Governance by Excess - The Case of Vietnam
(Tourism as an Instrument for Development)

Julio Aramberri
Chapter 7

GOVERNANCE BY EXCESS
The Case of Vietnam

Julio Aramberri
Dongbei University of Finance/Economics, Dalian, China

Abstract: With many great attractions, both natural and cultural, Vietnam has all the trappings of popular destinations. Over the last few years, it has developed them to a qualified success. This chapter analyzes Vietnam’s performance. In tourism development and overall, it remains lackluster because of excessive bureaucratic governance that thwarts healthy development. National authorities and specialized agencies exert massive control and stand on the way of successful economic performance. The legal framework for tourism development is a paragon of intrusive intervention in many areas that would perform better if left to the market. Keywords: Governance, development, legal framework, Vietnam National Administration of Tourism

INTRODUCTION

According to Merriam Webster (2002), the term “governance” has old roots. It has been in use since the Late Middle Ages in Europe, and derives from the Greek Κυβέρνησις, that is, the action of steering a vessel. Following a metalepsis of unknown origin, it became a synonym for ruling supremacy of a person or a group, as in government. Long time relegated in favor of...
the latter, governance has made a reentry in political and management research in the last few years. Merriam Webster defines five meanings of governance and, among them, “4a” is the one more currently employed today: “the manner or method of governing: conduct of office”. Therefore, it does not refer so much to the way in which power is organized or to its legitimacy, but to how it is put to use.

This new usage of the word started in corporate management research to probe “the system by which companies are directed or controlled” (ECGI, 1992). Additional layers of meaning have been progressively attached to refer to the way in which an organization (whether national or international, whether public or private) contributes to development; usually it is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development. Thus, development becomes the topmost attribute of governance, no matter how this goal is pursued. On its side, development has increasingly included the notion of sustainability and the relations between any organizational type and its stakeholders. In this way, governance has become a favorite in the jargon of international organizations, especially in the myriad United Nations agencies. The term has indeed some tactical advantages. On one hand, it avoids the thorny issue of legitimacy (whether power is exercised according to democratic procedures). On the other, any organization may have an efficient governance if it uses the economic and social resources of a country for sustainable development, as per the World Bank definition above. Political issues thus become secondary while technical aspects, the so-called codes of social and economic good practices, come to the fore. This may be quite helpful for United Nations agencies as it allows shunning the fact that many of its members do not qualify as democratic polities. In 2010, Freedom House (2010) claimed that only 89 countries in the world could be considered free, while the rest (104) were either partially free or not free at all. When one concentrates on other aspects, such as sustainability (not the most unequivocal of concepts either), the freedom issue becomes less relevant.

An additional use of “governance” refers to regulation. Regulation here means governmental policies oriented to the management and control of the economic and social activities of their members. One way or the other, all polities know a certain degree of regulation, although this degree may vary between two ideal types: one, total regulation (the government organizes all economic activities), as in centrally planned economies, and, two, complete freedom (where the economy is totally left to markets). In the real world of modern economies, however, the norm leads to many different
combinations of state intervention and economic freedom. Countries are usually classified according to the weight of the public sector (via taxes and public institutions), and that of the privately owned corporations and individual economic activities (Stiglitz, 2000). A complementary way of looking at the role of governance in an economy focuses on the way the private sector is regulated by governments in different ways (approval or certification of private activities; legal requisites to start business; red tape rules for enterprises, and so on).

This chapter deals with the specific type of governance (in the last two senses) applied to the tourism industry by the Vietnamese government. Tourism in this case includes all types of activities (individual or collective) related to transportation, food and beverage, hospitality, guiding, destination promotion, and others that provide goods and services for people who travel away from their usual residence for less than one year and do not undertake paid employment (the accepted statistical definition of tourism). This chapter discusses their legal framework and their organization as well as how this type of regulation fits in the overall picture of Vietnam’s economy. Therefore, tourism being but another economic sector, one first needs to understand the props of the Vietnamese economy as a whole.

VIETNAM’S HIGHLY REGULATED ECONOMY

The economic history of Vietnam after independence from France (1954) can be divided in three main periods: division of the country (1954–1975); reunification and centrally planned economy (1975–1986); and Đổi Mới economic reforms (1986–Present).

The Geneva Accords (1954) divided Vietnam into two zones at the North of the 17 parallel. They also provided that this separation would be temporary until free elections were held two years later to decide the future of the country. However, elections never happened and Vietnam remained divided between the North or Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1945–1976) and the South or State of Vietnam (1949–1955), later known as the Republic of Vietnam (1955–1975). The capital of the North was Hanoi and Saigon that of the South.

The Republic of Vietnam was a market society, heavily supported by international aid, mainly from the United States. On the template of the USSR, the North was organized as a centrally planned economy. The goal of the communists in the North, as defined by the First Five-Year Plan
(1961–1966), was the rapid transition from an agrarian society to another based on industrial development. However, the long civil war between 1959 and 1975, plus the US military intervention in the period, disrupted this project. For over 15 years, fighting pushed all of Vietnam toward a war economy with heavy losses, material as well as human, on both sides.

The North’s victory in the war ended the market experiment in the South. From then on, the country would follow the same centrally planned model applied in the communist area. It was not easy, for the absorption of the Southern economy into the new Vietnam proved more complicated than anticipated. Around one million citizens of the former Saigon regime fled. At the same time, the devastation from the war reduced the whole of the country to dire poverty and backwardness. The Second (1976–1980) and Third (1981–1985) Five-Year Plans strove to complete reconstruction and national integration, in fact with very limited success. Along the Maoist model, the Communist Party of Vietnam tried to implement collectivization for the agricultural sector, and central planning for the industry and services. The introduction of communes in the countryside failed to overcome peasant resistance, and even though industry got the lion’s share in investments, it did not have the capital or the know-how to secure a quick rebound of economic life. Soon it was felt that the model did not bear the fruits so confidently promised by the authorities (Gainsborough, 2004).

In 1979, China started a turnaround from the Maoist turmoil over the years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The Chinese Communist Party acknowledged the inefficiency of central planning and the need to unleash other productive forces beyond those controlled by the state (1979–1982), especially in agriculture and small and medium industrial companies. What followed were the so-called “Open Door” or reformist policies, kept until today with different degrees of intensity, but with high success. The Vietnamese communists, once again taking stock from the changes in China, procrastinated somewhat longer to certify the failure of their own economy, but in the end accepted the hard facts. At the 6th Party Congress in 1986, they proposed a Đổi Mới (usually translated as “Renovation”, also as “New Deal”), economic era, in fact a repudiation of the soviet model (Murray, 1997; Phạm & Vuong, 2009; Vượng, 2010).

On paper, Đổi Mới was presented as the natural transition from the planned economy to a so-called socialist market economy (Kokko, 1998). “Industrial development accelerated when individual firms, mainly State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), were allowed to determine their own prices and production” (Kokko, 2004, p. 69). In fact, even though Vietnam still adopts central or strategic plans
Dép Mới is a good example of what has been called state-guided capitalism (Baumol, Litan & Schramm, 2007).

This model calls for a strong public sector participation in the economy, while leaving some limited space to the highly regulated development of private corporations, above all small and medium industrial companies. Additionally, it is identified with the protection of national interests. In this way, the retreat from the soviet model aimed at maintaining the two fundamental Communist Party of Vietnam goals—socialism and independence. The socialist market economy tries to keep the best of two worlds. On one hand, it accepts that a significant sector of the economy works according to market principles, which offers opportunities to many Vietnamese companies and individuals while luring foreign direct investment and reducing barriers to international competition. In 2007, Vietnam became a member of the World Trade Organization. On the other, it shields, as much as possible, all domestic companies from foreign challenges, although SOE turn in the end to be the ones that fare best.

Over the years, Dép Mới has been an undisputed, but qualified success. It helped speeding the recovery from the ravages of the war and turned Vietnam into one of the fastest growing emerging economies. Between 1990 and 2010, it grew at an annual average rate of 7.3%, and per capita income almost quintupled, with a yearly growth of 5.3% since 1986 (World Bank, 2011). Even though the country still remains in the Lower Middle Income group as per the World Bank classification, many in the local population gained from the booming economy. One of its most salient achievements has been poverty reduction from 58% in 1993 to around 15% in 2008 (Singh, 2010). On the other hand, the national economy was kept in a tight bureaucratic grip that is finding it increasingly arduous to maintain the level of economic growth.

Still public sector companies (SOE) dominate Vietnam’s economy. In mid-2012, the private sector counted 436,801 operational businesses (the registered total was 647,627) and the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) expected to add another 350,000 until 2015. According to the calculations of the ministry, in 2015 small and medium industrial companies will contribute around 40% to the country’s GDP, plus 35% of capital investment, and they are expected to create around 4 million additional jobs (VietnamNet, 2012). At any rate, if MPI figures are right, in 2015 the public sector will still control at least 60% of the economy.

SOEs, which existed since the inception of the soviet-style economy, were streamlined and redesigned in 1990 as a key tool to promote quick industrialization of the country until 2020. More specifically, they were expected to invest in infrastructure and technology; to increase staff
and managerial quality; and to avoid competition from multinational corporations (Clarke, 2004). If one can put it so, they are the main conduits for national growth through import substitution. SOEs are of two kinds—corporations and groups. They are named according to the year in which their legal framework was established as Corporations 90 (single purpose companies) and Corporations 91 (business groups).

Corporations 90 can be created by Ministries and People’s Committees (local governments). They should have a minimum capital around US$25 million (500 billion Vietnamese Dongs). The creator institution appoints their top managers. In principle, Corporations 90 should operate in a limited business sector. In 2011, after some streamlining of their numbers, there were 85 Corporations 90 in Vietnam. On their side, Corporations 91 or Groups follow the South Korean chaebol pattern, or conglomerates that operate in many different areas. The Prime Minister is the only authority allowed to create Corporations 91 or groups, and he also appoints their Board of Directors composed of 7 individuals. Corporations 91 should have a minimum capital of around $50 million (1 trillion VND). Altogether, there were 11 groups in 2011. Both types of SOEs (90 and 91) contributed 34% of Vietnam’s GDP, with unequal results. Just four groups (Petro Vietnam, VNPT, Viettel, and Vietnam Rubber Group) contributed 80% of total earnings, while others faced serious losses (Le, 2011). Electricity Vietnam and Vinasihn (recently bankrupt and now under restructuration) are the best-known latter instances (Le, 2011).

The state reserves for SOEs a 100% stake in all kinds of activities directly connected to national security and defense, or considered strategic. Therefore, they are not open to private investment whether domestic or foreign. In other sectors such as transportation systems (national and urban railroads, airports, large seaports, flight control); postal services; and all media; private, and foreign investment are conditional, and companies, including those in road maintenance, international marine, railroad, and air transport, should have a public share over 50%. The government imposes a 49% foreign ownership cap in nonbank businesses listed on the Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock markets. The foreign ownership ceiling in listed and unlisted banks is 30%, with a 10% cap for individual investors (Jeffries, 2011). Approval of investments in the conditional area

requires detailed analysis of the application for investment approval, beyond that required for investment in non-conditional sectors. This may include consultation with relevant line ministries and preparation and presentation of
evidence relating to the investors’ expertise and experience in the relevant industry. In certain sectors, approval of the Prime Minister is required. Other applicable conditions may include minimum levels of investment capital, requirements for professional qualifications or insurances or limitations on the specific products or customers of the enterprise (Robinson, 2010; see also Allens-Linklaters, 2012).

SOEs have come under strong criticism from many sources, both institutional and academic (Clarke, 2004; Hayton, 2010; Le, 2011; MGI, 2012; World Bank, 2011). The main flaws in their operation appear to be easy access to privileged lines of public credit, thus crowding out private companies; big operational losses in many of them; blurry limits between governmental and managerial decisions; manager recruitment often based on political networking, not on merit and capacity; unclear regulations that opens them to all kinds of excesses and, eventually, corruption; and excessive economic protagonism that threatens overall performance of the national economy.

In the near future,

Vietnam’s challenge will be to ensure that capital is allocated across the economy in the most productive investment. What this means, in short, is that Vietnam needs less financing of unprofitable businesses, including state-owned enterprises, and improved supervision of the financial sector to ensure that investment is properly channeled to its most productive and profitable uses. Today, SOEs, which are less capital-efficient than companies in the private sector, enjoy disproportionate access to capital. Raising the productivity of Vietnam’s SOEs will be a particularly vital effort, given their continued prominence in the economy (MGI, 2012, p. 22).

Within the limits just mentioned, the Vietnamese government welcomes international capital which mainly comes as Foreign Direct Investments. Over the years, this sector has become an important source of investment. According to MPI data, from 1988 to 2011, capital of registered Foreign Direct Investment reached $228 billion, while capital effectively disbursed was $89.5 billion for a total of 13,811 projects (Vietnam Report, 2012).
Joint Ventures

Although there are other modalities (including totally foreign-owned companies), Foreign Direct Investment are mostly channeled through the establishment of Joint Ventures (JVE), following the 1987 Law on Foreign Investment and later amendments (Fukunaga, 2010; Nguyen & Meyer, 2004; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2007).

A JVE is an enterprise jointly established in Vietnam by two parties or several parties on the basis of a joint venture contract or agreement. A JVE may be established as a limited liability company and is a Vietnamese legal entity. The liability of each party is limited to the respective amount of legal capital contributed. A foreign party may make its contribution of capital in foreign currency, Vietnamese currency generated from investment activities in Vietnam, equipment, machinery, plant, building facilities, industrial property rights, technical know-how, technical processes, and technical services. The Vietnamese party to a joint venture may make its contribution of capital in Vietnamese currency, foreign currency, value of land-use rights, natural resources, value of rights to use water surface and sea surface, equipment, machinery, building facilities, industrial property, technical know-how, technical process and technical services (Treutler & King, 2007, p. 3; see also Meyer, Tran & Nguyen, 2005; Suntikul, Butler & Airey, 2009).

In a nutshell, most JVEs combine foreign capital and technical know-how with land rights and networking on the Vietnamese side. This marriage of convenience is often shotgun, because of legal requirements for foreign companies to operate in Vietnam. Therefore, JVEs are often fraught with problems between their parties (Pham, 2011).

One of the thorniest issues for JVEs in Vietnam relates to land-use rights, an issue that affects most of them, but is particularly sensitive in the case of hotels and resorts. There is no private property in or markets for land in Vietnam. Land belongs solely to the state and both Vietnamese and foreign individuals and companies can only use it according to rights granted by the government. As Vietnam is a densely populated country (276/km²), land distribution and use is an extremely delicate political issue. Only 27% of the landmass can be used for harvesting and permanent crops.
and, even though the contribution of agriculture to GDP has been dwindling since the end of the war in 1975, it reached 22% in 2011 and farming still employs 48% of the workforce (CIA, 2012).

Land being inalienable, its use is made possible by state allocation: either by direct lease from the state, by sublease from a grantee, by transfer from an existent lessee, or as capital contribution from a previous land user. In the end, all the system revolves around concessions by the state. Land-use rights are endorsed by a so-called Land Use Rights Certificate (LURC). This title is safer the closer it is to original allocation by the state. LURCs are usually valid for a definite period of time, although in some cases they may be indefinite. Residential developments for sale or lease usually get a 70-year lease renewable at the end of the first term. All leases are subject to rental fees. LURCs can be subleased and, in some cases, mortgaged or transferred (Allens-Linklaters, 2012; CTC, 2011). All this is subject to complicated legal procedures that make land-use operations extremely slow, subject to red tape, and often corrupt practices. Transparency International, a nongovernmental organization that studies corruption, ranks Vietnam as number 112 out of 182 in the world and 21 out of 35 in Asia-Pacific. Procurement procedures and land management are two of the areas where corruption was widespread in Vietnam in 2011 (TI, 2012).

The two main categories of land use in Vietnam are agricultural, non-agricultural (residential and business), and LURCs state which one they are granted for. Zoning and planning are administrative operations conferred to each level of government, meaning that in many cases the final authority will be with local People’s Committee. The use of those land rights has to be consistent with the plans adopted by the granting authorities for the specific location. However, these authorities can change the LURC land use in agreement with the existing statutes. But, as legal regulation is usually murky and cumbersome, in many cases LURC holders of small plots are powerless against abuses.

It is difficult to get reliable numbers for land disputes, but they seem to have been on the rise over the last few years, as a consequence of various causes: renewal of original leases after they had run their course, change of land use from agricultural to residential in the outer areas of expanding cities, and land subject to eminent domain for the construction of roads. Lessees affected by those changes are supposed to be compensated either in money or with certificates for new land, but a number of serious disputes arise because many people feel railroaded by officials colluding with powerful business people. The compensation they obtain after expropriation is
too low or they have to change their lifestyle in the new areas where they are made to settle.

At the beginning of 2012, national media focused on the case of Doan Van Vuon, a fish farmer in the vicinity of Haiphong, the big port city of the North. Mr. Vuon resisted eviction from his land, which was to be repossessed at the end of his 20-year lease in 2013, even using a rifle. As a consequence, police and army forces occupied his farm and razed his home, while he was indicted for attempted murder. Media probing showed that he was the victim of official malfeasance and that the responsibilities extended to high-level local apparatchiki in Haiphong. As the uproar grew, the Prime Minister finally ordered an investigation into the affair that helped calm down the ruckus (Marr, 2012). But many other cases receive less media attention and their protagonists remain uncompensated. Therefore, “land disputes continue to be the hottest political issue in Vietnam, far more corrosive to the legitimacy of the Communist Party than calls for multiparty democracy” (Hayton, 2010, pp. 982–983).

Regulating Tourism

Vietnam started developing tourism later than other countries of Southeast Asia. The industry’s performance between 1995 and 2011 has been encouraging, but not sparkling, as public sector regulations and the limits to JVE operations often act like a straightjacket for the development of tourism in Vietnam (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>'000</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>'000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,782</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,331</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,628</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: VNAT (2012).
Vietnam National Administration of Tourism (VNAT) expected that the number of foreign arrivals would top 6.5 million in 2012. However, the history of VNAT forecasting has not been impressive, as its all-too-ambitious plans often did not match reality. At any rate, this is a minor issue, as the numbers of international arrivals seldom rank uppermost in terms of economic performance. They may boast national pride, but tourism development has to be measured by its contribution to the national economy and general wellbeing. In this facet, Vietnam’s accomplishments do not fare well in comparison with other countries of Southeast Asia (Table 2).

In general, Vietnam runs low on most indicators in the table, but especially in the per capita income from the tourism industry. At any rate, every single country in the region, including Cambodia, the Philippines, and Laos, outperforms Vietnam in the score. The conclusion seems obvious: Vietnam’s tourism is not performing at the top of its potential.

It does not mean that tourism is unimportant for Vietnam’s economy or that there are no good opportunities for investors, as its activities are open to both national and foreign financing. In fact, one finds many international hotel brands, international travel companies, and food franchises doing business in the country (Suntikul, Butler & Airey, 2008). Since the 1990s, even with the previous proviso, Vietnam’s tourism economy has been growing. However, excessive regulation inhibits a more complete success.

Table 2. Southeast Asia: Main Tourism Variables (2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Incomea</th>
<th>Domestic Tourism (%)</th>
<th>TI 2011b (%GDP)</th>
<th>TI 2011c (US$ Million)c</th>
<th>TI 2011d (US$ per capita)c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>LI</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>LMI</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>LMI</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>UMI</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>18,779</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>LMI</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7,659</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>HI-NO</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>9,680</td>
<td>2,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>UMI</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>20,213</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>LMI</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3,809</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aAs per World Bank ranking: LI, Low Income; LMI, Lower Middle Income; UMI, Upper Middle Income; HI-NO, High Income, Non-OECD member.
bTI is the Tourism Industry or Direct T&T Contribution to GDP. Definition as per WTTC (2012a).
cUS$ at current exchange rates as on November 30, 2012.
The legal framework for tourism development in Vietnam harks back to the 2005 “Law on Tourism”. This legal text follows the usual Vietnamese pattern of excessive regulation followed in other economic sectors. It can be summarized in two principles: bureaucratic planning of all activities of tourism and highly controlled regulation of its limited markets.

Article 6 on “Tourism Development Policies” reserves for the state nearly all activities leading a well performing sector. The State is in charge of mobilizing every resource to ensure the development of tourism; accordingly, it will provide incentives and preferential policies on land, finance, and credit for companies of tourism, national and foreign, that protect its resources and the environment, conduct publicity and promotion, train and develop human resources, research and develop new tourism products, modernize its activities; improve infrastructures and transportation, and develop tourism in remote and isolated areas.

The overall planning mechanism is developed in articles 17–21. All tourism-related activities should be planned via general master plans or specific plans. Master plans may encompass the whole country, tourism zones, provinces, the five centrally run cities (Hanoi, HCMC, Can Tho, Da Nang, and Haiphong), and national resorts. Specific plans will address special areas or products. Each one of these plans must fit into the national economic strategy and, for those at a level lower than the whole country, also follow the directives of the national tourism master plan. Plans at all levels should preserve tourism resources and promote national cultural identity (the law does not define what this means). Additionally plans should promote the strength of each region and locality to create unique tourism products. The Law goes into very fine details as to the contents of master plans, which should include land-use needs, required investment capital and manpower to be employed. Plans should as well include an assessment of environmental impacts and measures to protect the natural habitat.

The specific competence to formulate and implement tourism development plans depends on their spatial range. General national plans and those that encompass more than one province fall under the authority of what the law calls the central-level State administrative agency in charge of tourism—a role reserved to VNAT, which operates within the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism. Plans for provinces and the five centrally run cities fall within the purview of their People’s Committees, which have to request VNAT’s advice in devising them.

Once plans are approved, the responsible agency shall publicize them for general knowledge. All tourism development projects shall comply with the requisites and procedures stated in the plans. Provincial-level People’s
Committees shall allocate land for tourism infrastructure works, physical and technical facilities in tourism cities, resorts and spots in accordance with decided, approved, and promulgated development plans; and they shall not assign or lease land to investment projects which are contrary to these plans or other approved investment projects or to those that will exert negative impacts on tourism resources and the environment. All organizations and individuals must strictly follow their approved development plans and shall neither encroach upon nor illegally use land areas already planned for tourism development. In a nutshell, a crucial component of tourism development—land use—can only be granted by the different levels of the bureaucratic machinery and only to those projects that are considered as faithfully following its requirements.

How do the different tourism promoters fit into this scheme? The rest of the law specifies in minute detail the requisites they have to fulfill and their obligations in order to be considered legitimate players. In general, they have to obtain approval of different agencies in order to start, determine, modify, and reorient their activities. Regulations are especially stringent for companies, and even more when they want to participate in international tourism. Foreign companies that want to operate in Vietnam’s tourism should do so through joint ventures or other legal options. When it comes to hospitality business, the law reserves to VNAT and provincial agencies the right to classify establishments in different categories and to inspect them. Guiding activities request the issuance of a guide’s card whether domestic or international. Only Vietnamese nationals, residing in the country and having full legal status quo, can get them.

In a nutshell, multi-layered bureaucracies do not only decide through planning what should count as tourism development, but they also can choose who will be allowed to participate and by what means. So much interference makes unnecessarily difficult to start tourism companies, generates uncertainty among eventual investors, and creates plenty of opportunities for individual kickbacks and widespread corruption. The system is accordingly fraught with inefficiencies that do not bode well for successful development. A few cases may illustrate this point.

Sometimes, the bureaucracy cannot deliver its side of the deal (land-use rights), even though it has certified the entrepreneurs and stamped their projects (Suntikul et al., 2009). In 2009, Low Keng Huat, a Singaporean company, obtained an investment certificate to build a hotel, an office building, and a residential development in Vung Tau, a beach resort close to Saigon. The project cost was $80 million and would be completed in 2014. However, in 2012 the company had not received the pledged land
(3.15 hectares). Other residential and leisure projects in the area faced similar hurdles. Winvest, with a $4.1 billion investment project (Saigon Atlantic), certified in 2006, had only got 100 of its 307 promised hectares in 2012. The Skybridge Dragon Sea project ($907 million) was also waiting for its allocated 45 hectares. The local bureaucracy could not complete the required land clearance because of complaints from previous lessees. In order to assuage their resistance, the government approved a 2009 decree that increased support for farmers affected by a change in land use from agriculture to industrial or residential investments. The decree stated that they had to get compensation 1.5–5 times higher than actual market value at the time of the final clearance, but the long time elapsed in bureaucratic decisions between investment certification and final land clearance made the final costs climb too high for some investors (Ngoc, 2012).

Other times, it is plainly the bureaucratic maze what makes changes in joint ventures extremely complicated and hazardous. In 1994, Thang Loi Investment Trade and Tourism and Singapore Chng Holdings formed a 30-year JVE to establish and manage the Fortuna hotel in Hanoi. Thang Loi was a SOE belonging to Vietnam Cooperative Alliance (a state agency that gathers under its umbrella and controls all cooperatives in Vietnam), and both parties agreed that they would transfer ownership of the hotel to this agency, at no cost, at the end of the lease. The hotel had huge losses at the beginning of its operation and Vietnam Cooperative Alliance, the owner of Thang Loi, negotiated a reduction of its exposure by lowering its stake in the JVE from 40% to 30%. MPI approved the plan in 1997, extending the lease to the company to 35 years instead of the original 30. However, in 2002 the government’s inspectorate objected to the plan. Later, in 2008, under new legislation, the parties to the JVE agreed that Thang Loi would sell its stake in the company to the Singaporean partner, omitting the latter’s obligation to free transfer of ownership to Vietnam Cooperative Alliance at the end of the lease. However, the Ministry of Finance did not accept the agreement and requested that the buyout be done in compliance with the initial contract (including final free transfer of ownership). As a consequence, the buyout did not take place (Huu, 2010).

Other times, it looks as though new entrants in the tourism business are pushed to throw in the towel because of bureaucratic obstruction. In February 2010, in a flashy ceremony in Hanoi, the Malaysian Prime Minister and Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister witnessed the signing of an agreement between Air Asia and VietJet, a local low-cost airline. Air Asia was to buy 30% of the latter’s capital and they would start a JVE transportation. Air Asia is one of the best-known low-cost carriers in Asia, and the
new company would be named VietJet Air Asia. It would operate both
domestic and international flights in Vietnam. As soon as the news spread,
“newspapers in Vietnam reported that Vietnam Airlines had protested to
the Prime Minister […] alleging that the new joint venture would just sim-
ply open Vietnam’s domestic aviation market to Air Asia’s predatory beha-
viors” (Citrinot, 2010). Vietnam Airlines is the national flag carrier and it
seemed to be wary of increased competition even though the Vietnamese air
travel market keeps on expanding. The Vietnamese government, though,
declared that the partial buyout of VietJet was within the law, and a maiden
flight was announced for October 2010. Sometime later, the Civil Aviation
Administration of Vietnam took issue with the proposed use of Air Asia
logo on the company’s planes and with other regulatory matters, which led
the Malaysian carrier to abandon the project in October 2011.

None of these and similar developments are highly encouraging for for-
eign and domestic investors in the tourism industry of Vietnam. As the
market is still expanding, many companies will ignore the warnings, but
whenever it will slow its pace—something that is bound to happen within
the next few years—they will have second thoughts.

The Irrepressible Regulator

According to the 2005 “Law on Tourism”, VNAT represents the maximum
authority in matters of tourism in the country. In 2007, it was embedded in
the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism and its Director General
reports to the Minister, but his decisions and policies carry much weight. In
this respect, VNAT is best known by the public for its promotional activ-
ities, but unlike many of its peers in the international tourism arena, its
functions extend way beyond that. According to its websites,

VNAT is a Governmental Agency which exercises the state
management functions over tourist operations and activities
throughout country. It has full control in terms of business
development, planning, public relations, personnel training,
conducting research, instructing and inspecting the implemen-
tation of policies and other regulations in the tourism sector
(VNAT, 2012).

The organizational chart includes two main areas: business and nonbusi-
ness related. The former includes the support units for the Director General
and his Deputy. They are the departments of: travel, hotel, finance,
marketing, international cooperation, and personnel and organization. Leaving aside the latter department, which deals with in-house management of budget, payrolls, personnel, and staff training, the other departments have a great number of functions vis-à-vis public and private travel and hospitality companies.

The Travel Department is the agency that advises the Director General on the management of travel activities of all kinds, including travel companies (tour operators and travel agencies), travel guides and guiding, transportation of tourists by domestic and foreign companies and individuals, plus tourist resorts, routes and sites within the national territory. It should provide guidelines and long-term plans for all travel operations; draft travel related legislation; elaborate strategic plans and implement them after approval; control the implemental activities of all other tourism agents; propose the granting, extension, or cancellation of licenses for foreign companies; coordinate the activities of provincial and local tourism agencies; organize conferences, seminars, and exhibitions; foster international cooperation; provide skills training for travel operators; advise on the establishment of travel, guiding, and transport associations; and inspect travel companies and handle violations of the law. Similar functions—extensive, detailed and intrusive—in the operation of hotel and other accommodation providers are the purview of the Hotel Department. The Finance Department deals with tourism statistics, and evaluates and participates in the implementation of all programs, plans, and investment projects for tourism development in Vietnam. In sum, these three departments control the practical totality of tourism development and operations in the country.

The other two departments have functions more comparable to those of other national tourism agencies. The International Cooperation Department participates in the negotiation and conclusions of international agreements and maintains relations with other national representatives while the Marketing Department is entrusted with researching and forecasting tourism products in the country and abroad; coordination and guidance of other agencies to participate in national and international marketing activities; and public relations and advertising campaigns.

Additionally, VNAT maintains other departments to gather and share expertise on different areas. The Tourism Information Technology Center provides information, research, and application of information technology for the tourism industry, and provides consulting services, engineering, information technology applications, and information services for the promotion of tourism, among other functions. The Institute for Tourism Development Research deals with strategy research, planning and
management policies, and development of tourism management services. Tourism Publications edits a number of journals (the best known being *Vietnam Tourism Review* and magazines; provides information on the activities of the department; and, also quite important, cooperates with media agencies and other organizations and individuals at home and abroad (i.e., orients public opinion in matters touristic).

Like other agencies of the Vietnamese government, VNAT does not volunteer much information about its current tasks and activities. Beyond a cursory description of its formal structure, it is very difficult to obtain data on budget, short-term strategies, and effective links with other governmental agencies and private companies. One of its tasks is the design of long-term strategic plans for the development of tourism in the country. It has not been possible to obtain the full text of the new plan for this chapter, but its main aspects are already in the public domain (Ngamsangchaikit, 2012; VOV, 2012), and a summary was presented at different conferences (Ha, 2012). The plan covers the 2012–2020 period and even anticipates some forecasts for 2030. Its basic goal is to turn tourism into a strategic engine for the Vietnamese economy, through high professionalism, modern infrastructures, and competitive quality products.

The plan projects a threefold increase in international arrivals between 2012 and 2030, reaching 18 million in the latter year and 14 million in 2020. The number of domestic tourists will double between 2015 and 2030 from 35 to 70 million. Total contribution of tourism to GDP will go from 3.5% in 2005 to 6.5–7% in 2020, and international receipts will grow fourfold between 2015 and 2030. Total employment in tourism (both directly and indirectly) will double between 2015 and 2030. The plan also pledges special attention to environmentally sustainable tourism. By 2015, it hopes, environmental impacts will be 100% controlled, and 90% of tourism establishments will reach acceptable environmental standards. By 2020, all of the latter will have achieved the 100% level, while 50–60% of tourism products will be certified as environmentally friendly.

The plan is overly sanguine and should be taken with the proverbial grain of salt. Projections that reach for nearly 20 years (2012–2030) tend to be shaky. Additionally there is no way to contradict its overall figures without knowing the methodology used to reach them, which VNAT does not share. However, there is one item which can be used to make some educated guesses—the projected numbers of international tourists.

UNWTO forecasts that international tourism will reach 1.6 billion arrivals in 2020 and 1.8 billion in 2030. The total for 2011 was 983 million. In this year, the market share of Southeast Asia in the world was 7.8%,
with 77.2 million arrivals. Table 3 calculates the number of arrivals in the different countries of Southeast Asia in 2020 and 2030 if the market share of the subregion and that of individual countries remains equal to the 2011 one.

It was claimed above that tourism in Vietnam is not performing to the top of its potential. However, it would be difficult to blame its slow development only on VNAT’s future plans. VNAT and many other national Destination Management Organizations are prone to wishful thinking, but soon the markets downsize their plans to more modest dimensions. Much more worrying for national tourism than the grandstanding, though, is the overextended power of the Vietnamese regulators. VNAT might dream of an ever more pleasant future for the development of tourism, and few investors would notice. However, as long as it has to put its seal of approval on all the main aspects of tourism development, Vietnam will lag behind other Southeast Asian countries that have reduced administrative fiat and allowed markets more breathing space.

**CONCLUSION**

It is not true that tourism is an important, even strategic economic activity for most countries, because it is unequally distributed over the world. Tourism only thrives in a few clusters (Aramberri, 2010). Luckily for
Vietnam, the country finds itself in one of them—the North-Southeast Asia corridor—close to the main feeder markets (China, Japan, South Korea), and in the middle of an area (Southeast Asia) that counts 600 million inhabitants. Definitely, with many great attractions, both natural and cultural, Vietnam has all the trappings of popular destinations.

Over the last few years, it has developed them to just a qualified success. Tourism has grown and its contribution to GDP is significant. However, Vietnam has been unable to reduce the distance with the most competitive destinations in the region (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, even Cambodia). In terms of dollars per capita generated by tourism, both international and domestic, or of the overall quality of its tourism, Vietnam is not up to its promise. Below the official celebrations and the grand schemes of the authorities, one feels a certain degree of jadedness among tourism professionals and consumers.

This chapter offers an explanation to the malaise. Vietnam’s economic performance, in tourism and overall, remains lacklustre because of excessive bureaucratic regulations that thwart its healthy development. The legal framework for tourism is a paragon of intrusive intervention in areas that would be better left to the forces of the market. Anybody wanting to start a tourism business has to go through extenuating exertions. They need certificates of approval for their intended activities, which are very narrowly defined; they have to comply with the numerous master plans of local or national authorities; if they form a company, social goals cannot be easily redefined without approval; they cannot buy the grounds where they intend to develop their business, instead they have to be granted land-use certificates; if they represent a foreign company, they should form a JVE with a local one, and all those steps become more and more difficult; if some local interests feel threatened by new entrants, the latter may find so many obstacles ahead of them that they may wind up throwing in the towel. Last but not least, some officials may request kickbacks in order to facilitate a smoother navigation of all of the above.

For the time being, with tourism flooding many Southeast Asian destinations, there will always be investors ready to accept such inconveniences in the hope that good business will compensate their headaches. However, once competition increases and benefits come back to average in the medium term, the relatively short chasm in competitiveness that exists today between Vietnam and other, less bureaucratic polities in its neighborhood may and will grow significantly.

Presuming that the quandary might be solved with better governance in the narrow sense of the term seems naive. It is not procedures and
well-meaning regulations that Vietnam lacks. It has them all and then some. However, as the agencies that apply them are not accountable to the public, it is difficult to expect that better practices, more personnel training, and clear operation manuals might increase efficiency and make the country more competitive. What Vietnam needs in order to unleash the many assets it possesses, both in general and in the tourism sector industry, and to become more successful is to bring about a more open society. Such a discussion, though, exceeds the boundaries of this contribution.
References

Acemoglu (Ed.).

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J.

Acosta, J.

Adams, W., Aveling, R., Brockington, D., Dickson, B., Elliott, J., Hutton, J., ... Wolmer, W.

Adelman, I., & Morris, C.

Adler, P., & Kwon, S.

Agarwal, S.


Aghion, P., & Howitt, P.

Agrawal, A., & Gupta, K.

Ahn, B., Lee, B., & Shafer, C.
References


Ashley, C., Roe, D., & Goodwin, H.

Atkinson, D.

Australian Bureau of Statistics.
(2011). *National regional profile: Torres Strait Island.* Canberra: ABS.

Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs.

Baggio, R., & Scott, N.

Baggio, R., Scott, N., & Cooper, C.

Balaguè, J., & Brualla, P.
(2001). La planificació´n del destino turı´stico en el siglo XXI. In *La gestio´n eficaz de un destino turı´stico del s XXI.* Barcelona: Educatur.

Balaguer, T., & Cantavell-Jorda, M.

Baran, P.

Baran, P., & Sweezy, P.

Barbini, B., Biasone, A., Cacciuto, M., Castellucci, D., Corbo, Y., & Roldán, N.
(2011). *Gobernanza y turismo: Análisis del estado del arte.* In Simposio Internacional Gobernanza y Cambios Territoriales, October 20–22s, Pucón, Chile.

Bardhan, P.

Barrado, D.

Barro, R., & Lee, J.


References 339


References


References


References

dekadt, E.
dekadt, E. (Ed.).
der la Fuente, A., & Doménech, R.
denison, E.
departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE).
department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT).
department of Resources Energy and Tourism.
department of Statistics.
department of Tourism (DoT).
diamond, J.
dieke, P.
Dirección Provincial de Ordenamiento Urbano y Territorial.
Doğrul, F.
(2012). Bölgesel kalkınma ve kalkınma ajansları. Istanbul: TÜRKONFED.
Domar, E.
DPT (Devlet Planlama Teşkilati).
Dredge, D.
Dredge, D., & Jenkins, J.
Dredge, D., & Pforr, C.
Dritsakis, N.
Drucker, P.
Durbarry, R.


Escobar, A. 


Esteve, R. 

ETA (Egyptian Tourism Authority). 

ETF (Egyptian Tourism Federation). 

ETFHRDUNIT. 

Eu-ssdp. 

Euromonitor. 

EuropeAid. 

Farrell, B., & Twining-Ward, L. 

Fayos-Solà, E. 


Fayos-Solà, E., Fuentes, L., & Muñoz, A. 
References


Fayos-Sola, E., García, P., & Moreda, A.


Fayos-Sola, E., & Jafari, J. (Eds.).


Fayos-Sola, E., & Pedro, A.


Fayos-Sola, E., Ruhanen, L., de Bruyn, C., Muñoz, A., Fuentes, L., & Fernández, A.


Felsenstein, D., & Fleischer, A.


Figueredo, R., & Rozo, E.


Financial Times.


Finnish Tourism Board.


Font, X.


Fontana, F.

Fontela, E., & Pulido, A.  

Fortanier, F., & van Wijk, J.  

Fox, J.  

Frank, A.  

Franke, S.  

Frechtling, D.  

Freedom House.  

Freire, M., Teijeiro, M., & Blázquez, F.  

Fuentes, L.  

Fuentes, L., & Muñoz, A.  

Fukunaga, Y.  
References


Fukuyama, F.

Future Brand.

Fyall, A., Oakley, B., & Weiss, A.
(2000). Theoretical perspectives applied to inter-organisational collaboration on Britain’s inland waterways. Hospitality Tourism Administration, 1, 89–112.

Gainsborough, M.

Gardela, R., & Aguayo, E.

Gee, C., & Fayos-Solà, E. (Eds.).

George, S.

Giddens, A.

Giménez, G., López-Pueyo, C., & Jaime, S.

Glaeser, E.

Go, F., & Govers, R.
Go, F., & Trunfio, M.  

González, A.  

González, A., & Hernández, J.  


Gordon, P.  

Government Monitor.  

Goymen, K.  

Granovetter, M.  


Grant, J.  

Gray, C.  

Green Star Hotel.  

Griffin, C.  

Grönroos, C.  

Grootaert, C., & van Bastelaer, T.  
Guisán, M.


Guisan, M., Aguayo, E., & Carballas, D.

Gunn, C.


Ha, V.

Håkansson, H., & Johanson, J.

Håkansson, H., & Snehota, I.

Halkier, H.

Hall, C.

Hall, C. M.


Henderson, J.

HEPCA.

Hercowitz, M.

Hernández Martín, R., & Santana-Talavera, A.

Hicks, N., & Streeten, P.

Hinch, T., & Butler, R.

Hirn, S., & Markkanen, E.

Hirsch, P., & Levin, D.

Hjalager, A.-M., Konu, H., Huijbens, E., Björk, P., Flagstad, A., Nordin, S., & Tuohino, A.

Hohl, A., & Tisdell, C.

Hollingsworth, J., Schmitter, P., & Streeck, W.


References


Katircioglu, S.

Keech, M.

Keller, P.

Kelliher, F., Foley, A., & Frampton, A.

Kendrick, J.

Kerr, G.

Keyman, F.

Khan, H., Chou, F., & Wong, K.

Kim, H., Chen, M., & Jang, S.

Kim, K., Uysal, M., & Sirgy, M.

Klein, N.

Klijn, E.
References

Knack, S.

Knebel, J.

Ko, T.

Kokko, A.


Kong, L.


Konu, H., Tuohino, A., & Björk, P.

Kotler, P., & Gerner, D.

Kozak, M., & Martin, D.

Krugman, P.

Kumar, A.

Kuper, D., Ramírez, L., & Troncoso, C.

Kuzey Anadolu Kalkınma Ajansı.
References 361


Kwon, D.


Kyriacou, G.


Lagendijk, A., Kayasu, S., & Yasar, S.


Lane, B.


Lansing, P., & De Vries, P.


Lau, L., Jamison, D., & Louat, F.


Le, T.


López, M., Anato, M., & Rivas, B.

Lucas, R.

Lue, C., Crompton, J., & Fesenmaier, D.

Luque, R.

Lutz, W., Goujon, A., Samir, K., & Sanderson, W.

Macbeth, J.

Madrid, F.


Magdoff, H., & Sweezy, P.

Mahbub ul Haq.

Maleki, E.

Manrique, C.

Mapunda, G.

References 363

Downloaded by University of Sussex Library At 16:59 20 May 2016 (PT)
References


Merriam Webster.


Meyer, K., Tran, Y., & Nguyen, H.


MGI (McKinsey Global Institute).


Mill, R., & Morrison, A.


Mincer, J.


Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, Viceministerio de Turismo y Departamento Nacional de Planeación.


Ministerio de Economía de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.


Ministerio de Cultura.


Ministry of Culture and Tourism.


Ministry of Development.


MINTUR Ministerio de Turismo de la Nación.


Miossec, J.


366 References

MITA.

MITA and STPB.

Mitchell, R., Wooliscroft, B., & Higham, J.

MND.

Morgan, D.

Mossberg, L.

MOT (Ministry of Tourism).


MTI.


Muhanna, E.

Murdy, S., Pike, S., & Lings, I.
References

Murphy, P., & Price, G.  

Murray, G.  

Muñoz, A.  

Myrdal, G.  

Narayan, D., & Pritchett, L.  

Navarro, F., Schlüter, R., & Adriani, H.  

Nehru, V., Swanson, E., & Dubey, A.  

Neira, I.  

Nelson, F.  

Nelson, R., & Phelps, E.  

Ngamsangchaikit, W.  


References


Pennington-Gray, L., & Holdnak, A.  

PEPBA.  

Pérez, F., Montesinos, V., Serrano, L., & Fernández, J.  

Pérez-Ducy de Cuella, E.  

Pérez, F., Montesinos, V., Serrano, L., & Fernández, J.  

Pforr, C.  

Pham, D.  

Pham, M., & Vương, Q.  

Piglia, M.  

Pike, S.  

Pikkemaat, B., & Weiermair, K.  

Pine, J., & Gilmore, J.  
References

Place, S.

Plog, S.

Portela, M., & Neira, I.

Porter, M.

Potts, T., Backman, K., Uysal, M., & Backman, S.

Prasharad, C., & Ramaswamy, V.

Prats, F., & Manchón, F.

Presenza, A.

Psacharopolous, G., & Arriagada, A.

Putnam, R.

Putnam, R., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R.

Queensland Government Department of Employment and Training.
Rady, A.

Rajotte, F.

Rapport, D., Hildén, M., & Wepping, K.

Rawls, J.

Red de Turismo Sostenible de Colombia.

Reid, D.

Republic of South Africa.

RETOSA.

Rhodes, R.

Ritchie, J., & Crouch, G.

Rivero, J.

Robinson, A.

Robinson, J.

Rodríguez, A., Díaz, P., Ruiz-Labourdette, D., Pineda, F., Schmitz, M., & Santana, A.
(2010). Selection, design and dissemination of Fuerteventura’s projected tourism image (Canary Isles). In S. Favro & C. Brebbia (Eds.), *Island sustainability* (pp. 13–24). Southampton: WITPRESS.
Rodrik, D.  

Romer, P.  

Rondinelli, D.  

Rostow, W.  

Rozo, E.  

Ruggeri, J., & Yu, W.  

Ruhannen, L.  

Ruiz, E., Hernández, M., Coca, A., Cantero, P., & del Campo, A.  

Russell, R.  

Russell, R., & Faulkner, B.  

Russo, A., & Segre, G.  

Rylance, A.  
Sampson, R.  

Sánchez, J.  

Sancho, A., Cabrer, B., García, G., & Pérez, J.  

Santana-Talavera, A.  

Sarlin, A., Nygrund, S., & Meriruoho, A.  

Sautter, E., & Leisen, B.  

Scarpetta, S., & Tressel, T.  

Schilner, D.  

Schlüter, R.  

Schultz, T.  

Schultz, T. (Ed.).  

Schultz, T.  


Schumpeter, J.  

Schymck, P.  

Scott, N.  
References


References

Sofield, T.  

Solow, R.  

Soteriou, E., & Coccossis, H.  

South African Tourism (SAT).  

Spagnolo, G.  

Spenceley, A., & Meyer, D.  

SRI.  

Stansfield, C., & Rickert, J.  

STB.  
Stefanos, K.  

Stewart, F.  

Steyn, J., & Spencer, J.  

Stiglitz, J.  


STPB.  

Strobl, A., & Peters, M.  

Such, M., Zapata, S., Risso, W., Brida, J., & Pereyra, J.  

Suntikul, W., Butler, R., & Airey, D.  


Sutcliffe, B.  

Tamer, A.  

Tamma, M.  
References


References

Trakya Kalkınma Ajansı.

Travel and Relax project plan.

Treuren, G., & Lane, D.

Treutler, T., & King, J.

Trousdale, W.

Trout, J.

Turkish Government.

Türkiye Tarih Vakfı.

Turner, L.

UK.
UMP.

UNDP.

Unger, J., Rauch, A., & Freire, M.

UNWTO.

URA.

URAK (Uluslararası Rekabet Araştırmaları Kurumu).
References


References

Virtanen, E.

VNAT (Vietnam National Administration of Tourism).

VOV (The Voice of Vietnam Radio).

Vuông, Q.

Wahab, S., & Pigram J. (Eds.).

Wallingre, N.

Wang, Y., & Davidson, M.

Wang, Y., Wu, C., & Yuan, J.

Wanhill, S.

WCED.

WDA.

Weaver, D.

Weintraub, E.
References

Weiss, T.

Wildlife Reserves.

Williamson, J.

Wolfensohn, J.

Woolcock, M.

Woolcock, M., & Narayan, D.

World Bank.


World Bank Group.

World Commission on Environment and Development.

World Economic Forum.


World Economic Forum (WEF).


References

