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Article
The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes: Progressive Ambition and Legislative Behavior in Uruguay
Legislative Studies Quarterly (2014)
  • Daniel Chasquetti
  • Juan P Micozzi, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Abstract

How do legislators develop reputations to further their individual goals in environments with limited space for personalization? In this article, we evaluate congressional behavior by legislators with gubernatorial expectations in a unitary environment where parties control political activities and institutions hinder individualization. By analyzing the process of drafting bills in Uruguay, we demonstrate that deputies with subnational executive ambition tend to bias legislation towards their districts, especially those from small and peripheral units. Findings reinforce the importance of incorporating ambition to legislative studies and open a new direction towards the analysis of multiple career patterns within a specific case.

Keywords
  • Ambition,
  • Legislators,
  • Congress,
  • Political Parties
Disciplines
Publication Date
2014
Citation Information
Daniel Chasquetti and Juan P Micozzi. "The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes: Progressive Ambition and Legislative Behavior in Uruguay" Legislative Studies Quarterly Vol. XXXIX Iss. 1 (2014)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/chasquetti/23/