Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Hybridity: The Dilemmas of Ethnic Chinese in Post-Suharto Indonesia

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Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Hybridity: The Dilemmas of the Ethnic Chinese in Post-Suharto Indonesia

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The dominant discourse in accommodating the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia during Suharto’s regime was one of assimilation, which forcefully aimed to absorb this minority into the national body. However, continuous official discrimination towards the Chinese placed them in a paradoxical position that made them an easy target of racial and class hostility. The May 1998 anti-Chinese riots proved the failure of the assimilationist policy. The process of democratization has given rise to a proliferation of identity politics in post-Suharto Indonesia. The policy of multiculturalism has been endorsed by Indonesia’s current power holders as a preferred approach to rebuilding the nation, consistent with the national motto: ‘Unity in Diversity’. This paper critically considers the politics of multiculturalism and its efficacy in managing cultural diversity and differences. It deploys the concept of hybridity to describe as well as analyze the complex identity politics of the ethnic Chinese in contemporary Indonesia.

Keywords: Chinese-Indonesians, hybridity, multiculturalism, assimilation, Indonesia, Chinese overseas

With a population of approximately 206 million and more than 1000 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, Indonesia is undoubtedly one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse countries in the world. The Javanese (41.7 per cent) and Sundanese (15.41 per cent) are two of Indonesia’s largest ethnic groups (Suryadinata et al., 2003). In comparison, only about 2–3 per cent of the population are ethnic Chinese, making them one of the many minority ethnic groups in Indonesia (Mackie, 2005). It is

1 An earlier version of this paper was published in Pass and Woods (2004).
2 I acknowledge here that I identify and enumerate ethnic ‘groups’ for convenience. ‘Group’ has been a conventional way to identify ethnicities in Indonesia, but it is a problematic concept.
3 Indonesia’s population census of 2000 revealed that the official percentage of ethnic Chinese was 0.86 per cent of the entire population (Suryadinata et al., 2003, p. 7). The 2000 population census was the first since 1930 to attempt to calculate the ethnic composition of Indonesia’s population. Successive governments have considered ethnicity a sensitive issue, and it was not included in the censuses conducted in 1961, 1971, 1980 and 1990 (Suryadinata et al., 2003, pp. xx–xxi). However, Suryadinata et al. acknowledged that the 2000 census percentage was problematic because of under-reporting of Chinese ethnicity. The name-changing regulation of 1966 forced Chinese to change their Chinese names into Indonesian-sounding names, along with the military-backed assimilation programme during the Suharto era and the fear of self-identifying Chinese identity due to the traumatic events of May 1998, meant that many Chinese identified themselves as belonging to other ethnic groups in the 2000 census (Suryadinata et al., 2003, pp. xx–xxi).
important to note that not all governments of multiethnic and multicultural nations adopt the ideology of multiculturalism as their official policy to accommodate ethnic and cultural differences. Moreover, even if they do, the policy tends to be like the concept of ‘democracy’—it can mean anything. This tendency was evident in the multiethnic state of Indonesia, before the fall of former President Suharto’s regime in 1998. The 32 years of Suharto’s authoritarian rule, also known as the New Order, began in 1966.

Jui-lan Thung (1998, p. 23), writing just before the regime’s collapse, contended, ‘The discursive competition between assimilationism, multiculturalism and the subjectivity of conditional belonging has not yet taken place in Indonesia. So far an assimilationist discourse rules. The possibility of developing multiculturalism is still remote.’ However, the downfall of Suharto not only ended the New Order’s ideology of assimilation, it also opened up a new space for the resurgence of identity politics across Indonesia. Consequently, the discourse of multiculturalism has been discussed and debated increasingly among social activists and academics in post-Suharto Indonesia.4

This paper begins with discussion of the position of the ethnic Chinese within the framework of Indonesia’s national ideology under Suharto’s New Order. It then critically examines the efficacy of multiculturalism as a government policy in managing cultural diversity and difference, especially in accommodating ‘Chineseness’ in post-Suharto Indonesia. The final section explores the idea of hybridity, encompassing syncretism and the complexities of cultural crossings, borrowing and mixing. The concept of hybridity is used here as a scholarly approach—or ‘heuristic device’ (Ang, 2001a, p. 17) or ‘methodological concept’ (Papastergiadis, 2005, p. 56)—to describe and analyze the complex identity politics of the ethnic Chinese in contemporary Indonesia. I do not intend to posit multiculturalism and hybridity in binary opposition, nor to suggest hybridity as a replacement for multiculturalism in government policy. On the contrary, I endeavour to highlight the importance for multiculturalism to recognize the blurring of cultural boundaries that takes place through hybridity in the everyday reality of an ethnically diverse society.

**Assimilationism under Suharto’s New Order**

In shaping Indonesia’s national policies during the New Order (1966–1998), President Suharto created a new ‘culture’ by reaffirming the importance of the ideology of *Pancasila*. *Pancasila* consists of five principles: the belief in one supreme God, humanism, nationalism, popular sovereignty and social justice. This national ideology was promoted as the single basic principle for all ‘mass organizations’ and ‘social-political forces’ under the Suharto regime (Morfit, 1986, p. 42). *Pancasila* was implemented to

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4 For instance, *Jurnal Antropologi Indonesia* (published by the Department of Anthropology in the University of Indonesia) organized its third international symposium in July 2002 in Bali with the theme, ‘Rebuilding Indonesia, a Nation of “Unity in Diversity”: Towards a Multicultural Society’. It also organized the workshop ‘Multicultural Education in Southeast Asian Nations: Sharing Experiences’ in Depok in 2003. Danusiri and Alhaziri (2002) present a collection of essays on multicultural education. The policy of multiculturalism in Indonesia is mainly advocated by the newly developed civil society, prompted by the post-Suharto process of democratization. For details, see Burhanuddin (2003) especially Section 3, ‘Multikulturalisme dan Penguatan “Civil Society”’ (Multiculturalism and the strengthening of civil society).
permeate ‘every facet of the life of our [Indonesian] nation and the state’ (Suharto cited in Elson, 2001, p. 241). The New Order’s interpretation of Pancasila was part of an attempt to achieve the primary goal of assuring political stability and security necessary for national development. Hence, to ‘deviate from Pancasila is to undermine development efforts, national stability and the character of the Indonesian people’ (Morfit, 1986, p. 43).

In addition, the plurality and pluralism fostered during Sukarno’s ‘Old Order’ were deemed by the New Order to threaten the nation’s development and security, and so were suppressed through the introduction of SARA in the 1970s (Thung, 2004, p. 219). SARA is an acronym that summarizes the sensitive issues of ethnicity (suku), religion (agama), race (ras) and interclass (antar golongan) differences. Under the banner of maintaining order and stability, all public discussions of issues related to SARA were prohibited. It can be said that, during the New Order, Indonesian citizens irrespective of their ethnicity, religion, class and gender were all imagined within a constructed homogeneous Pancasila national identity. The internally diverse identities were often subsumed and overridden by this imagined and constructed national homogeneity (see Rosaldo, 2003).

However, the New Order’s national ideology never managed successfully to accommodate the presence of its ethnic minorities, including the Chinese, in its construction of what Benedict Anderson (1983) describes as a national imagined community. As Ien Ang (2001b, p. 28) states, ‘while the Indonesian nation was from its inception imagined as a multiethnic entity, the place of those marked as “Chinese” in this “unity-in-diversity” has always been resolutely ambiguous and uncertain’. In the course of nation building, Indonesia has found it impossible to construct its national identity without identifying ‘significant others’.5 According to Anthony Reid, ‘Chineseness became one of the most important “Others” against which the new national identities defined themselves’ (cited in Lloyd, 2001, p. 3). While, for most nations, citizenship connotes a legal status that differentiates a citizen from a foreigner, in postcolonial states such as Indonesia, it was internally contestable. Rosaldo’s (2003, p. 2) concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ eloquently captures the power inequalities that are ‘at play in relation to mechanisms of marginalization and exclusion’, among different citizen ‘groups’ in a single nation. Ironically in the context of Indonesia, as Charles Coppel (1983, p. 3) observes, the term ‘Indonesian citizen’ (Warga Negara Indonesia, WNI) is artificial and non-realistic: if in everyday speech someone is referred to as a WNI, it is commonly understood to mean that s/he is of foreign (especially Chinese) origin and not indigenous (asli). WNI is thus understood to be an abbreviation of WNI keturunan asing (Indonesian citizen of foreign descent). The use of the word asing (foreign) underlines the alien-ness of Chinese-Indonesians in Indonesian asli eyes.

In Suharto’s Indonesia (and to some extent even now), ‘national identity’ required more than proof of birth in the country. Among citizens, there were official categories of pribumi (native) and non-pribumi (non-native)—based on ‘race’ and indigeneity—with the former being regarded as the ‘authentic’ (asli) inhabitants of the land.6

5 Stuart Hall contends, ‘The notion of the sociological subject reflected the growing complexity of the modern world and the awareness that this inner core of the subject was not autonomous and self-sufficient, but was formed in relation to “significant others”, who mediated to the subject the values, meanings and symbols—the culture—of the worlds he/she inhabited’ (Hall, 1992, p. 277).

6 The official labelling of the Indonesian population according to the ‘racial’ division of ‘pribumi’ and ‘non-pribumi’ was abolished only in 1998 by President Habibie.
The term ‘pribumi’ was as much an artificial national construct as the term ‘non-pribumi’. As there are about 300 different ethnic ‘groups’ that are considered as ‘native’ in Indonesia, it can be argued that there is no single pribumi identity. In Kalimantan, for instance, the Dayaks see themselves as more native (pribumi) than the Madurese who migrated there later. However, the New Order government ignored this internal diversity within the pribumi ethnicities when constructing the ethnic Other—the Chinese non-pribumi. Since Indonesianness is defined in terms of indigeneity or pribumi-ness, ‘no one can become [‘true’] Indonesian without first becoming a member of a pribumi ethnic group’ (Suparlan, 2003, p. 26). Hence, the Chinese who had acquired Indonesian citizenship were still seen as ‘foreigners’ and categorized as non-pribumi, as they were perceived to have originated from a land ‘outside’ the boundaries of the Indonesian nation (Aguilar Jr, 2001). This racial dichotomy of pribumi and non-pribumi was rigidly maintained during the New Order, with the intent continuously to objectify and essentialize the Chinese as the foreign ‘Other’ and prevent them from being accepted fully as ‘Indonesians’.

Yet, ironically, ‘Chineseness’ was also widely perceived as a ‘domestic’ problem (known as the ‘Chinese problem’ or ‘Masalah Cina’) which was detrimental to the nation’s solidarity. Viewing the dominant position of the Chinese in the nation’s economy as a problem, the New Order government attempted to solve it by endorsing a military-backed ‘Assimilation Program’ (‘Program Pembauran’). This programme prescribed the total dissolution of any markers and identifiers of ‘Chineseness’, and urged this problematic ethnic group to immerse itself in officially constructed local cultures. These constructed local cultures, as Ariel Heryanto (1998, p. 103) claims, were ‘the only legitimate ethnic cultures’ in Suharto’s Indonesia (see also Acciaioli, 1996). Thus, in this sense, ‘Chineseness’ was constantly under the threat of erasure.

The following observation by Soenarso (1997, p. 166), a military general who served in Suharto’s regime, reflects the extent of this erasure by assimilation:

> If you have a foreign body in your system, you have several options, You can just ignore that with maybe dire consequences [sic], or you may operate and take the foreign body out, or try to digest and absorb them [sic] into the system. We have chosen the last option.

This assertion resonates with Zygmunt Bauman’s description of the term ‘assimilation’: it seeks to make the different similar to oneself through ‘annihilating the strangers by devouring them and then metabolically transforming them into a tissue indistinguishable from one’s own’ (Bauman, 1997, p. 47). This policy of cultural assimilation forces the ‘foreigners’ to give up their cultural identity. The general assumption was that identity is singular rather than plural. Hence, one could either be an Indonesian or a Chinese. The more ‘Chineseness’ a person asserted, the less ‘Indonesian’ s/he became, and vice versa. Hence, to be completely Indonesian, the Chinese had to give up all their ‘Chineseness’.

During this period, the Chinese were given the right to expand the nation’s economy (and their own wealth), but, paradoxically, were marginalized and discriminated against in all social spheres: culture, language, politics, entrance to state-owned universities, public service and public employment (Heryanto, 1999, p. 326).7

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7 For details of discrimination in the Indonesian legal system against the Chinese, based on ‘race’, see Winarta (2004).
This continuous and intentional official discrimination against the Chinese placed them in a vulnerable position of ethnic and class hostility. It also undermined the New Order’s assimilation efforts by continuously reproducing their ‘foreignness’. The consequence of this was the May 1998 anti-Chinese riots, during which Chinese businesses were looted and Chinese women raped in Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia. As Jemma Purdey (2003, p. 423) noted, these riots had twin effects: they generated ‘a renewed awareness among this minority of their ethnicity and particularly of their vulnerability in Indonesia’, as well as ‘a widely felt realization that the assimilation project had indeed failed’.

The downfall of Suharto triggered a rise of identity politics across the whole of Indonesian society. Multiculturalism as a policy has been contemplated and endorsed by Indonesia’s new power holders as a preferred policy for rebuilding the nation, consistent with Indonesia’s national motto—‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’ or ‘Unity in Diversity’ (see Suryadinata, 2003). Nugroho (2002) argues that during Suharto’s era, ‘bhinneka’ (diversity) was sacrificed in the name of ‘ika’ (unity) through the repression of SARA.

The Politics of Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism, a policy first introduced in the US in the 1960s, was a significant shift in the ways that identity is constructed within western modernity. It signified abandonment of both western universalism and the ideology of monocultural assimilation (Agger, 1998). Multicultural policy generates a return to roots and leads to a strengthening of ethnic identities (Friedman, 1997, p. 72). Agger (1998, p. 69) describes multiculturalism as ‘the most politically engaged version of American postmodernism’. He contends that multiculturalism espouses postmodern theories that accentuate the notion that people’s differences are more important than their similarities. The demand for recognition of minority rights, culture and identity—what Charles Taylor (1994) famously refers to as a ‘politics of recognition’—is at the core of the discourse of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism attempts to subvert cultural homogenization by acknowledging the coexistence and equal representation of different cultures and peoples within a nation-state.

In any society, a certain group (or groups) will be considered ‘dominant’ through establishing and universalizing its culture and experience as the society’s norm. M. Khoirul Muqtafa (2004) recently noted that, in Indonesia, it will be a challenge to implement the discourse of multiculturalism as a policy, because this paradigm faces opposition from ‘dominant’ groups in the society, including the Muslim majority. Religious or ethnic dominant groups tend to see multiculturalism as a threat because of its promise to unveil the false universalism of these ‘dominant’ groups, and to give ‘voice’ to those groups which have been ‘culturally oppressed’ by being ‘both marked out by stereotypes and at the same time rendered invisible’ (Joppke & Lukes, 1999, p. 5).

The rhetoric of multiculturalism is reflected in the objective of the Jakarta-based Centre for Multicultural Understanding (RAGAM). RAGAM, a division of the Set Foundation, is an organization that aims to ‘empower civil society through public media’. It was first established in 1987 but was officially recognized only in 1999 after Suharto was ousted (see http://www.smallvoices.org/storyaryo.htm). As stated on its website, ‘RAGAM was developed in response to Indonesia’s massive multicultural diversity, and attempts to activate the voices of marginalized and minority groups within the huge population’. RAGAM took initiatives to produce a television series...
aiming at educating Indonesians about difference, to ‘break down racist preconceptions and generalizations’ (especially towards the Chinese) and to interrogate the identity not only of the minority, ‘but also of dominant society’.

Multiculturalism seeks to give voice to oppressed minorities and affords them an identity, subjectivity and personhood by encouraging individuals within that minority to ‘narrate’ their own experiences of oppression, which are perceived as different from other groups’ experiences of oppression (Agger, 1998, p. 72). In the case of post-Suharto Indonesia, ethnic Chinese took advantage of the democratization process brought about by ‘Reformasi’ (or Reform, used to describe the post-Suharto era) to liberate their long-suppressed identity and cultural heritage. A consequence of this was an ‘awakening’ or ‘resurgence’ of Chinese identity reflected in the formation of Chinese political parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the ‘revival’ of Chinese culture, religion, language, press and media (Hoon, 2004a, p. 13). For instance, this new multicultural environment has provided an ideal breeding ground in which the Chinese-language press can proliferate.

In 2004, I found 10 Chinese-language publications circulating in Jakarta. The publication of Chinese-language media in Indonesia was encouraged by the government because it demonstrates policy-makers’ new commitment in implementing Reformasi. To Chinese-Indonesians, the re-emergence of Chinese-language publications has important symbolic meanings, even though most of them no longer read or speak Chinese. The lift by President Abdurrahman Wahid on the 1978 official ban on Chinese printed matter signified victory over the ‘dark forces’ of Suharto’s regime and the beginning of a bright future for the Chinese in Indonesia. Even though competence or familiarity with the Chinese language no longer reflect the ‘Chineseness’ of most Chinese-Indonesians, the revival of Chinese-language publications is still perceived as an acknowledgement of the culture and identity of Chinese-Indonesians. This shows that the post-Suharto era has been an exciting period for identity construction and ‘speaking out’ (see Turner, 2003), as the Chinese have been given the opportunity to express their identity after being deprived of this right for over three decades.

Nevertheless, critics of multiculturalism argue that this policy does not necessarily empower minority groups. In the context of social reality, multiculturalism, despite its promises, does not necessarily redistribute power or resources. Ang (2001a, p. 14) argues that in the ‘multicultural nation’, differences between groups are carefully classified and organized into neat categories of distinct ‘ethnic communities’, each classified by their own ‘culture’. The boundaries of difference and the concept of diversity are still determined by specific hegemonic and dominant group(s) (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 199). That is to say, no matter how tolerant Indonesian multiculturalism (or unity-in-diversity) might be, and how the nation is re-imagined, the ultimate acceptance of minority groups, such as the ethnic Chinese, still largely depends on the hegemonic group(s) or power holders.

Despite the seemingly positive signs of Chinese cultural liberalization, racial discrimination in Indonesia is far from over. At least fifty discriminative laws and ordinances were still in force in 2002 (Anon., 2002). Just before the Chinese New Year

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8 The ‘dominant’ or ‘hegemonic’ groups here refer to the non-Chinese or ‘pribumi’ majority and the Indonesian government. Even though the non-Chinese pribumi is not a homogeneous group—as pointed out in the beginning of this paper—owing to self-internalization and for other reasons, they often ‘imagine’ themselves as a unified collectivity when juxtaposed against the Chinese ‘Other’.
(Imlek) celebrations in February 2002, the Chinese were warned by Jakarta’s Governor, Sutiyoso, to celebrate the festival in a ‘low-key’ way, in order to avoid ‘jealousy’ from society (Kompas, 8 February 2002). Sutiyoso’s comment also implies that anti-Chinese sentiment is still present, perhaps most strongly reproduced by perceptions of racially based inequalities of wealth. Hence, even though diversity in the form of different ethnicities and cultures has been tolerated on the official level, in reality minority groups still do not necessarily have the same rights as the dominant group(s).

Multiculturalists often represent minority cultures uncritically and simplistically as homogeneous utopian entities. And often multiculturalism is acclaimed as a success by simply presenting some superficial and decorative aspects of certain cultural forms. As Yiyian Wang (2000, p. 122) states,

In a society where certain cultures dominate, multiculturalism can be highly deceptive, for it is often the case that the minority cultures become decorative of the mainstream’s tolerance and generosity.

Even in New Order Indonesia, in spite of its assimilation rhetoric, the government put an extraordinary effort into promoting decorative aspects of their ideal version of minority cultures by essentializing them in school curricula and textbooks and in promoting regional arts such as traditional dance and crafts; and by displaying them in the form of monuments such as in Taman Mini theme park. Regional diversity in the decorative aspects of cultural forms was celebrated as evidence of the harmony between dominant and minority cultures and the ‘success’ of managing ‘unity-in-diversity’ (Foulcher, 1990; Acciaioli, 1996). Thus it can be seen that power holders paid lip service to the celebration of multiculturalism and cultural diversity in order to contain and restrain internal resistance within a political boundary. As Parker (2003, p. 246) points out, in the New Order, ‘The emphasis was not on exploring or understanding that difference, but on maintaining order—stabilitas [stability] and aman [security]’.

Similarly, David Parker’s description of how homogenized Chinese culture in the form of food provided by Chinese takeaways in Britain is hailed as contributing to a harmonious multicultural society shows just how shallow the idea of multiculturalism can be (Parker, 2000, p. 77). This point resonates in a speech by the then chargé d’affaires of the Indonesian Embassy in Sydney, Imron Cotan, who was later the Ambassador to Australia, on the occasion of the Indonesian Multicultural and Harmony Festival in 2002. He claimed, ‘Today we are once again presented with the richness of Indonesia’s cultures through which we will be able to sample some of its finest cuisine as well as enjoy its cultural performances presented by various ethnic groups, symbolizing the harmony of our society’ (Cotan, 2002). This shows how multiculturalism sometimes ‘confuses cultural difference with cultural diversity and thus naively assumes the displays of different cultures are the solution to cultural difference’ (Kuo, 2003, p. 230).

One other major problem with multiculturalism is that it tends to classify or categorize people into different homogenized and unified cultural ‘groups’ even though individuals might not want to be identified as such. David Theo Goldberg (1994, p. 7) maintains that, ‘Multiculturalism is celebrated in the name of a standard pluralism that not only leaves groups constituted as givens but entrenches the boundaries fixing group demarcations as unalterable’. An example of such reification and homogenization of specific cultures is UNESCO’s 1993 book, The Multi-cultural Planet, in which the world is divided into culturally homogeneous regions, and reference to ‘the European culture’,
‘the North American culture’, ‘the Arab’ and ‘the African’, among which dialogues should be developed (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 200). As Yuval-Davis observes:

[T]here is the inherent assumption that all members of a specific cultural collectivity are equally committed to that culture. They tend to construct the members of minority collectivities as basically homogeneous, speaking with a unified culture or racial voice. These voices are constructed so as to make them as distinct as possible…from the majority culture, so as to make them ‘different’. Thus, within multiculturalism, the more traditional and distanced from the majority culture the voice of the ‘community representatives’ is, the more ‘authentic’ it would be perceived to be within such construction. (Yuval-Davis 1997, p. 200)

This type of construction can be observed in popular Indonesian television serials, known as sinetron. The over-amplification of ethnic characteristics has always been an obsession of Indonesian sinetron. The sinetron usually attempts to present a character as ethnic by over-accentuating their regional accent or by making him/her wear their regional traditional costumes. After the end of the Cold War (i.e. with the waning threat of Communism) and, even more so, after the downfall of the New Order, ‘Chineseness’ was no longer taboo in Indonesian television programmes. I have recently observed that ‘Chinese’ characters are increasingly appearing in a few Indonesian sinetron. However, in showing that they were ‘Chinese’ or acting as ‘Chinese’, the actors had to put on ‘traditional’ Chinese costume—the male with a pigtail while the female held a silk handkerchief. These programmes deliberately use the popular stereotypes of the Chinese, including the emphasis on ‘Chinese’ appearance—slanted eyes (mata sipit)—and ‘Chinese’ characteristics—stingy (pelit) and money-oriented (mata duitan). The incorporation of ‘Chineseness’ in an overly accentuated ‘traditional’ form, in a sinetron that had a contemporary story setting, demonstrates that multiculturalism can be not only artificial and decorative but also dangerous as it (un)wittingly perpetuates stereotypes and essentialist demarcation between ethnic groups.

It should be stressed that the competition between identities and cultures is not simply a competition between groups, for example pribumi and non-pribumi, but it is also within communities and between individuals (Modood et al., 1994, p. 5). Multiculturalism not only accounts for differences between one culture and another, but also overlooks diversity within the same culture. This construction does not allow space for differences of interest and power within the minority collectivity such as through class, gender, religion, age and even culture.

The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have never been a homogeneous ‘group’. Regional and class diversity account partly for this heterogeneous self-identification. ‘Chineseness’ in Medan, for instance, is different from ‘Chineseness’ in Jakarta, Kalimantan, Bangka, Semarang, Sukabumi or Malang. Furthermore, the Chinese were stereotypically portrayed in Indonesia’s public sphere as economic creatures and wealthy business people. Although this image had some truth to it, it should not be generalized—there are many poor Chinese in Tangerang and Pontianak, for instance. Far from being a culturally homogeneous group, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are very diverse and can be identified differently in different periods and regions. Conventionally, scholars have divided them into two main groups: the totok (China-born newcomers, Chinese speaking) and the peranakan (local-born or mixed blood, Indonesian speaking) (Coppel, 2002, pp. 106–7). The totok were mainly labourers who arrived in the archipelago at the end of the nineteenth century; the peranakan settled in Indonesia from the seventeenth century. The totok were themselves not a unified group,
as they came from different parts of China and spoke different Chinese dialects. During
the New Order, scholars noted a general decrease in the usefulness of the totok/
peranakan distinction in identifying the Chinese owing to the forced assimilation
programme that resulted in the peranakan-ization of all Chinese (see Suryadinata, 1978,
p. 32).

Given the diverse and complex manifestations of ‘Chineseness’ represented by
regional, class, cultural and religious difference in Indonesia, the following questions
deserve to be raised: Is there a Chinese identity in Indonesia? Which ‘Chineseness’
should multiculturalism represent: for instance, the ‘Chineseness’ of Medan or Jakarta;
upper, middle or lower class; peranakan or totok; Muslim, Christian, Confucianist or
Buddhist; and primordial or hybridized?

Another question that follows from the above is who determines which
‘Chineseness’ should be represented in this multicultural model? Identity construction
and cultural representation are highly politicized processes that involve the play of
power—that is, the power to define who is included and who is excluded (Hall, 1996b,
p. 4). I have discussed above the unequal power relations within multiculturalism, as
dominant or hegemonic group(s) often solely determine which cultures are to be
included and the limits and boundaries of these cultures. However, it is also crucial to
note that the forces and power structures that influence the representation and shape
the construction of a minority culture are not necessarily external but can also be from
within the minority collectivity during self-representation. In the case of the Chinese-
Indonesian minority, leaders of resurgent Chinese organizations play an important role
in defining what ‘Chineseness’ means in Indonesia. Even though in reality ‘Chineseness’
is highly contested and diverse, certain power holders within the ‘Chinese community’
who have a variety of agendas—for instance, to stress ethnic solidarity, advocate a
return to ‘roots’ and primordialism, claim authenticity and promote resinicization—can
represent it as an unchanging and static or primordial entity. When this occurs, only a
particular version of Chinese culture and ethnicity is displayed as representative of all
‘Chineseness’ within the framework of multiculturalism.

One example of such self-essentialism of ‘Chineseness’ by Chinese organizations is
the annual Cici Koko competition begun in West Jakarta in 2002. Cici Koko (the
Hokkien terms for older sister and older brother) is a contest broadcast live on
television, jointly organized by the Chinese Surnames Association (Paguyuban Sosial
Marga Tionghoa Indonesia or PSMTI) and West Jakarta Municipality. It is open to
young Jakarta-resident Chinese participants and aims to promote Chinese art and
culture and to show that Jakarta is a multiethnic city (Setiogi, 2003; Anon., 2004). One
of the criteria by which the contestants are judged is their knowledge of Chinese culture
and the ability to use Mandarin. The competitors had to wear ‘traditional’ Chinese
costumes during the contest. Winners had to wear ‘traditional’ costumes when

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9 The Cici Koko contest was modelled quite closely on the Abang None (terms for older brother and sister
in local Betawi dialect) contest—the original Betawi version of the competition in Jakarta. The costumes
and selection criteria are the same for Abang None as for Cici Koko, except that the former is open to
Betawi contestants (another ethnic group prominent in Jakarta), while the latter is for Chinese.

10 The criteria of this competition were based on five areas. As well as knowledge of and ability in the
Mandarin language and Chinese culture, the remaining three were knowledge of tourism in West Jakarta
and Indonesia in general, personal etiquette, and general knowledge about society and state (Jawa Pos
Dotcom. Accessed 8 March 2004). Some winners of the Cici Koko contest acknowledged that they rarely
speak Mandarin at home, although they need to have some knowledge of the language in order to win the
contest (The Jakarta Post, 31 March 2003).
attending public events, since they were expected to be ambassadors for the city and also representatives of the Chinese community.

The compulsory knowledge of Chinese culture and language and the wearing of ‘traditional’ costumes implied an ideal version of ‘Chineseness’ that PSMTI wanted to exhibit or revive, even though most young Chinese do not speak Mandarin and have little knowledge of Chinese culture, let alone wear a version of traditional Chinese costumes in their day-to-day lives. Projection of this homogenized, essentialized and primordial version of ‘Chineseness’ through the powerful instrument of television media makes it easier for the Indonesian public to assume that this is the identity of all Chinese in Indonesia. However, as Pnina Werbner (1997b) asserts, this ‘strategic essentializing of self-representation’ (p. 248) is a ‘rhetorical performance in which an imagined community is invoked’ (p. 230), and which can be ‘culturally empowering’ (p. 248) for the ethnic actors.

The insistence on an essential ethnic character or the requirement of ethnic solidarity might mean individuals are represented under an ethnic and cultural identity that might not necessarily reflect their own identity. Chinese-Indonesian academic Melani Budianta (2004, p. 606) stated, ‘For Chinese who are Chinese cultured, I am not Chinese [enough] because I do not speak Chinese nor have any orientation to the Chinese culture; and for those who are not Chinese cultured, I am Chinese’ [my translation]. Peranakan Chinese of mixed ancestry and other hybridized Chinese-Indonesians, like Budianta, who live in-between Chinese and local cultures or who simply could not trace their historical ties to authenticated tradition, may be disempowered by multiculturalism as they cannot find a place within this multicultural framework other than by re-imagining and repositioning themselves to identify with the ‘prescribed Chineseness’.

For Chua Beng Huat (2004), this is the ‘price of membership’ that individuals have to pay in order to belong to an ascribed ethnicity. He has also observed how individuals who do not reposition themselves to fit into one of these ascribed cultural categories or who demand the right to exit from these categories are cast as being ‘selfish’ and ‘free-riders’ within their society. However, Kelly Kuo (2003, p. 229) argues, ‘For those who have lost their ability to enunciate their own cultural identity, multiculturalism does not battle for cultural difference. Instead, multiculturalism displaces cultural difference in terms of inequality of cultural identities and representations among different groups with homogenized cultural diversities’. This homogenization of cultures fails to give recognition of, or ‘voice’ to, many minority groups and to potentially complex individual identities. It also fails to acknowledge the real diversity within a nation.

Multiculturalism also tends to essentialize cultural boundaries as fixed, static and monolithic, with no space for growth and change (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 200). Racism, according to Stuart Hall (1996a, p. 445), ‘operates by constructing impassable symbolic boundaries between racially constituted categories…[so that race] constantly marks and attempts to fix and naturalize the difference between belongingness and otherness’. It can be argued that the essentialist, fixed construction of cultures as mutually exclusive identities within multiculturalism enhances the ‘reproduction of potentially antagonistic, dominant and subordinate others’ (Ang, 2001a, p. 14), and, hence, provides an ideal environment in which racism can operate. The long history of complicated mutual stereotyping and Othering between the ethnic Chinese and pribumi in Indonesia that was founded on an essentialist discourse of impassable racial demarcation may be perpetuated and sustained by a policy of multiculturalism if people are ‘boxed’ and homogenized neatly into clearly boundary-defined ethnic categories.
The Politics of Hybridity

The efficacy of multiculturalism as a public policy has been severely challenged by the proliferation of diasporic and transnational connections in the cultural identifications of migrants in this increasingly globalized late-modern world. As political and economic borders are being re-defined in the process of globalization, ‘so the borders of the “nation” as both “a community of strangers” (Us), juxtaposed to a “strange community” (Others), also become re-defined’ (Anthias, 2001, p. 635). The proliferation of late-modern heterogeneity entails a disintegration of an essentialist distinction between fixed dominant group(s) and permanent minorities, partly constructed and perpetuated by the policy of multiculturalism. As Renato Rosaldo (1989, p. 217) comments:

In the present postcolonial world, the notion of an authentic culture as an autonomous internally coherent universe no longer seems tenable... Rapidly increasing global interdependence has made it more and more clear that neither ‘we’ nor ‘they’ are as neatly bounded and homogeneous as once seemed to be the case. All of us inhabit an interdependent... world marked by borrowing and lending across porous national and cultural boundaries....

Ang (2001a, p. 16) argues that the concept of hybridity confronts and problematizes all these boundaries, but does not erase them, and suggests a blurring of boundaries and, consequently, an unsettling of identities. The term ‘hybridity’ traditionally carried the connotation of being ‘impure’, ‘racially contaminated’ and genetically ‘deviant’ in social evolution theory. However, in the late twentieth century, ‘hybrid’ and ‘hybridity’ have been re-appropriated to signal cultural synthesis (Ifekwunigwe, 1999, p. 188). For Goldberg (1994, p. 10), ‘Hybridities are the modalities in and through which multicultural conditions get lived out, and renewed’. Hybridity is tied to the idea of cultural syncretism, which foregrounds complicated cultural entanglement rather than cultural difference partly solidified by multiculturalism (see Ang, 2001a; Anthias, 2001).

The often artificial and decorative display of cultural diversity by nation-states treats cultures as discrete categories and suggests that there has been little interaction between cultures. Multiculturalism remains as rhetoric, since it is in fact ‘monocultural’, in that it often does not allow for the recognition that an individual member of society may have more than one ‘identity’ at work within her/himself. In the context of multiculturalism, each individual possesses only one discrete cultural identity. In this sense, ironically, by unwittingly setting clear boundaries and delineations between cultures, multiculturalism has defeated its own purpose of avoiding the monocultural nation through an assimilation policy. People who do not fit into any of those defined cultural categories will be left with no choice but to ‘assimilate’ into the only officially ‘prescribed’ cultures that are available (as I note above in Chua’s observation).

I argue that being multicultural—rather than displaying a selection of monocultural individuals—is about the acknowledgement of the existence of a matrix of different

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11 Melani Budianta (2004, p. 603), a Chinese-Indonesian academic, wrote about her travel experience in multiracial Malaysia where the Chinese, Malays and Indians are rigidly categorized within their racial framework: ‘I felt as if I was in a country which was lived in by people from different worlds who did not see the need to interact with each other (my translation).
cultures within each individual. Moreover, this understanding of multiculturalism at the ‘micro’ level of the individual can also be translated to the ‘macro’-societal level, especially in the state’s accommodation of not only the existence of different ethnic groups, but also the diversity within each ethnic group. No wonder Homi Bhabha (1994, p. 38) suggests that the survival of cultural diversity will be based not on ‘the exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity’.

As mentioned above, the term ‘hybridity’ has an epistemological origin in pseudo-scientific racism. Werbner (1997a) perceives the transformation of this term within a discourse of dangerous racial contamination into one of cultural creativity as an empowerment. In her own words, ‘Insults have been turned into strengths’ (p. 21). That said, Ang (2001b) reminds us that some people are still not yet ready to accept this concept, because they have been captured by the dominant essentialist ideology of identity, nationality, ‘race’ and ethnicity. As a result, mixture is still conceived as ‘contamination, a breach of purity and infringement of “identity’” (Ang, 2001a, p. 200).

The emergence and proliferation of hybridity is not only an anathema but also a fear to some governments. Arjun Guneratne (2002, p. 20) notes that even though there is no historical validity to the concept of racial or cultural purity, the perception of cultural purity is nevertheless an indispensable ‘precondition for the development of nationalist sentiments’. The impurity, mixture, fusion and lack of identity that hybridity manifests are threatening to governments, as they perceive this hybridity as a force that tends to undermine the sovereign national identity of the nation, which is usually constructed in terms of cultural purity and authenticity. Therefore, ‘hybridity, whether ethnic or cultural, has to be suppressed, and becomes the site of anxiety’ (Silva, 2002, p. i).

Although often cited in postmodern literature, hybridity is by no means a new phenomenon, nor is it a postmodern ‘invention’ (Ifekwunigwe, 1999). Nonetheless, the process of cross-cultural flows and cultural mixture has accelerated rapidly with the proliferation of globalization in recent decades (Papastergiadis, 2005). The politics of hybridity has been intrinsic to the process of migration and dislocation, and has been practised by locals and migrants in their daily negotiation and construction of their identities, consciously or unconsciously.

One aspect of the process of hybridity experienced by Chinese-Indonesians is exemplified in the language spoken by the peranakan Chinese, who have resided in Indonesia for centuries. The peranakan intermarried with the locals and adopted local culture. They spoke a type of hybrid language called Bahasa Melayu Tionghoa or Chinese-Malay (also known as Batavian Malay). This language was a combination of bazaar Malay and the Hokkien (a Chinese dialect), and later enriched by borrowings from Dutch and other western languages (see Suryadinata, 2004, pp. 149–64). Although the Chinese-Malay language is considered as ‘low Malay’, much of its Hokkien vocabulary has become an integral part of the Indonesian language. Most of these words are related to food, e.g. teh (tea), kecap (soy sauce), juhi (cuttlefish), kue (cakes), tahu (tofu) and soto (meat soup). These words are used by Indonesians in everyday Indonesian language without their knowing of the words’ origins.

The lived reality of the hybrid condition of Chinese-Indonesians in contemporary Indonesia is shown in the mixed use of language in their daily conversation. I have noted elsewhere the hybridized Chinese-Malay language that has appeared in a post-Suharto Indonesian-language ‘Chinese’ newspaper called ‘Sinar Glodok’ (Hoon, 2006). Sinar Glodok is mainly circulated in the Chinatown (Glodok) area of Jakarta. An interesting feature of Sinar Glodok that illustrates the hybridized language used by
Chinese-Indonesians can be seen in its short-story column. The short stories are written in Indonesian, but Hokkien and Mandarin pinyin are also used. For instance, in the 19–22 February 2004 issue, Mandarin pinyin was used for the title of the story (which happened to be a Chinese proverb). Hokkien names (such as Ko A. Heng) were used to indicate that the characters in the story were ethnic Chinese; and Chinese-Malay expressions such as ‘Lu’ (you) and ‘Gue’ (I or me) were used in the conversational dialogues. This type of hybrid mixture of Indonesian language, Hokkien and Chinese terms and Chinese-Malay expressions is common in daily conversation within the Chinese community in contemporary Indonesia.

It is crucial to note that hybridity is a continuous and often convoluted process of cultural translation and negotiation that is never complete. For Bhabha (1994, p. 38), the space of the ‘inter’ is the ‘cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the ‘in-between’ space’. The migrant who experiences ‘multiple rootedness and consciousness . . . is forever mixing and mixed, forever crossing, traversing, translating linguistically and culturally. He [sic] is not either/or, but both’ (Chan & Tong, 1995, p. 7). This points to why assimilation remains an impossible idea: it naively treats identity as a discrete singular entity and forces people to choose between ethnicities. In this instance, one can be either an Indonesian or a Chinese. On the other hand, the concept of hybridity does not suggest a submission to the impossible idea of assimilation, or a retreat into an essentialized version of ‘Chineseness’ (Ang, 2001, pp. 71–2). Hybridity—an accommodation of cultures and peoples at the local level—is one of the ways to deconstruct the dichotomy between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. The appreciation of such hybrid identities might dissolve the rigid line between ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’, ‘pribumi’ and ‘non-pribumi’. The breakdown of these dichotomies would help to soften the essentialized differences associated with ‘Chineseness’ and pribumi identity.

Ernesto Laclau (cited in Hall, 2000, p. 236) states that ‘hybridization does not necessarily mean decline through the loss of identity. It can also mean empowering existing identities through the opening of new possibilities’. However, it is has to be recognized that these new possibilities are not detached from the constraints of existing boundaries. Ironically, although hybridity strives to overcome boundaries, it still depends on them. Hence, for Papastergiadis (2005, p. 60), ‘The critical task is not to strive for a utopian space beyond boundaries, but to re-engage the sphere of possibilities that are permitted or excluded by boundaries’. In the case of the Chinese in Indonesia, after a process of negotiating contradictions and the tension of maintaining one’s own culture and becoming like others, a ‘third space’ in the form of a common, new culture and social environment is created (see Chan & Tong, 1995, p. 9). This new culture suggests the recognition of the transformative process of Chinese ethnicity into a creative, adapted, hybridized Chinese-Indonesian identity.

Stuart Hall (2000, p. 227) notes that ‘[i]n diasporic conditions people are often obliged to adopt shifting, multiple or hyphenated positions of identification’. These new identities sometimes have a transethnic and transnational character. For instance, British Muslim identity is not restricted to an ethnic group, but is an ‘amalgam that

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12 This ‘new culture’ is evident in various forms, such as the transformation of food as a result of constant cultural exchange and borrowing. Chinese takeaways in Britain exemplify a modality of such cultural fusion; ‘what have now become familiar forms of difference such as sweet and sour, chow mein, are in fact not known in that form in China, but are British Chinese’ (Parker, 2000, p. 93). In Australia, the interventions and participation of Asians have transformed Australian public culture, especially in art, media and popular culture, as well as in everyday life.
may be linked to fabricating identity as a mode of resistance’ (Anthias, 2001, p. 625). However, it should be stressed that not all hyphenated identities are necessarily cultural hybrids. In other words, an individual who claims that he/she is part-Japanese, part-Chinese, part-Malaysian and part-Australian, does not automatically become a cultural hybrid. Hybridity is also not a reference to the mixed racial composition of populations (Hall, 2000, p. 226). Jonathan Friedman (1997, pp. 82–3) argues against the identification of individuals as fully formed hybrid subjects or ‘pure hybrids’, as this claim of ‘purity’ only returns to an essentialized notion of race and/or culture. Instead, hybrid identity formation is a continuing process of negotiations that is always in transit, travelling between different cultural spaces and different identity vectors (Munoz, 1999, p. 32).

Nevertheless, it has to be understood that hybridity does not necessarily lead to empowerment (Anthias, 2001, p. 622). In some cases, even where individuals adopt the cultural traits of their host society, they may still remain marginalized and Othered as ‘foreigners’. This is illustrated clearly in the Chinese-Indonesian experience especially during the New Order (and, to some extent, even now): regardless of the extent to which their identity was shaped by localization, they were never accepted as ‘true’ Indonesians and were never able to shed their identity as ‘foreigners’. Since hybridization involves multiple cultural flows, the possibility of hybridity inevitably depends on the willingness of the culturally dominant groups to abandon the automatic assumption of universalism and to realize that one’s cultural ‘product’ or belief is not the only one that is possible or desirable.

In his paper, ‘The institutionalization of hybridity’, Chan (2005) casts doubt on the possibility of hybridity being institutionalized as a political discourse in the near future. His reservation is based on the concern that current discussions of hybridity have not yet taken into serious consideration the social and economic relations of power. Moreover, he noted that ‘hegemonic racial hierarchies’ based on essentialism are still very much sustained within current institutional practices. Arguing against the unquestioning acceptance of hybridity as a ‘catch-all explanatory tool’, Chan (2005, p. 2) invites us to consider the difficulties related to the concept of hybridity that remain to be addressed by cultural theorists, should hybridity be institutionalized:

What exactly are the possibilities for using ‘hybridity’ to address structural inequities and issues related to social justice? Does everyone have the same access to mobilizing hybridized
agency? What are the affective and political investments involved in either wanting, or refusing to accept, hyphenated hybrid identifications, especially in increasingly conservative political climates?

It is useful to reiterate that hybridity is ‘not the solution, but alerts us to the difficulty of living with differences’ (Ang, 2001a, p. 17). As Chan showed, it is still premature to institutionalize hybridity. Perhaps hybridity is never meant to be institutionalized to replace current political frameworks and policies. As indicated at the beginning of this paper, hybridity is only an analytical approach, but a necessary one, for us to conceptualize identity and difference beyond the paradigm of essentialism. It provides a critical perspective for us to understand the ambivalence, dynamics and complexities of identities in late modern world. With such critical perspectives, we can thus ‘reaffirm the political frameworks that promote diversity over uniformity, inclusivity over exclusivity, merit over privilege, dialogue over dogma’ (Papastergiadis, 2005, p. 57).

In this paper, I have argued that the insistence of multiculturalism on enunciating culture as fixed and unchanging has rendered this policy a challenging practice. Multiculturalism that over-emphasizes cultural boundedness has the drawback of becoming a frame for hiding racism under the veil of ‘cultural difference’. Ironically, this is an effect that the very policy was set up to erase. Perhaps the real problem of multiculturalism lies in ‘that the “-ism” tends to convert “multiculturalism” into a political doctrine’ (Hall, 2000, p. 210). Multicultural conditions can only be lived out, regenerated and transformed with the recognition of hybridity. Nonetheless, the concept of hybridity is not immune to political abuse and has sometimes been (mis)represented as a discourse of simple multicultural harmony. Ang (2001a, p. 17) reminds us that ‘hybridity, the very condition of in-betweenness, can never be a question of simple shaking hands, of happy, harmonious merger and fusion’.

The process of democratization has given rise to a proliferation of identity politics in post-Suharto Indonesia. At the same time, this politicization has challenged the nation to seek new approach(es) to accommodating its diverse ethnic groups. The important question now for Indonesia is not so much how to ‘overcome’ and ‘get rid’ of difference, as was the case with its assimilationist policy, but rather how to ‘live with’ difference (Ang, 2001a, p. 194; Papastergiadis, 2005, p. 60). In formulating a multicultural policy to replace the old assimilationist paradigm in Indonesia, it is imperative for policy-makers to recognize cross-cultural mixing, borrowing and hybridization that takes place in day-to-day reality so that ethnic differences can be accommodated more successfully in this diverse nation.

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