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The Greek Military Regime (1967-1974) and the Cyprus Question — Origins and Goals

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This article employs the concept of military professionalism and its attributes to explain the Greek praetorian regime's handling of the Cyprus problem. Upon examining the relevant data it was found that for strategic considerations the U.S. and NATO sought to achieve a negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem which would have amounted to double Enosis. It was also found that professional needs created a dependency of the Greek military on NATO for arms, sophisticated training, and support which let them view participation in NATO as indispensable. As a result, the Greek military confused the interests of their nation with those of the Atlantic Alliance and sought to solve the Cyprus problem on the basis of NATO's interests even though such a solution went contrary to the national aspirations of Greece.

Military professionalism\(^1\) is considered by most students of contemporary civil-military relations as the most salient characteristic of modern military organizations. As such, a proliferating number of studies dealing with nations that have experienced praetorianism employ the concept of professionalism as a key variable affecting the behavior of the armed forces with respect to intervention and subsequent military rule. Other scholarly works deal with professionalism's impact on a host of other related concerns including the armed forces' ideological persuasions, organizational structure, and attitude toward human nature and politics.

This intense scholarly attention displayed toward these concerns, however, cannot be matched with a general neglect of the impact of "bloc" or alliance oriented professionalism on the foreign policy attitudes of the military of state members of such defense alliances as NATO, ANZUS, and OAS. Bengt Abrahamsson provides some theoretical support for this. He argues that the military perceive themselves as the sole guarantors of the physical, political, and moral integrity of their nation. But in order to be able to accomplish this mission

\(^*\) This paper is a much revised and condensed version of chapter five of the author’s doctoral dissertation titled "Soldiers in Politics: The Case of Contemporary Greece", University of Missouri-Columbia, 1986.

\(^1\) This paper uses Abrahamsson’s (1972) definition of military professionalism, which includes (a) specialized theoretical knowledge accompanied by methods and devices for application; (b) responsibility, grounded on a set of ethical rules; and (c) a high degree of corporateness deriving from common training and devotion to specific doctrines and customs. See his Military Professionalism and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications), p. 15.
military organizations need arms, equipment, sophisticated training, and support which, for the most part, can only be provided by a relatively small number of developed states most of whom belong in such alliances. Thus, dependency for such essentials and concern for the security of their client, the state, (and by implication the professional interests of the military organization) prompt officers to view participation and adherence to the basic principles of a "common bloc" as "positive" and even indispensable for they strengthen "the position of each individual country against the common adversary." As such, they are considered "perfectly compatible" with the military's nationalistic attitudes. In short, concern for the security of the state, Abrahamsson concludes, "...is transformed into favorable opinion of the defense community" (1972:83).

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether alliance-oriented military professionalism and its attributes impact on the armed forces' foreign policy attitudes. This is to be accomplished by looking at the Colonels' — as the Greek military rulers became known — handling of the Cyprus Question which culminated in the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios in July 1974. The following pages will trace the historical components of the Cyprus problem leading up to the establishment of the Cypriot Republic in 1960; examine the developments occurring from the constitutional crisis of 1962 up to the 1967 coup-d'etat, unfold the praetorian regime's Cyprus policy, and analyze the nature of that policy and assess the impact of Greece's membership in NATO on it.²

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW UNTIL 1967

"The central fact of nation-building," says Reinhard Bendix, "is the orderly exercise of a nationwide public authority" which presupposes "agreement concerning the rules that are to govern the resolution of conflict" (1964:18-22). The island of Cyprus inhabited by about 80 percent Greek-Cypriots and about 18 percent Turkish-Cypriots clearly does not fall in this category. The Greek-Cypriots trace their Greekness as far back as the fourth-century B.C. The introduction of Christianity fastened this link and established a pervasive Church role in every aspect of Greek-Cypriot life. The Moslem Turkish-Cypriots, meanwhile, view themselves as descendents of the Ottomans who occupied the island from 1573 to 1878 and see the modern state of Turkey as their mother country. But the barrier of religion kept the two communities apart and prevented the emergence of a national Cypriot consciousness. This was also enhanced by the geographic location which rendered Cyprus an important

² This paper is partly based on a survey questionnaire consisting of thirty-one close-ended questions administered during the month of May 1981 to thirty-four officers of the Greek Armed Forces on postgraduate training at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Of the thirty-four officers only eighteen bothered to return the questionnaire by mail as the author had requested.
refueling station for those who competed in this sensitive part of the world. The British, by virtue of a temporary agreement with the Ottomans, were the last to gain the right to administer the island. The Treaty of Lousanne (1923) formally added Cyprus to Her Majesty's colonial empire.

However, the tides of anticolonialism that swept the world in the years following World War II touched the more economically and politically developed Greek-Cypriots. Led by the Church and the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), they struggled for self-determination and Enosis (union with Greece). Citing strategic considerations, Britain initially sought to frustrate Greek-Cypriot aims by stimulating Turkish concerns regarding the fate of their co-patriots on the island. Ankara began advocating Takshim (partition) as the only just solution and looked toward the U.S. and NATO for support. The Western Alliance responded advocating a solution to the Cyprus problem within the confines of NATO. Since NATO's military strategy is nothing more than "an extension of American strategy" made possible through "the massive infusion of American personnel, technology, and capital" (Fedder, 1973:125), the U.S.'s posture on the Cyprus matter became the official policy of the Atlantic Alliance as well—an argument strongly echoed in the Greek press (Carmocolias, 1981:229).

After considerable pressure from the U.S. and elsewhere (Terlexis, 1971:335), Greece joined Britain and Turkey in an effort to negotiate a solution to the Cyprus dispute. In February 1959, it was announced in Zurich that a settlement was reached which the three "Guarantors" signed in London the following August. Conspicuously absent from the negotiation were the representatives of the two Cypriot communities who after initial hesitation signed the accord.

Briefly, the settlement consisted of three treaties and a draft constitution. The treaties established the island as a sovereign state, forbade either Enosis or partition, set out the terms of a military presence of both Greece and Turkey, and contained a provision whereby the three powers guaranteed the independence of the island. The constitutional structure established a biocommunal structure in all levels of government and life. The executive consisted of a Greek President and a Turkish Vice President elected separately by each community, each of whom had veto power in matters of security and foreign affairs. In accordance with the settlement the island became a republic in August 1960, with Makarios as President and Fazil Kuchuk as Vice President.

The imposed settlement ran into difficulties. The nature of the constitutional structure along with the mistrust each community harbored toward the differences in the level of economic development stalemated the central government. On November 3, 1963, President Makarios sought to break the impasse. He submitted a "thirteen point" plan aimed at amending key sections of the constitution, but the Turkish side rejected it. The dismissal of the plan shattered the uneasy calm that prevailed on the island for the past three years, and rumors of an imminent Turkish invasion spread. Meanwhile Vice President Kuchuk and the three Turkish Cypriot ministers resigned in protest,
leading to a virtual isolation of their community that lasted until July 1974.

Fearing that the tense situation in Cyprus could quickly spread to a wider conflict involving Greece and Turkey, the U.S. applied pressure to have a NATO-sponsored peace-keeping force restore order. President Makarios, however, rejected the idea, thus leaving the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution recommending that a U.N. peace-keeping force be sent to restore the peace. The Cypriot Government consented and a force of 7,000 men (UNFICYP) has been stationed on the island ever since. Under UNFICYP auspices a semblance of peace was restored, but the schism between the two communities widened and return to the London-Zurich framework became highly problematic (Coufoudakis, 1976b). In Athens the new Centrist government of George Papandreou appeared more sympathetic to the Archbishop's view than did its predecessor, and it secretly strengthened the Greek contingent on the island. Makarios sought and received Moscow's support. Thus, Makarios' and Papandreous' "common line" of opposing bilateral negotiations and seeking a U.S. solution won some badly needed support.

Washington, however, had very little patience with a U.N. approach and even less sympathy for Makarios' independent foreign policy positions. President Johnson applied pressure on Greece and Turkey to solve the Cyprus problem through bilateral negotiations and in July 1964 invited the Prime Ministers of the two countries for separate consultations. The Turkish leader offered no basic objections, but Papandreou, in spite of Johnson's arm twisting, refused to abandon the U.N. road. To help mediate the impasse, the American president summoned former Secretary of State Dean Acheson who presented what became known as the "Acheson Plan". Basically, the scheme called for Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, but in return Turkey was to receive the small Aegean island of Kastellorizon and maintain a military base and two Turkish cantons on the island. In effect, the Acheson Plan amounted to partition or, one may say, double-Enosis. Ankara seemed favorably disposed toward the plan but Makarios denounced it as totally unacceptable. Papandreou at first accepted the plan but later, succumbing to pressure from his son Andreas and Archbishop Makarios, rejected it.

The new government of Stephanos Stephanopoulos that replaced Papandreou's seemed more amenable to the Acheson Plan and appeared willing to proceed with bilateral negotiations. To counterbalance Makarios' influence, Stephanopoulos appointed General George Grivas, the former EOKA leader, as commander of the Greek forces stationed on the island. Grivas attacked Makarios' stand and proclaimed himself the champion of Enosis while keeping secret an agreement with Undersecretary of State George Ball in which he had consented to accept the basic thrusts of the Acheson Plan (Coufoudakis, 1976:283). Makarios protested and characterized Grivas' appointment "a great error" (Katsis, 1976:8). This prompted the resignation of Foreign Minister Tsirimokos. However, his successor met his Turkish counterpart in December 1966 and signed a protocol agreeing "to seek ways which would facilitate the solution of the Cyprus problem within the general
framework of relations between the two countries” (Katsis, 1976:97-98). Makarios’ skillful opposition and the ensuing collapse of the weak Stephanopoulos cabinet temporarily postponed the process, but the common line between Athens and Nicosia was replaced by a schism regarding the handling of the “national question”. It fell upon the military regime to continue and intensify the rift.

THE GREEK MILITARY REGIME AND THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS

Grivas’ presence on the island created a dual authority. He criticized Makarios for not wanting Enosis and attracted a small but vocal following to his “pro Enosis” stand. Grivas welcomed the coup in Athens as a positive development which contrasted with Makarios’ rather stoic attitude. Publicly the new rulers made bombastic pro-Enosis statements. Privately, however, they pursued a different line. London’s Daily Telegraph (July 1967) reported that “the Greek military see two obstacles to their ‘enotic’ policy. One is the nationalistic Cypriot public opinion which opposes concessions, i.e., partition. The other hindrance is President Makarios....” The military rulers, the report concluded, “characteristically leave the impression that they would not hesitate to clash with him” (Gregoriadis, 1975:1:134).

The kind of Enosis that the Colonels sought, however, was not one that could have come about as a result of self-determination, as Makarios argued, but an Enosis hammered out by the governments of Greece and Turkey. In short, the military regime’s Cypriot policy differed very little from that of Stephanopoulos’ apostate government. Evidence of this surfaced almost immediately. The Foreign Ministers of all NATO members urged Greece and Turkey “to resume their discussions” and the two governments agreed to meet on September 6, 1967 to discuss the Cyprus dispute. In an effort to consolidate the home front, the Colonels sought to deal with the Cyprus problem quickly by meeting Turkish officials on the banks of Evros River. In return for Enosis, the Greeks offered concessions which the Turkish side rejected as insufficient, but the two sides pledged to continue their dialogue.

The failure of this effort forced the Colonels to continue making pro-Enosis statements for domestic consumption. This led to an intensification of Grivas’ criticism against Makarios and at the same time angered the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus on November 15, 1967 fighting broke out. The National Guard under the command of General Grivas moved in and smashed the Turkish-Cypriot fighters. Ankara reacted sharply to these developments and through President General Sunay stated that “we decided to solve the Cyprus problem once and for all” (Katsis, 1976:122).

Turkey’s threat of military action alarmed Johnson, who quickly dispatched Undersecretary of Defense Cyrus Vance to the area to defuse the crisis. Under Washington’s pressure and fearing an internal upheaval, the Colonels accepted Vance’s recommendations which included withdrawal of all Greek forces clandestinely stationed on the island, dissolution of the Cypriot National
Guard—largely run by officers from mainland Greece, expansion of the size and scope of the U.N. peace-keeping contingent, and compensation by Greece to all Turkish Cypriots who had suffered losses as a result of the fighting. In addition, the Greek Government voluntarily recalled General Grivas, who had become an embarrassment. Archbishop Makarios, however, refused to accede to the dismantlement of the National Guard and to transfer police responsibility to UNFICYP troops. After extensive maneuvering in the U.N., the Turkish government finally agreed to modify its position regarding these two key issues. By the end of 1967 the Greek forces were out and the two communities had agreed to engage in intercommunal talks under the auspices of the U.N. aimed at solving the problem from within.

However, the intercommunal talks led nowhere and the blame for this failure in Athens, Ankara, and Washington was put on Makarios’ intransigence. As early as the summer of 1971 the State Department had concluded that “the problem Makarios” had to be neutralized and the task “was to be essentially left to Greece” (Coufoudakis, 1976:290). This is not to say that agreement had been reached on the method of implementation. Nonetheless, the Greek military rulers pursued a relentless campaign that culminated in the overthrow of the Archbishop in July 1974. Let us examine the events that unfolded during this four-year period.

On February 21, 1970, the Soviet News Agency Tass, reported the existence of “a subversive plan led by reactionary Cypriot and NATO elements” designed to install in Cyprus “a terrorist military dictatorship of the Greek model,” and charged responsibility for the plot to the “reactionary Greek officers who continue to occupy significant position in the Cypriot National Guard” (Katsis, 1976:135). Within a few weeks, the Soviet news agency’s report came true. On March 8, an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Makarios took place. As it turned out, the plot was designed to create a climate conducive to a military coup. Shortly before the assassination attempt, Der Spiegel reported that the Cypriot government was in possession of a document indicating that “the plot to overthrow Makarios’ government had been laid out in Athens” (Gregoriadis, 1975 II:121). At first, the Cypriot government denied the authenticity of the document, but later on Makarios linked Greek officers to the conspiracy (Gregoriadis, 1975 II:124-125).

The struggle between Athens and Nicosia undoubtedly strengthened the Turkish position but at the same time caused considerable nervousness in Ankara. Turkey always wanted a negotiated settlement and certainly did not view this quarrel as harmful to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests. Even though Ankara had very little liking for Makarios and would have been more than pleased to see him disappear from the scene, the Turks regarded with suspicion any moves by the Greek officers to bring about his violent overthrow and replace him with a pro-Enosis regime. Seemingly, Turkey wanted to avoid a military confrontation with Greece that could have been precipitated in the event that a pro-Enosis Cypriot government actively sought union with Greece. However, Ankara was also concerned about gaining the support of the
international community. Having endorsed the U.N.'s proposal for an intercommunal arrangement as well as Washington's suggestion for a negotiated settlement, Turkey sought to appear in the eyes of the international community as a defender of recognized treaties and agreements. Thus, if Ankara was forced to intervene in the event of a pro-Enosis take-over in Cyprus, Turkey would have acted in accordance with the Treaties of Zurich and London which essentially gave the right to the three guarantors to act together or individually, if common effort was impossible, to take action with the purpose of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the treaty.

In May 1971 Papadopoulos sought to pacify Turkish concerns. In an interview with the Turkish daily *Millet* he stated that the Cypriot problem must be worked out between Greece and Turkey, that "it should be made clear to the two Cypriot communities" that Greece and Turkey are not willing to disturb their relations, let alone fight, for their sake...", and that "if Cypriots are convinced that we are determined to maintain good relations, then they will come together and will try to reconcile their differences (Papadopoulos, 1968-1972: VI:92-95).

Papadopoulos' conciliatory gesture seemed to have reassured Ankara. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, taking advantage of NATO's Foreign Ministers' conference, met in Lisbon on July 3 and 4, 1971 and worked out an understanding designed to serve as a basis for handling the Cyprus dispute bilaterally. The Lisbon accord included the following three points among others: (1) Greece accepted the London and Zurich Agreements as being in full force; (2) the Cypriot problem would not be discussed in the U.N. or any other international body, but only between Greece and Turkey; and (3) Greece agreed never to advance the matter of Enosis again. Nonetheless, Soviet and Cypriot sources indicated that at the Lisbon NATO conference "a plan was formulated which foresaw the termination of Cypriot independence and the partition of the island" (Coufoudakis, 1976a:289).

Shortly after the Lisbon meeting, the military rulers began applying pressure on Makarios. In a letter dated July 18, 1971, Papadopoulos warned the Archbishop to go along with the Greek government's suggestions; otherwise the government "will find itself in the awkward necessity to take those steps dictated by the national interests... however bitter these measures may be" (Kakaounakis, 1976:159-161). Within a day or two, the Foreign Ministry passed a complementary but confidential note to Makarios emphasizing that "... Athens, as the ethnikon kentron (national center), draws and plans both policy directions and tactics," and bluntly concluded that "... the Cypriot line need be within and adapt to the national guidelines" (Kakaounakis, 1976:165-167). In effect, the military regime let the Archbishop know that Greece did not recognize the existence of Cyprus as an independent entity with the right to determine its own foreign policy, a ploy which clearly contradicted one of the fundamental points of the public Lisbon understanding, lending weight to the Soviet and Cypriot charges that the unofficial agreement at Lisbon was the opposite of the published version. Or, to be more explicit, the Greeks had been
given the go-ahead to proceed as if double-Enosis had in fact taken place in terms of foreign policy decision making between the Greek government and Makarios.

The independent-minded Archbishop would not be trapped. Responding to the argument that the Cypriot policy must be in conformity with that of the national center, Makarios stated: "I do not accept such a view, particularly when the Greek government repeatedly has emphasized its inability to undertake the military protection of Cyprus." Under the circumstances, the Archbishop concluded, "The Greek Cypriots must have the final word in anything that concerns their survival and national future" (Kakaounakis, 1976: II: 162-165).

Makarios' refusal to yield to the military rulers' ultimatum angered the Colonels and galvanized their determination to dispense with him. For this purpose the regime secretly dispatched General Grivas to the island to prepare the ground. This time Grivas' presence on the island caused "no anxiety" to the Turkish side (Katisis, 1976:154), but it was to irritate and undermine Makarios' rule and policies. Grivas, acting as a surrogate of the Athens regime, formed a terrorist organization which for sentimental reasons was named EOKA-B and whose alleged goal was to bring about Enosis. EOKA-B and other similar gangs that mushroomed on the island engaged in sabotage activities against the government. Athens offered its semi-official blessings to these groups stating that there was nothing illegal about them.

By the following February the Athens government and its surrogates in Cyprus, led by the Greek-led National Guard, appeared ready to stage a coup. The Cypriot government, however, got wind of the subversive plan and moved expeditiously to foil the plot. President Makarios informed the American ambassador that the Cypriots would resist the coup and that diplomatic representatives of other countries would also be informed. Fearing that a move against Makarios would embarrass the U.S. and perhaps endanger detente, the American ambassador urged his superiors to dissuade the Colonels' intentions. Within a day this initiative bore fruit and the U.S., through Ambassador Tasca, "warned" Papadopoulos "against the use of violence or heavy stuff" (de Borchgrave, 1974:2). It appears therefore that American policymakers deplored the use of violence but condoned the "peaceful" removal of Makarios.

Adhering to Washington's insistence against the use of "heavy stuff," the praetorian government temporarily shelved its coupist plans but not its sabotage efforts. At the same time the regime unleashed a diplomatic offensive to force Makarios' resignation. On February 25, 1972, Deputy Foreign Minister Panagiotakos delivered a memorandum to Ankara's envoy in Athens criticizing Makarios as an "unstable character" and a "liar," and concluded, that "cooperation between Athens and Nicosia is not possible as long as Makarios remains president of the Cypriot Republic" (Katisis, 1976:appendix). In essence, the Greek government formally sought Turkey's assistance to remove the Archbishop from power. Turkish authorities seemed prepared to cooperate.
Prime Minister Nihat Erim stated that “Greece and Turkey wish to arrange this problem (meaning Cyprus). . . (but) Makarios is capable enough to create difficulties for the two countries” (Katsis 1976:194-196). London’s Daily Telegraph, on March 28, 1972, evaluated the emerging common front against Makarios saying that “Greece and Turkey have decided that peace in Cyprus can be possible only when Makarios has left the scene...” and added, “there are not indications that America and Britain have come to a similar conclusion. . .”

Thus, a new offensive against the Archbishop got underway and took the form of pressure from within. Calls for his resignation came from the leadership of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Following the recommendation of the Greek government, three bishops delivered an ultimatum to Makarios demanding his resignation as president on the grounds that under church law an Archbishop should not hold temporal power. Makarios refused to comply and the bishops proceeded to defrock him. With popular support behind him he went on the offensive. He invited the Supreme Synod, consisting of Orthodox Patriarchs, to judge whether he had violated canon law. The Synod met in June 1973, cleared Makarios, and moved to condemn and defrock his three antagonists (Markides, 1977:108-112). Through the use of shrewd political maneuverings Makarios survived another crisis emanating from within the most powerful social force in Cyprus, the Orthodox church. The failure of these efforts to unseat the Archbishop prompted the Athens regime to re-employ violence. But “Plan Apollo,” as the latest plot became known, was never carried out because the Cypriot intelligence uncovered the plot in August 1973, and foiled it before it had a chance to blossom.

With the failure of Apollo time ran out on Papadopoulos. In November 1973, the hardliners led by security chief Ioannidis, toppled Papadopoulos for, as they put it, he had “failed to realize the goals of the April 21, 1967 Revolution. . .” (Gregoriadis, 1975:III:131). Having said that, however, the military tacitly admitted the failure of their regime. Within a few weeks it became apparent that the new government had nothing new to offer and lacked any sense of direction and vitality. As economic and political problems worsened, so did the government’s ability to cope with them. Only a national crisis could have saved the new regime. Shortly after Ioannidis’ ascent to power Grivas died, and his death gave the new strongman far greater control over the activities of EOKA-B. In February, supported by Athens, EOKA-B set in motion an all-out effort against the Archbishop.

However, the discovery of oil deposits in the Aegean reactivated the Greco-Turkish Conflict. This along with Ioannidis’ apparent failure to reassure Turkish authorities further exacerbated Ankara’s anxieties. At the same time, Cyprus presented an opportunity to the weak coalition government of Bulent Ecevit to strengthen its political standing. One or perhaps a combination of the following considerations seem to have shaped the thinking of the Greek military rulers in
their decision to stage a coup against the Cypriot leader: removing Makarios from the scene would not meet with American opposition; Makarios’ removal would pave the way for double-Enosis which would have been sold domestically as Enosis with minor adjustments; Turkey would accept anyone as Makarios’ replacement; Ioannidis and his colleagues had become contemptuous of the Cypriots higher standard of living and lifestyle and detested the legal status that the Communist Party (AKEL) enjoyed; finally, like their civilian counterparts, they believed that the Cypriots must follow the decisions of the ethnikon kentron regarding the handling of the national question.

The Archbishop and his associates sensed that a new coup was in the offing and once again sought to neutralize it. Cyprus’ envoy to Washington was instructed to ask American officials to exert pressure on the military rulers to change their plans. Ambassador Dimitriou called on the State Department and reportedly stated “that a serious effort will be made to assassinate Archbishop Makarios...” (Stern, 1977:94). Despite the flurry of diplomatic cables indicating that a military coup was imminent, “Foggy Bottom” adhered to Kissinger’s instructions to avoid meddling in the internal policies of the Athens regime and to give primacy to the national security relationship between Washington and Athens (U.S. Intelligence, 1975).

Washington’s latest attitude did not seem to reflect a change of heart. Makarios was still considered the stumbling block toward solving the Cyprus dispute within the framework of the Western Alliance. United States policymakers wished to see the Archbishop removed but, as previously, opposed his removal by force. The failure of the State Department, to dissuade Ioannidis against the use of “heavy stuff,” as the United States had done before, stems from what appeared to have been an intelligence failure. In fact, it was said that the latest report that the State Department received hours before the coup indicated that “Ioannidis... impressed by the arguments against violence... was cooling off on his coup intentions...” (Stern, 1975:55). In the light of these murky conditions, the State Department downplayed Ambassador Dimitriou’s warnings as unconfirmed rumors—a position echoed by Secretary Kissinger’s statement shortly after the coup that “the information was not exactly lying around on the streets” (Stern, 1975:55).

Despite the general calmness about Cyprus in the State Department, there was a dissenting voice, that of Cyprus Country Director Thomas Boyatt, who repeatedly warned his superiors of an imminent move against Makarios (Stern, 1975:46-50). The higher echelons of the State Department initially ignored Boyatt’s report but eventually instructed Ambassador Tasca to warn the Greek government against the use of violence. Tasca contacted Prime Minister Androutsopoulos and expressed U.S. disapproval of violence. But the American ambassador refused to see Brigadier General Ioannidis, the real holder of power, whom he dismissed as “a cop” that “you do not make diplomatic demarches to” (de Borchgrave, 1974:34). But while Tasca was being
reassured by the “official” Greek government that there was nothing in the offing, the de facto ruler, General Ioannidis, held repeated meetings with CIA officials who apparently led him to believe that Washington would approve of his plans to move against Makarios (Stern, 1976). Ioannidis’ statement months after the July coup that “if you knew what I knew you would have done the same thing” provides evidence suggesting that the State Department and the CIA pursued contradictory policies regarding the Cyprus issue.

Sensing that diplomatic efforts were producing no results, Makarios decided to abandon his wait-and-see tactics and went on the offensive. On July 2, 1974, he sent a non-confidential letter to Greek President General Gizikis openly charging that “members of the military regime of Greece support and direct the terrorist activities of EOKA-B and the involvement of Greek officers of the National Guard in unlawful acts of conspiracy and other inadmissible conducts.” Reminding the Greek rulers that he was not its “appointed perfect...but the elected leader,” Makarios demanded the immediate “recall of all Greek officers serving in the National Guard...” (Gregoriadis, 1975: III:169-173). The Archbishop’s letter did not change Ioannidis’ intentions. The muzzled mass media in Greece mentioned nothing about Makarios’ letter. Instead, the government unleashed an angry anti-Makarios campaign. The stage was now set. On July 15, 1974, the National Guard moved against the presidential palace. Makarios was overthrown but not physically eliminated as the military rulers had hoped. Nonetheless, a pro-Enosis terrorist, Nicos Sampson, was sworn in as President of Cyprus.

The military government of Athens moved quickly to deny any involvement stressing that the coup in Cyprus was an internal affair of the Cypriot republic. But the Turkish government and the Turkish-Cypriots would not have any of that and reacted sharply to the news of the coup. Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey characterized the overthrow of Makarios as a violation of the “Treaty of Guarantee” and on July 19 stressed that “the crisis is of large dimensions and Turkey’s patience is small” (New York Times, 1974). Turkey’s long awaited opportunity had finally come. Brushing away Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco’s plea to exercise restraint and using the Treaty of Guarantee as legal justification, Turkey invaded the island by force.

Turkey’s invasion prompted the “uniformed and incompetent” Ioannidis and his equally impotent “civilian ministers,” as Ambassador Tasca described them (de Borchgrave, 1974:34), to order general mobilization and prepared to declare war against the perennial enemy to the east. The declaration of a national emergency, however, automatically brought about the reinstatement of hierarchical command in the military. The hitherto docile commanders of the three services (army, air force, navy), and the Chief of the Armed Forces, were suddenly faced with either making decisions or implementing those made by their subordinate, i.e., Brigadier Ioannidis. In their July 22 meeting the three commanders informed the Chief of the Armed Forces that their respective services were not prepared for war. Then the four generals proceeded to remove Ioannidis and to call back the old political leaders to “save” the country. Following intensive deliberation, former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis was invited from his self-imposed exile to form a civilian government. Makarios
survived the coup and eventually returned to power and the military returned to
the barracks, thus terminating almost seven years of praetorian rule.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY REGIME'S CYPRUS POLICY

On the surface, the Cypriot policy of the apostates government and that of
the military regime seem to have one thing in common: both appeared prepared
to solve the "national question" through bilateral negotiations with Turkey—a
strategy that Markarios consistently rejected. A closer look, however, reveals
that while the Stephanopoulos cabinet indicated willingness to accept a
compromise solution involving the exchange of territories without necessarily
carving up the island, the praetorian regime, despite its bombastic pro-Enosis
public pronouncements, seemed determined to proceed with a solution that
would have culminated in double Enosis i.e., partition. The pro-junta Salonika
daily, Ellinikos Vorras, most tactfully expressed the military rulers' thinking
regarding the Cyprus problem: "Because we are realists," the editorial
contended, "since no other more favorable solution is possible, our first and last
concession is double Enosis with 80 percent of Cyprus to Greece and 20
percent to Turkey." And the author rhetorically concluded: "Why was the kind
of solution possible in Thrace and not in Cyprus?" (Katsis, 1976:160). Double
Enosis in effect, had been the praetorians' Cypriot policy. But why were the
military rulers of Greece, known for their nationalism, pursuing a policy that
went contrary to the very thrust of the "Megali Idea"?3 The answer to this
question can be sought by examining the reasons underlying America's, and by
implication NATO's, posture regarding Cyprus and by exploring the Greek
military's relationship with and attitudes toward the U.S. and the North Atlantic
Alliance.

The recovery of vast oil deposits in the Fertile Crescent coupled with the
rise of nationalism in the area and the establishment of Israel propelled the
Middle East to the forefront of the rivalry between the forces of communism and
democracy. The 1956 Suez crisis and the ensuing cooling-off in the relations
between the U.S. and Egypt (largely as a result of Secretary Dulles' refusal to
commit American assistance in the building of the Aswan Dam), as well as leftist
inspired coups in Iraq and Syria increased the strategic importance of Cyprus.
The once commercial refueling station became an important observation point
paramount to the strategic interests of the U.S. and the North Atlantic
community. At no other time did America desire more to "keep the Soviet
Union . . . from gaining some foothold in Cyprus as an ally of Archbishop
Makarios or through the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) which generally
supported Makarios" than in the years following the Six Day War of July 1967
(Campbell, 1976:14). The increasingly viable presence of the Soviet fleet in the
Mediterranean and the expansion of Russian influence in the Middle East
coupled with the rise of power of Middof in Malta, and the loss of home-porting
galvanized American and NATO determination to bring the Cyprus dispute to a
close (Coufoudakis, 1976a:287). It was within this context that American policy

3 Megali Idea (Great Idea) referred to a policy designed for the redemption of the former
Byzantine territories and the establishment of a greater Greece.
makers, from President Johnson on, applied increasing pressure on Greece and Turkey to solve the Cyprus question on the basis of bilateral negotiations guided by the famous/infamous Acheson Plan.

The "Castro of the Mediterranean," as Makarios was referred to in high policy circles in Washington, had repeatedly frustrated American aims to have the Cyprus problem solved within NATO. Consequently, the Cypriot leader was seen as too unreliable for American tastes and harmful to the Atlantic Alliance's strategic goals. At the same time, the continuing existence of the Cyprus issue had become an irritant in the relations between Greece and Turkey (both members of NATO's southern flank) and was seen in Washington as "a bleeding ulcer" that had to be eradicated (Campbell, 1976:15). The thoroughly anti-communist Greek military shared Washington's apprehensions toward Makarios' neutralist stands and fully subscribed to the North Atlantic community's fear of Soviet infiltration and eventual domination of the Mediterranean basin and the oil-rich Middle East. It is also reasonable to assume that the Greek military believed that without American and NATO support the goal of keeping the Soviets out of the area could not be accomplished. Thus, as a result of ideological congruencies reinforced by professional responsibilities to protect their client—the Greek state—the Greek military maintained a close, if not a cordial relationship with the U.S. and the North Atlantic Alliance since 1951 when Greece joined NATO.

This close relationship was based not on common ideological grounds alone, but on substantive actions as well. As table 1 indicates, NATO countries and particularly the U.S. became Greece's almost exclusive arms suppliers. Moreover, the Americans through the Truman Doctrine rushed to provide assistance to the Greek military in their battle against the communist insurgents during the critical stages of the Greek Civil War (1946-1949). Such aid continued to flow in during the ensuing years as part of American economic and military aid programs authorized by the U.S. Congress in the 1950's and 1960's. For a country the size of Greece, American aid amounted to a respectable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Value^a</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
<th>G.F.R.</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Other^b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964-73</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-76</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


^a—millions of U.S. Dollars
^b—not including Warsaw Pact Nations
portion of the defense budget, thus providing impetus to the argument that the Hellenic Armed Forces had become a “penetrated” institution.

In addition to monetary aid the Greek military benefited professionally by participation in common NATO exercises and postgraduate training in western—mainly American—military schools. During the years from 1950 to 1969, it is estimated that 11,229 officers of the Hellenic Armed Forces received postgraduate training “in the dogmatically anti-communist” corps, which approximated 11,000 men, the ratio “assume(d) considerable significance” (Couloumbis, 1976:126). Additional evidence further illustrates the close relationship between the Greek military and the North Atlantic alliance. For example, it was estimated that in 1971 77 percent of the navy officers, followed by 43 percent of the air force and 34 percent of the army, possessed proficiency in one or more foreign—mainly western—languages with English by far the most widely spoken (Kourvetaris, 1976:135).

This close relationship is said to have been one of the causes of the 1967 intervention. Upon assuming power, the Greek military announced that they did so in order to forestall a communist takeover which, among other things, would have disrupted Greece’s links with NATO—an agreement supported by a small but vocal number of academics (Kousoulas, 1969). Papadopoulos lost no time in stressing the importance of the North Atlantic Alliance committed to “the preservation of peace and the defense of the strifes of the western civilization which are constantly threatened by totalitarianism” (Papadopoulos, 1968:III:77).

The results of my survey questionnaire lend additional supportive evidence regarding the attitudes of the Greek military toward NATO and the U.S. In very high percentage the responding officers indicated that NATO has been beneficial to world peace and that Greece’s membership in it has kept the country out of communist danger. An equally high number of the officers felt that Greece could not have defended herself without NATO, and regarded the country’s continuous participation in it as vital to its present and future security interests. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the respondents (evenly distributed across the three services) indicated that Greece’s membership in the North Atlantic Alliance has been very valuable to their professional interests, as has the postgraduate training they received in the Naval Postgraduate School which almost unanimously they regard as superior to its counterparts in their homeland. Almost all of the responding officers agree that Greece’s membership in NATO has improved the training and general capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces, and at the same time they recognized the need for the U.S. as the leading non-communist power to play a prominent role in formulating and implementing the organization’s strategies. The same officers view American participation in NATO as almost indispensable. With respect to the relationship between the foreign policy objectives of countries belonging to defense alliances of the NATO type, two-thirds of the respondents expressed the opinion that member-states should adopt foreign policies that are in basic agreement with the fundamental goals and intentions of the
organization, even if they are not in complete harmony with the national aspirations of the member-state. Finally, without exception the respondents felt that Greece had been a very faithful partner in the North Atlantic defense community.

The overwhelmingly positive attitudes of the Greek military regarding NATO and the U.S. contrast sharply with anti-American and anti-NATO sentiments prevalent in the Greek press during the years following the 1974 Cyprus crisis. For example, Carmocolias found the attitude of the Athens press toward the U.S. and NATO to be “critical.” This uniform stance, he observes, “is especially noteworthy in a press system where dailies (newspapers) often adopt diametrically opposed views and provide fundamentally different interpretations to public affairs depending on political party affiliation” (1981:229).

The preceding analysis provides evidence suggesting that the U.S. sought an arrangement of the Cyprus dispute within NATO, fearing that any other solution outside the North Atlantic framework would compromise the strategic interests of the West. The data also demonstrates a very close relationship between the Greek military and the NATO defense community exemplified by the very positive attitudes on the part of the Greek officers toward both the U.S. and NATO. On the basis of these, then, one can argue that the Greek military—due to professional needs such as arms, training, and general support—became highly dependent on the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance and actively pursued a U.S.—NATO desired solution to the Cyprus problem even though such a posture seemed to compromise the national aspirations of the Greek state whose interests the military swore to defend.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this paper has been to examine the impact of alliance oriented professionalism on the behavior of the military of member states of defense alliances. This paper looked at the Cyprus question and its handling by the Greek praetorian regime that culminated in the debacle of July 1974, as a result of which Turkish military forces occupied a significant portion of the island.

It appears that the North Atlantic community and its leading member the U.S. sought to solve the Cypriot dispute within the confines of the alliance. American and NATO policy makers exerted considerable pressure on the predominantly civilian Greek cabinets (from the early 1950’s to 1966) to accept a NATO sponsored solution to the problem. The data revealed that on the whole, albeit eager to compromise and at least partially accept Western proposals designed to solve the Cyprus question within NATO, these civilian cabinets consistently rejected advances involving partition of the island in Greek and Turkish sectors—an approach long advocated by Turkey. The praetorian regime on the other hand was prepared to accept such a solution and, in fact, actively pursued a policy designed to bring about double Enosis while making bombastic public statements for Enosis.

What appeared to be a contradiction between the private and public aims of
the Greek military rulers in fact seemed to have been an unconscious but nonetheless classic case of confusion between the interests of their client, the Greek state, and those of the North Atlantic alliance. In pursuing a long held NATO goal to solve the Cyprus problem through a bilateral agreement between Greece and Turkey, the Colonels apparently had come to believe that such a solution would have meant the union of a part of Cyprus with mother Greece. They felt this would have satisfied the objectives of Greece and the Greek Cypriots. In short, the Greek military saw no distinction between Enosis and partition and viewed Makarios’ opposition to such plans as an anti-enotic obstacle that had to be liquidated.

This apparent confusion cannot be said to have been the result of accidental misinterpretations of aims and events surrounding the Cyprus quagmire. Instead, as the foregoing analysis indicates, it is the result of the regime’s handling of the close relationship between the Greek military and the North Atlantic alliance. Faced with a real or perceived communist threat the Greek military saw in NATO the only party willing and able to provide them with the necessary assistance and support to accomplish their professional mission. As the date reveals, the Greek military perceived the existence of NATO as paramount and identified the survival of their client, the Greek state, (and by implication their own organization) with the goals and well being of the North Atlantic alliance. Since Western policy makers perceived that a solution of the Cyprus problem within NATO would eradicate the organization’s bleeding ulcer, the Greek military rulers appeared prepared to assist them to bring such a solution about seemingly believing that this would also be in the best interests of their profession and their country.

In sum, the findings of this paper support the position that aspects of professionalism lead the military to confuse the interests of defense alliances to which they belong with the national interests of their own country. Recent developments in Poland where the military of that nation adhering to the U.S.S.R. — Warsaw Pact line moved to crush the Solidarity movement also appear to substantiate this thesis.
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