustained diplomatic conduct is indeed most useful where agreement is tentative or seems impossible at a comprehensive level (Jackson, 2000; Sharp, 2009).

In this respect, Hussein Banai is right to suggest in Chapter 2 that it is important for diplomacy to address the public imagination: that is, 'the representations of the past bearing upon present cultural and political attitudes'. He argues that

[m]erely to mediate between estranged publics who continue to insist on the absolute or universal validity of their own grand narratives,

identities, traditions, and uniqueness will not deliver them from estrangement. Instead, what diplomacy can and must do is to attempt to transform those aspects of public imagination that engender difference and lead to exclusion. It can achieve this by deterritorializing and decentering the discourses and disciplines that delimit and confine opposing views and imaginations.

This is not in order to reach a liberal consensus based on universal reason, but rather so as to 'enact pluralism, to continually articulate – not just mediate – reasons for the importance of maintaining a logic of cohabitation and critical dialogue'. What this underscores is the transformative potential of diplomacy, also taken up by Costas Constantinou in Chapter 3 of the book. By coining the term *homodiplomacy*, Constantinou explores a form of diplomacy that engages in heterology to revisit and rearticulate homology, 'whose mission is not only the knowledge and control of the Other but fundamentally the knowledge of the Self – and crucially this knowledge of the Self as a more reflective means of dealing with and transforming relations with Others'. This can be the result of an 'unofficial' experimental diplomacy of the everyday, but it is also something that has been occasionally institutionalized in Western and non-Western societies whereby spirituality has been positively employed to develop an ethic of encounter and durable relationship with Others.

Taken as a whole, this collection seeks to synchronize the study and practice of diplomacy with transformations taking place in international politics. Power is being reconfigured at an infrastructural level not yet fully comprehended. Networks are challenging and changing the nature of state power through new lattices of relatedness and responsiveness. To be sure, the US remains the dominant military and economic power; but post-9/11, post-Iraq, post-Great Recession, competing sources and mediations of power have emerged, constituting what we call the new *global heteropolarity*, in which a wide range of new actors are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. Varying in identity, interests and strength, ranging from fundamentalist terrorists to peace activists, new global actors now gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology rather than through the narrow stovepipe of territorially based sovereign governments. Enhanced by multiple platforms of networked media, non-state actors have become super-empowered 'diplomats' as well as militants. In this information-enriched environment, traditional forms of statecraft are transformed, and in some cases undermined, not just by infowar but

also by *infopeace*, through which information is produced by peaceful means for peaceful ends.

New proto-, anti- and para-diplomatic phenomena exceed even the catch-all phrase of ‘public diplomacy’. Indeed, as Anthony Deos and Geoffrey Pigman argue in Chapter 7, we need to widen our understanding of public diplomacy; a ‘sustainable public diplomacy’ requires genuine and ‘ongoing bi-directional communication of listening as well as speaking between a government and a foreign public’. This is in order not only to reconcile specific interests or discover common ones but also to allow a sustained communicative process to inform subjectivities and reconstruct identities on the ground.

By providing new global actors the means to traverse political, economic, religious and cultural boundaries, various networks – from cable news and political blogs to YouTube and Twitter – are changing not only how war is fought and peace is made, but are making it ever more critical to find new ways to mediate an extended spectrum of conflict and cooperation. By taking into account the heteropolar as well as multicultural nature of global politics, we hope this collection will help produce and extend global networks of knowledge and authority for a sustainable diplomacy.

## Notes

1. ‘The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009’, 9 October 2009, [http://nobelprize.org/cgi-bin/print?from=%2Fnobel\\_prizes%2Fpeace%2Flaureates%2F2009%2Fpress.html](http://nobelprize.org/cgi-bin/print?from=%2Fnobel_prizes%2Fpeace%2Flaureates%2F2009%2Fpress.html).
2. *Meet the Press*, Interview, 26 July 2009, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032608> and Clinton’s Council on Foreign Relations speech, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm>.
3. Guillelmus Durandus, *Speculum Legatorum*, extracts of which can be found in Vladimir E. Hrabar (ed.) *De Legatis and Legationibus Tractatus Varii* (Dorpati Livonorum: 1905) pp. 31–41.
4. See among others, Adjaye, 1984; Constantinou, 2004; Lloyd, 2000.

## References

- Adjaye, Joseph K. (1984) *Diplomacy and Diplomats in the 19th Century Asante* (Asmara: Africa World Press).
- Aldecoa, Francisco and Keating, Michael (eds) (1999) *Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments* (London: Frank Cass).
- Aristotle (trans. H. Rackham) (1934) *Nicomachean Ethics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Armstrong, J. D. (1993) *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

- Anderson, M. S. (1993) *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919* (London: Longman).
- Betsill, Michelle M. and Corell, Elizabeth (eds) (2008) *NGO Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
- Bleiker, Roland (2005) *Divided Korea: Towards a Culture of Reconciliation* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press).
- Bull, Hedley (1997) *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Butterfield, Herbert (1954) *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press).
- Constantinou, Costas M. (1996) *On the Way to Diplomacy* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press).
- Constantinou, Costas M. (2000) 'Diplomacy, Grotesque Realism and Ottoman Historiography', *Postcolonial Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 213–26.
- Constantinou, Costas M. (2004) *States of Political Discourse: Words, Regimes, Seditions* (London: Routledge).
- Cooper, Andrew F., Hocking, Brian and Maley, William (eds) (2008) *Global Governance and Diplomacy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Cross, Mai'a K. Davis (2007) *The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Der Derian, James (1987) *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Der Derian, James (1992) *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Der Derian, James (1995) 'Great Men, Monumental History, and Not-So-Grand Theory: A Meta-Review of Henry Kissinger's *Diplomacy*', *Mershon International Studies Review*, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 173–80.
- Der Derian, James (1996) 'Hedley Bull and the Idea of Diplomatic Culture', in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds), *International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Der Derian, James (2009) *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network* (New York: Routledge).
- Dow, Coral (2000) *Aboriginal Tent Embassy: Icon or Eyesore?* (Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library).
- Eban, Abba (1983) *The New Diplomacy* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).
- Garrison, Jim and Phipps, John-Francis (1989) *The New Diplomats: Citizens as Ambassadors for Peace* (Devon: Green Books).
- Gentili, Alberico (trans. E. H. Zeydel) (1594/1924) *De Legationibus* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Gray, John (1995) *Enlightenment's Wake* (London: Routledge).
- Grotius, Hugo (trans. F. W. Kelsey) (1646/1926) *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Gilbert, Felix (1951) 'The "New Diplomacy" of the Eighteenth Century', *World Politics*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1–38.
- Holzgreffe, J. L. (1989) 'The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 15, pp. 11–26.
- Hrabar, Vladimir E. (ed) (1905) *De Legatis and Legationibus Tractatus Varii* (Dorpati Livonorum).

- Jackson, Robert (2000) *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Jönsson, Christer and Hall, Martin (2005), *The Essence of Diplomacy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Kiesling, John Brady (2006) *Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books).
- Kissinger, Henry (1994) *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster).
- Latour, Bruno (2004) *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Lloyd, Lorna (2000) 'What's in a Name: The Curious Tale of the Office of High Commissioner', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 47–78.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (1522/2004), 'Advice to Raffaello Girolami', in Geoff Berridge (ed.), *Diplomatic Classics: Selected Texts from Commynes to Vattel* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 39–46.
- Melissen, Jan (2005), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Minear, Larry and Smith, Hazel (eds) (2007) *Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press).
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1985) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th edn, rev. K. W. Thompson (New York: Alfred Knopf).
- Moser, Michael J. and Moser, Yeone Wei-Chih (1993) *Foreigners Within the Gates: The Legations at Peking* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press).
- Nicolson, Harold (1954) *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (London: Cassell).
- Nicolson, Harold (1963) *Diplomacy* (London: Oxford University Press).
- Neumann, Iver B. (2003) 'The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled', *International Relations*, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 341–69.
- Neumann, Iver B. (2005) 'To Be a Diplomat', *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 6, pp. 72–93.
- Queller, Donald E. (1967) *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Richelieu, Armand (1688/1961) *Political Testament* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).
- Riordan, Shaun (2003) *The New Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Polity).
- Reus-Smit, Christian (1999) *The Moral Purpose of the State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Ross, Carne (2007) *Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
- Rossow, Robert (1962) 'The Professionalization of the New Diplomacy', *World Politics*, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 561–75.
- Sharp, Paul (1997) 'Who Needs Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic Representation', *International Journal*, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 609–34.
- Sharp, Paul (1999) 'For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations', *International Studies Review*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 33–57.
- Sharp, Paul (2003) 'Herbert Butterfield, the English School and the Civilizing Virtues of Diplomacy', *International Affairs*, no. 79, pp. 855–78.
- Sharp, Paul (2009) *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Sofer, Sasson (1988) 'Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 195–211.

- Viroli, Mauricio (1992) *From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Vitoria, Francisco, (trans. J. P. Bate) (1532/1995) *De Indis* (New York: William Hein).
- Watson, Adam (1982) *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States* (London: Methuen).
- Wellman, David (2004) *Sustainable Diplomacy: Ecology, Religion and Ethics in Muslim-Christian Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Wiseman, Geoffrey (2005) 'Pax Americana: Bumping into Diplomatic Culture', *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 409–30.

## Index

- Abou El Fadl, Khaled 43  
 absence, metaphysics of 124  
 accountability 31–2, 32  
 Aceh, Indonesia: human rights  
   abuses 185–6; humanitarian  
   pause, 2000 186; NGO activity in  
   185–7, 189; peacebuilding 174,  
   184–7; tsunami, 2004 186–7  
 active imagination 82  
 adversaries 41–2  
 advocacy campaigns 178  
 Afghan Development Association  
   (ADA) 182–3  
 Afghan Independent Human Rights  
   Commission 184  
 Afghanistan 163, 174, 175, 241; civil  
   war 179; drug production 179;  
   ethnic diversity 178; International  
   Security Assistance Force  
   (ISAF) 179; National Solidarity  
   Programme 184; NGO activity  
   180–4; Operation Enduring  
   Freedom (OEF) 179; *Peace Shura*  
   182; peacebuilding 173–4, 178–84;  
   regional power competition 179;  
   traditional councils 179–80; water  
   supplies 181; women in 180  
 Africa 109–25; Berlin conference,  
   1884 119–20; Christianity and  
   Africanness 115; civil wars in  
   175; colonization 10–1; the Dikko  
   Affair 120–2; diplomatic baggage  
   119–22; diplomatic space 112;  
   Eurocentrism 119; genocide against  
   the Herero 117; geopolitical  
   imaginary 119–20; Hegel on  
   117–8, 125; identity in 115–6, 119;  
   infantilization of Africans 117–8;  
   King's College, Budo 114; Lord's  
   Resistance Army 115–6; missionary  
   practices and 110–2, 113–6, 118;  
   multiple subjectivities 122; music  
   121; nation-statist story 119–20;  
   nativism 120–2; Otherness 110,  
   113–6; paradiplomacy in 95–6;  
   restoration of African conception  
   of Self 122–5; role of Eurocentrism  
   116–8; and the slave trade 112–3;  
   spread of Christianity in 113–5;  
   thingification of peoples 123;  
   Tswana community 111  
 African madness 116  
 Afro-pessimists 118  
 agonistic pluralism 90, 91  
 agricultural communities 32–3  
 Ahearn, Bertie 166  
 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 256, 264,  
   270, 271, 273  
 Ainslie, Sir Robert 137–8  
 Akhmadov, Ilyas 100  
 Al Qa'eda 152, 175  
 Albright, Madeleine 218, 251, 272  
 Algerian war of independence 56  
 alienation 60, 61, 68, 163  
 allies 41, 42–4  
*amān* 136–8  
 ambassadors 139; Bull on 55; EU  
   197–202; professional norms 198–9  
 Amhers, Lord 138  
 anarchy, cultures of 64  
 Anderson, Benedict 49–51, 64, 134,  
   137, 140  
 Anderson, Mary B. 177  
 Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985 165  
 Anglo-Irish relations 163–8, 169  
 Anholt, Simon 157, 158, 169  
 Annan Plan, the 188  
 anthropocentric thinking 41–2;  
   rejection of 31–2  
 anti-diplomatic tendencies 2  
 Apocrisiarus 135–6  
 appeasement 14–5, 227, 251,  
   266–70, 273  
 Argentina 96, 101  
 Aristotle 153  
 Armitage, Richard 272

- ASEAN 95  
 Ashman, Chuck 120–1  
 Augustine 130  
 Australia, aboriginal rights 11–2  
 autonomy 94  
 Aznar, José Maria 100
- Badie, Bertrand 91  
 Badiou, Alain 83  
 Bali 128–9  
 Banai, Hussein 17–8, 46–63  
 Baranyi, Stephen 177  
 bare life 91  
 bargaining 266  
 bargaining theory 194–5  
 baseline requirements 39  
 Basque autonomous parliament 100  
 Bátorá, J. 210  
 Benhabib, Seyla 64  
 Bentinck, Mark 201–2  
 Berlin conference, 1884 119–20  
 Berlin Wall, fall of 5  
 Berridge, Geoffrey 231  
 Bertrand du Rosier 134  
 Bible, the, creation stories 28–9  
 bioregions 32, 39, 40  
 Blair, Tony 112, 166  
 Bleiker, Roland 16, 235–52  
 Bloom, Allan 242  
 Bolewsky, Wilfried 93  
 Bolivia 263, 273  
 Bolshevik Revolution, 1917 213  
 Bolton, John 4, 224  
 Bond, James 250  
 borders 32, 41  
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 43–4  
 Botero, Giovanni 15  
 Bourdieu, Pierre 145  
 brand management 157–9  
 Brazil 101, 176  
 bridge building 25  
 Brown, Wendy 92  
 Bruton, John 165  
 Buenos Aires River 96  
 Bull, Hedley 54–6  
 Burke, Edmund 231  
 Burnett, Stanton 33  
 Burt, Richard 154, 155–6  
 Bush, George H. W. 217
- Bush, George W. 4, 151, 162, 213–4,  
 218, 219, 223–5, 228, 236, 238–9,  
 240–1, 251, 257, 267  
 Butler, Rohan 93–4  
 Butterfield, Herbert 16, 63, 69  
 Byzantine Diplomacy 125  
 Byzantium 136, 138
- Canada 95, 96, 155  
 Canada-US Pacific Salmon Treaty 96  
 capacity building 123  
 capitalism 90  
 Carr, E. H. 55  
 Carter, Jimmy 213, 217, 218, 229  
 Castro, Fidel 218  
 Catholic Church, the 78  
 Center for Strategic and International  
 Studies (CSIS) 154  
 centralization 89  
 Chamberlain, Neville 266–7  
 charity 69  
 Chavez, Hugo 229  
 Chechnya 98, 100  
 Cheney, Dick 223  
 child soldiers 175–6  
 children 173  
 China 138, 142, 237, 263; American  
 relations with 217, 219, 229;  
 paradigm in 95  
 Christ 80  
 Christendom 130–1, 134  
 Christian myths 128; and the  
 diplomatic corps 139–41; and  
 Eurocentrism 132–41; and the  
 immunity of envoys 133–5; and  
 permanent representation 135–8  
 Christian society 130  
 Christian subjectivities 113–5  
 Christian unity, myth of 132  
 Christianity: anthropocentric  
 thinking 41–2; creation stories  
 28–9; evangelical disposition  
 75–8  
 Churchill, Winston 263, 264  
 Cicero 73  
 circum-negotiations 265–6  
 civil society 169  
 civil society organizations  
 (CSOs) 152–3, 188

- civilians, protection of 175–6  
 civilizing processes 4  
*Claims of Culture, The* (Benhabib) 64  
 Clark, Ian 57  
 Classe, Father Leone 115  
 climate change 97  
 Clinton, Bill 217, 218, 238, 243, 251  
 Clinton, Hillary 4, 225, 226–7, 270–1  
 coexistence 2–3  
 Cohen, Roger 270  
 Cold War 229, 237  
 collective identity 92  
 collective imagination 49–51  
 Collier, Paul 175  
 Colombia 95, 176  
 colonial proselytizing 114  
 colonization 10–1, 114  
 Commission for Africa 112  
 common culture, EU 194  
 common good, the 71  
 common security 228  
 communication 152–4, 158–9, 166,  
 263–6; sustainable 159–63  
 communicative action 154, 159–63,  
 164, 166, 169  
 communities: agricultural 32–3;  
 building 32–3; local efficacy 38;  
 sustainable 31  
 community 49  
 community empowerment 123  
 community formation 27, 40  
 competitive identity 157–9, 160, 169  
 conflict: casualties 175; changing  
 nature of 173, 174–8; intrastate  
 174–5; NGO role 177–8; and  
 resource scarcity 30; transnational  
 175; urban 175–6  
 conflict management 184, 214  
 conflict resolution 25, 26, 28, 37,  
 39, 71, 165, 179–82  
 conflict studies 174  
 confrontational diplomacy 235–6,  
 239, 240–2, 251  
 Congo 56  
 Connolly, William 61, 91, 92  
 Constantinople, fall of, 1453 131  
 Constantinou, Costas M. 1–19,  
 67–83, 90–1, 94, 103, 104  
 constituent diplomacy 94  
 constructivist literature 195  
 continuous dialogue 215–6  
 continuous negotiation 14–6  
 Cook, Captain James 129–30  
 cooperation 40  
 Cooperation for Peace and Unity  
 (CPAU) 181  
 Cornago, Noé 12–3, 89–104  
 cosmopolitanism 2  
 Coveyduck, Graham 121  
 Cramer, Chris 177  
 creation stories 27–9, 34  
 critical responsiveness 61  
 Cross, Mai'a 16, 192–210  
 cross-border cooperation schemes 93  
 Cuba, American relations  
 with 218, 219  
 Cull, Nicholas J. 64  
 cultural convergence 195  
 cultural diplomacy 118, 123  
 cultural encounters 122  
 cultural setting 130  
 cultural translation 119–20  
 culture 52, 195  
 Cyprus 5, 67, 72, 188  
  
 Danzig 261  
 Darfur 177  
 Data Protection Policy 206–7  
*De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (Grotius) 10  
*De Legationibus* (Gentili) 10  
*De Otio (On Leisure)* (Seneca) 73–4  
 decolonizing diplomacies 122–5  
 decolonization 11, 144  
 Democratic Unionist Party 168  
 democratization 162  
 Deos, Anthony 19, 151–69  
 Department of Foreign Affairs  
 and International Trade Canada  
 (DFAIT) 155  
 Der Derian, James 1–19, 68, 94, 125,  
 130, 132, 135, 259  
 deterrence 241  
 dialogue 195  
*Die Another Day* (film) 250  
 difference, recognition of 161  
 Dikko Affair, the 120–2  
 diplomacy: American tradition  
 of non-engagement 216–20;

- Christocentric 69; classical era 4; confrontational 235–6, 239, 240–2, 251; definition 194–5, 214–5; domain of 46–8; emergence of European 130–1; engagement 236, 239–40, 242–6, 251–2; evangelical disposition 77; faith-based 70; and foreign policy 258; formalization 89–90, 130; great power 56–7; hierarchical 269; hierarchy of responses 220–1; internal EU 193; limits of 57–60; measuring success 62, 153–4; moral 69–70; multilateral 216; and negotiation 215; neo-conservative view of 224; origins 89, 130, 144; paradox of 48; pluralization 90–1, 102–3; public 58–9, 64, 81, 123, 125; with public imagination 60–2; reflexive 63; sovereign 47, 53, 54–7, 60; and spirituality 68–73; transformative role 61; in US-Iranian relations 258–62; without public imagination 53–7; world 70–1
- diplomatic, as euphemism for evasion 62
- diplomatic codes and protocols 55
- diplomatic compromise 203
- diplomatic conduct 5–6
- diplomatic corps,  
Eurocentrism 139–41
- Diplomatic Crime: Drugs, Killings, Thefts, Rapes Slavery and Other Outrageous Crimes* (Ashman and Tresscott 120–1
- diplomatic culture 55–6, 56, 103, 124, 128; EU 194–6, 204, 205, 209; hierarchy of responses 220–1, 228
- diplomatic experimentation 82–3
- diplomatic identity, bestowal of 8–9
- diplomatic imagination 110
- diplomatic intervention, causes of 47
- diplomatic law 90, 93
- diplomatic relations, violence of 123
- diplomatic reporting 221, 222, 230
- diplomatic representation, benefits and risks of 221–3
- diplomatic space 112, 257, 260–2, 268
- diplomatic system 8–13
- diplomatic theory, Eurocentrism 123
- diplomatic thinking 8, 260
- diplomatic understanding 8, 260, 262
- diplomatic values 262–3
- diplomats: EU 196–202, 208; and Eurocentrism 144; humanitarian 176–7; and public imagination 53; rationalist accounts of 194–5; reverse socialization 222; role 3, 62, 63; traditional view of 46–7; as a transnational profession 269; in US-Iranian relations 258–9, 260–1; virtuous 3
- disposability 2
- Do No Harm philosophy 181
- drugs and drug production 179
- Duchacek, Ivo D 94
- durability 2
- Durandus, Guilielmus 9
- Dutta-Bergman, Mohan J. 162–3
- duty of diplomacy 15
- Dwyer, Susan 248
- East Timor 56, 185, 186
- Eastern mysticism 71
- Ecological Footprint 36–8
- ecological histories 34
- ecological impact 36–8
- Ecological Location model 26–7
- Ecological Realism 25–45; and borders 32; and commerce 36–8; community building 32–3; interpretation 29–31; and power 29, 30, 31–2; and religion 26–9, 33–6, 41–2, 42–3; and Resilience Theory 35–6; and sovereignty 32–3; and Sustainable Diplomacy 38–45
- ecological sustainability 29, 41–2
- economic distortion 37
- economic stability 158
- education 42–4, 45
- Elster, John 230
- emancipatory discourse 75–8
- embassy, right of 10
- empathy 161
- enemies, engagement with 213, 215, 229–31

- engagement 123, 213, 215, 219, 223, 225, 227, 228–31
- engagement, zones of 62
- engagement diplomacy 236, 239–40, 242–6, 251–2
- English School, the 16
- environmental abuse 17
- envoys 129–30; immunity of 133–5
- Esack, Farid 43
- estrangement 104, 109–25, 125, 163; Christianity and Africanness 115; and Eurocentrism 116–8; mediation of 68, 160; missionary practices and 110–2, 113–6, 118; and the slave trade 112–3
- ethnicization 115
- ethno-nationalist conflict 99
- Eurocentrism 116–8, 119, 123, 128–44; and Christian myths 132–41; diplomatic corps 139–41; and diplomats 144; and the emergence of Europe 130–1, 132–3; European–Chinese relations 138; European–Ottoman relations 136–7; and hybridization 143; and the immunity of envoys 133–5; and narrative sociability 129–30, 136, 138, 139; and permanent representation 135–8; role of myth 128–30
- Europe: anchoring myths 141–2; emergence of 130–1, 132–3
- European Coal and Steel Community 193
- European identity 205
- European Union 16–7, 95, 101, 192–210, 267; ambassadorial expertise 193; ambassadors 197–202; bilateral embassies 196; citizens 204–5; civil servants 196–7; Civilian Committee on Crisis Management (CIVCOM) 201; Commission 196–7, 198; Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) 196, 197–202, 206; common culture 194; Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 197; consensus, 194; Council of the European Union 193, 196, 197, 199–200, 202–3; culture of compromise 199–200; dangers facing 193; diplomatic culture 194–6, 204, 205, 209; diplomatic networks 194; diplomats 208; enlargement 208–9; entrance exams 196; EU Military Committee (EUMC) 201; European Council 202–3; foreign policy 193, 209; inflexibility 193, 209; integration 209; internal diplomacy 193; Maastricht Treaty 210; policy consensus building 206–9; Political and Security Committee (PSC) 196, 200–2; political executives 202–4; positive image 192; presidency 204; professional diplomats 196–202; relationship with the US 206–8; security 206; Strategy on Radicalization and Recruitment (SRR) 206; subsidiarity 202; success 193–4; working groups 199–200
- European–African encounters: the Dikko Affair 120–2; missionary practices and 110–2, 113–6; and the slave trade 112–3
- European–Chinese relations 138
- European–Ottoman relations 136–8
- Evans, Alex 158–9
- evil 29–30
- exchange, unrecognised forms of 121
- experimentation 82–3
- Face to Face Interreligious Service 43–4
- faith traditions 40
- faith-based diplomacy 70
- federal countries 94
- Fela Kuti 121–2
- fisheries, salmon 96
- Fitzpatrick, Kathy 159–61
- food, sharing 143
- force, use of 2, 223
- foreign policy: American 213–31; the Bush legacy 223–5; communicating 152; definition 214; definitional issues 214–5; and diplomacy 258;

- and diplomatic representation 221–3; EU 193, 209; and ICTs 154–7; the Obama administration 226–8, 229; objectives 70; paradiplomacy 96–7; public dimension 156; and public diplomacy 159–61, 168–9; and soft power 59–60; and the war on terror 151–2
- foreignness 13
- forgiveness 69
- Foucault, Michel 58
- freedom 77
- French Revolution 6
- Freud, Sigmund 80, 82
- Futon, Barry 154, 155–6
- Geanakoplos, Deno John 136
- Geertz, Clifford 128, 128–9
- genocide 117
- Gentili, Alberico 10
- geopolitical imaginary, the 119–20, 124
- geopolitics 55
- gift exchange 143, 144
- Girolami, Raffaello 3
- global heteropolarity 18
- global survival 29
- global-interest diplomacy 3
- globalization 37, 45
- Gnostic discourse 78–82
- goals 7
- good 29–30
- Good Friday peace process 164, 169
- good message embassy, the 75–8
- Goodhan, Jonathan 177
- Grand Hotel, Brighton 165
- Gray, John 17
- Greece, ancient, *theoria* 68–9
- Green Belt Movement 42–3
- Gregg, Donald 247
- Grotius, Hugo 10
- group psychology 80
- Guillon, Edmund 58, 64
- Gutierrez, Gustavo 43
- Haas, Peter 198
- Habermas, J. 51, 52, 153–4, 159–63, 164, 166
- Hamilton, Keith 134
- Hankey, Lord 10
- hard power 160
- Hawai'i 129–30
- HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) 185
- Hegel, G. W. F. 117–8, 125
- Henrikson, Alan K. 93
- Henry Dunant Centre 185
- Hermes 79–80
- Hermetic tradition 79–80
- Himatic hypothesis, the 115
- history 46–7, 48, 49
- Hitler, Adolf 266–7
- Hocking, Brian 94, 155
- Homer 77
- homo-diplomacy 18, 67–83; aspects of 68; evangelical disposition 75–8; Gnostic discourse 78–82, 82; introspective negotiation 73–5, 82; and psychoanalysis 80; reverse accreditation 75–8, 82; and spirituality 68–73
- Honduras 263, 273
- hostage-taking 137–8
- human condition, the 57, 58, 63
- human rights 17, 52, 180, 185–6
- human security 176
- humanist spiritualities 71
- humanitarian diplomats 176–7
- humanitarian space 181
- hybridization 12, 143–4
- Ichkeriya 100
- identity 52; African 115–6, 119; building 222; collective 92; and communicative action 161; competitive 157–9, 160, 169; construction 154–7; Ecological Location model 27; European 205; national 35, 53, 169; sovereign 56; transformation 2
- ideology, and public imagination 48
- Igbal, Afzal 69–70
- Imagined Communities* (Anderson) 49–51
- IMF 101
- imperialism 4, 110, 124
- implementation, Sustainable Diplomacy 38–40

- inclusiveness 7  
 inconsistent relations 224–5  
 India 101, 142  
 indigeneity, politicization of 115–6  
 indigenous otherness 10–1  
 Indonesia, invasion of East Timor 56  
 infantilization 117–8, 125  
 influence 162; theory of 158–9  
 infopeace 19  
 information, dissemination of 155  
 information and communications technologies (ICTs) 152, 154–7, 168  
 information exchange 33  
 interconnectedness 168–9  
 International Atomic Energy Agency 238, 239, 267  
 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) 178  
 international law 10, 99, 102, 133;  
 immunity of envoys 133–5  
 international relations: moral dimension 29–30; realist 69; and religion 33–4  
 International Relations theory 58  
 international security 256  
 international trade, Ecological Footprint 36–8  
 internationalism, American 227, 231  
 Internet, the 155  
 introspective negotiation 73–5, 82  
 IRA 169; Good Friday peace process 163–8  
 Iran 50–1, 142–3, 163; diplomatic space in US-Iranian relations 260–2; nuclear energy programme 256–7, 259, 267, 271; talks with America 264–6; US-Iranian diplomacy 258–62; US-Iranian relations 219, 224, 226–7, 256–72, 264–6, 267–9, 270–2, 272, 273  
 Iraq 174, 175; insurgency 5; invasion of, 2003 56, 223; weapons of mass destruction 4  
 Irish Republic 164, 166–7  
 Islam 43; *amān* 136–8; anthropocentric thinking 41–2; creation stories 28–9; gnostic discourse 78–9; the greater jihad 70; moral diplomacy 69–70; the Umma 79; Wahabbi 43  
 Islamic Declaration of Human Rights 79  
 Israel 227, 256, 259, 273; invasion of Lebanon, 2006 8  
 Israeli-Palestinian conflict 5, 56  
*ius legationis*, the 8–9, 9, 10, 13  
  
 Jäärats, Klen 199–200  
 Japan 141  
 Jefferson, Thomas 216  
 Jenkins, Robert 101  
 Johnston, Douglas 33  
 Judaism 41–2  
 Jung, Carl G. 80–2  
  
 Kadirov, Ahmad 100  
 Kassim, Hussein 194  
 Kennan, George 221, 222, 230  
 Kenya 42–3  
 Khalizad, Zalmay 273  
 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali 273  
 Khatami, Mohammad 272  
 Kincaid, Johan 94  
 Kissinger, Henry 13–4, 53–4, 55  
 Kony, Joseph 115–6  
 Korean War 218, 237, 246, 248  
 kowtowing 138  
 Kratochwill, Friedrich 99  
 Kurdish Assembly in Exile 100  
  
 labour costs 37  
 Lacan, Jacques 49, 80  
 land: dependence on 35; God- language and 35; and religion 33–6  
 Langhorne, Richard 93, 134  
 Lateran Treaty 8  
 Latin America 95, 140–1  
 Latour, Bruno 3, 230  
 Law of Nations 10  
 League of Nations 6, 216  
 Lebanon, Israeli invasion of, 2006 8  
 Lecours, André 97  
 legitimacy 53–4, 55, 56, 60, 156  
 Leo the Great, Pope 135  
 Levant Company 137  
 Lewis, Bernard 136–7

- liberation theology 78  
 Libya 242; American relations  
     with 217–8, 219  
 lifeworlds 161, 162  
*localitis* 222  
 Lord's Resistance Army 115–6  
 Lucifer 80–1  
  
 Maastricht Treaty 1992 210  
 Maathai, Wangari 42–3  
 Macartney, George 138  
 McCain, John 225–6, 264  
 McCormack, Gavan 247  
 McDougall, Walter A. 216  
 Machiavelli, Niccolo 3, 14, 132  
 Major, John 165  
 Manning, C. A. W. 48, 51–2  
 Markovi, Ivo 43–4  
 Marx, Karl 78  
 mass media 81  
 Mattingly, Garrett 136  
 media, the 18–9  
 mediation 68, 160  
 medieval period 9, 92  
 Al-Megrahi, Abdel Basset 100  
 Melissen, Jan 159  
 memory 48  
 Menon, Anand 194  
 Mercurius 80–2  
 Merkel, Angela 204  
 Meyer, Christophe O. 202  
 military power 143, 241  
 Mine Ban Treaty 1997 178  
 Mitchell, George 166  
 modernity 124  
 modulated pluralism 97–102  
*modus vivendi* 17–8, 70  
 Moon Chung-in 243  
 moral diplomacy 69–70, 262  
 Moravcsik, Andrew 194–5  
 more diplomacy thesis 213–4  
 Morgenthau, Hans 4, 30  
 Moroccan–Spanish  
     relations 25–9, 70  
 Mottaki, Manouchehr 273  
 Müller, Harald 161  
 multilateral cooperation  
     schemes 94  
 multilateral diplomacy 216  
  
 multilateralism 101  
 multilayered diplomacy 94  
 multinational corporations  
     (MNCs) 32  
 multiple diplomatic self, the 230  
 Munich agreement 267, 273  
 mutual interest, and self-interest 29  
 Myanmar 176  
 myth: anchoring 141–3; role of  
     128–30, 138  
  
 Namibia 117  
 narrative sociability 129–30, 130,  
     136, 138, 139, 141  
 nation states: Anderson's  
     definition 49–51; Ecological  
     Footprint 36–7; Ecological  
     Location 27; formation of 53;  
     influence 38  
 national governments,  
     continuation of existing  
     paradigms 34–5  
 national identity 35, 53, 169  
 national interest 50–1, 54  
 national security 34  
 national unity 104  
 national-interest diplomacy 3  
 nationalism 44; as public  
     imagination 49–51  
 Native Americans 74–5  
 native peoples 10–2  
 NATO 101  
 natural capital 33  
 natural disasters 176–7, 186–7  
 negotiation 25; and diplomacy 215;  
     Good Friday peace process 163–8,  
     169; introspective 73–5, 82; Native  
     American tradition 74–5; Roman  
     concepts of 73–4; stoic 74; talk to  
     the enemy thesis 214  
 neo-conservatives 224, 228  
 networking 178  
 Neumann, Iver B. 12, 93, 103,  
     128–44  
*New Catholic Encyclopedia, The* 135–6  
 new diplomacy 5–7, 11, 102  
 Nicolaidis, Kalympo 194–5  
 Nicolson, Harold 5, 125, 194  
 Nigeria 96, 120–2

- Nincic, Miroslav 242
- 9/11 terrorist attacks 5, 59, 151, 264
- Nixon, Richard 213, 217
- Nobel Peace Prize 2009 1–2, 5
- non-engagement, American tradition of 216–20
- non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 13, 154; in Aceh 185–7, 189; in Afghanistan 180–4; funding 188; leave North Korea 240; role 177–8; role in peacebuilding 173–89; sustainability 189; vulnerability 188
- non-state actors 7, 152–3
- North, the: globalized market economy 37; and sustainability 33, 38
- North Korea: American relations with 218, 224, 229; confrontational diplomacy and 235–6, 239, 240–2, 251; diplomatic approaches 239–40; diplomatic challenge 235–7; engagement diplomacy and 236, 239–40, 242–6, 251–2; engagement with South Korea 236; famine 242–3; NGOs leave 240; nuclear weapons programme 235, 236, 237–9, 241–2, 247, 251; reconciliation with 249–50; reconciling historical differences 248–9; and South Korea's Sunshine Policy 243–6, 249–50, 251–2; threat perception 246–7; UN sanctions 241–2
- Northern Ireland 163–8, 169
- North–South split, Moroccan–Spanish relations 25–9
- Norwegian Church Aid 181
- Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 235, 237–8, 239, 267
- nuclear weapons 224, 226, 229, 235, 236, 237–9, 241–2, 247, 251, 268
- Nye, Joseph, Jr. 59–60, 152, 159–60
- Obama, Barack 1–2, 4, 5, 152, 214, 225–6, 226–8, 229, 235, 239, 243, 263, 267; Iranian policy 256–7, 270–1
- Odyssey* (Homer) 77
- old diplomacy 5–6, 125, 132–3
- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 179
- Opondo, Sam Okoth 10–1, 109–25
- Orientalism 125
- Ostpolitik 244
- Other, the 13, 18, 50, 67, 68, 69, 72, 77, 79, 80, 82, 162
- Otherness: Africa 110, 113–6; and diplomacy 122; and Eurocentrism 116–8; and race 118
- Ottoman Empire 136–8, 141, 144, 145
- Pacific Salmon Commission 96
- Pakistan 163, 175
- Palme Commission 228
- Panch Sila, the 142
- Papal nuncio, the 141
- paradiplomacy 12–3, 89–104; in Africa 95–6; in China 95; controversy 98; definition 93–4; domestic implications 103–4; dynamics 97–8; and ethno-nationalist conflict 99; in the European Union 95; fields of action 96–7; foreign policy 96–7; in Latin America 95; limits of 98, 99–102, 102–4; modulated pluralism 97–102; networks 94–5; normalization of 102; pluralism 90–1, 92, 102–3; practices of 92–7, 103; in Russia 95, 100; symbolic meaning 103
- partnership 159
- Passenger Named Record Agreement 206–7
- Paul, Saint 75–7, 83
- peace 174
- peacebuilding 13, 173–89; Aceh, Indonesia 174, 184–7; Afghanistan 173–4, 178–84; from below 181–3; and the changing nature of conflict 173, 174–8; NGO activity in Aceh 185–7, 189; NGO activity in Afghanistan 180–4; sustainable 188–9
- peace-making 2
- peace-preserving 2
- Pecquet, Antoine 139
- perforated sovereignties 91–2

- permanent representation 135–8  
 Perry, William 238  
 personhood 114  
*Philosophy of History* (Hegel) 117–8  
 Pigman, Geoffrey Allen 19, 151–69  
 Pius II, Pope 131  
 pluralism 90–1, 92, 102–3, 270;  
     modulated 97–102  
 pluralist order 61  
 plurinational states 104  
 Polish Corridor, the 261, 272  
 political executives, EU 202–4  
 Pollock, Kenneth 258  
 Pontanima 44  
 Pontremoli, Nicodema de 135  
 Posen, Barry 229  
 postcolonial diplomacy 12  
 postcolonial world 44–5  
 Postwar Reconstruction and  
     Development Unit (PRDU) 185–6  
 Potter, Evan 155  
 Pouliot, Vincent 195  
 poverty 42  
 Powell, Colin 4  
 power 18; ecological balance 29, 30,  
     31–2; hard 160; military 143, 241;  
     relations 98; soft 59–60, 152, 160,  
     168, 169; structures of 101  
 power politics 54, 98  
 precedence 140  
 professionalisation 16  
 psychoanalysis 80–2  
 public consequences, imagination  
     with 48  
 public diplomacy 19, 58–9, 64, 81,  
     123, 125; actors 152–3; American  
     222–3; bi-directional approach 162,  
     163; and brand management 157;  
     and communication 152–4, 158–9,  
     166; and communicative action  
     159–63, 164, 166, 169; competitive  
     identity and 157–9, 160; first use of  
     term 157; and foreign policy 156,  
     159–61, 168–9; goals 158–9; Good  
     Friday peace process 169; measuring  
     success 153–4; in Northern Ireland  
     163–8; sustainable 151–69  
 public diplomatic domain 112  
 public good 128  
 public imagination 46–63;  
     Anderson's formulation 49–51;  
     contingency 58; definition 48–53;  
     diplomacy with 60–2; diplomacy  
     without 53–7; and the diplomatic  
     domain 46–8; diversity 62–3;  
     flux 52–3; hybridization 56; and  
     ideology 48; Lacan's formulation 49;  
     nationalism as 49–51; normative  
     dictates 48; power of 63; and  
     religion 48; and sociological  
     imagination 51–2; and sovereign  
     imagination 47–8; and sovereign  
     imagination 57–60, 61; and  
     sovereign power 58  
 public opinion 156, 160, 162,  
     166, 203  
 public sphere, the 52  
  
 Qaddafi, Colonel Muammar 12,  
     217–8  
 Qur'an, the 79; creation stories 28–9  
 Qur'anic hermeneutics 43  
  
 racialization 115  
*raison d'état* 13–6  
 Rasmussen, Larry 32, 38  
 rationalism 194–5  
 raw materials, unequal  
     distribution 30  
 Rawls, J 61  
 Reagan, Ronald 242  
 Realism 29, 29–30, 31  
 reciprocity 134–5  
 reconciliation 2–3, 177, 249–50  
 Rees, William 36–7, 38  
 reflection 161  
 regime change 213  
 regional-interest diplomacy 3  
 relationships, sustainable 160  
 religion 39–40, 70; anthropocentric  
     thinking 41–2; creation stories  
     27–9, 34; and Ecological Realism  
     26–9, 33–6, 41–2, 42–3; and land  
     33–6; and public imagination 48  
 religious culture 28–9, 39  
 Renaissance, the 92, 132, 135, 139  
 representation 57, 61, 62, 63,  
     135–8, 264

- Republic of Cyprus 99–100  
 reputation, national 157–9  
 Resilience Theory 35–6  
 resource scarcity 30, 40  
 responsibility to protect 176  
 Reus-Smit, Christian 132–3  
 reverse accreditation 75–8, 82  
 reverse socialization 222  
 revolutions 144  
 Reynolds, Albert 165  
 Rice, Condoleezza 8, 217, 219, 223  
 Richelieu, Cardinal 13–4, 15  
 Ricoeur, Paul 248  
 Riordan, Shaun 156  
 Robison, Olin 154, 155–6  
 Romania 209  
 Romans 973–4  
 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 164  
 Russia, paradiplomacy in 95, 100  
 Rwanda 115
- Sahlins, Marshall 128, 129–30, 142  
 Said, Edward 63, 114  
 Sanayee Development Organisation 183  
 sanctions 221  
 Sanuto, Mario, the younger 135  
 Saraydarian, Torkom 70–1  
 Sartre, Jean Paul 123  
 Schmitt, Carl 52, 64  
 Schweisgut, Hans-Dietmar 201  
 Scipio Africanus, Publius 73  
 secrecy 269  
 security 16  
 Self, the 18, 50, 67, 68, 72, 162;  
   African 122–5; European 124  
 self-interest, and mutual interest 29  
 self-knowledge 2, 81  
 Seligman, John 115  
 Seneca 73–4  
 separateness, relations of 259–60  
 Sharp, Paul 14, 56–7, 103, 256–72  
 Sidy, Richard 70–1  
 Sinn Féin 165, 167–8  
 slaves and slavery 112–3  
 Slovenia 209  
 Smuts, Jan 117  
 social imaginary 49, 64  
 social justice 16  
 social pluralism 90–1  
 social relations 259–60  
 socialization, reverse 222  
 sociological imagination 51–2  
 soft power 59–60, 152, 160, 168, 169  
 Soldatos, Panayotis 94  
 Soone, Sander 201  
 South, the, and sustainability 33, 38  
 South Africa 224; apartheid 56;  
   paradiplomacy in 96; United  
   Democratic Front 43  
 South Korea 236, 238, 248–9; Sun-  
   shine Policy 243–6, 249–50, 251–2  
 sovereign diplomacy 47–8, 53,  
   54–7, 60  
 sovereign identity 56  
 sovereign imagination 50–1, 56; and  
   public diplomacy 59; and public  
   imagination 57–60, 61  
 sovereign interests, outlook 47  
 sovereign misrepresentation 60  
 sovereign power 54–5, 55, 58, 60,  
   61, 62  
 sovereign representation 54–5  
 sovereignty 8–9, 12, 54, 57, 60;  
   and Ecological Realism 32–3;  
   perforated 91–2  
 Soviet Union 237; American  
   relations with 217, 219, 221, 222;  
   Bolshevik Revolution, 1917 213  
 Spain: Basque autonomous  
   parliament 100; Moroccan–Spanish  
   relations 25–9, 70  
 Speke, Hohn Hanning 115  
 Spencer, David 26–7, 34  
 spirituality 67–83; and diplomacy  
   68–73  
 stability 53–4, 56  
 statehood, sovereign 8–9  
 states within states 99  
 status acknowledgement 143  
 status rivalry 139–40  
 Stevens, David 158–9  
 Store, Jan 199  
 Strand, Arne 13, 173–89  
 stranger within, the 81–2  
 strategic action 161, 162  
 subaltern classes, voicelessness 124–5  
 subnational government 91, 93,  
   96–7, 100–2

- subsidiarity 37, 202  
 Sudan 177, 242  
 sufficiency 38  
*Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad* (Bolton) 224  
 sustainability 2–3, 7–8, 30–1, 33, 37, 38, 45, 153  
 Sustainable Diplomacy, definition 38–9  
 sustainable diplomats 41  
  
 Taliban, the 175, 179, 183  
 talk, determination to 263–6  
 Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, Prince of Benevento 3  
 Tatarstan 98  
 Taylor, Charles 49  
 terrorists and terrorism 18, 153, 162; 9/11 terrorist attacks 5, 59, 151, 264  
 Thailand 141  
 Thatcher, Margaret 165  
*theoria* 68–9  
 Thorne, Susan 112–3  
 transparency 223  
 Tresscott, Pamela 121  
 Trotha, Lothar von 117–8  
 Trotsky, Leon 231  
 Turkey 99–100, 209  
 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 99–100  
 twenty-first century, diplomacy in 3–8  
  
 Uganda 115–6  
 UN Habitat 182  
 unconscious, the 81–2  
 United Democratic Front, South Africa 43  
 United Kingdom: Foreign Office 112, 113; Good Friday peace process 163–8, 169; release of Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi 100  
 United Nations 6, 101, 174, 220, 222  
 United Nations Security Council 174, 235, 241–2, 267; Resolution 1674 176  
 United States Information Agency (USIA) 157  
  
 United States of America: the Bush legacy 223–5; Council on Foreign Relations 226; and diplomatic representation 221–3; diplomatic space in US-Iranian relations 260–2; diplomatic tradition 213, 225, 228; dominance 18; engage-the-enemy school 227; EU relationship with 206–8; exceptionalist self image 216; foreign policy 151–2, 213–31; foreign policy definitional issues 214–5; foreign policy establishment 56; gifts to Ottoman Empire 144; hierarchy of responses 220–1; internationalism 227, 231; invasion of Iraq 56; more diplomacy thesis 213–4; *National Security Strategy* 240–1; Native American negotiation tradition 74–5; 9/11 terrorist attacks 5, 59, 151, 264; non-engagement tradition 216–20; and North Korea 235, 236, 238–9, 240–2, 243, 246, 247, 251; nuclear monopoly in Persian Gulf 268; *Nuclear Posture Review* 240; nuclear weapons 247; the Obama administration 226–8, 229; Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). 179; paradiplomacy 95; presidential election, 2008 225–6; problem of inconsistent relations 224–5; public diplomacy 162–3, 222–3; relations with China 217, 219, 229; relations with Cuba 218, 219; relations with Libya 217–8, 219; relations with North Korea 218, 224, 229; relations with the Soviet Union 217, 219, 221, 222; relations with Vietnam 217, 219, 229; and the release of Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi 100; squandered opportunities 220; talk to the enemy thesis 214; talks with Iran 264–6; Trading with the Enemy Act, 1917 218; US-Iranian diplomacy 258–62; US-Iranian relations 219, 224, 226–7, 256–72, 264–6, 267–9, 270–2, 272, 273; Vietnam War 56; war on terror 151–2

- universalism 76
- untrustworthiness 79–80
- urban violence 175–6
- Uruguay 96
  
- values: thick 52; thin 51–2
- Venezuela 95, 263, 273
- Vienna, Congress of 1815 139
- Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) 46–7, 120, 133
- Vietnam, American relations
  - with 217, 219, 229
- Vietnam War 56
- virtue and virtuosity 3
- Voegelin, Eric 145
  
- Wackernagel, Mathis 36–7, 38
- Wahabbism 43
- Walker, Brian 35–6
- Walker, Rob 58
- war: and continuous dialogue
  - 215–6; declaration of 216
- war on terror 2, 5, 151–2, 162
- water supplies, Afghanistan 181
- Watson, Adam 16
- Watson, Andrew 195
  
- weapons of mass destruction 229
- Weiler, Quentin 201
- Wellman, David 7, 25–45, 70, 91, 257, 262–3
- West, the 122; hegemony 128;
  - power politics 54
- Western diplomacy 6–7
- Westphalia, Treaty of 6, 9–10, 92
- Wight, Martin 53
- Wilberforce, William 112
- Wilson, Woodrow 216
- Wiseman, Geoffrey 14–5, 213–31, 263
- Wolff, Steffen 99
- women: in Afghanistan 180; Green Belt Movement 42–3; violence against 173
- World Bank 101
- world diplomacy 70–1
- World Economic Forum, Davos 273
- World War I 4, 6
- World War II 266–7
- Wright Mills, C. 51
  
- Yurdusev, Esin 138
  
- Zimbabwe 177