Super Liens to the Rescue? A Case Against Special Districts in Real Estate Finance

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I. Introduction

Henry and Claire, newly arrived to the state, eagerly drive into the gated and well-adorned front entrance of the Beau Chateaux subdivision.\footnote{1} With wide eyes, they marvel as they pass the carefully manicured lawns filled with meticulously pruned hedges, the architecturally pleasing homes on spacious lots, and the French chateau-style neighborhood community center, still in the early stages of construction, promised to feature a restaurant, tennis courts, a sprawling golf course, and a luxuriously ornamented swimming pool.\footnote{2} The couple pulls into their driveway and smiles with satisfaction at the beauty, the quality, and the lifestyle that they have bought into when they purchased a home here in Beau Chateaux. They especially feel lucky to have gotten into this development in its early stages, attributing their great deal on the purchase price of their home to their timeliness. Both are confident that the many empty lots and pre-built homes throughout Beau Chateaux will soon be filled with residents just like them.\footnote{3}

Neither Henry nor Claire has to worry about yard care, as others handle that service. Nor do they have to worry about continued construction of the community center, as that too is

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. See, e.g., \textit{We're the Face of Poverty: This is the tale of our two Baton Rouges}, \textit{Baton Rouge Bus. Report} (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.businessreport.com/article/20111114/BUSINESSREPORT0202/111119897 (last visited Jan. 6, 2015) (“That's because readers of this publication tend to be business executives, tend to be in an upper-middle-income bracket or higher, tend to be white and tend to live in faux French Country homes, many along Highland Road and almost all well south of Florida Boulevard.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

\item 2. See generally Setha M. Low, \textit{The Edge and the Center: Gated Communities and the Discourse of Urban Fear}, 103 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45 (2001) (describing the creation and aspects of American gated communities).

\item 3. See MARY G. SNYDER, \textit{Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States} 29 (1999) (“They also speak about a feeling of community, or a friendly community, or having neighbors like themselves, where they feel ‘at home.’”).
\end{itemize}
being taken care of. Next week there is scheduled to be a wine and cheese art walk in the neighborhood park, but Henry and Claire don’t have to purchase tickets or worry about paying for the food or spirits at the event. All of these expenses are taken care of beforehand, not by the payment of their homeowner’s association dues, but rather through the payment of their annual *ad valorem* property tax bill.

Importantly, Beau Chateaux is not just any private residential subdivision; rather, it has the special designation of being a special taxing district. The local city council has been feverish in its desire to lure innovative developers to the area and to spur growth in the local economy. In order to satisfy this economic development hunger, the city council agreed to create for the developer a special geographic designation, co-terminus with the property boundaries of Beau Chateaux, that would imbue a board of directors—appointed through a special statutory scheme—to charge annual property tax assessments against each of the individual parcels within the development. The board, whose members were appointed by the city council at the recommendation of the developer, then used the promise of the future revenues generated from these assessments to issue a substantial number of bonds, which were then sold to investors to raise capital for the project.

The developer, eager to attract potential buyers like Henry and Claire, used the proceeds from the sale of these bonds to support a significant portion of the costs of building Beau Chateaux. Everything from the many cobblestone streets, the

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4. See generally 1 McQuillen MUN. CORP. § 2:33 (3d ed.) (explaining the functions, purposes, and legal status of legislative special districts vis-à-vis municipal corporations).

5. See Christopher K. Odinet, *Fairness, Equity, and a Level Playing Field: Development Goals for the Resilient City*, 50 IDAHO. L. REV. 217, 220 (2014) (arguing that competition between cities to draw residents and to spur growth has increased since the Great Recession).

6. See generally 1 Gelfand, *State and Local Gov’t Debt Fin.* § 11:17 (2d ed.) (discussing the history, purpose, function, and creation of special legislative districts).

7. See id. (“Today, special authorities and special districts finance, construct and operate a wide range of programs and facilities. Generally, their capital projects are financed by revenue bonds, which are usually backed by service charges (e.g., bridge tolls, utility fees).” (citations omitted)).
environmentally friendly sanitary sewer system, the water distribution network, the parterre and antique rose laden community park, and even the expenses associated with the neighborhood center with its restaurant, tennis courts, golf course, and pool were paid for by the bonds issued by Beau Chateaux’s special taxing district.8

The developer felt quite pleased with his work9 because—although he did have to personally borrow a decent amount of money from his regular lending institution, Realty Bank, in order to fund the initial purchase of the land—the vast majority of the capital needed to build the improvements and infrastructure for Beau Chateaux were provided for by the special district. And since it was the special district that issued the bonds and guaranteed the debt from the future assessments, he was not personally liable for any of these obligations.10 Feeling so confident of his success, the developer went ahead and had the board of the district issue enough bonds so that he could not only complete phase one of Beau Chateaux as planned, but could also go ahead and finish phase two and most of phase three as well, all at the same time. People would come far and wide to make a home in this idyllic setting. After all, who would not want to live in a community where the homes are consistently beautiful, the yards immaculate, the streets reminiscent of old Europe, with gourmet food trucks lining the pre-fabricated village square, and

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8. See generally id.; see, e.g., Dale White, Homeowners in Failed Tax District Find Themselves in a Bind, HERALD-TIMBRE (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20130308/ARTICLE/130309612 (last visited Jan. 6, 2015) (“To pay for [infrastructural improvements], some developers obtain the state’s permission to set up CDDs. The special tax districts function as a government body that floats bond issues to pay for that infrastructure. The district boards add annual assessments to property tax bills to pay off the bond issues.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

9. It should be noted that usually developers operate through a business entity, such as a limited liability company or partnership or a corporation, and the issue typically arises when such an entity constitutes a thinly capitalized firm. See William J. Rand, The Closely Held Corporation: Its Capital Structure and the Federal Tax Laws, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 1009, 1069–70 (1988) (describing situations in which corporations are closely linked to a single developer and have little capital). However, for purposes of this Article, I refer to the developer in the male gender.

10. See White, supra note 8 (“In other words, property owners within a community development district assume a debt beside their mortgage and property taxes. They are obligated to pay off the district’s bonds.”).
where children are free to play throughout the community under the watchful eye of the private neighborhood security service? And to live in this lush fairytale-style paradise one need only pay a little extra on their property tax bill.

During the first year, after most of the phase one construction at Beau Chateaux was complete, all seemed to go well, and new homeowners like Henry and Claire began purchasing houses within the development on a fairly routine basis, but then the developer started to get a little worried. Although a decent number of parcels were now owned by third parties like Henry and Claire, a substantial number of the lots had yet to be sold and were still owned by the developer. He had been able to handle not only payments on the debt service for the real estate loan to Realty Bank, but also payment of the many individual property tax bills for the unsold parcels only by dipping into cash reserves from the project. Surely as word spread of the luxuries of Beau Chateaux hordes of willing buyers would be forthcoming. But, unfortunately, the housing market began to take a serious downturn in 2007 and 2008. Home prices began to fall tremendously, and that included those homes and parcels within Beau Chateaux. The developer started to get


12. See White, supra note 8 (“The district boards add annual assessments to property tax bills to pay off the bond issues.”).


worried because, although he could decrease the asking price for the homes and therefore take a hit to his profits, he could not do anything to decrease the annual costs of owning the property due to the *ad valorem* tax bill. The following year saw the downfall of many financial institutions, some of which had been known to purchase special district bonds like those of Beau Chateaux, and the mortgage market began to collapse as credit dried up.

Residents of Beau Chateaux, like Henry and Claire, began to sense that things were not going well. Construction of the community center had stopped months ago. The yards and the public park were not being kept up with the frequency that they once were and social events had vanished entirely. Not only that, but twice in the past year they had seen an increase in their special assessments. At first they assumed the Beau Chateaux drive down [house] prices."

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15. See *Ad Valorem*, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (9th ed. 2009) ("[Latin ‘according to the value’] (Of a tax) proportional to the value of the thing taxed." (brackets in original)).


17. See Singer, *supra* note 13, at 509 (“The entire business model switched from long-term repayment of mortgage loans by those who were likely to be able to make the payments (with foreclosure available as an unusual and secure backup in case of default) to a short-term market dependent on risk borrowers and compliant investors.” (citing JAMES R. BARTH, TONG LI, WENLING LE, TRIPHON PHUMIWASANA, & GLENN YAGO, *THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND CREDIT MARKETS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET MELTDOWN* 50–51 (2009)).
special district board wanted to build up reserves or might have needed a bit more to finance the construction of the golf course and center, but they were now beginning to suspect that something else might be afoot. What made matters worse was that no one was purchasing any more lots or homes within the development. Whole portions of the neighborhood assumed a zombie-like feel as structures remained empty and yards became overgrown.¹⁸

And the residents were right to be worried. The developer had used up all of his reserves and could not make the next payment of special assessments on the many unsold parcels in the community that he still owned. Soon, Henry, Claire, and their neighbors were given notice that the developer had declared bankruptcy and that Realty Bank was proceeding to foreclose on the many portions of the development still subject to its original mortgage. A month later, with no one paying the special assessments on that year’s property tax bills, the district as a whole went into default on its bonds. The bondholders, not willing to sit by and allow Realty Bank to exercise its mortgage rights to the prejudice of theirs, also foreclosed on their security rights. As part of the special district legal structure, the nonpayment of special assessments charged against the parcels within the development—much like with traditional real property taxes—created a lien on the individual lots. These, in turn, could be foreclosed upon like any other security device.¹⁹ And, also like

¹⁸. See Les Christie, Zombie Foreclosures Still Weighing on Housing Markets, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 13, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/13/realestate/zombie-foreclosures/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2015) (“RealTrac reported Thursday that foreclosure filings fell 27% year-over-year in February to a new seven-year low, indicating that the pace of filings have returned to normal levels since the foreclosure crisis. However, lingering problems loom.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Navideh Forghani, Vacant Homes Hurting Neighborhoods, ABC15 ARIZONA (Aug. 5, 2013) http://www.abc15.com/news/region-phoenix-metro/central-phoenix/vacant-homes-hurting-neighborhoods (last visited Jan. 6, 2015) (“Some investment homes aren’t re-sold right away so they can sit vacant for long stretches of time, sometimes becoming neighborhood eye-sores. Investors are buying up homes and just letting them sit there. Some aren’t maintaining the properties at all.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

¹⁹. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 33:9039.29(A) (2014) (“These benefit special assessments shall be a lien on the property against which assessed until paid and shall be enforceable in like manner as parish taxes.”); see also Miller infra note 119, at 147–49 (discussing public facilities districts in California); Galvan
real property taxes, this lien—although the product of an entirely private enterprise, used entirely for profit, and the financing of which was controlled entirely by the developer—is accorded super priority over and above any pre-existing security rights. This means that although Realty Bank has a first lien in the form of its mortgage on the development due to having advanced the upfront capital to purchase the land, the lien of the special taxing district is given superior status and, when foreclosed, would wipe out and completely destroy the lien of the bank.

As the bondholders and the bank each commenced foreclosure proceedings and fought out their various rights in court, Henry, Claire, and their neighbors began to realize the severity of their situations. The conditions in Beau Chateaux continued to deteriorate. The streets and sidewalks, as well as the community park, became overgrown with weeds and littered with debris. The community center, only half constructed, began to crumble and pose a safety hazard. The golf course became overrun with vermin and wild animals. And the many empty homes were constantly subjected to vandalism, consistent with the slew of recent reports of criminal activity throughout the neighborhood. Moreover, this malaise spread to adjoining neighborhoods that, although not benefiting from a special taxing district themselves, started to feel the negative effects of the nearby failing Beau Chateaux development. Buyers, retailers, and developers began to bolt from the area as properties become undesirable, values fell, and the community acquired the reputation of being one in decline.

Newspapers began to report that other real-estate-related special taxing districts like Beau Chateaux in the surrounding counties and across the state—as well as in other states—were

infra note 114, at 3049–57 (discussing MUDs in Texas); Griffith infra note 31, at 963–68 (discussing Florida’s community development districts, Georgia’s infrastructure development districts, Colorado’s public improvement districts, Delaware’s special development districts, and New Mexico’s public improvement districts).

20. See generally supra note 19 and accompanying text.

21. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 4.9(b) (1997) (“A holder of a junior interest who purchases real estate at the foreclosure sale of any senior lien on that real estate acquires title free and clear of the interest of the holder of the equity of redemption and of any interest that was junior to the foreclosed lien.”).
similarly failing in massive numbers as billions of dollars of bonded indebtedness defaulted or was close to default.\textsuperscript{22} Cities and towns across the United States that used special taxing districts for more altruistic purposes—such as to incentivize development in depressed areas or to provide critical human services to areas that are economically disadvantaged—were advised by their legal counsel that federal housing regulators have stated that because of the super liens that these districts can produce, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will not support residential lending for properties that are located within or may be located within such districts.\textsuperscript{23} Without the ability to obtain conventional financing, many community and economic development groups have been forced to abandon the use of special taxing districts as a way to finance critical infrastructure in areas where conventional lending is too risky to attract lenders at reasonable rates, if at all.\textsuperscript{24}

Henry and Claire now desire more than anything to sell their home and get as far away as possible from Beau Chateaux.


\textsuperscript{23} See, e.g., Prentiss Cox, \textit{Keeping PACE?: The Case Against Property Assessed Clean Energy Financing Programs}, 83 \textit{U. COLO. L. REV.} 83, 103 (2011) (“On August 31, 2010, the GSEs issued guidance statements indicating that they would not purchase mortgage loans if the homeowner had a PACE obligation unless the PACE program was structured so that the PACE lien was subordinate to the first lien mortgage loan.”).

\textsuperscript{24} For a discussion of the demise of another type of special taxing district, the Property Assessment Clean Energy special district, see Michael A. Wrapp, \textit{Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE): Victim of Loan Giants or Way of the Future?}, 27 \textit{NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY} 273, 284 (2013) (“The depth of the controversy over PACE programs became fully apparent when, with the supervision of the FHFA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac flatly refused to purchase any mortgages burdened by a PACE lien.”).
Unfortunately, they cannot afford to purchase a new home until this one has sold but, due to the neighborhood’s decline and the extremely high property tax bill, they cannot find a willing buyer. Also, because they purchased their home at the height of the housing bubble, they cannot afford to take a hit on the sale and thus cannot go down on their price. With so many of the parcels within the development being unmarketable, Beau Chateaux becomes a haven for blight and joins the line to the guillotine with the many other failed developments that have resulted from the unregulated abuse of real-estate-related development special taxing districts.25

While constructed above in the form of a narrative hypothetical, the plight of Henry, Claire, and the residents of Beau Chateaux is all too real. Stories like these have become common across the United States, especially in places where the ills from the housing bubble’s burst were felt most severely, like in Florida.26 Special taxing districts, for so long tied to traditional governmental functions like providing fire and police safety, water distribution, sewer services, and the development of economically distressed areas or important commercial centers, have become the instrumentalities of private real estate developers—and with tragic results.27 As cities and municipalities across the United States became zealous in their desire to attract new residents and to land economic development projects, they

25. See White, supra note 8 (illustrating the impact of the mortgage crisis on Florida communities utilizing special districts); Ritchie, supra note 22 (same); see generally Finout, supra note 22 (same).

26. See supra note 25 (describing the severity of the economic fallout in Florida).

became more willing—or dare say, enthusiastic—to bestow their guarded public powers and prerogatives into the hands of private developers to aid them in obtaining easy, fast cash.\textsuperscript{28} Unfortunately, with such power and such self-interest in the unchecked hands of private individuals, many developers over extended themselves (or rather their districts), which, coupled with the housing crisis, caused the entire real estate special taxing district scheme to come crashing down.\textsuperscript{29}

But this failure has not only meant that people like Henry and Claire find themselves in a hard spot. The ripple effect on the surrounding community—which can sometimes constitute an entire municipality or county—can be substantial.\textsuperscript{30} Economic depression begets more economic depression as potential investors, residents, and businesses retreat or run from these deteriorating areas, leaving them to become ghost towns filled with struggling businesses and haunted neighborhoods where many homes sit vacant or abandoned by their underwater owners.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{28} See Odinet, supra note 5, at 220 (describing the need for municipalities to compete with each other and provide incentives for development).

\textsuperscript{29} See White, supra note 8 (“As happened with Gran Paradiso, developments were started in what was becoming a declining housing market and the buyers needed to pay off CDD debt did not materialize, Lehmann said.”); Ritchie supra note 22 (“Today, Florida has 294 of these powerful districts that have borrowed billions by issuing bonds, and 123 of those—42 percent—are either defaulting or aren’t collecting enough money to make their payments . . . .”); FELDMAN ROLAPP, supra note 27 (listing risk of bond default through no fault of issuer as a disadvantage of community facilities districts).


\textsuperscript{31} See Janice C. Griffith, Special Tax Districts to Finance Residential Infrastructure, 39 Urb. Law. 959, 979 (2007) (“Even though the enabling IDD statutes in Florida and Georgia provide that the debt of an IDD does not constitute an obligation of the state . . . [t]he municipal bond market and credit rating agencies’ practices may link the district’s creditworthiness to the locality and possibly the state.”); Paul Donsky, Volume of ‘Subdivision’ Vacant Lots Overwhelms Banks, ATLANTIC JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Aug. 17, 2009), http://m.njc.com/news/business/volume-of-subdivision-vacant-lots-overwhelms-banks/nQKdl/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2015) (These idled, ‘zombie’ subdivisions can be found across metro Atlanta, but they’re most prevalent in outer-ring suburban areas. Selling them has proven tough, with some properties sitting on the market for months on end without even a nibble.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Becky Johnson, Development Done Right: Failed Projects Open Door for Those Taking the Long View, SMOKY MOUNTAIN
Further, this process undermines the basic notions of vested property rights without implicating constitutional considerations. The lender whose loan enables the developer to buy the land traditionally receives a first priority mortgage on the property. Except in rare cases, the lender would refuse to make that loan without a first priority lien that ensures that the debt will be paid before others whose liens or other interests in the property arose after the first mortgage loan was made. However, the law gives the special taxing district lien, imbued with public power but used for purely private purposes, super priority. Even


32. See STUART M. SAPT, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 9:19 (3d ed. 2013) (“The mortgage will also indicate that the indebtedness is secured by any buildings and improvements now or hereafter constructed on the land . . . .”).

33. See id. (explaining that mortgages usually contain affirmations that the property is free from other liens except those elaborated in a schedule annexed to the mortgage).

34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 7.1 (1997) (“A valid foreclosure of a mortgage terminates all interests in the foreclosed real estate that are junior to the mortgage being foreclosed and whose holders are properly joined or notified under applicable law.”).

35. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 33:9039.29(A) (2014) (“These benefit special assessments shall be a lien on the property against which assessed until paid and shall not be enforceable in like manner as parish taxes.”); see also Griffith
though the developer’s nonpayment of the assessments occurs only after the bank first obtains its mortgage, the mortgage is nonetheless inferior to the lien. While this type of subordination has merit in the context of general property taxes imposed by a municipality for purposes of education, police protection, and other public services, it represents an extreme injustice in the context of purely private, profit-driven developments. Despite this, there is no requirement that the special district or the municipality that created it pay just compensation to the first secured party for the impairment to its rights in the property. And lastly, the use of special taxing districts for private real estate developments has a wider adverse effect on community lending as a whole. Because real estate lenders cannot rely, as they have traditionally in the past, upon a first lien mortgage, many will no longer make loans for projects in areas that are subject to special taxing districts, no matter what legitimate and larger societal good they serve. Further, because

supra note 31, at 969 (“The district board determines the amount of assessments, which constitute a lien against the property until paid.”).

36. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 969 (“The district board determines the amount of the assessments, which constitute a lien against the property until paid.”).

37. See John Martinez, 4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 23:11 (2014) (“Absent a state constitutional provision to the contrary, the state legislature has great leeway in fashioning classifications between and among various types of property for revenue raising purposes provided that it has not acted in a palpably arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory fashion.”).

38. Id. § 21:17 (citing Buettner v. City of St. Cloud, 277 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1979)). Here you should say whether the mortgage lender knows, when making the loan, that the collateral is part of a special taxing district. If the lender knows that the loan is being made on collateral that is within or may be within a special taxing district then the lender can take into account the risk of subordination with its eyes open and can build that risk into the interest rate it charges.

39. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wilson, Maura A. Marchesi & Elias B. Hinckley, The Great PACE Controversy, 25 PROB. & PROP. 38, 39 (2011) (“Mortgage underwriters feared that loans secured by mortgages would become subordinate to PACE liens and as a result would not be readily sellable on the secondary mortgage market.”); see also Jeffrey Hoops, Setting the PACE for Energy Efficiency: The Rise, Fall, and (Potential) Return of Property Assessed Clean Energy, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 901, 902 (2012) (“Specifically, the FHFA believes that PACE creates unacceptable risk for lenders in general and its regulated entities in particular because most PACE legislation gives PACE assessment liens priority over pre-existing mortgages in the event of homeowner default.”).
of the potential to be primed by the district’s super lien, financial institutions at the secondary mortgage market level—who play such a critical role in making a liquid residential mortgage market possible—will likely refuse to purchase mortgages that are secured by properties within special districts, something that has already occurred in recent, similar situations involving PACE financing. While this has the potential to kill off effectively the use of purely private real estate development special districts, it will have the unintended consequence of eliminating the use of these financing tools in scenarios where they are truly warranted, such as in projects that improve poor neighborhoods or economically depressed areas where no conventional lender will extend credit. By doing so, a whole sector of viable community development financing will be utterly abolished. Although special taxing districts have received significant consideration by legal scholars in the past, this Article helps draw a more focused attention to the blatant abuses and negative effects caused by the use of special taxing districts in the purely private real-estate-development setting. Part II discusses the current economic climate of cities and municipalities across the country—those entities that serve as the primary creator of special taxing districts—in the wake of the Great Recession. This includes exploring the effects that the financial crash had on their wellbeing, as well as the continued economic and financial pressures faced by municipalities. Part II also highlights the reinvigoration in recent years of the importance of local government as a problem solver and a driver of economic and social prosperity—popularly called the “resilient city” movement. Part III gives an overview of the history and uses of special taxing districts throughout American history, including a

41. See id. at 601 (“Missouri lenders, legislatures, homeowners, environmentalists, and small businesses have thus been unable to move forward with a PACE program since federal lenders halted the initiative nationwide.”)
42. See generally supra note 41.
43. Infra Part I.
44. See generally infra Part II.
discussion of the development of special taxing districts used for real estate development purposes. It also includes a discussion of how, in light of the increasing intensity of economic development competition between cities, these particular special taxing districts have become tools that local government leaders use to lure private investors and businesses to their locale. Part IV peels away the gilt and hype behind these special districts when used for purely private development by pointing out their negative effects on vested property rights, the larger surrounding community, and the wider real estate financing market, particularly with respect to community lending. After analyzing these adverse consequences, Part V investigates the ways in which the use of real-estate-special-taxing districts can be better regulated and curtailed by pointing out the drawbacks to seeking a private, contract-based remedy as well by trying to prescribe statutorily their usage. This Article concludes by advocating that an equitable jurisprudential approach—in the form of a two-pronged test—to be adopted by courts to help better police the legitimate use of special taxing districts.

II. Special Taxing Districts and the Reinvigoration of Localism

Over the past several years, cities and other municipalities have been tested and strained by changing political winds and powerful economic and financial pressures. The financial and housing crisis of 2007 and 2008, followed by the Great Recession, caused a tremendous mistrust in the federal government. Many viewed poor policymaking and a loose regulatory system, all dominated and controlled at the federal level, as having been

45. See generally infra Part III.
46. See generally infra Part III.
47. See generally infra Part IV.
48. See generally infra Part V.
49. See generally infra Part VI.
50. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 227 ("While cities have enjoyed a prominent place in the story of flourishing throughout history, these institutions have also faced their share of trials and tribulations." (citing JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICA’S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 9–15 (1993))).
51. See id.
significantly, if not chiefly, responsible for allowing greed, corruption, and vice to settle into the American economy and which ultimately brought it crashing down.\textsuperscript{52}

In the wake of these events, political tolerance for centralized decision-making—and spending—has declined significantly.\textsuperscript{53} In its place has been a rise of an intense focus on cities and local governments.\textsuperscript{54} But municipalities have, in many ways, a heavier
yoke to carry in the wake of the financial downturn and, amid these increasing demands to be society’s new problem solvers, local governments are faced with intense pressures from all sides. It is through these economic and social pressures that local government decision-making has been steered precariously toward the creation of more and more special taxing districts as an instrument for economic, financial, and cultural viability, which has, in turn, served as an invitation for abuse and poor policymaking.

A. The Effects of the Economic Crisis on Local Governments

In order to understand why special taxing districts have been, and will likely only continue to be, such an attractive tool for use by local governments in fulfilling their new post-Recession destiny, it is necessary to appreciate how the economic crisis has impacted municipalities across the country.

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55. See Parisella, supra note 54 (“Like it or not, cities and their first administrators are being called upon to play a greater role on issues affecting more than their actual jurisdiction and this is a welcomed development.”).

56. See Parisella, supra note 54 (“It is becoming increasingly obvious that large centers are centers of economic, political, cultural, and community life. Together, they are doing more to increase their efforts to share best practices on safety, environmental, educational and community integration issues.”); Odinet, supra note 5, at 219 (“General governmental power and authority has shifted between a model favoring a more centralized federal or state government and a structure focused more on the autonomy and control of local governments.”).

Cities have enjoyed a prominent role in human society throughout the ages.\textsuperscript{58} The American city is no different, and, in fact, many of the greatest moments in the history of the United States—the rise and fall of great political movements, the birth of the industrial age, the genesis of new technologies, and the rise of a higher quality of life—took place amid the hustle and bustle of her cities.\textsuperscript{59}

1. The Financial Faring of Cities in the Great Recession

Although cities have faced a bevy of different challenges over the years—everything from the era of decay after the decline of the industrial era to the attempted renaissance brought about by the Housing Act of 1954\textsuperscript{60} and other federal legislation—the most recent wave of challenges came from the crash of the financial markets and the effects of the Great Recession.\textsuperscript{61} Specifically, the recession brought about a sharp decline in local government tax revenues,\textsuperscript{62} as massive streams of tax revenue that cities had


\textsuperscript{62} \textit{See id.} (referencing decreased tax revenue flowing to local
come to expect suddenly dried up or became consumed by new and unforeseen financial obligations.\textsuperscript{63} City services ranging far across the spectrum were privatized in an effort to shift financial responsibility and accompanying costs.\textsuperscript{64} Such services included things as varied as outsourcing the operation of the city zoo, trash pick-up, and even 911 emergency call centers.\textsuperscript{65} Budget cuts brought about massive layoffs of local government employees such as teachers, policeman, and firefighters, all in an effort to stabilize city finances.\textsuperscript{66}

The reason behind these drastic measures stemmed from diminishing tax revenues.\textsuperscript{67} By one report, states were hit with a 13% decline in local government revenues at the end of 2009.\textsuperscript{68} In governments); \textit{LOCAL SQUEEZE}, supra note 57 (analyzing decreased local government revenue streams by suing states like Michigan and Ohio as case studies).

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{See} \textit{LOCAL SQUEEZE}, supra note 57 (“Many [states, cities, and counties are] in a fiscal vise, squeezed on one side by reduced state aid and property tax income—which together make up more than half of local revenues—and growing demand for services on the other.”).

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{See} \textit{id.} (explaining that stone states, like New Jersey, have proposed privatization as a solution to revenue problems)

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{See} \textit{id.} (“Others have restructured departments or consolidated services with other localities. The city of Olathe, Kansas, recently partnered with surrounding Johnson County to build and run a single 911 dispatch facility, saving the city more than $300,000 in annual staffing and equipment costs.”).


\textsuperscript{67} \textit{See} Odinet, supra note 5, 228–29 (providing examples of municipalities which laid off employees to compensate for decreased revenue).

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{See} \textit{id.} at 229–30 (citing Lucy Dadayan, \textit{Tax Revenues Surpass Previous Peak but Growth Softens Once Again: Local Property Tax Collections Resume Modest Gains}, \textit{87 ROCKEFELLER INST.} \textit{1, 2} (Apr. 19, 2012), \textit{http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_finance/state_revenue_report/2012-04-19-SRR_87.pdf} (last visited Jan. 8, 2015) (“For instance, by the end of 2009, the majority of states were seeing a 13% decline in local tax revenues from prior
the past when cities had been faced by low tax revenues, they were able to obtain third party funding from state and federal coffers, but the Great Recession brought this back-stop system to a halt as both the state and the federal government were hit with their own financial woes. State legislatures could barely afford to meet their own financial obligations and were similarly on a cutting spree to balance their budgets. At the federal level, public opinion raged against additional borrowing and thereby cut off the possibility of a federal bailout for America’s cities.

2. Trying to Do More With Less and Less

years while budget shortfalls continued to rise.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

69. *See Local Squeeze, supra* note 57 (“Federal funds that have helped localities address these problems in the past also are beginning to shrink or expire.”); Tracy Gordon, *A Great Recession Brief: State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession*, BROOKINGS (July 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/12/state-local-budgets-gordon (last visited Jan. 8, 2015) (“State and local revenues often decline in an economic downturn, but federal grants may help to offset these losses.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).


71. *See Gordon supra* note 30, at 333 (explaining legislators’ intent to restrain state tax increment financing following the Great Recession).

Services that had long been seen as essentially tied to the function of local government—such as the provision of libraries, safety and fire services, roads and transportation, libraries, housing, and public health—were all subjected to deep draconian cuts. And even as the economy began to emerge from the downturn and private enterprise began to feel optimistic, dark storm clouds remained over local governments. Rainy day funds had long since been raided to maintain essential city services and there were no more disposable public assets to sell in order to plug holes with one-time monies. Sales tax revenues remained low, and the housing crisis's impact on property taxes produced a lagging effect such that, although the crash occurred in 2007–2008, the impact of the reduced tax monies only began to truly be seen in 2010. And lastly, many new financial obligations are on the horizon, such as debt service due on public-works bonds and retirement-system debt.

73. See id. at 226 [U]rban centers began to expand their offerings to include a wide array of amenities and services that had been little known prior to this period. 'A simple list of urban functions and the date when they first began to be performed illustrates [this] problem-solving approach[:] provision of a municipal water system (1822); sewage and sanitary works (1823); street railways (1832); public education (1840); municipal police force (1844); public parks (1840's); tax-supported public libraries (1854); bridges financed by municipal funds (1863); public health boards (1866); outdoor lighting (1880's).

74. See LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 57 (“[Cleveland, following budget shortfalls] also shut down five fire companies. With six trash crews eliminated, residents waited longer to have their refuse and recycling collected.”); Rob Gurwitt, As States Cut Aid, Localities Learn to Do Less with Less, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/tateline/2011/10/03/as-states-cut-aid-localities-learn-to-do-less-with-less (last visited Jan. 8, 2015) ([In Michigan], cities have cut back on services, laid off workers, put off hiring, merged departments and positions, and renegotiated labor contracts.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

75. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 243 (“As cities emerge from the wake of the economic downturn, the landscape has been altered and cities are being forced to adapt and re-tool so as to meet this new world order.”).

76. See id. at 229 (referencing the use of “rainy day funds” to deal with economic emergencies).

77. See id. at 231 (“Although cities vary in their dependence upon sales taxes, these revenue sources declined early in the economic crisis and have continued to remain relatively low.”).

78. See LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 57 (listing "exacerbating pension and
Against this backdrop of financial austerity, little outside support, and increasing expectations, cities have become ravenous for new forms of tax revenues.79 Almost all policy debates within the hallowed halls of city government across the country are consumed with ways in which new jobs, new developments, and new sources of tax monies can be lured, enticed, maintained, and augmented within the particular jurisdiction.80

B. A Call for Resilience in the Age of Cities

As the country enters—or perhaps better stated, reenters—the Age of Cities, the economic and financial pressures facing America’s local government decision makers are extreme, and so are the expectations.81 As the public has come to view federal debt woes” under “long term obligations” of states and municipalities).

79. See id. (“Localities’ dependence on two faltering sources of revenue—property taxes and state aid—presents profound challenges.”)
80. See id. (discussing, at length, the efforts of various local governments to reduce spending and increase revenue in innovative ways); Odinet, supra note 5, at 236 (describing the attempts by local governments to entice private developers to remain through investment).
81. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 231–32 (describing the “particular intense” economic pressures as a result of factors like pensions and retiring employees); see also Melissa M. Berry, Thinking Life A City: Grounding Social-Ecological Resilience in an Urban Land Ethic, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 117, 118 (2014) (arguing that the gradual shift from rural to urban life has frustrated Americans’ attempts to understand their place in the natural world); Jeffrey B. Litwak, State Border Towns and Resiliency: Barriers to Interstate Intergovernmental Cooperation, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2014) (linking small towns’ difficulties in providing infrastructure with a lack of urban resiliency to crises); John Travis Marshall & Ryan Max Rowberry, Urban Wreckage and Resiliency: Articulating a Practical Framework for Preserving, Reconstructing, and Building Cities, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 49, 51 (2014) (“Governments at all levels now face the daunting challenges of rebuilding cities quickly and ensuring they are stronger than before the disaster event.”); Andrea McArdle, Storm Surges, Disaster Planning, and Vulnerable Populations at the Urban Periphery: Imagining A Resilient New York After Superstorm Sandy, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 19, 19–20 (2014) (illustrating the need for local policy solutions in order to mitigate the extreme damage of disastrous weather); Palma Joy Strand, Cultivating “Civity”: Enhancing City Resilience with Bridging Relationships and Increased Trust, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 153, 154 (2014) (describing the need to mitigate “the devastating effects on large numbers of people when cities experience environmental and/or social shocks”); Kellen Zale, Urban Resiliency and the Right to Destroy, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 85 (2014) (“When considering what makes
leaders (and in some sense, state leaders as well) as having failed to move the country forward and bring about a robust economic recovery, all eyes have now turned to cities.

Public policy decision-makers, the media spotlight, scholars, and policy advocates have all focused intensely on local governments and their budding role. By virtue of their size and governance structure, many laud cities as being nimble and deft so as to have the ability to quickly respond to changing market conditions and as being flexible and adaptable so as to be innovative in taking advantage of new opportunities. Further, cities are praised as having “boots on the ground” in terms of understanding how everyday citizens deal with the challenges of this new economic climate. Since the services provided by a city resilient, planners, policy-makers and academics often focus on creating infrastructure to with-stand, respond, and adapt to change, whether environmental, economic or demographic . . .


83. See Tony Arnold, Resilient Cities and Adaptive Law, 50 IDAHO. L. REV. 245, 247 (2014) (“The term ‘resilient cities’ has grown in popularity, and many cities seek to become or remain resilient.”); Odinet, supra note 5, at 220 (referencing a reinvigorated interest in the power of city governments in recent years).

84. See Lowenthal, supra note 54 (analyzing the image and perceptions of cities throughout history); Parisella, supra note 54 (arguing that the power of city governments is growing as evidenced by the ability of mayors to influence national debates on issues like national security).

85. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 503–04 (1997) (“A metropolitan area, thus, functions as a kind of ‘marketplace’ in which, due to interlocal mobility, residents are more likely to have their preferences satisfied by local government offerings than if comparable public goods and services were offered by higher levels of government.”).

86. See James Wilford Garner, Government in the United States, National, State and Local 5–56 (2011) (describing the form and function of
cities—everything from trash pickup, to making sure there is running water, to keeping schools open for children—are so intimately tied to the everyday experiences of society, cities are viewed as having the unique ability to touch people’s lives directly—unlike the more removed and distant state and federal governments.

Local governments also, in theory, react more quickly to the will of its citizens. In other words, because elected officials and decision-makers live so close and interact so regularly with their constituents, there is more of a direct democratic aspect to the way in which municipalities are governed. And, moreover, cities can serve as laboratories, much in the way states have long been viewed, for testing creative ideas and new ways of encouraging business, handling governance, and providing for the administration of public goods and services.

With such trumpets and fanfare in the background, cities have found themselves in the position of not only trying to survive since the Great Recession, but also newly crowned with the laurels of the hero—an institution best able and ready to be America’s problem solvers. One noted commentator states that cities are taking the lead in a myriad of ways that were once unthought-of. In fact, many of the policy objectives once

local governments and the benefits of these attributes).

87. See Briffault, supra note 84, at 503–04 (listing the types of services provided to cities).

88. See id. (describing how local governments will be able to provide more efficient services than those “offered by higher levels of government” (citing Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)).

89. See id. (explaining how “interlocal mobility” can lead to residents having their preferences satisfied quickly).


91. See id. at 2010 (listing the benefits of experimentation at the local level); Sue Siegel, Cities as Laboratories, Discovering America’s Healthcare Solutions, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.huffington post.com/sue-siegel/cities-as-laboratories-di_b_4032819.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (supplying examples of how local communities of “colleagues, communities, and companies” have worked together to solve problems with health care) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

92. See Parisella, supra note 54 (“It is becoming increasingly obvious that large cities are centers of economic, political, cultural, and community life.”).

93. See id. (“[C]ities and their first administrators are being called upon to
advanced chiefly (if not exclusively) by the federal or state governments are now on the municipal policy agenda. These include programs that address climate change or environmental regulations that are implicated by the population densities within their borders. This also includes innovations in the way public transportation is provided so as to meet these population needs. And certainly in the wake of the financial crisis cities were expected—and often did—take a leading role in attempting to address unemployment issues through engaging in direct or indirect job creation efforts. When crime and unrest was on the rise due to stresses brought about by the downturn, local governments and their partners responded with increased security and innovative safety initiatives, as well as provided counseling and related social services to help people cope with mental illness and with getting back on their feet. And lastly, cities provide the primary showcase for the arts and culture, both of which are so vital to a happy and fulfilled society.

In essence, many scholars and policy advocates often reference the idea of the “resilient” city and its growing role in the post-recession world. Cities are challenged with formulating ways to be resilient and robust in a variety of situations so as to fulfill these newfound expectations.

C. Economic and Public Finance Pressures

play a greater role on issues.”).

94. See id. (describing the increased role that cities have had in addressing environmental issues).

95. See id. (“Whether it has to do with climate change or other environmental concerns, it is obvious that large cities have greater responsibility.”).

96. See id. (describing New York City and Montreal’s plan for a high-speed rail network).

97. See id. (explaining the link between a city’s quality of life and job creation).

98. See id. (linking the closeness of city officials to their ability to effectively assist citizens).

99. See id. (drawing a link between artistic communities and city leadership).

100. For more information on the “resilient” city concept, see supra note 81.

101. See id. (listing the new challenges that cities face including transportation, climate change, and job creation).
But of all the expectations imposed upon local governments in this age of city resiliency, none has taken center stage more than the deep-seated hunger to create jobs and encourage economic development. And this is particularly true with regard to bringing in and fostering new commercial enterprises, retail outlets, and residential developments. Importantly, these developments are essential to the city’s bottom-line. With tax revenues down so precipitously, creating new streams of tax monies is critical not only to fulfilling the economic recovery expectations imposed upon cities, but also to the survival of the municipality itself. New developments help drive up property values that, in turn, result in higher property tax realizations for the local government. And the development of previously blighted property—from which the city derives little if any property revenues at all—are especially beneficial. By extension, as more individuals live, conduct business, and play within the city’s borders, sales tax revenues also rise.


103. See Watson, supra note 102, at 3–8 (explaining the role of local governments in development).

104. See Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy, 95 Am. Econ. Rev. 817, 817 (2005), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Papers/compact06.pdf (describing the view that “competition for capital motivates governments to reduce their corruption, waste, and inefficiency, and to provide more growth-promoting infrastructure”).


106. See Watson, supra note 102, at 62–65 (describing how and why states offer tax incentives to industries).

107. See id. at 18–31 (listing the development activities that a city can undertake and exploring their impact).

108. See id. (describing the benefits of increased economic development).
But the fiercest foes that cities face in terms of their economic development efforts, more than any other opponents, are in fact one another. Every city faces the challenges associated with decreasing tax revenues and the need to find new sources of public funding. Similarly, all cities are feeling the pressure, both public and political, to step up to the plate as the leader in the American economic recovery. With only so many economic development opportunities to go around, cities often compete with one another for the same projects. In the waning days of negotiations to land a large industrial plant, a mega-manufacturing facility, or a new tech-headquarters, millions upon millions of taxpayer dollars—both in the forms of direct grants and in various indirect subsidiaries—are offered to the target enterprise.

III. An Arrow in the Arsenal: The Special Taxing District

109. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 233 (describing the role of competition in the marketplace theory of local government).
110. See id. (describing the challenges that a city faces in raising revenue); Watson, supra note 102, at 5 (giving reasons why cities focus on economic development).
111. See Parisella, supra note 54 (explaining how cities have taken an increased role in public policies).
112. See Watson, supra note 102, at 35–66 (“The competition for the limited number of new jobs created in this country each year, especially in manufacturing, has been an important factor in the increased emphasis on economic development among local governments.”).
One type of particularly popular public incentive program used by cities in their quest to boast real estate investment, and the subject of this Article, is the special taxing district like that enjoyed by Beau Chateaux. These are special purpose sub-districts of the larger municipality, which are governed by their own board or commission and operate as a sort of mini-local government that performs certain narrow functions.

The impact of special taxing districts on local government can hardly be understated. One commentator notes that there are roughly as many special districts as there are counties, towns, and cities across the United States combined. Moreover, these districts have achieved roughly $175 billion in expenditures and have incurred approximately $293 billion in debt obligations. Although they have traditionally served a more generic governmental function—such as for roads, bridges, fire services, and the like—they have been increasingly used for an assortment of different purposes. One of these includes their use for real estate development—called for purposes of this article “development special districts.” These districts were meant to provide a financing mechanism whereby the property owners within the geographic district would pay for certain essential infrastructure improvements through long-term debt obligations

114. See Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with MUDS to Pin Down the Truth About Special Districts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3042 (2007) (listing the benefits of special districts).
120. See generally id. (addressing how neighborhoods should be used to address various public policies).
on each lot in the form of a special assessment on their property tax bills.\footnote{121}{See id. at 109–13 (chronicling the raise of neighborhoods); see generally Callies, supra note 27 (describing the uses for tax increment financing).}

However, over time municipalities, in their desire to aggressively compete and attract investors and developers to their locales, have meted out development special districts to private developers to finance an assortment of private amenities and luxuries that extend far beyond what these districts were originally intended to support.\footnote{122}{See Griffith, supra note 31, at 956–61 (explaining the rapidly expanding role of special districts); Fineout, supra note 22 (describing the importance of tax-exempt bonds for one Florida community).} And this public give-away has had disastrous results, with portents of greater ills on the horizon.\footnote{123}{See generally White, supra note 13; Ritchie, supra note 22.}

A. The History and Uses of Special Taxing Districts

Special taxing districts in general have played an important role in the history of the country.\footnote{124}{See Shoked, supra note 90, at 1977–90 (providing a history of special districts).} These districts are created either directly by the state legislature or, more frequently, by individual local governments.\footnote{125}{See id. at 1977 n.22 (describing how state legislatures may either “pass a special act” or a “general law” in order to create special districts (citing N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 975, 990 (McKinney 2012))).} Professor Sara Galvan noted that the first special district appeared in Rhode Island in 1797 in the form of the East Greenwich Fire District and provided fire services to a handful of properties in the area.\footnote{126}{See id. at 1977 n.22 (“In the Philadelphia area, starting in 1790, special authorities were created for prison administration, port development, public health control, education, and police. By 1850, there were ten such districts.” (citing METROPOLITAN ANALYSIS 83 (Stephen B. Sweeney ed., 1958).”))} Their growth since then can hardly be understated.
1. Background and Early Iterations

Special taxing districts continued sprouting up throughout the 1800s to provide financing and to operate “toll roads, canals, and bridges.”127 The general theory behind the creation of these special purpose sublocal governments was that municipalities were not equipped to handle functions with such a specific scope and that these infrastructure items should not be supported by general government funds.128 Mid-nineteenth century courts espoused this approach as being entirely reasonable and that local governments would need from time to time to create “dissimilar corporate authorities, . . . imbued with administrative functions of a nature which could not be properly exercised” by the existing local government.129

Of course, the particular power that makes special districts so effective is their ability to levy a tax upon the parcels of land within the bounds of the district itself.130 In the early days of special taxing districts, numerous lawsuits were filed to challenge this essential characteristic; however, courts quickly rebuffed them.131 Judges regularly denied claims that the local or state legislature had exceeded its authority in vesting the taxing power in these sublocal structures.132 As an example, the Illinois Supreme Court, in a particularly sweeping 1869 holding, articulated the growing opinion of state courts across the country with regard to special taxing districts: “There is no prohibition . . . against the creation by the legislature, of every conceivable description of corporate authority, and when created to endow them with all the faculties and attributes of other pre-existing corporate authorities.”133 This broad view of legislative authority

127. Id. at 1978.
128. See id. (explaining how state legislatures designed funding for projects that were not funded from the "general budget of an existing local government (citing Bd. of Comm’rs v. Harrell, 46 N.E. 124, 125–27 (Ind. 1897))).
129. See id. (explaining the rationale that was endorsed by the Illinois Supreme Court (citing People ex rel. Wilson v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37, 50 (1869))).
130. See id. at 1979 (describing the districts’ power to assess and collect taxes).
131. See id. (detailing the legal challenges that legislatures faced).
132. See id. (describing two cases where courts upheld the power of the legislature to create special districts).
133. Id. (citing People ex rel. Wilson v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37, 50 (1869)).
included even the power to take certain powers and functions away from existing public entities and reallocate them to special taxing districts.\(^{134}\) Therefore, functions that were once carried out by local governments could be taken away and thereafter vested in these special purpose districts, without limitation.\(^{135}\)

2. Challenges and New Deal Proliferation

The next wave of challenges to special taxing districts came in the form of attempts to cabin their powers and to prescribe the limits of what they could accomplish.\(^{136}\) However these challenges, like the initial attacks on their creation, were equally unavailing.

Opponents first argued that the constitutional right to vote was inherently violated by the special taxing district structure.\(^{137}\) The general view was that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required one person, one vote, but that special districts voting power was allocated pursuant to the number of properties one owned within the geographic district.\(^{138}\) However, courts fired back that special taxing districts operated outside this constitutional rule such that voting power could be allocated based on land or other economic interests, which would otherwise be impossible under the traditional American governmental structure.\(^{139}\) Moreover, in many cases elections in

\(^{134}\) See id. (describing how courts came to adopt the view that the legislature could reallocate government functions to other districts (citing Straw v. Harris, 103 P. 777, 781–82 (Or. 1909); State ex rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, 43 N.W. 947, 949 (Wis. 1889))).

\(^{135}\) See id. at 1980 (explaining the broad view that courts adopted regarding the use of “corporate authorities” (citing Gilson v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 27 N.E. 235, 237 (Ind. 1891); Bowles v. State, 37 Ohio St. 35, 42 (1881))).

\(^{136}\) See id. at 1987–89 (explaining how special districts had more latitude in their powers to restrict the rights of its residents).

\(^{137}\) See id. at 1987 (describing how “[s]pecial districts . . . are for the most part exempt” from traditional right to vote jurisprudence).

\(^{138}\) See id. (describing how traditional government entities have been subject to the one person, one vote principle (citing Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968))).

\(^{139}\) See id. noting that special districts are primarily exempt from this rule (citing Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 (1973))).
special districts would be avoided altogether due to the district’s enabling legislation that provided for a governing board appointed by the city council or the legislature rather than one popularly elected.¹⁴⁰

Challengers of special districts also frequently argued that the use of funds raised by a district’s bond issuance violated state constitutional limitations on the levying and use of public monies.¹⁴¹ Most state constitutions provide restrictions on how much the state and any of its corporate constituencies can borrow, as well as a proviso that any borrowing must be for a public purpose and that the funds be used in furtherance of a public benefit.¹⁴² However, courts and special district advocates found ways around these constraints as well.¹⁴³

First, the public purpose requirement was interpreted to extend to the amelioration of “ills to be corrected through the use of public funding of measures with even substantial private benefit.”¹⁴⁴ These would include things like the improvement of blighted properties and the development of areas that had traditionally been cut off from conventional lending.¹⁴⁵ With regard to complaints about exceeding debt limitations, courts also found ways to distinguish special taxing districts.¹⁴⁶ Special districts were deemed “financially autonomous” because they had their own dedicated revenue stream derived from the special assessments.¹⁴⁷ Because they operated independently from the


¹⁴¹. See id. (describing state’s efforts to limit districts’ taxing power).

¹⁴². See id. (“Most TIF enabling statutes declare that tax increment bonds are not debt or an obligation of the local government subject to constitutional debt limitation provisions.”).

¹⁴³. See id. (citing In re House Bill 91S-1005, 814 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1991); Gude v. City of Lakewood, 636 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1981)).

¹⁴⁴. See id. (explaining that public purpose includes urban renewal).

¹⁴⁵. See id. (“[S]tate courts have developed judicial doctrines that evade constitutional debt limitations”).

¹⁴⁶. See id. (defining the public authority doctrine (citing AMDURSKY &
municipal government, they deserved treatment separate and apart from the restrictions on the local government itself.\textsuperscript{148} This jurisprudential exception became known as the public authority doctrine and was used by special taxing districts to avoid legal debt limits that otherwise restricted the borrowing of local and state governments.\textsuperscript{149}

Another jurisprudential exception to the debt-ceiling problem was the special fund doctrine.\textsuperscript{150} Under this framework because the monies generated by the special district were held in a “separate fund,” they were not considered to be within the ambit of constitutional debt.\textsuperscript{151} “Revenue bonds backed by a special fund, rather than by the government’s full faith and credit, are exempt from debt ceilings and referenda requirements because a bondholder’s only recourse is against the special fund itself and not against the local government.”\textsuperscript{152} This doctrine involved reconceptualizing the assessments levied by the district as a form of “self-financing” rather than as a tax in the traditional sense, thereby placing them outside normal legal constraints.\textsuperscript{153}

By the end of the Great Depression and during the time of the New Deal Era “there were over 8,500 special districts across the nation.”\textsuperscript{154} Much of this sudden proliferation arose due to the

\textsuperscript{148} See id. ("[T]he debts of independent public authorities are their own and are not the debt of underling local government.").

\textsuperscript{149} See id. (explaining the loophole and lack of electoral accountability created by the public authority doctrine (citing Robert H. Bowmar, \textit{The Anachronism Called Debt Limitations}, 52 \textit{Iowa L. Rev.} 863 (1967); C. Robert Morris, Jr., \textit{Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions}, 68 \textit{Yale L.J.} 234 (1958))).

\textsuperscript{150} See id. ("A ‘special fund’ is a segregated account within a local government that receives revenue raised from a source separate from the state or local government’s general tax revenues, in particular, ad valorem property taxes.").

\textsuperscript{151} See id. (explaining the reasoning of courts that have found special funds to be constitutional (citing \textit{GELDAND, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING} § 9:11)).

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{153} See id. (describing why some courts have found tax increments to be a special source of revenue).

\textsuperscript{154} Shoked, \textit{supra} note 90, at 1986 (citing \textit{WILLIAM ANDERSON, THE UNITS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES} 37 (rev. ed. 1942)).
efforts of the federal government. Although initially conceived as part of nation-wide irrigation, housing, and conversation initiatives, federal policymakers preferred to work with and channel federal dollars into special taxing districts rather than larger municipalities, which the Roosevelt administration viewed as being “hopelessly indebted and inefficient.”

The special district was praised by New Dealers for being “apolitical, specialized, service oriented, and public interest minded,” and run by professionals and subject matter experts, rather than subject to the wrangling and corruption of traditional city and county governments.

Special district commentators such as Professors Shoked, Griffith, Galvan, Stahl, Briffault, and Miller all note that courts have been very deferential to legislators in sanctioning the creation of special taxing districts. Even as their uses have slowly shifted over time from single function entities to multi-purpose mini-governments, there has been little effort to reign in their otherwise unfettered powers. In fact, if anything, courts and lawmakers have become increasingly liberal throughout the

155. *See id.* at 1986–87

The Reclamation Act of 1902 authorized large-scale participation by the national government in rural irrigation projects. Within a few years, the Federal Bureau of Reclamation began to push for the amendment of state laws and the passage of national legislation that would encourage the creation of irrigation districts and permit the irrigation districts to enter into contracts with the federal government. A similar pattern developed with respect to the other two prominent districts founded by general laws at the time: housing districts and soil conservation districts. With respect to housing districts, the most important catalyst to their creation and spread was the federal Housing Act of 1937. The Act offered federal subsidies to local initiatives, and New Dealers in Washington made little effort to conceal their preference for dealing with special districts rather than cities.

156. *Id.* at 1987 (citing Martin J. Schiesl, *The Politics of Efficiency* 46–59 (1977)).

157. *See id.* (noting that the idea of “expertise-driven government” was particularly appealing in the New Deal era (citing Dorothy Ross, *The Originals of American Social Science* (1991))).

158. *Id.* For more information on these commentators’ views, see Stahl, *supra* note 115; Miller, *supra* note 119; Briffault, *supra* note 85; Shoked, *supra* note 90; Griffith, *supra* note 31; Galvan, *supra* note 114.

history of special taxing districts insofar as defining the limits of what they can be created to do and the tools with which they can utilize to achieve their goals. They are neither county nor city, neither village nor town, yet they are more than a homeowners association or other private group. Further, they have all of the attributes of a regular corporate body. They can sue, be sued, enter into contracts, and acquire and dispose of property and its various appurtenances. In some cases, the special district even has the power of eminent domain. Special taxing districts possess special features that exempt them from traditional democratic parameters, yet they enjoy the privileges and attributes of private enterprises. And it is through this quasi-public, quasi-private status that they have become both so very enticing and so very dangerous.

3. The Rise of Varied Special District Uses

As the twentieth century marched forward, special districts only continued to rise in popularity. Numerous special purpose taxing districts were created to cover services such as parks, ports, airports, flood control, library maintenance, cemeteries,

160. See id. (listing the factors that a court will consider in determining special district status (citing Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Canaveral Port Auth., 642 So. 2d 1097, 1100–01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Floyd v. Mayor of Balt., 966 A.2d 900, 913 (Md. 2009); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895C cmt. a (1977))).
162. See Callies, supra note 27, at 1–3 (describing the legal status of special districts).
163. See id. (listing the legal powers of special districts).
164. See id. (enumerating on the broad powers of special districts).
165. See Stahl, supra note 115, at 942–44 (explaining how cities have granted special districts a diverse range of powers to operate under).
166. See id. at 943–45 (describing one problem with special districts as the fact that they “often cause troubling inequalities between wealthy and poor neighborhoods in the provision of city services”); see generally Miller, supra note 119; Briffault, supra note 85; Shoked, supra note 90.
167. See Briffault, supra note 85, at 503–09 (describing the rise in popularity of special districts).
transportation, emergency services, and an ever-widening array of public infrastructure projects.\(^{168}\)

One popular and heretofore different form included the business improvement district (BID), which is a special taxing district, the funds from which are used to pay for not only traditional services such as drainage and sanitation, but also for security patrols and street maintenance and repairs.\(^{169}\) The first BID is generally believed to have been the New Orleans Downtown Development District created in 1975, and their popularity increased tremendously in the following decades.\(^{170}\) In general, “BIDs operate parking facilities [and] maintain public amenities” which include the construction of “streets, sidewalks, fountains, street lights, benches, and other forms of street furniture.”\(^{171}\) One noted such BID is the one around New York City’s Times Square area that funds homeless prevention and mitigation efforts.\(^{172}\) In fact, at one time in the mid-1990s, Grand Central Station infamously used its own BID monies to “drive homeless people” from the area.\(^{173}\)

The BID was the beginning of the use of special taxing districts as a sort of economic development tool.\(^{174}\) They were used to help attract and maintain businesses within a certain area—usually downtown—and would often engage in projects that were meant to promote the commercial and business related activities of those operating within its geographic boundaries.\(^{175}\)

\(^{168}\) See Shoked, supra note 90, at 1972–73 (listing various purposes of special districts); see also Galvan, supra note 114, at 3042 (same).

\(^{169}\) See Briffault, supra note 85, at 517–19 (listing the non-traditional activities that business improvement districts undertake).

\(^{170}\) Miller, supra note 119, at 148.

\(^{171}\) Briffault, supra note 85, at 518.

\(^{172}\) See id. at 518–19 (“New York’s Time Square BID provides services to the homeless” (citing 1 NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS SERVICES, NEW YORK CITY BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 59 (August 1996))).

\(^{173}\) See id. at 519 (describing a 1995 controversy in which it was alleged that BIDs were attempting to drive people out of Grand Central and “functioning as a ‘goon squad’” (citing Heather MacDonald, BIDs Really Work, THE CITY JOURNAL, Spring 1996, at 29, 40).

\(^{174}\) See id. (linking BIDs to efforts to improve the “business climate within the districts”).

\(^{175}\) See id. (describing how BIDS used these efforts to “attract and retain business”).
In many ways, BIDs operated like “private chambers of commerce” that used the coercive powers of property taxation to fund their operations, even though they lacked the limitations and mandates of the larger municipal government.\footnote{176} But even the BID played a small part in the rise of the purely private use of special taxing districts compared to those special taxing districts which arose, first, in California and, then later, in Texas and other western states relative to funding neighborhood improvements.\footnote{177} In California in the 1980s, a referendum was passed called Proposition 13 that put a state-wide cap on all \textit{ad valorem} property taxes.\footnote{178} This greatly hamstrung the ability of local governments to fund critical infrastructure needs throughout the state.\footnote{179} In response, the California Legislature passed the Community Facilities Act—commonly known as the Mello-Roose Act—which allowed the creation of special taxing districts, separate and apart from the larger municipality, which would have the ability to impose and increase taxes within neighborhood-sized districts in order to fund infrastructure such as streets, lighting, sewer, and even schools.\footnote{180}

Similarly, the Texas Constitution was altered in 1971 to authorize the creation of municipal utility districts (MUDs).\footnote{181} As with community facility districts in California, these small geographic districts were used to fund infrastructure within certain discrete neighborhoods that would otherwise have been paid for by the municipality.\footnote{182} MUDs have been hugely popular

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{176} See id. (explaining the tools used by BIDs to attract commerce).
  \item \footnote{177} See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3042–45 (describing how special districts are used in Texas); Miller, supra note 119, at 137–40 (describing how California has used special districts).
  \item \footnote{178} See \textsc{Cal. Gov't Code} §§ 53311–53368.3 (Deering 2011) (providing an alternative method of financing public facilities and services); Miller, supra note 119, at 148–49 (describing why special districts arose in California).
  \item \footnote{179} See Miller, supra note 119, at 148–49 (explaining how Proposition 13 capped property taxes).
  \item \footnote{180} \textsc{Cal. Gov't Code} §§ 53311–53317.5 (2015); see also Miller, supra note 119, at 148–149 (explaining how Mello-Roose operated). Similar acts were also passed in Arizona, Washington, and Hawaii. \textit{Id}.
  \item \footnote{181} See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3044–45 (“The Texas constitution was amended to provide for the establishment of water districts in the early part of the twentieth century.”).
  \item \footnote{182} See id. (explaining how MUDs operated in Texas).
\end{itemize}
The idea that special taxing districts could be used for purposes other than traditional municipal infrastructure such as bridges, roads, drainage, and the like took hold in a powerful way and local governments and special district enthusiasts began to imagine a wider array of services and functions being exercised by these unique quasi-public, quasi-private governmental appendages.  

B. An Overview of Development Special Districts

The premise that underlies the special taxing district used in connection with private real estate developments (“development special districts”) rests on the basic notion, as expressed by Professor Stahl, that residents generally desire to control neighborhood externalities. They want to have some level of power over what their neighbors do, how the environment around them is built, and how everyday interactions with outside variables operate.

When individuals began to feel a diminished amount of control and input in the larger municipal governance structure, a more localized approach was looked to as a way to overcome feelings of being looked over or left out. Although all persons within the local government’s jurisdiction contributed their share of ad valorem property taxes, the uses to which these funds were put were not always uniform, and some felt likewise not in their best interest. Homeowners associations seemed like the answer...

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183. See id. at 3045 (“About 950 MUDs exist in Texas.”).
184. Id.
185. See generally id.
186. See Stahl, supra note 115, at 947–49 (explaining why neighborhoods “prize the ability to bring in positive externalities . . . and to keep out negative externalities . . . .” (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (2008); N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 195–213 (2008)).
187. See id. (listing the concerns of homeowners and how they interact with their neighbors’ actions).
188. See id. at 948 (describing why and how homeowners seek power).
189. See id. (describing how land use and improvements can effect a
because they allowed for a form of quasi-government among likeminded individuals.\textsuperscript{190} The use of deed restrictions and land covenants ensured that dues were paid and that their collection could be enforced.\textsuperscript{191} The funds raised could be used to build improvements such as golf courses, tennis courts, swimming pools, and other neighborhood amenities.\textsuperscript{192} The idea that private, localized individuals could and should control their immediate environment, rather than leaving such functions to the larger local government, built the foundation for the proliferation of the development special district.\textsuperscript{193}

For most of its history the special taxing district, when used for infrastructure projects, would cover a large area and everyone within that district would pay assessments in order to receive a particularized benefit. It may have been to obtain sanitary sewer services, water network distribution, or fire and safety services. An important distinction between the use of these districts and those known as development special districts is that the development districts came to include a smaller and more particularized area, often compassing only a discreet homogeneous development.

\textbf{1. Mechanics of Special District Funding}

The way in which development special districts work can seem fairly complex, but in fact it is no different than the way all other special taxing districts operate.\textsuperscript{194} In general, development special districts use long-term bond financing to fund their projects.\textsuperscript{195} The setup involves the district’s governing board

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\item Note: See id. at 948–49 (describing why homeowners associations helped address the issues of neighborhoods).
\item Note: See id. at 949 (explaining how homeowners associations exercised their power).
\item Note: See id. (listing the improvements that a homeowners association could initiate).
\item Note: See id. at 951 (explaining how special districts have been crafted to keep control localized).
\item Note: See Griffith, supra note 31, at 956–61 (describing how special districts are managed).
\item Note: See id. at 966–97 (laying out the financing method for infrastructure
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
commissioning a revenue study to determine the borrowing capacity of the district based on its future stream of property tax assessment revenues over time.\textsuperscript{196} After the bond issuance, an underwriter purchases or markets the bonds to third party investors such as large financial institutions, pensions, or retirement funds.\textsuperscript{197} The funds generated from the sale of the bonds are then used by the district to pay for the infrastructure or other special purpose projects.\textsuperscript{198} Over time, the collection of the tax assessments on each of the parcels within the district goes toward retiring the debt on the bonds.\textsuperscript{199} Thus, the district is able to obtain money immediately through the issuance of these debt instruments, build the improvements immediately, and pay them back over the course of time.\textsuperscript{200} Also, the burden of paying for these residential infrastructure projects is shifted from the local government and its general fund to only the owners of the parcels being benefited.\textsuperscript{201}

These debt instruments are considered by courts to be revenue bonds, meaning that payment under the bonds is secured by a particular and limited stream of revenue—specifically, the special district’s property tax assessments.\textsuperscript{202} In other words, no larger governmental general fund or credit worthiness is implicated in the bond issuance.\textsuperscript{203} Hence, when special district X that lies within county Y issues bonds, the repayment of those bonds is secured only by the assessments from district X, and county Y’s revenue streams are not at all implicated.\textsuperscript{204} While investors prefer municipal bonds—which are secured by the more affluent and resource-rich county X—revenue bonds are still very

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\item See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3060 (describing how Texas’s districts are funded through tax-exempt bonds).
\item Callies, supra note 27, at 1–3.
\item Id.
\item Id.
\item Id.
\item See id. (“[T]he arrangements tend to shift the risk of project failure from the local government and its taxpayers to the developers and bondholders.”).
\item Id.
\item Id.
\item See id. (describing how risk is segmented).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
attractive, as the interest on revenue bonds are exempt from taxation, both federal and state.\textsuperscript{205}

The deal could not be better for the developer.\textsuperscript{206} He gets to use special district financing to construct the infrastructure and improvements as he dictates with no cost to him whatsoever.\textsuperscript{207} The district issues the bonds, and the future owners of the land assume the long-term debt obligation.\textsuperscript{208} Meanwhile, the profits from the sale of the parcels (as in a residential subdivision) go to the developer.\textsuperscript{209}

\textit{2. Framework for Special District Lien Enforcement}

Payment of the special assessments is enforced by the district’s liens on the parcels within the district.\textsuperscript{210} In the event that a homeowner fails to pay his special district assessment, his parcel is then encumbered by a lien in favor of the district, which remains on the property until the amount is paid in full.\textsuperscript{211} The district can foreclose on a homeowner who fails to pay the assessment—as between creditor (district) and debtor (homeowner), the lien resembles a typical mortgage, lien, or other conventional security device.\textsuperscript{212}

But as between this creditor and other creditors, this lien is not like just any conventional security device, subject to the normal rules of recodarion, third party rights, and priority.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{205} See id. (listing factors that an investor may consider prior to making an investment).

\textsuperscript{206} See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3048 (“[R]eal estate developments have become [the districts’] most vocal advocates and have received most of their benefits.”).

\textsuperscript{207} See id. at 3048–49 (describing the process through which the developers and districts go through the funding process).

\textsuperscript{208} Id.

\textsuperscript{209} See Callies, supra note 27, at 1–3 (describing what a corporation has to gain from coordinating with special districts).

\textsuperscript{210} Id.

\textsuperscript{211} See Galvan, supra note 113, at 3048 (noting that real estate developers receive the most benefit from these special districts).

\textsuperscript{212} See id. at 3048–51 (listing the powers of special districts).

\textsuperscript{213} See id. at 3048 (explaining the powers and rights that are unique to special district developers and financiers).
Rather, this lien is given the same supremacy over pre-existing liens and property rights as the *ad valorem* property tax lien.\(^{214}\)

For instance, a developer may obtain a traditional bank loan in order to purchase real property for his development and, in exchange, grant a mortgage on the property to the bank. Then, in order to construct the infrastructure, he will have a special taxing district created to fund the improvements. The district’s board, which he controls, will issue the bonds and raise the funds. The assessments on the parcels within the development will fund the debt service going forward. However, if the developer fails to pay his special assessment on any particular parcel, then a lien will automatically be created on that parcel. And this lien, which arose long after the bank’s mortgage, will jump over the bank’s rights in the line of ranking and give the district—or more particularly, the bondholders—a first position as to the collateral. Therefore, the special district lien’s superpriority status ensures that even conventional liens that arise before the special district lien attaches to the property are nonetheless inferior to the rights of the district.\(^{215}\)

3. Structuring of Special District Governance

The fact that real estate developers are the major force behind development special district creation is of no surprise.\(^{216}\) The statutory framework that allows for the creation of these structures is geared toward the developer’s benefit—specifically in the way the district’s board is governed.\(^{217}\) The example of how the Texas MUD is created is instructive because it is emblematic of how most all development special districts are crafted.\(^{218}\) The statutory provisions that allow for the creation of MUDs are

\(^{214}\) *See id.* (describing how the rights of these creditors are protected).

\(^{215}\) *See id.* (describing how the rights of certain creditors are protected).

\(^{216}\) *See id.* (noting that real estate developers receive the most benefit from these special districts).

\(^{217}\) *See id.* (describing how MUDs tend to be run by a board of real estate developers).

\(^{218}\) *See id.* at 3048–49 (listing the steps for MUD formation). Professor Galvan gives an extensive and authoritative review of Texas’s MUDs and explains how they, in many ways, represent the larger world of special taxing districts nationally. *Id.*
relaxed at best.\textsuperscript{219} There are basically only four steps in the process: “(1) a landowner petition, (2) a review by a state agency, (3) a city or county review, and (4) an election.”\textsuperscript{220} Since at the beginning of the life of every real estate development the developer owns all the land, only his assent is needed to initiate the petition.\textsuperscript{221} The petition is then reviewed by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) that analyzes the request in light of “projected construction projects, tax rates, and sewer rates,” among other things.\textsuperscript{222} Then the petition moves on to the municipal governing body for the jurisdiction where the district will be located for final approval.\textsuperscript{223}

As Professor Galvan notes, approval of the petition through these governmental processes often comes as a matter of course.\textsuperscript{224} This is true because, from the local government’s perspective, there will be no drain on the public purse resulting from the formation of the district—rather, the entity will be, in theory, self-sustaining.\textsuperscript{225} And even if the TCEQ and the local government refuse to give their consent to the district’s creation, the developer can also ask the legislature to create the district through a special statute, thereby side-stepping this multi-tiered (if only superficial) approval process entirely.\textsuperscript{226}

\textsuperscript{219} See id. at 3049 (explaining how developers are able to take advantage of the lenient legal provisions in forming MUDs).
\textsuperscript{220} Id. at 3049–50.
\textsuperscript{221} See id. at 3050 (listing the steps necessary for MUD approval).
\textsuperscript{222} See id. (describing the four-step process for creating a MUD (citing TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 54.021 (Vernon 2002))).
\textsuperscript{223} See id. (explaining that a city’s consent is necessary but generally comes as a matter of course) (citing Dan Feldstein, Proposal Raising Home Values--and Tempers, HOUSTON CHRON., July 18, 2006, at A1); Chunhua Zen Zheng, Pearland Mayor Addresses Growth, Challenges, HOUSTON CHRON. (Brazoria County ed.), Jan. 22, 2004, at 1).
\textsuperscript{224} See id. (“A city’s consent typically comes as a matter of course—even, sometimes, in the face of widespread public disapproval.”).
\textsuperscript{225} See id. at 3050–51 (describing why approval rates are so high for MUDs).
\textsuperscript{226} See id. at 3051 (describing how a developer may ask their legislator for assistance in creating an “end run around a reluctant government” (citing Mike Lee & Josh Shaffer, Developing Power: Regional Growth, Once Dominated by a Few Tycoons, is Now Driven by Agencies, City Managers, Landowners and Average Residents. Though Money Still Talks, Power Is Harder to Hold, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 1, 2002, at 1)).
Once the petition is approved, a governing board is appointed by the city council, in accordance with the petition, to operate, to manage, and to make policy decisions on behalf of the special district. But instead of appointing members to the board from various sectors whose interests or expertise would lend credibility and reasoned judgment to the operation of the district, the individuals listed in the landowner’s petition are almost always appointed as a matter of course. And naturally, these include the developer’s associates, and, in the case of special legislatively-created districts, the developer himself may be a board member.

Since the initial members of the district’s governing board are generally handpicked by the developer, they are, with little exception, supportive of his views and intentions with regard to the district. This includes going along with whatever bond issuance details or other financing mechanisms he intends to use to fund the development, as well as the extent and aggressiveness of the build-out of improvements. And even after the district’s board is turned over to the third party owners of the parcels within the development, participation is consistently low.

One commentator notes that “a turnout of two to five percent is ‘unusually high’ for special district elections,” thereby giving a

227. See id. at 3052–53 (discussing the components of special district litigation).
228. See id. (explaining the process of appointing individuals to the board).
229. See id. (discussing the possibility of working around limitations on board appointments).
230. See id. (explaining that often, those appointed to the board are fairly closely connected to the project).
231. See id. (discussing the level of control exerted by developers).
232. Typically after a certain threshold number of parcels with the development have been sold to third parties, the developer will relinquish control of the special district’s board to the actual homeowners who will then elect their own representatives. See generally Christopher K. Odinet, The Perils of Primacy: Successor Liability for Lenders Turned Declarants in Louisiana Common Interest Communities, 74 LA. L. REV. 777 (2014).
233. See id. at 3053 (“More troubling for a special district than the control of a powerful interest group early in its development is the sustained absence of democratic participation in special district activities over time.” (citing JOHN C. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1957))).
motivated developer a chance to control the district’s administration and processes many years later.\textsuperscript{234}

\textbf{C. Development Special Districts as Economic Development Tools}

Over time it became evident to developers that by partnering with local governments, special districts could be used to promote private real estate projects in new ways.\textsuperscript{235} Special taxing districts like MUDs and community development districts provided a perfect framework for these public financing devices.\textsuperscript{236} If they could be used to fund traditional neighborhood infrastructure and business development efforts, then why not use them as a source of capital for private development? In that vein, as discussed above, arose the development special district—those special taxing districts that were essentially commandeered by private developers for the purpose of bank-rolling purely private projects—that extended far beyond the traditional roles for which they were initially envisioned.\textsuperscript{237} And local governments have been all too eager to embrace the development special district construct.\textsuperscript{238} In their view, these types of private real estate financing facilities were perfect—they imposed no obligations on the municipality, and there was no need to either directly fund the critical infrastructure improvements or indirectly guarantee the debt that was incurred in connection with their construction.\textsuperscript{239} The city was able to outsource the

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\item \textsuperscript{234} See id. (exploring the lack of democratic participation in the development of special districts) (citing NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 12 (1994)).
\item \textsuperscript{235} See id. at 3043 (introducing the strategy of building private developments through local government units).
\item \textsuperscript{236} See id. at 3048 (explaining a few ways in which MUDs tax incoming landowners to fund the development of special districts).
\item \textsuperscript{237} See id. at 3061 (discussing the costs that private developers can recoup because of partnerships with local governments).
\item \textsuperscript{238} See id. at 3053 (describing a Texas court’s ruling that seemed to approve of the link between local governments and private development enterprises).
\item \textsuperscript{239} See id. at 3074–75 (“Through annexation of infrastructure-building districts like MUDs, cities can avoid the cost, management, and liabilities of
\end{enumerate}
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provision of government goods and services to these “quasi-privatized entities [so as to] relieve the city of the need to finance such services.”

Further, if the development succeeded, new residents and subsequent property and sales tax revenues would follow. Although the special assessments levied would only go toward benefits enjoyed by those living within the district, the spill-over effect of these new residents on surrounding businesses, entertainment venues, and tourism activities would generate new tax revenues for the municipality as a whole. And how could these special districts not be wildly successful considering the grand projections and attractive renderings presented by the developer when making his request to the city council? After all, many people believed—and so particularly now—that “smaller is better” and that the empowerment of local governments and the “reduction of the scale of decisionmaking” present an optimal scheme of governance. Cities have lauded development special districts as being, aside from self-financing, excellent bubbles in which true civic engagement and democratic idealism play out through better responsiveness, a closer connection to the people, and less bureaucracy.

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240. See Stahl, supra note 115, at 984 (suggesting that more judicial oversight is required because cities have an incentive to outsource to private developments).

241. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3044 (stating that special districts bring in a lot of revenue).

242. See Briffault, supra note 85, at 512 (explaining that while much of the revenues raised stay within the development, there is some spillover into the government).

243. See id. at 519 (discussing the need to demonstrate that a development will positively impact the area); Galvan, supra note 114, at 3050–51 (detailing the steps taken to get a special district development approved).

244. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3047 (advocating that more local decision-making is preferable to that on a larger scale (citing Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980))).

245. See id. at 3048 (providing further support for the idea that smaller governments are preferable to large governments (citing Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173 (1996)); Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.C. L. REV. 190 (2001)).
So, according to the prevailing narrative, development special districts are good all around.\textsuperscript{246} For the developer, they allow for tax-exempt bond financing at a lower cost than financing available through conventional lenders.\textsuperscript{247} And of course, the debt undertaken in connection with building the improvements and infrastructure is off the books of the developer, since the debt is that of the district.\textsuperscript{248} The ultimate cost of the improvements need not come, as has traditionally been the case, from the sales proceeds from the lots within the development; rather, the long-term debt service obligations are supported by future owners over time.\textsuperscript{249}

Future homeowners are able to avail themselves of amenities and luxuries that the municipality would have never publicly supported or financed.\textsuperscript{250} And, because the bonded indebtedness is spread over the long-term assessment of special property taxes on the parcels, the purchase price of the properties need not be inflated to account for the need to repay the debt in the short term by the developer.\textsuperscript{251}

And lastly, for the municipality the development special district is an attractive economic development tool.\textsuperscript{252} They cost nothing to the city, and they have the potential to turn into cash cows for new tax revenues.\textsuperscript{253} As discussed above, cities are being

\textsuperscript{246} See Feldman & Rolapp \textit{supra} note 27, at 1–2 (offering advantages and disadvantages to developments).

\textsuperscript{247} See \textit{id.} at 1 (including financial benefits to the developer in a special district).

\textsuperscript{248} See \textit{id.} (noting that debts are not incurred by a developer, but by the district).

\textsuperscript{249} See \textit{id.} (stating that a developer can recoup costs in ways other than just sale price).

\textsuperscript{250} See \textit{id.} at 2 (offering as an advantage to a future owner the available of amenities more quickly and at a lower cost than if the property were not in a special district).

\textsuperscript{251} See \textit{id.} (stating that the sales price is favorable to a buyer because debts aren’t to be repaid solely from the sale of properties within the special district development).

\textsuperscript{252} See Griffith, \textit{supra} note 31, at 960 (explaining that special districts can provide a means of necessary development in areas that could not afford these improvements otherwise).

\textsuperscript{253} See \textit{id.} at 961 (explaining that major motivation to develop special districts is the ability to make necessary infrastructure updates without necessarily increasing taxes).
called upon to bring about an economic renaissance.\textsuperscript{254} With such a call to action it is all too inevitable that the creation of development special districts will only continue to be embraced by local government decision makers. Local governments are hungry for new tax revenues to support services and necessities that residents demand. However, cities are seeing diminished tax revenues, and there is barely any support from state and federal partners, which was once so free-flowing.\textsuperscript{255} The development special district serves as an attractive solution to this problem because it can attract economic investment and grow the tax base.\textsuperscript{256}

Economic development investors shop around from locale to locale looking for the right site to land.\textsuperscript{257} Investors want to get the best deal possible and maximize their output, productivity, and profitability.\textsuperscript{258} This is particularly true of real estate developers.\textsuperscript{259} Location is immensely important, but when multiple acceptable sites are identified, concerns turn to how these developments will be financed.\textsuperscript{260} Infrastructure costs only continue to rise and conventional lending can limit the extent of a developer’s ability to realize his vision for the project.\textsuperscript{261} Lavish chateau-style clubhouses, sweeping golf courses, and crystal blue swimming pools come at a high cost that can often involve speculative financing. Conventional lenders tend to be risk-averse and are more likely to reign in the whimsical aspirations of the developer.\textsuperscript{262}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{254} See \textit{supra} Part II (discussing the current economic climate in cities nationwide).
\bibitem{255} See generally \textit{supra} Part II.
\bibitem{256} See Odinet, \textit{supra} note 5, at 220 (introducing the benefits to a successful development, including raised revenues and a larger tax base).
\bibitem{257} See Griffith, \textit{supra} note 31, at 975 (discussing the need for local governments to attract developers).
\bibitem{259} See \textit{id.} at 13 (noting that land developers look at the location before making an investment).
\bibitem{260} See \textit{id.} at 1 (introducing the idea that financing real estate development is often an issue).
\bibitem{261} See \textit{id.} 191–94 (providing an overview of cost financing in real estate investment).
\bibitem{262} See generally John P. Wiedemer & Keith J. Baker, \textit{Real Estate Finance

But the development special district hurdles over all these obstacles. The developer need not borrow any money at all, and no conventional lender need be involved. A well-connected developer with political clout and an attractive sounding development can easily convince an economic development-hungry city council or county commission to authorize the creation of a special taxing district. And, in fact, the local government may take the offensive itself and affirmatively offer the carrot of a special district to the developer shopping around his project to various locales. While the city cannot promise to actually build the infrastructure from its own general fund, it can certainly create a legal framework whereby the developer can accomplish the same goal through other means—the development special district can do the trick. The tax exemption for interest on municipal and district bonds is key here. Conventional lenders pay tax on the interest they receive, but holders of municipal bonds do not. Therefore, the cost of capital for any developer will be lower to the extent he can bypass conventional lenders and borrow from bondholders who are subsidized by their income-tax deduction. Development special districts were widely used prior to the Great Recession. Many developments, ranging from the Deep South, to the west coast, and up the eastern seaboard, utilized these quasi-public, quasi-private entities to achieve the goals of real estate developers without (2012); see also Oliver R. Sims & Franklin B. Fields, Commercial Real Estate Lending: Risk Mitigation and Bank Supervision (2013).

263. See supra Part III.B (noting that special district developments have thrived).
264. See supra Part III.B (NEED PARENTHERICAL).
265. See supra Part III.B. (NEED PARENTHERICAL).
266. See supra Part II (noting that local governments benefit from special districts because they finance infrastructure development that the local government often cannot fund on its own).
267. See supra Parts II–III (explaining the process involved in developing a special district).
268. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 939 (discussing methods of financing special district development).
269. See id. at 970 (explaining the investment of municipal bonds).
270. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3060 (discussing how developers can lower costs by financing with municipal bonds).
271. See Shoked, supra note 90, at 1986 (discussing the widespread use of special districts).
hamstringing the public purse. But in the age of cities where the prevailing view is that local governments pose the best chance for economic recovery, the drive to use a variety of public tools and incentives has the potential to result in the creation of many more development special districts under the mantle of economic development. After all, the city will inevitably reap the manifold economic benefits that result from the successes of developments like Beau Chateaux. Development special districts serve as a great low cost financing tool for the developer. The infrastructure and improvement expenses of the project, although derived from a form of property taxation, cost the city nothing at all. Or do they?

IV. Understanding the Unintended Consequences

For all the accolades told about development special districts and their ability to have a positive effect on the local economy, little attention has been paid to some of the harsh, unjust, and far-reaching negative consequences that result from their use in terms of mortgage rights, real estate lending, and market equity. While true that they do not cost the city anything directly and that, if successful, they have the potential to increase

272. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3044 (discussing MUDs in Texas); Miller, supra note 119, at 148–49 (discussing public facilities districts in California); Griffith, supra note 31, at 960–74 (discussing Florida’s community development districts, Georgia’s infrastructure development districts, Colorado’s public improvement districts, Delaware’s special development districts, and New Mexico’s public improvement districts).

273. See Shoked supra note 90, at 2000 (discussing the benefits of developing special districts).

274. See Griffith supra note 31, at 961 (explaining that cities are motivated to develop special districts).

275. See Galvan supra note 114, at 3061 (discussing the low costs for private developers of special districts).

276. See supra Part III.B (explaining the benefits to financing infrastructures by developing special districts).

277. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3068 (introducing some negative consequences to the increased development of special districts); Griffith, supra note 31, at 972 (discussing the consequences of using special districts); Miller, supra note 119, at 153 (discussing racial and ethnic segregation as a negative consequences of special districting); Shoked, supra note 90, at 2002 (introducing some costs to developing through special districts).
tax revenues, other considerations that underlie their creation are often ignored. And with local government leaders continuing to use development special districts to achieve their economic development goals, these negative consequences are even more likely to be ignored.

A. Undermining Vested Property Rights

The first negative consequence brought about by development special districts has to do with the way in which the corporation is able to enforce the payment of its special property tax assessments. As discussed above, if an individual parcel owner refuses or fails to timely pay his assessment, the district is automatically granted a statutory lien against that property in proportion to the amount of the assessment, which the district can then foreclose upon.

1. Special District Liens Compared to Common Interest Community Liens

At first blush, this is no different than the statutory liens that are accorded to homeowners associations, condominium associations, and every other type of common interest ownership regime across the country when an owner fails to pay his association dues. The ability to impose a lien on the property

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278. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3053 (discussing the lack of democratic participation involved with special district development).
279. See Ritchie, supra note 22 (discussing the impacts of the financing of a special district development, which left residents with a great deal of bond debt); Watson, supra note 102, at 220 (introducing the notion of competitive local governments, which might motivate cities to use special districting to effect development); White, supra note 8 (providing examples of failed special taxing districts).
280. See generally Callies, supra note 27.
281. See id. at 786 ("To those owners who refuse to pay, the association can place a property lien against their parcel and thereby cause issues of non-merchantable title, violations of existing loan agreements, and a weakening of the parcel's commercial viability.").
282. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 (1989) (discussing traditionally payment mechanisms in place in residential communities); Frank
serves as one of the coercive functions that allow common interest ownership communities to control externalities. Without the ability to punish noncompliant homeowners, the neighborhood association would be without the ability to create positive externalities and to ward off negative ones. The entire common interest community scheme would be rendered merely voluntary and, therefore, lose much of its allure and effectiveness. Furthermore, many homeowners’ association statutes, condominium association statutes, and similar legal frameworks limit the extent to which the association can impose dues. This, in turn, helps keep the enforcement mechanism in check so as to ensure that individual financial obligations do not become overly burdensome.

However, what makes the development special district different is that it is a public body and the law gives the liens that are imposed in connection with its assessments super priority (the same status as ad valorem property tax liens).
Property tax liens enjoy super priority such that they generally prime all pre-existing liens on the property.289 General common interest community liens do not enjoy the super priority.290 Although some states allow for HOA liens to be given some form of preferred priority, it is always only for a certain limited period of time and only for a certain amount—typically fairly nominal compared to the unbounded amounts that be imposed through the special district lien.291

2. The Super Priority of Ad Valorem Property Tax Liens

The fact that general ad valorem property tax liens are given super priority status is not unusual.292 In fact, this has long been the rule since the government has a substantial interest in ensuring the timely and efficient collection of property taxes.293 Revenues from these taxes go toward supporting an array of important public necessities—everything from roads and bridges to schools and hospitals.294 So, although granting the general property tax lien a priority over pre-existing liens is an exception to the law’s usual first in time priority rule, the exception is

289. See id. (discussing the financial consequences of private developments aided by public government).
290. See Paula Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common-Interest Communities and the Rise of Government for “the Nice”, 37 URB. LAW 335, 348 (2005) (discussing the stringent payment requirements in place in some housing communities); French, supra note 285, at 363 (discussing similarities between communities associations, cities, and corporations).
291. See Miller, supra note 119, at 131 (noting the use of HOAs in California); Stahl, supra note 115, at 990 (discussing the impact of liens on property owners).
293. See Thomas Bonura, Misdirected Hostility: Are Criticisms of Texas Property Tax Lenders Justified?, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 569, 570 (2012) (“With the growing demand for these lien purchases and the growing desire of local governing entities to develop and facilitate an industry that maximizes revenue collection, it is no surprise that the volumes of tax lien transactions have risen at a corresponding rate.”).
justified because of the compelling societal benefit that is achieved by giving them the first position.295

Since the residents of the municipality rely upon the general collection of property taxes in order to fund services and public goods that are needed by the entire populace, it is reasonable, and in fact necessary, that the liens that arise in connection with their enforcement are given special treatment.296 And the market has easily accommodated this framework.297 When individuals take out a residential loan secured by a mortgage, the bank builds into the monthly payments an amount sufficient to take care of the annual property tax bill because the lender anticipates that the property tax lien will, by law, prime the mortgage.298

3. The Deprivation of Property Rights Without Just Compensation

However, the liens that arise in connection with development special districts are quite different.299 The developer, who initially owns all the land in the development, has the ability to indirectly appoint his people to the district board and thus is the one who, practically speaking, controls the amount of assessments that will be charged against each of the lots.300 Therefore, he has control over not only the amount of the liens but also over their enforcement, including in preference to his real estate lender.301

295. See id. at 7 (noting that property taxes are justified by the benefits resulting from the revenues raised); Frank Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 802 (2000) (discussing the increase in revenue that can result from certain tax liens).

296. See Alexander, supra note 72, at 806 (noting the special nature of enforcing payment of property taxes).

297. See id. (discussing the shift that has occurred to accommodate a need for changing property tax enforcement).


299. See Galván, supra note 27, at 1 (introducing the distinct nature of financing special districts).

300. See Galván, supra note 114, at 3051–54 (discussing developer control over special districts, especially in the early stages).

301. See id. at 3049 (noting the ability of most developers to choose a financial institution).
Going back to the example in the introduction above, the developer initially obtained a loan from Realty Bank so he could purchase the land and have some capital for the initial build out. The bank had its mortgage recorded as a first lien on the property. Then, a few months later, the developer had the local government grant him a special taxing district as part of their incentive package to entice him to come and develop in the area. The petition and the governing documents for the district were drawn up by the developer’s attorneys. Once approved, the developer swiftly had the board appointed with all his friends and supporters and began the process of having his attorneys and financial advisors generate the bond documents.

Spurred on by local government politicians eager for his success and buttressed by his own visions of the ultimate real estate community, the developer had the board issue a massive bond issuance to pay for the many luxuries and improvements he intends for Beau Chateaux. Realty Bank monitors these events in horror, understanding that the liens (which will be substantial) arising from this bond issuance will prime their pre-existing mortgage, but the bank is unable to do anything to stop it. As long as the developer is timely in making the debt service on Realty Bank’s loan there is nothing to legally be done.

But when Beau Chateaux fails and the district goes into default on its bonds because of a massive failure to pay the special assessments, the bondholders move to force the district to foreclosure on its liens and have the properties seized and sold.\textsuperscript{302} However, at the same time, the developer defaults on his loan to Realty Bank. Realty Bank now moves to exercise its mortgage rights to foreclosure on the property and to have it seized and sold.\textsuperscript{303} Technically Realty Bank’s mortgage was given first position due to the normal recording acts system. However, because the special district’s liens are given the same priority as general ad valorem property tax liens, the Beau Chateaux district’s right will enjoy super priority. Realty Bank’s interest will be subordinated, regardless of the fact that its rights arose

\textsuperscript{302} See White, supra note 8 (discussing a decline in quality of life in an abandoned special district development).

\textsuperscript{303} See generally Ritchie, supra note 22.
first and that without its initial capital, the development would not have even been possible.304

Importantly, the subordination of Realty Bank’s lien represents the taking of a private property interest by the government.305 However, as discussed above, no just compensation is due because of the theory that property tax liens serve a broader societal good.306 But is that really true? The general property tax lien surely serves such a purpose.307 Everyone within the jurisdiction enjoys the benefits conferred by general-purpose property taxes—they can all use the schools, the sewer system, the fire and policy services, and the water distribution networks.308 But this is not the case with the development special district.309 The benefits conferred by these property taxes are not wide spread or shared in the least.310 Rather, the goods and services that arise from these assessments are solely enjoyed by a discrete group of individuals in a purely private development.311

It is a foundation of constitutional jurisprudence that one cannot be deprived of one’s property interest without being accorded just compensation in relation to the value of what was taken.312 When the government exercises its power of eminent

304. See Bonura, supra note 293, at 579 (noting that the interests of creditors may be subordinated).

305. See Alexander, supra note 282, at 792 (framing the issue of subordination as a possible taking).

306. See id. at 748 (introducing the nature of the property tax); FISHER, supra note 294, at 6 (noting that people would resist paying taxes more strenuously if they did not receive some benefit from the revenues).

307. FISHER, supra note 294, at 6 (discussing that support for a property tax is traced to the idea that the people are benefitted in some way).

308. See id. at 187–205 (discussing the current property tax and the way in which revenues are spent).

309. See Miller, supra note 119, at 155–57 (discussing the fact that often the benefits in special districts are limited to that specific neighborhood).

310. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 974 (noting that the benefits effect a limited number of area residents).

311. See id. at 962 (discussing that special districts are created to accommodate small groups of residents who want the same services performed).

domain to take one’s land for a public park or to obtain an
easement for utilities or a right of way for a road, the private
landowner is compensated.313 Those who possess security rights
in property, such as the mortgage lien given to Realty Bank, also
have vested property rights that are given constitutional
protections.314 The only reason the *ad valorem* property tax lien’s
super priority does not require just compensation is because of
the very broad and compelling government interest that is served
by giving it such a status.315

But this rationale is entirely absent from the super status
given to development special liens.316 They serve only to enrich a
very narrow, limited, and private interest—namely to fund the
services and amenities of a private real estate development.317 It
makes no sense to effectively render the rights of third parties
like Realty Bank valueless in the name of paying for a golf
course, a community pool, and other private luxuries for Claire,
Henry, and their fellow residents in Beau Chateaux. However,
that is exactly what the development special district lien
allows.318

**B. Destabilizing Conventional Real Estate Lending**

Another unintended consequence that results from the
spread of development special districts has to do with their

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Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral*, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1106 (1972) (discussing eminent domain); Carol M. Rose, *The Shadow of The
Cathedral*, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2181 (1997) (discussing the state’s option to use
private land for public purposes).

Property After the Foreclosure Crisis*, 73 Md. L. REV. 523, 556 (2014) (noting that
banks often hold security interests in people’s homes); Michael S. Moskowitz,
*Trending Water: Can Municipal Efforts to Condemn Underwater Mortgages

315. *See* Alexander, *supra* note 282, at 770–71 (discussing the super priority
status of property tax liens).

316. *See* Callies, *supra* note 27, at 2 (discussing the reasons for prioritizing
property tax liens).

317. *See* Stahl, *supra* note 115, at 941 (introducing the idea that only a small
group benefit from the liens in special districts).

318. *See id.* at 990 (discussing the practical effect of a lien).
impact on the conventional lending market.\textsuperscript{319} The way in which special districts fund their improvements and operations serves in many ways as a sort of private bank for the developer.\textsuperscript{320} He gets free capital at low costs from a source that he practically controls.\textsuperscript{321} In exchange, he need not sign any personal guarantees or promissory notes and, if the project fails, the obligations are non-recourse to him.\textsuperscript{322}

It may seem that this scenario operates independently of other facts and that the unjustness of this situations is more policy oriented. If a given municipality chooses to bestow such benefits on a developer, then why should it not be free to do so? However, as discussed above, other creditors with vested property interests in the form of security rights are subordinated to the special district’s interest. \textsuperscript{323} And this subordination, as discussed below, has a serious impact on the conventional real estate lending market as a whole.\textsuperscript{324}

\textit{1. Impact on the Primary Mortgage Market—Community Lending Impacts}

In the traditional scenario, lenders assess their risk and make a determination on how much and under what conditions they will lend for a real estate project based on the economic and financial projections of the undertaking, the creditworthiness of the borrower, and the value of available collateral to secure the repayment obligation.\textsuperscript{325} The lender will advance funds if and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{319} See Saft, supra note 32 (providing an overview of financial transactions).
\item \textsuperscript{320} See Briffault, supra note 85, at 514 (discussing the initial funding for special district development).
\item \textsuperscript{321} See id. at 522 (explaining one way that developers see their projects financed).
\item \textsuperscript{322} See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3048 (noting that the development projects are low or no cost to the developer).
\item \textsuperscript{323} See Callies, supra note 27, at 2 (discussing the priority given to certain property tax liens); Larson, supra note 40, at 605 (noting that private lenders’ interests are subordinated to municipal lenders).
\item \textsuperscript{324} See Cox, supra note 23, at 104 (discussing the impact of subordination on home financing).
\item \textsuperscript{325} See Saft, supra note 32 (providing an overview of the lending process).
\end{itemize}
only if it believes sufficient property has been posted as security for the loan.\footnote{326}

In the event that the borrower, despite reasonable revenue projections and a clean credit history, defaults under the loan, the lender can foreclosure upon the collateral, have it seized and sold in accordance with law, and apply the proceeds from the sale to the remainder of the debt.\footnote{327} However, the value of the security in the collateral is premised on the idea that the lender has a first position lien on the property.\footnote{328} If another creditor has a superior position, then the property will be seized and sold and the proceeds applied in preference to the higher ranked creditor before the lender is repaid.\footnote{329} And, if the foreclosure sale does not draw a high enough bid (as is often the case), then the inferior positioned lender may end up with nothing at all.\footnote{330}

Since real estate lenders cannot know at the time of making the loan whether a development special district will be created and thereby prime their security rights, lenders will eventually begin tightening credit in real estate development lending generally.\footnote{331} This is particularly true with regard to the use of development special districts for purposes that truly are for a broader societal benefit.\footnote{332} For instance, some municipalities have not completely handed over the development special district device to private developers; rather, some have used them to partner with private developers to build in areas where conventional financing is not available.\footnote{333} Such blighted and

\footnote{326. See generally GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2009).
\footnote{327. See id. at 49 (offering a scenario in which a lender might advance funds).
\footnote{328. See id. at 94 (discussing the impact of priority position on lenders’ perception).
\footnote{329. See generally SIMS & FIELDS, supra note 262.
\footnote{330. See id. at 555 (giving a hypothetical example of a foreclosure sale).
\footnote{331. See generally Larson, supra note 40 and accompanying discussion of the PACE issue’s effect on real estate lending.
\footnote{333. See, e.g., Keila Szpaller, Missoula Aggressively Uses Urban Renewal Districts, MISSOULIAN (June 26, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/}
economically depressed areas are unable to attract private investment at the level that would be needed to truly improve that community. However, the city—through the granting of a development special district—a willing affordable housing developer, and a community-minded bank might be able to partner and bridge the financing gap to reinvigorate whole neighborhoods that have traditionally been cut off from the financing market.

But as development special districts continue to serve as piggy banks for private developers to construct lavish subdivisions such as the likes of Beau Chateaux, conventional lenders—however community-minded they may be—will be hesitant to lend in any project that might involve a development special district. In other words, the use of development special districts in such an aggressive and unrestrained way by purely private developers dirties the water for the use of these special districts for truly altruistic and worthy purposes. Banks and other lenders will shy away from advancing the “first-in” capital or the bridge financing because of the fear that the special district bond issuance will not be closely regulated or limited in scope in


334. See Varian, supra note 333 (explaining plans in place that aim to attract private investors to the region); Westwood, supra note 331 (discussing the impact of “years of neglect” and the plans for future improvements).

335. See Szpaller, supra note 333 (explaining plans to use special districts to finance improvements to the region).

336. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3048 (describing the mechanics of financing a special district development); see generally Callies, supra note 27 (discussing the unique financing of special districts).

337. See Griffith, supra note 31, at 963 (discussing the use of special districts to control where revenues are spent).
accordance with a conservative and realistic projection of the performance of the project.\textsuperscript{338}

2. Impact on the Secondary Mortgage Market—Comparison to PACE

The impact of development special districts is not only relevant to the primary mortgage market where loans are initially made.\textsuperscript{339} Rather, the potential to have a significant impact on the secondary mortgage market is where development special districts can cause the real injury. Many property lawyers, policymakers, and sustainability advocates will remember the issues surrounding the Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program.

PACE was initially known as the “Berkeley First Program” where a local business called Renewable Funding created a structure for financing residential solar energy systems and other energy efficiency improvements by partnering with local governments.\textsuperscript{340} The expenses related to these improvements for individual homes were built into the homeowner’s annual property tax bill.\textsuperscript{341} The idea came from a dilemma whereby homeowners would spend many thousands of dollars installing energy efficient improvements in their homes, but would not necessarily see the cost of these improvements translate into an increase in their home’s value.\textsuperscript{342} Homeowners never totally recouped their losses upon the sale of the homes.\textsuperscript{343} And even

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{338} See Larson \textit{supra} note 40, at 620 (discussing the fear of lenders that borrowers will exceed their own ability to pay).
\item \textsuperscript{339} See id. at 620 (explaining which financing tools are most in demand in mortgage markets).
\item \textsuperscript{341} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{342} See Cox, \textit{supra} note 23, at 104 (noting that improvements do not always increase a home’s value).
\item \textsuperscript{343} See About PACE, PACENow.ORG, http://pacenow.org/blog/about-pace (last visited Jan. 29, 2015) (describing the PACE program as an effective financing tool that saves homeowners money) (on file with the Washington and
when homeowners were able to get bank financing for these improvements, individuals rarely wanted to borrow the money due to their being compelled to continue making loan payments even after the property had been sold to a new owner.\textsuperscript{344} To address these issues, PACE was born.\textsuperscript{345}

PACE relies upon special property tax assessments to finance the energy improvements on the properties with the PACE district.\textsuperscript{346} The setup sounds familiar. Generally the municipality would create a special taxing district for a certain area of the locality.\textsuperscript{347} Bonds would then be issued and would be repaid by the future special property tax assessments over time.\textsuperscript{348} As with development special districts discussed above, the lengthy term for repayment (usually twenty years) allowed individuals to enjoy the energy savings from the improvements but only be required to pay a nominal amount each year.\textsuperscript{349} Municipalities loved it too because the increased efficiency of utilities was good for the pocket books of the general populace.\textsuperscript{350}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{344} See id. (discussing the benefits of PACE financing).
\item \textsuperscript{345} See id. (describing the challenge that PACE seeks to solve).
\item \textsuperscript{346} See Joel B. Eisen, \textit{Can Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive Technology?: The Case for Solar Utilities}, 24 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS \\ & PUB. POLY 53, 84 (2010) (“Project funding comes from special tax bonds repaid through taxes collected on the property tax bills of participating owners. California pioneered this approach, and as of 2010, eighteen states had laws that allow their counties and cities to establish special assessment districts for energy financing.”).
\item \textsuperscript{347} See Annie Carmichael, \textit{Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Enabling Legislation}, VOTE SOLAR (Mar. 18, 2010) (explaining that local governments set up special districts to finance clean energy); HANNAH MULLER \\ & SARAH TRUITT, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SOLAR POWERING YOUR COMMUNITY: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 35 (July 2009) (discussing the way special districts are set up to finance clean energy).
\item \textsuperscript{348} See Erin Elizabeth Burg Hupp, \textit{Refining Green Building Regulations and Funding Green Buildings in Order to Achieve Greenhouse Gas Reductions}, 42 URB. LAW. 639, 645–46 (2010) (“These costs are repaid to the city over twenty years through a special tax on the property.”).
\item \textsuperscript{349} See JASON COUGHLIN, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, PHOTOVOLTAICS (PV) AS AN ELIGIBLE MEASURE IN RESIDENTIAL PACE PROGRAMS: BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 2 (June 2010) (discussing the financial benefits to homeowners who opt into programs such as PACE).
and the need for more sustainability providers and software technicians created economic overflow, and thus more tax revenue.\footnote{351}{The plan sounded perfect.}

But alas, it was not to be. The PACE special district liens were also given super priority on par with \textit{ad valorem} real property taxes, as is accorded to all special taxing district liens, including development special districts.\footnote{352}{Thus, homeowners who utilized the PACE program to finance their infrastructure enabled a lien to attach to their property to secure repayment of the bonds.}\footnote{353}{This lien, as with development special districts, had the effect of priming the pre-existing lien rights of the homeowner’s mortgage lender.}\footnote{354}{As a response, in July of 2010, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) stated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would stop purchasing mortgages on the secondary market if the collateral was within a PACE district, even if the homeowner was not a participant in the program.}\footnote{355}{The result of this action was to effectively kill all PACE activity across the US.}\footnote{356}{For fear of having a negative impact on for and against participation in PACE programs} (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).


\footnote{352}{See Larson, supra note 40, at 609 (“Any such assessment constitutes a lien on the property and is collected “in the same manner and with the same priority as ad valorem real property taxes.”).}

\footnote{353}{See id. at 600 (“Under such a program, the cost of qualified energy improvements is added as an assessment tax to the owner’s yearly property tax bill, with the obligation to pay being secured by a lien on the encumbered property.”).}

\footnote{354}{See id. at 610–13 (discussing the concerns of major mortgage lenders about the lien prioritization of PACE liens).}

\footnote{355}{Bulletin from Freddie Mac to Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers 1 (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/bill1020.pdf (discussing changes to the mortgaging policy regarding homes within PACE districts).}

residential financing within their municipalities, local governments stopped creating PACE districts altogether.\textsuperscript{357} And, as might be imagined, lenders who could not count on selling their mortgage loans on the secondary market had no interest in making residential loans in PACE district-related areas.\textsuperscript{358}

PACE special districts have exactly the same rights and powers as development special districts.\textsuperscript{359} And, in fact, the development special districts pose a much greater threat because they are allowed to finance a wide array of improvements far beyond solar panels, rain retention basins, and the like.\textsuperscript{360} As a result, their bond issuances can be much larger and can produce a far more substantial lien than what would normally be spawned by a PACE district.\textsuperscript{361}

As local governments continue to embrace development special districts in their efforts to meet the growing expectation that they lead the way in terms of economic recovery, it is inevitable that eventually the secondary market as a whole—particularly the government-sponsored entities—will step in and put a stop to the use of development special districts altogether in the same fashion as was done with PACE.\textsuperscript{362} And this too produces a societal ill, because it further erodes the legitimate use of development special districts in connection with bettering truly deserving projects in economically depressed areas.\textsuperscript{363}

\textsuperscript{357} See Wilson et al., supra note 39, at 281–88 (discussing the goal of PACE programs and the debate surrounding them).

\textsuperscript{358} Id. at 39–40 (discussing the impact of the PACE program on mortgage lenders).

\textsuperscript{359} See generally Wrapp, supra note 24 (discussing the various ways different districts can be used to finance projects).

\textsuperscript{360} See Callies, supra note 27, at 326 (noting the amenities financed through private district developments); Wilson et al., supra note 39, at 276–78 (discussing the various uses for PACE funding).

\textsuperscript{361} See Larson, supra note 40 at 601–03 (explaining the mechanics of a PACE lien).

\textsuperscript{362} See Larson, supra note 40, at 612 (discussing the way the PACE program was essentially brought to a halt).

\textsuperscript{363} See id. at 618 (noting the community benefits of the PACE program).
C. Clothing Private Interests with Public Powers

Last but not least, the development special district give-away has a substantial negative effect on fundamental market fairness.364 Vying for economic development projects is undoubtedly a part of municipal competition.365 This has been so prior to the Great Recession and continues to be so even more today.366 As a part of this process, cities and local governments package together various incentive plans—sometimes tax breaks, sometimes direct grants, and even sometimes special taxing districts—all in an effort to lure in the ultimate prize.367 Presenting the best carrot in terms of the investors or businesses getting the biggest bang for their buck is how economic development battles between municipalities are ultimately won.368

1. The Profits and Problems of Public-Private Partnerships

The coupling of a development special district with the efforts and capital of a private real estate developer are often described as a form of public-private partnership.369 Under this scheme, the city subsidizes private development in the hopes of a

364. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 825–32 (critiquing the current system for its unfairness).
365. See id. at 793 (discussing the effect of competition on the finance market).
366. See Watson, supra note 102, at 220 (“As the economy begins to rebound from the Great Recession, competition between cities has become palpable in recent years.”); Casella, supra note 54 (discussing the trend of development outside of major cities); Parisella, supra note 54 (discussing the importance of major cities).
367. See Watson, supra note 102, at 7 (“[L]ocal governments enter the market as sellers competing against other localities for development. . . . The local government is selling its quality of life, its location, its available sites, its workforce, and various incentives in the same way that a private company sells its products to consumers.”).
368. See Odinet supra note 5, at 220 (“Cities often compete with one another to lure this economic development projects by each offering their own package of public incentives for the private business or developer to consider.”).
369. See Callies, supra note 27, at 21 (“Virtually every state authorizes tax increment financing in some form, almost exclusively for redevelopment projects.”).
Such arrangements have long occurred and have often carried a heavy price tag. In 2004 the City of New York meted out $100 million in public incentives to prevent Goldman Sachs from moving its headquarters to neighboring New Jersey. And after the 2008 financial crisis, New York City, eager to keep its venture capital population firmly in place, handed out $45 million in seed money to private sector projects.

But these public–private partnerships, despite being widely lauded even by the likes of President Obama, rarely turn out as rosy as they are initially envisioned. They necessarily involve giving preference to one private entity over another. Instead of forcing the private party to weather the risk associated with its for-profit ventures, and thereby having skin in the game to

370. See id. at 20 (“Tax increment financing . . . is ‘free money’ used to pay for the redevelopment and then returned to its rightful place as part of a now-enhanced stream of revenue to the governmental bodies which levy such taxes on the property in the first place.”).

371. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 236 (“For instance, in 2004 the city of New York allocated $100 million worth of public incentives to Goldman Sachs when the company threatened to move its headquarters to New Jersey.” (citing David W. Chen, Much Vilified, Financial Titans Find a Friend in Bloomberg, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, at A17)).

372. See id. (“Similarly, after the 2008 crash and in the face of the threatened departure of many venture capitalists from the city, the local government offered to invest roughly $45 million in seed capital to private sector enterprises in order to entice them to remain.” (citing David W. Chen, Economists’ Forecast: Chance of Change 100%, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at A17)).


374. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 238 (“In essence, by clothing the private party with the trappings of governmental power, the playing field is necessarily rendered uneven such that other businesses and service providers cannot fairly compete.”).
temper its expectations, the public subsidy largely frees them from such considerations.\textsuperscript{375} With the development special district, instead of having to personally sign the promissory note or personally guarantee the loan, the developer is able to spread the risk of the development’s failure to the larger public.\textsuperscript{376}

Moreover, in these supposed partnerships involving development special districts, the private party always has the leg-up.\textsuperscript{377} The developer need not worry about control or oversight by the local government because he controls the district’s board and there are rarely any administrative mechanisms in place for the city to supervise its activities.\textsuperscript{378} “The self-interested nature of these management arrangements lead[s] to a disproportionate share of risk being allocated to the private partner, rather than being evenly spread between the two.”\textsuperscript{379}

2. Winners, Losers, and the Uneven Playing Field

The haze created around the local government decision-making process when an economic development “win” is dangled before the eyes of decision makers usually leads municipalities into the open arms of the developer.\textsuperscript{380} Important considerations of fairness, equality in the marketplace, and a level playing field

\textsuperscript{375} See id. at 239 (“The self-interested nature of these management arrangements can lead to a disproportionate share of risk being allocated to the public partner, rather than being more evenly spread between the two.”).

\textsuperscript{376} See Galvan supra note 114, at 3060 (“MUDs, like many special districts, can take on significant debt without complying with the debt limitations imposed on the state, counties, or municipalities.”); Callies supra note 27, at 23 (“Put simply, TIF [(Tax Increment Financing)] creates funding by borrowing against future tax revenues that are expected to be generated by the redeveloped area.”).

\textsuperscript{377} See Odinet, supra note 5, at 237 (“[T]he hypnotic effect of garnering an economic development ‘win’ often leads local governments head-first into the open arms of private parties seeking development partnerships.”).

\textsuperscript{378} See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3052 (“Developers tend to exert tremendous influence over MUDs’ boards of directors . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{379} Odinet, supra note 5, at 239.

\textsuperscript{380} See id. at 237 (discussing how economic desperation can lead certain municipalities into vulnerable relationships with private businesses); Barrett, supra note 373 (discussing how “financial desperation” has contributed to six troubling trends in public-private partnerships).
easily fall away when the threat of losing the “deal” to another locale is looming overhead.\textsuperscript{381}

Inherent in all public–private partnerships is the idea that a private individual is being clothed with public powers and resources in order to aid him in being successful.\textsuperscript{382} However, the details and extent of the partnership are rarely well defined.\textsuperscript{383} The relationship is typically sold as a shared endeavor whereby both parties incur some risk in return for some reward.\textsuperscript{384} However, that is rarely the case.\textsuperscript{385} The extent to which the developer bears any risk at all is often unclear to the general public (and perhaps even to the local government decision makers) in the development special district context.\textsuperscript{386} It is the district that issues the bonds and is responsible for the debt service, not the developer.\textsuperscript{387}

Moreover, justified resentment builds in other developers and private actors in the marketplace who do not receive such

\textsuperscript{381} See Odinet, supra note 5, at 237 (“The promise of new infrastructure, jobs, and ongoing future growth creates a haze around the local government decision-making process such that many valid considerations are often let go by the wayside. One such important consideration is the role of fairness and competition.”).

\textsuperscript{382} See id. at 238 (discussing how governmental preference often leads to an imbalance in private business competition); Dominique Custos & John Reitz, Public-Private Partnerships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 558 (2010) (“While the public sector usually retains ownership in the facility or system, the private party will be given additional decision rights in determining how the project or task will be completed.”).

\textsuperscript{383} See Odinet, supra note 5, at 237 (“However, in truth, the exact nature of the ‘partnership’ is often not well defined. The extent to which both parties—the public and the private—are on the hook for both capital investment and for incurring losses is often left vague and uncertain.”).

\textsuperscript{384} See id. (“By engaging in these endeavors, local governments, at least nominally, are able to share both the risks and the rewards of a successful project with the private partner.”).

\textsuperscript{385} See id. at 238 (“While clothed in the mantle of a shared endeavor where each party walks into the arrangement with eyes wide open, the end result of these arrangements are [sic] often quite different than what was anticipated.”).

\textsuperscript{386} See id. (“[T]here is very little opportunity for the public to engage in meaningful oversight and management of the public private partnership relationship.”).

\textsuperscript{387} See Callies, supra note 27, at 21 (“All states appear to permit the issuance of bonds as the principal method of financing a project through tax increment financing.”).
favorable treatment. While other real estate investors must obtain conventional financing or equity participation and incur accompanying risk, the development special district parties need not do so. And the more cities that use development special districts to give special benefits to only certain private parties, the more the municipality inadvertently sends a message that it is in the business of selecting winners and losers—a form of crony capitalism. Some private groups will enjoy infrastructure subsidies, direct grants, tax breaks, and, in this case, special taxing district financing, while others are “forced to shoulder the burden on their own without public assistance.” The effect that results is a certain discontent across the jurisdictional market that results in private businesses refusing to invest in the area out of bitterness that they have not received a public subsidy or out of a holdout mentality in refusing to invest until they too receive government assistance.

388. See Odinet supra note 5, at 241 (“This creates a malaise throughout the municipality as private enterprise refuses to further invest within the city’s boundaries—either out of resentment or because they believe any such investment should be coupled with a public subsidy of their own.”).

389. See id. (“While some groups enjoy infrastructure subsidies and breaks from their tax obligations, others are forced to shoulder the burden on their own without public assistance.”)

390. See id. (“In essence, public-private partnerships of this nature send a message to other private businesses in the area that the local government selects certain chosen winners, and thereby implicitly (though unintentionally) creates disfavored losers.”). For a discussion of the related theories of rent-seeking and public choice economics, see Michael E. DeBowa & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 993 (1998); Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 409 (1993); Maxwell L. Stearns, Restoring Positive Law and Economics: Introduction to Public Choice Theme Issue, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 709 (1998).

391. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 241 (“While some groups enjoy infrastructure subsidies and breaks from their tax obligations, others are forced to shoulder the burden on their own without public assistance.”).

392. See id. (“This creates a malaise throughout the municipality as private enterprise refuses to further invest within the city’s boundaries—either out of resentment or because they believe any such investment should be coupled with a public subsidy of their own.”).
V. Recommendations for a Balancing of Interests

Development special districts have the potential to serve a valid purpose. When used to truly help provide financing for the development of areas that would otherwise be cut off from the lending market, their use is both legitimate and advantageous. However, the desire of cities to draw in economic development projects and generate more tax revenue is too tempting. It takes very few steps and little administrative process to create a development special district. Moreover, it is all too easy for policymakers to convince themselves that the district’s debt has no negative impact on the surrounding community.

While the failure of the Beau Chateaux project is merely hypothetical, actual cases of development special district failures are not. In Florida alone, where development special districts are called community development districts, there were 594 districts created across the state. In 2010, 42 percent of these districts where either “defaulting or not collecting enough money to make their payments.” These 123 at-risk districts have issued a combined total of over $4 billion in bonded indebtedness, which has been spread to financial houses, pension funds, and other large institutional investors across the country.

One district in particular exemplifies the abuse. The Arlington Ridge community development district in Leesburg

393. See supra Part III.B (providing an overview of development special districts).
394. See supra Part III (discussing the special taxing district).
395. See supra Part II.C (discussing the economic and finance pressures of local governments as a result of the economic crisis).
396. See supra Part III.A (discussing the history and uses of special taxing districts).
397. See supra Part III (discussing the special taxing district).
398. See Ritchie, supra note 22 (discussing community development districts in Lake County, Florida and across the state during the financial crisis).
399. See id. (“Today, Florida has 294 of these powerful districts that have borrowed billions by issuing bonds, and 123 of those—42 percent—are either defaulting or aren’t collecting enough money to make their payments . . .”).
400. See id. (“So how much do the 123 districts combined owe bondholders? Nearly $4 billion.”).
401. See id. (“Life at the Arlington Ridge retirement community south of Leesburg was considerably cushier before the developer went belly up.”).
issued $16 million worth of bonds.\textsuperscript{402} This was used to support not only traditional infrastructure, but also a community restaurant and other luxuries such as a social coordinator and a water aerobics instructor.\textsuperscript{403} Shortly “[a]fter selling about 235 of the planned 1,036 lots in the 487-acre project, developer Blair Communities went belly up.”\textsuperscript{404} The effects of a failed development of this size, aside from the consequences to the homeowners and the investors, on the surrounding community can result in shock waves of economic depression and downturn as businesses and new investors flee from the area.\textsuperscript{405}

The negative consequences that follow this free flowing public subsidy, particularly in the face of increasing municipal pressures to bring in new businesses, are substantial and have the potential to be even more so.\textsuperscript{406} Recognizing the problems and stemming the damage is becoming tremendously important.\textsuperscript{407}

\textbf{A. Solution 1: Contractual Cures}

One possible way to deal with the issue of the subordination of vested property rights and its impact on the real estate lending market would be to include an automatic default provision in all conventional lending documents.\textsuperscript{408}

\textsuperscript{402} See id. (“Thanks to the greedy way Blair Communities financed the project, retirees who live on about 235 of the lots now are stuck with $15.9 million in bond debt.”).

\textsuperscript{403} See id. (“We had a restaurant, full-time instructors for water aerobics, full-time security, social coordinators—they’re all gone,’ said Dominic Setaro, 62, a retired government finance officer.”); White, supra note 8 (discussing the struggles of homeowners in failed tax districts).

\textsuperscript{404} Ritchie, supra note 22.

\textsuperscript{405} See id. (“The defaults are leaving folks like Setaro to uproot their retirement and fend for themselves in a morass of complicated government finance involving these so-called ‘dirty bonds.’ And they aren’t the only ones hurt.”).

\textsuperscript{406} See supra Part IV (discussing the various unintended consequences of development special districts).

\textsuperscript{407} See supra Part IV (discussing the urgency needed to address the various unintended consequences of development special districts).

1. Implementing a Private Law Fix

In other words, using the example of Beau Chateaux, when Realty Bank first made the land loan to the developer, it could have provided in the loan agreement or mortgage contract that, in the event the borrower allows any special taxing district lien to attach to the mortgaged property without the mortgagee’s consent, then this shall constitute an automatic default. By doing so, the real estate lender would be able to anticipate beforehand the chance that the developer would obtain special district financing and thus diminish the value of the bank’s mortgage.\footnote{See generally Christine M. Gimeno & Tammy E. Hinshaw, \textit{Mortgage Acceleration Clauses}, 41 \textit{Ohio Jur. 3d Estates, Etc.} § 262 (West 2014).}

Therefore, if the developer intended to obtain financing through a development special district, then he would first have to consult with his mortgage lender. In doing so, the mortgage lender would review the financial projections, economic studies, and other relevant information in connection with the magnitude of the proposed bond issuance and thereby police how much debt the special district would incur.\footnote{See generally Callies, supra note 27.} The lender would consent to the creation of the district if and only if the borrower agreed to follow the bank’s dictates in issuing the bonds.\footnote{See generally id.}

2. Pondering the Drawbacks of Contract

However, there is a major drawback to this particular solution. First, the way in which special districts are created poses some problems insofar as lender’s counsel has the ability to craft the appropriate language.\footnote{See supra Part III.B (providing an overview of development special districts).} For one, it would be difficult to define and quantify when exactly a developer would “allow” a special taxing district lien to attach to the mortgaged property.\footnote{See generally supra Part III.B.} The local government is the body that creates the special district.\footnote{See generally supra Part III.B.} Although some statutory schemes require the
landowner (developer) to file a petition, there are cases where the local government can, on its own, initiate the creation of the district.415 Also, if the legislature creates the district via a special act, then the developer is not formally involved at all. So if one cannot quantify the developer’s formal role in creating the district, can the lender expect its remedy to be triggered by informal acts?416 If the developer writes to a legislator and asks her to sponsor a bill to create the development special district, does this constitute a default? What if the request to the legislator is made in the form of a conversation? Is it only a matter of proof now?

And what about other types of special taxing districts aside from the development special district? What if the locality votes to increase the property taxes in connection with the area’s sewer district or fire district?417 Would this constitute a default? It is, technically speaking, allowing the mortgaged property to be encumbered by a special district lien.418 If there were a local election regarding the increase in the fire protection district’s assessment, would the developer be compelled to vote against it in order not to violate the loan covenants? The issues raised here are difficult ones because the circumstances under which special districts arise can be so varied. This is particularly true because it is not the developer who legally creates the district.419 Rather, it is a third party—the local government or the state legislature—who does so, and they are not bound by any special relationship with the developer’s lender.420 So, while a private law solution between the parties might have the potential to resolve some of the problems, it cannot be expected to serve as a comprehensive remedy.

415. See generally supra Part III.B.
416. See Galvan, supra note 114, at 3052 (discussing the benefits to developers of using special law MUDs).
417. See supra Part III.A (discussing the history and uses of special taxing districts).
418. See supra Part III.A (discussing special taxing districts ).
419. See supra Part II.B (providing an overview of development special districts).
420. For more information on development special districts, see supra Part III.B.
B. Solution 2: Statutory Limitations

Statutory solutions also present a possible remedy to the problems related to the rampant creation of development special districts. In most cases, there is little to no statutory or constitutional parameters imposed on legislatures or local governments in their ability to create special taxing districts. There is no formal process of deliberation nor is there a list of factors that the legislative body must consider when positing whether to convey to a private party (or any party) the benefits of a special taxing district.

1. Enacting Legislative Parameters

At the local government level, the developer and his architects, planners, and attorneys woo the city council or county commission with promises of high-end developments that will result in large tax revenues. While the council may engage in some deliberative processes as to the merits of the project, studies have shown that more often than not the passage of ordinances creating such districts happens as a matter of course. And those development special districts created by legislative act are even more easily obtained. With so many members in the state house from so many far off corners of the state, it is easy to surmise that few (if any) will actively spar with the bill sponsor as to the legitimacy of a development special district in a particular far-flung town or county.

A possible solution might involve amending special taxing district statutes in every state to provide that the legislative body—whether state-wide or local—must review certain factors before approving a new special district or perhaps that the body can only create special districts that meet certain criteria. In

421. See supra Part III.B (explaining development special districts).
422. See generally supra Part III.B.
423. See generally supra Part III.B.
424. See generally supra Part III.B.
425. See generally supra Part III.B.
426. See, e.g., Zale, supra note 81, at 87 ("This article argues that before exercising the right to destroy as a property owner, a city should conduct a
the best-case scenario, the development special district would only be used in those instances where the project could not occur without public support and that the project furthers the goals of ameliorating an economically depressed or underserved area.

2. Remembering the Inevitability of Discretion

However, the problem with this approach is that a determined and resolute legislative body that is intent on conferring the favored party with a special taxing district subsidy will find a way to justify the district’s creation, even if it does not actually meet the criteria. When cities and municipalities are being pushed to drive economic growth and to spur new jobs and investment, there is little chance that local government decision makers—much less state legislators—will truly evaluate each development special district request with a discerning eye.\textsuperscript{427} The developer would argue that the project is not possible without the subsidy because he is financially unable (or unwilling) to shoulder the burden of obtaining conventional financing. Or, perhaps he would argue that financing is not available or practical.

The council, in turn, would argue that the granting of the district does indeed help ameliorate an economically depressed area. If a previously undeveloped area becomes a booming neighborhood or commercial hub then, under a rising tides raise all ships theory, nearby underserved and depressed areas would benefit from the spill-over effect. And the local government would further declare that the revenues produced from the new tax base would be used to focus additional public subsidies to these underserved areas in the future. With so many economic and political pressures facing cities today in terms of their role in the economic recovery, it is of little doubt that every development special district request would meet whatever criteria or narrow purpose the lawmaker could craft.\textsuperscript{428}

\textsuperscript{427}. See supra Part II and accompanying discussion of pressures put on American cities post the Recession.

\textsuperscript{428}. See supra Part II.A (discuss the effects of the economic crisis on local
demolition review procedure targeted at evaluating the impacts of the proposed exercise of the right to destroy on the city’s resiliency.

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C. Solution 3: Adopting a Two-Pronged Jurisprudential Approach

While a private law or contract-based solution has limitations, and while a statutory cabining of authority in relation to the creation of special districts has its weaknesses as well, there is another solution that could prove effective. This solution involves the adoption of a doctrine of equitable subordination by courts in dealing with a competition between development special district liens and pre-existing mortgage rights. As discussed above, the super priority status accorded to the special district lien is what causes most of the problems. But if there were a way for courts to police situations whereby special district liens were used in overreaching ways to the prejudice of the pre-existing rights of third parties then developers and special district boards would be less motivated to abuse the device.

In other words, the developer would not be inclined to overreach in the issuing of the bonds for mere luxuries and amenities, nor would he try to obtain a special district for the development of an area that was already prime for development, if he would not be able to validly market to bondholders that they would have a first priority lien to secure their investments. The bondholders will be less enthusiastic in investing in the project if they believe that their rights to repayment might be subordinated to the interests of another creditor (like Realty Bank). Through this system, market forces would disincentivize the developer from being overly aggressive in his use of the development special districts.

The test would work as follows: when confronted with competing secured parties—the bondholders or district and their or its liens on the one hand, and the real estate lender’s mortgage on the other—the court would engage in a two-step process of

429. See supra Part IV (discussing the various unintended consequences of development special districts).
430. See supra Part III.B (explaining development special districts).
431. For more information on development special districts, see supra Part III.B.
432. See supra Part III.B (providing an overview of development special districts).
determining whether the super priority status of the special district's lien should be respected or whether it should be subordinated to the pre-existing mortgage.

1. The Stand On Your Own Prong

The first part of the test involves the court analyzing the “stand on your own” prong. Under this study the court looks to whether the project could have been accomplished through the use of non-development special district financing. In other words, could the developer have obtained conventional financing or equity financing through traditional channels and achieved the same result as he did using the special district?

This inquiry would be challenged or substantiated through market analyses as to whether the area was prime for development or merely speculative, through economic studies to show the likelihood of a return on investment, and through an exploration of the credit-worthiness of the borrower versus the amount of risk a conventional lender would be willing to bear based on the market and the type and scope of the project. If the answer was determined to be yes—that the project could have been accomplished using non-development special district financing—then the liens in connection with the district’s debt should be subordinated to the rights of the pre-existing mortgagee. But if the answer was no—the project would not have been possible without the special district benefit—then the court would move on to the second prong.

2. The Community Benefits Prong

The second part of the test is the “community benefits” prong. This prong involves the court asking whether the benefits conferred on the parcels within and by virtue of the special taxing district inure to the measurable benefit of an economically distressed area. The purpose here is to decipher whether, if the project in its current iteration could only have been achieved through the use of a development special district, this project actually benefits, in an assessable way, an economically troubled area.
This would be determined based on substantiated evidence of tangible benefits to an economically distressed area that is either within or near the development special district. In other words, does the development bring jobs, blight improvement, or other economic benefits to an area that is in need of investment, resources, and opportunity? These benefits cannot be merely abstract or intangible. There must be actual data and tangible evidence that support realistic projections as to the benefits that will accrue to the target area. And it is not enough that these benefits exist, but they must actually impact an economically distressed area. This might include a portion of the locality that is blighted, historically undeveloped or underdeveloped, populated with a high number of low-income individuals, or that suffers from a number of at-risk factors.

If the answer was yes—the project does indeed measurably benefit an economically distressed area—then the super priority of the special district lien should be respected. However, if the answer was no, then the lien should be subordinated to the pre-existing rights of any mortgagees.

By creating such a framework, courts would be equipped with a tool for policing the inappropriate use of development special districts. The test does not invalidate the district as a whole or call into question the validity or the wisdom of its creation. Rather, it merely assesses, based on measurable factors, whether it would be constitutionally appropriate to subordinate the pre-existing property rights of secured parties to the district’s rights in the property. Further, the test provides flexibility in that if only a portion of the district’s financing is used for an improvement or infrastructure project that fails to meet the test, while another portion of the financing satisfies the two prongs, then a value-to-value subordination of the lien could occur. This would allow for the bifurcation of the lien’s super priority status so as not to unduly injure true community benefits resulting from the special district along with those benefits that are purely private.433

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433. See supra Part III (discussing the special taxing district).
3. A Comparison to Other Equitable Doctrines

Moreover, such flexible tests are not without precedent in American law. United States courts have long employed various judicially-created tests to help balance the interests of private parties, even when they do not produce a bright-line rule. In the bankruptcy context, federal courts use a theoretically similar, although structurally different, form of equitable subordination when a superior bankruptcy claimant acts in such a way as to injure the rights of junior creditors. In these cases, the court can subordinate the superior creditor’s claim to that of the junior creditor or force all other creditors—secured and unsecured—to be paid first before any payments are made to the bad-acting superior creditor. In essence, this much broader authority allows federal bankruptcy judges to strip a valid lien of all its power and authority over collateral. And while this power is vaguely provided for in Section 510(c) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, it has generally been held to be within the providence of the courts to define its parameters and develop its usages.

434. See Baxter Dunaway, 1 L. Distressed Real Est. § 7:57 (West 2014) (discussing bankruptcy courts’ use of equitable subordination in cases when bankruptcy claimants act in ways to injure the rights of junior creditors).

435. See Jeremy W. Dickens, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of ‘Control’, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 801, 802 (1987) (explaining the various instances in which equitable subordination could be employed by the court).

436. See Rafael Ignacio Pardo, Note, Beyond the Limits of Equity Jurisprudence: No-Fault Equitable Subordination, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1489, 1490 (2000) (“[T]he purpose of the [equitable subordination] doctrine is ‘to reprioritize the order of allowed claims based on the equities of the case, rather than to allow or disallow the claim in the first instance.’”); Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. Law. 417, 428 (1985) (“[T]he court generally may award any relief that it deems appropriate to undo the wrong and ensure that the liquidation results are equitable. This relief can include voiding of liens . . . .”)


At the state court level, the doctrine of unconscionability serves as yet another example of how judges have shown a propensity to engage in the extra-statutory policing of private contracts. The doctrine of unconscionability can be traced back to early English law which sought to provide prohibitions for certain contracts that “no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.” Since that time, a multitude of American states have utilized this principle, including the United States Supreme Court. Courts have often declared that the power to police private contracts in this manner is part of the judiciary’s inherent and intrinsic powers. Consequently, the power is not derived from legislation, but rather from general jurisprudential and constitutional principles that allow the judiciary to refuse to enforce unfair contracts or provisions which are deemed too burdensome, onerous, or one-sided. Courts generally look for evidence of overreaching by one party who is in a superior bargaining position to the disadvantage of another.


442. See id. at 287–88 (“One such [judicial] tool is unconscionability, . . . used since at least the eighteenth century to ‘police’ contracts that are grossly unfair and one-sided.”)
party who is in an inferior position due to education, language, economic status, or social demographic. And although UCC article 2 codified the doctrine of unconscionability, it had long existed under, and continues to be developed purely by, the judiciary.

Just as these equitable doctrines have allowed courts to interpose fairness and equity between private parties, the two-pronged test articulated above could be similarly used to help ward off the harms that arise from development special district abuse. By ensuring that over-reaching developers are unable to bank on the unfettered use of development special districts and their super priority liens, market forces and considerations of risk will ultimately scale back the aggressive use of these devices for purely private developments and better encourage their use for true community development that inures to the benefit of the wider public.

VI. Conclusion

As cities continue to scramble for new sources of tax revenue in this post-recession economy, the magnitude and pace of municipal competition will only continue to rise and become more intense. To that end, the use of public incentive packages and other subsidy offerings as a tool to lure economic development projects to a given locale will also continue to rise. The special

443. See id. at 298 (“A court is to consider factors such as the age, literacy, and business sophistication of the party claiming unconscionability; the bargaining tactics of the other party to the contract; and the commercial setting of the sales contract.”).

444. See Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 8 (2012) (“The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code sanctioned the doctrine of unconscionability in Article 2, but did not define the term or establish a framework for its implementation. . . . The drafters of section 2-302 intentionally left the task of defining unconscionability . . . to the courts.”).

445. See supra Part II (“As cities and municipalities across the United States became zealous in their desire to attract new residents and to land economic development projects, they became more willing . . . to bestow their guarded public powers and prerogatives into the hands of private developers to aid them in obtaining easy, fast cash.”).

446. See supra Part III (“It is through these economic and social pressures that local government decision-making has been steered precariously toward the
taxing district has already been shown to be a powerful tool in the city’s arsenal, and municipalities have evidenced a willingness in the past to distribute these public subsidy devices to aid developers in financing their various projects.\textsuperscript{447}

However, the unintended consequences of the use of special taxing districts in this manner cannot be understated.\textsuperscript{448} First, the liens they produce undermine vested property rights without any of the protections accorded under traditional due process and deprivation of property analyses.\textsuperscript{449} Parties with superior rights in property, such as mortgagees and first secured parties, are unjustly subordinated to the rights of the later arising special district lien merely because the enabling statutes accord them the same status as \textit{ad valorem} property taxes.\textsuperscript{450} However, this superiority is misplaced because, although traditional property taxes support a broad array of public goods and services, the resources and amenities supported by the special district liens are purely private.\textsuperscript{451}

Second, these development special district liens can have a substantially negative impact on the secondary mortgage market.\textsuperscript{452} As lenders can no longer be certain of their first position lien over the collateral, the ability to effectively market securities backed by these mortgages quickly becomes impossible.\textsuperscript{453} Secondary market firms such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will likely refuse to purchase these securities due to the inferior position (as it has shown a history of doing under similar circumstances in the past), which could result in the creation of more and more special taxing districts as an instrument for economic, financial, and cultural viability, which has in turn served as an invitation for abuse and poor policymaking.

447. See supra Part III (providing information on the use of special taxing districts).
448. See supra Part IV (outlining the many unintended consequences of using special taxing districts to attract private developers).
449. Supra Part IV.A.
450. Supra Part IV.A.
451. Supra Part IV.A.
452. See supra Part IV.B ("[O]ther creditors with vested property interests in the form of security rights are subordinated to the special district’s interest. And this subordination . . . has a serious impact on the conventional real estate lending market as a whole.").
453. Supra Part IV.B.
entire secondary market abandoning these types of loans. And as primary lenders can no longer sell these mortgage loans on the secondary market, they will no longer be willing to lend in projects that are coupled with special taxing district financing, including projects in low income and economically distressed areas where public subsidy financing of this sort is crucial. Such a scenario is not merely hypothetical; rather, the exact same situation occurred a mere four years ago with the very similar PACE special taxing districts.

And lastly, the give-away of these special financing districts inherently creates a political dilemma as to the creation of winners and losers and the proliferation of a financial and risk-based distortion in the local economy. By bestowing private benefits on only certain investors and businesses and not on others, a general climate of crony capitalism is created which substantially undermines the goals of the resilient city.

A possible solution to this problem involving special taxing districts might entail the use of private law cures. In other words, mortgage lenders might attempt to contractually anticipate and prevent the creation of special taxing districts and the resulting damage to their collateral position. However, as discussed above, the ways in which various state and local laws dictate the creation of the districts make precise drafting almost impossible. Another solution might involve enacting public law parameters to hem-in local governments and legislators from creating special districts when they are meant for purely private purposes. But such parameters, when so closely tied to the

454. Supra Part IV.B.
455. Supra Part IV.B.
456. Supra Part IV.B.
457. See supra Part IV.C (“And the more cities use development special districts to give special benefits to only certain private parties, the more the municipality inadvertently sends a message that it is in the business of selecting winners and losers—a form of crony capitalism.”).
458. Supra Part IV.C.
459. Supra Part IV.A (discussing the various methods of using private law to cure the defects of special taxing districts).
460. See supra Part V.A (proposing contractual cures to deal with the subordination of vested property rights).
461. Supra Part V.A.
462. See supra Part V.B (discussing the use of statutory limitations on the
discretion of the lawmaker, will likely prove insufficient since a determined city council or legislature will find reasons—even if only superficial—to argue that the project has merit. Moreover, such an ex ante limitation may have the result of unduly questioning the validity of local government policymaking even when there does not yet exist a bona fide dispute among private parties as to their lien rights in property.

Finally, this Article argues for the adoption of a two-pronged jurisprudential test that seeks to provide a more nuanced framework to police the competing interests of lien claimants in the real-estate-related special taxing district context. In order for the special district lien to enjoy its super priority, the test would require that the special district subsidy be necessary for the financial viability of the project and that the project create a tangible and measurable benefit to an economically distressed area or population. Such a test would allow an appropriate level of flexibility for the legitimate use of special taxing districts and would build upon a combination of other jurisprudential and discretionary doctrines that already exist in American law.

Special taxing districts used for real estate developments have and can continue to play an important role in the recovery of the American economy. Areas that are hit the hardest, such as those that are economically distressed and where the cost of development is too high compared to the potential return, stand to benefit from such a public subsidy. However, this public benefit comes with consequences that, if abused, can unjustly harm private rights in property, diminish certain forms of community lending, and distort the field of equal economic

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463. Supra Part V.B.
464. Supra Part V.B.
465. See supra Part V.C (“This solution involves the adoption of a doctrine of equitable subordination by courts in dealing with a competition between development special district liens and pre-existing mortgage rights.”).
466. Supra Part V.C.
467. Supra Part V.C.
468. See supra Parts II–III (discussing the use of special taxing districts in order to reinvigorate municipalities struggling during the Recession).
469. See supra Part III (discussing how, for some districts, the use of special taxing districts in order to encourage public private partnerships is the only practical option).
opportunity in a given jurisdiction. Through the adoption of the flexible approach described above, to be administered under the neutral eye of the courts, the inherent lien priority contest involved in special district real estate projects can be moderated so as to maintain the integrity of this type of financing device.

470. See supra Part IV (discussing the need to use special taxing districts cautiously due to their many unintended bad consequences).

471. See supra Part V.C (discussing the suggested two-pronged approach courts could use to employ equitable subordination when special district liens and pre-existing mortgage rights are in conflict).