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Unpublished Paper
WHEN THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES III: PERSONNEL POLICIES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES
ExpressO (2012)
  • Carrie Leonetti
Abstract

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground that such personnel policies create an actual conflict of interest. Career advancement should not be the controlling factor in how charging, prosecuting, and sentencing decisions are made.

Keywords
  • disqualification,
  • conflict of interest,
  • prosecutorial discretion,
  • overcharging,
  • prosecutorial misconduct
Disciplines
Publication Date
February 16, 2012
Citation Information
Carrie Leonetti. "WHEN THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES III: PERSONNEL POLICIES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES" ExpressO (2012)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/carrie_leonetti/57/