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Mapping Chineseness on the landscape of Christian churches in Indonesia

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Scholarship on the Chinese Indonesian community has largely been concerned with the tensions between the community and the majority non-Chinese (or pribumi). The fault lines were usually examined against the background of Suharto’s assimilation policy, the 1998 anti-Chinese riots, the stark imbalance of the nation’s wealth within this minority group, and Chinese loyalty – or chauvinism – in the time of nation-building, and in the face of the rise of modern China. Little attention has been given to Christianity as offering a shelter for the inconspicuous propagation of Chineseness; particularly in terms of the conduct of services in Chinese, the teaching of the language, and business-management leadership. The network of Chinese churches locally, and extending internationally beyond Indonesia, represents a rich field for further scholarship. This article sets out an epistemological map in the service of such research.

Keywords: Chinese Indonesians; Christianity; Indonesia; Chineseness; identity; religion

Interest in the study of Chinese Indonesians grew during Suharto’s New Order period (1966–1998) owing to the discourse on the ‘Chinese Problem.’ Scholars researched on the history of the Chinese in Indonesia and the community’s response to the New Order assimilation policy. The role of the Chinese in the nation’s economy also came under scrutiny because much of indigenous resentment centered on the concentration of wealth within the minority group. Interest in the study of the Chinese Indonesians was renewed after the 1998 anti-Chinese riots when the research focus shifted to issues relating to violence, politics, identity, and, in the wake of the rise of China, to the post-Suharto renaissance of Chinese culture, language, media, and religions. This author proposes that the lack of scholarly attention paid to the study of Chinese Christians in Indonesia is conspicuous for the importance of the subject with regard to the notion of Chineseness in the Chinese Indonesia community. Chinese conversion to Christianity is a rich field for the study of identity politics.

During the New Order, the Suharto administration actively promoted religious affiliation to prevent the re-emergence of Communism. Many Chinese considered that joining an officially recognized religion afforded them the best protection against persecution. Christianity was a most suitable choice because the religion did not bear the stigma of being Chinese. Indeed, for the Chinese minority who were subjected to forced assimilation and oppression of their culture, Christianity offered a new identity. Consequently, Christianity experienced a boom with the mass conversion of ethnic Chinese.

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churches, however, have maintained a very low profile in their expression of Chinese identity because of the assimilation policy. Soleiman and Steenbrink argue this reticence is a reason why there never was a development toward a ‘truly contextual Chinese Christianity,’ although, ‘a Chinese ethnic identity cannot be concealed, and ethnicity remains a very important factor in Indonesian society’. This partly explains why Chinese Christianity has not attracted much scholarly attention.

According to the 2000 Census, approximately 35% of Chinese Indonesians are Christians (both Protestants and Catholics). This figure comes only after Buddhism that accounted for around 54%. Remarkably, the Chinese Christian population increased to almost 43% in the 2010 Census, most likely because of conversion in Pentecostal-Charmistic churches, the fastest growing denomination in Indonesia. Despite almost half of the Chinese population in Indonesia are Christians, there is a tendency not to view Christianity as a Chinese phenomenon. This is because Christianity is not naturally considered indigenous to the ethnic Chinese compared to ‘traditional Chinese’ religions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, and the Tridharma (Sam Kauw – a syncretism of Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian practices). However, although this may explain why scholarship on the religions of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are confined largely to the study of more explicitly ‘Chinese’ religions, it does not explain why the study of Chinese Muslim community, which accounts only for a little more than 5% of the Chinese population in Indonesia, has received disproportionately more attention in the literature compared to the Chinese Christians. This is in addition to the fact that besides being more numerically significant, the members of Chinese Christian community is also much more diverse and has a more complex ethno-religious landscape than its Chinese Muslim counterpart.

In fact, it is not only Chinese churches that have been neglected; Christianity in Indonesia itself is an understudied topic. The field of religions in Indonesia is dominated by the sheer size of the population of Muslims, which, according to the 2010 population census, represent 87% of the Indonesian population. Outside this group, Christians form the second largest religious group in the country and represents the largest concentration of members of minority ethnic groups with 7% of the population represented by Protestants, 3% by Catholics, less than 2% Hindus, and a smaller percentage Buddhists and Confucianists. Despite the importance of Christianity as a minority religion, there has been little published work in English on the subject. We have had several monographs of ethnographic research on various Christian ethnic minorities, but had to wait till 2008 for the publication of a comprehensive tome, a gap suitably filled by the impressive 1000-page volume, *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, edited by Aritonang and Steenbrink. If Christianity in Indonesia has not been sufficiently considered, works published in English on Christianity among the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are even scarcer. Chinese churches have played a significant, although subtle role in shaping the identity, culture, business, and communal life of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, yet scholarly literature on the Chinese Christians in Indonesia is limited to only one unpublished PhD thesis, two monographs and a handful of book chapters and journal articles.

It is commonly perceived that only Buddhist and Chinese temples played a role in preserving Chineseness when the Chinese culture was under the threat of erasure during the New Order. The agency and contribution of Chinese Christian churches, particularly, the Protestant churches, in maintaining Chineseness has largely been denied. In fact, some Chinese Indonesians have criticized the mass conversion of Chinese to Christianity as an abandonment of Chineseness and Confucian values in favor of Westernization. Yet while it is true that a number of Chinese churches have chosen the route of assimilation
and Indonesianization, other churches have stuck to their Chinese identity. These churches not only view themselves as constituting an ethnic church in Indonesia but have moved beyond maintenance to the inculcation of Chineseness through teaching Mandarin in Sunday school, delivering bilingual sermons in Indonesian and Mandarin, and maintaining transnational ties with Chinese churches in Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia. In this manner, these churches have been able to nourish and renew their Chineseness as well as to imagine themselves as part of a transnational, global network of Chinese churches.

One of the major transnational Chinese Christian organizations is the Hong Kong-based Chinese Coordination Center of World Evangelism (CCCOWE). Founded in 1974, it aims to unite a global Chinese Christian diaspora and to create a global Chinese church. As a pan-Chinese transnational network, CCCOWE is sometimes seen as ‘the last bastion of … primordial ethnic chauvinism’ because of the organization’s insistence on preserving an essentialist notion of Chineseness, and its resistance to the local assimilation of Chinese churches. However, in the light of an increasingly complex landscape of migration and globalization, the definition of Chineseness in CCCOWE is in dire need of revision to reflect reality. Any definition must necessarily take into account the cultural diversity of diasporic Chinese churches.

Globalization has led to an increase in the diversity of population and the complexity of ethnic identity. It is now no longer possible to simply signpost a church as ‘Chinese.’ The notion of Chinese Christians itself can be a stereotype resulting from the homogenization of Chinese churches without an understanding of the history and developments of Chinese Christianity within individual churches and congregations. The homogenizing effect has unwittingly essentialized Chinese Christianity into a simplistic monolith. To the contrary, any definition of Chinese church must be made against the background of intricate contestations of identity politics. To determine whether a church is ‘Chinese,’ the following questions may be raised: Is the cultural heritage of the church to be considered according to the ethnic origin of the founder and of the first congregations? Or should the ethnic composition of the current population of the church be taken into account? Is Chinese language a defining benchmark of the Chineseness of the church? How do we categorize churches that do not use Chinese but are attended by predominately Chinese members? What about churches that are established and managed by ethnic Chinese and offer Chinese ministries, but do not self-identify as ‘Chinese’ churches?

There are no simple answers to these epistemological questions. A thorough examination of various internal and external factors, such as the history of the church; its development trajectory, including any changes in its culture, language, and identity; and government policies and global events affecting the church or the ethnic Chinese in general, is essential to the study of Chinese Christian churches in Indonesia. The definition of a ‘Chinese’ church in Indonesia is made even more complex by the politics of identity for Chinese churches have had to adopt different strategies to deflect ethnic discrimination. This article is a cartography of Chinese Christian churches in Indonesia written to serve as a guide through the diverse and complex landscape of ethnic and cultural identity in the modern world of migration and globalization. It comprises an assembly of knowledge drawn from secondary data and literature, as well as empirical research derived from interviews that the author conducted with church leaders such as pastors and committee members of church synods in Jakarta during fieldwork over intermittent periods between 2008 and 2012. The information is classified into categories for easier navigation by the reader who can enter into the material to track the trace of Chineseness to be amplified in individual research.
There may be a variety of approaches applicable to the study of Chinese Indonesian churches based on theology, culture, social class, minority politics, and political economy. But as a pioneering study, this article focuses on two approaches it deems most relevant to the mapping of this complex and uncharted territory, namely cultural and denominational orientations. First, a local map is drawn up through a study of three important Chinese Christian churches in Indonesia: Gereja Kristus Ketapang (GKK), Gereja Kristus Yesus (GKY), and Gereja Kristen Indonesia (GKI). In this typology, Chineseness is traced within identity outlooks, habitus, and leadership and management styles of the individual churches. The author found the distinction between totok (pure blood, or Chinese-speaking Chinese) and peranakan (mixed-blood, or Indonesian-speaking Chinese), a useful starting point for the mapping of change and continuity in identity, even though elsewhere this author has argued that the totok and peranakan distinction has become outdated and lacking relevance in encapsulating the diverse identity of Chinese Indonesians today.

The second section of this article contextualizes Chinese churches in Indonesia within the larger heterogeneity of world Christianity. It places Chinese Christianity within three major global Christian movements in Indonesia: the Ecumenical, the Evangelical, and the Pentecostal-Charismatic movements. This categorization, it must be noted, has porous boundaries. The trajectory of Chinese Christian churches is towards globalization: it began in the division between totok new migrants and peranakan pioneer settlers and extends, in contemporary times, transnationally through the Charismatic-Pentecostal movements.

Various Chineseness in Chinese Indonesian churches: continuity and change

Stuart Hall argues that identity is a product of historical development and is in a constant process of change and transformation. An examination of the continuity and change of Chineseness in the Chinese Christian community is revealed in a survey of the historical development of contemporary Chinese churches beginning with the primordial totok–peranakan distinction that has divided the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

Conventionally, scholars have divided the ethnic Chinese into two main groups, the China-oriented totok (China-born, ‘pure’ blood) and the acculturated peranakan (locally-born or ‘mixed’ blood). The identification of the totok–peranakan distinction has historically been based on birthplace and bloodline. However, this became unrealistic after the migration of Chinese from China to Indonesia halted during the Great Depression. To replace the earlier distinction, a socio-cultural distinction was then used to account for the differences between totok and peranakan. According to this distinction, totok refer to those Chinese who had a Chinese-orientated upbringing and who used Chinese as the medium of communication even though they were born in Indonesia. Peranakan refer not only to Chinese with mixed ancestry, but also to those pure-blood local-born Chinese who could not speak Chinese at all.

The totok–peranakan distinction that characterized the Chineseness of Chinese Indonesians from the Dutch colonial period to the early period of post-Independence Indonesia also applies to the Chinese churches. Although the relevance of the totok–peranakan distinction has gradually diminished since the implementation of the Assimilation Program during the New Order, the cultural inheritance from this distinction is still, to a large extent, visible in some Chinese churches in contemporary Indonesia. Through a case study of three Chinese churches in Jakarta, this article demonstrates that the totok–peranakan distinction continues to be relevant for the purpose of identifying and determining the Chineseness and identity outlooks of Chinese churches today. Of the three
churches, two of them typify peranakan and totok Chineseness and one exemplifies an assimilated and Indonesianized Chinese church. All the three churches share an intertwined history and are reflective of the different identity prospects of Chinese churches in Indonesia.

**Gereja Kristus Ketapang (GKK) – peranakan Chineseness**

Established in Batavia (the old name for Jakarta) in 1905 by two missionaries from the Methodist Episcopal Church in America with just 10 members, the church has grown to around 5000 members today. In 1928, the Methodist Missions handed this congregation over to the Dutch Mission, the NZV, because of a lack of funding and other problems associated with territoriality and comity. At that time, the NZV almost had a monopoly in West Java, while the Methodist’s mission field was in Sumatra. The congregation, however, opted to become independent and joined a body of Chinese churches established by the Dutch and Chinese missionaries called the Tiong Hoa Kie Tok Kauw Hwee (THKTKH, Hokkien for Chinese Christian Church). The church became known as THKTKH Mangga Besar, named after the location of the church. It also became part of the Bond Kristen Tionghoa (BKT, or the Chinese Christian Union), which became formed in 1926. The aim of the BKT was to unite all Chinese churches in Indonesia regardless of their denominations, doctrines, and backgrounds and to encourage them to break away from Western missions. The BKT was inspired by the founding of the National Christian Council of China in the Republic of China in 1922, which advocated similar objectives.

According to Kurnia and Hale, ‘THKTKH Mangga Besar neither felt that it was a Dutch church, nor an Indonesian church. But this church felt emotional ties with churches in China’. In 1939, because of disagreements and incompatibility with the influence of the Dutch Mission in the THKTKH, the Mangga Besar and a few other congregations broke away from the THKTKH and founded the Chung Hua Chi Tu Chiao Hui (CHCTCH, the Mandarin version of THKTKH), an organization that was closely aligned to the churches in China. The CHCTCH was commonly known as the ‘Nationalist Chinese Church’ because of its anti-Dutch, anti-missionary, as well as pro-China sentiments. When the church moved to Ketapang Lane, it was renamed the CHCTCH Ketapang. The church comprised mainly Malay-speaking peranakan Chinese. In 1944, it started a new Mandarin section for the totok congregation peranakan Chinese. In 1958, CHCTCH Ketapang changed its name to an Indonesian-sounding one – Gereja Kristus Ketapang (GKK, Church of Christ in Ketapang) – in order to break away from ethnic exclusivism and to reach out to the non-Chinese. However, the church’s location in the Chinatown area of Jakarta led to its continued focus on the Chinese community.

Although the church does not have any Mandarin ministry and almost none of its members speak Chinese, the Chineseness of GKK ‘is still thick and dominant’. Here, ‘Chineseness’ is not defined by cultural resources such as language ability, but by the habitus of being Chinese. For instance, the congregation comprises mainly ethnic Chinese and all the church leaders are Chinese. Moreover, the organizational features of the church, such as leadership and management style, can also be broadly characterized as ‘Chinese-oriented’ – i.e. top-down, patriarchal, male-dominated, and seniority-conscious. I argue that such Chinese habitus has maintained the church’s identity as a Chinese church.
‘Can the GKK free itself from the ethnic prison?’ asked Kurnia and Hale. Judging from the history of the church, the authors doubt it. In what was known as the ‘Ketapang Incident,’ the church was burnt down on 22 November 1998 due to communal violence. This was not an isolated incident, as 21 other churches and 5 Protestant and Catholic schools were reportedly burnt and looted at around the same time. There is no question that organized pogroms and riots were carried out in 1998 by different interest groups, and religious violence had been on the rise before, during, and after the fall of the New Order regime. What is less clear, however, is whether the church’s twin identities of being Chinese and Christian made it an easy target during times of political unrest and contributed to the attack.

Gereja Kristus Yesus (GKY) – totok Chineseness

Gereja Kristus Yesus (lit. Church of Jesus Christ), which uses the Mandarin name ‘Jidu Yesu Jiaohui Guoyu Tang’ (The Mandarin Church of Jesus Christ), is currently the largest Chinese church with bilingual Mandarin/Indonesian worship services in Jakarta. The church was founded in 1945, with its former life being the CHCTCH Kuoyu Thang, a part of CHCTCH Ketapang mentioned above. After moving to the Mangga Besar district, the church became known as the Gereja Kristus Jemaat Mangga Besar (GKJMB, Church of Christ Mangga Besar Congregation). Because of rapid growth in members and congregations and to differentiate itself from its previous life as part of the Gereja Kristus (Church of Christ), in 2002, the church added the word ‘Yesus’ to its name and became Gereja Kristus Yesus (Church of Jesus Christ). GKY now has 35 congregations across Indonesia and four overseas (Singapore, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Sydney).

If Gereja Kristus Ketapang is the emblem of peranakan Chineseness, then GKY embodies totok Chineseness, even though the totok identity has been diminishing. In the early days, GKJMB was one of the only churches in Jakarta that preached in both Mandarin and the Foochow (Fuzhou) dialect. The Assimilation Program implemented during the New Order has resulted in the younger generations of Chinese Indonesians losing the ability to read and speak Chinese. Nevertheless, the church had continued to deliver bilingual services in Mandarin and Indonesian during the New Order, while the Foochow dialect preaching had stopped as a result of a lack of demand. The church had also exercised agency in preserving and maintaining Chinese language and culture through the preaching, hymnals, Sunday schools, and language classes for its members. These practices have persisted until today.

In contrast to GKK, which does not possess cultural resources in Mandarin, the Chinese language heritage of GKY has enabled the church to maintain ties with other Chinese evangelical churches, seminaries, and networks overseas. For example, GKY is an active member of the Chinese Coordination Centre of World Evangelism (CCCOWE), which has facilitated the church to invite Chinese preachers from the United States, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia to grace its pulpit. In this manner, GKY endeavors to nourish and renew its Chineseness through being part of a transnational, global imagined community of Chinese Christians.

However, the ability for GKY to sustain its ‘totok’ Chineseness is questionable. Apart from some of the older generation church members and few young people who returned from gaining an education in Chinese-speaking countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, and China, most of the congregation either had little or no competency in Mandarin. The church management, which is composed entirely of ethnic Chinese, uses Indonesian rather than Mandarin to conduct its day-to-day affairs and board meetings. The church faces an
ongoing challenge of recruiting interpreters competent in Mandarin and Indonesian to engage in real-time translation of sermons at the pulpit. According to the church’s Mandarin-competent Senior Pastor, his leadership role is quintessential in preserving the Chinese identity of the church. This is mainly because some of the younger Indonesian-speaking pastors have lost interest in Chinese culture and have received no ‘calling’ to the Chinese ministry.

Nonetheless, the resurgence of Chineseness after the fall of Suharto has offered a glimpse of hope for GKY. Many schools are now offering Mandarin, and there is a renewed interest in Chinese language and culture across Indonesia. The fruits of such resurgence can be seen in occasional presentations of Chinese songs and performances by the young generation in church services. Furthermore, the church is also frequented by new migrant workers and businesspeople from the People’s Republic of China who tend to reside in the Chinese-populated district of Mangga Besar in Jakarta. Nonetheless, because of cultural and linguistic differences, there has been little interaction between the PRC migrants and the Chinese Indonesian congregation, which goes to show that Chinese identities are plural and the meaning of being a Chinese (or a Chinese Christian) varies across contexts. Seen in this light, any insistence on preserving a singular, primordial Chinese identity, such as what the CCCOWE has maintained as its objective, is an impossible aspiration.

**Gereja Kristen Indonesia (GKI) – peranakan Indoneisiansness**

With more than a quarter of a million members spreading across more than 220 congregations, Gereja Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Church) is undoubtedly the largest ‘Chinese’ church in Indonesia. The term ‘Chinese’ needs to be qualified here because the GKI church had made a conscious decision to assimilate and ‘Indonesianize’ in the 1950s. Although the church today still predominantly comprises of ethnic Chinese members, non-Chinese account for at least 20% of its congregation. And unlike the two aforementioned churches, non-Chinese members in GKI are actively involved in the church management and leadership.

Gereja Kristen Indonesia is the result of the union of three major Chinese churches (THKTKH) in West, Central, and East Java in 1956. As described in the Gereja Kristen Ketapang profile above, the Chinese-oriented congregations left THKTKH to form the China-oriented CHCTCH, which later became GKK and GKY. The remaining THKTKH were ‘from the beginning orientated to the Dutch East Indies and later Indonesia and never considered mainland China as their centre,’ making its identity outlook markedly different from that of GKK and GKY.

The changing of the name of the THKTKH to GKI in the 1950s signified a ‘change in orientation and a transformation in identity’ of the church. The long and complex process of name-changing deliberation took place shortly after Indonesia became independent from Dutch rule. As the church was comprised mainly of peranakan Chinese who used Indonesian as their lingua franca and who had become Indonesian citizens, the church deemed it appropriate to focus its identity orientation towards the newly born nation. This is exemplified in the dropping of the word ‘Tionghoa’ (Chinese) in its new name, while other ethnic churches were still using ethnic names (e.g., the Batak, Sundanese, Minahasa churches). The reason that GKI needed to prove their ‘Indonesianness’ more than the other Indonesian churches of native descent is because Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent were required produce a certificate to prove their citizenship while native Indonesians faced no such requirement. Unlike other Indonesian
churches such as Gereja Protestant di Indonesia bagian Barat (GPIB or the Protestant Church in Western Indonesia) or Gereja Pentekosta di Indonesia (GPdI or the Pentecostal Church in Indonesia), GKI did not adopt the preposition ‘di’ (‘in’) in its name. Setiabudi argues, ‘The choice of GKI without “di” is not to be read as a statement that Indonesian Christians of Chinese descent are more Indonesian. It is to the contrary: they are not foreign to Indonesia, even when considered as foreign by some’. Hence, the name GKI functions as an insignia to show that it is an Indonesian church, and not just a church in Indonesia.

Indeed, this change of name had brought about some psychological readjustment to the church in terms of its openness towards receiving members of other ethnic origin. While congregations of GKI in urban areas are predominantly Chinese, those in smaller towns are attended by pribumi Indonesians. Even though the church has been united as one with a common statement of faith, liturgy, hymnal, and catechism, there are still some differences among individual congregations. For instance, theologically, some congregations are considered more liberal than others in their interpretation of scripture; socio-culturally some are considered more ‘Chinese’ in their Mandarin proficiency, cultural practices, and social class. A minority of GKI congregations have special ministries in Mandarin to cater for their totok members who understand Mandarin better than Indonesian. An executive committee member of the church synod of West Java asserts that the church values and respects such diversity because it embodies the uniqueness and individuality of the congregations, and it has never been a source of conflict within the church (interview, 15 June 2009). With the post-Suharto renaissance of Chineseness, GKI as a whole – except for some of the ‘more Chinese’ congregations – is largely unaffected. The same informant conjectures that ‘GKI has not participated in the euphoria of the resurgence of Chineseness because of [its] commitment to Indonesianization. The process to Indonesianize is continuous; there is no turning back, no resincification’ (interview, 15 June 2009).

Positing Chinese churches in national and global Christian movements

The preceding section has evinced the local particularities that define Chinese Indonesian churches through the prisms of cultural identity and historical legacy. However, to gain a more comprehensive perspective on the complex plurality of Chinese churches in Indonesia, it is also crucial to examine the phenomenon of Chinese Christianity in Indonesia within a larger frame of national and global dynamics. Keane cautions against the study of a Christian community in isolation. He argues that behind any potential commonality of a Christian community ‘lies a long history of texts, doctrines, institutions, and practices in which as much is shared, circulated, or reinvented as is distinguished and differentiated’. Thus, the reading of the different Christian movements in Indonesia cannot be detached from the international scheme of Christian experience because they are but local manifestations of the larger schisms within global Christianity.

Protestant Christianity is very diverse in its denominations and doctrinal positions. Closely associated to international Christian movements and organizations, the three largest Christian movements in Indonesia are the Ecumenical, Evangelical, and Pentecostal-Charismatic movements. A caveat to be emphasized is that memberships of the organizations of the three different movements in Indonesia are dynamic and not mutually exclusive. While there are churches that simultaneously subscribe to the membership of different movements, there are also those that do not participate in any of the
existing movements for various reasons, as will be exemplified in the discussion of the Reformed Evangelical Movement towards the end of this article.

The Ecumenical movement

Owing to the legacy of missionary activities during the Dutch colonial rule, a particular version of Calvinism dominant in the Netherlands, called the Dutch Reformed, had traditionally formed the largest denomination in Indonesia. Many of the so-called main-line churches, which are predominantly based on indigenous ethnic groups, inherited their theology from the Dutch Reformed denomination.\(^{39}\) Being members of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (PGI, or Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia), these churches strive towards the objective of forming a united Christian Church (Gereja Kristen yang Esa) in Indonesia.\(^ {40}\) As an overseer of the mainline churches and the first Christian organization to be established on a national level, the PGI is regarded by the Indonesian government as the representative of the Protestant churches in Indonesia, on par with the Indonesian Bishops’ Conference (KWI) of the Catholics, and Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah of the Muslims.\(^ {41}\) Promoting the global ecumenical objectives of the World Council of Churches, the PGI is also the epitome of the Ecumenical movement in Indonesia.

The Ecumenicals are commonly perceived as progressive and ‘liberal’ because their theology is inclusive and contextual, and they place heavy emphasis on social justice. With the influence of the World Council of Churches, the Ecumenical movement in Indonesia has adopted a ‘holistic approach’ to mission, which focuses on liberating the poor and the oppressed, instead of converting unbelievers.\(^ {42}\) They also perceive evangelism and Christianization as a traditional and colonial approach of mission. Rather than shunning local cultures as ‘pagan’ practices, the holistic approach of mission promotes an inclusive understanding and engagement with local cultures.\(^ {43}\)

However, not all members of the PGI are equally committed to the Ecumenical movement. Both peranakan Chinese churches discussed earlier, Gereja Kristen Ketapang and Gereja Kristen Indonesia, for instance, are members of the PGI, but GKI is more involved with the PGI, while GKK shares more commonalities with the Evangelical movement than the Ecumenical movement. This difference can be attributed to the historical background of the two churches: GKK was established by the Methodists and had never totally adopted the Dutch Reformed theology, even after it was handed over to the Dutch mission in 1928. Instead, it continued to be inspired by Pietism and Revivalism, which are both evangelistic in nature.\(^ {44}\)

On the other hand, GKI was itself a product of the Ecumenical movement (‘ecumenical’ literally means unity of the church) because it was born out of the union of three major Chinese churches (THKTKH) in West, Central, and East Java in 1956.\(^ {45}\) The inclusive stance of the PGI and its objective to unite the Christian church in Indonesia are seen to be complementary to the aim of GKI to assimilate and to Indonesianize. The commitment of GKI towards the Ecumenical movement, inter alia, is manifest in its inclusion of pribumi in the church leadership and its openness towards pribumi congregations.

The Evangelical movement

The second major Christian movement in Indonesia is the Evangelical movement, which regards the promotion of Christian fellowships and to spread the Gospel as its objectives.
Represented by the Communion of Evangelical Churches and Institutions of Indonesia (PGLII, or Persekutuan Gereja-gereja dan Lembaga-lembaga Injili Indonesia), Indonesia’s Evangelical movement is inspired by the World Evangelical Alliance. Aritonang and Steenbrink use the term ‘Evangelical’ to categorize doctrinally conservative churches in Indonesia, which are closely associated with Christian fundamentalism that emerged in the United States in the early twentieth century. The majority of the Evangelical churches in Indonesia were established by US missionaries, but some were founded by European missions and evangelists from China. These churches adhere to a Pietistic and Revivalist theology. In contrast to their Ecumenical counterparts, Evangelical churches tend to distance themselves from political involvement.

The Evangelicals subscribe to the view that the church’s mission is to proclaim the gospel through evangelism. They believe that salvation is exclusive to those who accept Christ and repent their sins. Against the idea of the church becoming a political or social action organization, their involvement in social action, such as humanitarin relief, is largely as a means to the end of saving souls from eternal damnation. In a nutshell, while the Ecumenicals emphasize a ‘horizontal’ dimension of mission, characterized by the struggle for freedom, liberation, social justice, solidarity among humans and prosperity of the world, the Evangelicals accentuates a ‘vertical’ dimension of mission, which features the preaching of repentance and conversion, and the establishment of a personal relationship with God.

Most ‘totok’ Chinese churches (i.e., those that still have Mandarin or bilingual services) in contemporary Indonesia belong to the Evangelical movement. In fact, various researches on diasporic Chinese churches demonstrate that churches that are culturally Chinese tend to be Evangelical. The reason for this is twofold: one is cultural and the other historical. Being a minority among other ethnicities, diasporic Chinese often see the need to preserve their Chineseness as counter force to assimilation. In his research on the Chinese Christians in America, Fenggang Yang contends that diasporic Chinese find a ‘good match between Confucian moral values and evangelical Christian beliefs’ because ‘the conservative Christian faith provides an absolute foundation for their cherished social ethics.’ This argument is apposite to the case of the totok Chinese, who have inconspicuously maintained their Chineseness through Evangelical churches in Indonesia and through the global diasporic Chinese Evangelical network, such as the CCCOWE.

On the other hand, the historic visits of John Sung in Java in 1939 had a tremendous influence on these churches in inculcating the Pietistic and Revivalist spirit. John Sung was the son of a Methodist minister in China who became an evangelist upon his return to China after obtaining a PhD in the United States. He made several epic mission journeys to Southeast Asia in 1930s, where he converted thousands of Chinese and trained many Chinese Christians to be evangelists. Some have argued that ‘Chinese churches in Java are still alive today only through the blessing of the revival brought by Dr Sung.’ John Sung arrived in Indonesia at a time when Chinese churches were facing serious challenges in reconciling Chinese culture with Christianity because the Confucianists had accused Chinese Christians of abandoning their Chineseness. Being an embodiment of the fusion between what was Christian and what was Chinese, John Sung was able to ‘help many nominal Chinese Christians to overcome the felt foreignness of Christianity and to cross that “Chinese” obstacle to baptism at that time’.

One important bastion of the Evangelical movement among the Chinese Christians in Indonesia is the Southeast Asia Bible Seminary (or SAAT, Seminari Alkitab Asia Tenggara). SAAT was established in 1952 by a well-known Chinese evangelist from Shanghai, Rev. Andrew Gih, who was also the founder of the Evangelize China
Fellowship (ECF), and who used to work closely with John Sung in a gospel band in China in the 1930s. The genesis of SAAT began in the 1950s when Gih conducted gospel rallies in Indonesia and saw that there was no theological seminary in Indonesia that offered training in Chinese. Most Chinese churches had to hire pastors from Hong Kong or China to serve in their Chinese ministry, and these pastors had often faced challenges in getting permits to live in Indonesia. The founding of SAAT was a response to such challenges. SAAT eventually became the bridge between Chinese churches in Indonesia and the global Chinese Christian community. Even though SAAT was unable to resist Suharto’s assimilation policy and had to change to an Indonesian curriculum, it remains famed for its Chinese and evangelical heritage today. In addition to producing many famous Chinese Indonesian preachers, SAAT has also become the foundation of the Holy Word Christian Church (Gereja Kristen Kalam Kudus) and the Holy Word Christian Schools (Sekolah Kristen Kalam Kudus), which have branches all over Indonesia.

With the liberalization of Chinese identity in post-Suharto Indonesia, SAAT reopened its Chinese theological program and rekindled its ties with the Chinese Christian world. At present, the Chinese program has 60 students, 50 of whom are from China. The seminary has recently relocated to an exclusive Chinese-majority residential area in Malang called Bukit Hermon, occupying seven hectares of land. Its modern premises include 16 contemporary apartments, a state-of-the-art auditorium, a mission building, a media and recording studio, a recital hall, a Bible museum, student dormitories, lecture halls, and classrooms. The lavished facilities serve to exemplify the wealth of the rich Chinese patrons behind the seminary. Entry into the seminary is guarded with very tight security, which main gate is located some 500 meters away from the main building – making it inconspicuous from the outside and safe from potential bombs. The walls of each building are decorated with Biblical verses in both English and Chinese to emphasize the importance of evangelism – a vivid expression of Chinese evangelical identity.

The Evangelical movement among Chinese churches experienced a major breakthrough in post-Suharto Indonesia with the establishment of the Communion of Chinese Churches in Indonesia (PGTI). In August 1998, shortly after the fall of Suharto, a number of Chinese churches, prominent Chinese pastors, and entrepreneurs established the Pusat Pelayanan Gereja-Gereja Injili Indonesia (PPGII, lit. Ministry Centre for Indonesia Evangelical Churches). The Centre’s Chinese name, however, used the term ‘Chinese’ (Tionghoa) in the place of ‘Evangelical’ (i.e. Ministry Centre for Indonesian Chinese Churches). The politics of naming here is revealing as it shows how the term ‘Evangelical’ has been used by Chinese churches to disguise their ethnicity, especially during the Suharto period, and the omission of the term ‘Chinese’ in PPGII shows that there was still fear and anxiety in identifying itself as an exclusive Chinese organization. Only after the position of the ethnic Chinese has improved, the Centre decided to change its name to Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Tionghoa di Indonesia (PGTI, the Communion of Chinese Churches in Indonesia) in 2007.

The establishment of the PGTI was spearheaded by Gereja Kristen Yesus, the largest church in Jakarta that offers a Chinese ministry. The organization has brought together more than 300 Chinese churches across Indonesia under its membership. PGTI perceives itself as an ethnic religious organization, just like other ethnic Christian associations (Batak, Javanese, etc). Some Chinese churches are reluctant to join the PGTI because of its ethnic exclusivity. Other peranakan churches such as Gereja Kristen Ketapang were ineligible to participate because of their inability to use the Chinese language. While Gereja Kristen Indonesia as a church is not involved in PGTI, some of its Chinese-speaking congregations became a member of PGTI at their own accord. Because of...
doctrinal differences, the PGTI does not extend its membership to Chinese churches with Pentecostal or Charismatic backgrounds. The PGTI has developed transnational links with global networks of Chinese Christian organizations, such as the Chinese Coordination Centre of World Evangelism (CCCOWE) and the Chinese Christian Evangelistic Association, to name two.

Like many Chinese organizations established post-1998, the PGTI is run mainly by the older Chinese-speaking generation. Because of the younger generation’s incompetency in Mandarin, the leadership and management of PGTI is dominated by an aging committee, which poses as a major challenge in its leadership regeneration. The short-term solution, according to the vice-chairman of PGTI, is to encourage overseas Chinese Indonesian pastors who are Mandarin-competent to return to Indonesia to build the Chinese churches. In the long term, its survival depends on whether the younger generation of Chinese Christians find such ethnic-based organizations appealing and are willing to preserve it.

The Pentecostal-Charismatic movement

The third largest Christian movement in Indonesia, and notably the fastest growing one, is the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement. Introduced to Indonesia by Dutch missionaries as early as 1910, Pentecostalism found itself a good fit in the Pietistic environment of Indonesian Christianity that emphasizes on otherworldliness, individual experience, and biblical authority, which had much affinity with Pentecostal practices. The movement was revitalized in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the arrival of the Charismatic or the neo-Pentecostal movement from the United States.

The aggressive proselytization carried out by Pentecostal-Charismatic churches is regarded by Indonesian Muslims as a major threat. This is commonly dubbed as Kristenisasi, or Christianization. The apprehension of a potential Christian ‘take-over’ of Indonesian society may be fostered by the conspicuous display of colossal buildings built by wealthy Pentecostal-Charismatic (and evangelical) churches. This can be exemplified by the Chinese-founded Bethany Church in Surabaya, which built a massive church facility that can accommodate 20,000 worshippers in 2000. As official permits to build a church have become increasingly difficult to obtain, due to the Joint Decree No. 1/1969 and the Joint Ministerial Regulation on Places of Worship 2006, the church circumvented the regulation by constructing a large ‘multi-purpose’ building and using it as a place of worship.

Scholars have argued that the prosperity gospel advocated in the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement has enormous appeal to the entrepreneurial-oriented ethnic Chinese middle class in Indonesia. They also cited various sources in the media which claimed that 70% of Chinese Indonesian Christians belong to this movement. While the figure is largely based on impressionist speculation and is likely to be an over-estimation, the increasing popularity of Pentecostal-Charismatic churches among the ethnic Chinese cannot be overstated. Chineseness, however, has never been a central feature in most Pentecostal-Charismatic churches. For example, established in 1945 by peranakan Chinese Christians who were educated in Dutch and Indonesian, the Church of Jesus the Messiah (GIA or Gereja Isa Almaseh) has considered itself a peranakan rather than a Chinese church since its inception. The original name of the church, Sim Ling Kauw Hwee (Hokkien for The Holy Spirit Church), was changed to its current name in Indonesian in 1955. While the church had Dutch and Javanese services in the 1940s and 1950s, it never had any service in Mandarin. According to GIA’s 35th Anniversary
Magazine, ‘The Chineseness of this church... has been fading. They melted (melebur) and assimilated (membaur) with Indonesian people until they were really unified’.64

To the Pentecostal-Charismatic churches, which were influenced by Charismatic movements in the US, the association with America and the West is more problematic than their Chineseness. It has been observed that these churches try to emphasize their ‘national’ status and their commitments to nation building while downplaying the influence of evangelists and the financial support from the West.65 A case in point is the Bethel Church of Indonesia (GBI, Gereja Bethel Indonesia), one of the largest and fastest growing churches in the world. GBI was founded by a middle class Chinese Indonesian pastor, Rev. Ho Liong Seng, who changed his name to Ho Lukas Senduk in the 1950s. Insisting on the church’s ‘national’ status, Senduk asserts, ‘GBI is not a local church, and it is not a regional or ethnic church. It is a national church. Its members and officials come from all the peoples of Indonesia, from Sabang to Merauke, and from Rote to Miangas. This is a Church displaying “Unity in Diversity”. It is not a branch of foreign church, but is the church of Indonesia citizens... free from foreign influence’.66 Andaya argues that the ‘national’ status of GBI is strengthened with the involvement of an ethnic Malukan preacher, Jacob Nahuway, in the leadership of GBI. The initiative to assimilate, in the case of GIA, or to become a ‘national’ church, in the case of GBI, has made the church an inclusive space for the mixing of middle class Chinese and non-Chinese Christians compared to the ethnically exclusive churches discussed earlier.67

Nonetheless, the strategic move by Pentecostal-Charismatic churches to keep a distance from Western association does not change the fact that Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity is a global movement. Koning argues that Chinese Indonesian Christians opt for this global religion to seek protection beyond the nation state and to embrace a global frame of reference.68 As such, in contrast to their fellow Chinese Christians who struggle to make a choice between Chineseness or Indonesianness, the Pentecostal-Charismatic Christians articulate a global or transnational identity, which usually encompasses the urban middle class.

The Reformed Evangelical movement

The Gereja Reformed Injili Indonesia (GRII or the Reformed Evangelical Church of Indonesia) is an example of a church that is not involved in any of three Christian movements mentioned above, although it may display features that could fit into any of the three streams. GRII was established in 1989 by Rev. Stephen Tong, a world renowned Chinese Indonesian evangelist who is also known as the ‘Billy Graham of the East’.69 Tong prudently combined neo-Calvinist doctrines with evangelical practices in his teachings. Unwilling to join any of the existing Christian movements, Tong founded his own Reformed Evangelical Movement, which aims to reactivate the Reformed faith and revitalize the evangelical spirit among Indonesian churches. Through Stephen Tong Evangelistic Ministries International (STEMI), an office he founded to coordinate his ministries, Tong has organized annual National Reformed Evangelical Conventions (NREC) in Indonesia.

It is significant to note that GRII is one of the very few non-Pentecostal-Charismatic churches that managed to grow rapidly in Indonesia. In 2008, the church received worldwide media coverage for the opening of the 600,000 square-foot Coliseum-like Reformed Millennium Cathedral in Jakarta, which seats 8000 people and houses a seminary, a museum, a concert hall and a school.70 Dubbed as ‘the largest Chinese church building in the world’, the church complex cost USD 40 million to build and took 17 years to
obtain an official permit from the authorities. With the proliferation of church attacks by Islamic hardliners in recent years, Tong is cognizant of the potential danger the high visibility of his church may bring, especially as the symbol of a double minority – Chinese and Christian – that the church epitomizes. However, when challenged on the necessity of building a church of such grandeur, Tong cited the constitutional rights of religious freedom and argued that his church is a statement to the world that Indonesia still embraces the freedom of religion.

It is not easy to categorize the identity outlook of Stephen Tong the pastor, his church and his movement. In terms of cultural identity, Tong fits comfortably into the definition of a totok Chinese. He was born in 1940 in Xiamen, a city in Southeast China, and moved to Indonesia when he was nine. He preaches fluently and competently in Mandarin and frequently cites Confucian classics in his sermons. As a renowned evangelist and the vice-chairman of the CCCOWE, Tong is widely respected in the global Chinese Christian community. He travels every week to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Taipei and Hong Kong to deliver expository Bible teachings in Mandarin before returning to Jakarta to preach in his own church in both Mandarin and Indonesian services on Sunday.

In Susy Ong's description of the Gereja Reformed Injili Indonesia, she argues that 'the term “Indonesia” in GRII indicates its national or non-ethnic characteristics; however, with its strong links to Chinese Christian groups abroad, and initial goal of the Christianization of Chinese (regardless of political affiliation), it turns out to be less national (Indonesian) and more Chinese'. Ong's understanding is invariably based on an essentialist assumption of identity, that one is either Chinese or Indonesian and that the more of one leads to the less of another. In reality, identity is multiple and circumstantial and can be strategically used in different contexts.

Although GRII has a Chinese ministry, it is not a member of the Communion of Chinese Churches (PGTI). One of the reasons for this is precisely because the church did not want to be seen as an exclusive ethnic church. Incidentally, GRII is also one of the few Chinese churches that entrusts a significant number of non-Chinese in key ministries and leadership positions. The founding of the Christian think tank, Reformed Centre for Religion and Society, by Stephen Tong and his protégé, Benyamin F. Intan, in 2006 in Jakarta also shows the commitment that Tong has to nation building.

While Tong embodies what it means to be ‘Chinese’ and has developed a profile in the Chinese Christian world, his ministries have transcended ethnic and national boundaries. His engagements in the global Christian scene include the founding of the Reformed Institute for Christianity and 21st Century in Washington D.C., which aims to equip Christians for global evangelism. In addition to that, Tong is also a member of the International Consultants of the Lausanne Committee of World Evangelization and is frequently invited to deliver keynote lectures at various international Christian congresses. In recognition of Tong’s life work in Christian ministries, the Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia – a prestigious bulwark of the Reformed faith – awarded him an Honorary Doctorate of Divinity in 2008 and established the Stephen Tong Chair of Reformed Theology in 2011, a rare honor for a Chinese pastor.

Conclusion
This article is a foray into the complex and heterogeneous landscape of Chinese Christianity in Indonesia. It traces the routes along which Chinese churches exercised agency to either preserve their Chineseness or to assimilate and Indonesianize. The
profiles of the three Chinese churches (GKK, GKY and GKI) discussed in the first section of the article provide a glimpse into the cultural typology of Chinese churches in Indonesia today. The *totok–peranakan* division was used as a starting point from which continuity and change in the identity of Chinese churches was mapped. Historically, the *totok–peranakan* distinction may be argued as a landmark for the first wave of globalization that saw large numbers of Chinese come to Indonesia. These later immigrants, who came to the country in the nineteenth century, were largely refugees fleeing from the travails of war-torn China as the country marked the end of dynastic rule and the formation of a republican government. They compare against the Chinese who came from the seventeenth century (and earlier) to seek a livelihood by sojourning or settling in Southeast Asia. The unprecedented growth of the Charismatic-Pentecostal movements in Indonesia may be argued as constituting a second wave of globalization affecting Chinese churches.

The ways in which Chinese churches have responded to external factors such as government policies and global Christian movements have shaped their identities. The mapping of Chinese churches within three major global Christian movements in Indonesia, the Ecumenical, the Evangelical and the Pentecostal-Charismatic, reveals the heterogeneity and schisms within the Chinese Indonesian Christian scene. Again, it has to be emphasized that the boundaries demarcating these Christian movements are porous and that Chinese Christians take a spectrum of positions when identifying themselves as followers of any particular movement. This is with the exception of *totok* Chinese Christians, most of whom, as discussed in the article, tend to be Evangelical because of historical and cultural reasons. Finally, there exist several other churches that do not subscribe to any of the three movements, adding to the complexity of the Chinese Christian scene in Indonesia.

The various case studies discussed in this article have attested to the fact that there is no single definition of the ‘Chinese’ church. It is likely that the contestation within the individual churches of what it is to be considered ‘Chinese’ will continue and probably become more intense in the post-Suharto Indonesia where there is space for the unrestricted articulation of Chineseness. The meager number of studies on the topic of Chinese Christian churches points to the subject as a rich lode for future research. Further studies in this area can focus on two aspects: in-depth ethnography that investigates the *habitus* of Chinese Christians and churches; and comparative research on the relationships between Chinese and non-Chinese churches, between Chinese Christianity and other religions, and between Chinese churches and other social actors such as the government agencies, businesses, and non-governmental organizations. It is hoped that this cartography will serve as a starting point for future investigators entering into the field of Chinese Christianity in Indonesia.

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Notes

2. Suryadinata, “Chinese Politics.”
5. Suryadinata asserts that many Chinese have converted to Christianity to escape the Communist purge and persecution of 1965. There has been an increase in the Christian population of Indonesia: in 1971, 7.4% of Indonesians were Christians, but the 2000 Census showed that the number had increased to 8.9%. Suryadinata argues that such increase ‘may be due to the conversion of ethnic Chinese to Christianity’. Suryadinata, “Buddhism and Confucianism,” 89. One of the reasons that accounts for Chinese conversion to Christianity lies in the schooling of Chinese children in Christian schools after the closure of Chinese schools in Indonesia post-1965. These schools were strategically set up by Christian churches to fill the gap in education of ethnic Chinese and to evangelize the students and their parents. See Hoon, “Mapping ‘Chinese’ Christian Schools”.
11. Aritonang and Steenbrink, *A History of Christianity*. Two later valuable additions to the literature are Schröter, *Christianity in Indonesia* and Seo, *State Management of Religion*.
15. Unless otherwise stated, the term ‘Christianity’ is used here to refer to ‘Protestantism’.
16. It has to be noted that such accusations are nothing new, as Coppel has documented the heated debates between Christians and Confucians in the Indies since the early 1900s concerning what constituted ‘Chineseness’ and whether Confucianism was a ‘true religion’. See Coppel, *Studying Ethnic Chinese*.
19. I refer to Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ in a broad sense to mean a set of dispositions, practices, and values that the church has unconsciously internalized and naturalized. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory*.
22. Unless otherwise stated, the church profile is adapted from *GKK 80 Anniversary Magazine*. 

23. For a detailed history of conversion of ethnic Chinese to Christianity in the Dutch East Indies, see Hartono, *Orang Tionghoa*. For the history of the division of mission fields between the Methodist mission and the NZV, see Daulay, *Kekristenan dan Kesukubangsaan*.


30. Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms and Jihad*.

31. Unless otherwise stated, this church profile draws its information from the author conducted with a senior pastor in GKY on 23 December 2008.

32. Unless otherwise stated, this church profile draws on an interview with an executive committee of the GKI West Java Synod on 15 June 2009.

33. Hartono, “The Union of Three.”

34. Ibid., 26.


36. Ibid., 140.


38. Hoon, “Between Evangelism and Multiculturalism.”

39. The term ‘mainline’ churches is generally used to refer to churches which follow the orthodox Reformation teachings, like Lutheran and Reformed (Calvinist); and in some countries also includes other ‘traditional’ denominations like Methodist, Baptist, Anglican and Mennonite. Borrowing from Aritonang’s usage of the term, ‘mainline’ is used to refer to the ‘traditional’ churches founded by colonial missions, juxtaposed against the ‘new’ churches established by American missions. See Aritonang and Steenbrink, *A History of Christianity*, 867, note 1.

40. Aritonang, “The Ecumenical Movement.”

41. Interview with the Executive Committee Member of the PGI on 16 June 2009. The PGI plays an important role in representing the Christian voice on various policy matters. Until the middle of the New Order period, the government would invite the Chairman of the PGI to become a member of the People’s Assembly (MPR).

42. Konaniah, “A Comparative Study.”


44. Pietism is a Christian movement practiced in the 17th and 18th centuries to emphasize individual piety and living a strict Christian life. It is considered a subset of the larger Revivalist movement in the same period when the church renewed its religious fervor to revitalize the spiritual ardor of its members and to win new souls for Christ.

45. Such union involved the unification of different liturgies and creeds observed by the three churches. For example, before the union of the GKI, the THKTKH in West and East Java subscribed to the confession of the Dutch Reformed Church (NHK, *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk*), while the church of Central Java opted for the creed of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands (GKN, *Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland*). See Hartono “The Union of Three,” 26.


47. The theological basis for their position is based on a pietistic interpretation of Romans 13 and a view that regards politics as dirty. See Budijanto, “Evangelicals and Politics.”


51. It can be argued that since such cultural baggage is not applicable to *peranakan* Chinese Christians, many of them have chosen to affiliate themselves with the more pluralistic Ecumenical movement.


57. Unless stated otherwise, the information about SAAT is taken from the 60th Anniversary Magazine of the seminary published in 2012.
58. The data is taken from the author’s field visit on 17 September 2012 when attending SAAT’s 60th Anniversary celebration.
60. Wiyono, “Pentecostalism in Indonesia,” 310.
63. The background of GIA is adapted from its 35th Anniversary Magazine published in 1981.
65. Andaya, “Contextualizing the Global.”
66. Ibid.
69. See Intan, God’s Fiery Challenger and Ong, “Ethnic Chinese Religions.”
70. See International Herald Tribune; Time; and Wall Street Journal.
74. Hoon, “Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Hybridity.”
75. See ‘Stephen Tong Chair’.

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