THE ROLE OF MARITIME ACADEMY OF NIGERIA (MAN) IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY

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BY IHENETU-GEFFREY CHINEDU

INTRODUCTION

The Maritime Academy of Nigeria, formerly known and addressed as the Nautical College of Nigeria, was established in 1979 by the Federal Executive Conclusion No.EC.(77) 172 with limited assistance from the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). It was designed as an integrated institution for the education and training of shipboard officers and ratings and shore-based management personnel. Following Nigeria’s ratification of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 Convention in 1986, the status of the college was raised in 1988 by the promulgation of Decree No.16 of 1988, its responsibilities enlarged and the name changed to the Maritime Academy of Nigeria.

LOCATION OF THE ACADEMY

The Maritime Academy of Nigeria is located on a vast stretch of land with a water front, in Oron, Akwa Ibom State on Latitude 4°.47’N and Longitude 8°15’E.
It is close to the Cross River approaches of the Port of Calabar in Cross River State and about 200 kilometres from Port Harcourt, Rivers State.

**VISION STATEMENT**

To be internationally recognized as a center of excellence in maritime education and training.

**MISSION STATEMENT**

To provide the merchant navy, the maritime industry and allied industries, qualitative education and training that accords with up-to-date technology, meets national and international standards, and satisfies end-user expectations.

**GOALS STATEMENT**

(a) To be competitive, innovative, interactive and proactive in meeting the manpower needs of the nation’s maritime and allied industries.

(b) To ensure that the quality and standard of the training conform with international requirements.
(c) To advance the development and participation of women in the nation’s maritime industry.

(d) To contribute to the overall development of all facets of the Nigerian maritime and allied industries.

OBJECTIVES STATEMENT

(a) To build the capacity to train annually at least 50 senior management personnel for the maritime industry, 500 specialized seamen for cabotage operations, and 200 merchant navy officers (of which 30% will be women).

(b) To achieve 15% in building of Cabotage vessels by 2011.

(c) To achieve 90% manning of Cabotage vessels by 2011.

SERVICES PROVIDED (MARITIME EDUCATION & TRAINING)

The functions of the Academy as spelt out in Decree 16 of 1988 are:
a) To admit and train the various levels of personnel required for the running and operating of ships of the merchant navy;

b) To train technical manpower for ports, marine engineering workshops, pilotage and navigation, marine insurance, hydrography, and other related services; and

c) To provide such other forms of instruction as the Academy may from time to time decide to undertake.

The following courses are currently on offer in the Academy:

1. Two-Year National Diploma programme in:
   
   (a) Marine Engineering
   
   (b) Nautical Science
   
   (c) Boat/Ship Building Technology
   
   (d) Marine Transport & Business Studies

2. Two-Year Higher National Diploma in:
   
   (a) Marine Engineering
   
   (b) Nautical Science
3. 12-Month Post Graduate Diploma in Shipping Technology

4. 12-Month Certificate & Associate Certificate in:
   (a) Marine Engineering
   (b) Nautical Science

5. Mandatory Maritime Safety Courses
   (Ranges from 1 day to 3 weeks)

6. Specialized Seamen Courses
   (Ranges from 1 week – 1 Year)

7. Customized Programmes
   (Ranging from 1-3 weeks)

8. Consultancy Services
   (Duration depends on the type and nature of the services required).

9. Bridging, Upgrading and Preparatory Courses for Examination and Certification of Competence.

10. Special Courses for Oil Industry Operators.

11. Manpower Development Short Courses covering shipping practice, port operations, marine insurance, maritime law and marine pollution prevention/control.

12. Others
   • Maritime Security Course
- Coxswain Management Course
- Marine Operators’ Course
- Lifeguard Course
- Short Courses for Dockworkers
- etc.

OBLIGATIONS/EXPECTATIONS OF THE ACADEMY:

**Customers**: Our customers shall:

  - Have the right maritime education and training provided in the Academy.
  - Fulfill their financial obligation to the Academy.
  - Provide feedback to the Academy of their performance, progress and achievement after the training in the Academy.

**Staff**: The staff of the Academy shall

  - Provide qualitative and appropriate education and training
  - Apply a systems approach to the teaching-learning process and a self correcting mechanism through feedback and continuous process evaluation.
  - Emphasize the total and proper development of the learner by the development of the cognitive, affective and psychometric domains and the provision of a conducive learning environment.
- Inculcate self confidence, discipline and good leadership qualities in the trainees.

**Management:** The Management shall:

- Maintain the right mix of staff in quality and in quantity
- Develop and retain a highly motivated workforce in a conducive work environment.
- Install a pragmatic, comprehensive and well-articulated staff training and development programme for improved productivity and efficiency.
- Encourage and enhance professionalism among its staff.
- Avoid wastefulness and ensure prudent management of resources.
- Be cost conscious and maintain a high degree of financial probity and accountability;
- Be competitive, innovative, interactive and proactive in meeting the training needs of the maritime and allied industries.
- Involve all employees in the attainment of the objectives of the quality standards system in order to achieve continuous improvement in all aspects of the institution’s training programmes.

**FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITIES:**

These two strata of government shall:
- Provide adequate security and conducive environment for teaching and learning.
- Provide funds to carry out both Recurrent and Capital projects for the upliftment of Academy.
- Formulate policies that will ensure growth and continuous improvement of the Academy.
- Carry out strategic plans, which will create competitive environment for the teaching-learning process.
- Provide funds for research and book publication that can benefit the Academy community and the nation at large.

The various stakeholders have various roles to play in the development of the Academy:

- The government is obliged to release running grants, provide for personnel emoluments and funds for capital projects.
- Some companies donate training equipment, also are employers of labour as and as well as Academy’s customers.
- The management and staff of Academy have the responsibilities of implementing policy decisions made by the Boards of the Academy and the Federal Ministry of Transport.

GRIEVANCES REDRESS MECHANISM AND HOW TO ACCESS IT
As a matter of policy, the end-users of the Academy’s products and services have a opportunity to send feedback (or complaints) to the Academy in respect of the institution’s products and services through questionnaires, which the Academy periodically sends out for completion. From an analysis of the questionnaires, the Academy is able to determine end-user needs and address them. Periodic interactive meetings with stakeholders and end-users of the Academy’s products and services also offer a platform to air grievances and seek redress. Indeed, aggrieved parties can also avail themselves of the usual channels of seeking redress, namely

a) Forwarding written complaints to the Heads of Department, Directors, Rector, Chairman of Governing Council, the Honourable Minister of State for Transport, the Honourable Minister, the National Assembly, or even Mr. President.

b) Complain to established organs of Government such as the Police, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, or the Public Complaints Commission.

Aggrieved persons can also use the electronic and print media to express their views or grievances.
ADDITIONAL COMMITMENT IN THE FORM OF COMPENSATION

IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE OF SERVICE DELIVERY

Compensation in the event of poor and non-commensurate on-the-job performance by a trainee who attended any of the Academy’s courses could take the form of:

- Re-training the trainee free of cost;
- Sending resource persons to conduct the training on-the-job for the affected trainee(s) and others. This will enable the trainers aptly relate the training to the job schedule and job environment for more effective results.

The feedback from the end-users is also used as input to effect remedial action in the teaching-learning process.

MARITIME DEVELOPMENTS IN NIGERIA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MARITIME ACADEMY OF NIGERIA

The sea is the lifeblood of any country – and indeed of any continent. Nations that trade get rich – and the more they trade, the richer they get. Apart from being the provider of trade routes, the sea provides food, commodities, income from tourism and even moderates the climate. However, these very attributes result in exploitation – and illegal activities – in the absence of control. In very
few cases are illegal acts perpetrated by neighbours – it is invariably by foreigners, who will continue to do so in a security vacuum. This will additionally impact on the cost of doing business, negatively impacting on trade and thereby on development and standard of living.

Of the fifty-four countries of Africa, thirty-nine are either littoral states or islands; therefore it is confidently expected that the continent is acutely aware of the impact of the maritime domain. The importance, for example, of maritime trade to the economies of African states and its potential contribution to economic development through the potential for employment opportunities, can be demonstrated by the simple statistic that almost 91 per cent of continental trade by volume went by sea in 2008. There is no alternative given the nature of the imports and exports and the totally inadequate overland infrastructure. The present rate of degradation of the road systems in Africa, in spite of conscious efforts to improve them, means that coastal trade is going to grow – supplementing the expected growth of international trade in commodities.

Africa’s fishing grounds are being pillaged; its coastal waters polluted and poisoned; and its marine environment destroyed. If these illegal and irresponsible actions are not stopped, Africa will starve. Why? Because very soon there will be no more fish; the population is increasing; agriculture is no longer
able to provide sufficient food; and importation of food is unaffordable because
the continent is becoming progressively poorer due to its inability to compete in
international maritime trade.

Maritime security is a key component of collective security and thus forms part
of the foundation for economic development. Africa is the only major region in
the world that does not have its own maritime policy or strategy, despite the
acknowledged importance of this component of any national or regional
economy. Given its unique continental needs, priorities and requirements, Africa
therefore needs to develop its own maritime strategy to promote economic
development for its people through improved maritime security, leading to
improved global competitiveness for its goods and services. A continental
security framework already exists in the form of the Common Defence and
Security Policy, and this should facilitate the inclusion of a maritime security
strategy without major policy changes, leading to the development of a wider,
more comprehensive maritime strategy that will unlock the economic potential
of the continent. What emerges is that Africa must decide how important its
maritime environment is – and allocate the required resources to ensure that this
asset is protected. By necessity, this must be done nationally, regionally and
continentially. It is accepted that given the relative absence of resources and
competing priorities, enhancing maritime capability will take time, but
developing the strategy that will guide the establishment of that capability should begin as soon as possible. The impact of inaction can be demonstrated by the attack on the French tanker Limburg off the Yemeni coast in 2002 which caused insurance premiums for the area to triple overnight; container traffic dropped almost 90 per cent; and an estimated 3,000 jobs were lost resulting in a cost of around US$15 million per month to the Yemeni economy. Research reveals that a great amount of valuable work in this domain has already been conducted. This extends from formal policy papers through regional strategy formulation to the resolutions adopted at the Sea Power Symposiums. In the longer term it will be important for these works to be collated and possibly integrated into a document that directs the continental approach to the challenge.

CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES TO AFRICAN SECURITY AND GROWTH: THE MARITIME ACADEMY OF NIGERIA LINK

Africa faces a variety of threats, which can be roughly grouped into ‘security’ and ‘non-security’ categories; both have an impact on economic growth. Security challenges:

- PIRACY
Over the last three years, close to 100 vessels have been seized by pirate gangs operating off the coast of Somalia and more than US$200 million has been paid out to hijackers. The piracy epidemic has militarised the Gulf of Aden. It has also highlighted the fact that Africa’s lack of maritime security capacity has forced Somalia and the African community to surrender maritime sovereignty – and the appropriate response – to the global community.

- **SMUGGLING**

Weapons, drugs and people smuggling (human trafficking) are major problems, particularly, but not exclusively, off the West African and Horn of Africa coasts. It has been estimated that an average of 300 Africans die every year during the hazardous and illegal crossings to Cape Verde, or in the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, as they venture in search of what they believe to be a better life. A variety of weapons and ammunition are smuggled through Africa’s porous land borders or through the maritime domain, fuelling existing conflicts. Finally, regarding the sensitive issue of drugs, not only does this constitute an increasing threat to stability and the social fabric of African societies, but Africa must accept international responsibility for addressing its role as a link in the global drug chain.

- **TERRORISM**

Considered as primarily a land-based challenge (most terrorist incidents, such as the infamous embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in
1998, have occurred on land), there is little doubt that there remains a high risk of terrorist incidents occurring at sea, or around coastal facilities such as ports and offshore oil wells.

- **BUNKERING**

Illegal oil bunkering – long prevalent in the Niger Delta – has become a sophisticated operation no longer requiring the collaboration of oil company staff to operate equipment at wellheads or provide access to pipeline junctions. The ‘bunkerers’ tap directly into pipelines away from oil company facilities and connect up to barges before transporting this oil to a receiving vessel. The downstream effect of this illegal activity is a major loss of revenue to the state, the generation of demand for illicit weapons and the escalation of violence in the area.

- **INSUFFICIENT COASTAL PROTECTION CAPACITY**

The African coastline has an approximate length of 31 000 km, including North and sub-Saharan Africa. The latter accounts for approximately 18 000 km. Given the naval resources at the continent’s disposal, it is impossible for the entire coastline to be permanently patrolled; but the littoral nations’ lack of coastal patrol vessels means that vast stretches of Africa’s coastline are, in effect, ungoverned spaces. Every African state faces specific challenges on its terrestrial and/or oceanic domain, and it is important to differentiate among them; but there is a group of challenges that are common to most. In general, it can be said
that a lack of specific domain vessels means that Africa’s coastlines are vulnerable to criminal activities, overfishing and environmental degradation.

- **LACK OF ‘DEEP WATER’ PATROL CAPACITY**

  True blue-water navies, ie navies with a global, deep-water operations capability, have been used for a variety of purposes: to protect maritime commerce and shipping; to support landward operations (expeditionary operations) in time of increased tension; to use sea power as a means of projecting economic power; to protect the coastal and oceanic domains from threats; and, in days gone by, to project ‘imperial’ power. For Africa, the priority must be to build up its coastal vessel capacity, but the continent also requires a significant regional capability, or the ability to operate out of sight of land and away from its home-base support. Some of the Horn of Africa pirates operate hundreds of miles from the coast and can only be successfully combated by deep-water ships.

**GROWTH CHALLENGES OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY**

- **SECURING INLAND WATERWAYS**

  Africa has approximately 300 000 km² of inland waterways (rivers, lakes, etc). Again, given the lack of naval assets, it is not possible to constantly patrol such a large area, but inland waterways face a similar range of security challenges to coastal and ocean areas, including piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing, gun-running,
trafficking in illicit goods and environmental degradation. Insecurity on the inland waterways is directly related to inter- and intra-state conflict, either as a cause or an effect. This has a ‘cascade effect’ on efforts to better integrate development efforts, particularly within the transport sector, leading to uncompetitive costs. Lack of control of the inland maritime superstructure costs Africa billions of dollars in lost revenue – which it can ill-afford. Arms smuggling and cross-border movement of paramilitary groups generate violence, heighten political instability and have a major negative effect on economic growth.

- INTER-STATE RESOURCE CONFLICTS

The demarcation of internal waterways has spurred a number of long-running disputes between member states of the AU. There are several examples: Botswana and Namibia have had differences over Kasikili (Sedudu) island; Congolese troops on the disputed Rukwanzi island attacked Ugandan prospectors who were conducting resource surveys in Lake Albert; and Migingo island is the subject of territorial claims by both Kenya and Uganda. As further discoveries are made of major mineral deposits, particularly where they extend across borders, inter-state tension will increase as a result of competition for access.

- INEFFICIENT AND INSECURE COMMERCIAL PORTS
The incapacity of commercial port structures to move imported and exported goods without delays and unjustifiable added costs results in prices that are uncompetitive on the global market. Anchorages and approaches that are poorly surveyed and dredged, coupled to outdated navigational information and non-functioning navigational aids, lead to increased danger to shipping and subsequent increased insurance costs.

- **SUB-OPTIMAL INTEGRATION OF ROAD RAIL, AIR AND SEA TRANSPORT NETWORKS:**

Regional organisations such as SADC, COMESA, IGAD and ECOWAS have made conscious efforts to liberalise continental trade, with varying degrees of success. Nevertheless, African countries generally face high transport costs, due to poor infrastructure and institutional deficiencies. High transport costs act as a form of taxation on profits generated by exports; they also increase the cost of imports. Insecure and/or inefficient port facilities are a major contributor to the high costs. Port facilities are the maritime component of what should be an integrated transport network that includes road, rail and port facilities. If one or the other element in this chain is deficient, it has a negative effect on the entire transport system. This in turn impacts on international trade and intra-African trade and development. Improved transport networks on land, sea and air are integral to Africa’s development, and also to Africa’s participation in the global
economy. The continent has a wealth of natural resources, but the weaknesses in infrastructure reduce the continent’s competitive advantage.

- **TOURIST INDUSTRY**

Africa has long advocated that tourism is a foundation stone of its continental economy. Blessed with an abundance of draw cards and diversity, the industry should prove to be an economic driver. However, the bulk of tourists to Africa are those from the richer economies who enjoy higher living standards – and expect these standards to be maintained to a large extent at their tourist destinations. This would include good port facilities, safety of passage, efficiency of personnel, low rates of crime, effective anti-pollution measures and environmental awareness.

**ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT IN NIGERIA**

- **THREATS TO AFRICA’S FISHERIES**

The fishing sector is divided into two sectors – capture fisheries, where fish are caught; and aquaculture, where fish are farmed or raised. Although aquaculture presently accounts for over 30 per cent of the world’s fish production, it is confined mostly to eastern Asia and, to some measure, to southern Africa. Most scientific opinion agrees that fish farming is the most logical and practical solution to meet the rapidly growing global demand for fish, and not the
traditional fishing grounds. These include over-fishing, poaching, and contamination of inland and ocean fisheries. Although estimates vary, it is estimated that Africa’s fishing industry earns the continent around US$10 billion annually through internal trade, global exports and fishing licences to foreign operators. The fisheries are also a key element in the provision of food, and any threat to the security of Africa’s fisheries is a fundamental threat to the food security of the continent. Aside from the spectre of potential widespread hunger, there are the ‘secondary’ effects of Illegal, Uncontrolled and Unreported (IUU) fishing – loss of state revenue and resulting job losses, poverty and the associated social problems like criminality, drug abuse and the erosion of community values. There is a strong opinion that it was the uncontrolled looting of the fishing grounds that has led directly to the emergence of piracy off the Somali coast.

- **NATURAL DISASTERS**

Floods or droughts have proved to be highly destructive, and generally the continent lacks the resources to tackle natural disasters, which may require mass evacuation initially, treatment of casualties, temporary shelter and also the capacity to rebuild the damaged infrastructure. To minimise the impact of natural disasters, it is a priority task to build a containment and reaction capacity.

- **CLIMATE CHANGE**
The threat of climate change with its accompanying violent weather is a challenge for Africa in the near future. Unseasonal weather conditions, including unusually prolonged droughts and recurrent flooding, have been experienced in the recent past, and this has serious implications for water security, agricultural areas adjacent to rivers and the fishing on which millions of Africans depend for their food. The changes are also affecting Africa’s demography, with more and more formerly rural Africans moving to the coastal regions and cities in search of employment. This will place stress on urban economies and escalate the incidence of financially related crime – and in many cases is already doing so. Arguably not an immediate priority, this threat to stability needs to be considered and methods found to mitigate the economic and societal effects of climate change.

PORTS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

Seaports constitute the hub of the maritime sector of a nation’s economy. For one thing, they are generally regarded as gateways between their hinterlands and forelands—the overseas territories to which they are linked by commerce and other elements. They thus serve as conduits in the exchange of merchandise between opposite ends of the intervening oceans. Moreover, without them, shipping and shipbuilding cannot exist and it is the capacity of a port that determines the volume and regularity of its shipping. Hence, our discussion will
focus largely on ports. However, ports do not exist for their own sake or as mere conduits of trade, but are expected to exert a developmental impact especially on their hinterlands. To be sure, a port has several hinterlands stretching from the port itself to as far as transport links and competing outlets permit. While the proximate hinterlands are likely to be captive to it, other areas may be contested by other ports depending on their differential access to transport facilities (Olukoju 1996b).

That said, a critical issue that is germane to our discussion is the potential of ports as growth poles. Do ports really generate development in their immediate or remote hinterlands? If so, what accounts for this or under what conditions can this be achieved? If such conditions are known, how can the developmental impact be optimised? In any case, what criteria should be employed to measure the developmental impact of ports and how reliable are they? With regard to the measurement of the economic impact of ports, the Canada Ports Corporation once developed a computerised Economic Impact Model, which supposedly ‘measures the economic benefits of the freight handling activities of [Canadian] ... ports on the local, provincial and national economies ... [and provides] a realistic and defensible assessment of the economic contributions of the ports’ (Tessier 1991:183). This assertion was based on certain observable results. Canadian ports were reported to have generated jobs (direct and indirect),
revenue, and personal income quantified in billions of dollars, which derived from port and related activities. However, critics have expressed doubts about the reliability and propriety of such measurements. Some contend that ‘port impact’ studies of this kind were designed by port authorities to justify or attract port investment. Others argue that it is misleading to attribute regional development to the ports, which are ‘only one element in a large number of producing and distributing systems’ which generate economic changes in a given region (Goss 1990:217). It may also be noted that accurate quantification of the regional impact of ports is difficult to achieve in the face of the diffusion (that is, of origins and destinations) of port traffic beyond the narrow confines of a region or nation. These foregoing criticisms should not be confined to ‘port impact’ studies as such but may be extended to the whole question of the significance attached to ports in economic development. Orthodox historians would naturally be wary of any explanation that ascribes sole or unduly exaggerated importance to a single causal factor: the pitfall of monocausal explanation. It is in this light that one should view the tendency to attribute developments generated in a region to either the geographical or transport factor. But as is indicated below, the human factor appears to be overwhelmingly important in this age of technology.
Whatever reservations that one may have about the reliability of the quantification of the social and economic impact of ports and their allied industries on the adjoining cities and regions, it is hardly debatable that port activities and shipping generate employment, and induce industrialisation and overall economic growth. The striking example of Maritime Industrial Developments Areas (MIDAs) in post-Second World War Europe aptly illustrates the immense growth-pole potentials of ports. Even so, it must be conceded that there is a symbiotic relationship between the port itself, on the one hand, and the port-city and port-induced industries, on the other. Economic boom or depression in either a port’s forelands or hinterlands immediately affects the port and the silting of the port or the loss of its comparative advantage to rival ports would be reflected in the fortunes of its hinterlands, particularly those that are dependent on it. A related issue is the role of human agency in these developments. Without prejudice to the now discredited thesis of environmental or geographical determinism, we may note that the development of the maritime sector and, indeed, of the wider economy, reflects the degree of the harnessing together of technological, political, economic, physical and other factors. However, what can hardly be controverted is that human agency can reverse or ameliorate the natural disadvantages of a port or initiate developments in its hinterland or foreland to the advantage or disadvantage of the port (Olukoju 1996c). This is most clearly manifest in the formulation and
implementation of policies which achieve port (re)development and foster shipping and industrial growth. Government is more suited to this sort of intervention because it has the capital that such large-scale works entail and it also has the capacity to absorb the impact of the long gestation of such low-return investments. It is capable of formulating policies reversing the natural disadvantages suffered by certain ports and regions.

THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE IN PORT AND MARITIME DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

The beginning of modern port development in Nigeria may be traced to the British occupation of Lagos, a notorious centre of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, in 1861, and the subsequent colonisation of the Nigerian hinterland. Lagos and Port Harcourt eventually emerged as the leading ports following extensive and expensive harbour works. At Lagos the most extensive works carried out during the colonial period (1861-1960) took place before the Second World War, while Port Harcourt was created from scratch (as in the case of Kashima) in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. The details of the harbour works have been provided elsewhere and need not delay us here (Olukoju 1992b, 1996a). We shall rather focus on maritime policy in terms of port development and administration from the colonial period to recent times. Port development
policy oscillated during this period from concentration to diffusion (Ogundana 1970, 1972). The former refers to a policy of concentrating investment in, and developing, a few ports, at the expense of the rest while the latter involved developing a multiplicity of seaport outlets. Such contraction and expansion reflected the prevailing global and local economic conditions which dictated the demand for shipping and port facilities. Hence, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, major public works (including harbour works) were suspended or deferred especially as the volume of maritime trade and shipping had contracted. Conversely, the optimistic outlook fostered by a trade boom (as in the immediate aftermaths of the two world wars) or the expectation of one, induced the formulation and implementation of port development projects.

In terms of the administration of Nigerian ports, policy was characterised, up to the mid-1950s, by a combination of duality of control and multiplicity of authorities. First, the duality of control meant that private interests such as the United African Company and the foreign shipping lines, specifically, Elder Dempster Shipping Line, controlled certain activities such as lighterage (Olukoju 1992a, 1992b, 1994, 2001-2002), and controlled certain ports (such as Burutu). Second, there was a multiplicity of authorities in the ports, especially the major ones like Lagos and Port Harcourt. Among these were the Railways, Customs, Port Engineering and Marine, each handling specific aspects of port operations,
such as tariff collection, transport, pilotage and harbour works. These
government departments were embroiled in an acrimonious inter-departmental
rivalry which impeded the effective coordination of services and port operations
(Olukoju 1992c). The management of the crisis entailed a series of investigations
and administrative reorganisation but it was not until the Nigerian Ports
Authority was established in the mid-1950s that a semblance of order was
established. Paradoxically, maritime administration in Nigeria has since
degenerated into a jungle of competing authorities hindering and meddling with
the efficient operation and administration of the ports.

By virtue of the Ports Act 1954 (Cap 55) of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria,
the Nigerian Ports Authority was established as the sole authority in control of
Nigeria’s ports in place of eight government departments. The NPA came into
being with jurisdiction over the operation of cargo-handling; maintenance,
improvement and regulation of harbours and approaches; dredging, pilotage
services, lighting and navigational aids, and related services. The NPA embarked
on indigenisation (‘Nigerianisation’) of its staff and the construction of a wharf
extension at Apapa and harbour works at Port Harcourt. Yet, within a decade, its
activities had come under the scrutiny of a commission of inquiry. The Justice
Beckley Tribunal found out that the NPA had engaged in redundancy and
jobbery in its appointments, and its operations had been bedevilled by ethnicity,
corruption and inefficiency. The civil war caused the enforced contraction of Nigerian maritime operations following the closure of eastern Nigerian ports such as Port Harcourt and Lagos became the only functional seaport. In 1969, the military government formally placed the ports of Warri, Burutu and Calabar, hitherto under private control, under the control of the NPA. The civil war was followed by the requirements of reconstruction and the oil boom in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Massive imports engendered by these developments resulted in unprecedented port congestion, characterised by the infamous cement armada whereby ships carrying cement stayed outside the ports in a long queue of vessels waiting to berth and offload their cargo. The country incurred huge losses in demurrage and damaged cargo, in addition to the unscrupulous dealings of some Nigerians and foreigners. The government then embarked on massive port development not only to cope with that exigency but in anticipation of increasing demand. But the slump of the 1980s forestalled the latter and left the country with under-utilised facilities. Meanwhile, port administration was undergoing certain changes which worked against efficiency and motivation of staff. First, the appointment of a military Port Commandant in the face of the port congestion of the 1970s eroded the influence and efficiency of the NPA Board, and breached the norms of due process and accountability. Second, the public sector reforms of the 1970s dampened the morale of NPA staff, who were now made to work under civil service conditions of service,
especially pay. Third, certain powers of the NPA were transferred to the Minister of Transport, who became the supervisory authority for the Authority. The consequence of these developments was that the NPA ‘moved from an autonomous status to that of a department of the Federal Ministry of Transport with its centralised control, no user representation advisory board and all the trappings of civil service bureaucracy’ (Ovbude 1991:276). These changes had wider and deeper implications for the NPA and the entire ports sector. The most striking is that the Authority was not consulted when the Ministry embarked on some important projects within its area of competence. This was the case with the Tin Can Island and Sapele ports. In the former case, adequate preliminary investigations were not carried out and, so, the NPA was saddled with dredging costs that would have been avoided. In the latter, the new port was too close to another at Warri, thus making it a white elephant project. The Sapele project and the construction of five berths (instead of the two recommended by the NPA) at Calabar were undertaken by the civilian government of President Shehu Shagari for political reasons.

A related policy thrust was the ‘commercialisation’ of port administration in Nigeria in the late 1980s. By Decree 25 of 1988, the NPA was listed among thirty-five state-owned enterprises slated for commercialisation. Ninety-two others were to be privatised. The aim was to make the NPA make profits on its
operations. Such a policy implied that the government would give the operators a free hand not only in day-to-day administration but in the setting of port charges and the collection of revenue. Unfortunately, the professed aim was never achieved, although the NPA (then renamed Ports PLC) was finally weaned off its dependence on state subventions as it succeeded in earning enough and making profits from its services to shipping and other port-users. However, the government never gave its officials a free hand at least to the extent of appointing the Authority’s Board of Directors and interfering in other ways. The NPA was never rid of political jobbery, sinecurism and large-scale fraud which had destroyed (or subsequently decimated) other government parastatals, such as the NNSL and Nigerdock, which were supposed to be financially solvent. In all, port development in Nigeria has had a measurable impact on city and regional development though the extent varies with each port. To be sure, the export processing zone developed around Calabar port in eastern Nigeria has yet to make the expected impact. A recurring factor in the decline of the port is that its natural hinterland is in the Republic of Cameroon. This has robbed it of a critical factor in its development, unlike the case at Lagos and Port Harcourt.

That said, the most profound case of port-induced urban and regional development has been that of Lagos, which generated a huge population
concentration in an adjoining metropolitan area that extends inland up to Ota, some forty-five kilometres to the north. Major developments at Apapa have also fostered an industrial zone that has grown in depth since the 1960s. Industrial zones have also sprouted at Ilupeju, Yaba and Ikeja as the port exerts its direct and indirect impact on its immediate hinterland. By 1971, the Lagos metropolitan area was dotted with six industrial estates. By 2000, functional estates included those at Apapa, Agidingbi, Amuwo Odofin, Gbagada, Iganmu, Ijora, Ikeja CBD, Ilupeju, Kirikiri, Matori, Ogba, Oregun, Oshodi/Isolo/Ijamasaja and Surulere (Light Industrial) (Akintola-Arikawe 1987:116, Table 6). The industrial estates at Ikeja and Mushin had owed their existence to the industrial policies of the Western Region government since the late 1950s but others too had developed since the 1970s. The extent of the impact of port development at Lagos may be judged by the rise and development of the Agbara and Ota-Ifo industrial estates in the ‘metropolitan shadow’ some twenty to forty kilometres away (Akintola-Arikawe 1987:125).

As well, the western railway linking Lagos with Ibadan and Kano, major urban, commercial and industrial centres, has also spread the impact of the port several hundred kilometres into the Nigerian hinterland. The same process has been replicated, though on a smaller scale, at Port Harcourt, the terminus of the eastern railway. The port literally created the city following its development in
the inter-war years (Anyanwu 1971; Olukoju 1996a). There, as in Lagos, the port serves as an industrial and commercial hub, and its hinterland extends to the administrative and commercial centres on the railway, like Aba and Umuahia.

A related issue is fleet development, which began in earnest with the establishment in 1959 of the Nigerian National Shipping Line (NNSL). The politics of that act has been studied elsewhere (Olukoju 2003) but it should be stated that the project was flawed from the start and it was, in any case, unlikely to have fared better given the hostile world in which Nigerian shipping had had to operate, and the unpatriotic and irresponsible management of the maritime sector of the Nigerian economy to date. Meanwhile, the NNSL tottered until it finally collapsed in the early 1990s, ironically in the immediate aftermath of the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Code on Liner Shipping which had sought to assist underdeveloped countries to gain a share of their maritime economy, especially the shipping trade (Karandawala 1989). The government of General Ibrahim Babangida had even proceeded to promulgate a National Shipping Policy (Decree 10 of 1987) to give effect to this code. The Decree established a National Maritime Authority as the clearinghouse of the maritime sector and the agency for the allocation of shipping space. Unfortunately, the basic precondition for meaningful participation by Nigerians
in the shipping business—an indigenous fleet—was lacking and when the government instituted a fund for fleet development—the Ship Building and Ship Acquisition Fund—that facility was simply turned into an open sesame to the looting of the treasury. The Fund was depleted and its beneficiaries not only failed to redeem their loans but merely bought scrap (worthless vessels) which were un-seaworthy. In the event, Nigerians could not utilise their forty per cent quota and merely fronted for foreign operators. The policy died a natural death and the NMA fell into the grip of a succession of incompetent and corrupt administrators who merely collect rent and fail to develop the mercantile marine or the maritime sector. The same verdict applies to the Nigerian Ports Authority, which, like the NMA, exists to collect rents on shipping. Similar unscrupulous leadership ran the NNSL aground while its counterparts in other parts of the Global South (Sri Lanka, for example) have managed to stay afloat (Dharmasena 1989; Iheduru 1996; Olukoju 2003).

INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Whatever decisions are taken regarding the formalisation or restructuring of an existing organisation or the creation and establishment of a new one, there are institutions that are integral to the status quo and will have to be carefully assessed to ensure that they are not disadvantaged by the proposed changes.
Additionally, there are institutions that have perhaps declined as a result of the very reasons that have encouraged the envisaged changes, and these should be considered as potential facilitators in effecting the changes.

**CHALLENGES FACING THE AFRICAN MARITIME INDUSTRY**

**MARITIME REGULATION**

The global shipping industry has been hard hit by piracy and the global recession. Shipbuilding contracts have been cancelled, while maintenance and port infrastructure costs are increasing. It is estimated that more than 30 of the major shipping companies will go into liquidation or receivership in 2009–10. This will leave a hole in maritime shipping that Africa will need to fill, to ensure that capacity in haulage, etc. is maintained. In addition, the crisis is an opportunity for African states and businesses to find a niche in regulatory security. Many ship owners are failing to pay for the ships that they already have, or have ordered. A number of ship operators are failing or refusing to operate the ships that they have on charter. This has led to the re-emergence of regulatory authorities and contract guarantors to assist claimants to get their money back. The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act is designed to clarify rights of states or companies in terms of commercial maritime liabilities. The Act
enables the arrest of ships to obtain security for claims to be pursued in arbitration abroad. South Africa has emerged as a leader in the field, but Africa as a whole could stand to gain by more proactive interventions. Ship owners are increasingly reluctant, or unable, to pay port fees, and there has been an increase in the number of ships’ crews (some of them African) that have not been paid or are in payment arrears. Taking the cue from South Africa, it is therefore important for Africans to ensure that they are paid for their maritime services by international operators. In addition, the recession shows that it is vital for Africa to acquire more commercial vessels and train the crews to run them. It will also be beneficial for Africa to invest in ship repair and maintenance facilities.

**PROCESS: MATCHING RESOURCES TO NEEDS**

The strategy must be the result of a stakeholder effort to ensure representation, contribution and commitment. It should address the requirement, ‘WHY’ a maritime strategy; the spectrum or field of the environment, ‘WHAT’ should be addressed and ‘WHAT’ is to be achieved. The subsequent phase will be to develop the implementation plan that will address ‘HOW’ it is to be achieved.

It is accepted that most African states are constrained by a lack of funds, or as mentioned earlier, by a lack of priority for maritime matters. In fact the two are closely interlinked and one invariably can be used to justify the other. The GDP
of sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 was some $691 billion – approximately the same as the Netherlands; only 7 countries, excluding South Africa and Nigeria, had a GDP in excess of $10 billion. It is very difficult to run a country on less than $10 billion – let alone make an allocation to maritime interests. However, it should also be recognised that inaction or abdication of action for whatever reasons, will contribute to an unaffordable situation with the passage of time. Additionally, it can be argued that Africa, despite its public pronouncements on common interests, has a tendency to think nationally. It is a continent of independent states with a measure of regionalism where this is of mutual or communal benefit. This mitigates against the development of regional solutions to problems – let alone continental solutions.

Although collaboration is increasing across many sectors in Africa, the underlying competition between nationalism, regionalism and continentalism sometimes makes regional/continental solutions more difficult to achieve.

ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE MARITIME INDUSTRY OF NIGERIA VIS-A-VIS MARITIME ACADEMY OF NIGERIA.

- MARITIME LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS

Africa’s national; bi-lateral; regional and continental maritime regulations need to be more coherent. The penalties for piracy, for example, must be the same wherever the offence is committed in African waters. International maritime
legislation and regulations also have to be taken into account to ensure continental and international legislation are not at variance with each other. A maritime regulatory framework will underpin and strengthen Africa’s maritime institutions. It will also reduce the likelihood of maritime conflicts of interest.

- **Naval forces**

African navies with more than ten operational vessels are the exception, and only South Africa has a genuine regional navy. Most of Africa’s littoral states have small, limited capacity comprising inshore or coastal patrol boats. In general terms, Africa will need to increase its inland and coastal waterway capacity, and create a collaborative or cooperative deep-water capability. This will entail more and better coastal patrol boats, and greater investment in ships and maritime patrol aircraft to assist in supervising and controlling marine borders. In summary, national and regional maritime resources will need to be better co-ordinated.

- **Coastal and port police forces**

More and better-trained coastal police forces (coastguards) will be required, particularly for countries that already face threats such as piracy; inland waterway-based military insurgency; and drugs, weapons and people trafficking, eg the Gulf of Guinea. Coastal and inland police are also integral to
environmental protection and to safeguarding tourist industries. In this regard, the police and other security forces may be the organisations best placed to accurately describe and motivate their resource requirements.

- Integrating maritime security into Africa’s overall security architecture:

Guided by the Constitutive Act of the AU, the Common Defence and Security Policy (CDASP) is a framework for implementing a collective African security strategy. The CDASP is primarily a land strategy that aims to enhance African development through security, as evidenced in the African Standby Force and the Regional Brigades. As one of the primary objectives of this policy, and its resultant organisations, is to address the need for continental Peace Support and Peacekeeping Operations (PSO/PKO) when required, a maritime strategy for Africa would need to consider its contribution to the CDASP. This could be achieved at the existing regional policy-making bodies, with specialist development by the associated regional maritime forums.

- SHARING OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

National and inter-state pooling of intelligence resources and information is already a major part of Africa’s collective security agenda. It will also be important for maritime security. Specific African countries already have bilateral
intelligence agreements with international partners such as AFRICOM, the EU, Interpol and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). Inter-African maritime intelligence resources will need to be identified and planning sessions will need to be held to see how best the limited resources can be optimised. The aim would not just be to contain military challenges, but to make environmental challenges, such as risk assessment and forecasting for environmental disasters, also fall within the provenance of maritime intelligence. Availability and easy access to a wide range of natural and human-activity data on the oceans is the basis for strategic decision-making on maritime policy. Given the vast quantity of data collected and stored all over Africa for a wide variety of purposes, the establishment of an appropriate maritime data and information infrastructure is of utmost importance. This data should be compiled in a comprehensive and compatible system, and made accessible as a tool for better governance, expansion of value-added services and sustainable maritime development. There is also a need for improved socio-economic data on the maritime sectors and coastal region as difficulties in obtaining this information are limiting the ability of regional stakeholders to develop rational, long-term plans and investments. This is a considerable undertaking with many dimensions, and will need to be developed according to a clear and coherent plan. The AU Commission should, in collaboration with lead nations in this field and international organisations, like the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO), the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO), and NGOs and/or civil society organisations, complement its processes, e.g. the multi-dimensional mapping of Africa’s waters, in accordance with IHO prescripts, in order to improve the access to quality data.

- **DISASTER RELIEF, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT**

As mentioned above, intelligence sharing will play an important role in predicting environmental crises. But securing Africa’s water environment will require specific scientific equipment and more trained personnel. Africa’s coastline faces serious environmental threats; for instance, the amount of fish in West African waters has diminished by up to 50 per cent over the past three decades. Coastal pollution off the West African and South African coasts has also increased by approximately 40 per cent in the former case and 30 per cent in the latter over the same period. Somalia faces the risk of massive coastal pollution if there is a collision or destruction of oil tankers; a threat heightened by the fact that ships are increasingly crowded into the dangerous waters off the Gulf of Aden. Inadequate planning in the development and utilisation of Africa’s coastline and the ocean floor (below the high water mark) has led, in many cases, to irreversible damage to the coastline – too often the sea is used as a dumping ground for untreated effluent because refuse removal from adjacent urban areas
does not exist and the streams running into the sea serve as a cheap and efficient alternative. Existing planning appears to focus on optimal land use with little consideration of how it may affect the sea and vice-versa with major consequences given the potential contribution of maritime transport, fishing, aquaculture, leisure activities, off-shore energy production and other forms of ocean floor exploitation. Many of the coastal wetlands and coastal forests have been lost, particularly on the coast of West Africa. Rivers and lakes are drying up due to climate change and human pressures, and are also becoming more polluted. It will therefore be important to quantify just how serious the environmental threat is at the national, regional and continental levels. Resource inventories can then be assessed and collective capacity building can be implemented to contain the problems. Maritime spatial planning is therefore a fundamental tool for the sustainable development of marine areas and coastal regions, and for the restoration of Africa’s seas to environmental health. Many countries in Africa do have a sound environmental planning regime, but more needs to be done to reverse the damage that has taken place. Responsible decision-making in this area lies with the member states and the necessary competencies need to be developed. A commitment to common principles and guidelines to facilitate the process in a flexible manner is required. This will help to ensure that regional marine ecosystems, that transcend national maritime boundaries, are recognised, respected and protected.
- **Continental collaborative mechanism**

The maritime strategy will need to be embedded within regional and continental organisational frameworks. Overall, it is the AU that should be the initiator of the process and the regulatory authority. But implementing the strategic vision that would have to be agreed to by the member states of the AU might be the task of specific regulatory and implementary bodies within the AU and regional organisations.

- **Commercial interface**

It is important to assess what resources are available in terms of maritime facilities. Maritime security must include the protection of maritime commerce and infrastructure. However, much of the infrastructure at ports is in need of upgrading, and the regional integration, repair and maintenance of transport networks will be a priority. This will necessitate reviewing both the physical infrastructure and the human capacity in order to improve efficiency, save time and cut costs.

- **International and legal responsibilities and requirements**

Most of the globally binding maritime security agreements are under the auspices of the UN and its maritime body, the IMO. Africa, like other global
stakeholders, is bound by a variety of international maritime treaties and conventions. The most important include UNCLOS. This convention is designed to regulate shipping and clarify the territorial jurisdiction of coastal states. UNCLOS recognises the right of ‘hot pursuit’ of suspect vessels in sovereign waters, provided the host country or region has agreed to this. Other global conventions include the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention (SUA) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). The ASEAN region has the South East Asia Regional Port Security Cooperative (SARPSCO). Africa may need to learn from the Asian and Latin American experience and craft maritime legislation and treaties that are appropriate for specific African needs and conditions (while also having international validity).

- **Soft infrastructure**

People, training and systems are required, as any strategy is only as good as the people who are tasked with implementing it. Human resource development is a fundamental component of any maritime strategy. This includes training for personnel in their specific tasks and how best to integrate their roles with personnel from commerce. Systems integration and technological upgrades may also be required. Public awareness of the inherent value of maritime resources is fundamental to success – and understanding the impact of human activities on
the maritime systems should lay the foundation for responsible utilisation of these disappearing resources. Credible information is essential in the forming of opinions therefore marine science, technology and scientific research will be required to educate students and the general public on the sustainable development requirements of the world without contributing to environmental degradation. Of pivotal importance to any continental maritime initiative is the visibility and image the AU generates for the maritime environment in Africa, and ensuring the perspective and approach to the oceans and seas is reflected in regard to Africa’s inland waters and the challenges faced by island states.

- **Maritime awareness and education**

Maritime training and education in both the commercial and naval sectors is vital for Africa’s development and security. Africa has a number of naval academies and educational institutions which provide training and develop maritime skills. There is also evidence of national and regional initiatives, however, more needs to be done to improve co-operation and funding for maritime education. It is also important to encourage the participation of land-locked states. The AU and regional bodies thus need to promote the design of a system providing Africans with better and wider career prospects in the maritime disciplines. This will include broadening the scope of maritime studies and enhancing the skills and qualifications for the maritime professions. During the development of this
document, valuable information has emerged of work in progress that should be exploited, the details of which have not been included here in the interests of brevity.

- **Budget**

There will need to be a costing for a maritime strategy. It is perhaps too early to say at this stage how this would be done. Much would depend on whether the maritime strategy is essentially incorporated into strategies and budgets that are already in place (for instance, if it were formally incorporated into the AU’s CDASP, then less budget revision might be needed). If the maritime strategy were more of a ‘stand-alone’ initiative, then it is likely that a larger, specific budget would need to be allocated.

**CONCLUSION**

Awareness of the importance of the maritime environment is evident, but unfortunately not at the level that would raise its profile or change its priority. The object of this initiative is to work towards this goal. The danger of addressing an all inclusive maritime strategy at the outset that would benefit the economies of the continent is that the task will appear and prove to be complex and daunting, reducing its chances of success. For this reason, it is argued that
this should be a cumulative process, commencing with those components that enjoy the highest priority and commensurate visibility. This will permit concentration of effort – of particular value where resources and funding can be expected to be in short supply. Developing and implementing a comprehensive African maritime strategy is not something that can be done overnight. It needs to be a consultative process and one that is rooted in the ethos of collective security and development. It is Africa, not its international partners that should be setting the agenda and outlining the vision. Moreover, international stakeholders often frame Africa’s maritime and general security challenges in apocalyptic terms. Threats are seen as nearly insuperable obstacles and Africa’s capacity to influence its own security is often downgraded. Developing an African-owned maritime security strategy will frame the challenges in an altogether more positive light and present an opportunity for the continent to control its own destiny.