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Article
The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice
Duke Law Journal
  • Chris Guthrie
  • Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cornell Law School
  • Andrew J. Wistrich, US District Court for the Central District of California
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2009
Keywords
  • judges,
  • ALI,
  • decision making,
  • intuition,
  • deliberation,
  • heuristic and biases
Disciplines
Abstract

Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing these important judicial officers.

Citation Information
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Andrew J. Wistrich. "The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice" Duke Law Journal Vol. 58 (2009) p. 1477 ISSN: 0012-7086
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/chris-guthrie/4/