At recent conferences on Confucianism, questions were often raised about Confucian attitudes toward women, usually by female scholars. Answers given on these occasions have typically been unsatisfactory. The issue is a complex one. On the one hand, Confucianism has an infamous past of oppressing women, which today’s Confucians cannot feel proud of. On the other hand, it does not appear that contemporary Confucian scholars are making headway in dealing with this problem. Obviously, if Confucianism is to remain a world philosophy and religion, it has to deal with this problem. We cannot expect a philosophy and religion to have a future if it is prejudicial against half of the human race.

Given the large extent to which Confucianism is being discussed today, it is surprising how little effort has been put into such an important issue. Early contemporary Confucians, such as Xiong Shili, Mou Zongsan, and Liang Shuming, simply did not deal with this subject. In the dawn of the twenty-first century, most contemporary Confucian scholars are supportive of equal rights for women, but there is little philosophical scholarship on this subject. This situation may be partly caused by a kind of historical guilt; it may be due to an unwillingness or inability to deal with a difficult issue; it may be the consequence of insensitivity or shortsightedness. Some Confucian scholars today may still feel it “unmanly” to engage in discussion of feminist concerns. I call this apparent psychological impasse the Confucian “gender complex.” This impasse is extremely detrimental to the cause of Confucianism, which is going through the process of transforming itself and moving into a new millennium. Confucianism must overcome this gender complex to flourish in the future.

We can tackle the issue of Confucianism and feminist concerns by asking three questions. First, has Confucianism oppressed women? Second, if yes, how much has Confucianism oppressed women? And third, what can be done about it? This article attempts to answer these questions.
In this article the term “Confucianism” is used to mean the philosophic-religious tradition that originated in Confucius and was further developed and sustained by scholars and supporters of later times in (mainly) China’s history. With this understanding there is little doubt that the answer to our first question of whether Confucianism has oppressed women has to be affirmative. The Han Confucian master, Dong Zhong-shu (179–104 B.C.E.), maintained that between the two principles that govern the universe, the *yang* and *yin*, *yang* is superior and *yin* is inferior. He said that “The husband is *yang* even if he is from a humble family, and the wife is *yin* even if she is from a noble family” (*Chunqiu fanlu*, Bk. 11, section 43). Therefore, between the husband and wife, the husband is superior and the wife inferior. The degrading attitude toward women became extreme during the period of Song-Ming neo-Confucianism. Zhu Xi (1130–1200), the prominent neo-Confucian, advocated the “Three Bonds,” which asserts the ruler’s authority over the minister, the father over the son, and the husband over the wife. Commenting on whether poor widows could get remarried, another prominent neo-Confucian, Cheng Yi (1033–1107), said that it is a small matter to starve to death, but a large matter to lose integrity, implying that widows getting remarried are immoral (whereas it is acceptable for widowers to remarry). This degrading and oppressive attitude toward women translated into oppressive practices in reality. During the Ming dynasty the doctrine of “chaste widowhood” became an official institution. Women who kept their widowhood were officially honored and their families were exempt from official labor service. Consequently, tremendous pressure was put on young widows not to remarry. The notorious practice of women’s foot-binding was also institutionalized during this period and lasted till the early twentieth century.

In defending the Confucian doctrine of the role of men and women as that of the external (**wai**) and the internal (**nei**), Lin Yutang writes

> Confucianism saw that this sexual differentiation was necessary for social harmony, and perhaps Confucianism was quite near the truth. Then Confucianism also gave the wife an “equal” position with the husband, somewhat below the husband, but still an equal helpmate, like the two fish in the Taoist symbol of *yin* and *yang*, necessarily complementing each other. It also gave the mother an honored position in the home. In the best spirit of Confucianism, this differentiation was interpreted, not as a subjection but as a harmony of relationships.⁴

Lin claims that the deprivation of women’s rights outside the home is “unimportant” compared with their position in the home:

> In the home the woman rules. No modern man can still believe with
Shakespeare that “Frailty, thy name is woman.”... Close observation of Chinese life seems to disprove the prevalent notion of women’s dependence. The Chinese Empress Dowager rules the nation, whether Emperor Hsienfeng [Xianfeng] was living or not. There are many Empress Dowagers in China still, politically or in common households. The home is the throne from which she makes appointments for mayors or decides the professions of her grandsons.  

Lin concludes that in real daily life, Chinese women “have not been really oppressed by men,” and that “the so-called suppression of women is an Occidental criticism that somehow is not borne out by a closer knowledge of Chinese life.”

Lin’s account does not do justice to the historic facts of women’s oppression by men in Confucian patriarchal society. It is true that women had power inside the home. But this power is not nearly comparable to (ruling class) men’s power in the society. Women’s power inside the home in ancient China may be compared to the power of contemporary women’s beauty in the West: It functions within the patriarchal power structure which ultimately benefits men.

II

Now the second question: How much have women been oppressed by men under Confucianism? This question is not as easy to answer as the first one. One may find countless stories of women’s oppression in the history of China. But it is one thing to accept the oppression of women as an undeniable fact in the history of China; it is yet another to say that oppression was all that occurred there. While accepting the fact of the oppression of women, one may still argue that Chinese women were not as powerless as they have often been portrayed. This does not only mean that women, mainly mothers-in-law, had power inside the home; the fact that such females as Lü Hou (241–180 B.C.E.) Wu Zetian (624–705), and Ci Xi (Empress Dowager, 1835–1908) ruled China with an iron arm indicates that Chinese gender relations could not have been merely a matter of men oppressing women.

There is also evidence that some Chinese women lived married lives that can be characterized as harmonious and equal. The Song female poet, Li Qingzhao (1081–1140), recorded a description of her relationship with her husband that was so revealing that it deserves to be quoted at length:

When a book was bought, he and I would always read it together, mending the text, repairing the manuscript, and writing the captions. And when a painting or a bronze vessel was brought home, we would also together open it, play with it, study its merits, and criticize its
defects. Every evening we studied together till one candle was burned up. . . . Every evening after supper, we would sit together in the Kuei-lai Hall and make our own tea. We would wager against each other that such and such a quotation was to be found on a certain page in a certain chapter of a certain book. We must number the exact line, page, chapter, and volume, and then check them from the bookshelves. The winner was rewarded by drinking the first cup of tea. But when one of us did win, one was so happy that one’s hand trembled with laughter and the tea would spill all over the floor. So the first cup of tea was rarely drunk. We were resolved to grow old and die in such a little world of our own.9

Reading these words, one cannot help comparing this husband–wife relationship to any harmonious relationship between equal partners, ancient or contemporary. It indeed existed. But one should not take this as the norm. The challenge, then, is how to give a holistic account of gender relations in the history of China.

It is fair to say that scholarship on this subject in the past one hundred years has not been a balanced one. Most scholars of Chinese women have concentrated on exposing the misery of Chinese women in traditional China, particularly under Confucianism. In doing so, their works have in effect portrayed Chinese women as nothing but miserable victims. These works cannot be said to have told the whole story about Chinese women.

In the 1990s, a different voice in the realm of scholarship on Chinese women started to rise. In a 1992 article historian Li Yuning maintains that Confucian philosophy itself was not exclusively antiwomen; as in the cases of other major traditions, Confucianism has its favorable as well as its unfavorable consequences with regard to the position of women.10 She argues that some Confucian ideas have actually helped improve women’s position. For example, Confucians believed that everybody could improve through education and self-cultivation regardless of one’s birth status and social background. They also believed that the rules of li (“propriety”) should be adjusted to changing times and circumstances; therefore, the respective roles of men and women were subject to change as conditions changed. Li Yuning traces the modern favorable changes of Chinese women’s status to its roots in tradition, particularly the Confucian tradition.

In a pathbreaking work Dorothy Ko shows that literate gentry women in seventeenth-century Jiangnan (south of the Yangzi River) were far from oppressed or silenced. Being a de facto household manager, the housewife had ample opportunities to influence family affairs. Ko maintains that the power of the Confucian ideological and cultural tradition is at once a constraint and an opportunity for privileged women; we cannot assume that these women were extraneous to the Confucian tradition. Even though they were oppressed and constrained
in many ways, it is more valid to recognize them as intrinsic to that tradition.\textsuperscript{11} She argues, “The invention of an ahistorical ‘Chinese tradition’ that is feudal, patriarchal, and oppressive was the result of a rare confluence of three divergent ideological and political traditions—the May Fourth–New Culture movement, the Communist revolution, and Western feminist scholarship.”\textsuperscript{12}

Susan Mann also challenges the stereotyped scholarship in which Chinese radicals and Westerners alike saw Chinese women as oppressed victims of a “traditional culture” who were liberated only by education and values imported from the West. She criticizes this mentality for binding up the study of Chinese women to a “response-to-the-West” paradigm, and has confronted students of Chinese history with an Orientalist view of gender relations.\textsuperscript{13}

Lisa Raphals’s recent study shows that women in early China were often represented in ancient literature as intellectually adroit, politically astute, and ethically virtuous, directly countering the familiar image of Chinese women as eternally oppressed, powerless, passive, and silent. She questions some tacit assumptions among China scholars about philosophical activity in ancient China, which are often based on transhistorical generalizations and essentialized normative concepts, “Confucian” or otherwise. Consequently, she poses some challenging questions: Can we assume, for example, that the readers, writers, and audience of Chinese philosophical works, at all times, were men? Can we assume that references to “people” (\textit{ren})\textsuperscript{1}, including a range of “sages” and “developed individuals,” inevitably referred to men?\textsuperscript{14} Her study presents negative answers to these questions.

These authors by no means deny that Chinese women have been oppressed, nor do they intend to defend Confucianism’s deplorable practices in regard to women. Their studies of Chinese women, however, serve as a strong corrective to the common image of Chinese women as universally victimized. Reading their works along with works on Chinese women’s oppression by men, one may answer our second question this way: While Confucianism’s oppression of women was quite severe—indeed undeniably severe—it must have left some room for women’s moral cultivation and even social participation. Such room, however limited, may be expanded as the times change.

III

Such an answer to the second question may lead to an answer to the third and last question: What can be done about Confucianism’s oppression of women? The answer to this question has a practical as well as a
philosophical dimension. Practically speaking, Confucianism (or more accurately, people under the influence of Confucianism) must change its behavior and attitude toward women. It is fair to say that much improvement has been made for women in the last half century, even though there is still some way to go. Philosophically speaking, we need to explore common ground between Confucianism and feminism and find out whether Confucianism is able conceptually to accommodate women’s equality. In the 1990s, some writers started to look for a philosophical convergence between Confucianism and feminism.

In my article “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study” (1994), I have argued that Confucianism and feminism, though dissimilar in many aspects, share similar ways of thinking in ethics. There I outline several parallels between Confucian ethics and care-oriented feminist ethics, in contrast to Kantian and utilitarian ethics. First, as moral ideals, *jen* (*ren*) and care share an important similarity. Through an analysis of the Confucian concept of *jen*, I argue that this concept carries a strong caring orientation; they both focus on the tender aspect of human relatedness. Second, in contrast to Kantian and rights-based moral theories, both Confucians and feminists advocate the conception of human beings as socially connected individuals, not as disinterested, separate individuals. Third, both ethics emphasize situational and personal moral judgment as well as character-building, instead of rule-following. Wary of rigid general rules, they both allow flexibility in moral practice, and regard the ability to make moral decisions under particular circumstances as an important aspect of a person’s moral maturity. Finally, Confucian ethics advocates “love with gradations.” Because the self is socially constructed and defined, a person has more obligations toward relatives or more closely-connected people than those who are unrelated or less closely connected. Specifically, one’s obligations toward parents and family members are greater than obligations toward nonrelatives. Some feminists think along the same lines. They argue that care starts with people around the caring person, and then expands to people further away. Both agree that, if there were no gradations, one would fail in one’s obligations toward people around him or her.

If the Confucian *ren* ethics has a care orientation, how could it have oppressed women? There are two ways to explain the apparent discrepancies between Confucianism’s care orientation and its women-oppressive past. One account is that early Confucians (Confucius and Mencius) were not as supportive of values degrading women as were some later representatives of the tradition, such as the Han Confucian, Dong Zhongshu, and other Song-Ming neo-Confucians. The women-oppressiveness of Confucianism may have been a supplementary attitude added on by
later Confucians to the core doctrines outlined by Confucius and Mencius. Another account points to the restrictive application domain of ren in the Confucian tradition in general. Just as sexist interpretations of democratic principles in ancient Athens denied women political rights, and racist interpretations of Christianity denied blacks brotherhood and sisterhood, sexist interpretations of ren and other core values of Confucianism may have been responsible for excluding women in ancient China. It does not, however, necessarily imply that the concept of ren itself is sexist. I conclude that given the philosophical similarities between Confucianism and feminism, the two may render support to each other and become allies in pursuing their ideals.

In his essay, “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self: Some Parallels and Their Implications” (1997), Henry Rosemont, Jr., notes some parallels between classical Confucianism and contemporary feminism, parallels similar to those already mentioned above in my own article. While readily acknowledging that Confucius and his followers were sexist, Rosemont maintains that the thrust of this tradition was not competitive individualism, which is associated in the West with the masculine, but rather other-directed nurturing, which is associated throughout Western history with the feminine. He argues that because sexism revealed in classical Confucian writings was characteristic only of gender structure (patterns of social organization), not of gender symbolism or gender identity, it is possible to reconstruct Confucian philosophy in ways that a great many feminist thinkers might endorse. Therefore, the feminist demand for gender equality may well be brought into Confucianism without distorting its basic insights and precepts. Confucianism may be modified to accord with contemporary feminist moral sensibilities.

It should be noted that neither Rosemont nor myself endorses a gendered virtue theory. To the contrary, our studies show that ethical virtues which have been associated with women in the West are in fact not gendered. If we are correct in our assessment of the philosophical convergence between Confucianism and feminism, then Confucianism will be able to accommodate feminist demands not only out of political necessity but also based on philosophical affinity.

In a recent article “Confucianism and Feminism,” Terry Woo suggests that Confucius should not be condemned as a misogynist and primary oppressor of women, but in his uncritical adherence to the traditional norms of sexual segregation and male authority, Confucius may be judged an accomplice to the continued cultural minimalization of women. Woo takes the common thread of feminism to be, as Karen Offen puts it, “the impetus to critique and improve the disadvantaged status of women relative to men within a particular cultural situation.”
But unlike Henry Rosemont and myself, Woo regards feminism as a force to fight for rights and individual choices, whereas Confucianism emphasizes duty and self-cultivation. Therefore, she maintains that Confucianism in its core values is at odds with feminism. Nevertheless, like Li Yuning, Woo sees two principles in Confucianism, namely an equal opportunity to learn and an attitude of openness and flexibility, which do not in principle contradict feminism; in fact, these are where the two philosophies converge and they are most able to reinforce each other. Woo calls for an end to the one hundred and fifty years of a relatively one-sided affair between Confucianism and feminism, namely feminism criticizing Confucianism. She suggests that at this time when the issue of race or charges of racism are threatening the integrity of feminism, an appropriation of ren and a better understanding of the history of Confucianism offer a sense of cultural recovery for Chinese feminists and a better understanding and inspiration for non-Chinese feminists.

It is encouraging that the prominent contemporary Confucian, Tu Wei-ming, has also started addressing this issue. It may be an indication that the contemporary Confucian movement has finally started to take feminist concerns seriously. In his essay “Probing the ‘Three Bonds’ and ‘Five Relationships,’” Tu differentiates the “Five Relationships” in Confucian humanism and the “Three Bonds” in politicized Confucianism. The “Five Relationships,” first advocated by Mencius, are love between father and son, duty between ruler and subject, distinction between husband and wife, precedence of the old over the young, and trust between friends. These are important elements of Confucian humanism. The “Three Bonds,” namely, the authority of the ruler over the minister, the father over the son, and the husband over the wife, emerged in Confucian literature almost four centuries after Mencius’s Five Relationships. Tu maintains that the psychocultural dynamics of the Confucian family lies in the complex interaction of these two ideals. Tu argues that the idea of the Three Bonds is a deviation from the spirit of Mencius’s Five Relationships and therefore should not be confused with the latter. Unlike the conception of the husband–wife relationship in the Three Bonds, Mencius’s idea of the distinction of the husband and wife is based on the principle of mutuality; the underlying spirit is not dominance, but division of labor. According to Tu,

It is not true that the Confucian wife is “owned” by the husband like a piece of property. The wife’s status is not only determined by her husband’s position but also by her own family’s prominence. By implication, her ultimate fate is inevitably intertwined with the economic and political conditions of her children, both sons and daughters. While in the domestic arena, the husband’s influence may also prevail, especially
in extraordinary situations when vital decisions are made, such as the selection of tutors for sons’ education, the wife usually wields actual power on a daily basis . . . The Confucian wife is known for her forbearance, but her patient restraint is often a demonstration of inner strength. While her purposefulness may appear to be overtly and subtly manipulative, she has both power and legitimacy to ensure that her vision of the proper way to maintain the well-being of the family prevails; for the wife is not subservient to the husband, but is his equal.24

Tu suggests, however, that it may be simple-minded to completely separate the Three Bonds and the Five Relationships. He holds that the Five Relationships served as an ideological background for the Three Bonds, and so a sophisticated understanding of the Three Bonds must involve adequate appreciation of the Mencian conception of the Five Relationships. Tu’s article is a short one. But it may signify that after a longtime “one-sided affair,” Confucianism has finally started to “talk back” to its feminist critics.

One may say that these philosophical essays more or less answer our third question this way: In many ways Confucianism is compatible with feminism. Indeed, it can accommodate feminists’ demand for sex equality, and it must do so. These philosophical studies, though still preliminary, open doors to further explorations that may help Confucianism come to terms with feminism.

IV

In the recently published volume The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, authors of philosophy, religious studies, history, literature, Asian studies, and interdisciplinary studies answer our three questions from various perspectives.25 While all take a critical stand against Confucianism’s oppression of women, their studies shed new light on some important issues.

Several authors find that the view of women during such early times as the Han period, and in early Confucian texts, does not degrade women. Various sources such as the Book of Odes, Guoyu, Zuozhuan, and Gujin Renbiao both criticize vicious women and praise virtuous women, and they typically allow women to participate meaningfully in the Confucian project, reserving places in the pantheon of moral paradigms for heroines as well as heroes. Women had not been considered inferior in the aretaic sense. Paul Goldin concludes that it is unjustified to simplistically say that Confucianism considers women inferior to men. Michael Nylan compares ancient Greek and Han Chinese elite women. She points out a main problem in stereotyping ancient elite Chinese women—that limited prescriptions for women in classical Chi-
nese (mainly Confucian) texts, prescriptions that were themselves the subject of considerable debate, have all too naively been read as accurate historical descriptions of women. She argues that the stereotypes of ancient China do not come from ancient historiographers, but rather from relatively recent sources, namely the neo-Confucians and the May Fourth reformers, both of whom for different reasons preferred to assume the existence of rigid gender roles among cultured elites in antiquity, as well as the continuity of an ultra-stable traditional Chinese culture. Her study shows that, just like Han elite men, Han elite women were lauded for their education, physical courage, loyalty to family, and attention to ritual. Sandra Wawrytko’s study of sexuality in early times reveals a picture of gender roles and relationships much more complicated than that of the stereotyped women in Confucian China. She suggests that during the early times in China, there was a Confucian–Taoist continuum rather than an opposition on the view of women. Her survey of sexuality throughout Chinese history shows that gynophobia, as a backlash to counter perceived female power, came later in history. This study sheds important light on the historical background of Confucianism and helps us understand early Confucians’ attitudes toward women.

Lisa Raphals shows that historical narratives from the Warring States and Han periods, such as Gujin Renbiao (Table of Ancient and Modern Persons) and Lienü Zhuan (Collected Life Stories of Virtuous Women) represent women as possessing the same capacities for wisdom, practical intelligence, and moral reasoning as men do. She argues that this testimony cannot be extended to Confucianism, however. Raphals contends that although the authors of these narratives are Confucians, the stories they convey are not necessarily Confucian. This position is debatable: When Confucians write about exemplar virtuous women, it only makes sense that these women exemplify Confucian virtues and that these stories represent Confucian ideals and values. Raphals and other authors all agree that Confucianism became oppressive to women at later stages.

On the more theoretical side, several authors investigate common ground between Confucianism and feminism. Joel Kupperman maintains that the deepest questions of feminist ethical philosophy have to do both with the ways in which roles or the expectation of roles enter into the formation of self, and with the choices about it that can or should be open. He argues that there is convergence between Confucian ethical philosophy and feminist concerns about social roles, rituals, and the formation or revision of self. Both Confucianism and feminism take seriously the ethical importance of becoming a certain kind of person, and this implies reflection on ways of shaping oneself and also on the shaping of others to come. Both also have an orientation that emphasizes responsibilities. Although Kupperman agrees with Chen-
yang Li on the similarities between Confucian ethics and feminist ethics, he maintains that there is also a major difference between the two: Whereas Confucianism largely bases itself on tradition, feminism opts for reforming tradition. Nevertheless, Kupperman argues that the historical baggage of Confucianism’s hierarchical roles and gender relations is largely or entirely disposable; indeed, the essential insights of Confucianism can be formulated without it.

Philip J. Ivanhoe finds that two prominent Confucian philosophers, Mencius and Xunzi, hold views similar to the gendered virtue and vocational virtue positions that can be found in contemporary feminist ethical theory. The gendered virtue view maintains that, by nature, women have greater resources for and tendencies to see and appreciate ethical situations in terms of their particularity and context, and in terms of interpersonal relationships. By relying primarily on their feelings and intuitions as opposed to objective and rational rule-following, women purportedly are able to make more reliable ethical judgments. The vocational virtue view maintains that the distinctive ethical tendencies demonstrated by women are the result of the particular social roles and norms that women have been allocated under systematic oppression by patriarchy. Mencius’s and Xunzi’s ethical theories of virtue ethics respectively resemble these two views. Ivanhoe concludes that a meaningful dialogue between Confucianism and feminism is possible in constructing a more adequate and just philosophical position. Through a comparative study of the Ming Confucian philosopher Li Zhi (1527–1602) and John Stuart Mill, Pauline Lee offers a Confucian feminist critique of liberal feminism. She argues that Confucianism has its own distinctive expression of feminism which focuses on self-cultivation. While liberal feminists view legal reform as the most effective tool for overcoming gender inequality, and Marxist feminists conceive of the subversion of capitalist social structures as the prime method for overturning the subjugation of women, Li Zhi, a Confucian feminist, understands the process of self-cultivation to be the most effective strategy for addressing the problem of patriarchy.

David Hall and Roger Ames argue for the importance of understanding the Chinese correlative model. In correlative understanding, gender is fluid and lacks exclusivity; the sexist problem is one of degrees of disparity rather than strict inequality, for males and females are created as a function of difference in emphasis rather than difference in kind. Correlativity more easily promotes the redefinition of roles and gender characteristics than does the dualistic model. Therefore, even though in practice the weight of tradition is a formidable obstacle to the instantiation of such redefinitions, it is still plausible to assume that, in the absence of transcendental commitments to the contrary, alterations in
practice may be more easily made if there are concomitant changes in cultural attitudes and practices that reinforce sexual inequalities.

Along similar lines, Ingrid Shafer highlights the tendency toward “both–and” rather than “either–or” thinking in Chinese traditions, and argues that in the absence of Western spirit–matter and soul–body dualism, Confucian philosophy considers human beings not primarily as rational persons, but as persons distinguished by a conjunction of heart and mind, affection and reason, compassion and cognition, love and intellect. This characteristic makes Confucianism an ally as well as a philosophical resource in the feminist ecological movement, which emphasizes harmony rather than conflict between humanity and nature.

Like the authors whose works we explored earlier, none of the authors in this volume denies that Confucianism has oppressed women, none regards this oppression as excusable, and none deems it acceptable for Confucianism to continue this practice. Nevertheless, from historic and philosophical perspectives these authors show important resources in Confucianism, which may help this tradition to accommodate women’s legitimate concerns. This is not about defending Confucianism; it is not a backward-looking endeavor. On the contrary, it is essentially a forward-looking perspective. While fully acknowledging the injustice Confucianism has brought to women, reexamining historic facts, and looking into its philosophical convergence with feminist ethical thinking, we may reveal the potential for Confucianism to endorse women’s equality. The observations made in these studies could serve as a starting point for Confucianism to address feminist concerns, and for Confucianism to overcome its “gender complex” and eventually come to terms with feminism.

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Endnotes

1. This article overlaps with my Introduction to The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, edited by Chenyang Li (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 2000).


3. Dong may or may not have written these statements, but they are undoubtedly statements by Han Confucians. For the question of whether Dong wrote all chapters in Chunqiu fanlu, see Sarah Queen, From Chronicle to Canon: The Hermeneutics of the “Spring and Autumn,” According to Tung Chung-shu (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
5. Ibid., p. 145.
7. Ibid., p. 145.
12. Ibid., p. 3.
18. Ibid., p. 117.
19. Ibid., p. 111.
20. Ibid., p. 137.
**Chinese Glossary**

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