Skip to main content
Article
Checklists and Worker Behaviour: A Field Experiment
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (2015)
  • C. Kirabo Jackson, Northwestern University
  • Henry Schneider, Cornell University
Abstract

We analyze data from a field experiment in which an auto-repair firm provided checklists to mechanics and monitored their use. Revenue was 20 percent higher during the experiment, and the effect is equivalent to that of a 1.6 percentage point (10 percent) commission increase. Checklists appear to boost productivity by serving both as a memory aid and a monitoring technology. Despite the large benefits to the firm, mechanics did not use checklists without the firm directly monitoring their use. We show that a moral hazard can explain why mechanics do not otherwise adopt checklists.

Keywords
  • Checklists,
  • Worker productivity,
  • Moral Hazard,
  • Monitoring
Disciplines
Publication Date
2015
Citation Information
C. Kirabo Jackson and Henry Schneider. "Checklists and Worker Behaviour: A Field Experiment" American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (2015)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/c_kirabo_jackson/25/