Skip to main content
Article
Resource security: Competition for global resources, strategic intent, and governments as owners
Journal of International Business Studies (2014)
  • A E Bass
  • Subrata Chakrabarty
Abstract
We develop a resource security theory by examining the intent of acquisitions of scarce resources by multinational firms. Results suggest that owners of firms can shape the intent of resource acquisitions. Specifically, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to acquire and pay more for resources for exploration rather than exploitation. This is because SOEs’ owners —governments— are most concerned with securing their country’s future. We contribute to the literature by suggesting that ownership influences resource acquisitions, that resource security is of importance to multinational enterprises, and that SOEs invest abroad to safeguard both their own and their home countries’ future.

-----

Keywords
  • Corporate entrepreneurship,
  • International entrepreneurship,
  • Resource dependency,
  • Resource-based view,
  • Securing natural resources,
  • State-owned enterprises
Publication Date
2014
DOI
10.1007/s10551-013-1963-0
Citation Information
Bass, A. E., & Chakrabarty, S. 2014. Resource security: Competition for global resources, strategic intent, and governments as owners. Journal of International Business Studies, 45(8): 961-979.