Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed. A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86)

Cas Mudde, DePauw University
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CAS MUDDE
University of Leiden, The Netherlands

Abstract. The so-called ‘third wave’ of right-wing extremism has taken both society and social science by storm. In contrast to the many studies that look for possible explanations for the success of this ‘wave’, this article focusses on right-wing extremism itself. In the first part, the concept is defined on the basis of the existing literature, as a political ideology that consists of a combination of several features. In the second part, these features are first conceptualized and second used in a comparative analysis of the ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties (the Dutch CP'86, the German NPD and the Austrian NDP). This analysis shows a more differentiated picture of the ideology of this ‘party family’, and is a warning against too careless generalisations.

Introduction

Articles in the press about the electoral success of right-wing extremist parties in Western Europe seem to be the order of the day, especially since the coming of the third wave of right-wing extremism at the beginning of the 1980s (Von Beyme 1988). As was to be expected, the academic world is following suit slowly but surely. Following the electoral successes of parties like the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the French Front National, and the German Republikaner, there is growing unrest and fear in other European countries over the electoral success of ‘like-minded parties’. We see this in the Netherlands, for instance, in the case of the Centrumdemocraten and, to a lesser extent, the Centrumpartij'86.

The question which then presents itself is: What makes parties such as these ‘like-minded’? The answer seems evident: right-wing extremism. If we examine the meaning of the term right-wing extremism, however, this answer proves to be insufficient. The harmony and clarity that exist in both the scientific world and the media with regard to the labelling of certain parties as right-wing extremist does not appear in the definition of the concept. As we will see, there are a wide variety of definitions of right-wing extremism. Indeed, most of the authors involved define right-wing extremism as an ideology composed of a combination of several different, and intrinsically complex, features although they differ on the number, type, and combination of features.

In this study we will first provide some insight into the history of the
concept of right-wing extremism and into the problems involved in defining it. Second, we will create an 'operational definition' of the concept right-wing extremism. This definition should be seen first and foremost as a means of providing more insight into the complex nature of the right-wing extremist ideology, not as the definition of right-wing extremism. Third and last, we will find out if alleged right-wing parties are 'like-minded', by analysing the literature of three of these parties.

The concept of right-wing extremism

History of the term right-wing extremism

The origin of the concept, and study, of right-wing extremism is found in the study of fascism. This field of research, which produced an enormous number of publications just after the Second World War, has provided the theoretical framework for research on post-war right-wing extremist parties. Most of the authors involved used the concept 'fascism' as the collective term for Italian fascism on the one hand, and German National Socialism (Nazism) on the other hand, the latter being considered a variant of the former.

In the 1960s, several publications appeared in which this 'homogeneity' was challenged. The English expert on fascism, Trevor-Roper, wrote about this: 'Behind the one name lie a hundred forms' (Trevor-Roper 1969: 19). In Mosse's view, these 'hundred forms' could be divided into two main groups, which differed ideologically as well as geographically (Mosse 1966). He considered the main ideological difference between the two groups to be racism and anti-Semitism, which played a far more important role in the 'fascist' movements in Central and Eastern Europe than in similar movements in Western Europe (Mosse 1966: 24).

Until the 1960s, the study of post-war nationalist movements was largely the domain of researchers on historical fascism. By using terms such as neo-fascism and neo-Nazism, they sought to find historical continuity. This changed with the coming of parties like the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans (better known as the Poujadists) in France, which emerged towards the end of the 1950s and mid-1960s. These new parties had clear ties with the past at both the ideological and the personal level, though these ties were not, as was assumed, exclusively with fascist organizations.

The coming of these new parties was attended by the entry of several new terms into the scientific world. 'Right-wing radicalism' became the collective term for both the 'new right' parties and the (neo-)fascist and (neo-)Nazi parties; however, terms like neo-fascism and neo-Nazism never disappeared completely. Although the latter were generally used for (mostly small) organizations that openly showed admiration for and/or continuity with pre-war fascist and Nazi organizations, neo-Marxist authors kept using these terms for all parties at the far right (see among others Berlin et al. 1978; Winkler 1980). Since the mid-1970s, the term right-wing extremism has been in vogue as the collective term for all these parties: it was originally used alongside right-wing radicalism and later replaced it. Today, there is a broad international consensus regarding the use of the term 'right-wing extremism' (Ueltzhöffer 1991). In German, the term Rechtsextremismus has been dominant, in French extrême droite and in Dutch rechtsextremisme.

Right-wing extremism as a political ideology

What is right-wing extremism? This apparently simple question is difficult to answer in practice. Though the term right-wing extremism is today quite current in the political and social jargon, there is no unequivocal definition. As Knüttner (1991: 12) notes, this is due in part to the social relevance of the concept:

As many concepts, the definition right-wing extremism also has a double-function. When applied in a serious scientific manner, it serves knowledge, as a slogan in the daily political struggle [it serves] the labelling of the political enemy.

The term right-wing extremism has, in both societal and scientific discourse, a bearing on a large number of things. While concepts such as 'socialism', 'liberalism' and 'communism' have a long history and a more or less fixed description, this is not true of the concept of 'right-wing extremism'. Using an inventory of seventeen definitions, Herz distinguishes six criteria by which right-wing extremism can be defined: party organization, political goals, means and tactics, social structure of the voters, personality of the voters, and ideology (Herz 1975: 30–31). The most important criterium, and the one most often mentioned, is ideology.

The question of how to define the right-wing extremist ideology can not be answered unequivocally either. To the extent that a consensus of opinion exists among the scientists concerned with this field, it is confined to the view that right-wing extremism is an ideology that people are free to fill in as they see fit.

Some authors define right-wing extremism on the basis of one single feature. Husbands (1981), for example, considers xenophobia to be the characteristic feature of Western European right-wing extremism, while Hartmann et al. (1985: 9) use right-wing extremism as a collective term for all 'progress-hostile forces'. This approach has, at least, two major problems. First and foremost, when right-wing extremism is the same as xenophobia, the first term becomes superfluous. Second, reducing right-wing extremism to only
one feature, whether xenophobia, or hostility to progress, or whatever, leads to distorted and limited knowledge of the wide and complex phenomenon.

In the majority of definitions, however, these problems are absent. In general, right-wing extremism is considered to be a combination of ideological features that are distinguishable from one another. For instance, Horchem (1975: 1) points to a combination of ‘nationalism, the idea of the omnipotence of the State, and an ideology deriving from the sharpened form of romantic racialism which emerged in the latter parts of the 19th century’. Betz (1990: 45) refers to a combination of ‘a tightening of strict law and order to combat rising crime rates associated with drugs; a return to traditional moral values in the face of a growing number of abortions and the AIDS threat; and, most important of all, the protection of national and cultural identity allegedly threatened by third world immigrants, foreign workers, and refugees’.

On the basis of a literature study, 26 definitions and descriptions of the right-wing extremist ‘ideology’ were selected. They were taken from different linguistic areas (Dutch, German and English), in order to minimize the influence of country-specific features. These definitions were then used to construct an inventory of those features of the right-wing extremist ideology most often mentioned. The following five features were mentioned, in one form or another, by at least half of the authors: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the strong state (see Table 1).

**Method of research**

*Conceptualizing the ideological features*

By selecting these five features we have not so much solved the problem, as shifted it. Two major problems remain to be solved: first, the conceptualization of the five features, and second, the demarcation of the minimal combination of features that constitutes right-wing extremism. The latter problem will be taken up in our concluding discussion. First, we turn to the conceptualization of the different features.

Each of the five features is in itself highly complex and difficult to define. The aim of the next part is to conceptualize these features so that they can be used in empirical research, for example, in the study of the ideology of alleged right-wing extremist parties, or in the study of the ideology of individuals. The conceptualization process consists of two stages; operationalizing, and then making the concept fit for ‘travel’. By operationalizing we mean making the theoretical concept measurable, that is, verifiable.* In the second stage the ‘operational definition’ is defined in such a way that it can ‘travel’ so that it is applicable in different national or cultural surroundings.

In order to connect empirical materials horizontally across national boundaries, they must also be connected vertically; that is, capable of being related to concepts that are sufficiently abstract to travel across national boundaries. (Rose 1991: 447)

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This last stage is essential for cross-national comparative studies. If a concept is defined in a way that is typical for a specific national or cultural environment it will be applicable only in that specific environment. For instance, if nationalism were defined as the striving for a Great-German Empire, this would make the concept unfit for use in comparative studies that go beyond that specific context.
Analysis of primary sources

On the basis of a detailed analysis of party literature, so-called primary sources, we shall examine the extent to which each of the features we have identified constitutes a part of the ideology of the separate parties under consideration. The analysis is largely qualitative (or at least non-quantitative) by nature, as the research question focuses on the presence or absence of the feature in the ideology of the parties, and not on the quantity of the feature that is present or absent (Sartori 1970: 103ff.).

Only a few comparative studies, of the ideology of political parties are available. In the Netherlands some non-quantitative studies in this field were published in the 1960s and early 1970s (De Bruyn 1971, 1976; Hoogerwerf 1963, 1970; Lipschits 1969); in the 1980s most of the contributions were quantitative studies that were influenced by the extensive ECPR-sponsored manifesto-project (Budge, Robertson & Hearl 1987; for Dutch studies in this tradition see Dittrich, Kleykers & Tops 1986; Michels 1993: 127–48). The few non-quantitative studies in this field have shown however that this method of analysis can produce interesting results too.5

Most studies, both quantitative and qualitative, of the ideology of parties use only manifestos and election programmes in their analyses. Some authors, however, take the view that these sources, election programmes in particular, are not satisfactory in the case of right-wing extremist parties. Because they do not show the true face of the parties, for tactical considerations. Election programmes of political parties are aimed, among other things, at the attraction of members and voters, and at establishing the public profile of the party. They have a primarily external orientation (Flohr 1968: 60; Zielonka-Goei 1989: 13). Behind this ‘front-stage’ a far more radical ‘back-stage’ would be hidden.6

However, right-wing extremist parties do not have the exclusive right to a discrepancy between the official manifesto and the ‘truly’ supported views proclaimed elsewhere. Flechtheim (1974: 179) argues that this is customary with all parties:

The manifestos alone will hardly fully open the true nature of the party – that purpose political manifestos are as a rule too much in the sign of ideological covering. With those parties that are explicit ideological creations . . . at least much of what could be compromising will be left unsaid.7

To gain insight into the possibility of the party manifesto deviating, from the ‘unspoken’ ideology of the party (its ‘back-stage’), we will also analyze party literature with a primary orientation that is internal. This involves first and foremost the membership papers and other party papers that are the official documents aimed at members on behalf of the party leadership. The analyses of both cautiously drawn-up manifestos and more strongly-formulated party papers should give us a good insight into the ideological principles of contemporary right-wing extremist parties (Holzer 1981: 23).

The selection of the parties

In the next section, the party literature of three parties will be analyzed for each of the features of the right-wing ideology that we have identified. These parties were selected for both practical and intrinsic reasons. The principal intrinsic criteria were (i) the organization has to have contested elections with some success, (ii) the organization has to be described unequivocally as right-wing extremist in the media and scientific literature, (iii) the organization has to be one of the principal representatives of the right-wing extremist spectrum in its country, and (iv) the organization must also have been politically active in the 1980s. The most important practical criteria were mastery of the language and the availability of party literature.

On the basis of these criteria a specific group of alleged right-wing extremist parties has been chosen, the ‘nationaldemocratic’ parties: the German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NDP, founded in 1964 as a German right-wing extremist ‘catch-all’ party), the Austrian Nationaldemokratische Partei (NDP, split of the national-liberal Freiheitliche Partei Osterreich in 1967), and the Dutch Centrumpartij’86 (CP’86, founded in 1986 as the successor of the bankrupt Centrumpartij’86). All three parties belong to the more extreme of the right-wing extremist parties in their respective countries. Ignazi, for instance, classifies all three on the ground of their ideology into the more extreme group of ‘old ERPs’, which are ‘linked to fascist tradition’, as opposed to the more moderate ‘new ERPs’ like the Republikaner, the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreich, and the Centrumpartij’86.

Analysis of the party literature

Nationalism

The first feature of the right-wing extremist ideology that is dealt with here is nationalism. Nationalism is a relatively young phenomenon, having its origin in the latter part of the 18th century. Although nationalism is a rather controversial concept, there is some consensus of opinion in the literature on its definition. The following ‘operational definition’ is based on this consensus and describes nationalism as a political doctrine that proclaims the congruence of the political unit, the state, and the cultural unit, the nation (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawn 1990). This doctrine is elaborated further by Koch (1991), who distinguishes two forms of the nationalist political programme:

On the one hand, it strives for internal homogenisation: only people belong-
ing to the X-nation have the right to live within the borders of state X.

On the other hand, there is the drive for *external exclusiveness*: that is, state X needs to have all people belonging to the X-nation within its borders (Koch 1991: 31).

Given this elaboration, the strengthened forms of nationalism which are mentioned as ideological features of right-wing extremism in several definitions, are included. The elaboration is more restrictive than the operational definition, because the congruence of state and nation is combined with a specific political programme. To speak of nationalism it suffices that the congruence of state and nation is pursued; the elaboration concerns a specification of the different forms of nationalism.

Nationalism constitutes an important characteristic of the ideology of all three parties. Both the German NPD and the Dutch CP’86 stress the importance of external exclusiveness in their manifesto. They see this as their ‘highest national democratic goal’ and justify their striving with the announcement that ‘injustice does not serve peace’. On closer investigation, the fact that both parties use almost the same language in stating their goal proves to be no coincidence. Since 1989, the manifesto of the NPD, which dates back to 1987, serves as both programme and manifesto of the CP’86. They translated the NPD-manifesto almost literally, although those passages that are placed in a typically German context are – using similar phrasing – placed in a typically Dutch context.

This strong resemblance in manifestos is not continued in party papers. While the NPD gives the highest priority to external exclusiveness in both manifesto and party papers, the CP’86 stresses external exclusiveness in the manifesto and internal homogenisation in party-papers. The Austrian NDP only stresses internal homogenisation in party literature. Under legal pressure – the pursuit of an *Anschluß* with Germany as well as its propagation is explicitly deemed illegal in article 4 of the Austrian constitution – the party restricts itself with regard to external exclusiveness to just a few guarded statements. This ambiguity is best demonstrated in the first article of the NDP manifesto:

The German-speaking Austrians are part of the German *Volk*; therefore, Austria is a German state. We recognize its constitution. Our politics is directed towards the fundamental interests of the entire German *Volk*.

Despite this obligatory recognition of the Austrian constitution, external exclusiveness plays an important, though hidden, role in the ideology of the NDP.

**Racism**

The second feature with which we are concerned is racism. Racist theories have been very popular in science as well as in politics, especially before the Second World War. The classical definition of racism is the belief in natural and hereditary differences between races, with the central belief that one race is superior to the others (Geiss 1988: 15; Miles & Phizacklea, 1979: 2). Since the beginning of the 1980s this definition has come under pressure in consequence of the introduction of the term ‘new racism’.

Nations on this view are not built out of politics and economics, but out of human nature. It is our biology, our instincts, to defend our way of life, traditions and customs against outsiders – not because they are inferior, but because they are part of different cultures (Barker 1981: 23–24).

The main similarity between the two types of racism is that both emphasise natural and permanent difference between groups of people. There are, nevertheless, fundamental differences between the two ‘racisms’.

The main difference is that ‘new racism’, in contrast to ‘classical racism’, does not stress the superiority of the ‘home’ group, but rather the incompatibility of other groups. According to the new racist vision, all races and cultures are equivalent and have the right, even the obligation, to develop independently and separately. However, this development must take place within their own culture; for every individual is bound by nature to his culture, and, therefore, cannot develop outside of it. The second difference has to do with the distinguishing criterion; in classical racism groups are distinguished exclusively on the ground of race, with new racism culture is the most important criterion.

In this study, the general *feature* of racism is defined as a view that there are natural and permanent differences between groups of people. Classical racism and new racism, as defined above, are considered to be *types* of racism. To avoid ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori 1970: 1034) and concept-entanglement, however, the term ‘new racism’ is replaced in this study by the term ‘culturism’.

Racism plays an important role in the ideology of all three parties. Each presents itself openly in its externally-oriented manifesto as culturistic and preaches the right to equivalent culture of a separate existence. However, this trend is not universal in internally-oriented party papers. There is a remarkable difference between the two ‘German’ parties (NPD and NDP) and the Dutch CP’86: the two German parties seem to accept the equivalence of all cultures and *Völker*, with the exception of the ‘exalted’ German *Volk*, while the CP’86 only accepts equivalence within the same race.

It thus comes as no surprise that classical racism plays the most important part in the ideology of the CP’86. Although the party explicitly states that ‘no race or *Volk* is superior to the other’, closer reading shows that one race is ‘more equal’ than the others. The superiority of the white race is implicated in slogans as ‘it’s nice to be white’ and ‘white is beautiful’ and by the usage of the White Power-logo. The inferiority of other races is also only visible indirectly. Nowhere is it explicitly written that other races are
inferior, yet the party-paper *Centrumnieuws* speaks of ‘jungle-people’, ‘non-European underdeveloped nations’, ‘degeneration’ as a result of the mixing of races, and the ‘overgrowing’ of the indigenous Dutchmen by ‘brown and black’.

Although both German parties seem to flirt with classical racism, the importance of the white *race* always stays secondary to that of the German Volk. This can best be illustrated by this response of the NDP document *Klartext* to a readers appeal for ‘white solidarity’. The editor responded as follows:

> Even at the risk of disappointing you, I have to say that the survival of the white race is immaterial to me, as far as it does not go hand in hand with the resurrection of our Volk .... We should therefore not lose ourselves in shoddy *Großrassenromanik*, but try to make cold and sober German politics.\(^{15}\)

This ranking can most probably be explained by the fact that the ‘warcrimes’ against the German Volk that are recurrently cited by both parties, such as the bombardment of Dresden and the post-war occupation and division of Germany, were committed by whites (particularly the Americans, French, English and Russians). Both parties consider these crimes to be the primary cause of all misery in which the German Volk finds itself since 1945.\(^{16}\)

**Xenophobia**

In the inventory of the definitions of right-wing extremism, the feature xenophobia has been used as a collective noun for descriptions about fear, hate or hostility regarding ‘ethnic foreigners’. Although xenophobia literally means fear of strangers in Greek, it is usually defined broader in the scientific literature.

> Xenophobia – *Fremdenhass* and *Fremdenfeindschaft*, «fear» («phobie») for and hate against the «stranger» as «enemy» .... (Geiss 1988: 28)\(^{17}\)

The term ethnocentrism is closely linked with the term xenophobia. In the English and Dutch literature ethnocentrism is as a rule defined broadly, as a complex of attitudes in which a positive attitude towards the ingroup is linked with a negative attitude towards outgroups (Sumner 1940: 13; Levinson 1969: 150; Eisinga & Scheepers 1989: 12). In the German literature, ethnocentrism is often defined more narrowly. Geiss (1988: 31), for instance, defines ethnocentrism, which he regards as ‘collective xenophobia’, as follows:

> ... Ethnocentrism: a great or small Volk stands in the centre of humanity – opposite to them all other Völker and people are secondary or inferior.\(^{18}\)

In this study xenophobia is defined as fear, hate or hostility regarding ‘foreigners’. Ethnocentrism is seen in the German tradition as a specific form of (collective) xenophobia and is defined as holding one’s own Volk or nation to be superior to all others.

The presence of xenophobia in the ideology of the three parties is abundantly clear. Until the 1980s the NPD directed its xenophobia, with the slogan ‘Germany for the Germans’, first and foremost against the (presence of) occupying forces in the FRG and the GDR, and only in a secondary way against foreign workers. The NDP directed its xenophobic campaign in this period primarily against the ‘threat’ of Yugoslavs, in particular Slovenian, both inside (particularly in Carinthia) and outside Austria.

In the 1980s xenophobia became one of the most important ideological characteristics of the two German parties. Not only did the importance of xenophobia increase within both NPD and NDP, but also the number of groups that were defined as ‘unwanted foreigner’ expanded. Both shifted the largest part of their attention to the foreign workers and asylum-seekers, and even founded special parties for this theme: the NPD founded organisations like the *Bürgerinitiative Ausländerstopp* (Citizen’s Initiative Foreigners’ Stop) and the *Hamburger Liste für Ausländerstopp* (Hamburger List for a Foreigners’ Stop), and the NDP the *Bürgerinitiative zur Durchführung eines Volksbegehrens zum Schutze Österreichs vor Überfrerndung und Unterwanderung* (Citizens’ Initiative for a Referendum to Protect Austria against Foreigners’ Domination and Flooding) and the *Ausländer-Halt-Bewegung* (Foreigners’ Halt-Movement).

The CP’86 has been voicing its xenophobia in an extremely aggressive manner ever since its foundation. Even more than the two German parties, the CP’86 paints the ‘here not belonging’ in its party paper as criminal, impudent, and work-shy ‘parasites’ who pursue the ‘Islamization’ of the Netherlands. This is quite the opposite of the ‘moderate’ xenophobia that the party, like the two German parties, put forward in their manifestos. In their externally-oriented literature the parties speak of the ‘foreigners’ as innocent ‘victims’ of the high finance who are cut off from their indigenous surroundings with the risk of losing their identity. This leads to the grotesque situation that the CP’86 constitutes itself as protector of the autochthons against the danger of ‘foreigners’ in its party-paper, and as protector of autochthons and aliens together against the ‘mariist-zionist-capitalist’ danger in its manifesto.

Ethnocentrism constitutes an important part of the ideology of the two German parties; but not in the ideology of the CP’86, which considers the white race, and not the Dutch Volk, to be superior. Although both NPD and NDP propagate the equivalence of all Völker in their manifestos, their party papers paint another picture. Both consider the German Volk to be the core of the European Völker. The NDP even claims that without the ‘German heart’ the ‘Europiden’ would become extinct, ‘as every living organism must die, when it is separated from its own centre’.\(^{19}\) Both parties
are also extremely proud of the German Volk, which is, according to them, gifted with superior qualities in the field of technology, science, productivity, and culture.

**Anti-democracy**

The fourth feature of the right-wing extremist ideology is ‘anti-democracy’. What the different authors understand by anti-democracy remains, more often than not, undecided. The question is whether anti-democracy can be described adequately. To define anti-democracy we first have to define democracy; and an unequivocal definition of democracy is not extant. In scientific and societal discourse democracy has proven to be a normative concept, which has again and again been defined differently throughout the ages (Backes 1989; Lipschits 1969).

To come to a broadly accepted definition of the concept of democracy lies beyond the borders of this study. The operational definition that is developed here will therefore be based on those of other authors. These can be classified in two groups. The first group is based on the notion that democracy is primarily a *procedure*. Democracy is accordingly defined principally as pluralism; thus anti-democracy is seen as anti-pluralism. The second group of definitions is based on a *substantive* notion of democracy. According to this group, democracy amounts to the acceptance of the fundamental equality of the citizen. Hence, it follows that anti-democracy is the rejection of the fundamental equality of the citizen.

In this study both descriptions of anti-democracy are combined in one concept, mentioned by several authors as a feature of the right-wing extremist ideology, the organic vision of the Volk (Jaschke 1987). In this vision the Volk is regarded as a living soul, an organism. As the state is seen as nothing more than the political arm of the Volk, it is also considered to be (part of) an organism. Theoretically speaking, everyone could be equally important in an organic state. However, in the right-wing extremist variant this is not supposed to be the case. Just as in a body, with millions of blood-corpuscles and only one heart, the law of supply and demand applies in an organic state. Only a few, and often only one, persons are gifted by nature with the qualities that good leadership requires. The leader is the heart of the Volk and has absolute power. His leadership is above discussion, as only he is able to decide what is good and what bad for the Volk. The organic Volk is thus, in its extreme shape, combined with the leadership principle.

The organic vision of the Volk is classified as anti-democratic on the basis of both descriptions of democracy discussed above. On the one hand, it is anti-pluralist, better yet monistic, because contradistinctions within the Volk, and thus the state, are not accepted; since the individual is nothing without the Volk, his interests can never deviate from those of the Volk. On the other hand, it takes the line that ‘natural inequalities’ exist, which is expressed most strongly in the leadership principle. This rejection of the fundamental equality of the citizen makes the organic vision of the Volk anti-democratic on the basis of the second description too.

Though the organic vision of the Volk is a very concrete, and therefore limited, definition of anti-democracy, it has some major advantages in regard to the former two descriptions. The main advantage is the fact that it is formulated positively, providing insight not only into what the parties do not want, but even more into what they do want. As Sontheimer (1983: 14) notes:

> For, the negative function of anti-democratic thinking, the *anti* against the established democracy, is as a rule linked with a *pro* for an otherwise constituted state.

The second advantage is that by the positive formulation the often subjective choice between rejection and criticism of democracy is been precluded. The third advantage is that we can work with a concept that is clearly described; in contrast with more obscure concepts such as ‘pluralism’ and ‘equality’.

Only in the ideology of the Austrian NDP does the organic vision of the Volk play an important part. In its manifesto we find a clear example of this vision: ‘Every Volk is a naturally grown organism with its own character, and cannot be remoulded artificially’. The party is certain that all parts of a Volk have a common biological and cultural heritage and thus essentially share a common historical fate. Since the state should merely be the political ordering of the Volk, this organic vision also holds for the state. The organic vision was voiced recurrently in the party paper in the form of the *soziale Volksgemeinschaft* ‘a community which internal order is determined by the extent of the performance for the Volk’.

The NDP only voiced its organic vision openly in its 1973 manifesto, although before and after that date several passages in manifestos and party papers hinted at the concept. In the manifestos of 1987 and 1992, the party limits itself to a tight monistic vision on the state, in which there is neither place for ‘group-egoism’ nor for the ‘Volk-hostile class-struggle’. Like the NPD, the NDP thinks that ‘to uphold the true democratic principles, individual and sectional interests should always be appointed and subordinated to the whole’.

The CP’86 never showed any sign of an organic vision in its literature. Although the party takes a strong stand against ‘group-egoism’ and the ‘Volk-hostile class-struggle’, like its two German sister parties, it does not bring up any concrete alternatives for the current ‘degenerated’ political system in the Netherlands. In fact, it simply lacks any coherent vision on the state.

None of the three parties hazards an open acceptance of the leadership principle. The NPD came the closest in its early years with its striving for a directly elected president with extended powers, who should ‘embody the greatness of Volk and state’. This vision on the president has been used
by many authors to prove that the NPD was, following Hitlers NSDAP, anti-democratic and strived for a dictatorship (Cf. Bockemühl 1969; Bruggeman-Raith 1968; Dittmer 1969). However, this vision was moderated considerably in the 1973 programme; notably, the same programme in which the NPD for the first (and last) time articulated its organic vision openly. Neither the NPD nor the CP'86 ever strived openly for the leadership principle. Nevertheless, the NDP made no secret of the fact that not everyone would be equal in the pursued soziale Volksgemeinschaft.

The strong state

The fifth and last feature of right-wing extremism, the strong state, is a collective noun for sub-features that have to do with a strengthened repressive function of the state. The three most important sub-features of the strong state are anti-pluralism, law-and-order, and militarism (Galanda 1981). As anti-pluralism has already been discussed above as a part of antidemocracy, the strong state is here defined on the basis of the other two (sub-)features.

Law-and-order is not only a feature of right-wing extremism, but of conservatism and the non-extremist right-wing as well. It involves a quest for order and authority. This is accompanied by the demand for the strong punishment of those who breach the rules. Solitary confinements must be served under very poor conditions; the ultimate penalty is capital punishment. To maintain order the state must have a strong police force at its disposal.

Militarism expresses itself, naturally, in the call for a strong army to protect national interests. The army must have a lot of manpower, the newest technology, and a very large amount of equipment. Serving in the army is regarded as the highest honour; pacifism, on the other hand, is regarded as a sign of weakness, and as an undermining of the ‘national will’.

In the most extreme form of militarism, which is part of Nazism and fascism, war is considered the natural condition: peace, on the other hand, is considered an artificial period between wars. War is considered to be more than a means to pursue the ‘national will’; war is the ultimate goal (Cf. Baradat 1991: 241). Positive and unique characteristics are ascribed to war. This extreme militarism is fed by ethnocentrism; the home state is regarded superior to others, and has a duty to dominate them.

If both law-and-order and militarism are present, we can speak of a desire for a strong state. If only one of these features is present, it is mentioned separately.

Law-and-order plays an important part in the ideology of all three parties. All want a substantial extension of the number of acts that are punished (especially Sittlichkeitsverbrechen like prostitution, pornography, and homosexuality), a radical austerity in the living conditions in prisons (which are painted as luxurious hotels in the party papers), and much higher prison sentences. They also agree that the current criminality is caused by ‘the decline of values’ caused by ‘the egoistic capitalism’ and ‘weak left-wing policies’.

The NPD and CP’86 take their desire for law and order even further than the NPD, although the latter seems to have hardened its stand on law and order under the leadership, since June 1991, of Günter Deckert. Both the NPD and the CP’86 pursue the reintroduction of the death penalty and of labour camps. The NPD wants the death penalty for drug dealers (‘A drug dealer that hangs, saves the lives of thousands’), child kidnapping, high treason, and Blutverbrechen. The CP’86 believes that only an ‘iron fist’ can save the Netherlands: When criminality is fought in a hard, ruthless and consequent manner, that criminality will disappear in the shortest time. Part of this ‘iron fist’ are the death penalty for people who have dealt drugs, or committed rape, murder or incest, as well as ‘bread and water in labour camps’ for prisoners.

Only in the ideology of the NDP does militarism play an important part. The Austrian party sees an important educational function for the army and vehemently opposes the shortening of the compulsory military service and the official recognition of conscientious objectors. They want to strengthen the Austrian army further, both in personnel and in material. In its early years the NPD took a radical militaristic position as well. The similarity in the manifesto passages of both German parties concerning compulsory military service is striking (see also Fichtner 1968). The NDP writes in its 1967 manifesto: We recognize military service as honourary service for Heimat and Volk. The NDP articulates the same message in fewer words: ‘Military service is honourary service’. Unlike the above mentioned manifesto of the CP’86, the 1967 manifesto of the NDP is no literal copy of the 1967 manifesto of the NPD. However, it seems probable that the NPD did get some ‘inspiration’ out of the NPD-manifesto (Fichtner 1968).

After 1973 the NPD moderated its position, accepting the right to conscientious objection and vehemently opposing nuclear armament. This shift in position is probably caused for the largest part by the definite anchoring of the West German army into NATO. according to the NPD an occupying force, and the fear of a Brudermord on German soil in case of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. With the breakdown of the Berlin Wall this fear seems to have disappeared and radical militarism is rearing its ugly head again. In the 1992 manifesto the old description of the compulsory military service has been rehabilitated: ‘Military service is honourary service for the German Volk’.

One aspect of militarism that has always taken a prominent place in the literature of both NPD and NDP is an unbounded admiration for military life. Particular attention is paid in party papers to the performance of the German army in the Second World War – both the Wehrmacht and the (Waffen-)SS. At the centre of these passages are terms such as ‘camaraderie’, ‘heroism’, ‘highest honour’, and ‘example’. The ‘German’ soldier is for both parties the prime example of strength, discipline, and pride.
Militarism does not play a part in the ideology of the CP'86. The party considers the army a 'necessary evil' and pays only little attention in its literature to military affairs. Neither an adoration of military life nor an appreciation of the educational value of compulsory military service are present in the party literature of CP'86.

Summarizing, we can state that the feature of the strong state is present only in the ideology of the two German parties (NPD and NDP). This feature plays a far more important part in the NDP than in the NPD. In the case of the CP'86 only law-and-order play an important part in party ideology; militarism is absent.

Discussion

We have seen that the concept of right-wing extremism has, in both the societal and the scientific discourse, a bearing on a large number of things. In this study, right-wing extremism has been defined, on the basis of an extensive study of the scientific literature, as an ideology that is made up of five features: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the strong state. These features were conceptualized and subsequently used in the analysis of the party-literature of three alleged right-wing extremist parties. The research question was: Are (all) these alleged right-wing extremist parties actually right-wing extremist? The analysis showed that the ideology of the Austrian NDP contains all five features, the German NPD all except anti-democracy, and the Dutch CP'86 'only' the first three (that is, nationalism, racism and xenophobia).

The question that remains is: What combination of features constitutes right-wing extremism? This question can not be answered objectively. There is no consensus in the existing literature. Most of the authors involved do not even go into this question, though there are, however, three different approaches to it.

The first approach might be termed the qualitative approach. Here the five features are not all considered equally important. The qualitative approach is particularly common in Germany, where 'anti-democracy' is seen as being by far the most important feature; without anti-democracy there can be no (right-wing) extremism (Cf. Backes, 1989; Backes & Jesse 1989; Doll 1990). Following this approach, only one of the three parties, the NDP, can be labelled right-wing extremist. When the sub-feature of the leadership principle is dropped as part of the definition of anti-democracy, the NPD can be labelled anti-democratic, and thus right-wing extremist too.

In the second or quantitative approach all features are considered equally important and only one criterion is used: the number of features (Pennings & Brants 1985; Mecse 1981). Here, several options are open. When right-wing extremism is defined as an ideology containing all five features, again only the NDP complies with the definition. When, however, a party has to possess only half of the features, all three parties are right-wing extremist. All three parties share nationalism, racism and xenophobia.

The third and last approach might be called the mixed approach, as it uses qualitative as well as quantitative criterions. Here we might think of a combination of anti-democracy with any one of the other features, with the abovementioned result. Or a combination of one of the first three (exclusionistic) features (nationalism, racism and xenophobia) and one of the two (right-wing) features (anti-democracy and the strong state). In this case, only the two German parties can be labelled right-wing extremist.

Constructing the boundaries to the concept of right-wing extremism is an important task, both scientifically and societally, yet, in my opinion, the gaining of insight into the ideology, or ideologies, of alleged right-wing extremist parties should be the main interest of social scientists. This can best be achieved by placing the question of whether a party is right-wing extremist or not, somewhat into the background. To gain a better insight into the ideology of alleged right-wing extremist parties, the concept of right-wing extremism is more useful as an indication than as a criterion. Once the concept is 'dissected' into several features, as we have done in this article, it is possible to obtain a better insight into the ideology of these parties. Next, similarities and differences in ideology between the parties can be obtained by comparing them on the basis of the different features. Then, and only then, social scientists and others can begin to confront the question of whether particular parties are right-wing extremist or not.

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Notes

1. This is even the case in Germany, where the academic study of the phenomenon is far more consistent than in (all) other countries (Cf. Backes & Jesse 1985: 181). Some of the more recent examples of the English literature on right-wing extremism are Chiles, Ferguson & Vaughan (1991), Hainsworth (1992), and Merkl & Weinberg (1993). See further the special issues on right-wing extremism published by West European Politics (1988), European Journal of Political Research (1992), and Parliamentary Affairs (1992).
2. In his voluminous study of post-war nationalism in Germany between 1945 and 1963, Tauber (1967) clearly demonstrates the ideological similarities between post-war 'right-wing extremism' and pre-war 'national-conservatism'.
3. 'Wie viele Begriffe, hat auch die Bezeichnung Rechtsextremismus eine Doppelfunktion.
Wissenschaftlich seriös angewendet, dient sie der Erkenntnis, als Kampfvokabel im tagespolitischen Streit aber der Abstempelung des politischen Gegners’ (Knüttel 1991: 12).

4. Sartori (1970: 1045) speaks in this context of the transformation of the definition of meaning in an 'operational definition'.

5. Hoogerwerf (1963, 1971), for instance, demonstrates on the basis of a – both in time and between parties – comparative analysis of the 1948 and 1963 election programmes of the two major Dutch parties (ARP, KVP, PvdA, VVD) that a larger correspondence had come into being regarding the social-economical policies. The ideological differences that existed in 1948 were altered into differences in strategy and means in 1963. See also the work of Michel (1992, 1993).


8. For other classifications on the ground of ideology, see Kirlpel & Oswalt (1991), and O’Mal- lain (1987). For the ideological differences between the Centrumdemocraten and the CP’86, see Van Holsteyn and Mulde (1992).


11. So the NPD sees in ’the ideas of the Hambacher Festes of 1832 a nationaldemocratic tradition, in which the will of our Volk to national unity and freedom, to democracy and social justice manifests itself’, while the CP’86 sees in ’the struggle of a.o. the Geuzen of 1576 a nationaldemocratic tradition in which the will of our Volk to national unity, freedom, democracy, and social justice manifests itself’. See Nationaldemokratische Gedanken (p. 3): and, Nationaldemokratische gedanken (no pages given).


13. Barker (1981: 23) uses the term ’pseudo-biological culture’ to describe the theory of new racism. The German term ’Ethnopluralismus’ is somewhat comparable in this context. In the ethnopluralist view the world is divided according to nations, which are incomparable among themselves and have their own separate identity (Cf. Backes 1989: 213).


16. This is also most clearly stated by the editor’s response: ’Die Hautfarbe sollte bei Liber- leung von Millionen Deutscher aus ihrer angestammten Heimat empfelen’ (Klaterext, No. 6, 1978).

17. Xenophobie – Fremdenhass und Fremdeinschätzung, ’Angst’(=phobie) vor und Haß auf den ’Fremden’ als ’Feinde’ . . . ’ (Geiss 1988: 28; see also Eisigsa & Speehers, 1988: 11). In the 1990 version of the Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary xenophobia is defined as ’a fear or extremely strong dislike of people from other countries’.


19. ’. . . wie jeder lebendige Organismus absterben muß, trennt man ihn von seiner Mitte’. Taken from the Nationaldemokratische Nachrichten (No. 6, 1973), which was the official party paper of the NPD until 1975. At the end of 1974 the party-paper (with the subtitle Kampschrift der NDP) merged with the independent right-wing magazine Klarext and the new party-paper was also named Karterext (subtitle Zeitung für nationale Politik).


22. The term anti-pluralism that is formulated negatively can better be replaced by the positive term ’monism’, that is, ’. . . the tendency to treat cleavage and ambivalence as illegitimate’ (Lipsit & Raab 1970: 6).

23. ’Die negative Funktion des antidemokratischen Denkens, das Ant im Vergleich zur herrschende Demokratie, ist ja in aller Regel gekoppelt mit einem Pro für einen anders gestalteten Staat’ (Sonnheimer 1983: 14).

24. Sonnheimer (1983) clearly shows in his classical study Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik that not every critical position towards the Weimar-Republic (1918–1933) was fed by an anti-democratic attitude; the Weimar-Republic had a constitution that was very democratic, yet it failed miserably in practice.

25. ’Jedes Volk ist ein naturlich gewachsen des Organismus eigener Art und kann nicht künstlich umgeformt werden’ (Wir Nationaldemokraten, p. 3).

26. ’. . . eine Gemeinschaft deren innere Rangordnung durch den Grad der Leistungen für das Volk bestimmt wird’ (Karterext, No. 11, 1982).

27. ’Einzel- und Gruppeninteressen müssen in Wahrung wahrhaft demokratischer Prinzipien stets dem Ganzen und untergeordnet sein’ (Politik in unserer Zeit. Das Manifest der NDP mit Erläuterungen, Hannover, DN-Verlag, 1967: p. 16). The NPD writes exactly the same, only the word ’wahrhaft’ is substituted by the word ’echter’, in its manifesto Wir Nationaldemokraten, p. 10).


30. Wannier kriminalität hard, meedenlogen loso een consequent zou worden bestreden . . . dan zou de misdadigheid binnen de kortste tijd zijn verdwenen’ (Centrumnieuws, No. 1, 1989).

31. Wir bekennen uns zum Wehrendienst als Ehrendienst für Heimat und Volk’ (Wir National- demokraten, p. 12).

32. ’Wehrendienst ist Ehrendienst’ (Politik in unserer Zeit, p. 9).


34. The official definition of the German state is stated in the annual Verfassungsschutzbericht (Bonn, Der Bundesminister des Innern).
References


Equality and efficiency: The illusory tradeoff

LANE KENWORTHY
Department of Sociology, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY, USA

Abstract. Scholars and policy makers have traditionally assumed that nations face a tradeoff between income equality and economic efficiency. Greater equality is believed to reduce investment and dampen work incentives. A heterodox view suggests that a more egalitarian distribution of income may have beneficial efficiency effects by augmenting consumer demand and encouraging workers to cooperate in upgrading competitiveness. This paper offers an empirical assessment of the relationship between equality and efficiency, based on cross-sectional data from 17 advanced industrialized economies over the period 1974-90. The comparative evidence indicates no adverse impact of greater equality on investment or work effort, nor on growth of productivity or output, trade balances, inflation, or unemployment. On the contrary, higher levels of equality are associated with stronger productivity growth and trade performance, and possibly with higher investment and lower inflation.

Introduction

Along with liberty and democracy, equality is one of the most cherished social principles of the modern world. Yet it has long been accepted by scholars and policy makers that we ought not have too much equality of income. The most prominent basis of this sentiment is the widespread view that income equality impedes economic efficiency. Is this presumption correct? Is there a tradeoff between equality and efficiency?

According to the tradeoff thesis, equality undermines efficiency by reducing investment and dampening work incentives. Holding other factors constant, countries with greater income equality should thus exhibit economic performance results inferior to those of nations with less egalitarian distributive arrangements. A heterodox view holds that a more egalitarian income distribution may have beneficial efficiency effects by augmenting consumer demand and encouraging workers to cooperate in upgrading competitiveness. This paper offers an empirical assessment of the relationship between equality and efficiency, based on cross-sectional data from 17 advanced industrialized democracies over the period 1974-90. The first section outlines normative debates on the desirability of income equality. The second discusses the contending views on the existence of an equality-efficiency tradeoff. The third section assesses previous research on this issue. The fourth section describes the data and method used in this study, and the fifth presents and discusses the findings. A brief conclusion follows.