Secularity, Religion and the Possibilities for Religious Citizenship

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Abstract
Scholarly predictions of the secularization of the world have proven premature. We see a heterogeneous world in which religion remains a significant and vital social and political force. This paper reflects critically upon secularization theory in order to see how scholars can productively respond to the, at least partly, religious condition of the world at the beginning of the twenty first century. We note that conventional multiculturalism theory and policy neglects religion, and argue the need for a reconceptualization of understanding of religion and secularity, particularly in a context of multicultural citizenship — such as in Australia and Indonesia. We consider the possibilities for religious pluralism in citizenship and for “religious citizenship”. Finally, we propose that religious citizenship education might be a site for fostering a tolerant and enquiring attitude towards religious diversity.

Keywords
religion, citizenship, secularization theory, secularity, religious citizenship, citizenship education

Introduction
The premise of this paper is that, contra secularization theory, “religion” has not dissolved in the modern world. On the contrary, we see a heterogeneous world in which religion remains a significant and vital social and political force, and an aspect of plural modernities. Some countries, such as Australia, are broadly but unevenly secular, with pockets of religiosity; in many societies, the world is still, to use Weber's phrase, “a great enchanted garden” (1963 [1922]:270), and people live their lives enmeshed within a religious worldview; other societies, such as in Indonesia, are undergoing a process of re-conversion. Scholarly predictions of the secularization of the world have proven premature. Secularization theory, perhaps most famously put forward by Berger in The Sacred Canopy (1969 [1967]), posits that modernity, with its capitalist and individualist ethos, and rational values, will be a secular modernity: the force of religion as the
hegemonic worldview will decline, and religion will be consigned to a small, private world. However, there is almost a sub-genre of revision, resistance and refutation of secularization theory (e.g. Berger, 1999a; Casanova, 1994; Chaves, 1994; Stark, 1999; Stark and Finke, 2000). This paper is an attempt to critically reflect upon secularization theory and the arguments of its modifiers and resistors, to bring about a genuine response to the, at least partly, religious condition of the world at the beginning of the twenty first century.¹

We begin by outlining the major features of secularization theory, along the way identifying the many variations on the theme. We then survey the condition of the world, showing the failure of secularization theory to identify continuing and resurgent religiosity in the contemporary world. We explore the cases of religious Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, and neighbouring, broadly secular, Australia, to exemplify the diversity of the global religious landscape. Through our long-term ethnographic experience of Indonesia, our lived experience as residents of Australia, and a review of current events in these two countries in the light of the literature on multiculturalism, we consider the possibilities for religious pluralism in citizenship and for “religious citizenship” in both religious and broadly secular societies. We note that Western multiculturalism, in theory and policy, neglects religion; yet in countries like Australia, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there are aggrieved religious minorities. We argue that there is a need for a reconceptualization of multiculturalism such that it incorporates understanding of the need for peaceful co-existence of religiosity, minority religions and secularity. We also caution that “tolerance” invokes the power of the powerful to define the barbarism of the religious, ethnicized, irrational ‘Other’. Finally, we propose that religious citizenship education might be a site for fostering a tolerant and enquiring attitude towards religious diversity.

**Secularization: Theme and Variations**

From the 1960s, secularization theory was the prevailing model for how the world would “deal with” religion under conditions of modernization. Weber's 1904–05 essay on *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930) and his later *The Sociology of Religion* (1963 [1922]) proposed that the values of Protestantism and advanced capitalism would bring about the “disenchantment” of the world. His proposal was developed and refined by scholars such as Parsons

¹ This paper is part of a larger project, “Education for a Tolerant and Multicultural Indonesia”, which is financed by an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant (DP0984683).
(1966) and Luckmann (1967), and by Berger (1969 [1967]). They saw religion as a social construction that is shared and internalized by individuals, thus providing a “canopy” of explanations and meanings that shelters individuals, and hence society, from the potential destructiveness of chaotic, arbitrary existence. In *The Sacred Canopy*, Berger proposed that the twin forces of secularization and pluralism were in a dialectical relationship that created modernity: secularization generates pluralism, by destroying the transcendental authority of established religion, and pluralism relativizes religion, weakening its taken-for-grantedness and claims to hegemonic and unique truth. Both worked to “hollow out” the “sacred canopy”.

This cluster of work became known as “secularization theory” and became the accepted paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) by which the nature and development of advanced capitalist society were explained. “Protestantism divested itself as much as possible from the three most ancient and most powerful concomitants of the sacred — mystery, miracle, and magic. This process has been aptly caught in the phrase ‘disenchantment of the world’ (Weber, ‘Entzauberung der Welt’)” (Berger, 1969 [1967]:111).

Although there are various aspects to the theory, the backbone of secularization theory, and the most important component for our purposes, is “differentiation theory”. Differentiation theory is “the conceptualization of the process of societal modernization as a process of functional differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres — primarily the state, the economy, and science — from the religious sphere and the concomitant differentiation and specialization of religion within its own newly found religious sphere” (Casanova, 1994:19). Differentiation produced the disenchantment of the world, the separation of religion and state, and the development of comparative autonomy for political, education, scientific, economic and other institutions from religious authority and institutions. Differentiation is the component of secularization theory that is usually credited with the most validity (Casanova, 1994).

Other aspects of secularization theory that are relevant here include the privatization of religious belief, such that “Religion manifests itself as public rhetoric and private virtue” (Berger, 1969 [1967]:133). Secularization theory

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2 Berger has recanted and published an edited book on this subject (1999a). In this book, Berger uses the term desecularization, which implies that a process of secularization did occur, while others claim that the world never was disenchanted (e.g. Stark, 1999; Stark and Finke, 2000).

3 Other aspects of secularization theory include the transformation of religious institutions into secular institutions — e.g. educational institutions, such as universities, that in medieval times were religious institutions are now secular institutions — and the transfer of social
allows that under conditions of modernity, religious belief can still thrive at the level of the individual, and family, but posits that the number and proportion of people who say they believe in God, practise religious rituals, attend religious worship, belong to religious organizations, and so on, decline with modernity. Chaves modifies the claims for secularization theory at the level of the individual by proposing that,

the relevant questions about the scope of religious authority over individuals are questions about the extent to which actions are regulated by religious authority... Hence, data about religious intermarriage, religious authority’s attempted control over reproductive behaviour, diets, voting, etc. are much more relevant to debates about secularization than are data about belief in God or church membership (1994:768).

One of the ramifications of the individualization of religion is that the source of religious belief is the consciousness of the individual, rather than the shared, inter-subjective reality previously taken for granted. The concomitant of the individualization of religion is that religion becomes a matter of choice for the individual (or the family), rather than the means by which the members of a society share a common understanding of the nature of the world. This is what is behind Charles Taylor’s question, how is “being religious” different in the year 1500 — i.e. in the medieval world in the West — and in the year 2000 (2007:13)?

Secularization brings the de-monopolization of religion per se, as well as the de-monopolization of particular religious traditions, a decline in religious authority at many levels (Chaves, 1994; Dobbelaere, 1999), and the development of a pluralistic, competitive situation in which the allegiance of followers cannot be taken for granted. Particular religious traditions compete not only with one another but also with other truth-claims, communities and ideologies for the “choice” of potential followers. For the purposes of our paper, the idea that “secularization ipso facto leads to a pluralistic situation” (Berger, 1969

responsibilities from religious authorities to state authorities, e.g. hospitals and orphanages. Some scholars have focused on the reduced role of religious elites and authorities under conditions of modernity. Some scholars have stressed the rise of science as a new ideational system that makes claims for absolute truth: a minority sees science as a new religion; others see science as quite different from religion because it does not ultimately rely on faith.

4 There is (probably rightly) considerable imprecision in this aspect of the theory, in that advocates of secularization theory do not postulate the percentage of the society that would be needed to be able to label a society as “secular” or “predominantly secular”. A popular measure is the percentage of individuals who attend church each week (for Christianity) or pray five times daily (for Islam); commonly, survey data about downward shifts in these percentages are put forward as evidence of secularization.
[1967]:135; Berger, 2012) is important, not because it insists upon the separation of church (sic) and state, but because religious minorities require protection from the potential of a religious majority, in a position of political dominance or hegemony in the state, to impose religious oppression (Khan, 2004). That is, secularization encourages a religious majority to feel their fortunate position of power as conditional, ephemeral and relative, while providing religious minorities with a moral framework that encourages freedom and protection. Nevertheless, secularization has not solved problems of conflict (between followers of different religions, or indeed among followers of a religion).

**Religion in the Contemporary World**

Against the secularization thesis, anthropology has shown that in all societies “the quest for meaning that transcends the restricted space of empirical existence in this world, has been a perennial feature of humanity. (This is not a theological statement but an anthropological one….)” (Berger, 1999b:13). Indeed, the growth in the number of adherents of major religions in recent decades raises significant questions about the secularization thesis. However, this increase has not been even across the board. Here we briefly survey some major trends of religion in the contemporary world.

With the decline of Communism, religious activities proliferated in Russia following the reinstatement of the Orthodox Church, as well as in China after the Roman Catholic Church was instated, resulting in what some have termed the “re-sacralization” of these societies (Turner, 2007:258; Tham, 2008:16). Christianity has experienced an explosive growth in developing countries. Ironically, it has not been the more secularized and liberal denominations that have grown, but rather their more conservative counterparts — it has been those which believe in supernatural faith, miracles, infallible scriptural authority and evangelism that have been ascendant (Miller and Yamamori, 2007:36). This new strand of Christianity, referred to as the Pentecostal or charismatic movement, is remarkably different to the more established and institutionalized traditional denominations. Tham argues that the rise of this movement is a reaction to secularization on the one hand, and a demonstration of the failure of institutional religions to meet the emotional needs of their followers on the other. He maintains that the hyper-rationalism and disenchantment brought about by secularization has deprived individuals of “transcendent perspectives” which give meaning and purpose to their lives (2008:23). Furthermore, secularization and modernization have limited the role of institutional religion in the public sphere. As a result, a religious “market place” has been created as the new
religious movement attempts to “re-institute the sacred canopy” and “grapple with the demands of modernization and secularization” (Tham, 2008:24).

Another backlash against rampant secularity has been evident in the United States. Here the religious right (made up mainly of charismatic, evangelical Christians, as well as other conservative and fundamentalist Christian denominations, traditional Catholics and orthodox Jews) enjoyed significant influence in politics and public policy, at least until recently. They united around issues like abortion, gay marriage, stem cell research, and terrorism. Most commentators exclude the US from the secularization phenomenon.

However, in Australia and Western Europe, church attendance continues to fall and these societies are usually said to be secular societies. Australia is a country of increasing secularity. Censuses in Australia routinely ask about religious affiliation, but it is an optional question. The instruction “if no religion, write none” was introduced in 1971. This saw a seven-fold increase from the previous census year in the percentage of persons stating they had no religion. Since 1971 this percentage has progressively increased to about 22% in the 2011 Census (ABS, 2012). Nevertheless, Australia is also a country of immigrants, and the small minority religions of Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism are the fastest growing categories (ABS, 2012). There is also a movement of Pentecostalism, as well as an amorphous rise in New Age and spiritualist beliefs (e.g. ABS, 2012; Tacey, 2000; Tacey, 2003).

In the United Kingdom, parish churches are losing their sense of prominence within the public sphere (Percy, 2004). Although secularization and the “laws of man” (sic) seem to have prevailed in the legalization of gay marriage in some European countries like Spain and the Netherlands, issues pertaining to religion have not disappeared. With a growing migrant Muslim minority, secular societies in Europe are confronted with religious issues in the public sphere such as the controversial head scarf affair in France and the Rushdie affair in Britain (Bowen, 2007; Werbner, 2002). In some countries, there is the perception among dominant secular elites that Islam seeks to be a religion of the public sphere, contesting laïcité. Hence, Islam is positioned as a “public religion, . . . the underlying social machine incorporating all spheres of action and, specifically, political arenas into the cultural web. Secularism, on the other hand, appears as the opposite pole, as the virtual abolition of religion in the domain of politics and public life” (Nökel and Stauth, 2005:256).

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5 In response to the 2011 Census questions, stated religious affiliations were: 25% Catholic, 17% Anglican, 19% other Christian denominations, 22% “no religion” and 7% non-Christian religions (note: does not add to 100%, due to inadequate descriptions and non-answers) (ABS, 2012).
However, the global resurgence of Islam has occurred predominantly among already-Muslim communities — that is, it is a revitalized expression of Muslim identity and piety, above all evident in Muslim everyday practice. However, the aspect which has captured most media and government attention has been the eruption of Islamist demands for political power, not just through conventional political processes, including the ballot box (e.g. Algeria, Turkey, and Palestine), but also through violent Islamist terrorism. These opposite poles of Islamization — heightened religious piety and Islamist extremism — are nowhere more obvious than in Indonesia. Public discourse in Indonesia is now highly Islamized, and civil practices such as jilbab-wearing have become de rigeur for Muslims (see, e.g. Fealy and White, 2008). At the same time, Muslim extremists have successfully instituted a series of violent attacks on Western targets (notably in Jakarta and Bali), as well as intervened violently in inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts, e.g. in Ambon (see e.g. Hasan, 2010; ICG, 2002a; ICG, 2002b; ICG, 2006).

Scholars caution against seeing the Islamic resurgence as purely a reaction to the dominance of European civilization or Western modernity, but, as Asad (1993) reminds us, it is not possible to view Islam or any other religion as an island. Certainly, globally, there have been political events since the 1960s — most recently the Taliban rule of Afghanistan and then invasion by the US, and the invasion of Iraq by the US — that have been instrumental in producing “political Islam”.6

There is no doubt that these events have all contributed to a hypersensitivity among Muslims of their identity and place in the world, but it is important not to allow world political events to hijack understanding of the religious nature of this movement. The Islamic resurgence is a rediscovery of what it means to be a Muslim: how to live as a member of a moral, religious Islamic community, how to behave under modern conditions — which might mean living in a non-Islamic community — and the meaning of religion in one’s individual life. The Islamic resurgence has not only attempted to create better Muslims, but has also “provided people with a source of pride and personal identity” (Thomas, 1988:904).

6 An-Na’im (1999:103) comments, “Political Islam can be broadly defined as the mobilization of Islamic identity in pursuit of particular objectives of public policy, both within an Islamic society and in its relations with other societies. . . . In fact, the mobilization of Islamic identity toward such goals can be seen as integral to the legitimate right of Muslim peoples to self-determination.”

The coming to power, democratically, of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is one instance of the successful institutionalization of political Islam.
The Need to Consider Religion in Multicultural Citizenship — the Cases of Indonesia and Australia

Having established that the secularization thesis underestimated the need for religion under conditions of modernity, and that religiosity is prevalent in the contemporary world, here we aim to show that there is a need to acknowledge this religiosity, even in so-called secular nation-states such as Australia. We are looking at new ways for religious people to belong to larger polities, such as nation-states, in a modern world, and at new ways for nation-states to acknowledge and value the religiosity (as well as non-religiosity) of their citizens.

Here we move from a global overview to two very different but neighbouring countries, Indonesia and Australia, the better to ground our argument. These two countries represent two very different versions of multiculturalism in practice; one country, Indonesia, is a developing, religious (Muslim-majority) country; the other, Australia, is a prosperous, broadly secular, Western country. In Indonesia, religious identity is a matter of public acknowledgement and a compulsory aspect of citizenship. In Australia, religious identity is a matter for the individual, and freedom of religion is understood as “providing a ‘negative freedom’ from [state] interference in religious belief or worship” (Coleman and White, 2006:8). These two countries can be said to embody the complexity and plurality of the contemporary religious landscape.

With more than 300 ethnic groups and 700 living languages, Indonesia is one of the most culturally and linguistically diverse countries on earth. There are officially only six religions in Indonesia. According to the 2000 census, 86% of the population follow Islam, 6% follow Protestantism, 3% Catholicism, 2% Hinduism, and a smaller percentage Buddhism (CIA, 2011); since 2006, Confucianism has been an officially recognized religion. An estimated 20 million persons practise animism and other types of traditional belief systems (Oslo Coalition, 2008). All citizens must identify their affiliation with one of the six religions in documents required by government, e.g. in birth and marriage certificates. Recent changes allow an empty space for ‘religion’ in the national ID card (KTP). The first *sila* or principle in the Pancasila, which is the state ideology, is belief in one supreme God. Thus, Indonesia is neither a secular state nor an Islamic state, but it is a religious state.

Although the national motto is “Unity in Diversity”, during Suharto’s rule (1966–1998), the main method of dealing with ethnic and religious plurality was largely to pretend it did not exist. Assimilation into a national culture was the dominant discourse in Suharto’s Indonesia (Foulcher, 1990; see also Mujibarrahman, 2006: Chapter 5). After the interminable 32 years of New Order government under Suharto, Indonesia almost seemed to erupt in
ethnic-religious violence (Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002). It patently failed to uphold its national motto, as trouble-spots flared in ugly violent conflict: there were attacks on the Chinese in several towns and cities, ethnic violence in Central and West Kalimantan, religious and ethnic conflict in Poso, Lombok, Halmahera, Ambon, and elsewhere. And there were continuing separatist movements in East Timor, Papua and Aceh.

Democratization and decentralization effectively strengthened ethnic and regional identities (Aspinall and Fealy, 2003). Democratization opened the way for expression of tension, and decentralization meant that there was plenty to fight for: local elites played up tensions within communities in their own self-interest (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010). With the economy in disarray, analysts began to worry about national disintegration as well as rising religious extremism in Indonesia.

Over a rather longer period, since the 1980s, Islamization has produced a more Islamic public space in Indonesia (Fealy and White, 2008). While Islam is very diverse in Indonesia, and there is a continuum from tolerant moderation to terrorism (Barton, 2004; van Bruinessen, 2002), neo-fundamentalism emerged as an important force in Indonesian society. Although Islamist terrorism is the prism through which the Western media have mainly represented Indonesia since 2002, inside the country the trend has been towards more scrupulous observance of the five pillars of Islam and a much more public expression of piety.

While Indonesia post-1998 is a much more open and democratic society than under Suharto, the version of multiculturalism that prevails now is circumscribed — there are restrictions on religious belief and non-belief, and on religious identity; there is lack of tolerance for minority groups of various types (e.g. some religious minorities, atheists and secularists, some ethnic minorities, people of alternative sexualities) and an “absent state” (negara absen) when it comes to protecting minorities; there is continuing racism towards some minorities, such as the Chinese and Papuans; a largely secret war has been waged in West Papua over some decades, and there are still occasional outbursts of ethno-religious violence in some other areas; and the declaration of syariah (Islamic law) in some districts has particularly restricted women’s freedom and mobility. On the other hand, religiosity is assumed; the state recognizes as public holidays the holy days of the six religions; and religions are taught in schools, in the confessional mode. Indonesia is the sort of nation-state that puts the lie to secularization theory: Indonesian modernity is plural and democratic, but religious; differentiation has not placed religion in its own box, nor has religion been ascribed a role only in the private sphere.
Simultaneous with democratization, and to some extent in reaction to the greatly enhanced media freedom, there has been a swing towards intolerance. There were mass protests and counter-protests from 2006 over a proposed anti-pornography law (Allen, 2009). In 2005, MUI (the Indonesian Council of Ulama) prohibited Muslims from praying with non-Muslims; in 2005 they issued a fatwa forbidding Muslims from marrying non-Muslims and outlawed the Islamic minority sect, Ahmadiyah, and pluralism, secularism and liberalism in general (Gillespie, 2007); in 2008 came the Joint Ministerial Decree which prohibited members of Ahmadiyah from proselytizing (Crouch, 2009). Furthermore, the construction and building of religious worship places have increasingly become a site of controversy and dispute, as highlighted in the recently published monograph, *Disputed Churches in Jakarta* (see Ali-Fauzi et al. 2012).

Although the Constitution accords “all persons the right to worship according to their own religion or belief”, it does not accord the right not to be religious. However this “freedom of religion” is circumscribed by the first principle of the national ideology of Pancasila, which states a belief in one supreme God. Thus, atheism, animism and polytheism are not permissible in Indonesia. Atheism was stigmatized during the Suharto regime when an atheist was automatically assumed to be a communist who warranted exclusion from the national community. More recently, the state’s position towards atheism is being put to the test with the imprisonment of a 30-year old self-declared atheist under charges of blasphemy, disseminating hatred and spreading atheism (*The New York Times*, 21 May 2012).

Thus, although Indonesia can be said to already have religious citizenship, in regard to these latter issues Indonesia suffers from a lack of state support for religious and non-religious minorities. We return to consider religious citizenship in Indonesia in a later section.

In Australia, as in many Western countries, there have been two main ways to “deal with” minority, usually immigrant cultures: the assimilation of minority cultures to the dominant majority culture, as in Australia under the White Australia Policy, or some sort of multicultural policy, which challenges the authority, dominance and even existence of a homogeneous national culture. This latter has been the case in Australia, as government policy, since about 1982. In 1989, a statement of policies and goals entitled *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* received bi-partisan political support (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 1989). This policy aimed to manage issues raised by the cultural diversity of Australia — including “problems and injustices” such as the “disproportionate number of non-English speaking background (NESB) immigrants [who] remain confined to low skilled, low-paid
employment” and the fact that “Many NESB women face additional problems of poverty, isolation and cultural tensions and conflict about the appropriate place of women in society” (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 1989). This Agenda did not mention that there were any problems of religious conflict or injustice that needed to be addressed.

While the Australian Constitution and laws guarantee freedom of religion, and multicultural policy, such as the National Agenda, explicitly outlaws discrimination on the grounds of religion, the Judeo-Christian underpinning of the Australian nation-state is explicit and undeniable.7 “[I]ts civil society and political culture have been profoundly influenced by religious belief. Indeed, the religious heritage has been so ubiquitous as to be largely taken for granted” (Galligan and Roberts, 2004:201). For instance, Australia says it will treat all citizens equally, but the only religious public holidays that it recognizes are Christian ones. The hegemony of “white”, Anglo-Saxon/Judeo-Christian culture tends to hide the interests and grievances of the followers of minority religions: “the state’s tolerance is a tolerance [of] major religions in the Christian-Judaic tradition and . . . it will over-ride the impact of believers’ views where it regards those views as departing from what it considers community values” (Coleman and White, 2006:9). Thus, while Australia resoundingly trumpets its tolerance of diversity, it clearly demands “an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia, to its interests and future first and foremost . . . in the interests of social cohesion and justice” (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 1989).

We propose that in Australia, multiculturalism as explicit government policy and as dominant public discourse has neglected religion and religious minorities, to its peril. Against a backdrop of the growing population of Muslim immigrants, in 2001 three events occurred that brought to a climax a generally rising tide of anti-Muslim feeling: first was an alleged gang rape in Sydney, second was the events of September 11, in New York, and third was the arrival of around 440 mainly Afghan refugees who had been given shelter by the

7 In 2009, the Rudd government introduced a new Citizenship Test for immigrants who want to become citizens. The booklet of testable information that prospective citizens have to learn states, in a section entitled “Freedom of religion and secular government”, that Australia has a “Judeo-Christian heritage, and many Australians describe themselves as Christians. Australia has public holidays on Christian days such as Good Friday, Easter Sunday and Christmas Day. However, the government in Australia is secular. This means that there is no official national religion. People in Australia are free to follow any religion they choose, as long as its practices do not break Australian laws. In addition to Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism and many other religions are practised freely in Australia. Australians are also free to not follow a religion. The government treats all citizens equally, whatever their religion or beliefs” (Australian Government, 2009:18).
Norwegian vessel, the *Tampa*, and were refused entry by the conservative Howard government.

Australia, usually seen as a multicultural success story, saw some ugly attacks on Muslims: some women wearing veils and headscarves were villified and attacked; Arabic newspapers and other institutions received death threats; some Islamic schools had to be temporarily closed after they and their pupils were attacked; and mosques were the subject of attacks (see Rutland, 2006:24–25 for further references). Fortunately such episodes did not escalate, though some episodes of inter-cultural conflict, such as the Cronulla riots, have anti-Islamic nuances (Noble, 2009). Nevertheless, there has been something of a shift away from multiculturalism in Australia, which lines up with a retreat from multiculturalism in many countries in Western Europe (Phillips, 2007:4–8). Currently, a fortress mentality is obvious in Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers who arrive by boat. It is very unfortunate that the issue has become politicized, with the two major political parties engaged in a “race to the bottom” in their unsympathetic rhetoric about “illegal immigrants”. The other, more long-standing problem area for Australia is the underclass status of its Indigenous People, who continue to experience dramatically different standards of health and well-being to those enjoyed by the rest of the nation. Aborigines are adversely affected by generations of trauma (e.g. caused by the government policy of separating Aboriginal children from their parents and communities — the “Stolen Generations”), racism, social exclusion and poverty, as well as dispossession.

Those two issues aside, Australia has made solid progress on creating a harmonious and stable society from its diverse population mix. From a unique public television, radio and online media station, SBS, which broadcasts in many different languages, to migrant community centres, inter-faith organisations and inclusive public schools, Australia has implemented a huge range of pro-diversity policy initiatives that broadly seem to have worked.

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8 In October 2010, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, declared that multiculturalism had “utterly failed” in Germany. This was largely due to its inability to accommodate religious others (read: Muslim Turks), among other problems such as unemployment and social integration (BBC News Europe, 2010). Similarly, in February 2011, the British Prime Minister David Cameron and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy both denounced state multiculturalism as a “failure” (BBC News UK Politics, 2011; Reuters UK Edition, 2011). In reply to these European statements, the Immigration Minister in Australia, Chris Bowen, reiterated his government’s support for multiculturalism, stressing that the difference between multiculturalism in these Western European countries and in Australia was that Australia “respected different cultures, but afforded ultimate primacy to Australian values” (*The Australian*, 2011). Up until this statement in February 2011, the Gillard government was not considered to be pro-multiculturalism.
However, in the academic discourse on multiculturalism in Australia, religious diversity is neglected in favour of cultural and ethnic diversity. Most academic books on multiculturalism theory and diversity fail to address religious diversity. A recent book, titled *Everyday Multiculturalism* (Wise and Velayutham, 2009), barely mentions religion. A standard text on human resource management for Australian university students, *Managing Diversity in Australia: Theory and Practice*, mentions the word “religion” only twice: the second instance follows these sentences: “... we will map the contours of diversity in Australian workplaces. To do this, we will use the criteria of race, gender, age, ethnicity and disability. These are the main criteria that are of interest to the Australian Human Rights Commission (ARHC). These are not the only contours of diversity that could be examined; other dimensions include religion, sexuality and locality” (Strachan et al., 2010:20).

*Rethinking Australian Citizenship* (Hudson and Kane, 2000) devotes separate chapters to a wide range of “differential citizenships” possible in Australia — indigenous citizenship, social citizenship, cultural citizenship, multicultural citizenship, feminism and citizenship, environmental citizenship. The idea of religious citizenship is not entertained. Hudson later (2003) elaborated that “citizenship is different on different sites and in different contexts and domains; different citizenships involve multiple capacity; exercises of civic capacity do not fall under a single citizenship; and not all citizenships can be totalized by reference to nation-state citizenships” (2003:426). Such an understanding of citizenship allows for scope to imagine a new sort of citizenship based on religious identity. Hudson’s idea of differential and heterogeneous citizenships suggests that religious citizenship could be conceptualized as being of quite a different order. He identified five definitions for religious citizenship: nation-state, civil society, human rights, legal documents, and reflexive account (2003:426–427). For a country such as Australia, we suggest exploring the potential for religious citizenship in civil society: “the citizenship that religious persons can exercise in the civic sphere” (2003:426). We suggest that in Australia, functional differentiation (arguably the most accepted component of secularization theory), in concert with privatization (in the sense that religiosity should be confined to the private world), have progressed to the extent that there is a lack of space for religious people to exercise their citizenship in the public sphere. This is particularly the case for people of minority religions. Later we propose that education is one area where the expression of religiosity could be publically explored.

The point we want to make here is that academic discourse of multiculturalism, in Australia, and worldwide, does not adequately theorize religion nor does multiculturalism policy in Australia adequately acknowledge religious
We are not just talking about economic injustices, such as high unemployment rates among migrant minorities: we think that countries like Australia need to do some hard thinking about meaningful symbolic recognition, non-Christian religiosity, minority religious identities and how they can be better included in communities and “mainstream culture”.

However, we also want to acknowledge some potential problems with “religious citizenship”. One problem is that the discourse of religious tolerance tends to be conducted among religious elites (Rutland, 2006:26). Brown (2006) has written of the way “tolerance talk” has discursive effects — producing a privileged, superior class of individuals, who deem themselves the tolerant, secular, civilized mainstream, in contradistinction to people (commonly mobs) who are deemed the irrational, fanatical, extremist or fundamentalist Other. “Tolerance is generally conferred by those who do not require it on those who do” (Brown, 2006:186). Secularists hold themselves superior to the religious, and this conceit legitimates intolerance of non-liberal states and patriarchal minority religions (Brown, 2006:7; Parker, 2007; Parker, 2011).

We see this phenomenon commonly played out in multiculturalism discourse and practice in Australia: only ethnic minorities have culture or religion — the dominant white culture does not appear as culture, and secularity appears as a neutral, objective “fair go”, when in fact it fails to identify the needs of religious minorities. As Brown notes, this discourse of civilized tolerance reeks of Orientalist imperialism: secular, Western democracies enjoy human rights and celebrate cultural diversity, and therefore have the right to “stand[] for the expansion of human liberty” in fundamentalist countries such as Afghanistan (President Bush, 18 May 2004 as cited in Brown, 2006:177). In other words, “tolerance” invokes the power of the powerful to define the barbarism of the religious, ethnicized, irrational Other. We have to recognize the potential of tolerance in religious citizenship to become an instrument of power, and we need to pay attention to the process of negotiation and power play between the state and civil society when conceptualizing any kind of religious civic citizenship.

The identification of religious tolerance as a discourse of power has a history. Secularization theory is a part of that history. Asad has discussed how, through the post-Reformation period in Europe, “religion” came to be regarded as a thing in its own right — and that enabled its domestication by the state (1993:206–207). “Religion” came to be seen as a force which elicited passions and beliefs that were irrational. It became something that had the power to threaten public order and the state. Religion also became “part of what is inessential to our common politics, economy, science, and morality. More strongly put: religion is what actually or potentially divides us, and if followed with passionate conviction, may set us intolerantly against one another” (Asad,
This, of course, is the crux of “differentiation” in secularization theory — the development of separate spheres, and the relegation of “religion” to its own little sphere.

The secularity of some Western countries is often seen by religious people as explicitly not neutral. Muslim people commonly see the banning of the Muslim head-scarf as a partisan, illiberal attack on their religious freedom and right to express their religiosity. This signals that the West, while posing as the upholder of universal values such as tolerance and human rights, does not always practise what it preaches; neither does it have a monopoly on tolerance and human rights.

Religious Citizenship

With increasingly complex and plural identities emerging from globalization, new concepts of citizenship are urgently needed to accommodate such diversity within (and beyond) the nation-state. Conventionally, citizenship is understood as a legal status, an administrative category and a political practice that accounts for one’s membership, rights and obligation to a political community (Stokes, 2008). However, as we have seen, the discourse of citizenship has evolved and extended into areas beyond the legal and political, to include civil, cultural and social areas — thus the emergence of new expressions such as “multi-cultural citizenship”, “corporate citizenship”, and “ecological citizenship”. The concept of “cultural citizenship” was employed by Rosaldo (1999) to expand the idea of citizens’ rights based on class to citizenship issues of gender, race, sexuality, ecology, and age. In his view, disadvantaged, marginalized and disenfranchised subjects deserve full citizenship in spite of their cultural difference from mainstream society. This concept was subsequently deployed and fine-tuned by Ong (1999) to refer to the cultural practices negotiated out of ambivalent and contested relations with the state, that establish the criteria of belonging within a national population and territory. Drawing from Rosaldo and Ong, Winarnita (2008) defines cultural citizenship as performance and expression of national belonging through engagement in social, cultural and economic activities.

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9 Some theorists of secularization see science as one of the chief driving forces for secularization. While we agree theoretically that science seems to be antithetical to religion as a way of explaining the world, we would note here the failure of secularization theory to recognize the human capacity for contradiction: science and religion can and often do co-exist, both at the level of the individual and in society. For instance, many apparently well-educated Christians accept creationism, and many Muslims who believe that Allah created the world explicitly advocate that Muslims should accept Western technology and science.
political issues, even in the absence of legal or formal citizenship. The foregoing discussions suggest that citizenship is more than a legal status or administrative category and includes political practice, as well as a mode of participation in public life (Stokes, 2008). Membership of and participation in religious non-governmental organizations and religious institutions could be considered acts of religious citizenship.

Nevertheless, a crucial question is the role of the state. While the classic nation-state notion of citizenship (passports, patriotism and gold medals) is not adequate to cater for the radically different potential claims of religious citizenship, we cannot ignore the nation-state. Religious citizenship would have to accommodate, be accommodated by, or sit side-by-side with the nation-state; it would have to recognize and engage citizens’ emotions which are bound up with the nation-state: intense feelings of belonging, of hurt and injustice at being marginalized, treated as second-class citizens or dispossessed, mixed pride-and-disappointment, patriotic expectations and hope; simultaneously it would have to offer a new moral authority, certainty, dignity and prosperity; as well as achieve international acceptability, recognition and status. This is a tall order! Iran is an extreme example, and we are not advocating replication, nor religious revolution — but we do support the exploration of other, more inclusive ways to operationalize religious citizenship.

A stark contrast to the case of a strong, Islamic state is one where the state is weak, as in the case of post-Suharto, Muslim-majority Indonesia. As discussed earlier, although Indonesia has a form of religious citizenship, we maintain that its version of religious citizenship is not ideal. The state’s role in the treatment of its religious citizens is far from consistent. On the one hand, the Constitution allows religious freedom; on the other hand, the state assumes a monopoly in defining what constitutes religion and only recognizes six religions. Furthermore, the state fails to protect religious minorities like Christians and the followers of the Islamic sect, Ahmadiyyah. For instance, on 6 February 2011, three Ahmadis were publicly lynched by Islamic hardliners in West Java; a day later a mob burned down three churches in Central Java, in an unrelated case of outrage against an unsatisfactory court sentence against a Christian man accused of proselytization and blasphemy (Bush, 2011); in Aceh, where *syariah* is the prevailing system of law, the Banda Aceh administration closed Christian churches and Buddhist temples in October 2012 (Saragih, 2012). Such incidents point to increasing intolerance and violation of religious freedom. Sadly, the state has taken little action on such attacks on religious minorities. In broadly Christian areas of Papua, the influx of Muslim domestic migrants is changing the ethno-religious landscape such that many Papuans feel they are becoming a minority in their own land.
An ideal multiculturalism, with true religious citizenship, in Indonesia would see not the “negative freedom” advocated in liberal Australia but explicitly pro-active government intervention on the side of minorities, to protect their right, enshrined in the Constitution, to “worship according to their own religion or belief”. It would see the acceptance of minority group identity where there is currently racism and stigma; the peaceful settlement of the Papua problem; and the rule of law where currently there is corruption, confusion and legal competition. As Modood argues, “Multiculturalism is clearly beyond toleration and state neutrality for it involves active support for cultural difference, active discouragement against hostility and disapproval and the remaking of the public sphere in order to fully include marginalized identities” (Modood, 2007:64).

In Australia, sometimes religious minorities require recognition and accommodation — for instance, for public holidays, houses of worship and some religious practices — and sometimes they would prefer anonymity. Since September 11, Australia has enacted new laws like the Anti-Terrorism Act 2005, and successive governments have found it in their electoral interest to take a hard line against asylum-seekers. While these measures do not explicitly target Muslims, they are commonly perceived, by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, to construct Muslim-ness as suspicious and threatening. Sometimes the high-handed control of religion and of national borders and citizenship comes at the cost of a breach of human rights. This is the case with Australia’s mandatory detention of asylum seekers. Clearly nation-states have to strike a balance between protection of the basic human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (as in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and protection of citizens from terrorist attack, but we also need some new ways to think about religious identity in a citizenship context. Australia has barely begun to take seriously the particular religious and legal needs of its Indigenous People, and there is clearly room for improvement by governments in Australia in their accommodation of immigrant religious needs and identities. However, we consider that the greatest need in Australia as far as religious citizenship is concerned, is to foster awareness among the dominant secular elite that religious people have a basic human right to practise their faith. There has been an enormous shift in social awareness about the rights of people of alternative sexualities in Australia and a growing awareness of the privilege enjoyed by heterosexuals — for instance, in everyday language, there is a strong trend to use “partner” instead of “husband” or “wife”. We would like to

10 It is ironic that many asylum seekers in Australia are refugees from wars in countries like Afghanistan waged by the US, with Australia its loyal ally.
see an analogous trend in acceptance of religiosity and of the practices of religious people, and especially of people of minority religions.

Actions that promote religious citizenship should be different in each country, as our two examples show. Kymlicka, in advocating for a liberal multiculturalism, argues that liberal citizens should put in a “conscientious effort to . . . see how issues look from the point of view of those with differing religious commitments and cultural backgrounds” (2001:297). The teaching of such “civility”, he believes, is primarily the responsibility of civil society, namely the church, family, on the street, and in neighbourhood shops (2001:298–302). Religious citizens can draw on their religious capital and values of peace, respect and love to pursue a “common good”, which can be found in most religious traditions, and is accessible for both religious and secular citizens. Such pursuit of a “common good” enables members of a common polity to build bridges and enter into dialogue with each other despite their differences in religion, ethnicity or culture.11

Religious Citizenship Education

Education is potentially a site for the fostering of a tolerant and enquiring attitude towards religious diversity. It is widely recognized that school plays an important role in shaping the character traits and dispositions of students and in preparing a new generation for their responsibilities as citizens (Kymlicka, 2001; Weisbrod, 2002; Weinstock, 2004). Many countries are explicit that among the aims of their education system is the aim to produce good citizens. For instance, in Indonesia, the Education Act of 2003 stipulates that the aim of education is to produce Indonesians who have a “belief in God the Almighty and . . . high morality, good health, knowledge, intelligence, creativity, independence, and would be democratic and responsible citizens” (Soedijarto, 2009).

Citizenship education has been practised by most countries, with varying foci depending on national ideology. In arguing for religious citizenship education as a global necessity, Miedema argues,

all children in all schools should have the full possibility to develop in a substantial way (that is not only cognitively but also experientially and practically) their religious identity as part of their broader identity; and all schools should be obliged to foster a

11 For a discussion on how religious institutions, in particular, the Christian church, can facilitate political participation and promote participatory citizenship, see Weithman (2002) and Rasmussen (2012).
However, in state schools in many broadly secular countries today, religion is either absent or relegated to a second-class (i.e. non-examinable) subject status. This is the case in Australia. Religious people who are unsatisfied with such arrangements may enrol their children in segregated religious schools, “partly in order to teach their religious doctrine, but also to reduce the exposure of their children to the members of other religious groups” (Kymlicka, 2001:303). Kymlicka has identified some of the problems with such schools, including the inadequate education in citizenship. He argues that citizenship education is more than knowledge of political institutions and constitutional principles but should be education about how we deal with people who are different from us in their race, religion and class. He further contends that segregated religious schools, which tend to be homogeneous in their ethnocultural backgrounds and religious beliefs, are unlikely to be able to teach students how to live with “differences” (2001:304). Like Kymlicka, Miedema expresses doubt that segregated religious schools can adequately prepare students for encounter and dialogue with adherents of other religions (2006:969).

While there is some evidence that supports both Kymlicka and Miedema’s reservations (see for example, Hoon, 2009), other research on religious schools suggests otherwise (Halstead and McLaughlin, 2005; Parker, 2010a; Raihani, 2012). These scholars recognize the potential for religious schools to become significant sites of multicultural citizenship education wherein citizenship rights are taught and cultural and religious differences are welcomed and valued. The caveat is that, more often than not, it has been individual educators, rather than the schools as a whole, who have promoted multicultural and inclusive education on citizenship (Parker, 2010b; Raihani, 2012). Halstead and McLaughlin make the important point that religious schools can provide students with distinctive values that equip students to evaluate others’ values (which can, and indeed should, include disapproval) and also provide students with reasons to go on to place higher value on other integrative social values such as tolerance and “civic respect” (2005:70). This means that such schools are engaged in some quite subtle and nuanced work of creating secure identities in their students as well as building strong communities of empathetic citizens committed to the common good.

We recognize that the introduction of religious citizenship education would bring its own policy and curriculum questions (see, for instance, Barnes, 2009; Kymlicka, 2001). Nonetheless, we would like to see both state and private religious schools teaching students how to live with “differences”, including religious differences, and not just in a token or ritualistic way. We would borrow
from Ninian Smart and argue that the study of religions should be both “polymethodic” and “poly-religion”: students in all schools should be taught to “take religion seriously”, to study more than one religious tradition and to have their students engage in active, participatory tolerance education (1995).

We would opt for a “non-theological” and “non-confessional” paradigm to direct teaching and learning in religious education, with students engaging in active, participatory tolerance and interfaith education. Religious citizenship education should attract students’ attention through the discussion of everyday life issues (such as courtship, friendship, pre-marital sex, abortion, circumcision, cross-religious marriage) and not be afraid to challenge students with the big questions of religious philosophy (students can discuss the existence of God, or the afterlife). It should acknowledge the differences, uniqueness and competing truth claims of different religions, as well as the faith of religious followers, and respect their cherished particularity and superiority. Such education would attend to peaceful, everyday co-existence and recognize the right of religious freedom (for a guide on how such a curriculum can be designed and implemented, see Engebretson, 2009). The aim of such religious citizenship education would be to foster understanding of religious difference beyond stereotypes, similarities and conventional ritualistic behaviour, enabling students to “negotiate with the perspectives of ‘others’ and integrate such perspectives into their own actions and reflections” (Miedema, 2006:975).

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to reflect critically and productively upon the secularization thesis. The events and wash of the 9/11 Islamist attacks on the US, as well as the “furiously religious” condition of the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Berger, 1999b:2), indicate the need for fresh analysis of “religion” in the world. We briefly surveyed the recent trend of religious resurgence in the contemporary world and, through analysis of the religious situation in the religious nation-state of Indonesia and the broadly secular, multicultural nation-state of Australia, we argued the need for new analysis of the meaning and scope of religion in state-society relations. We contend that multiculturalism policy has to take religion seriously, as does multiculturalism theorizing. We agree with Nökel and Stauth that there is “a need to open the secular public to the possibility of religious inclination, that is, a need for communication on the basis of difference to be acknowledged” (2005:362) and propose that some consideration be given to new modes of “religious citizenship” within the framework of multiculturalism. Finally, we propose that religious citizenship education in schools has potential as a site
where a tolerant and enquiring attitude towards religious diversity might be encouraged.

References


