Skip to main content
Article
The Consequences of Cobenefits for the Efficient Design of Carbon Sequestration Programs
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics
  • Hongli Feng, Iowa State University
  • Catherine Kling, Iowa State University
Document Type
Article
Publication Version
Submitted Manuscript
Publication Date
1-1-2005
DOI
10.1111/j.1744-7976.2005.00030.x
Abstract
n this paper, we study the social efficiency of private carbon markets that include trading in agricultural soil carbon sequestration when there are significant cobenefits (positive environmental externalities) associated with the practices that sequester carbon. Likewise, we investigate the efficiency of government run conservation programs that are designed to promote a broad array of environmental attributes (both carbon sequestration and its cobenefits) for the supply of carbon. Finally, policy design and efficiency issues associated with the potential interplay between a private carbon market and a government conservation program are studied. Empirical analyses for an area that represents a significant potential source of carbon sequestration and its associated cobenefits illustrate the magnitude and complexity of these issues in real world policy design.
Comments

This is a working paper of an article from Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 53 (2005): 461, doi:10.1111/j.1744-7976.2005.00030.x

Citation Information
Hongli Feng and Catherine Kling. "The Consequences of Cobenefits for the Efficient Design of Carbon Sequestration Programs" Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics Vol. 53 Iss. 4 (2005) p. 461 - 476
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/catherine_kling/92/