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Article
Regulatory Effectiveness in Onshore and Offshore Financial Centers
Virginia Journal of International Law (2013)
  • Andrew P. Morriss
  • Clifford Chad Henson
Abstract

Onshore jurisdictions, such as the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany, are critical of offshore financial centers (OFCs), such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Channel Islands. Arguments against OFCs include claims that their regulatory oversight is lax, allowing fraud and criminal activity. In this article, we present cross-jurisdictional data, showing that OFCs are not lax. We also provide qualitative analyses of regulatory effectiveness, demonstrating that input-based measures of regulation are inappropriate metrics for comparing jurisdictions. Based on both quantitative input measures and a qualitative assessment, we reject the onshore critique of OFCs as bastions of laxity.

Publication Date
2013
Citation Information
Andrew P. Morriss and Clifford Chad Henson. "Regulatory Effectiveness in Onshore and Offshore Financial Centers" Virginia Journal of International Law Vol. 53 (2013)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/clifford_henson/10/