That Ohio State University

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Fuck

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Oh *fuck*. Let’s just get this out of the way. You’ll find no *f*-word, *f*—*ck, f—–k, @#$!, or other sanitized version used here.¹ This is quite a
change from Professor Allen Walker Read’s 1934 scholarly treatment of the word, *An Obscenity Symbol*—fifteen pages and eighty-two footnotes penned without once printing the word *fuck* anywhere in the article. 2 I won’t even cleanse my title as Dr. Leo Stone did with his landmark piece, *On the Principal Obscene Word of the English Language*. 3 And why should I? This isn’t the first time you’ve seen the word and, if you keep reading, it certainly won’t be the last. Let me explain the genesis of this piece.

A trilogy of events motivated me to start this project. The first occurred during my second year teaching law. In my Professional Responsibility course, the lesson for the day was attorney racist and sexist behavior. The case 4 I assigned from a leading casebook 5 was liberally sprinkled with *fuck*, *cunt*, *shit*, *bitch* and the like. Sensitive to the power of language, I recited the facts myself rather than ask a student as was my norm. After the course was over, I was reviewing my student evaluations and discovered this: “I was a little disturbed by the way he seemed to delight in saying ‘cunt’ and ‘fucking bitch’ during

viewed through the lens of taboo by so many others. I am well aware that I risk offending some readers. I view this as my duty. As my former professor Sandy Levinson recently explained, “Teachers in particular may be guilty of evading part of their own responsibilities if they become too fastidious in ‘avoiding . . . words that shock.’” Sanford Levinson, *The Pedagogy of the First Amendment: Why Teaching About Freedom of Speech Raises Unique (and Perhaps Insurmountable) Problems for Conscientious Teachers and Their Students*, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1359, 1360 (2005). Discussing offensive speech requires that one be willing to breach standard norms and run the “risk of offending. I think it is as simple as that.” *Id.* at 1390. On this matter, I cannot agree more with Professor Levinson.


class. I think if you’re going to say things like that in class, you should expect it to show up on the evaluation. Now I was the one a little disturbed. How could any educated adult, much less a graduate student in a professional program, be offended by hearing these words read from a court opinion? I decided then to explore this topic. However, early in my career and armed with other safe, doctrinal projects on my research agenda, this one had to wait.

The idea resurfaced a year later when I read about the plight of Timothy Boomer. While canoeing on the Rifle River in Michigan, Boomer fell overboard letting forth a fuck or two. As if his day wasn’t bad enough, the nearby sheriff gave him a ticket—and not for unsafe canoeing. Instead, he was cited for violating an 1897 statute forbidding cursing within earshot of women and children. Then he was convicted. Amazed that this could happen in the twenty-first century, my curiosity about the legal implications of fuck was rekindled. I decided to dedicate one of my research assistants to exploring the area.

While this background research was ongoing, the third event crystallizing my intention to write this Article occurred. A federal district judge was reported as sending federal marshals to arrest a man for contempt of court for sending the judge an email containing the word fuck. Now I can understand contempt charges if this happened in open court, or if the man had been a lawyer involved in the case. However, the facts recounted by the newspaper implicated none of these reasons. It was a private email sent from the man to the judge criticizing his handling of the settlement of a consumer class action lawsuit of which the man was not even a party.

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8 The Michigan statute stated: “Any person who shall use any indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar or insulting language in the presence or hearing of any woman or child shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.337 (2006)).
9 Boomer was sentenced to a seventy-five dollar fine and four days of community service. Id.
10 I was especially flabbergasted by the fact that Boomer was convicted. His story surfaced during the appeal of the conviction. See People v. Boomer, 655 N.W.2d 255 (Mich. 2002).
11 United States District Court Judge Algenon L. Marbley.
12 Kevin Mayhood & Mark Niquette, Expletive Lands Critic of Ruling in Court, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 2004, at 01C (describing the plight of Robert Dalton who was arrested by federal marshals after calling Judge Marbley a “fuck up” in an email).
14 Dalton, the author of the email, is a longtime critic of a local car dealer which was the defendant in the class action settlement. Mayhood & Niquette, supra note 12.
I don’t profess to be a constitutional scholar, but I always thought the heart of the First Amendment was the right to criticize the government—federal judges included. In my mind, the guy should have been able to yell “fuck the judge” at the top of his lungs from his rooftop if he wanted to. While Judge Marley ultimately withdrew the contempt charge, after this incident I knew this Article had to be written—after I was tenured.

Three legally trained minds—a law student, a law enforcement officer, and a federal judge—each heard the word fuck and suddenly lost the ability to calmly, objectively, and rationally react. If fuck has power over these people, what are the limits of its influence? Three consonants and a vowel ordered one way—“fcuk”—is a multi-million dollar designer label coveted by many worldwide. With the slightest of alterations, f-u-c-k becomes so forceful that its utterance can land you in jail. What transforms these four letters into an expletive of such resounding power?

The explanation for the visceral reaction to fuck is word taboo.

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15 It is clear that Judge Marley was solely concerned with the actual use of language. After Dalton was dragged into court, Marley reportedly said: “As an articulate man, you could have found another way to express yourself.” Id. Only after Dalton conceded this point (“In retrospect, I could have used other creative words to express the strong sentiment I have.”), did the judge withdraw the contempt charge. Id.

Historically, not all Ohio judges have had such a severe reaction to fuck. In 1970, amidst the usual Ohio State-Michigan football frenzy, someone printed bumper stickers that said “Fuck Michigan.” A law student put one on his windshield and was arrested by the Columbus Police Department for violating the city’s obscene-literature law. Judge James A. Pearson dismissed the case concluding that it would be absurd to interpret the sticker to mean “have sexual intercourse with the state of Michigan.” He further concluded that most of the citizens of central Ohio would feel that the bumper sticker had some redeeming value. See Allan Sherman, Rape of the A.P.E. 22-23 (1973) (describing the bumper sticker incident).

16 I want to be clear: no one at the College of Law or the University has ever, in any way, tried to limit my academic freedom. Instead, I have experienced exactly the opposite; the faculty and administration have generously supported my research efforts. Still, FUCK made me skittish. I believe it is the force of taboo, central to my thesis, that led to this self-censorship. See infra Part II.


18 See infra Part II.
According to psycholinguists, its taboo status is likely due to our deep, subconscious feelings about sex. The taboo is so strong that it compels many to engage in self-censorship. However, refraining from the use of *fuck* only reinforces the taboo. In the process, silence empowers a small segment of the population to try to sanitize our vocabulary under the guise of reflecting a greater community. Taboo is then institutionalized through law.

In this Article, I explore the intersection of the word *fuck*, taboo, and the law. First, to fully understand the legal power of *fuck*, I draw upon the research of etymologists, linguists, lexicographers, psychoanalysts, and other social scientists to examine its history and modern usage. Then I consider taboo as the non-legal source of *fuck*’s power. To illustrate the effect of taboo on the legal treatment of the word *fuck*, I survey four major areas: First Amendment, broadcast regulation, sexual harassment, and education. This survey of the legal implications of the use of *fuck* reveals both inconsistencies in its treatment and tension with other identifiable legal rights. The power of taboo explains these inconsistencies. It also highlights why attempts to curtail the use of *fuck* through law are doomed to fail. Fundamentally, *fuck* persists because it is taboo, not in spite of it. Understanding these relationships ultimately yields *fuck* jurisprudence.

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19 See infra Part II.B.
20 See infra Part II.C.
21 A brief note about the limits of this project: I am interested solely in the word *fuck* and its variations and why this particular four-letter word has such a robust intersection with the law. While I find interesting the scholarly work of those who strive to understand the power relationships expressed by “who fucks” and “who gets fucked,” this Article does not address the issue of gendered language. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 124 (1989) (“Man fucks woman; subject verb object.”); Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 690 (1990) (“But why is it the end of the world ‘to be fucked?’ Why do we think of all forms of oppression in terms of ‘getting fucked?’”). Those with similar scholarly interests, not in the word *fuck* but in the act of *fucking*, such as my colleague and friend, Marc Spindelman, will also find that this piece offers no insight into their topic. See, e.g., Marc Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 32 (2004) (exploring queer theory’s understanding of “the pleasures of sexual hierarchy” and pondering “[w]hat’s sexy about a woman acting like a man by fucking a man thus being treated like a woman”). Finally, those interested in other offensive words, such as *nigger*, may see some parallels, but I have deliberately not tried to fashion an ambitious understanding of all offensive and hurtful speech. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME WORD (2002); Randall L. Kennedy, “Nigger!” as a Problem in the Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 935. Rather, I have tried to keep my focus on the word *fuck*. 
I. FUCK HISTORY

A. Etymology

Dr. Leo Stone’s 1954 lamentation that “scholarly information about this important word is remarkable for its scarcity” remains true today. The first recorded use is disputed. Some sources point to the poem Flen flyys—a Latin and English mix satirizing the Carmelite friars of Cambridge composed before 1500. Others claim the first known use of fuck is in a Scottish poem by William Dunbar, Ane Brash of Wowing, in 1503. However, it took nearly another century for fuck to make its lexicographic debut in John Florio’s 1598 Italian-English dictionary.

Not surprisingly, the etymology of fuck is unclear. Some etymologists trace fuck to Germanic languages with an original meaning of “to knock” and cognates such as Old Dutch ficken, Middle High German vicken, and German ficken. This widely accepted derivation,

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22 Stone, supra note 3, at 31.
23 The quest for the earliest recorded use is an example of historical lexicography. Historical lexicography is the study of the etymology, chronology, and meaning of words by means of an historical method that traces the meaning of the word back to its earliest appearance in print. All later developments in the word’s usage are then illustrated by dated and documented quotations using the word. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Politically Correct United States Supreme Court and the Motherfucking Texas Court of Criminal Appeals: Using Legal Databases to Trace the Origins of Words and Quotations, in LANGUAGE AND THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE 367, 368 (Marlyn Robinson ed., 2003).
24 See, e.g., THE F-WORD 117 (Jesse Sheidlower ed., 2d ed. 1999) (noting the initial citation as the poem attacking the Carmelite Friars of Ely and dating it as early as 1450-1475). The poem is named from the first line, “Flen, flyys, and freris,” or “fleas, flies, and friars.” The line containing fuck is: “Non sunt in coeli, quia gxddbov xxkxzt pg ifmk.” The Latin phrase “Non sunt in coeli, quia,” means “they are not in heaven, since.” Then the encoded phrase “gxddbov xxkxzt pg ifmk” is translated by substituting the preceding letter in the alphabet, while being mindful that i was then used for both i and j, v was used for both u and v, and vv was used for w. In the end, this leaves “fvccant vvivys of heli.” The translated line reads: “They are not in heaven because they fuck the wives of Ely.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Fuck, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuck (last visited Jan. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Fuck Definition]; see also Dictionary.com, Fuck, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=fuck, (last visited Aug. 29, 2006) (word history).
25 See, e.g., Read, supra note 2, at 268; Stone, supra note 3, at 31. The line is: “Yit be his feiris he wald haue fukkit./Ye brek my hairt, my bony ane.” Fuck Definition, supra note 24.
26 The word “fucks” appears in the definition of fottere along with jape, sard, swive, and occupy. See Stone, supra note 3, at 31.
27 See Read, supra note 2, at 267-68; see also Jesse Sheidlower, Introduction to THE F-WORD, supra note 24, at xx, xxv (“Fuck is a word of Germanic origin.”); DOOLING, supra note 3, at 32 (noting probable German origin). According to Read, the Latin cognates are pungo (to prick) and pugil (boxer) which comes from the root pug- (to thrust). See Read, supra note 2, at 267-68. But see Stone, supra note 3, at 32 (noting Read’s etymology and that his “strong opinion about a unilateral etymology is stated somewhat arbitrarily, without documentation of intermediate sources”). Germanic origin, however, is also seen from an Indo-European etymology. See William Whallon, Wicked Cognates, in 12 MALEDICTA, at 25, 25 (Reinhold Aman ed., 1996) (explaining Indo-European etymology of fuck using Grimm’s Law).
however, has its critics. Another possible etymology is through the French foutre and Latin futuere, but there are similar doubts and an absence of lineage for this derivation as well. Possibly there is a hybrid derivation where foutre participated with ficken to produce fuck. Still other etymologies suggest a Celtic derivation. Of particular interest to the lawyer-lexicographer is the suggestion of an Egyptian root petcha (to copulate). During the last Egyptian dynasties, legal documents were sealed with the phrase, “As for him who shall disregard it, may he be fucked by a donkey.” The hieroglyphic for the phrase—two large erect penises—makes the message clear.

Understanding the etymology of fuck is hampered because the word did not appear in any widely-read English dictionary from 1795 to 1965. The exclusion of fuck from the leading dictionaries illustrates a deliberate attempt to cleanse the language of this word. There is no consensus if fuck was ever acceptable or precisely when it became considered offensive. However, by the late seventeenth century a deliberate purge emerges that becomes well entrenched by the eighteenth century. By the late eighteenth century most dictionaries of p in ancient Indo-European came to be pronounced /f/ by Germanic tribes as in Greek pod with English foot. The Indo-European g became pronounced /k/ as in Greek gonu and English knee. Through the Indo-European pug becomes fuck. Id.

28 According to Dr. Stone, the general trends of vowel sound change in English fail to account for the evolution of ficken to fuck. Stone, supra note 3, at 42; see also James M. Ogier, Sex and Violence in the Indo-European Languages, in 12 MALEDICTA, supra note 27, at 85, 86-88 (describing the relationship between fuck and ficken as spurious).

29 Fuck Definition, supra note 24 (noting the possible connection to futuere and foutre). Stephen Skinner’s 1671 Etymologicon Linguae Anglicanae is targeted as introducing etymological confusion with derivation through the French foutre ultimately to Greek. See Read, supra note 2, at 268-69 (noting and criticizing Skinner for “mistakenly trac[ing] the word through the French”).

30 See Sheidlower, supra note 27, at xxvi (“The relevance of structurally similar words in more distantly related languages (Latin futuere, for example), is unlikely.”); Stone, supra note 3, at 42 (expressing doubts concerning the vowel change); Fuck Definition, supra note 24 (“However, there is considerable doubt and no clear lineage for these derivations.”).

31 Stone, supra note 3, at 42 (describing the combination of foutre and ficken).

32 Fuck Definition, supra note 24.


35 Fuck Definition, supra note 24; see Read, supra note 2, at 268-74 (detailing the absence of fuck from dictionaries). The absence of old citations to fuck makes the etymology hard to trace. DOOLING, supra note 3, at 24.

36 DOOLING, supra note 3, at 18 (“Fuck was kept out of print and out of dictionaries for hundreds of years for being the dirtiest, filthiest, nastiest word in the English language.”).

37 Fuck Definition, supra note 24 (describing some evidence of acceptability as late as the seventeenth century and other evidence of vulgarity as early as the sixteenth century).

38 See Stone, supra note 3, at 31 (“The attack on obscene words in literature began even in Elizabethan times, and apparently increased in severity thereafter.”); Read, supra note 2, at 269 (describing the strong current against use of low terms which started in the Elizabethan period
were being produced for use in schools; *fuck* was excluded over concerns of corrupting young minds. Not surprisingly, when Samuel Johnson, Jr. published the first American dictionary in 1798, it omitted *fuck* in order to inspire modesty, delicacy, and chastity of language.40 Noah Webster’s crusade against vulgar words sealed *fuck*’s fate in America: exclusion from his dictionaries of 1806, 1807, 1817, 1828, and 1841.41 This Websterian tradition was carried back across the Atlantic when in 1898 the authoritative *Oxford English Dictionary (OED)* deliberately excluded *fuck*.42 Indeed, its first appearance in the *OED* was not until 1972 where the entry gives the guarded “ulterior etymology unknown.”43

Whatever its origins, *fuck*’s longevity in English is surprising given the condemnation and concerted efforts to stamp out its use that continued throughout the twentieth century. It’s hard for me to believe that *fuck* was barely tolerable in print until the 1960s.44 The saga to preserve access to D.H. Lawrence’s classic, *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*—a novel banned on three continents until victory over obscenity charges—illustrates this point.45 The print media continues to agonize over the appropriate use of the word today.46 Similarly, most English-speaking

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40 Id. at 272-73.
41 Id. at 273.
42 Id. at 274. On this score, Read is particularly critical and labels it a “lasting shame” that the editors would not be true to the scientific spirit of the project and “offset the remissness” of the earlier lexicographers. Id.
44 While Jesse Sheidlower recounts that the earliest openly printed use of *fuck* in the United States was in 1926, a published 1846 case from the Supreme Court of Missouri states, “The slanderous charge was carnal knowledge of a mare, and the word ‘fuck’ was used to convey the imputation.” Shapiro, *supra* note 23, at 370; see Sheidlower, *supra* note 27, at xxi-xxii (identifying first printed example of *fuck* in U.S. as 1926). Shapiro also notes the 1889 use of “mother——g” by the Texas Court of Appeals and the 1897 use of “mother-fucking” by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Shapiro, *supra* note 23, at 371.
45 *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* was originally published in Florence in 1928. Because of D.H. Lawrence’s use of *fuck*, it was banned in the United Kingdom until 1960 when publisher Penguin Books won an obscenity trial. In Australia, not only was the book banned, but even a book describing the British obscenity trial was banned. See Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lady_Chatterley%27s_Lover (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). In the United States, Grove Press published the book in 1959. After confiscation by the U.S. Post Office, the publisher successfully challenged the order and the Second Circuit held that the work was not obscene. *See Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry*, 276 F.2d 433, 439 (2d Cir. 1960).
countries still censor it on radio and television.\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Fuck}'s continued vitality is even more amazing when compared to the fate of its sixteenth century synonyms: \textit{jape} and \textit{sarde} are virtually unknown; Chaucer's \textit{swive} is archaic; and \textit{occupy} returns to English with a nonsexual meaning.\textsuperscript{48} Why then is \textit{fuck} so resilient?

\section*{B. Modern Usage}

\textit{Fuck} is a highly varied word. While its first English form was likely as a verb meaning to engage in heterosexual intercourse,\textsuperscript{49} \textit{fuck} now has various verb uses,\textsuperscript{50} not to mention utility as a noun, adjective, adverb, and interjection.\textsuperscript{51} Testimony to the varied nature of the word \textit{fuck} is Jesse Sheidlower’s dictionary, \textit{The F-Word}, the definitive source on its use.\textsuperscript{52} Now in its second edition, the reference book is devoted exclusively to uses of the word \textit{fuck} and now spans 272 pages with hundreds of entries from \textit{absofuckinglutely} to \textit{zipless fuck.}\textsuperscript{53}

Linguists studying \textit{fuck} identify two distinctive words. \textit{Fuck}\textsuperscript{1} means literally “to copulate.”\textsuperscript{54} It also encompasses figurative uses such as “to deceive.”\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Fuck}\textsuperscript{2}, however, has no intrinsic meaning at all. Rather, it is merely a word of offensive force that can be substituted in oaths for other swearwords or in maledictions.\textsuperscript{56} The fact that \textit{Fuck}\textsuperscript{2} can

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\textit{Nation Inside Politics, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at A05; cf. Moore, supra note 3, at 14 (describing newspapers’ struggles with printing the word). But see Sheidlower, supra note 27, at xx (contending that few publications still refuse to print \textit{fuck}).}
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\textsuperscript{48} See Stone, supra note 3, at 35 (summarizing the fate of the early synonyms of \textit{fuck}); see also supra note 26 (listing synonyms).

\textsuperscript{49} See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{50} See The F-WORD, supra note 24, at 117-33 (identifying fourteen different verb uses).

\textsuperscript{51} See id. at 105-12 (listing ten separate noun uses); id. at 116 (defining \textit{fuck} the adjective as “describing, depicting, or involving copulation; pornographic; erotic.—used before a noun”); id. at 141 (showing use as interjection); id. at 168-70 (noting adjective use of \textit{fucking}); id. at 171-72 (noting the adverbial use as “exceedingly; damned”).

\textsuperscript{52} See generally id. Jesse Sheidlower, who compiled the book, was the Principal Editor of the \textit{OED’s} North American Editorial Unit. See Shapiro, supra note 23, at 370.

\textsuperscript{53} For the curious, \textit{absofuckinglutely} is an adverb meaning absolutely; \textit{zipless fuck} is a noun meaning an act of intercourse without an emotional connection. See The F-WORD, supra note 24, at 1, 272.

\textsuperscript{54} See \textit{cf. Moore, supra note 3, at 14 (describing newspapers’ struggles with printing the word).}

\textsuperscript{55} Id. at 19-27.

\textsuperscript{56} See Alan Crozier, \textit{Beyond the Metaphor: Cursing and Swearing in Ulster, in 10 MALEDICTA 115, 122 (1988-89).}

\textsuperscript{57} Id.

\textsuperscript{58} Id. at 122-23. \textit{Fuck}\textsuperscript{2} as a distinct word also has various uses as a part of speech. It can be
be substituted for either God or hell illustrates the lack of any intrinsic meaning. This linguistic distinction is crucial. The legal treatment of fuck is inconsistent due in part to the lack of recognition of this linguistic difference.

Suffice it to say, fuck is everywhere. As author Roy Blount, Jr. puts it: “the f-word is a fact of life. It thrives.” One recent Internet search revealed that fuck “is a more commonly used word than mom, baseball, hot dogs, apple pie, and Chevrolet.” It is present in movies, television programs, and popular music. An Associated

used as a noun as in “you’re as lazy as fuck,” as a verb as in “I’m fucked if I know,” as an adjective as in “This engine’s fucked,” and as an adverb as in “You know fucking well what I mean.” Id. at 123.

57 Id. at 124.

58 See, e.g., text accompanying infra note 228.

59 Some commentators believe that “verbal satiation”—where a taboo word heard often enough loses its effect—is the fate of fuck. See, e.g., Hugh Kenner, What Ever Happened to Profanity?, NAT’L REV., Jan. 20, 1978, at 90, 91. The incidents described in the introduction of this Article and that of Lorrie Hensley, infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text, lead me to believe otherwise.

60 Roy Blount, Jr., Foreword to THE F-WORD, supra note 24, at xv. For more on Roy Blount, Jr., see his self-penned biography at Roy Blount Jr., http://www.royblountjr.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).


62 The use of fuck in R-rated movies intended for adult audiences is now common. It found exceptional use in SCARFACE (Universal Pictures 1983), BLUE VELVET (Metro Goldwyn Meyer 1986), and PULP FICTION (Miramax 1994). See History of the Word “Fuck,” supra note 47 (describing use of fuck in these films). The use of fuck is not limited to the dark side of cinema either. Hugh Grant repeatedly uttered fuck in the comedy FOUR WEDDINGS AND A FUNERAL (Gramercy Pictures 1994). See Moore, supra note 3 (noting Grant’s humorous use).

On November 10, 2006, producer/director Steve Anderson released his new documentary, FUCK (Mudflap Films 2006). The film examines the impact of the word fuck on our culture through interviews, film and television clips, music, and original animation. See Fuck: Four Letter Film, About the Film, http://www.fourletterfilm.com/film.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). Anderson describes the difficulty inherent in producing a film where its very title is subject to a negative reaction:

All along I’ve wanted to call the movie just simply “Fuck”, because that is what the film is about. It’s the center of the film. But just like the word itself, there’s been much debate about what reaction the title would get. It’s obvious that you couldn’t print the ads for a film entitled “Fuck” in newspapers like the LA Times or New York Times. Some newspapers like LA Weekly might print it. How does it go on a marquee at a festival? So my feeling is this: The title of the movie is “Fuck”. We’ll make a design with an asterisk or a symbol, but the distributors or whoever takes the film, they’ll have their own ideas. They might use an asterisk. They might use two asterisks. They might rename it for their purposes just like they do in the newspapers. But when you go to the theater and you see it onscreen, or when you see it on DVD, the name of the movie will be “Fuck”. So in an odd way that’s what the movie is all about; people’s reaction to this word, the reaction to the title. The debate we’ve had as filmmakers has reflected society’s debate about the word itself. Is it appropriate? Can we get away with it? Is it a good thing? Is it a bad thing? I think the discussion over the title of the film reflects exactly what the film is about, so I decided to stick with that.
Press poll conducted in March 2006 found that sixty-four percent of those surveyed used the word *fuck*. Our President reportedly uses it with aplomb. The Vice President embraces it as well. But if you wear a t-shirt printed with pictures of Bush, Cheney, and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice labeled “Meet the Fuckers,” intended as a parody of the popular comedy “Meet the Fockers,” get ready to be kicked off an airplane. *Fuck* remains a word “known by all and recognized by none.” To understand this dichotomy over “our worst word,” I turn to

Id. I certainly identify with Anderson’s sentiments. The decision to title this Article *FUCK* forced me to undertake the same type of assessment. I concluded, as did Anderson, that the title itself serves as a catalyst for the conversation on the force of word taboo.

Despite attempts at censorship, *fuck* pops up on television. See Robert S. Wachal, *Taboo or Not Taboo: That is the Question*, 77 AM. SPEECH 195, 204 (2002) (identifying “What the fuck was that?” as an ad lib on *Saturday Night Live* (NBC television broadcast Apr. 12, 1997) and the use of *fuck* the next week to explain the prior accidental use); Sheidlower, supra note 27, at xxi (describing use on “Saturday Night Live” and Grammy Awards show). Of course, when *fuck* is broadcast over television today, the offending stations can be subject to FCC fines. See infra Part IV.B.


*MEET THE FOCKERS* (Universal Pictures 2004) is the sequel to *MEET THE PARENTS* (Universal Pictures 2000). The running joke in both movies is the similarity between the protagonist’s last name “Focker” and *fucker*.

Such was the plight of Lorrie Heasley. In October 2005, she was flying Southwest Airlines from Los Angeles to Portland and wanted to give her Democratic parents a laugh by wearing the t-shirt. See Todd Murphy, *Clothes Call*, PORTLAND TRIB., Oct. 7, 2005, available at http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id=32068 (quoting Harbin); see also Michelle O’Donnell, *Passengers Check Your T-Shirt Before Boarding*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, § 4, at 14. Some passengers complained to the flight attendants who asked Heasley to change, turn the shirt inside out, or leave the plane at a stop in Reno, Nevada. On the promise of a refund, Heasley got off the plane, but Southwest Airlines reportedly reneged on the refund offer. Murphy, supra. Southwest spokesperson Beth Harbin explained: “We support free speech. But when it comes down to things that are patently offensive or threatening or profanity or just lewd then we do have to get involved in that.” Harbin claimed that Southwest’s contract of carriage specifies that passengers can be banned for wearing clothing that is “lewd, obscene or patently offensive.” Harbin punctuated the fear: “The basis for our concerns was the actual word used.”

Id.

the realm of psychoanalysts, linguists, and sociologists. The answer lies in taboo.

II. F**k As Taboo

Just as trying to piece together the etymology of f**k is hampered by its conscious exclusion from dictionaries, understanding taboo language is hindered by taboo itself. In other words, taboo speech is so taboo that it hasn’t been regarded as a legitimate topic for scholarship.\(^{71}\) Saying f**k is a cultural taboo; studying f**k is a scholarly taboo. This failure only serves to perpetuate and strengthen taboo within the culture. It’s therefore not surprising that a variety of labels exist for what one is studying when one focuses on the use of words like f**k: cursing, swearing, dirty words, profanity, obscenity, and the like.\(^{72}\) However, where meaningful distinctions have been developed, taboo is both central and common.\(^{73}\)

A. Understanding Word Taboo

In every culture, there are things that we’re not supposed to do and things we’re not supposed to say: taboo acts and taboo words.\(^{74}\) Sometimes there’s a correlation, such as Western society’s taboos relating to sex. While sex is not entirely forbidden, it is regulated by a set of conscious and unconscious rules; given the appropriate time, place, and person, sex is not taboo.\(^{75}\) Incest, however, is taboo—so is


\(^{72}\) See Sagarin, supra note 70, at 31 (“Tabooed words are today known as obscene language, dirty words, four-letter words, and by a variety of other names, some misleading, some complimentary.”); Jay, supra note 71, at 9 (defining cursing as the utterance of emotionally powerful, offensive words such as f**k); id. at 10 (linking lack of research to difficulty finding appropriate term for offensive speech); id. at 191 (noting that profanity is a special category of offensive speech that means to be secular or indifferent to religion as in Holy shit).

\(^{73}\) For example, swearing is defined as a type of language use in which the expression refers to something that is taboo in the culture; should not be interpreted literally; and can be used to express strong emotions. Lars Andersson & Peter Trudgill, Bad Language 53 (1990).

\(^{74}\) See Jay, supra note 71, at 193 (“Every culture has domains of thought that are taboo. Taboos are sanctions on thoughts and behaviors that a society finds too powerful, dangerous, or mysterious to consider openly.”). While it may be tempting to our modern minds, it is wrong to place taboo language solely within so-called primitive cultures. Cf. Read, supra note 2, at 266 (finding taboo language present among “savages”—Australian aborigines); Ariel Arango, Dirty Words: Psychoanalytic Insights 3-6 (1989) (stating that while all primitive societies have taboo words, “our own sophisticated, contemporary culture” has forbidden words too). Similarly, it would be error to think of taboo as a modern social construct. See Read, supra note 2, at 266 (stating verbal taboo is not the product of cultural refinement).

\(^{75}\) Andersson & Trudgill, supra note 73, at 55-56.
the word motherfucker.76

While some taboo acts have corresponding taboo words, others do not.77 Cannibalism is one of our taboo acts. However, there are no unprintable English words—taboo words—referring to cannibalism.78 There are also purely linguistic taboos. For example, Thai speakers in an English environment do not use certain Thai words because they sound like taboo English words, such as the Thai words fâg (sheath), fâg (to hatch), and phríg (chili pepper).79 Similarly, Thai speakers avoid English words, such as yet, that sound similar to taboo Thai words, such as jéd, a taboo Thai word for sexual intercourse.80

The Polynesian word taboo itself has two precisely opposite meanings: one that is “sacred or consecrated” and the other “impure, prohibited, dangerous, and disgusting.”81 Generally, taboo words fall into one of these two broad categories.82 Due to its sacred nature, the Hebrews would not say their word for God.83 For our Germanic ancestors, the names of fearsome animals were taboo. Their word for bear is unknown because it was never recorded.84 Similarly, in parts of West Africa, the word for snake is taboo. The reptile is referred to euphemistically as a stick or piece of rope.85 Taboo words relating to body functions are also commonplace—which leads us to fuck.

“In the entire language of proscribed words, from slang to profanity, from the mildly unclean to the utterly obscene, including terms relating to concealed parts of the body, to excretion and excrement as well as to sexuality, one word reigns supreme, unchallenged in its preeminence.”87 Fuck. Nobody really knows

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76 Id. at 55; see JAY, supra note 71, at 165 (“Sex is a taboo topic in many cultures, and words denoting sexual activity become taboo.”). Such a correlation doesn’t always make sense. As one commentator notes, this would be as if Prohibition banned not only the sale of whiskey, but the reading of the label as well. ARANGO, supra note 74, at 4.
77 ANDERSSON & TRUDGILL, supra note 73, at 57 (“It is tempting to look at this very simply and to suggest that, for every behavioral taboo, there will be a taboo word. However, this simple description seems to be false.”).
78 Id. at 58.
79 Id. at 57.
80 Id. at 58.
81 ARANGO, supra note 74, at 4. Freud was apparently the first to point out this duality in the definition of taboo. See DOOLING, supra note 3, at 41.
82 See Thomas Nunnally, Word Up, Word Down, NAT’L F., Spring 1995, at 36 (“All societies, it would seem, proscribe, or place a taboo upon, the unrestricted use of certain words, such as those relating to the sacred and to certain body functions and body parts.”).
83 DOOLING, supra note 3, at 43.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 ARANGO, supra note 74, at 9 (“Basically, we notice that dirty words always refer to parts of the body, secretions, or behavior patterns that arouse sexual desire.”).
87 SAGARIN, supra note 70, at 136. Sagarin’s prose is delightful: “It sits upon a throne, an absolute monarch, unafraid of any princely offspring still unborn, and by its subjects it is hated, feared, revered and loved, known by all and recognized by none.” Id. Richard Dooling also creates a vivid image of the offensiveness of fuck: “[T]he f-word plays upon our sensibilities like
whether *fuck* is taboo because it falls into the category of “sacred and consecrated” or “prohibited and disgusting.” Nonetheless, the fact that the earliest recorded use of the word from the fifteenth century was in code indicates that *fuck* has been taboo for a very long time.

**B. Psycholinguistics and *Fuck***

An understanding of *fuck* as taboo language begins with Columbia University English Professor Allen Walker Read’s groundbreaking work in 1934. Read combined both linguistic and psychoanalytic principles to understand the nature of obscenity in general and the taboo status of *fuck* in particular. He viewed obscenity as a symbolic construct: “obscenity lies not in words or things, but in attitudes that people have towards these words and things.” The deep psychological motivation for taboo, according to Read, “probably has its roots in the fear of the mysterious power of the sex impulse.” Because primitive man found that the force of passion could so disorder life, he hedged it with prohibitions. The taboo persists because there is an emotional reaction, or “fearful thrill,” that generates from speaking the forbidden word. If you use the word to insult someone or to feel the thrill of doing something that is forbidden, you are actually observing the taboo; this is often labeled as “inverted taboo.” Thus, the taboo word is perpetuated through both its use and nonuse.

It took twenty years before another psycholinguist, Dr. Leo Stone, returned to the study of *fuck*. With his inquiry, all the tools of psychoanalysis were brought to bear on the taboo word. To Stone, the application of psychoanalysis to *fuck* was natural: “Since language is the chief instrument of psycho-analysis, and sex a major field of its scientific and therapeutic interest, the investigation of an obscene word would seem a natural psycho-analytic undertaking . . . .” His 1954 article was in response to one patient’s persistent use of the word *fuck* during analysis sessions. Determined to better understand both his
patient’s use and the taboo status of *fuck*, Stone provides both an encyclopedic narrative of the history and etymology of *fuck* and his own theory explaining its use. Stone concluded that

> [b]ased on inferences from clinical observation, the opinion is established that the important and taboo English word ‘fuck’ bears at least an unconscious rhyme relation . . . to the word ‘suck’ within the framework of considerations that determine the general phenomenon of obscenity, including the anal emissive pleasure in speech."[^97]

Thus Stone “developed the preliminary idea that the rhyme with the word ‘suck’ might have been an important unconscious determinant in the linguistic fixation and taboo of our word in general usage . . . .”[^98]

Whether you are willing to fully embrace Read or Stone’s hypotheses or not, these early psycholinguists provide us with two keen insights. First, *fuck* persists not in spite of taboo, but because of it. As Read aptly put: “A word is obscene not because the thing named is obscene, but because the speaker or hearer regards it, owing to the interference of a taboo, with a sneaking, shame-faced, psychopathic attitude.”[^99] Having set aside the word *fuck* as an obscenity symbol, we work hard to maintain the sacredness of the symbol.[^100] This is done primarily by implanting the taboo in our children. Children are taught a language of discourse—“this is a cat” and “this is a tree.” However, they are not offered the words to describe sex.[^101] A split world remains: “a world of things with legitimate official names” and a world of silence—taboo.[^102]

The second contribution of the psycholinguists is that *fuck* is taboo because of our buried, subconscious feelings about sex. Read held this belief and more recent commentators, like Richard Dooling, concur:

> Perhaps, as Read suggests, we carefully and subconsciously gather all the indelicate and unseemly associations we have with the brute

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[^97]: Mary S., married, usually in sudden pauses of her free association, would state that there came to her mind, without affect or impulse, the phrase “I want to fuck the analyst.” This was usually entirely out of context, at first gave rise to mild conventional embarrassment, and later came to be reported with slight bored irritation as a sort of recrudescent mild nuisance.

[^98]: By paying deference to the early work of Stone, Richard Dooling criticizes both the ultimate conclusion that *fuck* and *suck* are related, as well as Stone’s potential naiveté concerning his patient’s proclivity to say “I want to fuck the analyst.” See Dooling, supra note 3, at 47-51.

[^99]: Read, supra note 2, at 277; see Dooling, supra note 3, at 45 (“It’s vulgar, that’s all, because we have made it so.”).

[^100]: Read, supra note 2, at 267.

[^101]: Arango, supra note 74, at 184-85; see Read supra note 2, at 266.

[^102]: Arango, supra note 74, at 185; see Sherman, supra note 15, at 19 (“If you were brought up in America, you no sooner learned the word fuck than you learned you were not allowed to use it.”). In this sense, what is taboo is out of the speaker’s control because taboo is culturally defined. JAY, supra note 71, at 153.
act of reproduction, incest, sex outside of marriage, sex without love, selfish sex, child sexual abuse, fatal venereal diseases—and assign them all to a single unspeakable word. When the word is uttered, it stirs up all these unconscious, unspeakable aspects of sexual congress, which we don’t like to think about because they threaten the social order in a terrifying way.\(^{103}\)

Even if you do not find Stone’s *fuck/suck* hypothesis compelling, the psychoanalytic link to sex he espouses is widely accepted. It finds expression in those researchers who explain *fuck*’s taboo status as a reflection of the Oedipus complex.\(^{104}\) According to Dr. Ariel Arango in his book *Dirty Words: Psychoanalytic Insights*, “the ‘dirty’ word, to *fuck*, always means, at root, to *fuck* one’s mother; to go back to her womb. Such is the universal Oedipus longing.”\(^{105}\) Everyday use of the word would awaken the “sleeping dogs” among fathers and sons. Therefore, a ban on the word *fuck* is essential to bury the universal incestuous desire.\(^{106}\)

The importance of psychoanalysis to an understanding of *fuck* is not to the exclusion of other disciplines. Etymologists provide us with a valuable historical account of usage and taboo.\(^{107}\) Linguists point out that the phonological pattern of consonant+vowel+hard consonant+consonant may explain why *fuck* survived while sixteenth century contemporaries like *swive* and *jape* did not.\(^{108}\) Sociologists note the cultural influences on offensive speech. For example, use of *fuck* may be appropriate for some contexts (like a dorm room) but not others (like the Dean’s office).\(^{109}\) Still other social scientists search for an integrated theory to explain *fuck*.\(^{110}\) Despite these contributions, psycholinguistics offers the fullest explanation of *fuck* as taboo, as well as an insight into how to counteract its effects.

C. Effects of Taboo

Word taboo is irrational.\(^{111}\) Consider the example of the West
African taboo against snakes. I suspect few among us, especially those with a genuine fear of them, would find it rational behavior to yell “rope” or “stick” when a snake approached. Such a practice is so far removed from our experience that we tend to even associate the concept of taboo with so-called primitive cultures. Similarly, it is one thing to ban certain acts; as a society we are probably better off. But to proscribe naming those same acts makes no sense. As Harvard psychology professor Steven Pinker states, “the psychology of taboo is incompatible with the ideal of scholarship, which is that any idea is worth thinking about, if only to determine whether it is wrong.” Yet that is precisely what we do.

Psycholinguistics provides the insight into the way we react to the taboo nature of fuck. Emerging from an unhealthy attitude about sex, fuck is an example of what Read calls a “word fetish.” The extreme emotional response to the word only serves to perpetuate negative attitudes toward sex. In the case of fuck, its taboo status is due to subconscious sexual fears—unhealthy feelings about sex that are reinforced and exacerbated by the continuing word taboo. The taboo is so strong many engage in individual self-censorship.

Some overzealous adherents of word taboo are not content to limit themselves to self-censorship. They want to extend their own sense of “good words” and “bad words” to limit the use of fuck by others—and not just the sexual meaning of Fuck. The fuck word fetish is so intense that all uses of the word, including nonsexual Fuck, are often targets of

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112 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing snake taboo).


114 In this context, consider NAMBLA, the North American Man/Boy Love Association. NAMBLA’s stated goal is “to end the extreme oppression of men and boys in mutually consensual relationships by: building understanding and support for such relationships [and] educating the general public on the benevolent nature of man/boy love . . . .” An Introduction to NAMBLA, Who We Are, http://216.220.97.17/welcome.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). Irrespective of my position on free speech, I see wisdom in criminalizing the act of child sexual abuse. However, NAMBLA and its members certainly have a protected speech right in providing factual information to “help educate society about the positive and beneficial nature of man/boy love.” Id.

115 Pinker, supra note 111.

116 See Allen Walker Read, Introduction to SAGARIN, supra note 70, at 9, 9-10 (1962).
The taboo effect is institutionalized when offensive language leads to legal prosecutions or censorship. An understanding of the intersection of *fuck* and the law must begin with an appreciation for our individual reactions to taboo.

There are those who actively support the taboo. This includes those who engage in individual self-censorship and refrain from saying *fuck* because of the taboo, as well as those who deliberately use *fuck* because of the emotional thrill it generates (inverted taboo). Other forms of deliberate silence can also abet the taboo. Even those of us with the tools to understand the taboo effect often capitulate. For example, teachers who avoid using shocking words in the classroom when the topic involves speech certainly perpetuate taboo, as well as shirk their pedagogical responsibilities. How can you teach the “Fuck the Draft” case without using the word? But there are those who do.

To be sure there are also those who consciously choose not to use the word *fuck* because they do not want to convey any of its meanings or the emotions that go with the word. This seems more a matter of diction than taboo. It is irrational, however, to want to convey one of *fuck*’s meanings and then choose not to because of word taboo. Enter euphemism.

A corollary of self-censorship is the use of euphemisms. The “f-word” surely is our most common *fuck* euphemism. Presumably, it allows the speaker to both communicate the precise word intended, while at the same time conforming to the cultural taboo. This just seems silly. Everyone versed in the English language immediately

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117 See discussion *infra* Part IV.B.2
118 Read, *supra* note 2, at 277.
119 See Levinson, *supra* note 1, at 1360 (noting pedagogical responsibility).
121 Professor Levinson recounts with disappointment an anecdote about a former student of his who, while teaching government to undergraduates at The University of Texas, taught Cohen using the f-word euphemism. Levinson, *supra* note 1, at 1384. If it is any consolation, my use of *fuck* in this piece alone will surely help restore balance to the use of the word in academia.

If one needs support for my “f-word is silly” argument, go no further than the recent oral argument before a panel of the Second Circuit in Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 06-1760ag (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2006) (oral argument). Carter Phillips, counsel for Fox Television, opened oral argument with the following statement:

In 2002, the renowned actress and singer, Cher, responded to her critics in a television show by saying “fuck em.” In 2003, Nicole Ritchie who is an actress commented on
knows that the f-word is fuck. In fact, if the meaning weren’t universal the euphemism wouldn’t work. So why would anyone choose “the f-word?” One possibility is that it allows the user to identify the word used without emoting the hostility that Fuck² often contains. However, such a quoting use would already make clear that the words were attributable to someone else. Any reasonable person wouldn’t hold the quoter accountable for the speaker’s emotions. Philip Thody offers another explanation in his book Don’t Do It: A Dictionary of the Forbidden: “By forbidding certain actions in which other people too readily indulge, we show that we are not as others are. By not using certain words, we show that we are a class above some of our fellows, as well as in a class apart.”¹²³ From this perspective, using the f-word instead of fuck doesn’t show that one is better mannered.¹²⁴ Rather, use of the euphemism is to differentiate class and reinforce a linguistic superiority over others. Those who give in to the pressure of taboo not only serve to reinforce it, but also empower the self-appointed guardians of speech to restrict fuck’s use by others.¹²⁵ I’m not talking about real “speech police” (the FCC), but ordinary citizens or private businesses that want to impose their version of what is appropriate speech on others. The complaining passengers, flight attendants, and Southwest officials who combined to eject the woman wearing the “Meet the Fuckers” t-shirt from her flight all create a classic example of moralists overstepping their bounds.¹²⁶

Popular music has also been a fertile ground for this type of vigilante censorship. The quintessential punk group the Sex Pistols felt

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¹²⁴ Being well-mannered is often described as not saying things in public that one wouldn’t say in front of the parents or grandparents. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 1384. This, of course, is merely another way of describing how taboo is passed from one generation to the next.
¹²⁵ See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (describing the incident). Almost daily, I encounter invisible others trying to control my use of language through email. The Eudora email program rates the use of fuck with its highest “three chili pepper” rating and a juvenile attempt at a humorous message: “Your message . . . is the sort of thing that might get your keyboard washed out with soap, if you get my drift. You might consider toning it down.” Still, the intent is to make me engage in self-censorship.
the censorship of others as record labels played “hot potato” with them over the lyrics to their songs in the late 1970s. In 1984, the Dicks released a 7" record (back in the days of vinyl) entitled “Peace?” that included the song “No Fuckin’ War.” However, the company that printed the record jacket was offended and blacked-out “Fuckin” from the cover leaving only “No _____ War.” Recently, some radio stations took self-censorship one more step by banning the pop group Black-Eyed Peas’ hit, “Don’t Phunk with my Heart,” apparently in an attempt to eliminate even euphemisms for fuck. The music industry’s concern over fuck in lyrics could also be due to fear of institutionalized taboo—government censorship.

Institutionalized taboo takes many forms. State anti-obscenity statutes, like the archaic one from Michigan used against Timothy Boomer, are examples. There are federal statutes, such as Title VII, designed for different purposes, that are being used to clean up workplace dialogue. There are even institutional organizations, like the FCC, that are used for censorship in this country. However, all of these manifestations of institutionalized taboo are empowered by our Supreme Court—a Court constrained by the effects of taboo. The resulting fuck jurisprudence is characterized by inconsistent treatment of fuck, unnecessary conflicts, and uncertainties.

127 Offensive band names were rare until the late 1970s and the Sex Pistols formed with the explicit goal to offend the public. Joe Salmons & Monica Macaulay, Offensive Rock Band Names: A Linguistic Taxonomy, in 10 MALEDICTA, supra note 54, at 81, 82.

128 See DICKS, No Fuckin’ War, on PEACE? (R Radical Records 1984). In their taxonomy of offensive alternative rock band names, Salmons and Macaulay classify the Dicks as a “taboo band name” in the category of Sex, subdivision Genitalia. See Salmons & Macaulay, supra note 127, at 91 (“In order to avoid even more censorship than they would already encounter, several bands have used asterisks for vowels in particularly taboo words (C*nts, Sic F*cks). Similarly, some taboo words occur with non-standard orthography (Scumfucks) and a few other groups have chosen euphemistic forms (FU’s, F-word).”). In the universe of taboo band names, “[n]otice the predominance of fuck over all other vulgarities.” Id.

129 Both the lyrics sheet and the label of the record include Fuckin’; only the jacket is censored. Ironically, fear of censorship by alternative rock bands can lead to self-censorship. See Salmons & Macaulay, supra note 127, at 91 (“In order to avoid even more censorship than they would already encounter, several bands have used asterisks for vowels in particularly taboo words (C*nts, Sic F*cks). Similarly, some taboo words occur with non-standard orthography (Scumfucks) and a few other groups have chosen euphemistic forms (FU’s, F-word).”). In the universe of taboo band names, “[n]otice the predominance of fuck over all other vulgarities.” Id.

130 See Thor Christensen, Hot Corner, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 16, 2005, at 12E (describing censorship of the song). The song was replaced by another version entitled “Don’t Mess with My Heart.” Id.

131 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.

132 See infra Part IV.C.

133 See infra Part IV.B.
IV. FUCK JURISPRUDENCE

A. The First Amendment: From Fighting Words to “Fuck the Draft”

The First Amendment may say that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, but of course it doesn’t really mean that. Whole categories of expression are carved out of protectable speech. Defamation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and incitement to violence are all types of speech that can be punished. Political speech cannot. In this dichotomous world of protected and unprotected speech, where does fuck fall? One commentator laments that a person “with four spare lifetimes and a burning desire to find out whether he may legally scream ‘Fuck!’ in a crowded theater will come away in confusion if he looks for his answer in the opinions of the United States Supreme Court.” To be sure, the Court’s categorical approach, compounded by fuck’s utility, makes the task complicated; but it’s doable. Generally, fuck is protected “offensive speech” straddling two pillars of unprotected speech—“fighting words” and “obscenity.”

In the regrettable 1942 decision, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court carved out of the First Amendment so-called “fighting words.” At issue was whether the states could punish a speaker for calling a city marshal offensive names such as “God damned racketeer” and “damned Fascist.” Noting that there has always been limited classes of unprotected speech, the Court described this universe as including “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Thus, the use of “threatening, profane, or obscene revilings” could be punished if it was likely to provoke a violent reaction. With rhetoric from the Court that lewd, profane, and insulting speech could be punished, fuck would appear in jeopardy.

Lucky for fuck, the Supreme Court hasn’t used Chaplinsky as a blunderbuss against taboo language. Instead, fighting words doctrine has been narrowed to require that the speech be a direct personal insult likely to provoke retaliation from the average person. Consequently,

134 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
136 DOOLING, supra note 3, at 57.
137 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
138 Id. at 569.
139 Id. at 572.
140 Id. at 573.
141 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (discarding fighting words doctrine because it was not personally directed in a provocative fashion); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
the Court protects speech and reverses convictions premised on the fighting words doctrine even when streams of dirty words are uttered in anger. You can call teachers “mother-fuckers” at a school board meeting. A mother can yell “god-damn—mother fucker police” as they arrest her son. And even though a Jehovah’s Witness can’t call the city marshal a “damned fascist,” a Black Panther can call the police “mother-fucking fascist pig cops.” While rulings like this seem to leave little of Chaplinsky intact, it has still never been overturned.

Obscenity is another First Amendment doctrine with a relationship to fuck and taboo. Long recognized as a category of unprotected speech, obscenity is hard to define. In the nineteenth century, American courts embraced the British standard that focused on the sexual nature of the material and its tendency to corrupt those susceptible to it such as youths. Such a standard reflects the taboo nature of sexual conduct and language prevalent at the time. Even in the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s definition of obscenity as “material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest” still has taboo at its core. One could legitimately write about sex, but characteristics such as “utterly without redeeming social importance” and tendency to “excite lustful thoughts” or “prurient interests” would still support an obscenity conviction. Justice Potter Stewart’s classic line—“I know it when I see it”—seems to sum up the definitional difficulty. Apparently, the Court didn’t see it very often from 1967 through 1973.
when it overturned thirty-two obscenity convictions without opinion.150

Finally in *Miller v. California*,151 the Court reaffirmed the unprotected nature of obscene material and articulated a now well-known three-part test that: (1) the average person, applying community standards, would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.152 This test, however, essentially guarantees that *fuck* is not legally obscene.153

Recall the linguists’ categorization of *Fuck*1 and *Fuck*2. Only *Fuck*1 relates to the act of sex.154 By defining obscenity as inherently relating to sexual conduct, any use of *Fuck*2—which has no intrinsic definition at all—cannot be obscene.155 Similarly, the figurative use of *Fuck*1 as to deceive would be outside of obscenity doctrine’s reach as well.156 Even if the term is used in a plainly sexual sense, the likelihood that the additional burdens of the *Miller* test, such as holistic review, community standards, and lack of value, could be met. While *fuck* may be commonly mislabeled as an “obscenity,” modern obscenity doctrine reinforces sexual taboo, but poses little threat to the use of the taboo word itself.

By far, the most important victory for breaking the word taboo comes in *Cohen v. California*157—the “Fuck the Draft” case—where the Court comes to terms with this four-letter word. In protest of the Vietnam War and the draft, Paul Cohen wore a jacket bearing the phrase “Fuck the Draft” while in the Los Angeles County Courthouse.158 Cohen didn’t threaten to or engage in violence or make any loud or unusual noises.159 All he did was walk through the corridor of a public building wearing the jacket.160 He was arrested, convicted, and

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152 Id. at 24.
153 See DOOLING, supra note 3, at 61 (“Because of the well-established ‘prurient’ requirement, foul language and profanity are almost never considered obscene . . . .”).
154 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. *But see* Blomquist, supra note 122, at 98 (claiming “all F-word usage has at least an implicit sexual meaning”). Blomquist’s statement, however, is inconsistent with his four-page discussion on varied use of *fuck* and the many examples provided with plainly nonsensual meanings. See id. at 70-74.
155 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
158 Id. at 16.
159 Id. at 16-17.
160 Interestingly, Cohen had no problem entering the courthouse wearing the jacket. Once in, he actually removed it and draped it over his arm. Only after a bailiff alerted a municipal court judge of Cohen’s jacket was Cohen arrested as he was leaving the building. See id. at 19 n.3; see
sentenced to thirty days in jail for violating a California statute prohibiting malicious and willful disruption of the peace by offensive conduct. The Supreme Court reversed holding "the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense."

To reach this result, the Court first found that Cohen’s use of *fuck* didn’t fall into other categories of proscribed speech. This was not a fighting words case because there was no direct, provocative personal insult. This was not an obscenity case either. “Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the State’s broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic.” There was nothing erotic with “Cohen’s crudely defaced jacket.” Nor was this a captive audience case. “Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.”

*Cohen* was about “punishing public utterance of this unseemly expletive.” To the Court, the stakes were high as our political system rests on the right to free expression. “To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. . . . That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.” Although alert to the divisiveness in the country, the Court would not allow discord to silence debate. With the elegant prose of Justice Harlan, *fuck* was protected: “For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”

While I speak of “the Court” as a monolithic oracle, the men who judged *fuck* in 1971 brought to the bench not only their vision of the First Amendment, but also their blind spot of taboo. They were not all of like mind on this case with four justices dissenting. Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Black, wrote “Cohen’s absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little speech.”

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*also* FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 n.25 (1978) (describing facts of *Cohen*).

161 *Cohen*, 403 U.S. at 16.

162 *Id.* at 26.

163 *Id.* at 20.

164 *Id.*

165 *Id.* The Court’s opportunity to fully explore the parameters of obscenity was still a couple of years away in *Miller*.

166 *Id.* at 21.

167 *Id.* at 23.

168 *Id.* at 24-25.

169 *Id.* at 25.

170 *Id.* at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun’s “*fuck* as conduct” argument is hard to
Blackmun further dissented due to an alternative construction of the California statute; Justice White concurred in this portion of the dissent. But thanks to Bob Woodward’s and Scott Armstrong’s inside account of the Supreme Court, The Brethren, we can witness the effect of word taboo on the high court’s five to four decision.

Ironically, Harlan originally called the Cohen case a “peewee,” while Black initially found the conviction so outrageous he supported summarily reversing without oral argument. It was Harlan’s opposition that led to oral argument and allowed for the most triumphant blow against word taboo imaginable. On February 22, 1971, Chief Justice Burger, obviously gripped by his own view of fuck as taboo, called the case for oral argument, but admonished petitioner’s counsel to keep it clean: “the Court is thoroughly familiar with the factual setting of this case and it will not be necessary for you . . . to dwell on the facts.” Paul Cohen’s lawyer, Professor Melville Nimmer, responded: “At Mr. Chief Justice’s suggestion, I certainly will keep very brief the statement of facts . . . What this young man did was to walk through a courthouse corridor . . . wearing a jacket on which were inscribed the words ‘Fuck the Draft.’” The Chief was irritated; the rest of the Court refused to say fuck, referring instead to “that word.” Nimmer was brilliant. In that tête-à-tête, Cohen won. If Nimmer had acquiesced to Burger’s word taboo, he would have conceded that there were places where fuck shouldn’t be said like the sanctified courthouse. The case would have been lost.

understand. He cites the troubling case of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949), which states that First Amendment protection doesn’t extend “to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” As Professor Volokh recently pointed out:

Likewise, uttering words that may cause a fight would also be constitutionally protected today, unless the words are specifically targeted at the offended party. This distinction in modern fighting words law between unprotected speech “directed to the person of the hearer (“Fuck you” said to a particular person) and protected speech said to the world at large (“Fuck the draft” said on a jacket) may be sound. But the Giboney principle that speech may be punishable when it carries out an illegal course of conduct doesn’t help justify that distinction.

Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1323 (2005). For those generally interested in the speech-as-conduct issue, Professor Volokh’s article provides not only a comprehensive summary of the law and commentary in this area, but also a warning that we should avoid the temptation of resorting to labels when confronted by troubling speech and its First Amendment implications. See id. at 1347-48.

171 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), id. at 28 (White, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 128.
174 Id. at 129.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See id. (recounting Nimmer’s thought that he would lose if he didn’t say fuck at least once); Levinson, supra note 1, at 1365-66 (explaining that making the concession would probably not
Woodward and Armstrong provide additional accounts of the Justices’ word taboo and the influence of taboo on their votes. Not surprisingly, Burger relied on euphemism and referred to the case as the “screw the draft” case; he voted to uphold Cohen’s conviction. Black—who had always been viewed in absolutist no-law-means-no-law First Amendment terms—said it was unacceptable conduct, not speech. Black’s clerks recount that it was word taboo that led to the about-face: “What if Elizabeth [his wife] were in that corridor. Why should she have to see that word?” Harlan, who had triumphed over his initial fears, now wanted to reverse the conviction: “I wouldn’t mind telling my wife, or your wife, or anyone’s wife about the slogan . . . .” With that, Harlan became the fifth vote of the new majority and was assigned the opinion. The Chief, however, never rose above the grip of taboo. When Harlan was to deliver the opinion in open court, Burger begged: “John, you’re not going to use ‘that word’ in delivering the opinion, are you? It would be the end of the Court if you use it, John.” Harlan laughed. The Chief waited. Harlan delivered the opinion—without saying fuck. Even in guaranteeing the right to say fuck, the word taboo was too strong for Justice Harlan.

One would think that is the end of it. The Supreme Court says you can say fuck. It’s not obscenity. Its use—without more—isn’t fighting words. But the taboo effect of a word like fuck isn’t going to be broken by a five to four vote. So, if you say fuck on television, in the workplace, or in the classroom, you had better hope that one of Nimmer’s disciples is available to take your case.

B. Fuck and the FCC

Despite the strong rhetoric in Cohen, it didn’t take long for the Supreme Court to create another category of lesser-protected speech to contain fuck—indecency. With the approval of administrative regulation of indecent speech, the Court elevates another player in the

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178 See Woodward & Armstrong, supra note 172, at 129-33; Levinson, supra note 1, at 1360-62.
179 Woodward & Armstrong, supra note 172, at 130.
180 Id. at 131.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 133.
183 Id.
184 The Court’s composition changed dramatically from Cohen in 1971 to Pacifica in 1978. Justice Harlan (the author of Cohen and its deciding vote), Justice Douglas (another Cohen majority vote), and Justice Black (of “no-law-means-no-law” fame) were all gone by 1978. They were replaced by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens—all part of the majority upholding FCC action against indecency in Pacifica.
censorship game, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). However, the FCC treats *fuck* inconsistently. The resulting arbitrariness of decision-making chills speech. FCC procedures compound concerns that new speech vigilantes are influencing the entire direction of broadcast discourse. With taboo language at issue, the concentration of power over words into the hands of speech zealots guarantees greater restriction. Simply ask comedian George Carlin.

1. *Pacifica* and a Pig in the Parlor

George Carlin’s now infamous monologue “Filthy Words” spawned indecent speech regulation in *FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.* At 2:00 pm on Tuesday, October 30, 1973, a New York City radio station played a recording of Carlin’s comedy routine about the seven “words you couldn’t say.” *Fuck* and *motherfucker* made his short list. One parent, who was driving with his son, heard the broadcast and wrote a letter complaining to the FCC. The complaint was forwarded to the radio station for a response. In its response, Pacifica defended the monologue as a program about contemporary society’s attitude toward language. Additionally, the station had advised listeners of the “sensitive language” to be broadcast. The FCC issued an order granting the complaint and holding that the station “could have been the subject of administrative sanctions.” Seizing upon its statutory authority to restrict “any obscene, indecent, or profane language,” the Commission characterized the Carlin monologue as “patently offensive,” though not obscene. As “indecent” speech, the Commission concluded it could regulate its use to protect children from exposure to such patently offensive terms relating to sexual or excretory

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186 Id. at 729-30.
187 The other five were: shit, piss, cunt, cocksucker, and tits. Id. at 751 (appendix containing transcript). There were originally only six dirty words when Carlin debuted the routine in Milwaukee, Wisconsin at a lakefront festival. On July 21, 1972, Carlin was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. The complaint alleged that Carlin used the following words (f*uck, f*cker, mother-f*cker, cock-sucker, asshole, and tits) while performing before a large gathering including minor children ranging from infancy to the upper teens. The complaint also alleged that Carlin used language tending to create or provoke a disturbance by stating “I’d like to f*ck every one of you people out there.” See Reinhold Aman, *George Carlin’s Milwaukee Six,* in 2 MALEDICTA 40, 40-41 (Reinhold Aman ed., 1978).
188 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30.
189 Id. at 730.
190 Id. (citation omitted).
191 Id. at 731. The Commission’s statutory authority provided at that time that “[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)).
activities and organs. This conclusion is a perfect example of institutional taboo.

The Supreme Court agreed holding that it was permissible for the FCC to impose sanctions on a licensee because the offensive language was indecent—that is, nonconforming with accepted standards of morality. The Court differentiated unprotected obscenity (requiring prurient appeal) from lesser-protected indecent speech. As the Court explains, the Carlin monologue was unquestionably speech within the meaning of the First Amendment; the FCC’s objection to it was unquestionably content based. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, even gets the rhetoric right: “But the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection.” While words like fuck “ordinarily lack literary, political, or scientific value, they are not entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment.

However, in the context of broadcasting, twin concerns of privacy and parenting trump the First Amendment. Patently offensive, indecent material broadcast “over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.” Additionally, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. “Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant.” Consequently, the Commission’s special treatment for indecent broadcasting was reasonable under the circumstances. “We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.”

The Court’s justification for regulation of indecent speech is transparent—word taboo. The Court, through the FCC, imposes its own notions of propriety on the rest of us. The dissenters recognized the inconsistency with Cohen immediately. The privacy interests within

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192 *Pacifica*, 438 U.S. at 732.
193 *See id.* at 739-40. In an attempt to keep the Supreme Court’s courtroom clean, Chief Justice Burger told counsel for the Commission at oral argument that he need not lay out the specific language at issue as the Chief did to Nimmer in *Cohen*. This time it worked because it was precisely the position of the FCC that the words were socially unacceptable and needed to be restricted. *See Levinson, supra* note 1, at 1365.
194 *Pacifica*, 438 U.S. at 740.
195 *Id.* at 744.
196 *Id.* at 745.
197 *Id.* at 746.
198 *Id.* at 748.
199 *Id.* at 749.
200 *Id.* at 750-51.
201 *Id.* at 764. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent joined by Justice Marshall. *Id.* at 762. Justice Stewart also dissented and was joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. *Id.* at 777.
your home are not infringed when one turns on a public medium, like the radio. Instead, this is an action to take part in public discourse by listening. The voluntary act of admitting the broadcast into your own home, and inadvertently confronting Carlin saying fuck, is no different from walking through the courthouse corridor and seeing Cohen wearing Fuck. Just as you can avert your eyes from the offensive jacket, you can hit the off button on the radio.

What of the potential presence of children rationale? The interests of the “unoffended minority” who want to hear the dirty words are ignored in favor of majoritarian tastes. Justice Brennan clearly understood the folly of this. He notes that parents, not the government, have the right to decide what their children should hear. “As surprising as it may be to individual Members of this Court, some parents may actually find Mr. Carlin’s unabashed attitude towards the seven ‘dirty words’ healthy, and deem it desirable to expose their children to the manner in which Mr. Carlin defuses the taboo surrounding the words.”

FCC censorship protects neither privacy nor parental rights while sacrificing First Amendment rights. As Brennan reminds us, even though a pig may be in the parlor, you don’t have to burn down the house to roast it.

2. Powell, Profanity, and the New Speech Vigilantes

Following Pacifica and the Supreme Court’s abdication of indecency to the FCC, the Commission has tried to keep our parlors “swine-free” for over thirty years. However, the inherent problem of proscribing speech based on its content, the Commission’s inconsistent rulings, the resilience of broadcast personalities, and the rise of new forms of media, all contribute to the FCC’s inability to eradicate indecency. The speech vigilantes are still at it though—armed with new weapons to extinguish fuck.

With the so-called shock jocks of morning radio trending toward more explicit programming, the FCC released a revised Policy

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202 Id. at 764-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 765.
204 Id. at 767.
205 Id. at 770. This is certainly the parenting approach I have taken in raising my daughter with no cataclysmic effects.
206 Id. at 766 (citing a similar metaphor drawn by Justice Stevens in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
Statement on Indecency in 2001. The Policy Statement retains FCC regulatory basics such as: the safe harbor period from 10:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M., concern for children, and empowering parental supervision over them. The Policy Statement also articulates a two-part test to define indecent broadcasting. First, the material must relate to sexual or excretory organs or activities. If so, then the FCC determines if the material is patently offensive as measured by community standards for the broadcast medium. The subjectivity involved in applying a standard made up of vague terms that are in turn defined by equally vague terms certainly chills speech. Moreover, the process is subject to manipulation by a vocal minority that can fashion a community standard for the broadcast medium that doesn’t reflect the true measure of tolerance for taboo language.

You only need to look at two recent examples of television broadcasting of the word fuck to appreciate the problems of FCC indecency regulation—Bono at the Golden Globe Awards and Tom Hanks at Normandy. The poster child for subjectivity of the FCC and fuck incidents is U2’s lead singer Bono. During the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, Bono accepted the award for Best Original Song in a Motion Picture with excitement: “This is really, really fucking brilliant.”

209 Id. at 3.
210 Id. at 4.
211 Id.
212 Professor Calvert squarely identifies this basic principle: the vaguer the definition, the greater the government censorship. See Calvert, supra note 207, at 347-49; see also Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Free Speech and the Right to Offend: Old Wars, New Battles, Different Media, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 671, 701 (2002) (stating vague terms such as “indecency” and “offensive” chill free expression).
213 Because the FCC pegs indecency to a contemporary community standard, it often uses the number of citizen complaints against a broadcast as a strong indicator that the contemporary community standard was breached by indecent material. If a well-funded pro-censorship group, like the Parents Television Council, churns the numbers of complaints both the community standard and speech regulation are not truly representative. For example, in an FCC action against Fox in 2004 based upon an episode of “Married by America,” the FCC specifically noted 159 complaints against a single episode. This large number, however, actually turned out to be only ninety because duplicates were sent to multiple staff members. All but four of the ninety were identical. Only one complaint mentioned actually seeing the program. The vast remainder of the ninety was generated by a PTC email campaign. See Calvert, supra note 207, at 332-33. In 2004, FCC Chairman Michael Powell publicly justified increased indecency enforcement due to growing concerns expressed by the large numbers of complaints filed. See Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 3717 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-243802A2.pdf.
214 The song was “The Hands That Built America.” The film was GANGS OF NEW YORK (Miramax Films 2002).
The statement was delivered live on the East Coast, but was bleeped later on the West Coast. Initially, there were few complaints to the FCC. Of the 234 total complaints received, 217 were part of an organized campaign launched by the Parents Television Council (PTC). FCC Enforcement Bureau Chief David Solomon issued a decision of no liability on the part of the broadcasters because the Policy Statement, as a threshold matter, requires indecent speech to describe sexual or excretory organs or activities. Solomon concluded that Bono used fucking as an adjective. His use did not describe sex or excretory matters, but was a use of Fuck having no intrinsic definition at all. Moreover, a fleeting use of fuck—even if intended in a sexual way—was considered nonactionable under FCC precedent.

Despite the reasonableness of Solomon’s decision, special interest groups like the PTC lobbied the Commissioners to reverse the opinion and cleanse the airwaves of this type of taboo language. The PTC quickly had the ear of FCC Chairman Michael Powell. Powell made repeated public statements that fuck was coarse, abhorrent, and profane. On March 18, 2004—over a year after the incident—the

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217 Id.; see Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19,859 (2003) [hereinafter Golden Globe I] (memorandum opinion and order). The PTC is a perfect example of the way word taboo is perpetuated. The group’s own irrational word fetish—which they try to then impose on others—fuels unhealthy attitudes toward sex that then furthers the taboo status of the word. See supra notes 125-130 and accompanying text (describing this taboo effect). The PTC has even created a pull-down, web-based form that allows people to file an instant complaint with the FCC about specific broadcasts, apparently without regard to whether you actually saw the program or not. FCC Indecency Complaint Form, https://www.parentstv.org/ptc/action/sweeps/main.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) (allowing instant complaints to be filed against episodes of NCIS (CBS television broadcast Oct. 25, 2005), Family Guy (FOX television broadcast Nov. 6, 2005) and/or The Vibe Awards (UPN television broadcast Nov. 15, 2005). This squeaky wheel of a special interest group literally dominates FCC complaints. Consider this data. In 2003, the PTC was responsible for filing 99.86% of all indecency complaints. In 2004, the figure was up to 99.9%. Calvert, supra note 207, at 330.
218 See Golden Globe I, supra note 217, at 19,860-61, ¶ 5.
219 Solomon’s characterization of Bono’s use of fucking as an adjective may not be right. Grammarians with a more careful eye might label this use as that of an adverb, that is, as a word used to modify an adjective, verb, or another adverb. Regardless of how you classify the part of speech, the use was clearly not sexual.
220 Id.; see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (describing Fuck¹ and Fuck²).
223 See, e.g., Susan Crabtree, You Say It, You Pay, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 15, 2004, at 8.
Commission granted the PTC’s application for review and concluded that Bono’s use of *fucking* was not only indecent, but also profane.\(^{224}\) In reaching both conclusions, the Commissioners reversed former FCC determinations further mucking up indecency law.

In order to find Bono’s statement indecent, the Commissioners had to find that the phrase “really *fucking* brilliant” both described sexual activities and was patently offensive.\(^{225}\) On both these elements, the Commissioners do an about-face from previous FCC rulings. First, they find that any use of the word *fuck* is *per se* sexual: “[W]e believe that, given the core meaning of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or a variation, in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls within the first prong of our indecency definition.”\(^{226}\) This conclusion is—of course—*per se* wrong. Given the research by linguists distinguishing between *Fuck*\(^1\) and *Fuck*\(^2\), the conclusion that the sentence—This is really, really *fucking* brilliant—“depict[s] or describe[s] sexual activities”\(^{227}\) is simply not credible.\(^{228}\) It does, however, reflect psycholinguists’ contention that the taboo status of *fuck* is linked at a subconscious level to buried feelings about sex, regardless of how the word is actually used.\(^{229}\)

Nonetheless, having cleared the first part of their own definition of indecency, the Commissioners turned to the second part of indecency and to a finding that based on three factors, the use of *fucking* was patently offensive.\(^{230}\) First, the description was “explicit or graphic” (quoting Michael Powell: “I personally believe that it is abhorrent to use profanity at a time when we are very likely to know that children are watching TV’ . . . ‘it is irresponsible for our programmers to continue to try to push the envelope on a reasonable set of policies that try to legitimately balance the interests of the First Amendment with a need to protect our kids.’”); Levinson, supra note 1, at 1383 (according to Powell, “if the F-word isn’t profane, I don’t know what word in the English language is”).


\(^{225}\) Id. at 4977, ¶ 6.

\(^{226}\) Id. at 4978, ¶ 8.

\(^{227}\) Id.

\(^{228}\) See *supra* notes 54-58 and accompanying text (describing *Fuck*\(^1\) and *Fuck*\(^2\)). When courts have faced the identical question as to the use of *fuck*, they have little difficulty discerning the patently nonsexual meaning of *fuck*. See, e.g., *supra* note 15 (describing Judge Pearson’s explanation of the “Fuck Michigan” bumper sticker). In a recent blog posting, Eugene Volokh also argues that a state statute targeting obscene and patently offensive bumper stickers could not be applied to *fuck* where its use is nonsexual (as in *Fuck Bush or Fuck You*) and where the statute defines both obscene and patently offensive in terms of sexual conduct. See *Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, Offensive Bumper Stickers—and Seemingly More Legal Error on the Part of Law Enforcement, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2006_04_16-2006_04_22.shtml* (Apr. 19, 2006, 13:47).

\(^{229}\) See *supra* notes 103-106 and accompanying text (explaining psycholinguists’ position that *fuck* is taboo because of subconscious feelings about sex).

\(^{230}\) Three principal factors govern a finding of patent offensiveness: (1) the explicit or graphic nature of the description or depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells or repeats at length description or depiction; and (3) whether the material appears
apparently by the Commissioners’ fiat: “The ‘F-Word’ is one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language.”\textsuperscript{231} How Chairman Powell can say this when Justice Harlan said the opposite in Cohen is nothing short of amazing.\textsuperscript{232} Such a conclusion is also at odds with the Fuck\textsuperscript{1} and Fuck\textsuperscript{2} distinction since most use of fuck—including Bono’s—was patently nonsexual.

But there was no need for wordsmithing on the second factor, whether the use was repeated. The Commission simply reversed itself: “While prior Commission and staff action have indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ such as that here are not indecent or would not be acted upon, consistent with our decision today we conclude that any such interpretation is no longer good law.”\textsuperscript{233} Having eviscerated its own law of indecency, the FCC finding that the use of fucking was “shocking”—the final element of patent offensiveness—is not.\textsuperscript{234}

The permanent damage inflicted to the already shaky foundation of indecency law remains to be seen. Whatever its reach, the Commissioners were so determined to stop people from saying fuck on TV that they applied a whole new, independent ground for punishment—profanity.\textsuperscript{235} This misapplication is inconsistent with our understanding of both language and law. According to linguistics, profanity is a special category of offensive speech that means to be secular or indifferent to religion as in “Holy shit,” “God damned,” or “Jesus Christ!”\textsuperscript{236} The Commissioners even recognized that their own “limited case law on profane speech has focused on what is profane in the context of blasphemy.”\textsuperscript{237} Nonetheless, the Commissioners found

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\textsuperscript{231} Id. at 4979, ¶ 9.

\textsuperscript{232} See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“[I]t is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”); see also text accompanying note 169.

\textsuperscript{233} Golden Globe II, supra note 224, at 4980, ¶ 12. This is also a departure from the Court’s Pacifica holding that was limited to the Carlin monologue as broadcast. In describing the characteristics and limitations of “as broadcast,” the Court turned to the Commission’s Pacifica order.

\textsuperscript{234} Golden Globe II, supra note 224, at 4979, ¶ 9.

\textsuperscript{235} See id. at 4981-82, ¶¶ 14-16.

\textsuperscript{236} See JAY, supra note 71, at 191; Levinson, supra note 1, at 1389.

\textsuperscript{237} Golden Globe II, supra note 224, at 4981, ¶ 14; see also Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell, id. at 4988 (noting this was the first time the profanity section was applied to fuck and
fuck profane on the strength of common knowledge that profanity means “vulgar, irreverent, or coarse language”238 and the Seventh Circuit’s “most recent decision defining ‘profane,’” a 1972 pre-Pacifica case.239 Luckily, the Commissioners threw in the last definition of profane from Black’s Law Dictionary or one might have thought they were stretching.240 While there are many definitions for profane, including the Commissioners’ choice, the decision to make a 180 degree turn from the Commission’s own prior treatment of profanity as blasphemy is unwarranted on such a slim collection of authority. From now on, however, broadcasters are on notice that fuck is also profanity—at least between 6:00A.M. and 10:00 P.M.241

There you have it. Word taboo drives the FCC’s final conclusion that Bono’s single use of the phrase “really fucking brilliant” is indecent because any use of fuck is per se sexual and patently offensive; it is patently offensive because it is per se vulgar and shocking. It is also profane because it is vulgar and coarse. Luckily, the broadcasters, while subject to an enforcement action, escaped a penalty because of a lack of notice.242 But there is nothing fortunate about what is really going on here. To enforce their preference, the Commissioners engage in bizarre word-play. “Indecent,” “patently offensive,” “vulgar,” and “profane” are loosely defined in an interlocking fashion that blurs any real distinction except the obvious one.243 The Commissioners censor

stating that “today’s decision clearly departs from past precedent”); Statement of Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy, id. at 4989 (“Rather, ‘profane language’ has historically been interpreted in a legal sense to be blasphemy.”). Because taboo has largely restricted scholarly treatment of these issues, confusion around the sub-categories is bound to happen. See, e.g., Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, Profanities on Bumper Stickers, http://volokh.com/posts/1143534242.shtml (Mar. 28, 2006, 2:24) (placing shit in the profane as opposed to lewd category of speech when commenting on Atlanta woman being ticketed for “BUSHit” sticker on her car).

238 Id. at 4981, ¶ 13.

239 See Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972) (“‘Profane’ is, of course, capable of an overbroad interpretation encompassing protected speech, but it is also construable as denoting certain of those personally reviling epithets naturally tending to provoke violent resentment or denoting language which under contemporary community standards is so grossly offensive to members of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.”). That the Commissioners were compelled to dig up this stale definition of profane based on nuisance and offer it as authority is nothing short of amazing.

240 See Golden Globe II, supra note 224, at 4981 n.34, ¶ 13 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (6th ed. 1990) definition of profane). Legitimate concerns about lack of fair notice could make the FCC’s new profanity definition subject to void-for-vagueness challenges. See Calvert, supra note 207, at 348.

241 Golden Globe II, supra note 224, at 4981, ¶ 14. Professor Levinson kindly refers to the miscategorization of fuck as “profane” as a “mistake.” See Levinson, supra note 1, at 1389. Professor Calvert finds it symptomatic of our broader culture wars and political opportunism. See Calvert, supra note 222, at 75-85.

242 Golden Globe II, supra note 224, at 4981-82, ¶ 15.

243 See Michael Botein, FCC’s Crackdown on Broadcast Indecency, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13, 2005, at 4 (describing the FCC’s penchant for piling one inference upon another to imply indecency). With profanity in particular, there is also the danger that the category will sweep more broadly
fuck because it’s a word that they don’t like to hear. That is, unless it’s in a good movie or on cable.

Compare Golden Globe II with the Commissioners’ recent treatment of fuck in Saving Private Ryan to see the arbitrariness in their decision-making and the chilling effect it generates. On November 11, 2004, the ABC Television Network decided to air the award-winning World War II film as a special Veterans Day presentation. The movie’s realistic re-creation of a military mission to rescue a young soldier included violent visuals and many taboo words such as fuck. In the wake of the Commission’s reversal on fuck’s treatment at the Golden Globe Awards, sixty-six ABC affiliates refused to broadcast the film because of the chilling effect of potential FCC penalties.

As expected, following the broadcast the American Family Association and others filed complaints with the FCC about the repeated use of fuck in the film. This should have been a no-brainer given the Commissioners’ treatment of Bono’s fucking slip less than a year before. Applying Golden Globe II, the FCC found the complained-of use of fuck in Saving Private Ryan to be per se sexual and therefore within the scope of indecency regulation. Fuck as used in the film was also patently offensive because (1) it was per se explicit and graphic (once again because the Commissioners say so) and (2) fuck was used repeatedly. However, the opinion “saves” Private Ryan from censorship because its use of fuck did not pander, titillate, or

\[\text{244 Ibid. at 4508-09, ¶4;}\]
\[\text{245 See id. at 4508-09, ¶4; Botein, supra note 243 (noting confusion from FCC decisions as the reason the sixty-six ABA affiliates decided not to show the movie); Calvert, supra note 207, at 350 (noting fear of fines and puritanical media environment as reason for dropping the film). Who could blame them? With the Commissioners’ conclusion in Golden Globe II that any use of fuck was inherently descriptive of sexual activities and patently offensive as vulgar and shocking language, airing the film with its repeated use of fuck and other taboo words would literally be taunting the FCC to fine them.}\]
reflect shock value. Rather, the expletives uttered by these actor/soldiers were in the context of realistic reflections of their reactions to unspeakable conditions and peril—or so said the Commissioners. Compelled to distinguish, the Commissioners wrote that the context of Bono’s utterance of the word "fucking" during a live awards show was shocking, while the same language—only more of it—in Saving Private Ryan was not.

This position is indefensible. The “shock” factor of the patent offensiveness inquiry is already the most subjective of the indecency elements and bound to yield differences of opinion. Each of us who hears the word "fuck" come out of a television or radio is either shocked or not shocked. It shouldn’t matter whether "fuck" is said by an activist or an actor, rock star or soldier, Grammy or Oscar winner, Bono or Tom Hanks. And it shouldn’t matter whether it’s said on an awards show or in a war movie—"fuck" should be treated the same. Otherwise, it’s the five FCC Commissioners, imposing their personal tastes and preferences, proclaiming when "fuck" has value and can be heard, and when it doesn’t and is banned. This type of arbitrary process is subject to abuse and should not be applied to protected speech.

If neither the type of speaker nor the type of programming justifies the Commissioners’ distinction, are there other potentially viable rationales for treating the same words differently? One possibility might be the source of the words. Is the speaker using the word "fuck" directly by personal choice or is it an indirect, quoting use of the word? While that is a factual distinction between Bono’s direct use of "fucking" and Tom Hanks’ indirect use of "fuck" read from a script, basing a regulatory policy on this difference is unsound. In the context of the FCC issuing fines against the broadcast of indecent language that must be paid by the station, it is not rational to punish a station for Bono’s outburst over which it had no control, yet not punish the station that has total control over whether to broadcast Saving Private Ryan.

The FCC’s renewed interest in "fuck" illustrated by Golden Globe II and Saving Private Ryan also illuminates the structural problems of speech regulation. A single informal complaint—even one without

251 See id. at 4512-13, ¶¶ 13-14.
252 Id. at 4514, ¶ 18; see Botein, supra note 243 (describing FCC’s vague rationale).
253 See Jacob T. Rigney, Avoiding Slim Reasoning and Shady Results: A Proposal for Indecency and Obscenity Regulation in Radio and Broadcast Television, 55 Fed. Comm. L.J. 297, 324 (2003) (describing how the third offensiveness factor on pander, titillate, and shock is the most subjective of all).
254 I think the answer here is “not.” As others have noted, “common discourse in our society, for better or worse, has moved far beyond what the FCC indecency standard appears to require for television and radio.” Garziglia & Caldwell, supra note 207.
255 The arbitrariness of Saving Private Ryan only serves to further chill speech by increasing uncertainty as to when taboo language can be used. See id.
supporting documentation—triggers the process. After forwarding the complaint to the broadcaster for response, the FCC then decides the indecency case without formal pleadings or hearings, based upon non-record evidence. Because there is no hearing requirement when the FCC imposes a fine, it can simply issue a notice of apparent liability; the broadcaster must either pay it or refuse to obey triggering the Justice Department to file a civil suit to collect the fine. Given the explosion of complaints that have been lodged in recent years, the litigation option is unattractive to both the FCC and broadcasters.

Increasingly, the FCC relies on consent decrees with broadcasters after issuing a notice of apparent liability. However, if the Commissioners don’t like the results, as in Golden Globe I, they can rehear the matter and reverse—along with long-standing procedural precedents such as the fleeting utterance and live utterance doctrines, and justified reliance on previous staff precedents. The long, expensive, and arbitrary process pressures broadcasters to settle rather than defend speech. When the only potential defenders of fuck and free speech engage in self-censorship, the intended balancing of speech interests erodes. This is magnified by the rise of special interest groups with word fetish and web platforms to make instant filing of documented complaints quick and easy, allowing a small minority to impose their speech preferences on the rest of us.

There is also a glaring underinclusiveness with any attempt at speech regulation by the FCC. Its indecency regulations only apply to

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256 See Botein, supra note 243 (describing the simplicity of the process and the post-2004 elimination of documentation requirement).

257 See id. (“[I]n many situations [the FCC] simply relies upon the complaint—usually without a tape or transcript—and finds the material indecent or not, and enters an order.”).

258 Id.

259 The FCC received only 111 total indecency complaints in 2000 and a slightly higher 346 complaints in 2001. Then there was a dramatic upsurge in 2002 (13,922), 2003 (202,032) and in 2004 an amazing 1,068,802 complaints. Calvert, supra note 207, at 329.

260 See Botein, supra note 243.

261 See id. (describing recent erosion of recognized defenses); Golden Globe II, supra note 224, at 4980, ¶ 12 (fleeting and live utterances), id. at 2981-82 & n.40, ¶ 15 & n.40 (profanity precedents).

262 Calvert, supra note 222, at 65 (“Broadcasters also may be more willing to rapidly settle disputes with the FCC over alleged instances of indecent broadcasts rather than contest and fight the charges in the name of the First Amendment’s protection of free speech.”); see Calvert, supra note 207, at 352-53 (describing Viacom’s capitulation to a $3.5 million dollar consent decree rather than fight the dispute for free speech); Botein, supra note 243 (noting settlement pressure).


264 See Calvert, supra note 207, at 328-35 (discussing at length the power of a vocal minority to flood the FCC with indecency complaints).
The rise of cable television and satellite radio provide attractive alternatives to broadcast personalities like Howard Stern who want to be free of FCC harassment. Given the dramatic number of new subscriptions to Sirius Satellite Radio—Stern’s new media host—the FCC’s preoccupation with *fuck* is out of step with the perceptions of millions of Americans. In fact, commentary by the Commissioners themselves identifying increased media tolerance of taboo words as justification for increased FCC vigilance further demonstrates that the Commission is out of touch: most people are simply not shocked by *fuck* anymore. The Commissioners, however, reject any allegation that they use contemporary community standards that merely reflect their own subjective tastes. Rather, they rely on their “collective experience and knowledge, developed through constant interaction with lawmakers, courts, broadcasters, public interest groups, and ordinary citizens.” Given contemporary usage and acceptance of *fuck*, one wonders to whom the Commissioners are talking.

Even as the FCC continues to defend its censorship based on Pacifica’s twin rationales—the special importance of broadcast media (especially television) and child protection—a more realistic picture of the broadcast landscape undermines this rationalization. In 2003, 98.2% of households had at least one television. A commanding 86% of households with a television subscribed to cable or satellite

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265 See Garziglia & Caldwell, supra note 207, at 54 (noting that competing media like cable, satellite, and Internet are not subject to indecency regulation); *see also* Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).

266 Stern reportedly left broadcasting subject to regulation for the new satellite radio domain to escape the FCC. *See* Calvert, supra note 207, at 357. The existence of these media alternatives may also contribute to the rise in *fuck* use. University of Colorado Professor Lynn Schofield Clark argues that “in an era when many Americans receive all TV programming via cable, the wider latitude enjoyed by cable TV channels has ‘put pressure’ on broadcast channels, contributing to the word’s spread.” Don Aucoin, *Curses! ‘The Big One’ Once Taboo, The Ultimate Swear is Everywhere, and Losing its Power to Shock*, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 2004, at B13. Media flight, however, is the ultimate self-censorship.


269 Professor Lynn Schofield Clark contends, “It is becoming more common in everyday conversation.” Aucoin, supra note 266. Other commentators on American culture agree. Lance Morrow contends that it is possible for *fuck* to become permissible. The article quotes Morrow as saying, “I think that might happen . . . . Somehow the whole sociology of [fuck] has changed.” *Id.*


service.\textsuperscript{272} That leaves only 14% of households relying on broadcast media alone.\textsuperscript{273} This data certainly suggests the dwindling importance of broadcast-only format to the media milieu.

A similar trend erodes the notion that all parents want is a little help from the government in protecting their kids. The V-chip innovation and television rating system, while far from perfect, offer tools for parents to use if they have concern over exposure to harsh language.\textsuperscript{274} I suspect the number of parents truly belaboring this issue is rather small given that 68% of children aged eight to eighteen have a television in their own bedroom.\textsuperscript{275} Surely a parent overly concerned about taboo language would educate themselves about the current technological tools available before putting a television in Junior’s room—the most difficult place to monitor and control.\textsuperscript{276} They also have another self-help remedy—simply remove the set.

The new speech vigilantism reflected in the FCC’s recent treatment of fuck also finds friends in Congress. After the Bono fuck incident and initial Bureau opinion, Congressmen Doug Ose\textsuperscript{277} (R-Cal.) and Lamar Smith (R-Tex.) introduced a bill that would define as profane, and give authority to the FCC to punish, any use of the words shit, piss, fuck, cunt, and asshole, and “phrases” cock sucker, mother fucker, and ass hole.\textsuperscript{278} While this bill never emerged from committee, the FCC apparently decided to seize this power anyway—at least over fuck and

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\item[\textsuperscript{273}] Id. at 2505, ¶ 12.
\item[\textsuperscript{276}] I also don’t place much weight on the FCC’s position that regulation is justified because parents either don’t use the V-chip technology they have or know that they even have it. The FCC should not jump in to protect children from language their own parents don’t find significant enough to use pre-existing measures to reduce.
\item[\textsuperscript{277}] It is interesting that Ose only objects to the language when used in free broadcast media. “When I’m subscribing to cable, I get it, OK. But when I watch free broadcast TV, me and my kids should not have to hear it.” Crabtree, supra note 215 (quoting Ose).
\item[\textsuperscript{278}] See H.R. 3687, 108th Cong. (2003) (defining profane to include: “‘shit’, ‘piss’, ‘fuck’, ‘cunt’, ‘asshole’, ‘cock sucker’, ‘mother fucker’, and ‘ass hole’, compound use (including hyphenated compounds) of such words and phrases with each other or with other words or phrases, and other grammatical forms of such words and phrases (including verb, adjective, gerund, participle, and infinitive forms’)). Interestingly, George Carlin’s list of filthy words at issue in Pacifica differs only in the inclusion of “tits.” The so-called Clean Airwaves Act appears to have died in Congress—a fitting end to censorship—though not all would agree with me. Compare Stephanie L. Reinhardt, Note, The Dirty Words You Cannot Say on Television: Does the First Amendment Prohibit Congress from Banning All Use of Certain Words?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 989 (2005) (concluding Clean Airwaves Act is unconstitutional), with Jennifer L. Marino, Comment, More ‘Filthy Words’ But No ‘Free Passes’ for the ‘Cost of Doing Business’: New Legislation is the Best Regulation for Broadcast Indecency, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 135 (2005) (taking the opposite position).
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motherfucker. While the role of censor may not be palatable for Congress, there was broad support for last year’s legislation that bumped up FCC indecency fine capacity. The power to impose increasingly crippling fines on broadcasters for even inadvertent use of fuck is yet another FCC tool to extort self-censorship.

What then does the law permit? Fuck the Draft. Fuck Hitler. Fuck the ump. Fucking orders. Fucking brilliant. Fucking genius. Fuck the FCC. The easier question is what should it protect—all of them. However, the powerful effect of word taboo is at work. While there is no perfect way to gauge where the public is on the scale of indecent language, the finding by the Associated Press that almost two-thirds of those surveyed use the word fuck illustrates broad public acceptance. Nonetheless, five unelected FCC Commissioners—each individually affected by word taboo—police our radios and televisions supposedly in our interests. They are empowered by a procedural system that exaggerates a handful of complaints into a frenzied mandate. The FCC then institutionalizes the taboo through an arbitrary process that either censors fuck outright or chills broadcasters into self-censorship. What the regulators don’t appreciate is that fuck, as taboo, is only strengthened by their actions.

Finally, the television networks have decided to fight back. In March 2006, under the new leadership of Chairman Kevin J. Martin, the FCC announced a $3.6 million fine against 111 television stations that

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279 See supra notes 235-241 and accompanying text (discussing FCC extension of profanity definition to fuck).
280 See Garziglia & Caldwell, supra note 207 (noting congressional support raising FCC fine to $500,000 per violation).
281 See Calvert, supra note 207, at 351-52 (listing self-censorship examples induced by fear of FCC fines).
284 No, says the Supreme Court in Pacifica. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
285 Yes, says the FCC in Saving Private Ryan, supra note 246. Tom Hanks, a.k.a. Captain Miller, says: “We’re not here to do the decent thing, we’re here to follow fucking orders!” Memorable Quotes, supra note 283.
286 No, says the FCC in Golden Globe II, supra note 224.
287 Yes, says the FCC in Saving Private Ryan, supra note 246. Memorable Quotes, supra note 283 (“Lt. Dewindt: Yeah, Brigadier General Amend, deputy commander, 101st. Some fucking genius had the great idea of welding a couple of steel plates onto our deck to keep the general safe from ground fire.”).
288 I certainly hope so.
289 Noveck, supra note 65.
290 Commentators who conclude that restrictions on the use of fuck do not amount to chill because “these words and phrases can be substituted with less offensive ones that still convey the intended message” or that “their use will not be ‘chilled’ because they are not used” commonly now on television, fundamentally misunderstand what chill is (and probably have a future on the FCC). Marino, supra note 278, at 170-71.
aired a 2004 episode of CBS’s “Without a Trace” allegedly depicting a teen orgy. In the wake of this record fine, the four broadcast networks petitioned for judicial review of the order directly challenging the FCC’s arbitrary and inconsistent indecency regulation. This coordinated counter-offensive seeks to overturn indecency rulings against CBS’s “The Early Show,” Fox’s “Billboard Music Awards,” and ABC’s “N.Y.P.D. Blue” based on use of the words *fuck* and *shit*. NBC joined the other broadcasters seeking reversal of *Golden Globe II*. In addition to challenges to the FCC’s arbitrariness, the networks are also challenging the underlying relevancy of indecency rules where most viewers receive paid programs from cable, satellite, and the internet—all mediums afforded greater First Amendment protection. In essence, new technology has undermined the basis for indecency doctrine. The network strategy is designed to muzzle the Commission.

The networks scored a temporary victory in July 2006 when the Commission asked the Second Circuit for a voluntary remand of the case. The Commission sought the remand to allow the broadcasters and other interested parties an opportunity to file responses before imposing forfeiture liability—a detail the Commission ignored in the original order. The Second Circuit granted the Commission’s motion on September 7, 2006, remanding for sixty days for the entry of a final or appealable order of the FCC. The Commission immediately announced a two-week window for comments.

On November 6, 2006, the Commission released its new order dwelling chiefly on an incident at the 2003 Billboard Music Awards where Nicole Richie exclaimed—“Have you ever tried to get cow *shit* out of a Prada purse? It’s not so *fucking* simple.” The Commission reaffirmed its commitment to both the troublesome indecency analysis, 293

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292 Id.
293 Id.
294 See id. (noting the changed circumstances argument caused by the proliferation of cable, internet, and satellite programming); Hilden, *supra* note 263 (arguing new accessible technology makes special broadcasting rules obsolete).
295 Fox and CBS filed a joint petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. ABC filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit which was subsequently transferred and consolidated in the Second Circuit. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, FCC 06-166, 39 Communications Reg. (P & F) 1065, ¶ 8 (Nov. 6, 2006).
296 Id. ¶ 9.
297 Id. ¶ 10
298 Id. ¶ 13; see id. ¶¶ 12-54 (discussing 2003 incident). The order also addresses the 2002 Billboard Music Awards incident involving Cher’s “fuck ‘em” comment, finding a violation under similar analysis. Id. ¶¶ 55-66. In addition to the Early Show incident discussed *infra* notes 302-304, the order also dismisses various NYPD Blue complaints for procedural irregularities. Id. ¶¶ 74-77.
including the per se sexual nature of *fuck* and reversal of fleeting utterance doctrine, and the new profanity analysis.\(^\text{299}\) In this order, however, the Commission expanded its control on language and found *shit*—the S-Word—to also be indecent and profane.\(^\text{300}\) Further, the Commission rejected the networks’ preventative delay measures as inadequate attempts and any notion that it might ignore the first blow. Finding the broadcast media to be uniquely accessible to children, the Commission also rejected the networks’ position that cable and satellite technologies have diluted the importance of broadcast media and that V-chip technology changes the community standard.\(^\text{301}\)

While Richie can’t say *shit*, a Survivor finalist can on The Early Show. Twila Tanner, one of the four finalists from “Survivor: Vanuatu,” described another player as a “bullshitter.”\(^\text{302}\) While the Commission speculated that the segment aired by CBS was merely promotional, it deferred to the network’s characterization of the comment as part of a bona fide news interview. It concluded that “regardless of whether such language would be actionable in the context of an entertainment program” it was not in this context.\(^\text{303}\) Given this finding, the Commission intends to continue the uncertainty spawned by the *Golden Globe* and *Saving Private Ryan* decisions.\(^\text{304}\)

There is, however, at least one broadcast with which the Commission will not have to struggle. On December 11, 2006, the Second Circuit agreed to allow C-SPAN to broadcast the oral arguments in the appeal of this order.\(^\text{305}\) Given the major networks’ involvement, we might even hear *fuck* on the evening news. With the ultimate resolution of these legal challenges still pending, it’s difficult to predict where indecency law will end up. However, one thing is sure. The networks will continue to face a hostile Commission, vocal minorities, and a nonsupportive Congress—all influenced by word taboo.

\section*{C. Genderspeak and Fuck in the Workplace}

The use of *fuck* in the workplace impacts the law in some

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See id. ¶¶ 15-18 (indecency); id. ¶¶ 19-27 (fleeting utterance); id. ¶¶ 40-41 (profanity).
\item See id. ¶¶ 14, 17, 20, 22, 23 (*shit* and indecency); id. ¶ 40 (*shit* and profanity).
\item See id. ¶¶ 32-38 (delay systems); id. ¶¶ 46-52 (technology and community standards).
\item Id. ¶ 67.
\item See id. ¶¶ 69-73.
\item In a separate statement concurring and dissenting, Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein chastises his fellow commissioners for failing to develop a “consistent and coherent indecency enforcement policy.” Id. (Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part).
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interesting ways. Quite simply, men swear more than women. This means, of course, men say *fuck* more—especially on the job. Depending upon the variant of *fuck* that is used, anti-discrimination law can be implicated. This leads to a potential legal conflict: protected speech versus protecting workers. Just as with the uncertainty created by the FCC’s *fuck* regulation, ambiguity over Title VII’s reach risks our language rights being diluted by word taboo.

Men and women communicate differently. Analyzing these differences has produced a flurry of contemporary literature focusing on so-called “genderspeak” and sociolinguistic research into language and gender. Some genderspeak differences are subtle. Others, like the use of taboo language, are hard to ignore. Genderly speaking, men use more taboo language than women. Research conducted among Midwest college students yields this non-stunning conclusion: “Female students recognize fewer obscenities, use fewer obscenities, and use them less frequently than males.” In particular, men use *fuck* more than women—significantly more. There was a 32% greater use of *fuck* by men and 39% greater use of *motherfucker*. Women, however,
find *fuck* and *motherfucker* far more offensive than men do.\textsuperscript{313}

The explanation for this gender difference is harder to pinpoint. One proffered reason is a link to the military. Professor Allen Read linked the disorganization of modern life caused by World War I to the explosion in the use of *fuck* by soldiers.\textsuperscript{314} “[T]he unnatural way of life, and the imminence of a hideous death, the soldier could find fitting expression only in terms that according to teaching from his childhood were foul and disgusting.”\textsuperscript{315}

Gender identity and male power have also been linked to men using more taboo language.\textsuperscript{316} While women are expected to exhibit control over their thoughts, men are free to “exhibit hostile and aggressive speech habits.”\textsuperscript{317} As sociolinguist Robin Lakoff suggested in her landmark work, *Language and Woman’s Place*, “the ‘stronger’ expletives are reserved for men, and the ‘weaker’ ones for women.”\textsuperscript{318} More recent research confirms the link between gender identity and language—with a twist: there is an increasing tendency for professional women in male-dominated professions to adopt “men’s language” or cursing to help secure acceptance as a professional and a woman.\textsuperscript{319} Despite this research, there remains a significant gender difference in the use of *fuck*. Whatever the ultimate reason for the gender difference, it impacts the workplace.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, female use was similarly constant, but at 26% in 1975 and 28% in 1980. By way of comparison, *cunt* clearly came out the more taboo word in these surveys. Male use of *cunt* dropped from 1975 to 1980 from 53% to 45% whereas female use of *cunt* rose slightly from a mere 5% to 7%. *Id.* at 252 tbl.1.

313 See MILLWOOD-HARGRAVE, supra note 3, at 10 (reporting the results of ranking the “very severe” words from the British study).

314 Read, *supra* note 2, at 274; see DOOLING, *supra* note 3, at 9 (describing increased use stems from military and WWI); Sagarin, *supra* note 70, at 142 (“In all-male circles, and in the armed services, the number of times in which the word [fucking] could be worked into a conversation would be the criterion by which one would judge the masculinity, the sophistication, or the freedom from taboos, of the speaker.”).

315 Read, *supra* note 2, at 275.

316 JAY, *supra* note 71, at 165 (“Ultimately, cursing depends on both gender identity and power; males tend to have more power to curse in public than females.”); Stapleton, *supra* note 307, at 22 (“Given that taboos play an important role in maintaining the status quo of a society, women have traditionally been more fully subject to their effects than have men.”).

317 JAY, *supra* note 71, at 165; see ELGIN, *supra* note 306, at 219 (noting “decent women” would never soil their lips with such foul words); Stapleton, *supra* note 307, at 22 (“Firstly, swearing, or use of expletives, is perceived as an intrinsically forceful or aggressive activity.”).


religion, sex, or national origin.”

Interestingly, the statute doesn’t expressly prohibit sexual (or racial) harassment. However, with its landmark decision in *Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson*, the Supreme Court recognized that a hostile or abusive work environment could establish a Title VII violation of discrimination based on sex. Title VII is violated when “the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Further attempts by the Court to precisely define the parameters of a hostile work environment claim have proved problematic. Nonetheless, from *Meritor* on, a conceptual model of sexual harassment emerges of male workforce domination and female vulnerability to harassment.

This is where *fuck* comes into play. Hostile environment claims under Title VII often include allegations of use of taboo words. Because men use the word *fuck* more often than women, hostile environment allegations involving *fuck* and its variants follow a standard model: a male harasser directs *fuck* comments at a female employee. Title VII, however, is not the “Clean Language Act” “designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity.” How then do courts treat claims of verbal sexual harassment involving *fuck*? In general, three different doctrines are used by the federal courts to determine if words amount to actionable conduct: a gender-specific/gender-neutral test, a sexual/nonsexual test, and a specifically-directed/generally-directed test.

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322 Id. at 64-65.
325 See Kearney, *supra* note 309, at 89-90 (“Though the evidence is anecdotal, the difference in the way men and women use language is hard to ignore. The legal consequence is also significant. If women are less likely than men to use profanity in the workplace (at least for the reason that they do not choose to use it as the language of insult), is it such a stretch to say that they are also more likely to be offended by it when they witness it?”).
The gender-specificity test focuses on whether an offensive verbal statement is gender specific. That is, the comment must be targeted at one gender. If the comment is capable of being directed at either gender, no harassment claim is stated. For example, if a female plaintiff is called a whore or cunt, such terms are gender-specific and could fall in the actionable category. In contrast, offensive words that could be targeted at either men or women, such as asshole, are gender-neutral and would not support a sexual harassment claim.

The sexual/nonsexual test focuses on the sexual nature of verbal harassment. In this sense, sexual does not equate with gender. Rather, it means sexual activity. If the statements were of a nonsexual nature, such as “dumbass” or “get your head out of your ass,” the nonsexual nature would render them nonactionable. Conversely, suggestions that a female employee was in the habit of having oral sex for money, comments about her anatomy, or expressing a desire to have sex with her fall into the sexual nature category and could support a harassment claim.

The third test used by some courts focuses not on the nature of the statement, but to whom it is directed. Offensive comments that are generally directed reflect at best a vulgar and mildly offensive environment; statements must be personally directed to create an actionable claim. Even after a finding under the gender-specific or sexual-nature test that statements could rise to the level of verbal sexual harassment, a court might still inquire into whether the statements were specifically directed in order to deny a claim.

When these tests are applied specifically to pure verbal sexual harassment claims—that is, where there is no other contaminating harassing contact—fu*k fares well. Given what we know from linguistics, the general absence of a sexual meaning in all fu*k’2 and many fu*k’1 situations should shield much use of the word from Title


330 See Browne, supra note 328, at 492-93 (providing examples of gender neutral and gender specific language).

331 See Cook, supra note 328, at 479-80 (describing sexual nature test).


333 See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1997).


335 See, e.g., Ptasnik v. City of Peoria, 93 F.App’x 904, 908-09 (7th Cir. 2004) (failing to reach question of whether foul language and sexual comments were offensive when it was not directed at plaintiff but other women). But see Torres, 116 F.3d at 633 (noting that the fact that statements were not made in plaintiff’s presence was of no matter because an employee who knows that her boss is saying things behind her back may reasonably fund the working environment hostile).
This is the case. Those courts applying the gender-specific test hold that *fuck* and *motherfucker* are general expletives that are gender-neutral. Uses of *Fuck* such as “*fucking idiot*,” “*stupid motherfucker*,” and “*dumb motherfucker*” are neutral, verbal abuse and nondiscriminatory. Even when *fuck*-based, gender-specific insults are found, such as “*fat fucking bitch*,” if the alleged harasser also refers to men with *fuck*-based, gender-specific insults, such as the “*fucking new guy*,” the complained-of language does not establish a sex harassment claim. The use of foul language in front of both men and women is not discrimination based on sex. However, comments such as “*fucking bitch*,” “dumb *fucking broads*,” and “*fucking cunts*” were gender-specific. As Judge Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit wrote in *Steiner v. Showboat Operating Company*, “[i]t is one thing to call a woman ‘worthless,’ and another to call her a ‘worthless broad.’”

Application of the sexual/nonsexual test to *fuck* also tends to be favorable. For example, the use of *fuck* and “dumb *motherfucker*” are not considered inherently sexual. Recognizing that *fuck* is used frequently, one district court concluded that the fact the plaintiff was offended was indicative of her sensibilities not sexual harassment.

Use of “offensive profanities” that have no sexual connotation such as “*fucking idiot*,” “*can’t you fucking read*,” “*fuck the goddamn memo*,” and “*I want to know where your fucking head was at*,” as a

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336 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (describing difference in *Fuck*¹ and *Fuck*²).
338 See Ferraro v. Kellwood, No. 03 Civ. 8492(SAS), 2004 WL 2646619, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2004) (“*fucking idiot*” and “*stupid motherfucker*” are neutral and nondiscriminatory); Naughton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 02 C 4761, 2003 WL 360085, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2003) (citing *Hardin*, 167 F.3d at 345-46, as holding that “*dumb motherfucker*” and “when the *fuck* are you going to get the product” were neutral verbal abuse).
339 See Hocevar, 223 F.3d at 736-37 (“Offensive language was used to describe both men and women.”).
340 Id.
341 Id. at 1464. As Judge Fletcher’s anecdote implies, it is being called a bitch, broad, or cunt that is the actionable gender-specific language; *fuck* merely intensifies it.
342 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
343 Id. at 1464. As Judge Fletcher’s anecdote implies, it is being called a bitch, broad, or cunt that is the actionable gender-specific language; *fuck* merely intensifies it.
344 See *Hardin*, 167 F.3d at 345-46 (identifying coarse language including “*dumb motherfucker*” and “when the *fuck* are you going to get the product” as not being inherently sexual comments).
matter of law cannot make a prima facie case for sexual harassment. Even the phrase to “go *fuck* himself” is not evidence of a sexual criticism. Similarly, in the same-sex context, the harassing comment “*fuck* me” when uttered by men to men, more often than not has no connection whatsoever to the sexual acts referenced.

Irrespective of whether the allegation may be gender-related or sexual in nature, courts routinely require offensive comments to be made “to her face or within earshot.” Consequently, “*fucking bitch*” may be considered a gender-based insult but would not support a plaintiff’s claim where the evidence showed that term was used by a supervisor only when talking with others, not to the plaintiff. Similarly, the statement that an employee looked so good he “could *fuck her*” did not support a hostile work environment claim because it was directed at others, not the plaintiff. Neither *fuck* nor *motherfucker* would support a claim either if the complained of language was not specifically directed, even if the plaintiff overheard it.

Considering men use the word *fuck* more in the workplace, it is not surprising that hostile work environment claims based on *fuck* involve male *fuck*-sayers with female *fuck*-complainants. Nonetheless, *fuck* statements as a basis for Title VII claims are routinely rejected using the methods described above. By itself, *fuck* falls into the category of an “offensive profanity” or “vulgar” language. Verbal sexual harassment claims, however, can’t be used to “purge the workplace of vulgarity.” Even when *fuck* is used persistently, it doesn’t rise to the level of sexual harassment. As the Supreme Court notes, Title VII is not a “general civility code for the American workplace.”

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347 See Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1544-46 (10th Cir. 1995). The court also found the comments not gender specific. *Id.* at 1546. In contrast, a supervisor who repeatedly refers to an employee as a “dumb *cunt*” is making a sexual remark and is subject to a hostile environment claim. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997).
348 See Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Most unfortunately, expressions such as ‘*fuck me,*’ ‘*kiss my ass,*’ and ‘*suck my dick,*’ are commonplace in certain circles, and more often than not, when these expressions are used (particularly when uttered by men speaking to other men), their use has no connection whatsoever with the sexual acts to which they make reference even when they are accompanied, as they sometimes were here, with a crotch-grabbing gesture.”); Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 261 n.8 (4th Cir. 2001) (accord).
350 *Id.* at 1380-81.
351 See Ptasnik v. City of Peoria, 93 F.App’x 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2004).
352 See Spencer v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 97 C 7718, 1999 WL 14486, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 1999) (noting that profanities and crudities were generally directed and not actionable).
353 See *id.* (“Although vulgar and boorish, the use of foul and offensive language and comments without more does not create an actionable hostile environment under present authority.”).
354 Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995).
only when *fuck* is used as a modifier for gender-specific statements, such as “*fucking* cunt,” does it appear to be actionable.\footnote{356} Of course, such gender-specific harassing statements could form the basis of a Title VII claim with or without the *fucking* adjective.

Even though *fuck* is not typically actionable under Title VII, employers’ reactions to Title VII, such as the adoption of voluntary anti-harassment plans, provide another example of word taboo at work. Despite the dearth of empirical support that taboo words like *fuck* cause any harm to the listener,\footnote{357} employers can—and do—adopt policies designed to curb workplace harassment that are overly broad and unnecessarily and improperly restrict free speech rights in the workplace.\footnote{358} Employers who adopt overly restrictive workplace speech policies engage in self-censorship and impose these restrictions on others just as broadcasters avoiding programming containing *fuck* do.\footnote{359}

Much law review ink has already been spilled detailing the potential conflict between the First Amendment and Title VII.\footnote{360} The pages of the Federal Reporters, however, remain amazingly light on the subject.\footnote{361} I can add little to this conversation\footnote{362} except to say, as to

\footnote{356}See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).
\footnote{357}See JAY, supra note 71, at 233 (“Secular-legal decisions implicate curse words as doing psychological and physical harm to listeners, even though these decisions lack empirical support.”).
\footnote{358}Professor Volokh explains. We start with Title VII law grounded in vague words like severe and pervasive. To comport with this, employers necessarily err on the safe side. Some employers “consequently suppress any speech that might possibly be seen as harassment, even if you and I would agree that it’s not severe or pervasive enough that a reasonable person would conclude that it creates a hostile environment.” Eugene Volokh, *What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment” Harassment Law Restrict?*, 85 GEO. L.J. 627, 635-37 (1997). These zero-tolerance policies are not hypothetical. “Employers are in fact enacting such broad policies and are indeed suppressing individual incidents of offensive speech.” Id. at 642. Kingsley Browne also develops the thesis that vagueness in Title VII law leads employers to adopt overly broad speech regulation in contravention of the First Amendment. See Kingsley R. Browne, *Zero Tolerance for the First Amendment: Title VII’s Regulation of Employee Speech*, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 563, 580-97 (2001).
\footnote{360}See Browne, supra note 358, at 575 n.77 (collecting dozens of citations to law reviews as a “partial list of articles devoted specifically to the First Amendment and workplace speech”); Burke, supra note 359, at 612 nn.142-43 (collecting authorities addressing First Amendment violations with Title VII and those showing the lack thereof).
\footnote{361}Kingsley Browne and Eugene Volokh have “[t]he most thorough catalogue of cases in which verbal expression formed all or part of a finding of liability under Title VII.” DOOLING, supra note 3, at 94; see Browne, supra note 358, at 574-80 (explaining the dearth of First Amendment analysis in Title VII case law). See generally Eugene Volokh, Comment, *Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment*, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992).
\footnote{362}Professor Browne makes one suggestion on the future of hostile environment theory that I can’t let go without comment. He calls for the use of heightened pleading requirements similar to
fuck, the doctrines of fighting words, obscenity, captive audience, and the like have been explored and rejected.363 Nothing in Title VII changes this. Only the category of lesser-protected indecent speech (now bastardized by the FCC) remains as a constitutional option.364 However, none of the original Pacifica justifications—parental control, child access, and home privacy—have any vitality in the workplace.365 A better alternative is to simply leave fuck alone.366

The treatment of fuck in the workplace provides two lessons. First, Title VII law recognizes the varied uses of fuck and the key linguistic distinction between Fuck¹ and Fuck². The tests that the courts have developed to determine actionable verbal sexual harassment, such as the sexual/nonsexual test, treat fuck according to its intended use. Calling an employee a fucking idiot, an obvious nonsexual use of Fuck², would not meet the harassment standard. Conversely, the statement by a supervisor to an employee that “I want to fuck you,” an equally obvious use of Fuck¹, would at a minimum meet the sexual use test. Hence, the federal courts demonstrate facility in recognizing varied uses of fuck and take that into account. This stands in stark contrast to the broadcast regulation by the FCC where every use of fuck is deemed per se sexual—turning a blind eye to the linguistic distinction and a model for its legal application.

While fuck-based claims under Title VII show at least the capacity for law to accommodate valuable lessons from linguistics, the multiple those in defamation cases where the precise defaming language must be pleaded or risk dismissal. Conclusory allegations should be insufficient. The rationale is to allow defendants to quickly and cheaply extricate themselves from meritless litigation. See Browne, supra note 328, at 545-46. This is a particularly bad idea—already rejected by the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). I have been roundly critical of the use of heightened pleading whether it is judicially-imposed, statutorily-mandated, and most recently as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002) (criticizing judicially-imposed heightened pleading in civil rights cases and statutory heightened pleading under the PSLRA and Y2K Act); Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers—Strike Rule 9(b), 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281 (2004) (advocating an end to Rule 9(b)). If you care to read more about the subject of heightened pleading in the defamation context (or any other), see Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003).

363 See Browne, supra note 328, at 510-31 (applying and rejecting First Amendment doctrines as a basis for Title VII speech suppression including, labor speech, captive audience, time-place-manner regulation, defamation, fighting words, obscenity, and privacy); see also Volokh, supra note 361, at 1819-43 (detailing why harassment law is not defensible under the existing First Amendment exceptions).

364 In 1991, Professor Browne wrote that indecency theory couldn’t be used to contain fuck. See Browne, supra note 328, at 528-29. Unfortunately, the recent maneuvers by the FCC certainly provide a doctrinal basis for restricting fuck by labeling it as per se sexual and patently offensive as they did in Golden Globe II. See supra notes 214-44 and accompanying text. Of course, I don’t think this is any wiser for sexual harassment than for broadcasting.

365 See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing Pacifica rationale).

366 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 359, at 605-07 (questioning judicial decisions recognizing a hostile environment based upon words alone).
tests used by varying jurisdictions can also generate uncertainty. Uncertainty, can in turn lead to employer development of overly restrictive anti-harassment policies with the predictable chilling effect consequences. Whether motivated by a desire to avoid liability or impose a more sanitized version of workplace speech, taboo continues to have power.

D. *Fuck in Education*

Having spent most of my life in school—either attending or teaching—I know that *fuck* gets plenty of use in educational settings. *Fuck* finds its way into a public school through the mouths of either students or teachers. Given the law’s reaction to the presence of children in earshot of taboo language,\(^{367}\) if there is one area to predict harsh treatment for offensive language, this is it. Whether based on *in loco parentis* or some other modern need to maintain educational process,\(^{368}\) schools seek to protect children from taboo language. Surprisingly, there’s some unexpected judicial tolerance in this area—but only if you’re the teacher.

1. *Tinker’s Armband but Not Cohen’s Coat*\(^{369}\)

It’s axiomatic that public school students don’t “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”\(^{370}\) At the same time, “the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools ‘are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,’ and must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.’”\(^{371}\) There are several different taxonomies used by commentators to describe the universe of school speech.\(^{372}\) Where *fuck* is concerned, I find most useful a

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\(^{367}\) For example, the presence of children drove the Court, FCC, and complainant in *Pacifica* and still plays a role in indecency regulation. Similarly, the Michigan statute used to convict Tim Boomer, the cursing canoeist, required the presence of children as well.


\(^{372}\) See Andrew D.M. Miller, *Balancing School Authority and Student Expression*, 54 BAYLOR
categorization dividing school speech into three types: *Tinker*-type, *Fraser*-type, and *Kuhlmeier*-type—based on the trilogy of leading Supreme Court cases in the area.\(^{373}\)

There is student speech or expression that happens to occur on school premises.\(^{374}\) This type of speech is like a student wearing a black armband in protest to participation in the Vietnam War as they did in *Tinker*.\(^{375}\) A school must tolerate *Tinker*-type-black-armband speech unless it can reasonably forecast that the expression will lead to material and substantial interference with school activities.\(^{376}\) A second type of speech in the school setting is school-sponsored speech. This is speech that a school affirmatively promotes as opposed to speech that it merely tolerates, like the school-supported student newspaper at issue in *Kuhlmeier*.\(^{377}\) Expressive activities delivered through a school-sponsored medium (what I call *Kuhlmeier*-type-school-sponsored-student-newspaper speech) can be regulated so long as the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.\(^{378}\)

The third type of school speech is vulgar, lewd, and offensive speech. Unlike the core political speech in *Tinker*, sexual innuendo, lewd, or vulgar speech can be constitutionally punished because the offensive speech is contrary to the school’s basic educational mission.\(^{379}\) *Fuck* seemingly falls into this expansive and ambiguous *Fraser*-type-lewd-and-vulgar speech category. *Fraser* involved the suspension of a high school student for giving an election nominating speech that was filled with pervasive, “plainly offensive,” sexual innuendo.\(^{380}\) Despite the opportunity to clarify the boundaries of offensive language, the

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\(^{373}\) See *Tinker*, 393 U.S. at 503; *Bethel Sch. Dist.*, 478 U.S. 675; *Kuhlmeier*, 484 U.S. at 260.

\(^{374}\) See *Tinker*, 393 U.S. at 514; Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004).

\(^{375}\) In 1969, the Court in *Tinker* upheld the right of middle school students to wear black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. *Tinker*, 393 U.S. at 510-11.

\(^{376}\) See id. at 509.

\(^{377}\) See *Kuhlmeier*, 484 U.S. at 276.

\(^{378}\) In *Kuhlmeier*, the Court allowed the school to exercise editorial control over a school-sponsored student newspaper so long as the regulation was legitimately related to an educational concern. 484 U.S. at 273.

\(^{379}\) In *Fraser*, the Court upheld the right of the school to punish a student for making an elaborate, graphic, explicit, sexual metaphor. See 478 U.S. at 685.

\(^{380}\) See id. at 683.
Court failed to carefully define the speech at issue. It called the speech “offensively lewd and indecent,” “vulgar and lewd,” and “sexually explicit” all in the same opinion.381

What then is the difference between the Fraser-speech subsets of lewd, indecent, vulgar, offensive, or sexually explicit? For example, “lewd” is often defined as “obscene.”382 However, under a Miller definition of obscenity383 the word fuck is not obscene because the word is neither erotic nor contains the essential element of sexuality to be prurient.384 Consequently, fuck is not likely covered by the lewd subcategory. As to indecency, we must return to Pacifica and the FCC to understand its contours.385 As far as fuck is concerned, indecency applies only if one makes the erroneous connection to per se sexual activity and patent offensiveness.386 The only remaining subcategories to apply to fuck are offensive or vulgar speech, yet confusion also abounds as to what these terms means.387 In the end, neither classification is helpful in predicting how fuck would be treated.

While I am sure fuck is used by many a student, few reported cases explore a student’s speech right in this context. Given the outcome with even non-taboo speech, I see little chance that fuck would find protection under the current state of the law. However, if fuck were student-originated, today it would be on a t-shirt. All the recent student action surrounds t-shirt speech and illustrates the difficulty of “offensive” or “vulgar” as useful tools for speech regulation.

For example, the Sixth Circuit recently held that an Ohio high school could ban Marilyn Manson t-shirts as vulgar or offensive speech under Fraser.388 The t-shirt starting the brouhaha depicted a “three-faced Jesus” and the words “See No Truth. Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth.” On the reverse was the word “BELIEVE” with the L, I, and E highlighted.389 After being told by the principal to change or go home, the student went home. Defiant, he returned the next three days donning a different Marilyn Manson shirt; each day he was sent

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381 Id. at 684-85.
382 See Miller, supra note 372, at 655.
383 Under Miller, obscenity requires (a) the average person, applying community standards, would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
384 See DOOLING, supra note 3, at 61 (“Because of the well-established ‘prurient’ requirement, foul language and profanity are almost never considered obscene . . . .”).
385 See supra notes 225-34 and accompanying text (discussing FCC and indecency definition).
386 This necessarily requires the finding that the material is patently offensive—that is, explicit, graphic, repeated, and shocking. See supra notes 224-35 and accompanying text.
387 See Miller, supra note 372, at 646-49 (discussing confusion and calling for more precise definitional categories in order to create a more workable and understandable framework).
388 See Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).
389 Id. at 467.
A split panel of the Sixth Circuit held that under Fraser the school could ban merely offensive speech without having to apply Tinker’s substantial and material interference test. What is most troubling is the court’s methodology. Rather than explaining why the t-shirts themselves were offensive—where all the court had to offer was that Marilyn Manson appeared “ghoulish and creepy”—the court focused on the “destructive and demoralizing values” promoted by the band through its lyrics and interviews. Using a judicial version of the transitive property, the court found that the band promoted ideas contrary to the school’s mission and the t-shirts promoted the band. Ergo the t-shirts were offensive. Because they were offensive, the school could ban them. This type of application of Fraser leaves virtually no speech off limits as long as it can be traced back to an ultimate offensive origin. No speech—except the Confederate flag that is. Within months of the Marilyn Manson case, the Sixth Circuit held that a Kentucky high school that suspended two students for wearing t-shirts with the Confederate flag had to meet Tinker’s substantial and material interference test before it could prohibit wearing them to school.

This type of inconsistent, if not downright bizarre, application of Fraser isn’t isolated. Just as the FCC declares nonsexual uses of fuck as per se sexual, courts often sexualize other nonsexual language to enforce a prohibition against the speech. For example, a federal district court upheld the suspension of a middle school student for wearing a t-shirt that said “Drugs Suck!” because the message was vulgar and offensive. The court found “suck” had sexual connotations. After admitting that “suck” was also a general expression of disapproval, the court found that meaning derivative and “likely evolved from its sexual

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390 Id.
391 Id. at 470–71.
392 Id. at 467 (ghoulish and creepy); id. at 469–71 (lyrics and interviews).
393 Following this reasoning, the band’s offensive lyrics include fuck so I suppose the t-shirts promote fuck so they could be banned as if they said fuck. Giving credit where credit is due, it is the high school principal William Clifton, who propounds this bonehead argument. See id. at 469–70. The federal district court and two of the Sixth Circuit panelists buy into it unfortunately.
394 Id. at 471.
395 The court rejected the argument that the t-shirt itself wasn’t offensive in comparison to other t-shirts that promoted bands like Megadeth and Slayer, each with equally explicit lyrics. See id. at 470; Miller, supra note 372, at 647–48 & n.169 (discussing case). Only the dissenter, Judge Gilman, seems to recognize the folly of the majority opinion. Judge Gilman points out the obvious: even if the band’s lyrics are vulgar or offensive, nothing on the t-shirts was. Boroff, 220 F.3d at 472, 473–74 (Gilman, J., dissenting). Unfortunately for fuck, Gilman defines vulgar and offensive in terms of Pacifica speech and says that if the t-shirts contained those words, the school could ban them. Id.
meaning only as recently as the 1970s.398 Consequently, “Drugs Suck!” had a prurient element subjecting it to prohibition.399 The same sort of reasoning led another federal district court to uphold prohibition of an anti-drunk driving t-shirt that proclaimed “See Dick drink. See Dick drive. See Dick die. Don’t be a Dick.”400 The court found that the word “Dick” came within a vulgarity exception to the First Amendment.401 This type of sexualization of nonsexual language serves as a good predictor of how fuck might be banned by blurring the Fuck1 and Fuck2 distinction. Given this level of confusion among the courts on both linguistics and the legal standard of vulgar and offensive speech, student-initiated use of fuck as free speech seems doomed.

2. Fuck in Teacher Speech

We might see a different outcome if a teacher used the word in class. Justice Fortas’s famous Tinker line about not shedding constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate applied to both students and teachers.402 Surely teachers, cloaked with the tolerance afforded by academic freedom,403 must have a safe haven for the use of fuck. I am, of course, banking on some modicum of personal protection—especially in the context of legal education. As Professor Levinson put it, it would be “especially problematic to say that any speech is off limits when addressing the question of which speech, if any, speech can ever be ruled off limits.”404 Unfortunately, teacher speech exists in a murky First Amendment environment. As the Second Circuit recently lamented: “Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has determined what scope of First Amendment protection is to be given a public

398 Id. at 1537.
399 Id.
401 See id. at 159. The state court ultimately struck down the vulgarity clause of the school’s code on state statutory grounds. See Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 667 N.E.2d 869 (Mass. 1996); see also Pyle, supra note 368, at 586-89 (discussing firsthand involvement in the litigation).
402 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”)
403 Academic freedom is a concept used to defend a variety of speech and conduct activities. Academic freedom encompasses a professor’s freedom to teach, freedom to research, and freedom to publish opinions on issues of public concern. Academic freedom is rooted in European traditions and in our society’s recognition that “institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good . . . which depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.”
404 Levinson, supra note 1, at 1381.

college professor’s classroom speech.” Public school teachers traverse the same uncertain terrain.

Where teacher speech is involved, the Tinker trilogy is often supplanted by Pickering v. Board of Education. Public school teacher Marvin Pickering criticized the board of education for its handling of fiscal matters in a letter to the local newspaper; he was fired. The Supreme Court held that Pickering’s speech was protected by the First Amendment because it was of “public concern.” Because Pickering so squarely rests on the “interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern,” it might appear inapplicable to in-class, taboo language, by a school employee. Nonetheless, five federal appellate circuits apply Pickering to the in-class speech of teachers to exclude that speech from any First Amendment protection whatsoever. In these jurisdictions, teachers are obviously stripped of any ability to use First Amendment academic freedom arguments to protect curricular decisions to use fuck in class.

In contrast, five other circuits apply Kuhlmeier and require a reasonable relationship to a legitimate pedagogical concern before permitting schools to silence teacher curricular choice. However, even before Kuhlmeier provided an alternative to Pickering, the First Circuit recognized the academic freedom of high school teachers to use the word fuck as a curricular decision in Keefe v. Geanakos. A senior English teacher assigned a reading from Atlantic Monthly that contained an “admittedly highly offensive . . . vulgar term for an incestuous son”—motherfucker. He was suspended, risked discharge, and sought injunctive relief which was denied by the district court. The First Circuit reversed after conducting its own independent review of the article and finding it “scholarly, thoughtful and thought-provoking.” Chief Judge Aldrich also included the following assessment:

405 Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 467 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Cohen v. San Bernadine Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1996)).
407 Id. at 564.
408 Id. at 568.
409 Id.
411 Professor Weiner makes a persuasive argument for a new legal standard to protect social studies teachers who use sexually explicit material in the context of government or legal system lessons. See id. at 675-83.
412 See id. at 626-27 (identifying the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits as applying Kuhlmeier).
413 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
414 See id. at 361.
415 Id.
With regard to the word itself, we cannot think that it is unknown to many students in the last year of high school, and we might well take judicial notice of its use by young radicals and protesters from coast to coast. No doubt its use genuinely offends the parents of some of the students—therein, in part, lay its relevancy to the article. Judge Aldrich recognized the value of studying *fuck* because of its taboo status.

The First Circuit revisited the issue again in *Mailloux v. Kiley* where another high school English teacher taught a lesson on taboo words that included writing *fuck* on the blackboard. Following a parent’s complaint, he was fired for “conduct unbecoming a teacher.” While the district court seemed to agree with the testifying experts that the way Mailloux used the word *fuck* was “appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances and served a serious educational purpose,” divided opinion on the issue compelled the court to fashion a test for such situations. Ultimately, the district court held that it was a violation of due process to discharge Mailloux because he did not know in advance that his curricular decision to teach about *fuck* would be an affront to school policies. The First Circuit, after rejecting the route taken by the district court and opting instead for a case-by-case analysis, nonetheless affirmed the result because the teacher’s conduct was within reasonable, although not universally accepted, standards and he acted in good faith and without notice that the school was not of the same view.

Despite these positive outcomes of reason over taboo, don’t draw the wrong conclusion. Courts that apply the *Kuhlmeier* test to a teacher’s in-class use of *fuck* might well come out the other way. In *Krizek v. Board of Education*, the district court denied preliminary injunctive relief to an English teacher whose contract was not renewed

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416 Id. (footnote omitted); *see also* Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
418 Id. at 1389.
419 Id. at 1392. The district court crafted the following test:

> [W]hen a secondary school teacher uses a teaching method which he does not prove has the support of the preponderant opinion of the teaching profession . . . which he merely proves is relevant to his subject and students, is regarded by experts of significant standing as serving a serious educational purpose, and was used by him in good faith the state may suspend or discharge a teacher for using that method but it may not resort to such drastic sanctions unless the state proves he was put on notice either by a regulation or otherwise that he should not use that method.

Id.
420 Id. at 1393.
421 *See Mailloux*, 448 F.2d at 1243.
422 Id. at 1392.
423 Id. at 1393.
424 Id. at 1392.
425 Id. at 1392.
426 *See Mailloux*, 448 F.2d at 1243.
after showing the movie *About Last Night* to her eleventh graders.\(^{424}\) The court described the film as containing “a great deal of vulgarity” including “swear words” and quoted the dialogue at length illustrating a liberal use of *fuckin’,* *fucking,* and *fuck.*\(^{425}\) Applying the *Kuhlmeier* standard, the court found that the school had a legitimate concern over vulgarity and could find the film with its frequent vulgarity inappropriate for high school students.\(^{426}\) Consequently, the court rejected a preliminary injunction because the teacher was unlikely to prevail on the merits of her First Amendment claim.\(^{427}\)

Similarly, in *Vega v. Miller*,\(^{428}\) the Second Circuit found that college administrators had qualified immunity from First Amendment claims by a college teacher who had been disciplined for permitting a classroom exercise, initiated for legitimate pedagogical purposes, to continue to the point where students were calling out a series of sexually explicit words and phrases. The in-class exercise was a word association lesson known as clustering in which students select a topic, then call out words related to the topic, and finally group related words together into “clusters.”\(^{429}\) The students selected “sex” as the topic for the clustering exercise. Vega then invited the students to call out words or phrases related to the topic, and he wrote many of their responses on the blackboard including *clusterfuck,* *fist fucking,* and other taboo words.\(^{430}\) To determine whether qualified immunity existed for the college administrators, the court explored what the clearly established rights were in this context. While the court reserved the ultimate question of the constitutionality of the discipline, it had little difficulty concluding that no decision had clearly established that dismissal for Vega’s conduct violated a teacher’s First Amendment rights.\(^{431}\) Hence, qualified immunity was available to the college administrators.

While these courts purport to use the same legal test for determining the First Amendment academic freedom of teachers, they reveal much inconsistency. An indirect use of *fuck* from a popular magazine is okay, but an indirect use of *fuck* from a popular film is not. Mailloux’s English lesson using *fuck* as an example is protected while Vega’s English lesson using *clusterfuck* is not. Eleventh graders need protection but twelfth graders don’t (but college students might). This is hardly the consistency we would hope for in constitutional speech

\(^{424}\) *Id.* at 1132.

\(^{425}\) *Id.* at 1133-35.

\(^{426}\) *Id.* at 1139. The court also considered and rejected the standards used in both *Mailloux* and *Keefe.* *Id.* at 1140-41.

\(^{427}\) *Id.* at 1144.

\(^{428}\) 273 F.3d 460 (2d Cir. 2001).

\(^{429}\) *Id.* at 462-63.

\(^{430}\) *Id.* at 463.

\(^{431}\) *Id.* at 468-70.
If there is uncertainty in the application of the Kuhlmeier standard, the courts that apply the Pickering analysis don’t fair much better as they strip educators of constitutional protection for in-class speech. For example, the Fifth Circuit used Pickering to reverse the district court’s reinstatement of a university teaching assistant who spoke to an on-campus student group and referred to the Board of Regents as a “stupid bunch of motherfuckers” and said “how the system *fucks* over the student.” In so doing, the Fifth Circuit panel gave credence to the testimony of other English professors that “it shows lack of judgment to use four letter words to any group of people” and that one who used such language was “ill fit for my profession.” This is acquiescence to the power of taboo language.

In a more recent example of Pickering application, English professor John Bonnell openly and frequently used vulgar language in the classroom including *fuck*, *pussy*, and *cunt*. After being accused of creating a hostile environment, Bonnell defended his use of language on the grounds that none of the terms were directed to a particular student and they were only used to make an academic point concerning chauvinistic degrading attitudes toward women as sexual objects. A female student ultimately filed a sexual harassment complaint based on his offensive comments; Bonnell responded by copying the complaint and distributing a redacted version to all of his students. This led to a disciplinary suspension for routinely using vulgar and obscene language, disruption of the educational process, and insubordination. Bonnell sued and ultimately the district court granted his injunction.

The Sixth Circuit, however, reversed finding that the classroom profanity was not germane to the subject matter taught and was therefore unprotected speech. “Plaintiff may have a constitutional right to use words such as ‘pussy,’ ‘cunt,’ and ‘fuck,’ but he does not

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432 See Duke v. N. Tex. St. Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 832, 836-38 (5th Cir. 1973). In the published opinion, the court refrained from printing the words *motherfucking* and *fucks* and used the asterisk euphemisms instead. The district court had held that the Constitution protected her use of profanity because to prohibit particular words substantially increases the risk that ideas will also be suppressed in the process. *Id.* at 838.

433 *Id.* at 839.

434 Not only does it reflect the power of taboo in the English professors’ comment and court’s credence given it, but the misapplication of Pickering may also be influenced by taboo. At least two critical questions seem to be answered the wrong way. First, the teacher was not in class but rather was outside of class when the comments were made. Second, she was commenting on topics not germane to her coursework, but of interest to the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.

435 See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 802-05 (6th Cir. 2001).

436 *Id.* at 803.

437 *Id.* at 804-05.

438 *Id.* at 808.

439 *Id.* at 820-21.
have a constitutional right to use them in a classroom setting where they are not germane to the subject matter, and in contravention of College’s harassment policy. The court left open the possibility that in-class use of taboo language that was germane to the subject matter might be permissible.

What then does this survey of faculty use show? First, the federal appellate courts are divided on how to treat teacher use of taboo words, with half of the circuits choosing the rule from Kuhlmeier and the other half applying older Pickering. This decision in itself directly charts the course of tolerance for the use of fuck because Pickering analysis would not provide protection for in-class use. While the courts using Kuhlmeier could extend First Amendment protection to teachers’ curricular decisions to use fuck, as Krizek illustrates, that doesn’t always occur.

While others have tried to synthesize the judicial treatment of fuck used by teachers in the classroom, the results are unsatisfactory. For example, Professor Robert Richards, of the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment and Penn State University, contends that the key is whether the speech is germane to the subject matter. According to Richards, “if I was teaching a media law class I could use the word ‘fuck’ when discussing the Cohen v. California case... [i]t would be germane to the subject matter. However, if I used the term repeatedly in math class, that would not be germane.” Unfortunately, “germaneness” doesn’t explain why relevant techniques used for legitimate pedagogical purposes (and hence germane) as found in Vega were not protected. Similarly, trying to make sense of the treatment of faculty use of fuck can’t be explained by direct and indirect uses of the word. Direct uses of fuck as in Mailloux are protected while indirect uses of fuck as in Vega and Krizek are not—exactly the opposite of what we would expect.

Word taboo, however, helps explain the vastly different treatment afforded teachers’ in-class use of fuck. I see the influence of word taboo on the parents who often initiate the complaints. Administrators and school boards allow fear of the word fuck to serve as a litmus test.

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440 Id. The court relied on Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (“[T]he protection afforded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it.”) and Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584-85 (5th Cir. 1995) (college professor’s captive audience does not allow denigration of students with profanity such as bullshit, hell, damn, God damn, and sucks).

441 One glimmer of hope comes from Hardy v. Jefferson Community College, 260 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2001). In Hardy, a Sixth Circuit panel (including Judge Gilman) affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss a community college instructor’s claim that he was dismissed for using “nigger” and “bitch” in the context of a class discussion on social deconstructivism.

for competent teaching. Even judges who are on the front-line of First Amendment protection can succumb to word fetish over *fuck*. Collectively, their extreme emotional reactions to *fuck* and its variations lead to the second-guessing of the curricular decisions made by the teaching professional in the best position to design appropriate curriculum for the student audience—the teacher in that class.

**CONCLUSION**

*Fuck* is taboo—deep-rooted and dark. For over half of a millennium, we’ve suppressed it. If the psycholinguists are right, we’ve done so for good reason. *Fuck* embodies our entire culture’s subconscious feelings about sex—about incest, being unclean, rape, sodomy, disease, Oedipal longings, and the like. The word shoulders an immense taboo burden. Recognizing the role of taboo language, it is easy to understand why there is still such a reaction to the word. Taboo explains the individual reactions to *fuck* of my student, the sheriff, and the judge I mentioned at the start of the Article. It explains the difficulty faced by scholars trying to understand the word whether their discipline is lexicography, linguistics, psychology, law, or another social science. For my purposes, taboo is also the tool that helps me understand why the law acts and reacts to the word *fuck* as it does.

*Fuck* is all about sex and nothing about sex all at the same time. Virtually none of the uses of the word *fuck* that I recount have anything to do with sex. Boomer’s *fuck!*, Cohen’s *Fuck the Draft*, Bono’s *fucking brilliant*, Keefe’s *motherfucker*, the ubiquitous *fuck you*—none of these are sexual in meaning. Nevertheless, the taboo is so strong that we engrave the negative connotation despite the denotation. Viewed this way, Chief Justice Burger’s fear that the Supreme Court would collapse if Brother Harlan uttered *fuck* in the courtroom is understandable (as is Justice Black’s concern for offending his wife). The individual reaction of parents to spare their children from the inadvertent broadcast or the calculating teacher now has a point of reference. The fanaticism of Chairman Powell and Congressman Ose is really their own disguised fear. As all these individual reactions are writ large, taboo is institutionalized.

Looking at the areas where *fuck* and the law commonly intersect, our progress toward escaping “from the cruel and archaic psychic coercion of taboo”\(^\text{443}\) appears limited. From a constitutional vantage point, the First Amendment accommodates vulgar *fuck* when core political speech is involved (although I wonder whether the Justices

\(^{443}\) ARANGO, *supra* note 74, at 193.
would have as much patience for “Fuck the Court”). Absent that clarity, the law permits taboo to marginalize fuck as speech such as when the FCC declares fuck per se sexual or applies profanity standards to it. The same process allows private employers and public schools to chill workplace and school speech as judicial uncertainty promotes aggressive speech restrictions as safe institutional havens—for taboo that is.

Regardless of its source, when taboo becomes institutionalized through law, the effects of taboo are also institutionalized.444 If we want to diminish the taboo effect, the solution is not silence. Nor should offensive language be punished. We must recognize that words like fuck have a legitimate place in our daily life.445 Scholars must take responsibility for eliminating ignorance about the psychological aspects of offensive speech and work to eliminate dualistic views of good words and bad words.446 Taboo language should be included in dictionaries, freely spoken and written in our schools and colleges, printed in our newspapers and magazines, and broadcast on radio and television.447 Fuck must be set free.

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444 See ARANGO, supra note 74, at 184 (“Now we understand why censorship . . . falls upon these dreaded words. It is due to the same cause that makes us shiver when we hear them: the taboo of incest.”); cf. Don Aucoin, supra note 266 (“[O]ne reason the word may be less taboo today, especially among young people, is that the sexual activity to which it is linked is also less taboo.”).

445 Author Allan Sherman describes his experience to conquer the power of fuck:

I put in a fresh sheet of paper, looked around to make sure nobody was watching, then shut my own eyes tight and pecked out the letters on the typewriter—F U C K.

After a decent interval I opened my eyes and looked. A jolt of adrenalin shot through my stomach. I had shocked myself. . . . I ripped the page out of the machine, crumpled it up, threw it in a [sic] ashtray and set fire to it. But I didn’t feel better; I felt worse. . . . I promised myself, I shall overcome.

I put a fresh page in the typewriter. Starting at the top left corner I typed, single space: fuckfuckfuck fuck. . . from top to bottom. All told, there were 504 fuck s on a page. Somewhere around number 327 a strange thing happened: The word ceased to frighten me.


446 JAY, supra note 71, at 250.

447 See ARANGO, supra note 74, at 193.