Beyond Eurocentrism: The Frankfurt School and Whiteness Theory

Clay Steinman, Macalester College

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/clay_steinman/6/
Beyond Eurocentrism: The Frankfurt School and Whiteness Theory

Clay Steinman

People make their own history, but they do not make it out of whole cloth; they do not make it out of conditions chosen by themselves, but out of such as they find close at hand. The tradition of all past generations weighs like an alp on the brains of the living.

—Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*

As a white and mostly European enterprise, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School has reparations to pay. The reasons are structural, not biographical. The wealth—the spectacular economic growth—of Europe and later the United States made possible critical theory’s development, providing the conditions that supported its practice as well as its objects of analysis. Yet the colonial basis of much of this wealth remained distant, suffering peripheral to critical theory’s explicit concerns. The debt and its accumulated interest endure, to be repaid if in small measure with engaged theoretical work, particularly work that introduces critical race theory to critical theory, of which the essay by Susan Buck-Morss discussed in this chapter should be considered exemplary. This engagement would reinvigorate critical theory as “minor” theory, in the language of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, theory alive as “crystals of becoming whose value is to trigger uncontrollable movements and deterritorializations of the mean or majority,” theory reverberating with the voices of silenced or subdued minorities, articulated through forms conscious of their recombinations. These are terms true to critical theory’s emancipatory project.

Reparations would first acknowledge the dispossessed, their specific historical presence, and then take seriously their claims on Western intellectual culture. Such efforts would ask whether critical theory can *in theory* adequately
address issues of race, of colonial domination and its residual toxicity, of an emancipation that decenters Enlightenment conceptions of the good life in favor of an openness to what centuries of thinkers conceived of as the animal barbarism of the dark and unwashed. If "cultural criticism must become social physiognomy," then critical theory must illuminate the white barbarism on which Enlightenment culture and its own critique in the last instance rest.

This seems more productive than, for example, yet again indicting Theodor W. Adorno for his hostility to jazz. Instead, it might be possible to see what critical theory itself can contribute to its own assessment, by working through the critique of Adorno on jazz while examining the racial politics of The Authoritarian Personality, for decades in the United States the most widely known work of the Frankfurt School. The Authoritarian Personality sought to measure and account for domestic racism after World War II, concentrating on the relationship between anti-Semitism and psychological and social structures of domination. Adorno played a major role in the project; Max Horkheimer was its key administrator.

Richard Leppert, Evelyn Wilcock, and others have maintained against ad hominem dismissals that Adorno’s essays on jazz were fundamentally antiracist in their attention to appropriation and domination. Permeated by dialectical thought, Adorno’s essays, argued in nonlinear form, are rarely of simple character. Product of an elite German education, Adorno wrote with prejudice against the commercial, and he did not know jazz to anything like the extent he knew the music of high art. His writing—most of it dating from the 1930s and the early 1950s, when long-playing records with extended improvisation were just appearing—is, as Leppert says, "missing" a half century of composition and performance available today. Adorno’s writings on jazz reproduce the cardinal sin of his critiques of commercial music generally: they overemphasize standardization, and this accounts for the essays’ own "formulaic aspect." Yet I suspect this was as much a matter of Adorno’s individual taste and conjunctural tactics (for whom and against what was he writing?)—taste and tactics that we can assess without resort to evaluation of the underlying theory. For that theory, as a dialectical theory, is distinctively a theory of contradiction. It would argue that each work of jazz is both the product of a "commercial business driven by the pursuit of profit and a site of creative human activity from which some very great popular music has come and continues to emerge." Yet here the analysis only begins. Whatever Adorno’s individual remarks, for critical theory generally this hybridity becomes reconceptualized as a dynamic symptom of human potentiality blocked—and reenvisioned. Jazz is seen against a field of the heterogeneity of its own potentiality, the potential of musical choices governed by its his-
torical development as a musical form. It is this potential that becomes illuminated as denied, the ghost of lost chances in a landscape of industrial gray.

Because of jazz’s origins primarily in Afro-diasporic history and its crucial status as a site of superior accomplishment, because of jazz’s own performance of the dialectic of creativity and oppression, indeed creativity against oppression in the Afro-diaspora, arguments about the politics of jazz have for almost a century been inseparable from arguments about the politics of race. In the 1930s, when Adorno’s first major article on the subject appeared, whites tended to speak and write of jazz as black music in an essentialist sense, entertaining but primitive and perhaps even dangerous, its refinement best left to whites—providing all-too-apt examples of what bell hooks calls “eating the other.” Record companies forced black groups to call themselves by such names as “The Jungle Band” and “Chocolate Dandies” even though the groups wanted to call themselves by the names of their leaders and musicians; songs themselves were given such labels as “Ethiopian Nightmare” and “Thick Lip Stomp.” In England and Germany, critics described jazz as degenerate black and Jewish culture, deserving wary approach or, as for the Nazis, suppression.

Mostly writing about “German dance-band music” and against the racist essentialism of most jazz critics and many fans, Adorno argued in the mid-1930s that the best jazz performances were not extensions of a primitive racial nature but that they “in virtuoso pieces yield an extraordinary complexity.” Nevertheless, the jazz he heard suffered from being “dominated by the function” of being “dance music” rather than being “dominated . . . by an autonomous formal law,” as was the modern serial music he championed as beacon of emancipated creativity. As for its connection to African music, because of its commercial standardization, the “extent to which jazz has anything at all to do with genuine black music is highly questionable; the fact that it is frequently performed by blacks and that the public clamors for ‘black jazz’ as a sort of brand-name doesn’t say much about it, even if folkloric research should confirm the African origin of many of its practices.” When he argued that the “skin of the black man [who plays jazz] functions as much as a coloristic effect as does the silver of the saxophone,” Adorno did so to criticize “the capitalist requirement that [the formal elements of jazz] be exchangeable as commodities.” As part of this commodification, the “European-American entertainment business” uses black musicians as “figures in advertisements, . . . their triumph . . . a confusing parody of colonial imperialism.” To the extent that jazz did have black origins, he said, they were in the “music of slaves,” of the “domesticated body in bondage.” Any attempt to break out of the modern bondage of capitalist life through the “partial success” of improvisation “counts strictly among those attempts to break out of
the fetishized commodity world which want to escape that world without ever changing it, thus moving ever deeper into its snare." By the time he wrote "Perennial Fashion—Jazz" in the early 1950s, Adorno had gained a better sense of the varieties of jazz and its histories. He acknowledged the existence of bebop and said there is "little doubt ... regarding the African elements in jazz," but he still maintained that the "range of the permissible in jazz is as narrowly circumscribed as in any particular cut of clothes" manufactured by the fashion industry.

This is of course Adorno's standard argument, repeated time and again in different analyses of the white-dominated culture industry and its products, so it might appear that his writing on jazz only happens to be about the problematics of black culture in racist society. Yet to the extent that the argument does not foreground the specific situation and experiences of black performers and black audiences—does not see African American music as a site of struggle—it is not only Eurocentric but also white, an epistemological location neither Adorno nor many other European American thinkers of the time could have seen. The whiteness of Adorno's analyses resides in their assumption that audiences were not significantly raced or, more precisely, that race was at most one aspect of social disadvantage in class society. Adorno's treatment of jazz misses the emancipatory meaning it could have for progressive people of the Afro-diaspora (and for allies such as Herbert Marcuse): concentration on the work's moment of negation, which critical theory considered its task to illuminate in the culture it privileged. Jazz rearticulates elements of the music of African life, torn and reconstituted by the Middle Passage and slavery, music itself originally sung as resistance to slavery, as critique of European domination. Like all music, jazz in any of its varieties concretizes complex and contradictory historical experiences into sounds, and in so doing its texts in their details offer access to a mediated form of that experience, which Stuart Hall and others have called the "diaspora aesthetic." Structurally, this historical struggle Adorno could not see, and so like many listeners he fetishized what Mike Budd has analyzed as the "separation of the sound of jazz from the social relations and functions of which Afro-diasporic music was a part," a separation covered by social ignorance, facilitated by the commodity form.

Yet this aesthetic, a "minor" and hence valorized aesthetic in Deleuze and Guattari's light, was explicitly taken up by Duke Ellington and other African American jazz composers and musicians, if in more nationalist terms. In 1939, Ellington, for example, wrote, "Our aim has always been the development of an authentic Negro music, of which swing is only one element. We are not interested primarily in the playing of jazz or swing music, but in producing a genuine contribution from our race. Our music is always intended to
be definitely and purely racial.”

For Adorno, Ellington’s appeal to authenticity might have seemed a denial of the contradictory ways history stamps cultural work. Yet an antiracist critical theory would value the appeal’s insistence on the irreducible existence in the music of oppression and resistance, taking up the negative moment of the struggle for self-representation that Ellington’s argument represents. Such a reconstructed critical theory would see white efforts to essentialize jazz as the products of what Ella Shohat and Robert Stam have called “ethnicities-in-relation,” permeating significant social relations in societies marked by racial histories.

To think “white” is to stake out a position that appears nonracial, to think in ways that do not acknowledge the racial privilege connected to a white position. Tim Wise has put it succinctly: “Being white means never having to think about it.” This might seem a perverse way of describing Adorno, a racial refugee from the Nazis, who in 1945 did associate the difficult contemporary situations of blacks and Jews, and in one unpublished version of “On Jazz” included Jews in his exploration of jazz style and the extent to which individuals may play along with their own stigmatized situation. Yet it is in his treatment of blacks that Adorno became most white. Never a writer cloaked in the discourse of the impartial, Adorno here spoke from a position that neither foregrounds nor acknowledges that it is raced. Despite his own commitment to the “equality of all who have human shape,” despite his own losses to the racism of the Nazis, Adorno generally failed to apply critical theory’s critique of domination to the history of Afro-diasporic struggles.

Such an assessment, however, risks fetishizing individual thinkers when what matters is discursive context. Even if Adorno’s racial politics had been deliberate rather than unwittingly reproductive of the structural, which I do not believe, the expectation that thinkers should somehow be perfect, more politically sensitive than their environment normally would allow, not only rubs up against the insight from Marx with which I began this chapter but also smacks of a childish desire for perfection in one’s parents. Throwing rocks at Adorno does not help sort out the value of critical theory for an antiracist emancipatory politics.

A more dialectical approach might start with Susan Buck-Morss’s consideration of critical theory and the Enlightenment in light of slavery and colonial domination. As she argues, Enlightenment notions of freedom were developed in a world of slavery that “by the mid-eighteenth century . . . came to underwrite the entire economic system of the West,” a contradiction lived by John Locke and black slavery’s other freedom-loving investors. Enabling this contradiction was a distinction between the concept of slavery, condemned as a moral wrong, and the practice of colonial slavery, embraced as justifiable. This opposition may have functioned as a metaphor for one less
kind and gentle, that between slavery involving whites and slavery involving blacks. "Weak minds exaggerate too much the injustice done to Africans," said Montesquieu. Perhaps no set of Enlightened elites was more inconsistent on the matter than the majority of U.S. revolutionaries who campaigned against what they thought of as their enslavement by royalist Great Britain and then supported the writing of slavery of black people into their founding Constitution. None was more inconsistent—except perhaps for those among the French revolutionaries who supported the keeping of colonial slaves until 1848. Eurocentrism is not just another form of ethnocentrism, not just a matter of paying attention only to what is closest to home, a blind spot so prevalent that it might easily be seen as congenital rather than racist. Because what Buck-Morss calls "really-existing slavery" was essential to the fabric of European economic life into the nineteenth century, internally as well as colonially, its erasure functioned as mystification in the service of domination, the failure of Enlightenment in the service of Enlightenment’s self-satisfaction.

This exomination of blacks takes a curious form in the volumes of the Institute of Social Research–related U.S. project, the Studies in Prejudice series coedited by Max Horkheimer, and specifically in the book on which Adorno collaborated, The Authoritarian Personality. These works interrelated ideas and methods from psychoanalysis, empirical social psychology, and critical social theory to study psychological and social causes of bigotry. An analysis of their racial politics might assist the development of an antiracist critical theory. In their foreword to the series, Horkheimer and his coeditor, Samuel H. Flowerman, began by referring to the "full and violent destructiveness" of Nazi anti-Semitism and ended by offering the five volumes in their series as tools for understanding and combating "intergroup prejudice and hatred." The movement from the particularity of the war against the Jews to more general considerations of prejudice reproduces the conceptual confusion in The Authoritarian Personality as a whole. A "prominent example of politically committed social research in the American academy," is it a book about anti-Semitism, or is it about bigotry in general at a specific historical moment? Horkheimer, in the preface to the volume, began by saying, "This is a book about social discrimination." He defined the topic at hand as "the position of minorities in modern society, and more specifically the problem of religious and racial hatreds," which he linked to the development of the "authoritarian type of man" and to "antidemocratic trends." These would be measured by the "F scale," a psychological indicator of potential for fascistic behavior, for a personality that "fawns before admired authority (representing strength) and loathes weakness—in Jews, women, homosexuals, or other outgroups." Aside from a reference to the Institute's 1939 work on anti-Semitism,
Horkheimer says nothing to indicate that this would be largely a study of bigotry against Jews.\textsuperscript{47} The project, including its subsidized publication by Harper and Brothers, was funded by the American Jewish Committee, whose Department of Scientific Research Horkheimer was hired to head after a two-day planning conference in New York in May 1944.\textsuperscript{48} Yet I do not believe that the concentration on anti-Semitism was an effect only of its funding.\textsuperscript{49} Rather, for Horkheimer, Adorno, and their social-psychologist colleagues on \textit{The Authoritarian Personality} at the University of California, Berkeley, racism against blacks with some exception seems to have fallen through the epistemological net within which they worked, stitched together from ill-fitting Marxist, Freudian, and liberal-instrumental social-psychological approaches.\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, in chronicling the prejudice studies, neither Jay nor Wiggershaus in their otherwise helpful accounts makes more than passing mention of prejudice against anyone other than Jews.\textsuperscript{51}

The concerns of the \textit{Authoritarian} studies also had specific contextual sources. In the shadow of the particularities of the Holocaust, in a moment when the coming decline of U.S. anti-Semitism could not be foreseen, the need to generate critical knowledge of anti-Semitism was understandably urgent. Anti-Semitism was still oppressive and threatening to Jews in ways almost unimaginable today, ways confirmed by the interview material in \textit{The Authoritarian Personality}. One unpublished study led by Frankfurt School researchers of 566 factory workers in major U.S. cities during the late war period, for example, found that more than two-thirds were in some sense anti-Semitic.\textsuperscript{52} Well into the postwar era, U.S. right-wing discourse still included openly anti-Semitic elements, and leftists of many political stripes were fearful of a resurgent right. At the same time, research universities remained largely segregated by law or in effect, and funding for studies of racism against blacks in particular was miniscule. As telling as it seems now, it should not be startling given the context that in a nearly 1,000-page book about the instantiation of majority ethnocentrism in U.S. individuals, in a series called “Studies in Prejudice,” African Americans receive only a handful of mentions. Still, they are worth enumerating.\textsuperscript{53}

1. \textit{African Americans and ethnocentrism}. The first reference comes in the conceptual introduction, “The Study of Ethnocentric Ideology,” in which Daniel J. Levinson explained that the researchers labeled their object of study ethnocentrism—rather than prejudice or racism—because they considered it a broader term, extending to in-group feelings about out-groups neither racial nor religious (102, 107).\textsuperscript{54} These included “Okies,” “the insane,” and “zoot-suiters.”\textsuperscript{55} For Levinson, “ethnic” described perceptions of cultures, not body types or nations, a point particularly important in terms of thoughts about Jews (103).\textsuperscript{56} “Ethnocentrism,” then, involved “a hierarchical, authoritarian
view of group interaction in which ingroups are rightly dominant, outgroups subordinate” (150).

The researchers first measured prejudice against Jews in a separate measure of anti-Semitism, the “A-S scale” (57–101). To analyze the connection between anti-Semitism registered on this scale and other forms of ethnocentrism, they then developed an “E scale” of 34 items (102–50). Subscales of the E scale looked at three other forms of ethnocentrism: hostility toward African Americans, the “N scale”;\textsuperscript{57} hostility toward other minority groups (Japanese and Filipino Americans, “Okies,” “foreigners,” “criminals”) and women of all backgrounds, the “M scale”;\textsuperscript{58} and the “P scale,” which measured what Levinson called “pseudo-patriotism,” conformist attachment to national identity and nationalist hostility to Mexicans, Germans, and Japanese (107). “Genuine patriotism” was ascribed to those who identified with their own national values but understood their relativism (107; emphasis in the original).\textsuperscript{59}

The purpose of the scales was to find correlations between these different forms of ethnocentrism.\textsuperscript{60} The hope was that such correlations would illuminate general psychosocial causes and, ideally, lead to prescriptions for change. Statistically, the E scale was found reliable overall as a measure of an identifiable constellation of attitudes, and the results of the three separate subscales (but not all individual items) correlated with each other and with the E scale with “considerable significance,” allowing predictions to be made from one to the other (112–13). The E scale also correlated with the results of the A-S scale (122–23). One conclusion from this might have been that Jews and people of color and women of all backgrounds had a common political project against prejudice since “each facet of ethnocentric ideology as here conceived is accepted by most high scorers, rejected by most low scorers” (146), but there is no indication that this connection ever was made. Ultimately, the E scale questionnaire was reduced to ten items for easier use. The question about women in the postwar era was dropped, hostility to women’s rights having been found so strong and widespread that the question failed to discriminate between high and low overall scorers\textsuperscript{61} (121). The reduced E scale did include a question about zoot-suiters, but there is no indication that the investigators related its responses to prejudice against Mexican Americans or Latinas/Latinos generally.\textsuperscript{62} These results correlated well with what would become the Berkeley group’s most famous and enduring instrument, the F scale, designed to measure “implicit antidemocratic trends” and “implicit prefascist tendencies” (222, 224, 222–79). Yet because they wanted an instrument “that would measure prejudice without appearing to have this aim and without mentioning the name of any minority group,” the F scale itself did not examine hostility toward disadvantaged groups in the United States (222).
Designed as metonym for racism against African Americans, anti-Semitism, and prejudice among other U.S. minorities, the F scale over time became their metaphor, blotting out the particularities of prejudice, their histories no longer visible as cause.

2. African Americans and the raced gaze. Another mention of African Americans comes in Betty Aron’s chapter on the value of the Thematic Apperception Test, which asks research subjects to tell the story they see playing out in a series of pictures with a range of plausible meanings. Aron used the test to elicit information about character traits, background, and constellations of prejudice (489–90). For example, subjects who had taken the E scale test were shown a photo of a police officer with a night stick facing a man in a T-shirt whose race seems unspecifiable, his arms outstretched, and his back against the wall (picture 6, between 508 and 509). The picture was “commonly interpreted as [showing] a suspect caught by the police.” High E scale scorers tended to describe the man as a “dangerous criminal, a Negro or Mexican with an innately weak character. . . . He may have been involved in a strike or race riot for which he is condemned by the story-teller.” For low scorers, “the man has either been striking for higher wages or fighting race prejudice”—a markedly different take on a similar scenario. As Aron says, “The most important differences between stories of high and those of low scorers reflect their attitudes toward minority groups” (527–28). Subjects were also shown a picture of an African American in his early teen years wearing a suit jacket and open-collared white shirt standing next to an elderly African American woman in a chair. Beyond the young man is the bottom half of a photograph; all that can be seen is a group of legs in trousers and shoes. Both are looking at something to the right of the photo’s edge. As Aron describes it, they appear “‘clean’ or ‘neat,’ and seem to be acting in a socially acceptable way.” High scorers tended to construct scenarios in which the two were “different from most Negroes.” Low scorers tended to stress a bond of familial love and encouragement between a grandmother and grandson. High scorers said the boy has done well in school, but not very well. Some high scorers thought that the two were looking offscreen at someone dying or being hurt (528–29). These results seem suggestive for research and theory about raced responses to media.

3. African Americans and the authoritarians. The highest overall scorers on the ten-question E scale (and in subsequent in-depth interviews) were white non-Jewish prisoners at San Quentin (817–18). They also scored highest on the F scale (844). These prisoners were the most specifically racist against blacks, stressing biological connection to apes and animals generally and to “savages” and “the jungle” (825). Suffering from “intense status anxiety,” they repeatedly expressed fears of black people not being kept “in their
place" and rising up against whites and then taking advantage of them (826; emphasis in the original). Though they were anti-Semitic, the high-scoring prisoners differentiated clearly between the two groups; for example, they not once connected Jews with the "primitive instincts" they frequently ascribed to blacks (830–35). According to the report of the principal investigator of the San Quentin study, William R. Morrow, "Negroes are almost universally perceived as a very submerged outgroup—as contrasted with an imagined 'dominant' outgroup such as Jews are thought to be" (824). Jews, on the other hand, were routinely characterized as possessing "dominance combined with exclusiveness." For Morrow, "This attitude centers around fantasies of victimization by Jewish power, and a fear of being overwhelmed by that power" (831). It was also sometimes mixed with envy and admiration (832)—feelings rarely mentioned in connection with blacks. Fear and insecurity have been common causes of both anti-Semitism and racism against black people. But like the enormous differences in socioeconomic status and political power of Jews and blacks in the United States at midcentury, the forms of prejudice have been quite distinct. The Authoritarian Personality made clear that while there have been connections between symptoms of anti-Semitism and white supremacy, they differ fundamentally in that anti-Semitism has in some measure functioned as perverted populism, resentment against shadowy and illegitimate powers, while racism against blacks has tended to involve contempt and hostility for those of a distant and strange underlife. As one respondent put it, "The Negroes produce so rapidly that they will populate the world, while the Jews will get all of the money" (636). These findings showed that racism against blacks was a different and generally more severe problem than anti-Semitism in the United States. But nowhere does the book analyze this phenomenon or explore its causes and effects.

Despite the work on racism in the body of the book, there is not one word about it specifically in the introduction, which concentrates on using the research to study and combat the "potentially fascistic individual," with a focus on anti-Semitism. In the four chapters he signed, Adorno did mention hostility to African Americans, but always in connection with anti-Semitism or prejudice generally. Although unambiguously opposed to such hostility—clearly here he was antiracist, as Leppert says of Adorno's writings on music—Adorno never analyzed antiblack racism's specific qualities or distinctive harms. He did mention findings that "members of other minority groups, with strong 'conformist' tendencies, were outspokenly antisemitic. Hardly any traces of solidarity among the different outgroups could be found" (611). But he made no mention of prejudice by Jews—with two exceptions involving prejudice of Jews against Jews, the first of a Jewish man of Turkish descent who "indulged in violent anti-Semitic diatribes" and the second of German
Jews against their eastern European counterparts (612, 624). In the chapter he coauthored on the F scale, he did write, “Although anti-Semitism is still to be understood primarily as an aspect of general ethnocentrism, there can be no doubt but that it has some special features of its own” (265). These are described in a chapter (16) signed by Adorno. Yet no such consideration was given to racism against African Americans. At the same time, Adorno anticipated by decades the critique antiracists would make of orthodox Marxism, taking to task those who “belittle the importance of racial discrimination by labeling it simply as a byproduct of the big issues of class struggle,” and he went on to say that such a position “may be indicative of repressed prejudice on their own part” (772). No liberal universalist, he argued that people free from stereotypes would “tend to acknowledge differences and to take a positive stand toward differentiation” (773).

In 1943, before working on the project (in English) for the American Jewish Committee, Horkheimer and Adorno wrote (in German) most of what was to become the “Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment” chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment. Again a distinction is made between racism against African Americans and anti-Semitism, though here the Nazi terror is invoked: “The blacks must be kept in their place, but the Jews are to be wiped from the face of the earth, and the call to exterminate them like vermin finds an echo among the prospective fascists of all countries” (137). There is of course much already written about the relationship between the two projects. Here I want to use the second, more explicit text to argue, again, that while anti-Semitism is considered in detail and seen as the emblem of domination, racism and colonialism figure only implicitly, as examples of the general “evil senselessly visited on . . . all the persecuted, whether animals or human beings,” Enlightenment gone mad (165). Missing, too, is consideration of the specific racial projects that spawned and have revivified oppressions of blacks and Jews (let alone of other racially marked victims of institutional prejudice). In part what makes “Elements of Anti-Semitism” so unlike anything in The Authoritarian Personality is its development, especially in the section published after the war, of an argument about the incorporation, the taking up, of the general moment of anti-Semitic irrationalism in the rationalizations of postwar society. “Anti-Semitic views,” Horkheimer and Adorno wrote, “always reflected stereotyped thinking. Today only that thinking is left” for “in the world of mass production, stereotypes replace intellectual categories” (166). Later Adorno would write, “We viewed social psychology as subjective mediation of the objective social system, without whose mechanisms it would not have been possible to keep a hold on its subjects.” Wiggershaus argues that what mattered to Adorno and Horkheimer was not so much the amount of anti-Semitism in the United States in the
1940s as the terrifying rise of technocratic thinking and its ruthless “attitudes and behaviour which lacked any reverence for living beings, for people, for the victims of discrimination.”

Critical theory historically and today, in earlier generations and in our own enterprises, carries with it the responsibility of the well-fed, even though it has opposed racism against blacks and other U.S. minorities, even though it has been sensitive to the misery of the “millions hungering for rice who have fallen through the narrow meshes” in a world in which the “abundance of goods ... could be produced everywhere.” Again, the issue is structural, not biographical. The critique of anti-Semitism in the early twenty-first century requires a more general critique of colonial and postcolonial racism that can be found but is by no means foregrounded in The Authoritarian Personality and the “Elements of Anti-Semitism.” The critique of instrumental reason must not turn its back on race. Racism is so entangled and difficult that struggles against it could well use critical theory’s commitment to the dialectic of possibility. In the chapter of social analysis that he originally intended to include in The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno stressed his long-standing interest in the imbrication of the social in the psychological and in his belief that the Berkeley studies pointed the way toward empirical analysis of that process. What he wanted to see next was research designed “to find out how objective economic laws operate, not so much through the individual’s economic motivations” as “through his unconscious make-up.” He believed such studies “would provide us with the true scientific explanation of the nature of contemporary prejudice.” With this turn, the particular suffering of people raced as less than white becomes obscured, just as racial difference was not an issue for Adorno when he discussed the reception of jazz. Yet, again, none of this need be true in theory.

These losses—like the disappearance of women and Mexican Americans from the research of the Berkeley project or the lack of attention paid to other racisms and to homophobia and, indeed, like the minimal attention paid to the effects of prejudice on any of its victims—argue that the first generation of the Frankfurt School left a legacy best served by situating its texts in the moments in which they were written, by declining to see them as philosophical treatises historical only in the sense of a history of ideas—in short, by applying to them the strategies of critical theory itself. One reason the most timely writings of Herbert Marcuse—An Essay on Liberation, Counterrevolution and Revolt—may seem more out of date than, say, his “Affirmative Character of Culture” is that they embrace their historical moment, making less sense as that moment rapidly recedes. It may well be that we take too much of critical theory as being beyond its moment, that we can best use critical
theory for emancipatory purposes if we insist on that aspect of it that attends to the concrete.\textsuperscript{73} Just as the first generation of the Frankfurt School took as a central task the critique of Enlightenment, which thanks to Buck-Morss we can now more clearly situate in a world built on and within different forms of slavery, so it may be that a central task for later generations is to reconceptualize critical theory in ways that take up Anglo-European concepts only following their decentering and to rethink ways theory has been raced white, encumbered in Marx’s phrase from The Eighteenth Brumaire, by “circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” As Richard Dyer says of white racism, “One must take responsibility for it, but that is not the same as being responsible, that is, [as being] to blame for it.”\textsuperscript{74} Critical theory can take responsibility by engaging in its own defamiliarization. “White power . . . reproduces itself regardless of intention, power differences [among whites], and goodwill, and overwhelmingly because it is not seen as whiteness, but as normal. White people need to learn to see themselves as white, to see their particularity. In other words, whiteness needs to be made strange.”\textsuperscript{75}

One work that undermines its whiteness and at the same time seems rooted in critical theory, John Mowitt’s Percussion: Drumming, Beating, Striking takes its readers (and critical theory) to places earlier generations could not find with their conceptual maps. Mowitt continues critical theory’s explorations of music and its social situation, but he does so in a way that allows for multiple perspectives and contexts of production and consumption to be heard. The text refuses to mystify its own situated contribution in its organization of these voices of difference. Percussion takes up Adorno’s key concepts—immanence, nonidentity, the dialectic of rationalization—as well as his concern with the role of commodified music in people’s lives, especially as expressed with Hanns Eisler in Composing for the Films.\textsuperscript{76} Yet by listening to those who produce and receive and by seeing this production and reception in its social intertextuality, the book is able to make visible musical communication in its physicality, as interpellation of rhythmic sounds, culturally and economically coded to be sure.\textsuperscript{77} Mowitt offers an immanent criticism of Chuck Berry’s “Rock ’n’ Roll Music” that in its close analysis should sweep away any lingering high-culture prejudice that such music lacks any moment of art autonomous from the market.\textsuperscript{78} Yet more significant for a race-sensitive critical theory is the way Mowitt allows the work’s African American voice to be heard in its mediated form as the performed song “links the being of rock-and-roll to a struggle within the ‘contact zone’ between the cultures of Africa and the Americas, a struggle that is figured in the song as a conflict of beats.”\textsuperscript{79} However marked by their commodification, such works carry within them the promise of solidarity, of debts acknowledged and addressed. For Mowitt, as for Buck-Morss and, I hope, increasing numbers of
others, to talk about Western culture is to talk about race. Theory, as Mowitt argues, is struck by the recognition of cultures and voices of difference. Such a move, self-consciously raced, becomes necessary if, as we have been promised, "Enlightenment itself, [which] having mastered itself and assumed its own power, could break through," allowing us at last to hear and see a world transformed.80

NOTES

For additional readings, critical conversation, and editorial suggestions, I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers and to Sara Austin, Kendrick Brown, Steve Burt, Harry Hirsch, Hsueh Yeh, Nora Ishibashi, Leola Johnson, Sylvia López, Carlos Nelson, Joan Ostrove, Ahmed Samatar, Franz Samelson, Sandy Schram, and Jeff Sklansky and especially Mike Budd, Jim Dawes, Bob Entman, Nan Hanway, David Itzkowitz, Kiarina Kordela, Stephanie Leitch, Richard Leppert, Mark Mazullo, David Chioni Moore, Linda Schulte-Sasse, and Michelle Wright. Thanks to Peter Uwe Hohendahl for organizing and leading the 2001 Cornell Critical Theory Seminar on the Frankfurt School and the follow-up conference in 2002; to their sponsors, Cornell’s Institute for German Cultural Studies and the German Academic Exchange Service; and to Aoife Naughton, Max Pensky, Julia Stewart, and all the participants. Finally, I am grateful to the Associated Colleges of the Midwest and to the staff at the Newberry Library for research support and hospitality in the spring of 2004.


2. The white supremacist slaughter of the Herero, some 65,000 people, between 1904 and 1907 by German forces in what is now Namibia looms particularly large in this regard, emblem of the barbarism that Walter Benjamin insisted haunts civilized worlds. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 256. The standard account of the massacre can be found in Horst Dreschler, "Let Us Die Fighting": The Struggle of the Herero and the Nama against German Imperialism (1884–1915), trans. Bernd Zollner (London: Zed Books, 1980). For an incisive analysis, see Mahmod Mamdani, "A Brief History of Genocide," Transition, no. 87 (2001): 26–47. Robert W. Kestling has compared the treatment of blacks during the German imperial and Weimar periods with their treatment by the Nazis. "Blacks under the Swastika: A Research Note," Journal of Negro History 83, no. 1 (winter 1998): 84–99. Mamdani and others have connected the mentality of the German colonial genocide in Africa with that of the Nazi extermination of Jews. Most of the Frankfurt writers were Jews, and though all but Benjamin survived the Nazis, they suffered the Holocaust’s destruction of family and of friends and of the world in which they were raised.


10. Theodor W. Adorno, “On Jazz,” trans. Jamie Owen Daniel, modified by Richard Leppert, in Essays on Music, 470–95, and bell hooks, “Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance,” in Race and Representation (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 21–39. See, for example, Paul Whiteman, Jazz (New York: Sears, 1926). Whiteman was also featured in Universal’s 1930 two-color Technicolor musical review King of Jazz, which includes a racist cartoon by Walter Lantz imagining Whiteman’s comic encounter with the origins of jazz in Africa. See also Leppert, “Music and Mass Culture,” 353–54; Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media (London: Routledge, 1994), 226; and Wilcock, “Adorno, Jazz and Racism,” 71–72. A symptomatic song in this regard is Ray Henderson, Buddy De Sylva, and Lew Brown’s “The Birth of the Blues,” which begins, “Ohhh, they say some darkies long ago/Were searching for a different tune/One that they could croon/As only they can./They only had the rhythm, soooo/They started swaying to and fro/They didn’t know just what to use/That is how the blues/Really began.” This opening verse, recorded by the Revelers on July 14, 1926, was rarely used in subsequent recordings of “The Birth of the Blues” (making the “they” of the song’s standard lyrics vague) and cannot be found on the numerous Internet listings postings of the song’s words, although the Revelers’ 1926 version reached eleventh place on the charts. Ray Henderson, Buddy De Sylva, and Lew Brown, Victor BVE 35770-4, 1926; anthologized on Breezin’ Along with The Revelers, compact disc, ASV, AJA 5278, 1999 (date and sales information from liner notes). Adorno mentioned the group in his 1927 “The Curves of the Needle” and in his 1933 “Farewell to Jazz.” Essays on Music, 273 and 499. Given Adorno’s familiarity with the Revelers and the popularity of “The Birth of the Blues,” it seems almost certain that he heard this longer version. It might well have been one object of his critique, discussed later in this chapter, of the notion that such music had any significant connection to black people or to Africa. See also Frank Kofsky, Black Nationalism and the Revolution in Music (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), 9–10, 14.


13. Leppert, notes to “On Jazz,” 492 n, and Adorno, “On Jazz,” 470. Having investigated Adorno’s time in England, 1934–1938, Wilcock concluded, “It is difficult to claim that Adorno never heard real jazz” and noted that “it has been suggested that Adorno had no experience of black jazz on which to base his argument. This is untenable.” “Adorno, Jazz and Racism,” 65, 69.


15. Indeed, at one point Adorno called jazz “the amalgam of the march and salon music,” leaving aside Afro-diasporic influences entirely. “On Jazz,” 477, 491.


22. For example, with Max Horkheimer, he saw examples of Orson Welles’s innovative film style (here he must have been referring to *Citizen Kane* of 1941 and perhaps to *The Magnificent Ambersons* of 1942) as gestures of “calculated rudeness” that “confirm the validity of the system all the more zealously.” He criticized “early film comedies” (he might well have had Buster Keaton in mind), for whom “individual weakness is proclaimed and revoked in the same breath,” and “stumbling is confirmed as a kind of higher skill.” Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” in *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 102, and Adorno, “Perennial Fashion,” 129.


24. Being tone deaf to nuances of audience response was a methodological failing Adorno came to recognize after he had begun his difficult encounters with empirical media researchers in the United States, from 1938 to 1941: “It is an open question, which in fact can only be answered empirically, whether, to what extent, and in what dimensions the societal implications disclosed in musical content analysis are also understood by the listeners and how they react to them. It would be naïve simply to pre-
sume an equivalence between the societal implications of the stimuli and the 'responses.'” Adorno, “Scientific,” 227. However, Adorno’s 1953 essay “Perennial Fashion—Jazz” bears no trace of this subsequent insight, one crucial to any contemporary reconstruction of critical theory. “Perennial Fashion—Jazz” was no more concerned with the complexities of audience response, let alone the raced complexities of audience response, than was the 1936 “On Jazz.”


26. Mike Budd, e-mail message to author, July 20, 2003.


38. Robert F. Berkhofer Jr. defines ethnocentrism as “judgment of one people’s qualities by another in terms of the latter’s own ideals and standards” and says that it “has prevailed from ancient times to the present among all peoples.” He defines racism as “a specific social doctrine” that was “an invention of the European peoples in the modern period of their expansion around the world.” Berkhofer, *The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Vintage, 1978), 35, 55.

39. Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” 833. Buck-Morss indicts “official” “(white) Marxism” as well for its insistence that plantation slavery was premodern and thus not deserving inclusion in narratives of class struggle against capitalism—an exclusion opposed by W. E. B. DuBois as well as by such Caribbean Marxists as C. L. R. James and Eric Williams, the first prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, who argued that “plantation slavery was a quintessentially modern institution of capitalist exploitation.” “Hegel and Haiti,” 850, 851 n, 850. See, for example, James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*, 2nd ed. (1938; reprint, New York: Vintage, 1963). Williams, whom James had taught in Trinidad, was an outstanding and well-known student at Oxford around the time Adorno attended Oxford’s Merton College in the mid-1930s. Adorno may have known Williams personally; he likely was aware of the racism that Williams and other black students encountered at Oxford. Indications of this can be found in the twin critiques of racial essentialism and denial of lived difference Adorno wrote in 1945. Wilcock, “Adorno, Jazz and Racism,” 73 n, 74, and Adorno, “Mélange.”

40. According to Rolf Wiggershaus, the use of “Prejudice” instead of “Anti-Semitism” in the series title “stemmed from the caution of a Jewish organization intent on assimilation” and came about “in the hope that democrats would be more likely to respond to a call to fight prejudice and social discrimination in general than they would be to a call to fight anti-Semitism.” *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance*, trans. Michael Robertson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), 409.

41. A comprehensive theoretical analysis of *The Authoritarian Personality*, including what Martin Jay has called its “stress on psychological rather than sociological explanations of prejudice,” a stress visible in the text but later seen by Adorno as a result of a “misunderstanding,” is beyond the scope of this chapter. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 227, and Adorno, “Scientific.” 230. In hindsight, Adorno wrote of the volume, “The work’s focus on the subjective moments was interpreted along the lines of the predominant tendency of the times, as though social psychology was used as a philosopher’s stone, whereas, in Freud’s famous turn of phrase, it was simply trying to add something new to what was already known.” “Scientific,” 231; see also Anson Rabinbach, “‘Why Were the Jews Sacrificed?’: The Place of Antisemitism in Adorno and Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment,*” in *Adorno: A Critical Reader*, ed. Nigel Gibson and Andrew Rubin (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002), 132–49. Also worth further analysis is the history of the reception and impact of *The Authoritarian Personality* within social psychology. Richard Christie, for example, reports “outrage” by strict disciplinarians at the project’s combination of fields,

42. Max Horkheimer and Samuel H. Flowerman, foreword to the Studies in Prejudice series, Authoritarian Personality, by Adorno et al., v, viii.


44. Max Horkheimer, preface to Authoritarian Personality, by Adorno et al., ix.

45. Horkheimer, preface to Authoritarian Personality, by Adorno et al., ix, xi.

46. Horkheimer, preface to Authoritarian Personality, by Adorno et al., xi. The definition is from Stone et al., Strength and Weakness, 4.

47. Horkheimer did, however, tell a colleague in March 1944 that he hoped the project would provide the “scientific proof of antisemitism being a symptom of deep hostility against democracy.” Quoted in Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 361. For an account of Studies in Prejudice in the context of Jewish organizational efforts against prejudice within the ongoing national “race relations” project, see Stuart Svonkin, Jews against Prejudice: American Jews and the Fight for Civil Liberties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), esp. 11–40. For a harsh critique grounded in the

48. Svonkin, Jews against Prejudice, 37, 211 n, and Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 221.

49. The stress on empirical methods, however, may have been due to pressure from the American Jewish Committee. According to Samelson, in putting together their proposals, the authors believed there was a “need to develop empirical methods in order to reach an American audience as well as receive financial support.” This seems consistent with the prevailing faith among liberal intellectuals in social-scientific research as a tool for problem solving. Samelson, “The Authoritarian Character,” 34, and Svonkin, Jews against Prejudice, 28–40. For an account of the appeal of scientism to U.S. Jews and their allies for cosmopolitanism at midcentury, see David A. Hollinger, Science, Jews, and Secular Culture: Studies in Mid-Twentieth Century American Intellectual History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).

50. As late as June 1945, Horkheimer planned to supervise a study connecting anti-Semitism to racism against blacks, including anti-Semitism and racism internalized by its victims. This seems to have resulted in the Bettelheim and Janowitz volume mentioned later, but there racism against blacks in the end played only a secondary role. Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 378, and Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans, Studies in Prejudice (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).

51. Both do mention the discussion of prejudice against blacks by U.S. World War II veterans and its correlation with prejudice against Jews found in Bettelheim and Janowitz, Dynamics of Prejudice. Wiggershaus points out that one of many relevant questions elided in a preliminary report on the research in the summer of 1944 was, “What was the status of anti-Semitism in comparison with discrimination against the blacks and the policy of wiping out the American Indians and confining them to reservations?” He also notes that the report made no mention of the “social anti-Semitism” typical in the United States: unofficial but unquestionably valid and unavoidable regulations such as the exclusion of Jews from certain clubs, hotels or student organizations; or the percentage of positions given to Jews at most of the important universities or in a series of professions.” He attributes these omissions in part to “courtesy for the host country and the interests of the Institute’s sponsors.” Wiggershaus also twice connects the work on anti-Semitism to Gunnar Myrdal’s earlier work on racism in the United States, An American Dilemma, begun in 1937 with funds from the Carnegie Corporation and published in 1944, to which Horkheimer referred in December 1944 as he developed the Studies in Prejudice series. Wiggershaus notes, too, that one of the measurement scales discussed here, the E scale, included items related to “other minorities.” Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 219–52, 236; Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 350–80, 408–30, 426–27, 365, 350–51, 377, 412, 424; and Myrdal,


53. In what follows, all unmarked citations are to Adorno et al., *Authoritarian Personality*, in general.

54. Levinson’s views on race were remarkably consistent with learned views today: biological classifications have been arbitrary and do not exist in the world in pure form; there is nothing defensible about skin color’s “misapplication to cultures” (103). His use of ethnocentrism, however, was broader than was conventional at the time in its extension to groups with no common ancestry.

55. Although hostility toward outsiders and class prejudice may as well have been factors, most accounts have linked the 1940s reputation among whites of zoot suits—and the related arrests and beatings in Los Angeles of those who wore them—to racist prejudice against Mexican Americans. See, for example, El Teatro Campesino’s brilliant *Zoot Suit*; Mauricio Mazon’s *The Zoot-Suit Riots: The Psychology of Symbolic Annihilation*, Mexican American Monograph 8 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989); and “Zoot Suit Riots: American Experience,” Public Broadcasting Service, June 29, 2003, www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/zoot/.

56. As has been widely observed, not talking about the continuing and enduring effects of racism in the United States hides its existence; making all groups “ethnic,” whatever its ideally antiracist intent, risks marginalizing the particular forms of racial prejudice and discrimination experienced by African Americans, Asian Americans, Latina and Latino Americans, and American Indians.

57. The researchers included this scale, they said, because “Negroes are a large and severely oppressed group and since imagery of ‘the Negro’ has become so elaborated in American cultural mythology” (106). The research in this area was a forerunner of more recent work differentiating “modern racism” from “traditional racism,” a still urgent theoretical and empirical task. See, for example, Robert M. Entman and Andrew Rojecki, *The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 1–59, as well as Cornel West, “A Genealogy of Modern Racism,” in *Race Critical Theories: Text and Context*, ed. Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002), 90–112.

58. The M scale sought to identify antiwoman feelings by asking respondents, men and women alike, whether women “should be returned to their proper place in the home as soon as the war ends” (107).

59. The genuine patriot is “free of rigid conformism, outgroup rejection, and imperialistic striving for power” (108).

60. Anti-Semitism, for example, had been found to correlate with “opposition to labor unions and racial equality”—and to membership in college sororities (104).

61. Also discarded was a tantalizing question about the hostility of authoritarian personalities to avant-garde art, which Adorno notes was thrown out because familiarity with such art was limited to only a sliver of the population. Adorno, “Scientific,” 234.

62. For some administrations, the scale was cut to five items, eliminating all four about Jews and one of three about blacks. This was done both to make the form easier to complete and to make sure that the mention of Jews in the survey would not set off
alarms in the respondents (125). However, the researchers later came to believe the five-question survey did not offer adequate possibilities for cross correlations (133).

63. As Jay notes, prejudiced Europeans seemed to consider both blacks and Jews hypersexual, while the prejudiced veterans in Chicago in Bettelheim and Janowitz’s sample tended to consider blacks hypersexual but did not associate hypersexuality with Jews. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 236, and Bettelheim and Janowitz, *Dynamics of Prejudice*, 30.

64. Rabinbach, “‘Why Were the Jews Sacrificed?,”’ 133. Adorno later recalled that his work with Horkheimer on “Elements of Anti-Semitism” “was determinative for my participation in the investigations carried out later” that resulted in *The Authoritarian Personality*. “Scientific,” 230.


66. Adorno, “Scientific,” 231. While people who study the Frankfurt School tend to view *The Authoritarian Personality* in terms of the overall project of critical theory, and while there are moments in the book that support that view, even progressive social scientists can be forgiven for missing the underlying critique of capitalism. For an example of a sympathetic account of the development of the F scale that nevertheless seems blind to the book’s radical social critique and includes a devastating critique of its neoconservative critics (who complained that it ignored “left-wing authoritarianism”), see David G. Winter, *Personality: Analysis and Interpretation of Lives* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1996), 213–51; see also Brown, *Social Psychology*, 477–546. Among the most important contemporary work on authoritarianism has been Bob Altemeyer’s development of the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale and his application of the main post–Cold War version of the F scale, the dogmatism scale (D scale, or DOG), for liberal political purposes. Altemeyer, “‘Dogmatic Behavior among Students: Testing a New Measure of Dogmatism,” *Journal of Social Psychology* 142, no. 6 (2002): 713–21. Like Winter, Altemeyer shows how neoconservative claims about the existence of “left-wing authoritarianism” were in general empirically unsupported. Altemeyer has serious methodological questions about the Berkeley studies that he seeks to resolve, and he has problems with their reliance on psychoanalysis—all in the name of reconstructing the project. See, for example, his *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988). Yet for him, as for Winter, the radicalism underlying the critique of authoritarianism, its relation to Marxist analysis, is nowhere in sight. And for neither of them is racism against blacks a major issue in this context.

67. Wiggershaus, *Frankfurt School*, 422. Wiggershaus is particularly good at comparing the different political projects and conclusions of *The Authoritarian Personality* and *Dynamics of Prejudice*. While the former aims at the reduction of those social-psychological tendencies that function as the “subjective mediation of the objective social system” of capitalist mass production in order to make possible the realization
Beyond Eurocentrism

of social humanity, the latter endorses socialization to the existent as a tool for reducing prejudice. “The authors of the Chicago study did not share the Berkeley group’s critical views of society, and . . . they regarded the ability to take part in the American way of life as a sign of a well-developed personality, while for the authors of the Berkeley study this was a sign of conforming to a society which was full of failures and injustices and therefore a breeding-ground for prejudice.” Frankfurt School, 427; Adorno et al., Authoritarian Personality; and Bettelheim and Janowitz, Dynamics of Prejudice. For more on the utopian dimension of “Elements of Anti-Semitism,” see Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: Free Press, 1977), 179. Her argument illuminates the political project—and silences—of The Authoritarian Personality.


70. Quoted in Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 429.


72. Jacqueline D. Martinez, for example, discusses the relations between representations and self-representations in Phenomenology of Chicana Experience and Identity: Communication and Transformation in Praxis (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).


74. Dyer, White, 7.

75. Dyer, White, 10.


77. Mowitt’s analysis concentrates on what he calls the “percussive field,” performance embodying a hybrid of determinations, which can be conceptualized in terms of a “musicological division, a sociological division, and, for lack of a better term, a psychoanalytical psychological division.” Percussion, 4.

78. Mowitt, Percussion, 34–41.

79. Mowitt, Percussion, 36.