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The Long Mile of Empire: Power, Legitimation and the UK Bases in Cyprus

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ABSTRACT This article examines the continuities and discontinuities of imperial rule in Cyprus. It specifically investigates how the UK military base regime in the island has been negotiated in its local and regional contexts, including the recent accession of Cyprus into the European Union (EU) from whose territory the bases have been excluded. The study outlines the legal and political discourses and aesthetic practices surrounding the bases, and attempts to uncover their symbolic contradictions, paradoxes and implications. To this extent it underscores the tensions faced by competing discourses and practices of post-colonial emancipation, of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as of regional integration and global governance. It also underlines the diffusion of colonial power that occurred after independence and the limits this has placed on both British and Cypriot claims to sovereignty.

The Hundredth Mile

Post-colonial emancipation in Cyprus has been a pyrrhic experience. Dressed up as the culmination of heroic power struggles, it was little more than a sham, typifying the emerging pathologies that have afflicted local politics ever since. The story of the UK bases in Cyprus provides one such case of post-colonial empowerment while also disempowering, of spinning victory out of a defeat. It started with the consent in principle that the colonial power could keep “Sovereign Bases” in the island after independence, followed by hard bargaining on the part of local (mainly Greek-Cypriot) elites to limit their size. In particular, Archbishop Makarios, the Greek-Cypriot President-elect, resisted first the 140, then the 120 square miles, deemed necessary by the British government for the effective operation of the bases, proposing 30 or 40 square miles at most. There was little debate on what the
effective operation of the bases meant, whether this had local governance implications or aimed at Britain’s diminishing regional interests. Yet serious disagreements over the size of the bases postponed three times the date of independence in 1960, a source of embarrassment for all parties involved. In the end, the British government gave signs that it was willing to accept the compromise proposal of Dr Kucuk, the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President-elect, of 100 square miles. Makarios relented, but given the local pressure from both the Right and the Left,¹ which elevated the bases issue to yet another betrayal of the anti-colonial struggle, he pressed for a symbolic reduction to a less-than-a-hundred digit, eventually succeeding. This was how (Greek) Cypriots experienced an aesthetic of victory and the post-colonial state of affairs “credibly” registered. This was also why the UK retained sovereignty over only 99 square miles of the island.²

In the political history of Cyprus, that one square mile goes far. It has become emblematic of the post-colonial public transcript, but also symptomatic of a new state of empire. As an emblem it simulated the assertion of local “sovereignty” and “independence” against the excessive demands of the former colonial power. As a symptom, it referred back to the imperial state of affairs, which mutated into a consensual political arrangement: the empire now colluding with select local rulers to camouflage its presence, to disguise its continuation, but also to disguise its weakening state. The Treaty of Establishment (TOE) provisions concerning the status of the bases in Cyprus expose one important facet of post-colonial power relations. As will be shown in the following section, the strategic privileges and facilities of Britain almost remained intact, but disguised – in 100th mile style – through legal language and euphemisms. However, the juridical framing of Cyprus’ limited sovereignty and independence also boosted the narrative of British strategic reach, which was increasingly becoming non-credible in its regional and global contexts and claims. Simulation thus operated on two fronts: on the Cyprus front, the faking of sovereign independence; on the UK front, the faking of Britannia’s rule and global relevance.

Still, there are other dimensions to the story of the UK bases in Cyprus. It would be wrong to view them simply as the result of an imperial and local elite scheme, or rather, as a framework that did not address local security concerns and psychological “needs”. Part of the imperial rationale was to frame the Sovereign Base Area as a “safe haven” in the region from which order could be maintained, and that order and British interests globally projected. Perhaps it was so as to fulfil this special role that the bases required such a strong legal basis. Ironically, the bases eventually became a safe haven for Cyprus’ ethnic groups, fleeing inter-ethnic violence in 1963–64 and 1974. Furthermore, the bases provided the human and logistical backbone of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), at the express invitation of the Cyprus government. Indeed the bases played a role in the simulation and accrual of recognition, which was so crucial to Makarios’ government and its claim to represent the Republic of Cyprus in 1964 and 1974. With the rights that Britain received through the establishment of the bases there also arose responsibilities, of which the security “guarantor” was of particular importance. In many ways, a classic pattern was repeated in the Cypriot experience of decolonization, and then recolonization in multiple ways – through the presence of British bases and a broad swathe of British
legal prerogatives and soon after through the arrival of Greek and Turkish troops – infiltrating domestic decision-making processes and providing additional security “guarantees”. Thus, the geography and symbolic presence of the bases proved to be an important factor of the island’s status quo after 1974 (not least in that it was mirrored in the Turkish military’s use of sizeable parts of northern Cyprus).

In this regard, it is also necessary to consider the traditional and conservative defence of colonialism that it was a product of its time, that colonizers used the discourse of development, government and security, not merely in terms of their own interests, but paternalistically and even idealistically for the patronage and benefit of natives. These discourses were of course often based on totalizing, western, developmental and progressive norms that claimed to be universal. Thus the base regime can be criticized from two angles: first, as an expression of out-and-out imperialism, and, second, as an anachronism, exacerbated by the politics of the island itself, the region, and the Cold War. The rhetorical and aesthetic construction of the UK bases as a safe haven, has been supported not only by British strategic interests but also by Cypriot cross-ethnic interests and practices, which despite occasional protestations about certain activities there (for example, the storage of nuclear weapons or the health hazards of gigantic military antennae), have effectively reproduced the bases as a soft imperial or singular political space.

This is, as argued in this article, partly the reason why despite the accession of Cyprus into the EU, there has been almost no local pressure for the British Sovereign Bases to be treated as EU territory. On the whole, ordinary Cypriots reasonably assumed that the bases would become EU territory given that the UK is a EU member, until the Greek-Cypriot government simulated another victory and gained another symbolic mile. Namely, it announced that it had successfully negotiated a deal under which Cypriots living and working in territory of the bases would not lose out on EU benefits, despite the fact that this territory will not be EU territory. Accustomed to approach the Cyprus problem as just an inter-ethnic or Greek–Turkish problem, and incessantly focusing on how the EU dimension could resolve or exacerbate it, this other division of Cyprus through an international/EU border (over and above the de facto division of the United Nations (UN) buffer zone) was downgraded and rendered invisible. To be sure, beyond treaty obligations, there were realpolitik considerations why the Greek-Cypriot government has not pressed this issue or mobilized the population. How far this “soft imperial” problem might be renegotiated from within EU space in the more distant future, will be interesting to see. Yet, the issue of the bases also points to the wider and topical problematic of the changing codes and narratives of empire, both in Europe and around the globe. To this extent, propositions about the late modern workings of imperial sovereignty are quite pertinent; specifically, the increasing “non-place” of empire, progressively blurring distinctions between inside and outside, and supported by a notion of “omni-crisis” (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 183–204).

The diffusion of imperial power is certainly more complex than local nationalists and unitary state analysts would have us believe. The Cypriot experience of decolonization raises the question of how far-reaching decolonization has really been, but also whether decolonization was ever possible under modern global order power, legitimation and the UK Bases in Cyprus
conditions. Interestingly, it also raises the question of how much ex-colonial powers were, and are, actually able to realize post-colonial control and interests, and even – if they so desire – fully disengage from their colonial construction of local and regional order. The continuing presence of the bases seems to show that important aspects of Cyprus’ governance and foreign relations are overshadowed; yet they also indicate how Britain has been unable to fully exploit the bases in ways one would expect of an imperial power in a volatile region. Similarly, with the Republic of Cyprus’ sovereignty and with Britain’s claim that its bases in Cyprus are also sovereign all is not as it seems. In practice, both claims to sovereignty seem curtailed or limited in ways not immediately obvious. This is why this article attempts to expose and assess the workings of post-colonial power relations and the paradoxical effects official and non-official discourses have on the ground. In the next section, these issues are examined in the context of the legal regimes inherited in the treaties associated with the island’s independence and establishment of the bases. This is followed by an assessment of the security discourses, functional and aesthetic rationales disseminated by British practice concerning the bases in Cyprus. The final section reflects more generally on the practice of “the long mile of empire” and its more recent application within the context of the EU, as well as the UN Annan Plan for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, where the 100th mile – quite amazingly – shifts to the seas.

Re-contracting Empire

The anomalous existence of the UK bases in Cyprus is a legacy of British colonial rule over the island, a compromise over the stated British intention to keep Cyprus as a colony and its practical inability to retain local consent and enforce this objective militarily (Macmillan, 1971: 689). Interestingly, early on British imperial thinking absolved itself of ethical responsibilities: “The real adversary standing in the way of enosis [union with Greece] was not imperial Britain but the geopolitical realities of the island’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean.” (Reddaway, 1986: 14, 78). This type of thinking meant that geopolitics could and would be deployed to cover up Britain’s continuing colonial possession of Cyprus until the outbreak of the anti-colonial struggle in the mid-1950s. Geopolitical “realities” help explain both British intransigence over the transfer of Cyprus, illustrated by the infamous Hopkinson statement in July 1954 that Cyprus “can never expect to be fully independent”, and the continued British policy to retain military presence through sovereign bases on the island after independence (Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 1954). Yet, it should be noted that such grand geopolitical vision was also representative of an unwillingness to accept the declining nature of British global influence, and the loss of Egypt as a base in 1956.

While preserving its perceived imperial role, British diplomacy perfected the art of the annex in the case of Cyprus. The crucial and detailed provisions re-contracting empire – and significantly provisions over and above the exercise of sovereignty in the 99 square miles of the bases – have not been included in the main text of the Treaty of Establishment but skilfully moved to the long annexes to it.
Whereas the treaty covers three pages in the standard reprint of the Republic of Cyprus’ Printing Office, its annexes cover 70 pages. The annexes are drafted in technical language, and rarely examined but for the expert civil servant and lawyer. The legal status of the annexes is however secured in Article 11 of the Treaty of Establishment which provides that: “The Annexes to this Treaty shall have force and effect as integral parts of the Treaty.” Specifically, the annexes painstakingly articulate, on the one hand, other areas that Britain acquired in addition to the sovereign bases (these other areas are formally known as “Retained Sites and Installations”) and, on the other hand, British discretionary rights granted for the effective operation of the bases, and which allow the base authorities to take full control or intervene in the administration of crucial facilities and services, normally to be provided by the Republic of Cyprus. It should be noted, however, that successive British governments have been careful not to exercise casually these discretionary rights and consequently their “value” or “threat” lies more in their potential use in times of crisis, as sovereignly defined by the UK.

With respect to those 99 square miles, the UK acquired, or rather did not transfer sovereignty over two areas: the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area. Annex A gives details of the boundaries of the two base areas, exemplified through maps and air photographs. It further explains that the Republic shall not claim any territorial sea adjacent to this land, though it remains an open dispute whether this entitles the bases to claim their own territorial sea or exercise sovereign rights over the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of their coastal area (more on this in the last section). It further provides that the Dhekelia Power Station, though in Republic of Cyprus territory, may come under British control if there is deficiency of supply and so long as that deficiency continues. Following protestations from the residents of two villages, Ormidhia and Xylotymbou, that their villages were to become enclaves within the Dhekelia Base Area, special provisions were agreed in an exchange of notes between the UK and Cyprus representatives. In practice, the freedom of access and communication of the villagers was recognized, including the “free movement of vehicles, animals, produce and other property”. But “if, in exceptional circumstances” that freedom was to be restricted or controlled by the base authorities, it would be a “temporary” measure, “exercised in such a way as to avoid any unnecessary or unreasonable hardship or inconvenience”. (see Appendix G, “Access to Ormidhia, Xylotymbou and Dhekelia Power Station”, 1960). On the whole, the base authorities have been very careful to respect these freedoms, and have actually created a base within a base so as to address the standard operational security concerns within that space. Local grievances, nowadays, concern other issues such as the freedom to develop land or hunt particular species of birds.

With respect to the rights given for the effective operation of the bases, Article 2 of the Treaty of Establishment specifies that:

1. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord to the United Kingdom the rights set forth in Annex B to this Treaty.
2. The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the security and effective operation of the military bases.
situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign
Base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights
conferred by this Treaty (authors’ italics).

It is important to note first that the rights provided in Annex B are not
reciprocated, that is, the Republic of Cyprus does not have such rights over the two
Sovereign Base Areas. These rights confer to Britain discretionary sovereign powers
over the whole island without conferring upon Britain the full burden of
responsibility associated with the exercise of sovereignty. Note, for example, that
Article 5 of the Treaty of Establishment, which states that the Republic of Cyprus
“shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction” the rights and freedoms of the
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), deliberately not mentioning the
Sovereign Bases as having such responsibility. In fact, the UK negotiated a special
opt-out from the ECHR and has not been liable to the European Court of Human
Rights for acts committed within the Sovereign Base Areas. It has only recently and
reluctantly accepted the authority of the ECHR, specifically as of 1 May 2004 and
following Cyprus’ accession to the EU.8

One of the qualifications of these rights was a system of “financial assistance”
which was established in order for the UK to pay an annual sum to the Cyprus
government for the use of the bases; though not phrased in terms of rent in the
relevant exchange of notes, so as not to undermine the British claims to sovereignty
(Appendix R, “Financial Assistance to the Republic of Cyprus”, 1960). This sum has
not been paid by the UK since 1963 on the grounds that it was not clear where the
money should be paid since the constitutional arrangements of the Republic of
Cyprus had been upset. Indeed, Makarios’ government had acquiesced in this lapse
for these very reasons. Recently, there has been a discussion of using the funds owed
in the reconstruction of the north after a solution, including the revised annual sum
that had to be agreed as far back as 1965 (Cyprus Mail, 26 February 2004).

With respect to the infamous Annex B, note that it provides for the right to
exercise certain administrative functions and use of Cypriot territory, beyond the
“publicly agreed” sovereignty of the 99 square miles retained by Britain. To that
extent, the so-called “British Retained Sites and Installations” constitute a peculiar
legal regime. They are formally under Republic of Cyprus sovereignty, but the
exercise of that sovereignty has been permanently suspended.9 In practice, these
retained sites are treated like embassy premises within which the authorities of the
Republic could not enter without the explicit consent of the base authorities, with the
crucial difference that in the case of embassies the suspension of sovereignty is
based on the idea of reciprocation which makes the presence of embassies
conditional on the receiving state’s continuing consent. Ironically, though not
surprisingly, these sites and installations are roughly the areas the British
government originally asked to be included as part of the Sovereign Base Areas.10

Beyond “the right to continue to use, without restriction or interference” the
retained sites located in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, the UK also reserved
“the right” – as actually agreed and enshrined in the annex – “to obtain, after
consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the use of such
additional small Sites as the United Kingdom may, from time to time, consider technically necessary for the efficient use of its base areas and installations in the Island of Cyprus” (TOE, Annex B, Part II, 1960: Sections 1.1–3). “After consultation” is a very interesting legal phrase. It certainly cannot stop Britain from acquiring as many additional “sites” in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus as it likes. At most it limits Britain’s right to arbitrarily acquire such sites, that is, without going through the motions of “consulting” the Cypriot government. But, crucially, it does not require the Cypriot government’s consent to do so.11

What the crux of the matter is here are the rights the UK acquired, quite beyond the bases, quite beyond the retained sites and installations, but actually almost anywhere and everywhere in Cyprus, in time of peace, and in addition special rights, in time of war. Sometimes “consultation with the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus” is required to operationalize such rights. At other times, some “notification” of the authorities is enough for their exercise. At other times, the provisions simply state that the UK authorities “shall have the right to”, that is without consultation or notification.

The following should be considered. Without consultation or notification, the UK authorities can use roads, ports and other facilities freely for the movement of troops to and from the UK, the bases, the sites, the installations and the British training areas in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus (TOE, Annex B, Part II, 1960: Section 4.1). Without consultation or notification, the UK can fly military aircraft in the airspace of the Republic, having no restriction other than due regard of air traffic and Cypriot life and property (TOE, Annex B, Part II, 1960: Section 4.2). After consultation, the UK authorities have the right to install, maintain or dismantle lights and other aids to navigation in the territory of the Republic (TOE, Annex B, Part II, 1960: Section 4.3). “In consultation with, or in cases of urgency on notification to, the authorities of the Republic”, the UK can take control of Cypriot ports if they were to become inadequate to meet the needs of the bases or authorized service organizations (TOE, Annex B, Part II, 1960: Section 5.2). After consultation, the UK authorities can make surveys “of any kind in any part of the Republic” for the purpose of operations (TOE, Annex B, Part II, 1960: Section 8.1). There should be “no restriction on activities in the Republic of Cyprus” by the UK authorities “designed to promote the welfare of UK personnel…” (TOE, Annex B, Part II, 1960: Section 8.9). The UK authorities have “the right from time to time to engage in training within the territory of the Republic” and for such purpose six localities have been marked, some of which, like Akamas, environmentally protected areas only recently relinquished after local protests (see TOE, Annex B, Part IV, 1960).12

Special care was taken to acquire rights on the use of airfields, given the strategic vision of Cyprus as “the unsinkable submarine” of the eastern Mediterranean. The area of the Nicosia airport is therefore currently a site of conflicting jurisdictions. The Treaty of Establishment, Annex B, Part V, designates one area to be under Cypriot jurisdiction, another under British control (that is, a retained site) and part of it a “Joint User Area”. After 1974 the Cypriot area became a buffer zone under UN jurisdiction, though not the British site which retained its rights and made a profit by renting its installations to UNFICYP. The UK agreed to “give sympathetic
consideration” to requests of the Republic to acquire parts of this Site for extension of the airport, in exchange for “equally suitable” land elsewhere (TOE, Annex B, Part V, 1960: Section 2.3). Crucially, the Nicosia airport can come under the “exclusive control” of the UK “in emergency as may be determined by the United Kingdom” (TOE, Annex B, Part V, 1960: Section 7). Though the opposite does not apply for the Republic of Cyprus, that is, it cannot take “exclusive control” of its airport in times of emergency.13 Just before the Gulf War in January 1991, the British authorities resurfaced the runway of the disused Nicosia airport for emergency landings. The UK also has the right to use the Tymbou airfield, currently under Turkish-Cypriot control, though in this case “subject to the consent” of the Republic of Cyprus (TOE, Annex B, Part B, 1960: Section 8). To reiterate, these rights to use airfields, are in addition to the airfields UK has within the Sovereign Base Areas of Dhekelia and Akrotiri.

Finally, the most telling illustration of the very long mile of empire is the following amazing provision:

The Government of the United Kingdom shall have the right to obtain, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the use of such additional rights as the United Kingdom may, from time to time, consider technically necessary for the efficient uses of its Sovereign Base Areas and installations in the Island of Cyprus (TOE, Annex B, Part II, 1960: Section 9.1).

The right to more rights! The UK can acquire further rights, as it deems necessary in the future, “after consultation” of course. There is a paternalistic limitation linked to this: “The United Kingdom authorities shall, in the exercise of their rights in accordance with this Annex, at all times have due regard for the interests of the Republic of Cyprus and of its citizens, including in particular the normal rights of private property . . .” (TOE, Annex B, Part II, 1960: Section 9.2). The point here, of course, is that it is the UK government that determines what constitutes Cypriot “interests” and “due regard”; that is, still in overpowering colonial fashion. In short, having a right to more rights is what practically turns the long mile of empire into an infinite mile, if necessary.

It would be interesting to see what would happen if there was an attempt to exercise this right to more rights – which has, to the authors’ knowledge, never actually occurred. It would certainly be seen as somewhat crass under everyday circumstances, but what about in a situation of urgency where the bases formed the forward position of a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement action in the region? Would the Greek-Cypriot regime, or the Turkish-Cypriot one, or a United Cyprus Republic, see any benefit in reopening the colonial debate or would they acquiesce in the face of broader interests, from which they would hope to make some gain? The broader point here, however, is symbolic and aesthetic: the bases represented the power and reach of Britain, on local and regional display, and this persisted even though the bases increasingly became of less importance to Britain strategically, though of course they did play a role in, say, the first Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq, and indirectly in UNFICYP.
The Base as a Safe Haven

The right to more rights is not such an unusual trope in international relations as it might seem, even in the context of the imperial relics of military bases. The British bases in Cyprus seem to presage the development of the concept of safe havens, and especially given their crucial contributions to the UN in the crises of 1963–64 and 1974, among others, underline how they have been used later in a wider context. Indeed much of the practice of peacekeeping in general has emerged specifically from British colonial “peacekeeping” practices (Schmidl, 2000: 7–9) which were essentially of a policing nature, and became a way of sustaining or dismantling imperialism; thus it would come as no surprise if a similar analogy could be drawn between the British bases and the later uses of safe areas and safe havens. If one looks carefully at the relationship which emerges between the bases and the UNFICYP one can see echoes of what Paris has argued is a new mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission) (Paris, 2002). Ultimately the point is that bases and safe havens operate by creating an easily protected (extra) territorial zone in which the owner’s socio-political experience can be replicated and propagated into neighbouring zones of instability.

Safe havens are now normally negotiated with local disputants in conflicts, endorsed by a Security Council resolution, and operate on the expectation that they will act as oases of security in a war zone, which will eventually spread to encompass a settlement in a post-conflict environment (Debrix, 1999: 159–69). Thus, safe havens imply the right to have more rights by those actors that establish them. More recently, of course, this discretionary right has been articulated in terms of humanitarianism, rather than imperialism or national security. Yet, some commentators have argued that humanitarianism is simply an extension of imperialism in a weaker guise (Duffield, 2001; Ignatieff, 2003: 22–3). The notion of a safe haven has regularly come into prominence (mainly for negative reasons) in the last decade, given its application in particular in the first Gulf War to protect Kurds fleeing Saddam Hussein’s army in northern Iraq, and later in Bosnia, as zones protected by the UN in which local inhabitants would be safe from conflict.

Similar concepts were also used in Rwanda and Liberia. As Debrix points out, this was nothing more than an ideological simulation of a liberal political space where the UN and the West has already failed to propagate and support this through Bosnia (Debrix, 1999: 156). This is exactly what occurred in the UN safe areas of Srebenica and so forth, that supposedly provided the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with a base from which peace could be built. The use of safe areas as bases was essentially a compromise between overwhelming intervention and occupation and doing nothing at all. In the context of the creation of refugee camps in the Great Lakes region after the Rwandan genocide in 1994, they were established in order to deal with the problem of Hutus leaving Rwanda to escape retribution by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). These camps therefore acted as safe havens in which the western humanitarian liberal ideology could be enacted. In practice, however, they became statelets where Hutu power actors reconstructed a government in exile with many of the institutions of state, subsidized by the
humanitarian community, and in which many genocidaires took shelter. More recently, the use of bases as safe havens has been mooted as an approach to a post-Saddam Iraq. The question in all of these cases can also be reframed according to whom such bases provide safety for. Is it for populations caught up in humanitarian disasters, or is it for the personnel and officials who operate in them and from them? Some of these observations are relevant to the presence of the bases in Cyprus. These bases have been important in the context of the declining British Empire and its strategic calculations over the Suez canal and in Middle Eastern politics more generally. With the “end of the Empire”, the bases played a role in the Cold War and more recently in the context of the first and second Gulf Wars, and so continued to have a function in regional politics. They were also important as a projection of the continuing relevance of Britain to world politics despite the rise of the US (O’Malley & Craig, 1999). They also formed secure geographical locations where Britain could follow its strategic interests without being impeded by local political developments. From the local perspective, the bases have symbolized a variety of things beyond the continuation of colonial presence: a safe haven in the context of intra-communal violence, a source of revenue, a base for peacekeeping, a symbol of Britain’s “guarantees” over the island.

A number of these dynamics became essential in 1964 after the outbreak of violence sparked in part by Makarios’ attempt to suggest changes to the constitution. Given that Britain had forces in the bases, the Joint Truce Force was formed as a precursor either to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or UN involvement. In other words, the colonial function of the bases in their local context remained largely unchanged, that is to police law and order especially in times of crisis, as well as provide support for wider, regional strategic goals. This role was then passed onto the UN peacekeeping force that arrived in mid-1964, which also drew heavily on the bases in terms of logistics and support. In 1964, and again in 1974, a great number of people from all ethnic groups in Cyprus as well as British passport holders and foreign nationals, fled to the bases for protection. This was especially so in 1974, when thousands of Turkish Cypriots from the Limassol and Paphos regions moved there and many resided for several months in the hockey and cricket playing fields of the “Happy Valley” in Episkopi. An even larger number of Greek Cypriots from the Famagusta region fled to the Dhekelia Base. Typically, the inhabitants of Achna village, located just outside the Dhekelia Base Area and occupied by the Turkish army, took refuge in the Achna forest a few hundred metres away but within base territory; they have stayed there ever since building a twin village (and a premier league football team). The neighbouring inhabitants of Xylotymbou and Ormidhia were spared the displacement as their houses and fields were either surrounded or inside the Dhekelia Base Area. Thus the security furnished by British sovereignty was dramatically demonstrated to the locals during this period. Even President Makarios fled to the bases following the Greek junta-led coup in 1974, and from there via Malta to Britain. The symbolism of that escape, that is, of the “father” of anti-colonial struggle saved by the former colonial power and through their sovereign space in Cyprus, was tremendous. It was a symbolism that also seemed to confirm to some the collusion between the former colonial power and Makarios over his attempts in 1963 to remove some of the Turkish Cypriot rights under the 1960 constitution.
Perhaps, what is most important about the post-colonial nature of the bases is that both in local and regional terms their status has not been open to constant renegotiation with the Cypriot governments (as it has with the US use of Incirlik in Turkey, for example). Given the fact that Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Turkey have been prone to military and political instability during the post-colonial life span of the bases, it is obvious that the UK bases in Cyprus carried a wider regional significance (as does the huge US military base on Crete). Still, the presence of the bases upon the island has played an interesting implicit role in the post-colonial conflict it has been afflicted with. As a guarantor power under the treaties which established the Republic of Cyprus, one would have expected the bases to have played a key role in combating open conflict between Greeks and Turks in 1964, 1967, and finally in 1974. They did to a degree in 1964 with the Joint Truce Force and subsequent support for UNFICYP. In 1974, apart from dealing with the internally displaced persons who had retreated to the bases for safety, nothing was done to intervene militarily. There was, nonetheless, a disputed threat from James Callaghan, British prime minister, to use airpower from Akrotiri to prevent Turkish forces taking control of the Nicosia International Airport, which was one of the sites Britain had retained access to after independence. Packard, who had been involved in Cyprus since the Joint Truce Force of 1963 and was an avid supporter of reintegration, concluded that

the maintenance of the sovereign base areas and other military facilities on the island was deemed of paramount importance by the British and American governments, and their advisers certainly thought this aim would more easily be achieved in a divided Cyprus than in a cohesive, military state... (see O’Malley, 2001).

Since then, the bases have continued to disassociate themselves from Cypriot politics though it has been generally acknowledged that their location, which impinges upon the Green Line, has played a role in Cypriot strategic calculations. The Greek-Cypriot government has tended to view the bases as an implicit guarantee against further Turkish military advances while the Turkish-Cypriot leadership has seen the bases as a potential hindrance to Greek demands. As mentioned above, the Turkish-Cypriot vice-president was sufficiently willing to act as a mediator on the size of the bases when the Turkish-Cypriot side had initially resisted decolonization and then had argued that if this was to occur the island should be partitioned between Greece and Turkey. As Hocknell has pointed out, the presence of the bases meant the presence of an international boundary on the island – a precedent that was later on to be very important for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Turkish Cypriots under Rauf Denktash (Hocknell, 2001). The bases and the British government had disassociated themselves from these positions, focusing instead upon the perceived regional role of the bases. Of course, this role has also been very low-key and suspicions have abounded that Britain wanted to relieve itself of the bases as far back as the late 1970s. (O’Malley and Craig, 1999).
Beyond the “high” politics of the bases’ geopolitical role and symbolism, the political aesthetics of the bases as a civic example are also important in the representation of a liberal oasis of security. From this perspective, it is clear that an effort has been made by the base authorities to recreate a “little England” as also occurred in colonial India and Sri Lanka for example, where locals are now often heard fondly describing former colonial administrative areas, towns, and retreats in this manner. Nuwara Ellia in Sri Lanka and Darjeeling in India are still referred to as such, often with respect to tourists. Yet, if one compares the “little England” of Dhekelia and Akrotiri with, say, that of RAF Leuchars in eastern Scotland where the Royal Air Force has an important domestic airbase, it is clear that this representation is heavily idealized. The Leuchars base is similar to the Cyprus bases in that it is in a rural area, near the sea. But it scars the environment with barbed wire fences and cheap, unsightly architecture. Indeed, it looks more like a prison compound than a simulation of a homeland. In the case of the Cyprus bases the reverse is true. There has been an attempt to mimic local architectural traditions and to prettify the gardens, while maintaining typical English street names and social facilities such as the local pub or riding club. The bases in Scotland are functional. In Cyprus, they project the aesthetics of colonial power, rather than the resources of the technocratic state of modernity. They function therefore on a plane rather more dynamic and critical than they function in the UK. Not only do they represent an idealized version of Cyprus itself, but through the verdant cricket and rugby fields in an arid environment, they represent an era long gone, as well as power and resources. In this sense, it can be seen how the military as an institution, serve to reproduce an aesthetic (associated with honour, the officer core, and the “civilization of force”) which is anachronistic. Indeed, one could view the UK bases in Cyprus as the British military’s attempt at self-preservation in a post-imperial age, perhaps more so than the colonial relic of an unreflective government. As O’Malley and Craig have argued, the British government has since the late 1970s contemplated returning the bases, but through the verdant cricket and rugby fields in an arid environment, they represent an era long gone, as well as power and resources. In this sense, it can be seen how the military as an institution, serve to reproduce an aesthetic (associated with honour, the officer core, and the “civilization of force”) which is anachronistic. Indeed, one could view the UK bases in Cyprus as the British military’s attempt at self-preservation in a post-imperial age, perhaps more so than the colonial relic of an unreflective government. As O’Malley and Craig have argued, the British government has since the late 1970s contemplated returning the bases, but the US government and the British military have been reluctant to allow this to happen (O’Malley and Craig, 1999). From the British military’s perspective, the bases in Cyprus are one of the few remaining assets it has. Although, from the opposite side, the social outgoings of the military personnel in holiday resorts like Ayia Napa have been a constant source of embarrassment for the British army, and periodically fuelled local animosity.

It is to be wondered at whether the UK bases would have survived for so long if it had not been for the unusual situation that Cyprus found itself, as a “reluctant” or “orphan” state that no one wanted in its Republic of Cyprus form, as one UN Secretary-General once said (De Cuellar, 1997). Given their disproportionate influence on the local and regional status quo, according to Cold War and US security planners, the bases were seen as an implicit power broker. Yet, as an imperial remnant and a financial drain on the British government they were also a political embarrassment. Thus, the simulation of a liberal oasis and of little England was dependent upon a number of duplicities and contradictions that undermined both their significance as a symbol of power and their efficacy as a security agent in regional politics. In this context, it is interesting to note that the policing measures
taken within the base areas – not the more sensitive and fenced base within base – are also somewhat anachronistic. The police are not manned, nor equipped to anything like the same level that their UK counterparts are, though this is now being addressed.

This security or surveillance gap in the UK bases has interesting and paradoxical implications. It has been partly accidental and partly deliberate, partly the result of economic restraints and partly an attempt not to enforce strictly and fully the implements of “sovereignty” and thus antagonize the locals. In this regard, the base authorities try to limit some of the duties and responsibilities associated with claims to sovereignty. The case of around 70 boat people (from Iraq, Sudan and Syria) stranded in base territory on 8 October 1988 and claiming asylum proved quite revealing in terms of the limits or degree of sovereignty the British government wished to exercise. The British government initially proposed that the Republic of Cyprus should be responsible for processing their asylum applications – fearing the possibility of the bases becoming a Middle East branch for asylum seekers wishing to come to the UK – something that the Greek-Cypriot government resisted. That is to say, it is the Greek-Cypriot government which demanded in this instance that the UK assume fully its sovereign powers and responsibilities. As a result, refugee status was given to some of the migrants by the UK authorities, and for the rest deportation was suggested though postponed until circumstances allowed (Cyprus Mail, 10 February 2001, 29 November 2001). This matter has since been specifically addressed in the 2003 Protocol regulating relations with the bases, signed in view of Cyprus’ accession to the EU.18

Furthermore, this security/surveillance gap made possible, for example, the thriving of “smuggling” across the Green Line in the Dhekelia Base Area. From drugs and cigarettes to sports wear and halloumi cheese, the Dhekelia region has been virtually the only place in Cyprus after July 1974 and before April 2003, where the movement of people, animals and goods across the ethnic divide was relatively free. In addition, the presence of the base areas made possible the meeting of peace activists, given that British sovereignty neutralized the variable political interventions of both the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot regimes. Especially after the Turkish-Cypriot regime prohibited crossings for bicommunal meetings in the Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone, the Pergamos picnic area (inside the Dhekelia Base Area) and the Pyla village nearby (bordering the base area and inside the UN buffer zone) became the only areas for cross-ethnic contact. Places like Ali’s Bar, located on the Pergamos-Pyla main road inside base territory became literally “safe havens” for both smugglers and activists, though also frequented by Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot secret police, chatting up people and noting down car licence plates. From this perspective, British sovereignty and nominal police presence was most welcome and practically assisted the exercise of basic human rights in Cyprus.

The existence of the UK bases also had ambivalent effects in relation to environmental protection in Cyprus. On the one hand, environmentalists have accused the base authorities of destroying ecologically sensitive areas, like Akamas, which was until recently reserved for military exercises, or the Akrotiri salt lake area.
and its wildlife that is endangered by the installation of an increasing number of military antennae. On the other hand, any ecologically sensitive person is in no doubt of how, say, the beautiful Curium area would have “developed” in typical tourist resort style, also damaging the integrity of the important archaeological site there, had it not been for British sovereignty and base prohibitions that are not so readily answerable to local pressures and economic interests.

Old Schemes, New Metrics

In 1960 the UK gained its longed-for independence from Cyprus. It acquired two Sovereign Base Areas and special use rights over the territory and administration of the island without being burdened with the formal responsibilities of sovereignty, no longer dependent on having to rule a rebellious people and administer justice. Through the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the UK effectively legalized its political and military presence in Cyprus while freeing itself from the vagaries of global accountability, of having to defend its actions before international forums. As for the Republic of Cyprus – whose population never exercised the right of self-determination – far from becoming independent with this treaty, it found itself formally dependent on three “guarantor powers”, namely Greece, Turkey and the UK. Though in practice an “international” state or “tridominium”, successive Cypriot governments simulated the rule of an independent sovereign republic – as they had to, paradoxically, in order to maintain a degree of autonomy – popularly and globally disguising the fact that the Republic of Cyprus was anything other than an intriguing legal formation of imperial governance.

On the whole, the presence of the bases has been invariably legitimated by both Cypriot and British governments on the basis of their strategic use in the island and the region. They have played a role in local peacekeeping as well as NATO, the Gulf Wars, Lebanon and the Middle East in general. Their role in western global surveillance also seems crucial, be it in terms of the powerful radar system in Mount Olympus, or the most recent Echelon intelligence-gathering network. The rhetoric disseminated in this regard has been that of the hegemonic discourse of security, in which “great powers” express and extend their influence in regions of interest to them, and is therefore an instantly recognizable narrative to most of us. However, the more domesticated narratives associated with the arguments above about the residues of imperialism and complexity of power relations are, in our view, also very significant and interesting narratives. These go well beyond simple debates about global strategy and security. These discourses have certainly not been internationally legitimated, and in domestic politics are also far from being non-contentious. For example, the recent issue of the construction of new antennae at Akrotiri brought a vicious reaction from local residents who argued that there were health risks associated with these new masts that were unacceptable. It is interesting that complaints came only from Cypriots and that British personnel and their families also living in proximity did not seem to mind. For them, perhaps, the risks associated were relegated in the context of the military orientation of their professional lives, whereas for the local inhabitants these effects were directly
applicable to their permanent homes and endangered their lives. For the latter, this act also directly contradicted the logic of the base as “security guarantor”.

In this respect, it is worth noting that the point of the strategy of the safe haven has been to create small islands of tranquility from which international organizations or states, and an assortment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international agencies can base themselves in order to develop and propagate their strategies of peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, or more overt uses of force for collective security (Debrix, 1999; Paris, 2002). This strategy operates as a nascent process of liberalization, framed by the “zone of peace” argument, shadowing the notion that democratic peace and global security spreads (Singer & Wildavsky, 1993: 3). Conversely, the implication has been that outside of the base or the safe haven, security, rights, development, and political stability are doubtful, and regimes of power unstable, at least in the eyes of those that instigate the establishment of these areas. Yet, even purely military bases imply some form of standard setting in the local environment, through the projection of metropolitan power, norms and aesthetics, and while bases are supposed to form part of the strategic calculations of the metropolitan power, they are also significant for local strategic calculations (Pugh, 2003: 235–6). This further problematizes claims about the kind of security the UK bases in Cyprus are supposed to furnish. Security narratives, in this regard, have not been static but dynamic, constantly re-defining “the threat” and “whose security” the bases address. The Treaty of Guarantee implied that the bases would act as some sort of “guarantee” of Cyprus’ stability and this might have envisaged in the minds of the British government when they were negotiated – yet nothing seems to be further from the British government’s thinking nowadays. Indeed, as the recent 45-minute claim seems to indicate, the current British government is more interested in using the bases as a political tool in their own strategic spin against Saddam Hussein, rather than being concerned with the security of the Republic of Cyprus. Equally, a fine distinction between the island of Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus (that is, the island minus 99 square miles), allows the UK to claim that it fulfils its international obligations, rhetorically guaranteeing the “territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus” and “undertake to prohibit … [the] partition of the Island” (Treaty of Guarantee, 1960), while in practice violating that integrity and already partitioning the island through the Sovereign Base regime.

The recent EU dimension has the potential of redefining the security landscape of the British bases in Cyprus and could in time re-articulate power relations as well. A lot depends, of course, on political developments and the direction and speed of the common European security policy, as well as how the British bases will figure in the debate. Following Cyprus’ accession to the EU, relations with the bases are additionally covered by a 2003 Protocol which replaced Article 299(6)(b) of the Treaty of the European Community that addressed the issue in the Accession Treaty of the UK. Nonetheless this protocol leaves the base regime intact and the base areas officially outside EU territory. Indeed it can be argued that the protocol seeks to modify the perception of the bases, from that of an imperial matter to an exceptional arrangement within and between EU partner states. The protocol clearly stipulates
that the treaty establishing the European Community “shall not apply” to these areas “except to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation of the arrangements set out in the Protocol” (these arrangements concern immigration and customs control, taxation and provisions of the common agricultural policy, but do not include EU environmental regulations that the UK resisted). In terms of European institutional perception, it is interesting to note the precedents drawn in exceptionalizing the base territories. In relation to customs arrangements, the principality of Monaco is mentioned, and in relation to derogations from the common system of value added tax, the Isle of Man is named in addition to Monaco. Both these are more or less sovereign or autonomous polities, functioning “homelands”. In this sense, by harmonizing the bases by 60 per cent (as a headline in a Cypriot Daily put it; Phileleftheros, 9 February 2003), the provisions of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment discussed above have been remeasured, in practice retained but dressed up in a new, more politically correct guise. Still, the old and new responsibilities that go with UK sovereign rights, may acquire a different significance and be recontextualized in the future in ways the British and Cypriot negotiators had not imagined in 1960 or even in 2003.

The fact that the exercise of sovereignty entails in the end not just rights but duties and responsibilities, has been mainly behind the recent British Labour government’s offer/incentive to return 45 square miles of base areas, if there would be a settlement of the Cyprus problem. Ironically, this revisits Makarios’ bitter negotiations over the long mile, though this time the British government appeared to be more sensitive to the “viability” of the proposed United Cyprus Republic rather than merely to its own status and prestige. Unsurprisingly, the shadow foreign secretary raised anew the issue of “operational capacity” and whether “the British national interest is best served by the downsizing of British bases . . .” (Financial Times, 5 March 2004).

Still, a careful reading of the Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Establishment as annexed to the Annan Plan for settling the Cyprus problem (Annan Plan, Annex II, 2004) leaves serious suspicions that British imperial agendas are still very much in operation, and this time through supposedly neutral UN mediation, and eventually arbitration, in the form of the final text put to the Cypriot referenda in April 2004. As stated in its preamble, the Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Establishment was meant to “give effect to the intention of the Government of the United Kingdom to relinquish sovereignty over parts of Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area” (Annan Plan, Annex II, 2004). Instead, Article 6 of the Additional Protocol contained an interesting and crucial detail, while addressing the issue of the seas. It required a report “delimit[ing] the waters adjacent to the Sovereign Base Areas that the United Cyprus Republic shall not claim as part of its territorial sea . . . prepared by a duly qualified person to be designated by the Government of the United Kingdom” (authors’ italics). This was a surprise change from the previous version of the Plan, which the UN team made in its arbitrating capacity where disagreements existed (that is, a post-negotiation modification that was not open to renegotiation). Yet what is amazing is that this issue was not part of the negotiation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and the earlier version of the Annan Plan stated that there would actually be
“two duly qualified persons to be designated by the Governments of the United Cyprus Republic and of the United Kingdom” (authors’ italics). What is even more amazing is that this provision of essentially UK-authorized delimitation, specifically overrides the provision of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment, which allows for the referral of delimitation disputes “to an independent expert to be selected by agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Cyprus . . . [and whose] decision shall be final and binding” (TOE, Annex A, 1960: Section 2.4). In other words, on this particular issue the 2004 Annan Plan was a clear “improvement” for the British imperial prerogative, more “imperialist” than the 1960 post-colonial provisions. Reading between the lines of the Additional Protocol dissolves any doubts that this would have been anything other than a power imposition of the British interest given previous disputes with the Republic of Cyprus on whether the bases could have a territorial sea and its breadth (not to mention the issue of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, that the UK never claimed but also never denied, an issue exacerbated by recent reports of offshore oil opportunities in the area). Article 8 of the Additional Protocol thus covered the possibility of disputing the UK-authorized delimitation:

Any dispute about the interpretation or application of this Protocol shall be resolved by consultations and shall not be referred to any international tribunal or third party for settlement. (Annan Plan, Annex II, 2004)

In short, in exchange for relinquishing 45 square miles of base (land) territory, the UK government could appoint a person who was solely charged to delimit its base (sea) territory, and over whose final ruling, whatever that might be, the Cypriot government could not appeal in any international tribunal or refer the matter to an independent mediator or arbitrator. Land square miles would have been returned, presented as a grand act of post-colonial generosity, and instead sea square miles would have been seized in technical, non-publicized fashion, authorized through annexed details of the UN Plan settling the inter-ethnic conflict in Cyprus. In addition, the UK would have relinquished land territory in which the Cypriot population lived and worked, that is to say, territory whose administration entailed increasing levels of burden and responsibility, not only towards the local population but also towards a variety of EU and Council of Europe agencies. The Additional Protocol annexed to the Annan Plan would have also reconfirmed the sovereign legal status of the bases (a status that remains contestable under the law of treaties due to the coercive character of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment, which had to be agreed upon in exchange for independence) by giving the base regime and its sea extensions the highest possible authorization and legitimation in the form of local referenda. This would have constituted the final act in the complex power game that is the long mile of empire. Paradoxically, had both sides voted “yes” in the recent referenda (and there were other, good reasons for doing so), Cypriots would have boasted a reunified island inside the EU whilst inadvertently sealing a more subtle division that they learned to invariably live with – sometimes accepting, sometimes protesting, sometimes exploiting – on a daily basis.
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Notes

1 That is to say both EOKA, the Greek-Cypriot Fighters’ Organization, and AKEL, the Communist party.
2 The issue that the United Kingdom would maintain permanent military presence on the island in Sovereign Base Areas had been agreed at the London Conference on Cyprus (19 February 1959), which incorporated the Basic Structure agreed at the Zurich Conference between the UK and the two “motherlands”, Greece and Turkey (not the Cypriots; who participated in the London, but not the Zurich Conference). The administrative and practical arrangements were left to be negotiated in the Transitional Committee, which included representatives from the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. For these latter negotiations, including the issue of the size of the bases and the local discussions it initiated, see Ethnos and the Cyprus Mail, among other Cypriot dailies, from February–July 1960. Briefly on the 99 square miles compromise, see Ethnos, 5 July 1960.
3 The British Sovereign Bases were already excluded from the UK Accession Treaty into the EU; see Article 299(6)(b) of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
4 Namely the need to lobby for British support for EU entry and not to antagonize Britain given its special role in efforts to settle the Cyprus problem.
5 The authors use the official copy of the different treaties and documents relating to independence “Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defence by Command of Her Majesty”, July 1960, as reprinted by the Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus (Cmd. 1093). These documents were signed on the Day of Independence.
6 Article 1 of the Treaty of Establishment states clearly that “The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the Island of Cyprus, together with the islands lying off its coast, with the exception of the two areas defined in Annex A to this treaty, which areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.”
7 On the problematic enforcement of the Sovereign Bases’ laws and regulations on Cypriot nationals as well as the overall (il)legality of the Base regime, see Theodoulou (1995).
8 More recently, a Greek-Cypriot lawyer and MP, warned that he was planning an application against the UK to the European Court of Human Rights, for “unreasonably” restricting house planning and tourist development in the Sovereign Base Areas (Politis, 22 September 2004).
9 TOE, Annex B, Part I, 1(f) says that “‘Sites’ means sites which the Government of the United Kingdom is entitled to use pursuant to Section 1 of Part II of this Treaty” and 1(g) that “‘Installation’ includes any building or structure, whether permanent or temporary, and includes any installation whether on land or in the sea.”
10 To give the reader a sense of “the long mile”, the complete list of sites and installations is included here. 27 of these 40 sites have now been returned to the Republic. The most recent one, B8, was returned in July 2003 with a proviso that the UK will remain legally responsible for security in the area, given the possibility of unexploded bombs (B8 was used as a bombing range). The list as enumerated in Schedules A and B for Sites and C and D for Installations: A1 At the port of Limassol; A2 At Troodos; A3 At Mount Olympus; A4 To the north and west of Zyggi; A5 At Cape Kiti; A6/1 At Cape Greco; A6/2 Water supply for Schedule A6/1; A7 At Mount Yaila; A8 At Heraklis; A9 At the port of Famagusta; A10/1 At Nicosia airfield; A10/2 Water supply for A10/1; B1/1 At Polemidia, including small arms range; B1/2 Water supply for Schedule B1/1; B2 At disused airfield south of Larnaca; B3/1 North of Zyggi; B3/2 Water supply for Schedule B3/1; B4 At Famagusta, on the Nicosia road; B5 On and to the west of the main Famagusta-Salamis road; B6 To the north-west of Nicosia on the Kyrenia road; B7 At Nicosia, in Metokio street; B8 On the coast about 5 miles south of Larnaca; B9/1 To the west of Nicosia; B9/2 Water supply for Schedule B9/1; B10 On the outskirts
of Famagusta, on the Nicosia road; C1 At Troodos; C2/1 On the outskirts of Limassol; C2/2 Water supply for Schedule C2/1; C3 Near Paphos, about a quarter of a mile from the tip of Cape Paphos; C4 On the coast, near Ayia Irini; C5 At Kissonsa, about 7 miles north of Episkopi, including the Kissonsa water source, the pipeline bringing water to the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Anoyira tunnel; C6 At Limassol, in Paphos Road; C7 On the coast, about 3.5 miles north of Famagusta; C8/1 At Famagusta, in Peloponessus Street; C8/2 At Famagusta, in Steropis Street; C8/3 At Famagusta, in Gladstone Street; D1/1 On the south-west outskirts of Nicosia; D1/2 On the south-east outskirts of Nicosia; D2 At Karaoos, about 3 miles north of Famagusta; D3 Near Kalopsidha and Makrasya, about 6 miles north of Dhekelia, including water sources and the pipeline bringing water to the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.

11 As TOE, Annex B, Part II, Section 1.4 provides: "The enumeration in this Treaty of specific rights to be exercised within the Sites shall not be interpreted as prejudicing the general right of use and control to be enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Section."

12 The localities reserved for training are: (a) The Goshi Range Area; (b) The Akamas Range Area; (c) The Lefkoniko Range Area; (d) The Polis Training Area; (e) The Ayios Vasilios Training Area; and (f) The Prastion Training Area.

13 In non-emergency periods TOE, Annex B, Part V, Section 3 provides that "The United Kingdom authorities shall have the right to use the airfield at Nicosia together with any facilities on or connected with the airfield to whatever extent is considered necessary from time to time by the United Kingdom authorities for the operation of United Kingdom military aircraft in peace and in war, including the exercise of any necessary operational control of air traffic."

14 See also the Imperial Peacekeeping Manuals published by the British government in the period leading up to the First World War. See Schmidl, 2000:7–9.


17 The UN Security Council authorized a French initiative on 22 June 1994 through Resolution 929. Its mandate was to “contribute to the security and the protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk, including through the establishment and maintenance of secure humanitarian areas”.

18 Specifically, the Annex of the Protocol, Part IV, 7: “(a) An applicant for asylum who first entered the island of Cyprus from outside the European Community by one of the Sovereign Base Areas shall be taken back or readmitted to the Sovereign Base Areas at the request of the Member State of the European Community in whose territory the applicant is present. (b) The Republic of Cyprus, bearing in mind humanitarian considerations, shall work with the United Kingdom with a view to devising practical ways and means of respecting the rights and satisfying the needs of asylum seekers and illegal migrants in the Sovereign Base Areas, in accordance with the relevant Sovereign Base Area Administration legislation.”

19 Treaty of Guarantee, 1960, Article 4, provides for the right of individual or collective action of the three guarantor powers “in the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty... with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty”, and to the extent this includes the right to use force, it seems to violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

20 A number of local organizations have been protesting and at least one outspoken Greek-Cypriot MP even threatened the initiation of forceful measures if the antennae were not removed (Cyprus Mail, 2 November 2003). On the whole, however, protests have remained peaceful, despite some violent incidents in the summer of 2001, which remained limited and criticized at the time by the Clerides government as well as most political parties.

21 See Article 1(b) of the 2003 Protocol. In addition the Republic of Cyprus and the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding on how the Protocol is to be implemented in June 2003. An attempt has been made to delegate as much of the administration of the EU provisions to the Republic of Cyprus.
officials in charge of the different EU policies that may apply to Cypriot citizens living or working within the Sovereign Base Areas.

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