Red Devil or Tragic Hero? Osceola as Settler-Colonial Icon

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To those who wish to obtain a perfect idea of the “head and heart” of the Seminoles, we would refer them to Mr. Catlin’s gallery. Oceola breathes upon his canvas. It is the happiest likeness I have ever seen. His spirit has joined its brethren in the land of the shadows. His inglorious capture will descend to future ages.

New York Morning Herald, February 23, 1838

The imprisonment and subsequent death of Osceola (ca. 1804–38), a noted Seminole war leader, at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, caused a wave of national indignation. Many considered the warrior’s capture—he was seized by the army while under a white flag of truce during the Second Seminole War (1835–42)—as a shameful exercise. The usually staid Niles’ National Register disclaimed any “participation in the ‘glory’ of this achievement,” observing that if such a capture had been practiced against a “civilized foe,” it would have been “characterized as a violation of all that is noble and generous in war.” Osceola’s death and the later desecration of his corpse by an army physician (the head was decapitated and preserved, and there were attempts to publicly exhibit the gruesome trophy) stirred further outcry.

For a substantial portion of Anglo-Americans, Osceola—a name derived from the Muscogee (Creek and Seminole) asse yahola, or “black drink singer”—stood as the virtual embodiment of a tragic hero, and hence anything that could detract from this stature was deemed especially repugnant. A host of writers and journalists placed him amid a
pantheon of Native American champions that included Black Hawk, King Philip (Metacom), Pontiac, and Tecumseh—figures that appeared to fulfill the ideal of the wise, stoic, and noble red man, a stereotype popularized by author James Fenimore Cooper. Osceola was even compared to Napoleon by an admiring “scribbling fraternity.”4 But for many others, particularly frontier Democrats, Osceola’s demise was judged a fitting end for a thoroughly disreputable character, “the most inhuman butcher of men, women and children.”5

Whether the warrior’s capture and death elicited staunch approval or anger reflected one’s political and regional affiliations. Missouri Democratic senator Thomas Hart Benton, a leading orator and ardent Jacksonian expansionist, was unequivocal: “The only fault of our officers,” he proclaimed from the Senate floor, “is that they did not hang him the moment they caught him.”6 But the artist and chronicler of the American Indian, George Catlin, a Whig and native Pennsylvanian who spent time at Fort Moultrie while on commission to paint the famed warrior’s portrait, perceived things differently. As Catlin expressed himself in a widely circulated article, Osceola was nothing less than “the fallen Prince and Hero of Florida.”7

This essay will not only explore the meaning behind America’s divergent response to this Indigenous war leader but also examine why such a previously obscure figure from one of the most inaccessible regions of the eastern United States achieved extensive notoriety during the late 1830s. In doing so, I will draw upon the insights of settler-colonial studies, a particularly useful tool when sifting through the dense Romantic idiom and hyperpartisanship of the era.8 Historians such as biographer Patricia Riles Wickman have largely bypassed the ambiguities of Osceola’s public persona in an effort to arrive at a more accurate rendition of his life story.9 The perspective of this article, however, takes an opposite path. Journalistic embellishments pose special problems, to be sure. Yet the language used to frame the debates that centered on the Second Seminole War nevertheless reveals larger historical forces. Scholars have long demonstrated the subtle power of media framing, a term used to describe “the context or narrative theme through which the story is told,” to influence public opinion, but previous studies of the war have not benefited from such a perspective.10 It should thus be stressed that this seven-year conflict coincided with two major developments on the national scene: (1) the emergence of the Whigs as a second party,
one whose prime goal was of course directed at defeating Jacksonian opponents, and (2) the parallel rise of mass-circulation penny newspapers in major northeastern cities, most of which held strong political allegiances and depended upon sensationalism to advance stories and increase profits. For the first time, journalists began to be regarded as key players in swaying public opinion; newspaper editors in large metropolitan areas suddenly vied with elected officials as power brokers. Osceola’s contradictory persona as both hero and red devil was a direct result of this early convergence of mass media and partisan politics—the birth of mass culture in the United States.

In general there was an urban versus frontier sectional divide in journalistic narratives regarding the Florida campaign, with the most vehement antiwar sentiment emanating from northeastern Whig papers and a distinct antipathy toward Indigenes that centered in the southern and western frontier regions. Such distinctions have been lost in previous studies, such as John Coward’s *The Newspaper Indian* (1999), as well as histories of the Second Seminole War, most of which ignore the frontier Democratic perspective altogether and suggest that the view of the media toward Osceola was exclusively sympathetic. In a struggle to gain political leverage, the newly emergent Whig Party cast itself as a moral exemplar, vastly superior to “the moral malaria of Jacksonism,” as a leading congressman phrased it. The romantic idiom proved quite useful in this regard, and among other charges Whigs accused Democrats of being reckless warmongers who mistreated the “children of the forest.” The storyline of an Indian “prince” who rose to prominence only to be dishonorably captured and tragically cut down by the party of Andrew Jackson became the most effective weapon in the Whig arsenal. Even so, after five years of intensive antiwar rhetoric, the composition of the 1840 presidential election forced an abrupt change in tactics. The Whig presidential candidate, William Henry Harrison, an old Indian fighter, personally supported the war in Florida, and his successor, John Tyler, a former Democrat, also continued along this path once in office. This turnaround vividly demonstrated that the party’s sympathetic stance toward the Seminoles was in fact a form of political stagecraft that was devoid of conviction, a premise that will be made clearer in the course of this essay.

To be sure, representations of Native people as either idealized primitives or brutal savages had a long history in North America, a bifurcated
view that can be traced to the ideas of such eighteenth-century philosophers as Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. But it was not until the Florida war that political parties actually drew a line across this conceptual divide in the hope that their differing orientations would boost their electoral chances. The dual concept of the good and bad Indian was no longer exclusively relegated to philosophical musings or as an element to add excitement and romance to an adventure yarn but was consciously employed in the rough-and-tumble world of “modern” politics. Romanticism became the de facto framework for the Whigs, while many Democrats focused on barbarism. Ironically, both genres, as Australian anthropologist Patrick Wolfe observed, would eventually be used throughout the colonial world, as both reinforced settler-colonial hegemony—although this concept may not at all be apparent at first glance. Romanticism helped sustain a “legitimizing illusion,” a sleight-of-hand that drew national attention away from the country’s core aggression toward Native people by focusing on highly idealized literary and artistic creations. The power of this framework derived from its capacity to define the terms of debate without readers (or viewers) being cognizant of any overt manipulation.15

The persuasive formula devised by the Whigs certainly did not follow in the exact tradition of Rousseau, despite superficial similarities. Whig writers, for example, were peculiarly ambivalent toward Seminoles. They often referred to the Indians’ presumed extinction (attributing the Seminoles’ tragic end to their own doing), compared them to dangerous and irrational beasts, and, despite allusions to their classical beauty and physical prowess (in the case of Osceola), still characterized Native people as intrinsically inferior and untrustworthy. In contrast, the savage framing used by Democrats may at first seem infinitely more straightforward. Hyperinflated reports of “barbarous” killings, intended to provoke moral outrage, sustained a foundation for the settler-colonial “logic of elimination” by appeals to retributive justice.16 In this respect, most Democrats followed more directly in the footsteps of Hobbes, who envisioned “the savage people” of America as living in “a brutish manner,” devoid of laws and living lives that only promised violent death.17 Once again, however, a distinct duality surfaced. The Democratic elite in metropolitan areas such as New York City and Charleston also shared a strong affinity with the Romantic movement and so evoked Osceola’s tragic heroism while still advancing the tenets of Indian removal. De-
spite regional variations and contradictions, the frames of both parties strongly resonated within the culture at large and thus demonstrated high potential for influencing the electorate.

One’s physical proximity to either cities or the frontier therefore proved as vital as party affiliation in the selection of media frames. While Democratic readers could rely on the Globe (Washington DC), the Jackson administration’s paper of record, to consistently render the actions of the Seminoles under a vicious rubric, the activities of the Tammany Society in New York City, named for Lenni-Lenape leader Temane or “Tammany,” developed a different orientation. Tammany Hall was the nexus of Democratic power in the city and had too long been invested in the noble Indian motif to abruptly shift its orientation during the Florida war. Since its founding as a fraternal organization in the eighteenth century, members had assumed a pseudo-Indigenous character of their own. Their council chamber was known as the Great Wigwam, elected leaders were “grand sachems,” the rank and file were “braves,” and there were thirteen “tribes” based on the original colonies.

Emblems of Native legitimacy, bereft of any taint of savagery, were therefore embraced even while the wholesale purging of Indians from their lands was taking place. Such co-optation provided the dominant culture with a pseudo-Indigenous character of its own. Issues such as Native land title and fraudulent treaties became blurred when aggressive newcomers inverted the standard paradigm and incorporated a partially “Indianized” identity. There was a significant psychological process that took place: in the act of assuming Native identities, a recent theorist has observed, “indigenous people are transferred away.” This selective appropriation, a form of “self-othering,” served another symbolic function, as American citizens could accentuate their difference from European society and in so doing help define a unique national mythos. Unlike frontier Democrats who consistently drew upon the savage cliché, the Tammany faction actually praised Osceola’s heroic standing as a military leader while still remaining faithful to the war effort. The Romantic frame, with all its literary allusions and pretensions, simply held more cultural resonance in the city. This seeming paradox actually reinforces the idea that both genres were merely two sides of the same sword (as far as their relation to Native people was concerned). Ultimately, Whigs never adopted a truly humanitarian stance toward the Seminoles.
but merely “touched the sad and tender chords of the Indian story” for their own advantage.\textsuperscript{23}

The celebrity that was bestowed upon Osceola was of course an imaginary exercise based entirely on nineteenth-century European American sensibilities. Writers often alluded to classical Greek and Roman literature in their homages to Osceola, and so there was certainly no equivalence within the traditional worldview of the Seminoles. Moreover, the concept of a unitary military hero was antithetical to Florida’s Native people. As Wickman has emphasized, “White Americans have only a limited frame of reference for the force of the horizontal power structure that exists in the Maskókî [Muscogee] world.”\textsuperscript{24} Seminole war leaders consulted and acted together during large operations and may have served as lone commanders only during small-scale raids. Hence, Osceola, an individual who may have gained the title of \textit{tustenuggee thlacco} (big warrior) but lacked hereditary chiefly authority, was not a “general” in the full Western sense of the word and as the press often referred to him. Osceola’s base of support among the Seminoles—in actuality, a loose association of tribes that were drawn together by the exigencies of war—was indeed never as substantial as is commonly supposed.\textsuperscript{25} The remarkable volume of literary efforts devoted to this war leader, romantic paeans to singular heroic deeds, including poems and elaborate narratives, were surreal exercises that were seldom tethered to reality. Political aspirations, not facts, were the motive force behind the entire process. Osceola’s celebrity (or infamy, as the case may be) became a form of kitsch directed at the masses, formulaic and excessive in sentiment: the mirror image of the antebellum literary and press culture that created it.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{WAR BEGINS: “A FLOOD-GATE OF WRETCHEDNESS HAS BEEN OPENED”}

Despite dire warnings from the highest-ranking officers in the field, the first wave of Seminole raids in East Florida during the winter of 1835–36 caught the War Department quite unprepared.\textsuperscript{27} Most Seminole leaders flatly rejected the government’s demand that they forfeit their reservation land and be deported to the Arkansas Territory. As the deadline for removal neared, war was certain. Attacks upon the widely scattered white settlements in the peninsular interior, located in what was once the Semi-
nole homeland, were planned and coordinated not only by Osceola but by such leaders as Halpatter Tustenuggee (Alligator), Ote Emathla (Jumper), Emathla (King Philip), Yaholoochee (Cloud), Coacoochee (Wild Cat), and Abayaca (also known as Arpeika and Sam Jones) and sanctioned by members of the war council. Native warriors and their black auxiliaries—many of whom were descendants of runaway slaves from adjacent southern states—seemed to conduct their destructive operations “with the suddenness of the whirlwind and the storm.”

The conflict’s opening phase, planned a year in advance, proved catastrophic for the US territory. The so-called Dade’s Massacre, perhaps the best-known engagement of the entire war, followed in the wake of the initial assaults. News of the annihilation of Major Francis L. Dade’s command on 28 December 1835 shocked the nation on a scale that had seldom been witnessed before. Only a few soldiers managed to survive out of a force of 110. Such a devastating, one-sided loss at the hands of Native adversaries would only be surpassed much later by Custer’s defeat at the Little Bighorn (the Battle of Greasy Grass Creek). The assassination of Indian agent General Wiley Thompson—an event that occurred on the same date as the rout of Dade’s command and also filled the pages of the nation’s newspapers—certainly magnified white America’s general sense of shock and loss. Thompson was shot and killed by Osceola (also known as “Powell,” a reference to his long-absent English trader father, William Powell) and his men, acting under orders from the war council, when the agent took an imprudent stroll outside the confines of Fort King, a small wooden fort located deep in the interior. The agent’s body was riddled with bullets, he had been scalped “as far as the hair extended” (a practice also indulged in by settlers and soldiers), and his skull had been beaten in. Thompson’s companions suffered similar fates. “All this was done in open day light within 250 yards of Camp King,” a journalist wrote incredulously. The following month the Daily National Intelligencer assumed not only that “General Thompson fell a victim to his misplaced confidence in the sincerity of Indian faith” but that all the devastation wrought by the Florida war arose “from the same source.”

These incidents were followed by two major battles fought at the site of the Withlacoochee River in central Florida. Both involved large clashes between the US Army and the combined forces of the Seminoles, and in both instances the US military was fortunate to escape obliteration.

At the end of eight months, federal troops retreated, and key army
posts were abandoned and destroyed. Most of the interior settlements suffered the same fate. Panicked survivors sought protection within the nearest hastily erected stockade, where many endured sickness and hunger. Major commercial sugar mills and plantations were torched by the Seminoles, along with thousands of acres of farmland. Valuable herds of cattle and other livestock were confiscated—total losses were estimated at $8.5 million. The contents of homes that managed to escape the torch were smashed with a vengeance. As an army sergeant recounted, “Everything that industry and civilization has done is destroyed.” Furniture was hacked to pieces, and the remains of “tables, bureaus, sofas, mirrors, pictures, feather beds, books” littered the countryside. With the outnumbered army on the frontier largely confined within twelve-foot-high pine-log palisades during the spring and summer months, Seminole forces regained sovereignty over the peninsular interior, a region revered both as their rightful homeland and as “consecrated ground” (land that was believed to harbor ancestral spirits). Confronted with a disillusioned officer corps and aware of the increasing influence of the press, the military was extremely hesitant to reveal its dire position to the public. The Seminoles were “gorged with blood & flushed with success,” as one high-ranking officer confided to the secretary of war, and the army command fully realized the formidable nature of these “predatory bands of savages.” The settler-colonial framework of a bounded geographical and physical space, especially as it applied to the confines of the once-famine-stricken Seminole reservation, had in effect been inverted during the war’s first year.

Within a vast amount of media coverage that was devoted to the Florida war (numerous newspaper editorials; official battlefield accounts from the War Department; reports from the field by a select number of war correspondents; and a voluminous assortment of letter writers, anonymous and often cynical appraisals from junior army officers stationed in the territory, along with the comments of Florida’s planter class), a single, distinctive Seminole leader soon emerged. James W. Simmons, adventurer, poet, southern Whig, and one of the few correspondents awarded a byline, published a lengthy and influential article, “Recollections of the Late Campaign in East Florida” (1836), that offered one of the first critical, personal accounts of the war. Heretofore the author had contributed to such leading Whig papers as the National Intelligencer. Early in the war he was sent by the New York Courier and Enquirer, owned by the Whig politician James Watson Webb, to report
on General Winfield Scott’s Florida campaign. Simmons’s disparaging assessment of the war’s conduct echoed the party line, as did his seemingly sympathetic treatment of the Seminoles. Simmons suggested that the treaties imposed upon their Native adversaries were a sham and that the enforcement of “this attempted fraud upon the Seminole nation” violated the country’s moral principles. He also manifested a particular fascination with Osceola, to the exclusion of all other leaders.

Drawing upon an encounter with Osceola in the months just prior to the war, Simmons provided a level of intimate commentary regarding Osceola’s appearance and mannerisms that would have been deemed beyond the bounds of propriety if applied to any white male contemporary. Steeped in the Romantic idiom, Simmons helped forge a distinct literary journalism that would later flourish during the Civil War. He also aided, along with Catlin and many others, in creating a mythos regarding Osceola that permeated antebellum culture, a sociocultural construct that may have been used to counter Jacksonian policies but that was also invested in the tenets of settler-colonialism. Irrespective of the degree of gallant virtue some highly educated whites awarded to certain Native figures, most whites still perceived Indigenous people as fated to extinction and thus innately tragic, a peculiar aspect of the American character that Alexis de Tocqueville noted as “cold selfishness”—a ready acceptance and anticipation of the demise of Indians.39 Indeed, Simmons managed to weave a sense of predestined gloom throughout his portrayal of Osceola, whose face was judged “eminently worthy of Raphael” and whose nose “was Grecian, perfect!” The eyes nevertheless denoted something tragic.

The prevailing tone was that of profound melancholy, which rendered his smile the most wildly beautiful we had ever beheld. The eye, shaded by long, dark lashes, appeared to sleep as within a shroud, but it was a shroud of thoughts, which you could not doubt had for their subject the sad fortunes of his race, hundreds of whom were there around him, reminding him by their presence of their impending doom—if, indeed, he could ever forget this—for did not the wing of that cloudy destiny which hovered over them, throw, too, its cold shadow upon him?40

Simmons’s emotions clearly alternated between adulation and pity, but he also gave free vent to fear—a journalistic tendency that would cease
soon after Osceola’s death. At this time this Native leader may have been imagined as courageously “snatching the laurel from the brows of [Winfield] Scott,” but there were facets of this hero’s physiognomy that still remained troubling. The mere “play of his arms,” for example, was judged analogous to “that ease and energy of animals accustomed to spring at their prey.” Simmons’s perspective not only claimed a degree of clairvoyance but was almost microscopic in detail. “The speck of froth, white as the flaked snow, yet wrathful” that gathered at each corner of Osceola’s mouth was the result, Simmons imagined, of a “tremulous motion about the lips” that signified the “vexed spirit within.” “It was but the faint breath from the whirlwind of that stormy soul that played upon them, and gave to them their nearly audible vibration—they seemed as if they panted but to curse or kill!” Even the simple act of laughing and smiling, instead of prompting feelings of common humanity, Simmons took as menacing: “There is something wild and scarcely natural in the laugh of an Indian; and we never felt less inclined to trust him, than when he—laughed!” (Any laughter, of course, may have involved mockery toward whites, which would have undermined colonial power.) Despite protracted efforts to render “the physical man” to the public, the author—ostensibly favorably predisposed toward the Seminoles—lapsed into a web of contradictions. Indigenes, even in the guise of Osceola and despite rhapsodies of Greco-Roman aesthetics and battlefield glory, had proven not only unknowable but also inherently dangerous. Osceola’s core humanity and physicality were constantly beset by a narrative that relegated the war leader to the arena of a soon-to-be-extinct predatory species. Clearly at this time, at any rate, his persona had not yet been transformed into the embodiment of the “good” Indian.

Another contemporary treatment of Osceola emerged in M. M. Cohen’s popular war reminiscence, Notices of Florida and the Campaigns (1836). Cohen’s rendering also followed the same pattern of invading the personal sphere. (Historians have drawn a parallel between this tendency and the dramatic elements of black-face minstrelsy during the same period.) In Notices of Florida, the author, a Charleston attorney, former militia officer, and Jackson supporter, emphasized the warrior’s “white” characteristics much more than his Whig contemporaries had: “When conversing on topics agreeable to him, his countenance manifests more the disposition of the white than of the red man.” Among his various attributes, the warrior’s sense of exhilaration appeared to
surpass all others. Like Simmons, Cohen paid particular notice to the warrior’s “tremulous” lips (the result of emotions that “seem ever boiling within him”). There are obvious homoerotic overtones, albeit strategically offset by the hypermasculine framework of sports and fitness: “For years past, [Osceola] has enjoyed the reputation of being the best ball player and hunter, and the most expert at running, wrestling and all active exercises. At such times, or when naked, his figure whence all superfluous flesh is worn down, exhibits the most beautiful development of muscle and power.” 47 Cohen used the trope of Native physicality and oneness with nature to create a near-Adonis in reader’s minds. In the process, Indians were subjected to a white-defined manhood, a standard that appeared to exclude most Native males. They became, as historian Jeffrey D. Mason phrased it, “the unwitting . . . objects of the European gaze.” Such perceptions, Mason continues, essentially made the case that “they should embrace their own luxuriously melancholy demise.” 48

While Cohen relied on classical imagery in describing Osceola, he departed from the Romantic genre in more visibly ascribing sinister attributes. The author even likened Osceola to the character of Cassius in Shakespeare’s _Julius Caesar._ 49 While Cassius certainly possessed a certain nobility of mind, he was also a devious schemer who served as a coconspirator in Caesar’s gory murder. As an educated Charlestonian, Cohen could not refrain from anchoring his prose in a fashionable, high-toned style, but as a Democrat, he could not ignore the Seminole leader’s assassination of General Thompson. In the final analysis, Cohen believed, Osceola was simply like all other Indians, with revenge always “heading their bloody code.” 50

Compared to a convoluted style of writing that strained to camouflage European American prejudices under a romanticized mantle, the approach of most Democrats, particularly from frontier regions, was noted by their espousal of a savage motif that was unadulterated by romantic pretensions. 51 “They [Seminoles] have the human form,” as Florida’s Democratic congressional delegate David Levy asserted on the House floor, “but nothing of the human heart. Horror and detestation should follow the thought of them. If they cannot be emigrated, they should be exterminated.” 52 As posited, however, the essential difference between the two positions was actually slight. For southern Whigs such as US Representative Joseph R. Underwood (Kentucky), the value of Florida land was thought to be second-rate and thus not worth the
price in lives and treasure to be extracted in war. Instead, the admin-
istration should have allowed “these Indians to spend their existence,
and to dwindle into nothing, in the land where God had placed them.”
Given that the eventual demise of the red man was a foregone conclu-
sion, the “white race . . . could have acquired the territory inch by inch,
as it was wanted.” The final outcome, Indian removal and white sover-
eignty over the land, thus remained constant.

Osceola’s stature as the Seminoles’ single most outstanding military
leader was based on a view held by army officers, many of whom were
ill informed as to how Native forces actually conducted their internal
affairs. The army’s prestige also improved in direct proportion to any
magnification of the Seminoles’ fighting abilities. Consciously or not,
the rise of an exceptionally talented and charismatic Indian war leader
also aided a disillusioned public to better comprehend the army’s sub-
stantial losses. “This Powell [Osceola] is a perfect magician,” claimed
a correspondent for the mass circulation New York Herald. “With 1500
men, at the most . . . he keeps every port in Florida in dread of an at-
tack; cuts off all the communications; and threatens to eat up some six
thousand regulars, volunteers, and militia, with their seven Generals.”
In actuality, Osceola was never in sole command of such a force. Most
newspapers, regardless of political affiliation, nevertheless credited vir-
tually every skirmish or battle to Osceola alone, even though other lead-
ers were also in command. This happened even during occasions, such
as the defeat of Major Dade, when Osceola was not involved at all. Al-
though never the “Master Spirit of the Seminole Nation,” as he was at
times identified in the press, Osceola was still among the principal war
chiefs. This fact is confirmed by his presence alongside Jumper and
Alligator—senior leaders among the Alachua Seminoles—during the
failed peace negotiations that were initiated with the US Army at the
end of the second Battle of Withlacoochee (March 1836). It is worth
noting that several months afterward, during the Battle of Micanopy, a
concealed officer observed Osceola directing the movements of his war-
riors in conjunction with another unnamed chief (possibly Jumper)—
both held this joint command post from an elevated vantage point in
the rear. The horizontal power structure of the Maskóki thus appeared
to have extended to the battlefield. Moreover, Seminole war leaders
employed a range of innovative tactics. Nighttime assaults, long-term
sieges, even amphibious attacks were utilized throughout the war—
sophisticated strategies that necessitated high-level planning, organizational skills, and discipline.\textsuperscript{58} When engaged in pitched battles, according to a recent study commissioned by the National Park Service, “the Seminole employed excellent use of key terrain elements in staging before the battle, mounting an aggressive frontal assault, and then retiring in order to minimize losses.”\textsuperscript{59} Warriors were placed with precision and with the intention of concentrating fire power and diminishing opportunities for flanking by the enemy. Osceola and his contemporaries excelled at fully exploiting natural obstacles in order to hinder horse and infantry units. All things considered, Seminole warriors maintained an advantage over the US Army, which had scant knowledge of the terrain, endured terrible malarial epidemics during the late spring and summer months, depended on long trains of cumbersome supply wagons for sustenance, and drew upon \textit{grand guerre} traditions that were ill suited for this type of warfare.\textsuperscript{60}

In addition to Osceola’s talents in rallying his forces as an effective fighting unit was his heretofore unacknowledged resolve in curbing enemy casualties. According to the correspondence of an enculturated Cherokee dignitary (possibly John Ridge) who visited Osceola soon after his capture, “He is everything but savage, having punished his warriors in many instances for their barbarity. He has done much toward mitigating the evils of Indian warfare, by his powerful influence over his men; and had it not been for his talents and personal influence, the citizens of Florida would have suffered much worse.”\textsuperscript{61} Aside from this Native writer’s strikingly European American tone, this premise appears to clarify why the settler population and the military were not subjected to wholesale slaughter, an option, as a recent archaeological and historical survey suggests, that was plainly open to the Seminoles.\textsuperscript{62} Other contemporary reports similarly claimed that Osceola purposively spared “defenseless women and children.” The majority of frontier inhabitants did in fact manage to survive, albeit under great duress within crude stockades. If the Seminoles’ main intention was to generate panic and terrorize the settlers, as well as to deliver an overwhelming blow to the territorial economy, then they surely succeeded. While settlers were killed, wounded, or in some cases tortured, the absence of mass carnage is nonetheless startling given the Seminoles’ superior advantage during the war’s opening.\textsuperscript{63} As the editor of the \textit{Pensacola Gazette} astutely remarked, the lack of wholesale killing “could not have arisen for want of
Whether this strategic choice was Osceola’s alone, however, is most unlikely.

**CAPTURE AND DEATH**

During the fall of 1837, Secretary of War Joel Poinsett was under increased pressure to terminate the war. Tensions between Whigs and Democrats intensified as congressional debate centered on the war’s repeated battlefield failures, the mounting numbers of dead and wounded, snowballing costs, and the dubious legitimacy of the treaties. By this time General Thomas S. Jesup, US Army quartermaster and friend of Andrew Jackson, had assumed command of the war. Cognizant of the tarnished reputations of his predecessors in Florida, which included a military court of inquiry that brought two of the army’s most senior generals, Winfield Scott and Edmund P. Gaines, under public scrutiny, Jesup attempted a different strategy by advancing an ambitious peace initiative. This lengthy process resulted in a formal treaty of capitulation that involved several high-ranking chiefs, including the paramount leader, Micanopy. Despite widespread expectations, fighting resumed after Abayaca, head of the Miccosukee faction and a *hillis haya* (medicine man), seized control and in conjunction with Osceola hijacked Micanopy and the other chiefs in the process. Afterward, a much-exasperated Jesup resorted to radical measures. Believing the Seminoles were “perfidious” and incapable of upholding their word in any negotiation, he reasoned that he could suspend the normal rules of war. By disregarding the privileges accorded to a white flag of truce, Jesup sought what he considered, at least from a public relations standpoint, to be the most important prize of all—the capture of Osceola. On 21 October, the leader fell into Jesup’s trap at a location about eight miles south of St. Augustine. Surrounded by two hundred mounted US troops, Osceola and his band of men relinquished their arms and were subsequently paraded into the former Spanish provincial capital as spoils of war and imprisoned at the Castillo de San Marcos (aka Fort Marion).

Jesup’s public correspondence suggests that he believed that the Florida campaign would come to a close following Osceola’s imprisonment. “I consider the force of the [Seminole] nation broken by this capture,” he wrote shortly thereafter. “Though we may have a month or two of hard service, I think the war must terminate early this winter.” This senti-
ment was also reflected in the media, as some newspapers concluded that the army had finally “drawn the fangs from the reptile, so that he can no longer bite.”70 But in confidential communications to the War Department, Jesup was more realistic and never deemed Osceola’s imprisonment as decisive.71 Rather, he assumed that the seizure of such figures as Coacoochee, King Philip, John Horse (a black warrior), Alligator, Jumper, and Micanopy during this same period constituted “nearly all the War Spirits of the Nation,” and so Jesup had tangible expectations for ending the conflict.72 “The capture in this quarter must not only have weakened the enemy greatly,” he concluded, “but the loss of so many of their leaders must distract their councils.”73 Yet despite such a depletion of leadership, the remaining Native forces continued hostilities for another four years, primarily under the direction of Abayaca and supported by a newly escaped Coacoochee.74 In addition, Jesup, Poinsett, and the War Department as a whole failed to recognize the capricious nature of public opinion and misjudged the repercussions of such an ignoble capture. Whig Party organs quickly denounced the incident as an indelible stain upon the nation’s honor—the general was indeed forced to defend Osceola’s seizure for the remainder of his military career.75 “The deliberate violation of a flag of truce,” declared the Whig Atlas (Boston),

shows such a total disregard of obligations esteemed the most solemn,—such a total contempt for the best feelings of human nature, as marks the perpetrator of it to be a remorseless villain, dead to honor, and worthy of the contempt he courts. But this contempt, this disgrace, which showers so miserably upon the miserable Jesup, extends also, or ought to extend, without the least mitigation to that Secretary of War, who has approved the treacherous capture, by the retention of the prisoners, and to the President of the United States himself, who, by not disavowing their infamous behavior, makes himself responsible both for the General and the Secretary.76

Amid mounting indignation Osceola was transferred by steamboat to South Carolina, where he and other leaders were imprisoned at Fort Moultrie, located directly across from Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor. Large crowds gathered outside the garrison, waiting for a chance to glimpse the celebrity prisoner. “You have no idea of the curiosity raging here,” a young army officer wrote to his father. “Old & young & more
especially female throng the place from morning until night.”77 Several months previous to his seizure, Osceola had been ill from malaria, and his health deteriorated while he was in prison.78 Despite these circumstances, a weakened Osceola allowed himself to be taken to a window, where he politely nodded to the crowd. He even agreed to meet with Catlin and then consented to sit for his portrait—the artist’s written impressions of this encounter were then circulated in the press.79 “His face is certainly one of the most expressive I have ever seen,” Catlin noted. “Those who listen to his griefs as I have done, will see the sternness of a Roman, and in his agony a beautiful statue of Vengeance.” Like Simmons before him, Catlin decided that the “fallen Prince” was culpable in his own ruin. “He has a mind of a wonderful construction, calculated to fortify and yet destroy itself—a lurking cunning, capable of gilding with the warmth and glowing pleasantness of sunshine the whirling tempest that is raging in his soul, and even in his mirth and childishness destroying him.”80 By the end of January 1838 Osceola’s condition became critical, as he began to suffer from “violent quinsy,” a throat infection that threatened suffocation. An account of his medical condition written by Frederick Weedon, the army physician in charge, was widely published and assumed a clinical tone that was intended to reassure the reading public that the warrior was offered a high level of care. (In a macabre twist, Weedon later decapitated his patient’s head after death, ostensibly for phrenological study.)81 Osceola’s traditional healer, who was also in attendance, refused the white man’s medicine, and so physicians were obliged to leave the dying man alone.82

The war leader’s final hours were portrayed in several different guises on the national scene. Whigs often emphasized the pain and anguish of the fallen warrior. The New York Star reported, in excruciating detail, the agony of Osceola’s last moments: “the eye rolling in wild frenzy . . . the chest heaving in like the ocean billows; the throat laboring in the last death struggle of the deep gurgling rattle.”83 Minute details of pain and anguish took on an almost titillating aspect, a characteristic of a “culture of sensibility” that became a vital component of sensational journalism.84 In contrast, the National Banner and Nashville Whig stressed another facet of this sensibility: the sentimentalization of womanhood. Hence the final caresses of Osceola’s wife in prison were utilized to depict a rare moment of universal compassion: “The power of woman
mastered the keen remembrances of the Indian’s ills, and the voice of his faithful wife, as her arms supported his head and wiped from his brow the death damps, fell gratefully and soothingly upon the ebbing senses of the captive.” Poised amid great suffering, resigned to his fate, and attended to by a devoted wife, Osceola’s deathbed scene became linked to American domesticity. (Other reports correctly noted that Osceola actually had two wives, both of whom were present.) This melodrama also embodied the type of forbearance that was so prized within antebellum Christianity’s death-embracing ethos; it effectively brought the dying man into an emotional community wherein sins were forgiven and remembrance of heroic deeds could be passed on to later generations. Indeed, Osceola’s cultural apotheosis was actually bestowed in conjunction with his demise. Only after “his spirit had joined its brethren in the land of the shadows,” as a New York City paper phrased it, could a martyred Osceola (or rather white Americans’ conception of the man) be fully embraced and incorporated into the national consciousness. “Had we the power,” declared the New York Spectator (Whig), “we would send his name down to posterity in characters of light.” Such an encomium reflected a tendency of the party to merge the spheres of government and religion, but in this case such expressions also served a singular political utility. The capture and horrid death of this noble champion were laid squarely on the shoulders of the Democratic administration. Given the importance of Romanticism among the elite establishment and the culture at large (beginning in the previous century, for example, there was a profusion of poetry that exclusively dealt with the theme of the noble “dying Indian”), any appeal framed within this genre became quite formidable.

A few months after Osceola’s passing, Tammany Hall exhibited a newly completed portrait of the war leader (albeit one not painted by Catlin) that was mounted in a splendid gilt frame and open to public view. In effect, this portrait, as well as the celebrated likeness by Catlin, served as an exemplum virtutis: a hero whose noble conduct in battle was allowed broader emblematic significance within the culture at large. On another level, these portraits also functioned as a type of death mask, albeit rendered under a European American aesthetic, that underscored the eventual demise of the “noble” Indian. Catlin admitted that although he believed Indians were doomed to extinction, his portraits would still
enable them “to live again on the canvas;” albeit frozen in time and cut off from the future.\textsuperscript{92} Such memorialization was facilitated by Osceola’s exceptional “physiognomy and form,” which were judged, according to some observers, as attributable to his mixed ancestry; thus, he was inherently superior to “the mere Florida Indians” who were—correctly or not—thought to be “of a darker hue and coarser features, analogous to the African.”\textsuperscript{93} Since the high Romantic style was primarily a creation of urban environments that were far from the frontier, the prominence of these portraits in such cities as New York should come as no surprise.\textsuperscript{94}

The death of Osceola evolved into one of the top news stories of 1838. An outcome of this notoriety was the appearance of carefully crafted public imagery that was marketed for a variety of self-serving intentions.\textsuperscript{95} Proprietors of sailing vessels and steamboats of all descriptions along the eastern seaboard rechristened their ships \textit{Osceola} in an attempt to evoke power and resiliency in the face of nature. The name was awarded to racehorses and circus ponies alike. Various towns and counties that were looking to brand themselves with a certain cachet also took it as their own.\textsuperscript{96} Parents chose the name for both sons and daughters, and Osceola also served as a pseudonym among myriad editorialists. (Naming, it should be noted, implies entitlement, and name appropriation, as theorist Lorenzo Veracini observes, became “a powerful dispossessionary tool” among settler-colonial societies.)\textsuperscript{97} Among fashionable New Yorkers, the popularity of Catlin’s portrait inspired young men to model themselves after “the perfect beau ideal of an Indian prince” by growing long locks of hair that draped over their ears “à la Powell.”\textsuperscript{98} In keeping with popular sentiment and the Whig Party’s appeal among the cultured class, poets of varying skill penned effusive paens to the Seminole warrior, a phenomenon that increased Osceola’s symbolic value.\textsuperscript{99} But if “the eagle soul of the chief had pass’d,” as poet Alfred Billings Street declared, the memory of “the tomahawk’s lightning stroke” still persisted.\textsuperscript{100} No matter how grandiloquent the form, however, uneasy contradictions were also apparent. Whig Party operatives may have conceded that the Seminoles—indeed all Native people—had been “inhumanly persecuted,” but this truism did not preclude an insistence on the Native Other’s supposed intellectual inferiority or intrinsic barbarism. On more than one occasion, and despite the party’s self-image as social and humanitarian reformers, certain journalists noted the abso-
lute necessity of white dominion over Indians, albeit configured within a paternalistic guise.¹⁰¹

Supporters of President Van Buren deployed their own editorial repertoire and countered idealized portrayals, as well as the “hundred times told story” of Osceola’s capture, by accentuating a red devil caricature.¹⁰² “Let those who weep for the sufferings of the Seminoles—whose pens are exerted in behalf of their virtues—but examine into the treacherous character of these Indians,” exclaimed one editorialist.¹⁰³ Osceola’s death, however, proved to be a potent obstacle for Democratic operatives to overcome. “To die,” states religious scholar Ronald L. Grimes, “is not to become powerless, but to become powerful in a fixed mode.”¹⁰⁴ Images of death were thus conjured of defenseless young mothers, widows, and orphans falling under the blows of Seminole tomahawks, which reeked, it was invariably stated, of the blood of innocent children. Articles falsely claimed that the Indians were never awarded safe conduct under any flag of truce, and scorn was leveled at those who dared impugn Jesup’s honor or criticize the military, labeling any reproach as “anti-American.”¹⁰⁵ When a Whig politician in rural northeastern Ohio bestowed the name of Osceola upon his son, he drew fire from Democrats who sensed an opening for ridicule. The local Democratic paper was incredulous: “Will you vote for Mr. Bliss, who has named his first born son after the most inhuman butcher of men, women, and children that ever disgraced the figure of the human frame?”¹⁰⁶ Moreover, it was believed that only a hypermasculine demeanor, settler-colonialism’s sine qua non, could stand up to savagery. Literary homages to Osceola were deemed “sickly and old-maidish,” according to Thomas Hart Benton. The senator further asserted that the war leader was “effeminate” in both appearance and character, a type of personal attack that was not uncommon within the adversarial politics of the day.¹⁰⁷ Benton was indeed the most prominent proponent of a steady and “manly” course of action against the Seminoles and detested what he perceived as milk-soppishness and pseudophilanthropy.¹⁰⁸ His Senate speeches, first published in the Democratic Globe newspaper (Washington DC) and then distributed nationally, not only denounced the mawkishness of Whig organs but identified Osceola as the principal symbol in a false crusade on behalf of the “imaginary wrongs to Indians.”¹⁰⁹ It was simply the “perversity of party spirit”—as Benton saw it—that had turned Osceola into a hero-patriot, a claim that actually contained an element of truth.
CONCLUSION

Given the absence of written primary sources from Seminoles and the fact that the conflicting imagery connected with Osceola became so enmeshed with nineteenth-century sentiment, a true-to-life rendition may never be possible. Beyond his intelligent and purposeful command, athletic prowess, charismatic personality, and desire to limit enemy casualties, more can be said about what he was not than what was fundamentally known about the man. Significantly, the press honed in on Micanopy as Osceola’s diametric opposite, and the former thus became a convenient dramatic foil. Micanopy was quite often denigrated and termed “indolent” and “imbecilic” by the military; his supposedly “stupid countenance, full fat face, and short neck” placed the paramount chief, and by extension the majority of Native people, as grossly inferior. But then in a rare moment an army correspondent suddenly departed from this caricature and asserted that “Micanopy was not the fat old fool we thought him.” Indeed, far from being weak and debauched, the chief was now esteemed as “exercising regal powers” when he signed Jesup’s treaty of capitulation. His demeanor was “respectable... comporting with his rank,” and the chief further “evinced good judgment” during his public speaking. This remarkable transformation reinforced the army’s desire to add a level of legitimacy to the treaty. Such facile image manipulation was aided by the fact that Indigenous people were never allowed a firm identity within white culture. Indians, declared the eminent North American Review, may be “surveyed and observed,” but, much like phantoms, they could never be truly comprehended or “explained.” Frederick Douglass similarly asserted that, unlike blacks, who also suffered abuse but still embraced American civilization, “the Indian wraps himself in gloom, and proudly glories in isolation—he retreats before the onward march of civilization.” Once Natives had been relegated to such a peripheral status, journalists of either party were free to create their own contradictory impressions.

Given the ascendance of the mass media during the Florida war, highly stylized representations of Osceola not only functioned as self-serving illusions but were powerful icons in their own right—a type of mascot, if you will. Aside from being obvious appropriations of Indian-ness, mascots are in essence commodities to be rendered in whatever way the “owner” wishes; control can thus be fully asserted, albeit meta-
phorically, by the dominant colonial power. Indeed, Osceola’s demise resulted in the creation of what one scholar has called a “consumable, controlled Euroamerican image” that could be advanced for multiple purposes. Whether as hero or red devil, the war leader’s entree into the American mythos derived first and foremost from self-interest on the part of the settler-state. Seminole warriors may have dominated the battlefields of Florida during the war’s opening, but the country’s burgeoning media proved to be a formidable foe in its own right. By creating and then controlling the image of a wunderkind “demi-savage” who possessed a blend of white settler and Indigenous characteristics, journalists either emphasized the tragic (yet inescapable) consequences of white dominion or stressed monstrous attributes that justified calls for outright extermination. “So much for the mind’s sorcery,” James Simmons aptly remarked. “It is that that colors all our objects—giving to them their power to curse, or bless!” In the case of Indian removal, the end result of this convenient “sorcery” was the same; only the mode of operation and aesthetics differed. By enlisting the noble-but-doomed stereotype, Whigs indirectly supported Indian removal by casting Native extinction as inevitable. This entire process was similar to a theatrical melodrama whose primary aim was to buttress settler supremacy and, in the case of Whigs, to assuage any lingering guilt. Osceola may have been elevated into the realm of heroes among a portion of the populace, but Seminoles as a whole would never be allowed to enter this exclusive pantheon.

Osceola was buried with military honors just outside the entrance to Fort Moultrie. Since settler-colonialism’s effusive imagery still resonates today, some effort is required to depart from the “legitimizing illusion” that has dominated Osceola’s story for so long and to assess the interment objectively. The warrior’s decapitated remains, by any measure a deeply humiliating desecration, were left under armed guard by the very entity that had resorted to deception in order to imprison him. Placed just outside the looming fortress walls and later encompassed by a Victorian-style cast-iron fence, the gravesite can be interpreted as a veritable reservation in miniature. Army garrisons, especially those as substantial as this fort, are sites of immense symbolic power. In addition to extensive armaments, each fortification represented the broad reach of federal authority and elite eastern establishment culture. They also mark the degree to which the US government was invested in asserting
control and in displacing Indigenous autonomy. While ostensibly given a place of honor, the land where Osceola’s body was placed occupied the physical margins between the fortress and the environs of Charleston and in a state detached from the very Florida wilderness to which he wished to be ultimately returned. His remains were effectively placed in perpetual confinement. Military burial and the presence of uniformed guards, the custodians of power, symbolized the colonial norm: the radical transformation of a former Native space into a region of white cultural and geopolitical authority. (Indeed, it can be said that the entire nation was built on the graves of Native people.) Hence a potent framing was maintained even in Osceola’s burial tableau, a state of affairs that encapsulated the power relations intrinsic to settler-colonialism.118

The antebellum imagery that was linked to Osceola has certainly endured to the present day. The Whig framing that was crafted almost two centuries ago has long supplanted its savage counterpart to dominate the present. From the outset, media depictions of Osceola were chimeras devised to reinforce racial hierarchies and state power. His public image was entirely shaped by whatever white society felt compelled to project—while alive, he was powerless to interject his own voice into the fray. The contentious framing that dominated political discourse for most of the war proved startlingly successful as propaganda. Unfortunately, these cultural artifacts of the past will continue to obscure the country’s history of violence and moral failures toward Native Americans unless particular attention is paid to their illusory and misleading influence. A process of “decolonization” and renewed scrutiny becomes essential.

NOTES

1. “War in Florida,” Niles’ National Register, 4 November 1837.


3. Patricia Riles Wickman, Osceola’s Legacy (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 75. As a yahola Osceola manifested a special connection to the spirit realm; see J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Creeks and Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muscogulge People (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 249–50. For the importance of a yahola as a male deity, see John R. Swanton, Creek Religion and Medicine (1928; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 485.

5. Quote from “For Whom Will You Vote?,” *Lorain Standard* (Elyria OH), 6 October 1840.


9. Wickman, *Osceola’s Legacy*, 67–106. The author eschews “myth” in favor of verifiable facts regarding Osceola—an understandable priority for a biography. In doing so, however, Wickman fails to consider the wider implications of the myth-making process and ignores the role of the Whig Party in the development of Osceola’s tragic hero persona, as well as the Democratic focus on the vicious framework.


21. Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 47.


24. Wickman, Osceola’s Legacy, 68.


27. Quote in heading from Episcopal Recorder (Philadelphia), 13 February 1836. Unless otherwise stated, military details from the war will be drawn from Mahon, Second Seminole War.

28. The devastation of white settlements located in the East Florida interior—the land between the Suwannee and St. Johns Rivers—was a major aspect of the war but has nevertheless been omitted from most histories, which have instead centered on the destruction of the east coast sugar plantations. For clarification, see C. S. Monaco, “Alachua Settlers and the Second Seminole War,” Florida Historical Quarterly 91, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 1–32; Gary Ellis, C. S. Monaco, Ken Nash, J. A. Dean, and J. Principe, “Fort Defiance / Fort Micanopy and the Opening Battles of the Second Seminole War 1835–1836, Historic and Archeological Study,” American Battlefield Protection Program, National Park Service, Washington DC, 2010–11.

29. Quote from Florida Herald (St. Augustine), 12 May 1836.


32. Monaco, “Alachua Settlers,” 1–32. According to some reports, the Seminoles gave advance warning before the commencement of the war to certain settler families they had befriended and did not wish to harm; see “Seminole War: First Campaign. Extracts from the Journal of a Private,” *New Hampshire Gazette*, 9 May 1837.


34. Joel W. Jones, extract from a letter dated 24 February 1836 (St. Augustine FL), in Jones, “A Brief Narrative of Some of the Principal Events in the Life of Joel W. Jones,” 1849, manuscript, p. 144, Yonge Library.

35. Quote from John T. Sprague, journal entry, 27 April 1839, in “Macomb’s Mission to the Seminoles: John T. Sprague’s Journal, Kept during April and May 1839,” ed. Frank F. White, Jr., *Florida Historical Quarterly* 35 (October 1956): 160. For additional references to the sacred character of the peninsular interior, see Sprague, *The Origin, Progress and Conclusion of the Florida War* (New York: D. Appleton, 1848), 251, 273. See also William H. Simmons’s impressions in [Simmons], *Notices of East Florida* (1822; reprint, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1973), 46–47. This region, especially the area now known as Alachua County, was settled in the eighteenth century by Oconee Creeks. Micanopy—the paramount leader during the Second Seminole War—was the matrilineal descendant of the region’s earlier leaders. The sacredness of this land was undoubtedly related to the burial sites and to locations once used for the annual busk ceremony and sacred fires. For reference to the busk ceremony and dance grounds as representing “the spiritual core of Seminole life,” see Brent Richards Weisman, *Like Beads on a String: A Cultural History of the Seminole Indians in North Peninsular Florida* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989), 152. For a recent examination of the Seminoles’ reverence for burial land, see Cameron B. Strang, “Violence, Ethnicity, and Human Remains during the Second Seminole War,” *Journal of American History* 100, no. 4 (March 2014): 979, 982, 985. Seminoles also revered the ancient burial mounds of earlier Indigenous people (mounds are scattered throughout Alachua County). The most conservative faction of present-day Florida Seminoles maintains an all-inclusive view of the sacred, including “Sacred Burial Grounds, Sacred Sunlight, Sacred Waters, [and] Sacred Air”; see Peter B. Gallagher, “Bobby C. Billie Takes On National Park Service,” *Seminole Tribune*, 22 November 2011.

dent “Moliere,” *Morning Herald* (New York NY), 26 September 1837. “The officers themselves are disgusted with the service, and take no pride in conquering men for whose wrongs they sympathize, and against whom they feel no hatred.”

37. Eustis to Secretary of War, 7 January 1836, and Eustis to [Winfield] Scott, 10 April 1836, roll 0122, M567, RG 94, NARA.

38. James W. Simmons’s journalistic importance has previously been missed in the historiography. This article was first published in the *New York Evening Star* and then reprinted in various forms in other leading Whig papers and periodicals; see James W. Simmons, “Recollections of the Late Campaign in East Florida,” *Atkinson’s Casket, or Gems of Literature, Wit and Sentiment* 11 (November 1836): 542; “Recollections of the Late Campaign in East Florida,” *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington DC), 21 and 27 July 1836; *Richmond Whig* (Richmond VA), 27 July 1836; “Osceola,” *Cincinnati Mirror, and Western Gazette of Literature, Science, and the Arts*, 27 August 1836; “The Indian Chief—‘Osceola,’” *Alexandria Gazette* (Richmond VA), 15 July 1836.


43. Simmons, “Recollections,” *Atkinson’s Casket*.


46. Cohen, *Notices of Florida*, 235. Osceola’s mother was a Creek who also had partial white ancestry. Nonetheless, Osceola assumed membership in the Bird Clan by virtue of his mother’s affiliation and strongly self-identified as Indian; see Wickman, *Osceola’s Legacy*, 72, 143.


52. “Speech of Mr. Levy, of Florida, in the House of Representatives, June 12, 1842,” *Florida Herald and Southern Democrat* (St. Augustine), 1 August 1842.


55. This quote appeared in various papers, including “Important from Florida—Oceola Taken,” Morning Herald (New York NY), 1 November 1837; “St. Augustine,” Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), 2 November 1837; Daily Ohio Statesmen (Columbus), 3 November 1837; Daily Commercial Bulletin and Missouri Literary Messenger (St. Louis), 11 November 1837.


58. Vandervort, Indian Wars, 128.

59. Gary Ellis, “Battlefield Landscape Analysis—the Battles of Black Point, We-liko Pond, and Micanopy;” in Ellis et al., “Fort Defiance / Fort Micanopy,” 56–70. In this study, archaeologist Ellis provides the most detailed battlefield analysis of the Second Seminole War yet undertaken. This investigation includes kocoa (key terrain, observation / fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, and avenues of approach) maps, a standardized method of conducting a forensic review of military actions. It should also be noted that the Seminoles were keen observers of the US Army before hostilities commenced; see John Bemrose, Reminiscences of the Second Seminole War, ed. John K. Mahon (Tampa: University of Tampa Press, 2001), 25. For an ethnohistorical analysis of earlier forms of warfare among the Masköki, see Patricia Riles Wickman, The Tree That Bends: Discourse, Power, and the Survival of the Masköki People (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999), 95–102.

60. This last characteristic became fuel for scathing satire in such papers as James Gordon Bennett’s New York Herald; see especially “Florida War,” Herald (New York NY), 29 November 1837.


63. For a rare account of the torture of a militia soldier by Coacoochee’s band, see Ormond, “Reminiscences,” 17.

64. Pensacola Gazette, 23 April 1836; see also “From the South,” Herald (New York
ny), 17 May 1837; “The Indian War,” Fayetteville Observer (Fayetteville NC), 23 February 1837. For reference to saving the lives of military prisoners, see “Important from Florida,” New Hampshire Sentinel (Keene NH), 30 March 1837. A black man named Sampson, a member of Osceola’s band, claimed that Osceola directed warriors to spare the lives of settler women and children; see John K. Mahon, “Typescript Containing Information on Seminole Chiefs,” Mahon Papers, Yonge Library.


67. Jesup to [Captain] Galt (Garey’s Ferry), 16 August 1837, “Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General Main Series, 1822–1860,” roll 0145, M567, RG 94, NARA.

68. Edward J. Rielly, Legends of American Indian Resistance (Santa Barbara CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 104. The incident involving Osceola was certainly not the only time that the army ignored normal protocol associated with the white flag. This controversial practice continued sporadically during the rest of the war.


71. Jesup to R. Jones (St. Augustine), 2 October 1837, “Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General Main Series, 1822–1860,” roll 0145, M567, RG 94, NARA. In this letter Jesup stressed that Coacoochee was “unquestionably the best warrior and ablest Chief of the Nation.”

72. Jesup to Joel Poinsett (St. Augustine), 22 October 1837, “Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General Main Series, 1822–1860,” roll 0145, M567, RG 94, NARA.

73. Jesup to [Lt. Col.] Wm. Davenport (St. Augustine), 7 November 1837, “Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General Main Series, 1822–1860,” roll 0146, M567, RG 94, NARA.


75. Vandervort, Indian Wars, 131; Mahon, Second Seminole War, 217.


78. According to John Mahon, Osceola contracted malaria in 1836 while in the vicinity of Fort Drane; see Mahon, Second Seminole War, 218.

79. George Catlin, “Graphic Portrait of Osceola,” Newark Daily Advertiser, 2 Feb-
ruary 1838; “Portrait of Osceola,” Sentinel of Freedom (Newark NJ), 6 February 1838; “Osceola—the Victim of Jesup’s Treachery” (from the New York Star), National Aegis (Worcester MA), 14 February 1838; “Osceola” (from the New York Evening Star), Cincinnati Daily Gazette, 8 February 1838.

80. Catlin, “Graphic Portrait of Osceola.”


82. “Death of Osceola,” New York Commercial Advertiser, 10 February 1838. For contemporary reference to Weedon’s “pickling” of the head, see “3rd Artillery” [pseud.], New York Herald, 19 June 1842. For the outrage that erupted after plans for exhibiting the head in New York City came to light, see “Domestic News” (from the Sunday Morning News), Alexandria Gazette, 14 June 1838; “Shameful—if True,” Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 14 June 1838; “An Outrage” (from the Ohio Transcript), Daily Commercial Bulletin (St. Louis), 18 December 1838; “An Outrage,” Hudson River Chronicle (Sing-Sing NY), 19 June 1838.

83. “Death of Osceola, or Powell” (from the New York Star), Rhode Island Republican (Newport), 14 February 1838. The Star was owned and edited by Mordecai Noah, a former Jackson advocate turned conservative Whig. Noah was never on the party payroll, however, and described his paper as an “independent Whig Journal.” For more on the Star, see Jonathan D. Sarna, Jacksonian Jew: The Two Worlds of Mordecai Noah (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981), 98–100, 102.


85. “The Wife of Osceola” (from the Nashville Whig), Daily Commercial Bulletin (St. Louis), 24 May 1838. This story was also reprinted in the Alexandria Gazette (Alexandria VA), 1 July 1838—a quintessential Whig organ.


87. Morning Herald (New York NY), 23 February 1838.


91. “Portrait of Osceola,” *Evening Post* (New York NY), 30 May 1838. This portrait was by William Laning, a relatively unknown artist from Charleston. It should also be noted that William Cullen Bryant’s *Evening Post* aligned itself with the Democratic Party. For another example of the political use of the heroic Indian motif, see Scott C. Martin, “Interpreting ‘Metamora’: Nationalism, Theater, and Jacksonian Indian Policy,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 19, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 73–101.


93. “Death of Osceola” (from the *New York Star*), *Adams Sentinel* (Gettysburg PA), 26 February 1838.


99. Although the composition of the Whig Party was heterogeneous, certain generalities can be made as far as its appeal among the professional and learned classes; see Daniel Walker Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 13; Michael F. Holt, *The Rise and Fall of the Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 85–87.


102. Quote from the *New York Spectator*, 2 September 1840.

103. “G.” [pseud.], letter to the editor.


105. “G.” [pseud.], letter to the editor.

106. “For Whom Will You Vote?”


111. “From Florida” (from the *New York Gazette*), *Rhode Island Republican* (Newport), 22 April 1837.


113. Frederick Douglass, “The Future of the Negro People of the Slave States, Speech Delivered before the Emancipation League in Tremont Temple, Boston, Feb-
ruary 5, 1862,” in Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings, ed. Philip S. Foner (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), 485. Contemporary notions of the superior “industry and foresight” of black slaves vis-à-vis Indian masters was quite common; see Michael F. Doran, “Negro Slaves of the Five Civilized Tribes,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 68, no. 3 (September 1978): 335.


