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Article
Policy persistence in environmental regulation
Resource and Energy Economics
  • Jinhua Zhao, Iowa State University
  • Catherine Kling, Iowa State University
Document Type
Article
Publication Version
Submitted Manuscript
Publication Date
1-1-2003
DOI
10.1016/S0928-7655(03)00031-9
Abstract
We study the optimal emission standards under uncertain pollution damages and transaction costs associated with policy changes in a dynamic setting. We consider three alternative forms of transactions costs and show that they can lead to different kinds of delays of policy changes or smaller scales of these changes. Thus, policy persistence can be a rational response of forward-looking policy makers to future transaction costs, rather than an inefficient outcome of the current political process.
Comments

This is a working paper of an article from Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2003): 255, doi: 10.1016/S0928-7655(03)00031-9.

Citation Information
Jinhua Zhao and Catherine Kling. "Policy persistence in environmental regulation" Resource and Energy Economics Vol. 25 Iss. 3 (2003) p. 255 - 268
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/catherine_kling/84/