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Available online: 14 May 2012

To cite this article: Cas Mudde (2012): The comparative study of party-based Euroscepticism: the Sussex versus the North Carolina School, East European Politics, 28:2, 193-202

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2012.669735

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REVIEW ARTICLE

The comparative study of party-based Euroscepticism: the Sussex versus the North Carolina School

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(Received 9 February 2012; final version received 21 February 2012)

Since the late 1990s, a true cottage industry of ‘Euroscepticism studies’ has emerged, which has given way to hundreds of publications in increasingly prominent journals. This article looks at two of the most important ‘schools’ of Euroscepticism studies: Sussex and North Carolina. The two differ in many ways – e.g. definition, data and methods, scope – but account for much of the academic output on the topic. Initially, I briefly describe the major publications of the two schools, before comparing and contrasting them on the basis of some key dimensions (definition, data, scope, explanations). The article then discusses the crucial ‘so what question’ by focusing on the Achilles heel of Euroscepticism studies: salience. Finally, I propose ways in which the two schools can be better integrated and suggest some avenues of research for the post-crisis period.

Keywords: political parties; ideology; EU; East-Central Europe

1. Introduction

For much of the post-war period, the process of European integration was studied as part of the sub-field of International Relations rather than Comparative Politics. Even when the approach to ‘EU Studies’ was broadened, the field remained largely detached from mainstream Comparative Politics and was the singular domain of avowed Europhiles, who had little eye or time for criticism of the European institutions or process. This changed only in the 1990s, in part by party and public responses to the Maastricht Treaty, which blurred the boundaries not only between domestic and foreign policy but also between the new EU studies and the traditional studies of European politics. Since then, a true cottage industry of ‘Euroscepticism studies’ has emerged, which has given way to hundreds of publications in increasingly prominent journals.

This review article looks at two of the most important ‘schools’ of Euroscepticism studies: Sussex and North Carolina. The two differ in many ways, but account for much of the academic output on the topic. In the past years, both have published defining works that have inspired scholars around the world, but not so much each other. With the exception of some obligatory cross-citations, the Sussex and North Carolina Schools hardly communicate with each other, thereby hindering the accumulation of knowledge and inefficiently using what are still rather limited resources.

‖A longer version was published as EPERN Working Paper No. 23 (SEI Working Paper No. 121).
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ISSN 2159-9165 print/ISSN 2159-9173 online
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2012.669735
http://www.tandfonline.com
First, I will briefly describe the major publications of the two schools, before comparing and contrasting them on the basis of some key dimensions (definition, data, scope, explanations). Then, I will discuss the crucial ‘so what question,’ by focusing on the Achilles heel of Euroscepticism studies: salience. Finally, I will propose ways in which the two schools can be better integrated and suggest some avenues of research for the post-crisis period. This is particularly important for research into Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe, where accession and the economic crisis have lifted the veil of innocence of the EU for many parties and people.

2. The Sussex School

Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism is the magnum opus of the European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN), formerly Opposing Europe Research Network, directed by Szczerbiak and Taggart at the University of Sussex. The two volumes together include 30 chapters, written by a total of 37 different authors. Its intellectual genesis is Taggart’s seminal (1998) article ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems,’ the first attempt to comparatively and systematically research party-based Euroscepticism.

The first volume, ‘Case Studies and Country Surveys’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a), starts with an introductory chapter by the editors, which lays out the larger conceptual and theoretical framework. Essential to the project is their well-known distinction between ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Euroscepticism. The country cases include members of all waves of accession: founding members, early joiners, post-authoritarians of the 1970s, late West European joiners, and the first East Europeans (Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Finally, it includes one of the few outsiders, Norway. The focus and quality of the 18 short country chapters differ greatly; while some mostly describe the party-based Euroscepticism in their respective country, others devote much attention to explaining its absence/presence. More problematic, particularly for scholars of East European politics, is that most chapters are rather dated, ending around 2005, or in the case of the post-communist countries at the time of (the referendum on) accession to the EU.

All country chapters use (only) the editors’ definition and typology of Euroscepticism, but many struggle with distinguishing between the soft and hard types in practice, i.e. between ‘principled opposition’ and ‘qualified objection,’ and some find it hard to categorise parties as Eurosceptic or not. More problematic, from a comparative perspective, is that different authors seem to have different understandings of the concepts, leading them to categorise fairly similar parties differently. This is most striking in the case of the post-communist countries, where the issue of EU membership (largely absent in member states) dominates the debate and categorisation. This also makes the discussions on the new member states, in particular, rather dated, as they have changed significantly since these countries became EU member states.

The first volume ends with a comparative conclusion, in which the editors summarise the previous discussions on the basis of a typology of (three) patterns of party competition over Europe: limited contestation, in which no major party is Eurosceptic, open contestation, in which one of the major parties is Eurosceptic, and constrained contestation, i.e. ‘where Euroscepticism is certainly present, but where there appears to be less likelihood of European issues affecting domestic party competition directly’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, p. 349). The first is the dominant type in (Western) Europe, the second the rarest (but most discussed). The third type seems transitional, as the editors also suggest (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, p. 361), including only (but not all) new EU member states; it is largely a reflection of the debate over EU membership in the East. An updated categorisation would reassign most cases of the third category to the first (as the editors also predict; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, p. 363).
The second volume, ‘Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b), addresses conceptual and theoretical issues from a comparative European perspective. Chapters look at the causes of Euroscepticism in party systems (institutional structures and ideology versus strategy, respectively); at the role of transnational party federations; at Euroscepticism in the European Parliament, in national parliaments, and among sub-national elites; and at non-voting in European elections as evidence of Euroscepticism. Although all these chapters focus on different aspects, they all notice one thing: Euroscepticism is not that relevant in European politics.

3. The North Carolina School

The genesis of the North Carolina School is the dissertation research of Ray, part of which was published in his influential 1999 research note ‘Measuring Party Orientation towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Study.’ Ray and his (former) colleagues have continued to expand their unique dataset and create an extremely prolific research community extending well beyond North Carolina and even the United States. The main works of the North Carolina School have been published in various academic journals over the past decade, most notably in the special issues ‘Understanding Euroscepticism’ (Hooghe and Marks 2007) and ‘What Drives Euroscepticism?’ (Hooghe 2007). Here, I will focus primarily on the key publications on party-based Euroscepticism, the essence of the North Carolina dataset, even though members of the group have also worked on Euroscepticism at the mass level and in the media.

Ray’s (1999) ‘research note’ mainly introduced the North Carolina dataset; in fact, the article itself was as long as the appendix, which listed the main questions of the ‘expert survey’ and the average scores of all individual parties per country. The various ‘experts’ had been asked to evaluate all major political parties in their country on the basis of their overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration; the relative importance of this issue in the party’s public stance; and the degree of dissent within the party over the party leadership’s position (Ray 1999, p. 295). As Ray had asked them to evaluate these positions at four different periods in time (1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996), most findings reported in his research note are about trends in the 1984–1996 period. Most notably, he argued that, on average, parties had become more pro-European, and the salience of the issue as well as the extent of intra-party disagreement had increased.

In later work, Ray and his North Carolina colleagues have mostly looked into the effects and explanations of party positions on European integration. For example, by combining data from the expert surveys and the Eurobarometer surveys, Ray (2003, p. 978) found that ‘party positions do influence electorate opinion, but that this effect varies with levels of disagreement among parties, party unity, issue salience, and party attachment.’ Marco Steenbergen and collaborators elaborated this finding by developing ‘a dual-process model, whereby party elites both respond to and shape the views of their supporters’ (Hooghe and Marks 2007, p. 13).

Probably the most influential contribution to the broader study of political parties and European politics has been the cleavage theory of party positions on European integration, which has become the theoretical foundation of the school (Marks et al. 2002). Building upon the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan, the North Carolina School argues that party positions on European integration are the reflection of a new cleavage in European politics, which in later work was labelled rather cumbersomely Green/Alternative/Liberal versus Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist or the GAL-TAN dimension (Marks and Wilson 2000, Hooghe et al. 2002). Consequently, Euroscepticism is almost exclusively found among the ideologically ‘extreme’ parties.
4. Comparing the two ‘schools’

It is clear that the two schools have very different approaches to the study of Euroscepticism. This section compares the two schools on the basis of four of the most important issues: definitions, data and method, scope, and explanations.

4.1 Definitions

The issue of definitions has always plagued the Sussex group and is taken up by various authors in both volumes. In the concluding chapter of the second volume, Szczerbiak and Taggart devote most of their attention to conceptual issues, including the revision of their own initial (working) definitions of hard and soft Euroscepticism. In line with critique from Kopecký and Mudde (2002), they agree that

the key variables in determining party attitudes should be first, underlying support for or opposition to the European integration project as embodied in the EU (rather than a party’s support for or opposition to their country’s membership at any given time) and, secondly, attitudes towards further actual or planned extensions of EU competencies. (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, p. 242)

In the end, they redefine Hard Euroscepticism as ‘principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU’ and Soft Euroscepticism as ‘not a principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but (…) opposition to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, pp. 247–248).

At the same time, they struggle to construct a clear division between Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, debating whether it should be the quantity or the quality of the opposed policies. They suggest to specify ‘some areas of policy that are core parts of the European project as embodied in the EU or encapsulate its current/future trajectory,’ but acknowledge that ‘this is open to dispute’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, p. 250). One could also look at it from the other side of the equation, and ask what are the core areas for the political party in question? For example, while opposition to the economic policy of the EU might be secondary to a populist radical right party, it will be primary to a communist party. Hence, if the former stresses this, it indicates Soft Euroscepticism, while in the case of the latter it would (have to) lead to Hard Euroscepticism.

Szczerbiak and Taggart argue that their revised concept of Euroscepticism should be part of a broader typology of party positions on Europe, which also allows for distinguishing between ‘principled’ and ‘contingent’ support for European integration. At the same time, they are worried that ‘the more complex and fine-grained the typology, the more difficult it is to operationalise and categorise the parties’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, p. 246). Pointing to the shared experience of all contributors, they argue that ‘parties rarely elaborate their policies on the key issues on European integration in such detail that we can properly categorise them’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b). While I believe that this is mostly an effect of the selection of party literature (see below), this might also simply be another reflection of the low salience of the European issue to most political parties.

Overall, debates over the best definition of Euroscepticism are largely absent from the North Carolina School. Ray does not even use the term Euroscepticism in his original research note. The survey simply asks ‘experts’ to evaluate ‘the overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration’ on the basis of the following categories: (1) strongly opposed; (2) opposed; (3) somewhat opposed; (4) neutral, no stance on the issue; (5) somewhat in favour; (6) in favour; and (7) strongly in favour (1999, p. 295). Ray argues that while he ‘deliberately left the
interpretation of “European integration” up to the experts themselves,’ there was a lot of consist-
ency among experts, which suggests to him that ‘they were evaluating the parties on the same
underlying dimension’ (Ray 1999, pp. 286–287). Given the significant confusion and differences
among the true experts of the Sussex School, this seems an overly optimistic conclusion.

In a later article, Ray operationalises Euroscepticism by combining the North Carolina seven-
point scale and the Sussex categorisation of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, arguing that ‘with a
little imagination, one can see a block of hard Eurosceptic parties from 1 to 2 on the scale, and a
block of softer Eurosceptic parties from 2 to 3.5 or perhaps 4 on the scale’ (Hooghe 2007, p. 157).
While his operationalisation of Hard Euroscepticism makes sense conceptually, as both ‘strongly
opposed’ and ‘opposed’ seem to measure ‘principled opposition,’ his operationalisation of Soft
Euroscepticism does not. First, the value of 3.5 is a statistical construct without a particular
meaning. Second, the suggestion that a neutral stance and a no opinion on European integration
(a 4 on this scale) equals Euroscepticism, Soft or not, lacks any basis. And this operationalisation
is even more problematic in light of the generally low salience of the European issue for parties in
and outside of the EU. In fact, conceptually it would make at least as much sense to argue that a
score of 5 measures Soft Euroscepticism, as it indicates that the party is only ‘somewhat in favour’
of European integration.

4.2 Data

The Sussex School initially did not really address the data issue, i.e. on the basis of which sources
party-based Euroscepticism should be researched. The editors merely note that they ‘suggested
that the focus be on official party positions where they exist rather than with the positions of
party voters, activists, or MPs,’ adding, somewhat contradictorily: ‘In measuring how Euroscep-
tical a party is, we therefore suggested focusing on a party’s public statements, the parliamentary
voting on key European issues (treaties), and published party programmes/manifestos’ (Szczer-
biak and Taggart 2008a, p. 9). Consequently, different authors use different sources and
consign different importance to similar sources. Most authors seem to work predominantly on
the basis of official party literature, most notably election and party programmes, but others
assign at least as much importance, if not more, to votes on treaties or statements of individual
party representatives in the media.

The editors are aware of the confusion, which they consider the consequence of ‘different pro-
cesses associated with (a) Euroscepticism as a broad underlying position that political parties take
on Europe and (b) whether they use the European project as an issue of contestation’ (Szczerbiak
and Taggart 2008a). As they acknowledge, these ‘processes’ can have very different explanations.
To a certain extent, they refer to the difference in ideology and policy, which relate not just to the
question of explanations, but also to the question of data collection. While party ideology is best
studied by a ‘causal chain approach’ (or ‘thick reading’) of both externally and internally oriented
party literature ( Mudde 2000, pp. 18–24), policies can be found in election manifestos, MPs’
statements, and votes. Moreover, policy positions can easier be measured quantitatively; for
example, through the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP); see Marks et al. 2007).

The data of the North Carolina School are both its strength and weakness. Its strength, and the
key reasons for its popularity, is that the dataset is longitudinal, quantitative, and easily accessible.
Its weakness is the source of the data, i.e. the so-called ‘experts’ that fill out the surveys. Rather
than sending out a survey to one or two scholars of Euroscepticism, or party positions on Europe,
in a particular country at a particular time, i.e. true experts, initially surveys were sent out to 258
scholars to cover a total of 18 countries for four elections at one time (1984, 1988, 1992, and
1996). Few of these scholars worked specifically on party positions on European integration in
general, or Euroscepticism in particular. According to Ray (1999, p. 4), they were ‘indigenous
political scientists . . . [who] specialized in either the domestic political system of their nation, or European politics.’ Hence, rather than an expert study, this is really a peer survey! This is even more problematic in light of the confusion noted above; i.e. even among the true experts of EPERN there was confusion and disagreement about how to categorise many important parties. So, if the true experts are unsure, how can the broader scholarly community provide valid (rather than merely reliable) data?!

4.3 Scope
From the outset, the Sussex School has had a rather limited scope, focusing predominantly, and sometimes exclusively, on Euroscepticism at the party level. Although it broadened its focus to also include Euroscepticism in the various Accession Referendums (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2005), particularly at the height of the first post-communist accession debate (2000–2003), their bread and butter remained party-based Euroscepticism. This leads at times to a decontextualised and partial picture. For example, while most authors argue that (particularly Soft) Euroscepticism is often at least in part strategic, i.e. influenced by party competition, they do not look into the ways pro-European positions are mainly a reflection of strategic choices (i.e. governmental ambitions).

The North Carolina School studies party positions on European integration in general. In fact, in the early studies the term Euroscepticism was not or almost never mentioned. In later studies, the term became more central, and explicitly operationalised through their seven-point scale, even if it remained just one of several studied positions. The North Carolina School also moved much further beyond party-based Euroscepticism; only a few of the articles in the two special issues are purely focused on party positions; most study (also) Euroscepticism at the mass level (i.e. individual attitudes) and in the media (notably newspapers).

4.4 Explanations
The key debate in party-based studies is whether Euroscepticism is primarily explained by ‘ideological-programmatic or strategic-tactical party competition factors’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, p. 254). The North Carolina School stresses mainly the importance of ‘ideology,’ through the so-called ‘cleavage theory’ of party positions on European integration. But while their ‘GAL-TAN dimension’ might generate significant correlations in quantitative studies, it does not easily translate into the mainstream academic and non-academic debate about party ideologies. The main problem is that it is based upon fairly vague definitions, leading to rather broad and internally diverse camps of pro- and anti-European parties.

While the ideology thesis also finds support within the Sussex School, various authors stress the importance of strategy. Most notably, Nick Sitter and Agnes Batory conclude that party strategy explains Euroscepticism on the basis of a comparative study of agrarian parties. Although this conclusion is based on just one party family, the authors argue that ‘there is little reason to suspect that this is unique to agrarian parties’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, p. 75). However, a somewhat similar study of regionalist parties, using the North Carolina expert surveys, comes to a diametrically opposed conclusion, namely, that ‘regionalist political parties are consistently pro-EU across time, space, and issue area’ (Jolly 2007, p. 109).

The problem with both studies is that the selected groups of parties are both problematic ‘party families’ (Mair and Mudde 1998). While the agrarian parties have a common origin, they do not (or no longer) share a core ideology. Similarly, regionalist parties might share a critical position towards the central authority of their country; they differ not only in their final goal (from autonomy to independence) but also in their broader core ideologies (in fact, they can be found at the
radical left, the radical right, and everywhere in between). Hence, in both cases the research design does not really allow for the controlling of the variable of ideology.

Szczerbiak and Taggart seem to oppose the ideology thesis initially: ‘the European issue is a very slippery one, amenable to very different interpretations, and one cannot necessarily be easily read off from other party positions’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, p. 238). However, their main conclusion takes a very different turn on the debate:

Having reflected on this, we feel that much of this ‘ideology versus strategy’ debate has been cast in incorrect terms. Much of the confusion here stems from the conflation (not least by ourselves on occasions) of ‘Euro scepticism’ as (a) a broad, underlying party position and (b) whether or not (and how) parties use the European issue (in this case in a contested way) as an element of inter-party competition. (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, p. 255)

While I agree with the need to distinguish between party position and issue contestation, their final argument that the underlying party positions on the European issue are determined by two factors, the party’s wider ideological profile and values and the perceived interest of its supporters, and that the relative importance of these two factors ‘is determined by the type of party in question and whether it is primarily a more ideological, value-based goal-seeking or a more pragmatic office-seeking party’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, p. 256), is largely tautological.

5. So what? The question of salience

Ever since, Taggart’s foundational article salience has been the Achilles heel of Euroscepticism studies. Almost every case study of Opposing Europe?, whether they found (Hard or Soft) Euroscepticism at the party level or not, concludes that ‘the relevance of the European issue in [name of country] is extremely low’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, p. 91). In fact, in the few cases that Euroscepticism is actually relevant, it is mainly at the party level, not at the mass level. The few exceptions are often countries where referendums are held about the European issue, in which case the party dynamics often change fundamentally.

This leads Szczerbiak and Taggart to the conclusion that ‘while vote share gives a crude indication of a (Eurosceptic) party’s significance within its party system, it is not possible to “measure” levels of party-based Euroscepticism in a particular country (or, indeed, comparatively) by aggregating vote shares’ (2008b, p. 259). This statement needs to be qualified, however. It is correct that the vote share of Eurosceptic parties cannot be used as an indicator of the importance of Euroscepticism at the mass level. However, particularly if calculated on the basis of percentages of parliamentary seats, support for Eurosceptic parties can be a measure of party-based Euroscepticism in a country and this measure can be used comparatively.

They further suggest that salience of the European issue is a multifaceted concept that relates to, at least, three aspects: ‘first, the extent to which parties use the issue in inter-party competition (...); second, more generally how much it features in the public debate of political issues; and, third, how much weight citizens attach to it when determining their voting behaviour’ (2008b, p. 253). Particularly for studies of party-based Euroscepticism, I would add to that a fourth aspect: the way in which the European issue relates to the core ideology of the party. For example, for nationalist and socialist parties, one of the two foundational aspects of European integration, i.e. pooled national sovereignty and an integrated market economy, directly opposes the core of their ideology.

The North Carolina School has little discussion on the question of salience, which it considers to be dealt with by the expert survey question on ‘the relative importance of this issue in the party’s public stance.’ The main exception is an article that compares the salience of the European
integration issue across three datasets (the CMP, the European Election Study, and the North Carolina expert survey) and find that ‘one common dimension underlies the different salience measures’ (Netjes and Binnema 2007, p. 35). The problem is that this tests the reliability of the measure, rather than the validity.

The measure used in the North Carolina expert survey is highly problematic. First of all, the terminology is vague and will undoubtedly be interpreted very differently between countries and among ‘experts.’ Second, as many chapters in both *Opposing Europe?* volumes have shown, ‘Euro-contestation,’ i.e. the party’s public stance on European integration, is not the same as the party’s position on the issue. In fact, Szczerbiak and Taggart argue that ‘broad, underlying party positions on Europe need to be distinguished from whether (and how) parties use the issue in inter-party competition and that these phenomena are driven by different causal mechanisms’ (2008b, p. 259).

6. Towards a more integrated approach

While the two schools do not completely ignore each other, it is still amazing how little cross-fertilisation there is between the two dominant groups of scholars of Euroscepticism. Undoubtedly this is, in part, a consequence of methodological differences (as well, perhaps, of more fundamental epistemological and ontological differences). And while both are also partly doing different work, there is considerable room for (further) integration.

The main strength of the Sussex School is validity, i.e. depth, detail, and expertise. EPERN is made up of scholars who specialise in Euroscepticism in a specific country, which they know through and through. Moreover, they employ a more precise typology of party positions – which does need some revision. The main weakness so far is reliability, which can be improved by providing clearer definitions and more explicitly stating the sources on the basis of which party positions should be analysed.

In almost complete opposition, the main strength of the North Carolina School is reliability, most notably cross-temporal; cross-national reliability is somewhat hampered by conceptual confusion. Moreover, their dataset is easily available and easily combinable with other cross-national and cross-temporal quantitative datasets, like the Eurobarometer. Hence, it is particularly well suited to uncover correlations between Euroscepticism and other party variables (cross-nationally), trends in party positions, and connections between party positions and mass attitudes. The main weakness is the lack of detail and depth, which makes it difficult to say much about causality or the *why* question.

The obvious solution is to combine the two schools in a mixed-methods approach, i.e. a ‘nested analysis’ (Lieberman 2005), which will play to the strengths of both. For example, in a first step the North Carolina data can uncover a cross-temporal development (e.g. increased party-based Euroscepticism) and test some possible explanations (e.g. increased mass-based Euroscepticism). In the second step, different case study strategies of the Sussex School can establish how mass-level Euroscepticism translates into party-based Euroscepticism (‘pathway case’) and explain why in some cases it does not translate (‘deviant case’) (Gerring 2006).

7. Into a (soft) Eurosceptic future

It will be years before we know the full consequences of the on-going economic crisis in Europe, but there is no doubt that it has brought European integration (back) to the top of the political and, now also public, agenda. For many ‘ordinary Europeans,’ the EU has finally moved from foreign policy to domestic politics, and from a low salience to at least a medium salience issue. While this
will affect all positions on European integration, first indications are that Euroscepticism is growing in the East and West, but that the reasons for it are becoming more and more diverse.

If one would apply the original definitions of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism to today’s European political parties, few would not qualify. From Turkish membership to the Greek ‘bailouts,’ frustrated criticism and even outright opposition are developing in the most unexpected corners of Europe. Even the traditional backbones of the European project, the Christian democratic and social democratic parties, are no longer immune to ‘qualified opposition’ (or at least specific criticism). This provides a whole new challenge to the field: ensuring that Euroscepticism does not again become ‘a generic, catch-all term encapsulating a disparate bundle of attitudes opposed to European integration in general and opposition to the EU in particular’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b, p. 240).

Whereas salience remains the Achilles heel of Euroscepticism studies, increasingly conceptual clarity will become a major issue of concern too. While virtually any critique of European integration could be classified as (Soft) Euroscepticism until the mid-1990s, without the group of Eurosceptic parties becoming too large and meaningless – not unlike the category of anti-immigration parties – in the future we might all be Eurosceptics in one way or another. This will require a finer conceptual framework, which distinguishes between different types of opposition (and support) of the European project, but also between ideological and policy positions.

With most European countries now in the EU, which itself is much more defined than (at least) before the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, political parties’ ‘ideological’ positions on European integration are increasingly irrelevant to European politics. What does it truly matter that many populist radical right parties like the Slovak National Party support a ‘Europe of the Nations’ or conservative parties like the Czech Civic Democratic Party only an extended ‘common market,’ when most debates on European integration have nothing to do with these issues? What are the consequences of assuming that many parties do not hold a well-developed ideological position on European integration, but instead develop their positions in a rather ad hoc manner? It seems that most political parties, at least in the post-communist accession states, took a rather ‘Europragmatic’ approach to European integration (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a). Assessing each individual issue from a similar ideological-strategic position, they developed fairly consistent and predictable policy positions, even if they did not always relate to the same European utopia. How has this changed in light of both accession and the economic crisis, which transformed some new countries from net receivers into net payers (at least in the ‘bailouts’).

In conclusion, there is little doubt that the future will see an increase in the occurrence and salience of (party-based) Euroscepticism. Moreover, with the ever developing EU, encroaching on more and more issues of traditionally domestic politics, Euroscepticism will become even more diverse. This will require not just a more qualified typology and measurement model, but also a better use of our limited resources. To fully understand the highly complex political phenomenon of Euroscepticism, a mixed-methods approach combining insights from both the North Carolina and Sussex Schools provides the most promising avenue for future research.

Acknowledgements

I thank Maryann Gallagher and Maria Spirova for their feedback on earlier versions.

Note

1. To be fair, the North Carolina group has devoted considerable time to issues of reliability and validity of their dataset, including triangulating it with other datasets (such as the CMP). This is not the place to get
into this debate, but interested readers are encouraged to look in particular at part 1 (European Integration) of the special symposium ‘Comparing Measures of Party Positioning: Expert, Manifesto, and Survey Data’ in *Electoral Studies* (2007).

**Notes on contributor**

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