This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging in the United States, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly comparative criminal-procedure literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in American prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge that do not exist in their counterparts overseas. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of American prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground that such personnel policies create an actual conflict of interest.
- conflict of interest,
- prosecutorial discretion,
- prosecutorial misconduct
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/carrie_leonetti/62/