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Examining the role of identity in negotiation decision making: the case of Cyprus

Cigdem V. Sirin
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Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to examine the effects of ethnic and social identities on negotiation decision making in the context of the Cyprus conflict.
Design/methodology/approach – The author conducts a theory-driven case study of the 1959 Zurich-London agreements on Cyprus, analyzing the positions of Turkey, Greece, Britain, and the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities during the negotiation process. The analytical method is the applied decision analysis procedure.
Findings – The analysis of the Zurich-London negotiations over Cyprus suggests that even in the presence of adversarial ethnic ties, decision makers who have a shared (and salient) social identity are more likely to employ collective-serving decision strategies and seek even-handed solutions that will not jeopardize their mutual interests. Here, Turkey and Greece – both NATO members – decided to settle on a commonly agreed negotiation outcome despite their ethnicity-driven, clashing interests over Cyprus. In contrast, decision makers with severe ethnic fragmentation with no shared social identity (as with the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities) are more prone to employ self-serving decision strategies and seek zero-sum negotiation outcomes that will exclusively benefit them.
Research limitations/implications – Regarding the applied decision analysis procedure employed in this study, it is necessary to acknowledge the subjective nature of the construction of the decision matrices with respective values/ratings, even though such procedure is based on empirical and situational evidence.
Originality/value – The study introduces a novel theoretical and analytical framework to the literature on negotiation decision making in identity-based conflicts by combining the social contextualist perspective with the polyheuristic decision model and using applied decision analysis. By anchoring the analysis in the historical context of the Cyprus conflict, the study also contributes to the relatively underdeveloped literature on conflict management in the Middle East.

Keywords Negotiation decision making, Social contextualist perspective, Poliheuristic theory, Applied decision analysis, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Conflict resolution, Agreements

Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
Identity, in its various forms (be it national, religious, ethnic, ideological, or cultural), has always been a powerful force in shaping politics and society. While identity may act as a unifier bringing people together under one group, it may also function as a potent divider between different groups leading to the outbreak of serious tensions and conflict. Recently, identity-based conflicts – especially ethnic-based ones – have become a major area of interest and concern for social scientists and political decision

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makers. As most conflicts of the post-Cold War era have increasingly become identity-related, scholars and policy makers have begun to search for effective conflict management and resolution strategies to deal with such conflicts. Given the proclivity of identity-based conflicts to turn into recurrent and intractable wars, more research is needed for understanding and explaining the decision making processes and outcomes related to the management and resolution of such conflicts (Rothman, 1997; Bar-Tal, 2010).

This study examines the effects of ethnic and social identities on negotiation decision making. In doing so, the study offers a novel theoretical and analytical framework to the literature on negotiation decision making in identity-based conflicts by combining the social contextualist perspective (Kramer et al., 1993) with the poliheuristic decision model (Mintz and Geva, 1997; Mintz, 2004) and using applied decision analysis. The research questions that guide this study are: “Whether and how do ethnic ties/identities affect decision making in a given negotiation setting?” and “Does the existence of social identities shared with the opponent in a negotiation setting influence the process and outcome of negotiation decision making in identity-based conflicts?” In search for answers, I conduct a theory-driven study of the Cyprus case with a focus on the 1959 Zurich-London agreements to resolve the Cyprus conflict, for which I analyze the positions of Turkey, Greece, Britain, and the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities during the negotiation process. By anchoring the analysis in the historical context of the Cyprus conflict, this study also contributes to the relatively underdeveloped literature on conflict management in the Middle East.

2. Literature review

2.1 Identity-based conflicts and their resolution

The term “identity-based conflict” generally refers to social conflicts that are based on ethnic, cultural, religious, or national-based identity differences (see Gurr, 1994; Rothman, 1997; Kriesberg, 1998). Given the fact that many recent conflicts in the world have increasingly involved elements of identity, there has been a substantial growth in scholarship on this topic. Thus far, most research on identity-based conflicts has focused either on their outbreak, duration, or post-conflict management strategies. On the other hand, studies that specifically examine the negotiation dynamics observed during the resolution of such conflicts have been relatively sparse.

Scholars find that combatants fighting over issues tied to their ethnic identities are prone to having greater difficulty in reaching a compromise settlement than those fighting over more negotiable political or economic issues (Randle, 1973; Horowitz, 1985). According to Gurr (1994), ethnopolitical conflicts are fought not just over resources or power, but also over protecting group status, culture, and identity. Because such conflicts tend to involve clashes over indivisible stakes and incompatible goals, the viability of positive negotiation outcomes may be significantly impaired. Similarly, Zartman (2004) suggests that elements of compromise are characteristically missing in ethnic conflicts because the contending parties seek terms that are often repulsive to the other side and also because a formula for a shared sense of justice is difficult to develop when separate justice is demanded. Subsequently, identity-based, ethnopolitical conflicts are generally resistant to traditional resource-based and/or interest-based resolution methods, particularly since such conflicts are essentially about recognition and survival (Rothman and Olson, 2001).
As Hicks (2001) aptly puts it:

If a conflict involves a perceived or unconsciously experienced threat to identity, we should be better able to respond effectively to and resolve the conflict by recognizing and understanding this element. As negotiators and as participants in conflicts, we will be more able to make good decisions in the midst of differences and disagreements if we understand the sources of our responses to those differences (p. 39).

On a parallel basis, Isajiw (2000) suggests that identity recognition is a vital component in the process of interethnic negotiation and, if not properly addressed, entire peace-making efforts may be seriously undermined. Nevertheless, the amount of accumulated knowledge in this field is still limited and much work remains with respect to theory development (see Pearson, 2001). With these considerations in mind, I next look to the general literature on negotiation decision making.

2.2 Negotiation decision making

In the study of negotiation decision making, there exist a variety of theoretical approaches and analytical models (see, for example, Bazerman et al., 2000; Druckman, 1997; Raiffa, 1982, Raiffa et al., 2002; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Zartman, 1978, for extensive reviews of the negotiation literature). The dominant theoretical model in this field of research has been rational bargaining, which lies at the core of normative and prescriptive approaches to negotiation decision making. Therein, economic and game theoretic models depict decision makers as rational actors motivated primarily by self-interest trying to maximize their own expected utility while minimizing costs during the bargaining process (e.g. Brams, 1990; Roth, 1991; Terris and Maoz, 2005). Another major theoretical framework in negotiation research consists of structural approaches that examine negotiation outcomes as a function of structural characteristics specific to negotiation settings (e.g. Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). Such structural features may include the number and relative power of negotiating parties, or the salience of issues discussed.

Alternatively, cognitive/psychological-based theoretical frameworks posit that negotiators are often influenced by other concerns beyond utility maximization or structural issues. Within this line of research, the individual differences approach focuses on personality-related factors (e.g. Barry and Friedman, 1998). The information-processing approach, on the other hand, highlights the role of judgmental heuristics and biases in negotiations (e.g. Carroll and Payne, 1990; De Dreu and Carnevale, 2003). According to this latter approach, decision heuristics represent certain allocation rules (such as maximizing one’s absolute gain, relative gain, or joint gain, and/or minimizing differences) that interdependent decision makers use when negotiating (see Allison and Messick, 1990).

2.3 Social contextualist perspective in negotiator decision making

Extending the scope of theoretical frameworks employed in negotiation decision making, Kramer et al. (1993) offer an alternative approach, which they term the social contextualist perspective. According to this perspective, in order to understand negotiator decision making, it is important to take into account the impact of the social environment within which negotiators are characteristically embedded since many real-world negotiations occur in the context of preexisting ties and relations such as membership in the same political organization.
The social contextualist perspective in negotiator decision making builds upon social identity theory, which examines interpersonal behavior through the lens of social group memberships (see Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1985). One of the key assumptions of social identity theory is that personal and group identities tend to be inversely related: when one identity is salient, the other recedes in importance (see Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Kramer and Brewer, 1984). Applying this assumption to negotiator decision making, the social contextualist perspective suggests that in the absence of a shared social identity, decision makers are likely to adopt more self-interested orientations focusing primarily on their own preferred outcomes. In contrast, if there exists a shared (and salient) social identity among negotiating parties, the social contextual perspective anticipates that negotiators are more likely to have a heightened concern about the other party’s gains and losses, and prefer relatively more equal negotiation outcomes (Kramer et al., 1993).

Given its focus on the role of identities, Kramer et al.’s (1993) social contextualist perspective thus offers a useful framework for analyzing negotiation decision making in identity-based conflicts. However, one should refrain from engaging in overly-simplistic applications of this theoretical framework in the area of identity-based conflicts. Indeed, one should note that Kramer et al.’s (1993) original study investigates interpersonal conflict in a laboratory setting with the negotiation task built around a business deal as opposed to ethnic conflict situations (as in the case of Cyprus) in which negotiators represent their group in a politically, culturally, and ethnically toxic environment. This being the case, special care must be taken to address historical and contextual factors that encroach upon such complex cases of intergroup identity-based conflicts. Nevertheless, since the general basis of the social contextualist perspective – social identity theory – has commonly been applied to the study of identity-based conflicts (see Müller-Klestil, 2009), this specialized framework can be highly compatible for analyzing negotiation dynamics in such settings.

2.4 Poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision-making

Even though the social contextualist perspective is helpful for incorporating the role of identities in examining negotiation decision making outcomes, it does not fully capture the processes that lead to such outcomes. In order to trace the negotiation decision making processes in identity-based conflicts, I look to a decision making model – poliheuristic theory – that bridges the gap between process and outcome research orientations in international relations (see Mintz and Geva, 1997; Mintz, 2004).

According to poliheuristic theory, decision-making is a two-stage process for which policy makers use a mixture of decision strategies (Mintz and Geva, 1997; Mintz, 2004; Mintz et al., 1997). The first stage of decision making entails rejecting alternatives that are unacceptable to policy makers on a critical dimension (such as domestic/political, diplomatic, or military/strategic). This stage involves a heuristic-based simplification of decision problems. At the core of the decision strategy for this stage is the “noncompensatory principle,” which serves to discard alternatives that do not pass a certain threshold on a given dimension. Specifically, if a certain alternative scores low on a critical dimension, a high score on another dimension cannot compensate/counteract for it, and consequently that alternative is discarded (Mintz, 1993). The second stage entails selecting an alternative from a subset of remaining alternatives with the purpose of maximizing benefits and minimizing costs using more analytic decision rules. Accordingly, the poliheuristic model suggests that by
facilitating cognitive management of a multifaceted strategic interaction, the early heuristic-based elimination process allows for more complex decision strategies such as the expected utility model to operate. Thus, the poliheuristic model also bridges the “rational-cognitive” divide in the study of foreign policy decision making (Mintz and Geva, 1997).

In specifying the conditions under which rational-analytic strategies may be employed at the second stage of decision making, Astorino-Courtois and Trusty (2000) point to the structural complexity of the remaining choice set. In particular, the second-stage choice rule is affected by the interrelations of the decision dimensions and the number of alternatives remaining after the first-stage eliminations. Research in cognitive psychology predicts that more complex decision making strategies should be most common if the noncompensatory calculus of the first stage yields a much-reduced decision matrix containing minimal value conflict. However, if the choice set is not significantly reduced during the first stage (e.g. if most alternatives exceed the cutoff value and are very close in value to one another) and if trade-offs between values are extreme, the second-stage decision task can remain relatively complex, increasing the likelihood of continuing with simple heuristic-based decision strategies as in the first stage.

In identifying relevant dimensions that decision makers generally take into account for a given decision task, poliheuristic theory refers to domestic politics as “the essence of decision” (Mintz and Geva, 1997; Mintz, 2005). As such, the model captures how domestic politics enter into the decision-making process in the form of primary motivations and goals. According to the poliheuristic model, political loss aversion (i.e. evaluating gains and losses in political terms) overrules all other considerations since leaders are driven more by avoiding political failure than achieving success (Anderson, 1983). This being the case, the domestic political dimension is almost always noncompensatory in the poliheuristic model (Mintz and Geva, 1997; Mintz et al., 1997; Kinne, 2005). That said, once the domestic politics dimension is given primary consideration, decision makers may then evaluate the remaining alternatives based on other relevant dimensions, such as military and strategic ones (see Mintz, 1993; DeRouen, 2003). Hence, the domestic political dimension may not necessarily be the most salient dimension at the second stage of decision making (James and Zhang, 2005).

In interactive settings, decision makers consider viable alternatives and important dimensions along with an assessment of the opponent’s perceived preferences and concerns. Therein, the poliheuristic model postulates that leaders simplify their decision tasks, first of all, by eliminating alternatives that are politically damaging for them. That said, as Mintz (2004) points out, in strategic settings such as those that characterize many war and peace decisions, decision makers may eliminate not only their own politically infeasible alternatives but also alternatives perceived to be politically infeasible for their opponents. Applying this logic to negotiation decision making in identity-based conflicts, the question then becomes “How do negotiating parties take into account individual versus mutual gains and losses in deciding a certain negotiation outcome?” The answer may lie in merging the poliheuristic model with the social contextualist perspective.

3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
The relative strength of a party’s collective identity and the manner in which such identity is constructed and maintained help shape how conflicts and their resolutions
are likely to develop (Coy and Woehrle, 2000). As Kriesberg (1998) points out, each disputant brings multiple identities into a conflict situation and levels of salience associated with each identity may shift during the course of negotiations. The layering and ranking of an individual’s identities and loyalties depends largely on the situation since different issues may tap different identities. To illustrate, a person might prioritize the identity of an “African American” when dealing with issues of racial equality, of a “feminist” when writing a petition against sex discrimination in the workplace, of a “Christian” when participating in a public debate over the issue of prayer in public schools, or of a “worker” when joining a protest against a policy designed to curb the bargaining rights of labor unions (see Sirin, 2010). Therefore, the key to determining which identity is most likely to be salient for an individual (or group) in a given case is the context and objectives of interpersonal (or intergroup) interactions.

In intergroup conflict, certain identities may become more salient and/or more amenable to negotiation while others may be less so. An example in this regard is the groundbreaking field experiment conducted by Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif et al., 1961) at a summer camp for boys at Robbers Cave, Oklahoma. In the first phase of the experiment, Sherif and his colleagues divided the boys into two separate groups and worked towards generating in-group identification and unity. In the second phase of the experiment, the two groups came into contact through friction-producing competitive activities resulting in the formation of negative attitudes and acts of hostility toward one another. However, in the third “integration” phase, Sherif et al. (1961) were able to shift the interaction between the members of each group from intergroup conflict to intergroup unity by generating superordinate goals, which could only be achieved through cooperation between the two groups. This eventually led to a superordinate identity in which all of the boys considered themselves to be part of the same group.

Evidently, identities based on deeply-rooted attributes, such as ethnicity, race, or religion, are not as open to change as was the case in the Robbers Cave experiment. Nevertheless, many studies on identity-based intergroup conflict – particularly those that adopt structural-instrumentalist and social-constructivist approaches – suggest that despite their seemingly rigid nature, identities may be transformed from being conflict-inducing sources into conflict-resolving ones, particularly by openly addressing the issues of identity, threat, and negativity together with developing various strategies to achieve intergroup trust and cooperation (see Müller-Klestil, 2009).

In light of these considerations, I argue that theorizing about negotiation decision making in intergroup conflicts should encompass an in-depth treatment of “identity” in addition to the instrumental and structural issues. Due to its focus on the role of identity, the social contextualist perspective is an effective approach for examining negotiation decision making in identity-based conflicts. Specifically, given its attention to how the existence and salience of shared social identity of the negotiating parties affect negotiation outcomes, the social contextualist perspective enables one to analyze negotiation settings that involve multiple identities. In addition, to trace the decision making processes in a given negotiation setting to resolve an identity-based conflict, the poliheuristic model offers a useful theoretical framework particularly vis-à-vis analyzing the strategic interaction patterns and decision strategies adopted by the
negotiating parties. Accordingly, I combine the social contextualist perspective with poliheuristic theory to propose the following hypotheses:

**H1.** In a negotiation setting, decision makers who have a shared social identity are more likely to employ collective-serving decision strategies and seek evenhanded solutions that will not jeopardize their mutual interests compared to those who do not possess such shared identity.

**H2.** In a negotiation setting, decision makers with severe ethnic fragmentation with no shared social identity are more likely to employ self-serving decision strategies and seek zero-sum negotiation outcomes that will exclusively benefit them as compared to those who have a shared social identity.

**H3.** In the concomitant presence of conflicting ethnic identities and a shared social identity, preference for self-serving versus collective-serving decision strategies and negotiation outcomes are likely to depend on the salience of the negotiating parties’ ethnic versus shared social identity.

### 4. Methodological framework

Regarding the methodological framework, this study employs “the applied decision analysis procedure,” which is an analytic procedure for recreating or “reverse engineering” decision making (see Mintz, 2005; Mintz and DeRouen, 2010). This method explores the decision rules, strategies, and information search patterns that decision makers employ in the process of reaching a particular decision outcome. To recreate the decision-making process, the applied decision analysis procedure employs a decision matrix in the form of a chart that provides a useful visual reference with rows representing the decision dimensions and columns representing the decision alternatives (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010).

The applied decision analysis procedure is composed of several steps (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010). The researcher first identifies the set of available alternatives (such as use force or do nothing) and the relevant dimensions (such as military or economic) for the decision task based on empirical and situational evidence. The researcher may then choose to assign weights (i.e. importance levels) to dimensions if there is evidence that the decision maker perceives some particular dimensions more important than others. Next, the researcher identifies and rates the major implications of each alternative on each dimension (such as military implications of doing nothing in response to a crisis situation). Last, the researcher identifies the decision rule used by the decision maker (such as maximizing versus satisficing).

### 5. The case of Cyprus

Given its historical background as well as the variation regarding the ethnic and social ties of the parties involved, the Cyprus conflict is an ideal case for exploring the role of identity in negotiation decision making. Specifically, the Cyprus case provides an opportunity to examine negotiator decision making in identity-based conflicts from multiple perspectives and by considering different combinations of the parties involved as follows:

1. Turkey and Greece: two enduring rivals with strong ethnic ties to the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, respectively and both members of an
important intergovernmental security organization, NATO (presence of adversarial ethnic ties, presence of a shared social identity).

(2) Britain: a colonial power with no ethnic ties to either Turkey or Greece, or to the two Cypriot communities and a member of NATO as with Turkey and Greece (absence of adversarial ethnic ties, presence of a shared social identity).

(3) Turkish and Greek Cypriots: two extremely self-contained and antagonistic ethnic groups with no common collective ties (presence of exclusionary ethnic identity, absence of a shared social identity).

5.1 Decision problem
The Cyprus conflict is an intractable, identity-based conflict that remains unresolved over half a century later. The Island of Cyprus, located at a strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, consists of an ethnically divided society: Greeks (which comprised approximately 82 percent of the population as of 1960) and Turks (comprising approximately 18 percent of the population as of 1960) with loyalties to Greece and Turkey, respectively (Borowiec, 2000). Cyprus was under Ottoman rule from 1571 to 1878. Thereafter, Cyprus fell under British control and officially became a British colony through annexation in 1914.

The launch of a Greek Cypriot anti-colonial guerilla revolt in 1955, Britain’s ensuing decision to decolonize the island, and the uncertainty surrounding the island’s future turned the Cyprus issue into an international problem (Joseph, 1985). At the time, Greek Cypriots were demanding enosis (i.e. the union of Cyprus with Greece), which had the support of the Greek government. Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government sought taksim (i.e. partition of the island between Turks and Greeks). These conflicting demands led to incidents of ethnic violence on the island and escalating tension between two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece. A solution to the Cyprus problem was reached in 1959 through negotiations between Turkey and Greece, which served as a prelude to the establishment of an independent bi-communal Cypriot state. Subsequently, the outline of their settlement was formed in Zurich. The treaties were finalized in London with the participation of Turkey, Greece, Britain, and the representatives of the two Cypriot communities (see Fisher, 2001).

5.2 Employing the applied decision analysis procedure to examine the Cyprus conflict
Following the applied decision analysis procedure, I constructed the decision matrices for Turkey, Greece, Britain, and the Turkish and Greek Cypriots as pertaining to the Zurich-London negotiations (see Tables I to V). To do so, I conducted an in-depth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternatives</th>
<th>Domestic/political</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partition between Turkey and Greece</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexation by Turkey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification with Greece (Enosis)</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-determination</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent bi-communal state</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two separate states</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weights</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I.
Turkey’s decision matrix during the Zurich-London negotiations
review of numerous scholarly works along with various historical documents and accounts concerning the Cyprus issue (see Appendix). Therein, to properly build the decision matrices for each negotiating party, I sought to identify those specific dimensions and alternatives that were most commonly and consistently referred to throughout a wide range of historical and scholarly accounts on the conflict. Subsequently, I designate domestic/political, strategic/military, and diplomatic realms

### Table I. Dimensions and Alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/political</td>
<td>Partition between Turkey and Greece: −9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annexation by Turkey: −10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unification with Greece (Enosis): 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-determination: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent bi-communal state: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two separate states: −9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic/military</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 10</td>
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</tbody>
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### Table II. Greek Cypriot authority’s decision matrix during the Zurich-London negotiations

<table>
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<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/political</td>
<td>Continued British rule: −1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partition between Turkey and Greece: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annexation by Turkey: −7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unification with Greece (Enosis): −7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-determination: 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent bi-communal state: 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two separate states: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic/military</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 8</td>
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</table>

### Table III. Britain’s decision matrix during the Zurich-London negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/political</td>
<td>Continued British rule: −9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partition between Turkey and Greece: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annexation by Turkey: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unification with Greece (Enosis): 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-determination: 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent bi-communal state: 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two separate states: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic/military</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 8</td>
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</table>

### Table IV. Turkish Cypriot authority’s decision matrix during the Zurich-London negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/political</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic/military</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table V. Greek Cypriot authority’s decision matrix during the Zurich-London negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/political</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic/military</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>Accept the agreements “as is”: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject the agreement: −10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue bargaining: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weights: 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as the key dimensions in which the decision makers operated during these negotiations. The alternatives vary depending on the options available to the negotiating parties. For Turkey and Greece, the alternatives regarding Cyprus include partition, annexation, enosis, self-determination, independent bi-communal state, and two separate states. For Britain, continued British rule is another alternative to consider. For Turkish and Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, the available alternatives include accepting the agreement “as is,” rejecting the agreement, and continuing to bargain. I then rate each alternative on each dimension based on the implications (i.e. consequences) of choosing a given alternative for a given dimension for each party involved in the negotiation process. Specifically, the ratings are assigned on a 21-point scale ranging from −10 (the most unfavorable implications) to +10 (the most favorable implications). I also assign weights for each dimension, since historical accounts attest that the negotiating parties deemed certain dimensions more important than others during the course of the Zurich-London negotiations.

As for the applied decision analysis procedure, one should acknowledge the subjective nature of the construction of the decision matrix tables with values/ratings assigned by the researcher, even though such procedure is based on empirical and situational evidence. With this caveat in mind, in assigning the ratings to the decision matrices of the negotiating parties, I acted as the principle coder given my immersion in the decision task through archival and library research. However, to ensure that the ratings were not arbitrary and that they adequately reflect the numerical representation of each decision alternative for the negotiating parties, three graduate students acted as alternative coders and, thereafter, inter-coder reliability checks were conducted. These graduate students were trained on foreign policy decision making, including poliheuristic theory and applied decision analysis. They were then introduced to the Cyprus conflict, the decision task, and the positions of the five negotiating parties. After studying the decision task, the coders were asked to independently assign ratings to the decision matrix of each negotiating party. To determine inter-coder reliability, I computed Krippendorff’s alpha (a standard reliability coefficient that measures the agreement between coders). The reliability test yielded a score of 0.794, which is generally considered a satisfactory level of inter-coder agreement (see Krippendorff, 1980).

6. Analyses of the Zurich-London negotiations over Cyprus

6.1 The positions of Turkey and Greece

The interactions between Turkey and Greece embody two contradictory elements: both countries have been members of the same security alliance, NATO, since 1952, but both have also been enduring rivals (Kollias, 1996; Sezer, 1991). In fact, the Greek-Turkish rivalry can be traced back more than a thousand years – to the times of the Byzantine Empire clashing with various Turkish states in Anatolia (also known as Asia Minor). In that period, one major turning point was the defeat of the Byzantines by the Seljuk Turks in 1071 in the Battle of Manzikert, which seriously undermined Byzantine authority and resulted in a growing Turkish presence in Anatolia (Peteinarakis, 2007). Later on, the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottoman Turks marked the fall of the Byzantine Empire. The Ottoman Turks made the coveted city the capital of their empire and gained control over vast lands, including Greece and other territories with a predominantly Greek population for a long period of time. Four
hundred years of Ottoman rule over Greece came to an official end in 1832 when the Ottoman sultan formally recognized the Kingdom of Greece as a sovereign state as a consequence of a successful Greek uprising (backed by Western powers) against a declining empire. Following its independence, Greece launched an ambitious military campaign to gain new territories in Thrace and Anatolia at the expense of the Ottomans (see Carkoglu and Rubin, 2005).

With the end of the first world war in 1918, the key Allies (i.e. France, Great Britain, and Italy) began the partitioning of the defeated Ottoman Empire. At this time, periods of rivalry and resentment between Greeks and Turks reached another climax with the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922, which was fought over Thracian and Anatolian territories (Peteinarakis, 2007). The decisive victory by the Turkish revolutionaries led to the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, which recognized the independence of the newly-established Republic of Turkey and its sovereignty over East Thrace and Anatolia. The treaty also involved a population exchange between Turkey and Greece resulting in the displacement of more than one and a half million people, namely the Orthodox Greek citizens of Turkey and Muslim Turkish citizens of Greece (Ker-Lindsay, 2007).

Although they clashed for most of their history together, Turkish-Greek relations eventually took a positive turn in the post-Lausanne period thanks to the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father and first president of modern Turkey, and Eleftherios Venizelos, then-prime minister of Greece (Demirozü, 2008; Kalaitzaki, 2005). Having settled major territorial disputes and minority issues, Ataturk and Venizelos worked jointly towards an effective rapprochement between the two nations for peace and stability. In the late 1920s, a growing perception of common defense interests served as an additional factor in the development of détente between Turkey and Greece. According to Kalaitzaki (2005), while Turkey and Greece still mistrusted each other to some extent, both countries had mutual concerns about Bulgaria’s intentions to gain access to the Aegean as well as Italy’s ambitious policies in the eastern Mediterranean. In June 1930, Turkey and Greece signed an agreement that settled the remaining disputes arising out of the population exchange and the value of the properties that were left behind (Demirozü, 2008). The mutual reconciliation and friendship efforts between the two countries were further enhanced with the Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration, as well as with a protocol on parity of naval armaments in October 1930 (Kalaitzaki, 2005). In September 1933, the two countries signed the “Entente Cordiale” treaty, in which they agreed to consult each other on international issues of common interest (Turkes, 1994). A year later, together with Romania and Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece signed the Balkan Pact, which was a regional pact against the spread of aggression in the Balkans (Turkes, 1994).

In short, before the Cyprus issue strained their relationship, Turkey and Greece had thus been actively seeking collaboration starting from the late 1920s, particularly due to common defense and security concerns, which represented vital superordinate goals. At that time, a shared social identity between Turkey and Greece began to fully materialize and became particularly salient once both countries fell under Soviet threat. In the case of Greece, the Soviet Union and its satellites were providing support to Greek Communists in the civil war. Turkey, on the other hand, had to resist overt Soviet territorial claims as well as plans to control the Straits (see Mango, 1987). Under such circumstances, Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952 to effectively curb the
Soviet threat, thereby institutionalizing the salient shared identity between Turkey and Greece. Indeed, such a rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations was reflected in a statement by then-Turkish President Celal Bayar during a state visit to Greece in January 1954, when he described Greek-Turkish cooperation as “the best example of how the two countries who mistakenly mistrusted each other for centuries have agreed upon a close and loyal collaboration as a result of recognition of the realities of life” (cited in Kalaitzaki, 2005, p. 110).

In addition to becoming NATO allies, Turkey and Greece were among the original members of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was established in 1948 and superseded by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1961 (Mango, 1987). Furthermore, Turkey and Greece became joint members of the Council of Europe in 1950 (Kalaitzaki, 2005). In the same year, they both sent contingents to Korea (Mango, 1987). In 1954, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia signed the Second Balkan Pact – a three-nation treaty of alliance, political cooperation, and mutual assistance. According to this treaty, any armed aggression against one party would be considered an aggression against all parties and any necessary retaliatory measures would be taken immediately (Bilman, 1998). However, the emerging Cyprus issue diminished the positive atmosphere generated by the treaty while Yugoslavia began to improve its relationship with the Soviet regime, both of which contributed to the unraveling of the Balkan Pact by 1960 (Bilman, 1998). Such was the nature of the delicate alliance between Turkey and Greece as they strived to form a shared social identity in their quest for collective security.

Given their strategic importance, even before their NATO membership, the interactions between Turkey and Greece, along with their political and economic conditions, posed a major concern for western powers. In fact, the strength of NATO’s southeastern wing and the Northern tier has always depended upon Turkey and Greece, particularly during the Cold War when the Soviet Union bore a burgeoning military presence in the area. As a result, Turkey and Greece became the major beneficiaries of aid and assistance from the Western powers (particularly from the US via the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in 1947) for their role in the effort to contain the spread of communism in the Balkans and the Middle East. This being the case, when Cyprus started to become a source of growing tensions between Turkey and Greece, the US and other Western powers became highly alarmed. At the time, Parker T. Hart, then-assistant secretary of the US for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, asserted that “the fate of our alliance system does not rest entirely in our hands or in our capacity to maintain its military strength. It is dangerously dependent on a solution to the Cyprus riddle” (see Hart, 1972, p. 142).

Aside from the delicate circumstances surrounding the international relationship between Turkey and Greece, the governments of both countries were also dealing with a number of difficulties on the domestic front. With regards to Turkey, the Democrat Party (DP) came to power in 1950 with the promise of economic prosperity under the leadership of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. By the mid-1950s, however, Turkey suffered serious economic troubles marked by severe inflation and high unemployment. Soon, the Menderes government turned to the US and the European creditors to help keep Turkey afloat (Stephens, 1966). Amid these troubles, the Menderes government began to lose public support. By the elections of 1957, the DP received 48 percent of the vote, closely followed by the major opposition party, the
Republican People’s Party (CHP), which garnered 41 percent vote share. Consequently, although the Menderes government retained power, its standing in the country had been weakened and had become more sensitive to domestic and foreign problems (Stephens, 1966).

After 1955, the Turkish government faced one of its greatest challenges as tensions concerning Cyprus flared when Greek Cypriots began a major revolt against British occupation of the island. Due to historical and ethnic connections, the Turkish press gave extensive attention to the events in Cyprus, reporting on incidents of ethnic killings on the island while also stressing the strategic importance of Cyprus to Turkey. Subsequently, the Turkish public reacted strongly to the events by holding large-scale public demonstrations and chanting the slogans of "Cyprus is Turkish" and "Partition or death," thus clearly communicating their support for annexation of the Turkish side of the island (Rustow, 1979). Amid overwhelming public pressure, the Turkish government moved to address the Cyprus problem.

On the Greek part, domestic pressures were not much different than that of Turkey. Prior to the 1950s, Greece had favored, though not directly supported, the demands of Greek Cypriots for enosis (Bolukbasi, 1988). During those years, the Greek government was dealing with political instability at home and was not in a position to prioritize the unification of Cyprus with Greece, settling instead on a more "hands-off" policy. However, once the Greek Cypriot revolt erupted after 1955, pro-enosis demonstrations became widespread throughout the country. In fact, Greek public support for enosis grew to the point that the Greek government felt obligated to respond to the Cyprus problem and soon took the issue before the UN, though no resolution was passed (Bolukbasi, 1988).

Analyzing these historical accounts and applying the poliheuristic model to dissect the decision making process for Turkey and Greece leads to the following observations (see Tables I and II for the decision matrices of Turkey and Greece, respectively). To begin with, the domestic/political dimension appears noncompensatory for both Turkish and Greek governments given the high public salience of the Cyprus issue and strong public pressure to take action in a certain policy direction. On the part of Turkey, in the first stage of its decision-making during the Zurich-London negotiations, the Turkish government immediately ruled out enosis as a viable option. The alternative of self-determination was also discarded because it could eventually result in enosis given the will of the Greek Cypriot majority in the island. Greece, on the other hand, eliminated partition, annexation by Turkey, and separate state as viable options. Otherwise, these alternatives would have resulted in a major political loss for both governments.

As previously mentioned, poliheuristic theory suggests that decision makers may also eliminate alternatives that are not politically feasible for the opponent. However, the model does not specify the conditions under which such deliberations of mutual gain and loss may take place. This is the point at which the social contextualist perspective is useful. Specifically, I look to the social contextualist perspective to consider the role of identity in negotiation decision making. On the one hand, one may argue that being enduring rivals and having strong, adversarial ethnic ties to the Cypriot communities could make the adoption of collective-serving decision strategies extremely difficult for Turkey and Greece. However, as the social contextualist perspective predicts, negotiators that share social identities (here, both are NATO
allies) may be more prone to eliminate alternatives that are politically unacceptable to themselves as well as their opponents (see Hypothesis 1), especially if such shared social identities are more salient than ethnic ties at the time of negotiation (see H3).

As Anastasiou (2008) points out, “both Greece and Turkey implicitly came to the conclusion that the economic, military, and political interests, to be derived from cooperation with NATO, exceeded their squabble over Cyprus” (pp. 87-88). Consequently, the Turkish government decided to eliminate the options of partition, annexation, and division of the island into two separate states, all of which were not politically feasible for the Greek government. In a similar vein, Greece knew that enosis and self-determination were not politically viable options for the Turkish government. Moreover, the inter-communal killings (particularly resulting in the significant loss of life among the minority Turkish Cypriots) increased the risk of a possible war with Turkey. Such a war would likely have resulted in the expulsion of both Turkey and Greece from NATO as well as the loss of American military and foreign aid. Additionally, the United Nations was unable to resolve the Cyprus issue. All the while, fear over the possibility that Britain might lose patience and either forcibly partition Cyprus or withdraw in such a way that a de facto partition would take place was a powerful influence on the Greek government. Hence, Greece dropped its support for enosis and self-determination, and did so partly in response to Turkey’s key concession to relinquish its partition demands.

The surviving alternatives (i.e. those not eliminated by either side at the first stage of decision-making) represent the potential outcomes of the strategic bargaining situation. In the second stage of decision-making for this case study, the decision matrix was reduced to a single viable alternative for the Turkish and Greek governments – the creation of an independent state. This alternative represented the narrow middle ground between mutually exclusive ethnic policies and goals (Joseph, 1985). As such, an agreement on this alternative would represent a compromise between the Greek preferences for enosis or self-determination and the Turkish counter-demand for partition of the island.

According to poliheuristic theory, the second stage is based on a more analytical processing of a reduced set of alternatives with the purpose of utility maximization. In this case, since there was only a single remaining viable alternative – the creation of an independent state – the negotiators focused on maximizing the utility of that option. Indeed, as Mintz (1993) suggests, “Even when one alternative is left (by default), a final refinement on the default choice is typically performed by trying to minimize costs and maximize benefits” (p. 600). Greece’s maximizing decision strategy at this stage is reflected in the conversation between Konstantinos Karamanlis, the prime minister of Greece, and Demetres Bitsios, the head of the Cyprus desk in the foreign ministry in Athens and the permanent representative of Greece to the UN, who was present at the Zurich-London negotiations:

Be that as it may, the decision had been taken to seek a settlement with the Turks, and the talks were in full progress. With all these considerations in mind, I said to the Prime Minister that as things stood, or objective should be to obtain the best possible terms in the agreement and try to make it as workable as possible. I recapitulated what we had already stressed with Vlachos in our memorandum, and referred to certain points which seemed to me of major importance: The decisions of the Cypriot Council of Ministers – to be composed of seven Greeks and three Turks–should be taken on a majority basis. On this point, we should be
unyielding. We should also reject the establishment in Cyprus of a Turkish military base. I went on saying that since two small military contingents would be sent to Cyprus by Greece and Turkey, we should insist that their presence be linked only to the treaty of alliance (Bitsios, 1975, pp. 101-102).

Likewise, Turkish government negotiators also applied similar efforts towards utility maximization and risk minimization as part of their decision strategy for the Zurich-London negotiations. As part of the negotiation settlement, the political or economic union of Cyprus with any other state was to be prohibited as a means to legally impede any future demands for enosis. In addition, highly extensive safeguards were to be provided to the minority Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, the creation of an independent, bi-communal Cypriot state would prevent Greece from gaining control of the Eastern Mediterranean or otherwise gaining proximity to the southern Anatolian littoral (Oberling, 1982).

Once negotiators reached a maximizing mutual consensus, the Zurich-London Agreements were settled in 1959, resulting in the establishment of a *sui generis* bi-communal partnership republic in 1960 with a single international identity and a unique constitution. The founding treaty also allowed for the permanent stationing of Turkish and Greek military contingents in Cyprus. Last, the three guarantor powers – Turkey, Greece, and Britain – were given the right to intervene in the event that a breach of the founding treaty should occur.

In sum, the agreement seemed to put an end to the escalating tension between Turkey and Greece, thus alleviating the concerns of both countries as well as those of the broader international community (particularly Britain and the US). The analyses of the positions of Turkey and Greece during the Zurich-London negotiations thus corroborate Hypotheses 1 and 3, suggesting that negotiating parties with a shared and salient social identity are likely to employ collective-serving decision strategies and seek evenhanded solutions that will not jeopardize their mutual interest.

### 6.2 The position of Britain

At the beginning of the 1950s, Britain perceived Cyprus to be a vital asset for the defense of its interests in the Middle East (Dodd, 1999). However, when the Greek Cypriot guerilla rebellion broke out in 1955 against British-rule of the island, Britain started to reconsider its Cyprus policy. At around this time, the failure of British attempts to control the Suez Canal in 1956 and the overthrow of the British-backed Iraqi monarch in 1958 diminished the strategic importance of Cyprus for Britain (Stephens, 1966). Under such circumstances, British efforts to keep the control of the island soon became more of a military liability rather than an asset. Britain’s desire to withdraw its political control over the island was also influenced by anti-colonial movements around the world. Consequently, Britain sought ways to disengage itself from any political responsibility for Cyprus while maintaining its military presence on the island (Borowiec, 2000).

At the same time, Britain wanted to avoid a civil war between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities that could possibly instigate a military confrontation between Turkey and Greece. A war between two strategic allies within the North Atlantic security system would be extremely costly in the face of the Soviet threat. Because Britain did not wish to antagonize neither Turkey nor Greece by favoring one

Examining the role of identity
over the other, it instead sought a more balanced solution to the Cyprus problem (Oberling, 1982).

John Reddaway, a former colonial administrator in Cyprus, describes the drastic changes in Britain’s position regarding the Cyprus issue during the 1950s as follows (Sonyel, 1997, p. 9):

Last stand on the established ground of “no compromise” on British sovereignty (1954); formal recognition of reality and legitimacy of the interests of both Turkey and Greece in Cyprus (September 1955); acceptance of self-determination in principle but not in practice (November 1955); acceptance of contingent application of self-determination with the proviso that the Turkish Cypriots would have a separate right involving the option of partition (December 1956); and finally formal recognition that the Cypriots were part of the Turkish and Greek nations and hence that as a means of reconciling amicably the conflicting demands of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots to be united with their motherlands, Cyprus should enjoy the advantages of association with Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth.

By declaring that it was ready to give up its sovereignty over Cyprus, the British government cleared the way for Greco-Turkish talks. Although Britain gave much leeway to Turkey and Greece in negotiating the terms of the agreement, it insisted on one key provision – that a number of military bases on the island should remain under British sovereignty. As Holland (1998) argues, “The truth was whilst both Greece and Turkey recognized the necessity to grant the principle of British military facilities in an independent Cyprus, neither had any real interest in their size or status. The British and the Cypriots were to be left to fight this matter out between them” (p. 307). After hard bargaining throughout the Zurich-London negotiations, the treaty of establishment met Britain’s key demand with the provision of an air base and two sovereign British military bases on the island, limited to 99 miles (Holland, 1998).

The British prime minister tried to frame the Cyprus accords as a victory for all, by claiming that no party had suffered defeat and that there was in fact no other viable alternative. This had been the rhetorical strategy of almost all British governments during the decolonization process in order to justify their decisions and to alleviate potential negative electoral implications. This demonstrates the primacy of the domestic/political dimension for the British government in dealing with the Cyprus problem. One should note that such discourse to create the impression of a tour de force was not convincing for most conservatives. In fact, many were questioning why it had been necessary for British soldiers to die when sovereignty over a great bulk of the island had been lost anyway (Holland, 1998). As such, the British government tried to “save face” by at least retaining some military bases on Cyprus. Therefore, as some observers and officials suggested, “the British decision to maintain sovereign areas on the island had been dictated by domestic political factors rather than by strategic or international considerations” (see Holland, 1998, p. 330).

Table III illustrates Britain’s decision matrix. Here, the absence of ethnic ties to the Cypriot communities lowered the weight of the domestic/political dimension for Britain compared to Turkey and Greece. However, the domestic/political dimension still remained as the key decision dimension given the British government’s concerns for political survival. On the other hand, the presence of a shared social identity with Turkey and Greece vis-à-vis membership in NATO significantly affected Britain’s negotiation decision making. As discussed above, given their strategic importance for
collective security, Britain did not want to alienate Turkey and Greece. So, in an attempt to be balanced, Britain, in the first stage of decision making, eliminated all the alternatives that were not politically viable for both Turkey and Greece, including the options of partition, annexation, enosis, self-determination, and the division of the island into two separate states. This corroborates H1 given Britain’s efforts to seek collective-serving decision strategies and evenhanded solutions to the Cyprus problem during the Zurich-London negotiations to appease both Turkey and Greece.

As for the remaining alternatives at the second stage of decision making, the option of continued British rule fared significantly lower than the creation of an independent state. This reflects the attitude of the British government and the public, whose main concerns lay with the security of the British soldiers and citizens residing on the island. As Stephens (1966) points out, “If the Greeks and Turks did not agree and the Greeks went on fighting the British, there was a strong probability that the public opinion in Britain might long before demand the abandonment of a thankless task” (pp. 158-59). Consequently, Britain agreed to the creation of an independent state and followed a maximizing strategy when bargaining for the number and size of the British military bases on the island as the key British provision for reaching a resolution agreement.

6.3 The positions of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities
The Turkish and Greek communities of Cyprus are divided along ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic lines. The exacerbation of ethnic relations in Cyprus after second world war was largely due to the fact that colonial rule preserved the pre-existing pattern of political representation (Stefanidis, 1999). This pattern, inherited from the Ottoman millet system, was based on ethnic-religious and political segregation of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, which contributed to the essentialization of their adversarial ethnic identities while suppressing the generation of any superordinate goals that could produce a shared social identity between the two groups.

In 1950, the newly elected Archbishop of Cyprus, Makarios III, arranged for a plebiscite among Greek Cypriots in order to test the popularity of enosis on the island. The result was a 96 percent favorability rating (see Hadjipavlou, 2007). The public support among the Greek Cypriots to unite with Greece set the grounds for a strong campaign against British rule that erupted into guerrilla warfare in 1955 with the formation of the EOKA (the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

The guerilla warfare resulted in the loss of several hundred lives, which alienated the Turkish Cypriots, who countered enosis with a call for partition into separate communities (taksim), each associated with its motherland (Hadjipavlou, 2007). The Turkish Cypriots aligned themselves more with the British rulers and formed the TMT (Turkish Defense Organization), which engaged in limited intercommunal fighting with the Greek Cypriots until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958 (Fisher, 2001).

The economic repercussions of the EOKA campaign and the British counter-measures in the form of curfews, mass detentions, and dismissals of workers from military establishments were beginning to impact the Greek Cypriot population (Mirbagheri, 1998). The Greek Cypriot community (along with Greece) was highly concerned about the possibility that Britain might lose its tolerance for rebellion and either partition Cyprus by force or simply withdraw its forces from the island, possibly resulting in a de facto partition. More importantly, the Greek Cypriots knew
that Greece would not support them indefinitely at the expense of worsening relations with Turkey. In fact, Archbishop Makarios argued that “There was no choice for me. They told me: ‘if you refuse, you will be responsible for all the repercussions in Cyprus. The world has put its hopes on the success of the conference, and you will be responsible for its failure.’ I was sure if I did not sign the agreement, there might be partition. Cyprus would be divided as a colony and we should not be able to raise the question again. The less bad thing was to sign” (Stephens, 1966, p. 166). Even General Grivas, who was the head of the EOKA movement, said that “This settlement – even though it is not what we expected – is preferable to national discord, for in the latter case (to reject the agreement and continue to struggle) we were bound to lose everything” (Bitsios, 1975, p. 111).

The real purpose of the London meeting was to impose a take-it-or-leave-it option on the Turkish and Greek Cypriots to accept the agreements. The UK as the retiring colonial ruler, Turkey as the big brother of the Turkish Cypriot minority, Greece as the sponsor of a pan-Hellenic unity, and all three countries as formal allies faced with deepening inter-communal hostilities sought to prevent the escalation of the Cyprus issue into a military confrontation within the North Atlantic security system (Hart, 1990). However, the more immediate parties in the conflict, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities were interestingly playing a secondary role during the negotiations (see Tables IV and V for the decision matrices of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, respectively).

Although both Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives were under intense pressure to be fully compliant with the terms of the Zurich-London accords, such pressure did not necessarily preclude them from negotiating until the very end. Regarding Archbishop Makarios, his last minute second thoughts about the agreements were interpreted by many prognosticators and scholars as a bargaining strategy to improve the resolution terms – a natural piece of brinkmanship on his part, “as he always had confidence in his negotiating skills” (Clerides, 1989; see also Moran, 2009). Indeed, in his 1969 valedictory dispatch, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, Sir Norman E. Costar, referred to Archbishop Makarios as a “masterly practitioner of the Byzantine tactics” who “can wreck any policy he disliked.” Costar further wrote that Makarios “likes it to be publicly apparent that his hand is being forced by others (of course in the direction he wishes) so that he can if necessary subsequently claim to be absolved of responsibility.”

Makarios, therefore, planned to accept what he could get from the Zurich-London negotiations until Greek Cypriots could regroup and renegotiate at a later, possibly more favorable time (Salih, 1978). In fact, only a month before the declaration of independence, Makarios publicly announced that “the agreements do not form the goal. They are the present and not the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their national cause and shape their future in accordance with their will. The Zurich-London Agreements have a number of positive elements but also negative ones, and the Greeks will work to take advantage of the positive elements and get rid of the negative ones” (Mirbagheri, 1998, p. 17).

As for the negotiation skills of the Turkish Cypriot leaders, Fazil Kucuk (a Swiss-educated doctor) and Rauf Denktas (a British-educated lawyer), they were able to secure extensive constitutional safeguards for their people during the Zurich-London negotiations. In fact, the agreements were highly favorable for
Turkish Cypriots to the point that Greek Cypriots found some of the provisions embedded in the agreements unfair and offensive, including the presence of Turkish troops, the advent of separate municipalities, and the imposition of a 70-30 Greek-Turkish ratio among the police and civil servants, particularly since Turks made up only 18 percent of the Cypriot population (see Hadjipavlou, 2007). In response, Kucuk and Denktas argued that altering the fundamental provisions of the agreements would take down the entire resolution structure (Holland, 1998). Meanwhile, Britain and Turkey also insisted that the agreements must be accepted in their entirety.

Taken together, during the Zurich-London negotiations, the presence of exclusionary ethnic identities and absence of a shared social identity between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities led these two negotiating parties to adopt self-serving decision strategies and seek zero-sum negotiation outcomes that would exclusively benefit their own group, which corroborates \( H2 \). In this sense, mutual interest was not part of the decision calculus for either group and concessions were given only when presented as a take-it-or-leave-it option.

7. Discussion and conclusion
In this study, I have examined the effects of ethnic and social identities on negotiation decision making in the context of the Cyprus conflict. The analysis of the 1959 Zurich-London negotiations over Cyprus suggests that even in the presence of adversarial ethnic ties, decision makers who have a shared (and salient) social identity are more likely to employ collective-serving decision strategies and seek evenhanded solutions that will not jeopardize their mutual interests. Here, Turkey and Greece – both NATO members – decided to settle on a commonly agreed negotiation outcome despite their ethnicity-driven, clashing interests over Cyprus. In contrast, decision makers with severe ethnic fragmentation with no shared social identity (as with the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities) are more prone to employ self-serving decision strategies and seek zero-sum negotiation outcomes that will exclusively benefit them.

7.1 Implications of the study
By combining the social contextualist perspective with the poliheuristic decision model and using applied decision analysis, this study introduced a novel theoretical and analytical framework to the literature on negotiation decision making in identity-based conflicts. While the social contextualist perspective helped explore the role of the identity in shaping negotiation outcomes (here, the Zurich-London agreements), the poliheuristic model was particularly useful to trace the decision making processes of the negotiating parties. The applied decision analysis procedure, on the other hand, allowed for a more systematic examination of negotiation decision making in an identity-based conflict by providing useful methodological tools to “reverse engineer” the negotiators’ decision calculus.

My findings parallel previous scholarly conceptualizations of civil war resolution as part of a three-step process that includes decisions on whether to initiate negotiations, whether to compromise, and finally whether to implement the terms of a resulting agreement (see Walter, 2002). By examining the Zurich-London negotiations, I tackled the first and second phases of conflict resolution *vis-à-vis* the Cyprus conflict. The outcome of these first two phases was a compromise solution to the Cyprus problem,
which established an independent Cyprus governed by means of a power-sharing arrangement between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Thereafter, however, the Zurich-London agreements proved to be a failure at the third phase of the conflict resolution (i.e. the implementation of the agreement terms). The fragile structure of the bi-communal partnership republic founded in 1960 shattered in only three years, when the Greek Cypriots sought to make amendments to the constitution that the Turkish Cypriot community found unacceptable. Subsequently, there was a revival of inter-communal violence, which permanently brought UN peacekeeping forces to the island starting in 1964. Eventually, continuing crises and acts of ethnic aggression in Cyprus resulted in a Turkish military intervention in 1974 and, immediately thereafter, the de facto separation of the island into two different states. Because the international community deemed such de facto separation enforced by the Turkish military as illegitimate, there has been no international recognition of the Turkish Cypriot administration that controls the northern part of the island since then. More recently, the issue became even more complicated when Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004 as a divided island (see Sozen, 2004; Yesilada and Sozen, 2002). To this date, the Cyprus issue remains unresolved.

7.2 Limitations and future research

One limitation of this study, as previously mentioned, relates to the use of the applied decision analysis procedure given the subjective nature of the construction of the decision matrices with respective values/ratings. One future avenue of research may be to work towards developing a more advanced and more systematic use of this method to study negotiation decision making. For example, the applied decision analysis procedure can be adopted and advanced for analyzing a given intergroup conflict by bringing together a number of expert analysts and/or negotiation teams from both sides of that conflict using a group-consensus-based democratic methodology to obtain commonly-accepted matrices and scoring systems through in-depth contemplation and deliberation based on empirical and situational evidence[1].

A brief discussion is also warranted regarding the use of case study analysis as the main research method employed in this study. One major shortcoming of case studies is the limited external validity and generalizability of the findings since the results obtained from a study that focuses only on a particular country or region may not be readily applicable to other countries or regions (see Coppedge, 1999). In addition, several scholars point to the issue of degrees of freedom given the fact that the number of observations in a case study research is insufficient for making causal assessments and systematically testing hypotheses (see Collier and Mahoney, 1996). Other scholars, however, suggest that one can address this problem by increasing temporal and/or within-unit variation, which thereby increases the number of cases (Campbell, 1975; Gerring, 2004). Moreover, most scholars acknowledge that case studies are valuable in providing context-specific explanations for processes that lead to general political outcomes and thus serve as important tools for theory development (see Bates, 1997). Another related issue is that case studies may provide significant amendments to partially established theories and compel scholars to narrow the parameter values in which their theories have explanatory power. Setting the limiting conditions in which relationships will hold is an important part of science and case studies are well equipped to perform this task.
By and large, the trade-off for decreased generalizability and parsimony is an increase in the potential accuracy of one's findings derived from area-specific case studies (see Przeworski and Teune, 1970, p. 21). As Pye (2001) points out, in certain areas of research it is necessary to go beyond the search for statistical correlations and cross-national generalizations in order to achieve the body and substance expected of scientific knowledge. This is especially important if the researcher also seeks to offer policy prescriptions, a fairly common objective in the areas of conflict management and resolution. Otherwise, using one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions based on general findings from cross-national studies that fail to attend to country or region-specific dynamics can often be misleading, if not detrimental, in efforts to resolve certain conflicts.

In short, for the purposes of this study, the case study method appears to be the most appropriate means to accurately discern the complex and highly contextual nature of negotiations concerning this particular conflict. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the limitations that one must contend with when applying the case study method, I have sought to refrain from making over-generalized or inflated claims about the findings. Regarding the degrees of freedom issue, I have sought to increase within-unit variation (and thus the number of observations) by analyzing multiple parties involved in the negotiations.

Despite the inherent drawbacks of the case study method as they pertain to the issues of external validity and generalizability as well as the subjective nature of the applied decision analysis procedure employed here, I believe that the arguments and findings of this study may, to a certain extent, relate to other identity-based conflicts and their resolution. As Fisher (2001) points out, “the conflict on Cyprus is mirrored by identity-based conflicts in many other parts of the globe at various stages of escalation and intractability” (p. 324). For instance, in the case of conflict in Northern Ireland, the 1998 British-Irish Peace Agreement (a.k.a. the Good Friday Agreement) signaled a new approach to conflict resolution via the promotion of overlapping identities between Irish Catholics and Protestants, which proved to be a major development in the Northern Ireland peace process. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, zero-sum perceptions of the conflict on both sides – with the Israeli-Palestinian ethnic identities constructed as mirror images of one another – largely contribute to the recurrent failure of numerous negotiation attempts over the past several decades (see Müller-Klestil, 2009). Last, another pertinent case, which concerns the former Yugoslavian countries, illustrates how the materialization of the “European” supranational identity (as part of major efforts towards accession to the European Union) played a role in improving intergroup relations in a region torn by violent ethnic conflict not so long ago (Štiks, 2006). Accordingly, the theoretical framework and the methodology employed in this study can also be applied to such cases.

My analysis of the Cyprus conflict is also relevant for academic studies and international peacebuilding efforts regarding conflict management and resolution in the Middle East. One avenue for future research is to compare the Cyprus case with other conflicts in the region. For instance, similar to Cyprus after the Zurich-London agreements, Iraq has been undergoing political transitions based on power-sharing among its Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish population in the aftermath of the US intervention in 2003. In the Cyprus case, the two Cypriot communities failed to develop a shared social identity to reconcile their ethnic differences, soon rendering the power-sharing
agreement futile. In the Iraqi case, the major groups involved in the current power-sharing arrangement are in a fragile state. The question then becomes whether a later development of cross-cutting cleavages and shared collective identities in a multiethnic society might increase the odds for effective conflict resolution and long-term inter-ethnic peace.

Another avenue for future research would be to examine the dynamic nature of adversarial versus shared identities, particularly with regards to their salience levels. Within the context of the 1959 Zurich-London negotiations, for example, a shared social identity between Turkey and Greece led to a compromise solution over Cyprus that was favorable to both parties and curtailed the escalation of the conflict. However, the recurrence of inter-communal violence in Cyprus resulted in Turkey’s controversial military intervention in 1974, a sign that its ethnic identity rather than its shared social identity superseded Turkey’s decision calculus in that case. As such, future research may explore the conditions under which the presence of a shared identity among the negotiating parties may no longer be effective in avoiding violent conflict – both for the case of Cyprus, as well as for other cases. Therefore, additional research in this area should be directed towards rigorously addressing the issue of changes in identity salience. In sum, continued theoretical and empirical explorations are warranted regarding the role of identity in negotiation decision making.

Note
1. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer who suggested these valuable points.

References
Bitsios, D.S. (1975), Cyprus, the Vulnerable Republic, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki.


Salih, H.I. (1978), *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*, University of Alabama Press, Birmingham, AL.


Further reading


Appendix

List of historical documents reviewed

(2) Memorandum setting out the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

(3) Documents agreed in the French text and initialed by the Greek and Turkish prime ministers at Zurich on February 11, 1959.

(4) List of documents annexed:
   - Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus.
   - Treaty of guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey.
   - Treaty of alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.
   - Declaration made by the government of the United Kingdom on February 17, 1959.
   - Additional article to be inserted in the treaty of guarantee.
   - Declaration made by the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers on February 17, 1959.
   - Declaration made by the representative of the Greek Cypriot community on February 19, 1959.
   - Declaration made by the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community on February 19, 1959.
   - Agreed measures to prepare for the new arrangements in Cyprus.


(8) Britain and Cyprus: key themes and documents since World War II (collected by William Mallinson).

(9) Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inönü, June 1964, as released by the White House, January 15, 1966.

(10) “Cyprus: valedictory despatch”, by Norman E. Costar, British high commissioner in Cyprus to the secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, April 28, 1969.

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