Fighting Corruption on the Transdnistrian Border: Lessons from Successful and Failed Anti-Corruption Programmes

Bryane Michael

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Fighting Corruption on the Transdnistrian Border: Lessons from Failed and Successful Anti-Corruption Programmes

Bryane Michael and Mariya Polner

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Abstract
In 2007, both Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities took firm steps to reduce corruption along the Transdnistrian border. This paper – aimed mainly at anti-corruption practitioners and scholars in public administration – discusses the background and underlying principles guiding the anti-corruption work being adopted by both governments in order to facilitate discussion about optimal anti-corruption programme design. This paper presents a set of tools used during the planning phase of the anti-corruption programme — outlining the methodology used to assess the extent of corruption on the Transdnistrian border, the problems of legislative transplants, a “contract test” for defining corruption offenses, a method of risk analysis, and a model of optimal anti-corruption programme organizational design.

THIS PAPER IS A DRAFT AND DOES NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES MENTIONED IN THIS PAPER.
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Introduction

Government services in both Ukraine and Moldova are widely perceived to be corrupt and inefficient. These perceptions appear, at first glance, broadly supported by data compiled by the World Bank. Figure 1 shows the results of a survey which measures the effectiveness of government to engage in public sector activities. The Figure shows that Ukrainian and Moldovan government services are, according to the survey data, more effective than most Former Soviet countries — but much less effective than their Eastern European counterparts in countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic. One implication of relatively low government effectiveness has been an inability to control corruption. Looking at control of corruption indicators shown in Figure 2, Ukraine and Moldova are roughly as capable (or slightly more capable) in fighting corruption than other former Soviet Union countries — but much less able to control of corruption than the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

This article attempts to provide an academic background on practitioner work in designing an anti-corruption programme at the Transdnistrian border – allowing the reader to “look under the hood” of an anti-corruption programme and see some of the

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1 The following article draws upon the authors’ experiences while working for the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Odessa, Ukraine in 2007 as an independent/external expert. All the data are drawn from public sources. The views in this paper remain my own and do not represent the views of the EUBAM or the Ukrainian and Moldovan governments. None of the material in this paper can be construed as representing a position on the diplomatic situation surrounding Transdnistria (as we have no view on this situation).

2 These data, like other data such as Transparency International’s cross-country index of corruption perceptions represent a computed summary measure from several perceptions surveys. While the World Bank estimates use more complicated statistical procedures, these numbers still only represent levels of corruption as perceived by survey respondents. See Kaufmann et al. (2006) for more on the methodology. See Galtung and Stamford (2003) for more on the strengths and weaknesses of various empirical methods of measuring corruption.
academic considerations in anti-corruption programme design. The first part of this article will provide an estimate of the scale of corruption along the Transdnisterian border – showing an economic methodology used to estimate corruption in two particular services – border guard and customs — in Ukraine and Moldova. The second part of the article presents the problems with current anti-corruption programme design (particularly those relying on legislative changes and Action Plans). To prepare for a greater role of administrative sanctions (instead of criminal sanctions) against corruption, the paper discusses the “contract test” for corruption. The third part of the article discusses a risk-management approach to fighting corruption – showing how authorities can fight corruption without increasing the regulatory burden which actually increases corruption. The fourth part of the article discusses the optimal “location” (within the public sector) of anti-corruption work in a public sector – namely the decision taken by government authorities and advisors where to base legal responsibility for fighting corruption. The final section concludes by raising questions for further research.

This paper discusses the fight against corruption focusing on two specific government services – the border guard service and customs service – in Ukraine and Moldova; in a very specific geographical region – the Transdnisterian region. At the time of this writing, the political situation surrounding the geographical area between the Dniestr River and the Ukrainian border remained uncertain (as will be briefly discussed in this article). For the purposes of this article, Transnistria shall refer to the region in along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border and not to the political entity occupying the Transdnisterian area.

Overview of the Transdnistrian Region

The Transdnistrian area is situated along a significant proportion of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. In 2006, more people and goods flowed from Ukraine to Moldova than vice-versa. In 2006, roughly 7.5 million people crossed the border from Ukraine into Moldova, while 5.8 million people crossed the border from Moldova into Ukraine. Figure 3 shows the level of trade between these two countries – and goods are either transported in trucks and cars across the Moldovan-Ukrainian border or by plane. Both countries also serve as important crossing through points for goods in transit on route to other countries. Trade with both Ukrainian and Moldovan businesses is highly regulated, creating incentives to pay bribes in order to circumvent trade restrictions as will be discussed later in this paper. As can be seen from Figure 4, the number of regulations required to engage in international trade is higher in these two countries than in OECD countries (though lower than in many Former Soviet countries).

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3 As a contribution to the anti-corruption literature, the material in this paper naturally does not represent all the considerations of the Transdnistrian programme or suggests that the advisors slavishly followed theory in designing the programme.

4 Due to the difficulty in estimating the volume or value of this trade, such traffic is not considered in this paper.
The red area in Figure 5 represents the area disputed between the Moldovan government and the authorities of the Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic based in Tiraspol (TMR). The existence of this semi-autonomous area has created a unique situation – from an anti-corruption point of view – because the region has often been referred to as a “black hole” for the trafficking of people, arms, narcotics and goods for resale (Socor, 2006). Reliable estimates put black market activity in the region at roughly $250 million (CISR, 2003). Reliable information also suggests that Transdnistrian companies are engaging in fraudulent re-export – importing products from outside Moldova and then falsifying documents of Moldovan origin in order to take advantage of lower tariff rates between Moldova and Ukraine. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the extent of administrative corruption in the Transdnistrian territory is extremely high, compared to corruption levels in either Ukraine or Moldova – in effect representing a pool of individuals and resources willing and able to corrupt officials on either side of the territory. In one view, the Transnistrian authorities have been facilitating the traffic of contraband in order to finance their military activities aimed at independence. However, this view has recently been contested by independent observers who note that previous estimates of black market activity have been exaggerated.

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5 Many transliterations of Transnistria are widely used, including Transnistria, Transdniestra and Pridnestovia (as this area is sometimes referred to as the Pridnestovian Moldovan Republic or PMR).
6 The CISR (2003) estimates that, given the economic sanctions being imposed on Transdnistria, up to 50% of officially reported GDP is involved in the black market. In 2005, according to the same source, GDP in the region was $500 million.
7 These schemes are both variegated and often complex. One example of such a scheme is the illegal transport of goods to duty-free zones in Moldova where these products are labeled as duty-free production and then re-exported to their original country of origin (often Ukraine)! The EUBAM website (www.eubam.org) provides this and other information.
8 For an unbiased and highly readable analysis of Transniestrian situation (and the possible responses by the EU and the EUBAM, see International Crisis Group (2006). See Almond (2006) for another critique of the media assertions of high rates of criminality and smuggling in the Transnistrian region.
Irregardless of Transdnistria’s diplomatic position, the existence of this semi-regulated territory wedged between Ukraine and Moldova has resulted in several distortions in the trade environment. First, a *cordon sanitaire* has been established in Moldova, along the Dniestr River, consisting of internal customs inspectors responsible for inspecting goods and people coming into other parts of Moldova from the Transdnistrian region. Second, in order to ensure that Transdnistria based companies are regulated according to international standards, third-party countries such as Ukraine insist that Transdnistrian companies exporting abroad must have a Moldovan certificate of registration – obtainable in Chisinau (the capital of Moldova). Third, and partially as a continuation of Soviet practice, both Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities engage in 100% inspection of goods and individuals crossing the border. Such intense inspection results in significant economic losses in time spent at the border, administrative delays and disincentives for engaging in international trade.

**Estimating the Level of Corruption**

Corruption, particularly the payment of bribes, occurs when a private individual interacts with a government official.\(^9\) Such interaction with government officials in the Transdnistrian region primarily occurs as border crossers interact with customs officers or border guards.\(^10\) Customs services in Moldova and Ukraine are responsible for collecting taxes on particular types of goods, as well as ensuring that importers and exporters follow import/export procedures. Customs officials are also responsible for ensuring that contraband (such as weapons, drugs, and generally prohibited goods and materials) does not enter the country. The border guard service checks passports (to ensure that the individual entering the country has the legal right to enter) as well as patrols border crossing points and the “wild” border (known as green borders on land and blue borders at sea) to ensure that individuals are not illegally entering the country. Any time an importer or an individual entering the country wishes to contravene national regulations, they can bribe customs and border guard officials.

From the reports and survey information available, corruption particularly affecting the Ukrainian/Moldovan border is *relatively modest by national standards (though excessive by European Union standards)*. While direct measurement of corruption is difficult, indirect measurements are often used to point out obvious problems with customs and border guard service delivery – as corruption is often either a symptom of poor service delivery, or concomitant with poor service delivery. Slow and unhelpful administration often results in corruption. As shown in Figure 6, roughly 35% of Moldovan respondents in a business survey reported by Carasciuc (2005) noted that they had to give a bribe *every time* they crossed the border (with roughly the same amount of respondents noting that they never needed to pay bribes). In exchange for those payments, as shown in Figure 6, the majority of border crossers received faster processing times, and one-third received a “better” classification of goods. More worryingly, in 14% of the cases, business representatives faced coercion – having “no other choice” but to pay bribes.

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\(^9\) The canonical definition of corruption involves the “use of public power by a government official for a private gain”. A defense of this definition is presented later in this paper.

\(^10\) In practice, several other government departments may be present at the border, including health and sanitary inspections and veterinary services.
Survey data covering trade-related corruption among Ukrainian business people are much more difficult to obtain. Figure 8 shows popular perceptions of corruption in a number of government services. As shown in the Figure, 64% of respondents think that corruption represents a “serious” problem (as stated in the survey) whereas almost 80% of respondents thought corruption in hospitals represented a serious problem.

Corruption has a negative impact on both public revenue and economic development. According to the Carasciuc (2005) study, in Moldova, the average size of a bribe paid to a customs official is $32 (staying the same amount in 2002 as 2006). Border guards asked for – on average — $17 (remaining also at the same level from 2002 to 2006). According to Government of Moldova data, 5.8 million people crossed the border from Moldova into Ukraine. Based on international evidence, at least 5% of border crossers may be required to pay bribes. Thus, if Moldova conforms to other countries, $4.9 million in bribes were paid to Moldovan border guard. Assuming that the

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11 Several USAID financed reports attempt to assess the level of corruption in Ukraine (Spector et al., 2005; Black and Blue, 2005). As the report authors are known experts in the anti-corruption field, the abstract, generalized and highly jargon-laid nature of these reports can probably be attributed to the funder (USAID). See SIGMA (2006) for a comprehensive governance assessment. SPAI (2002) provides an assessment of Moldova’s anti-corruption programme.

12 According to a survey taken in 2003 under the Partnership for a Transparent Society Program, 75% of respondents believed corruption to be very widespread in the Ukrainian central government, while 62% indicated they had actual personal encounters with corrupt officials over the previous five years. This corresponds roughly with perceptions surveys from other EU countries. For example, Rudzitis (2002) cites survey evidence showing that 73% of survey respondents thought the Lithuanian customs service was dishonest but only 5% having actually paid a bribe to the service. Kouzmina (2006) provides data from the Russian Federation showing that customs clearance delays are roughly on par with those of Ukraine and Moldova.

13 These data contrast resoundingly with data from most Central and Eastern European countries. For example, in recent data looking at corruption perceptions in Romania, the largest number of respondents (66%) thought that in the customs service, “all or almost all officials in the agency are corrupt” – as opposed to 55% for police and 54% for the health service.
bribe on the Ukrainian side is the same, and that 7.5 million people crossed from Ukraine into Moldova, then the total amount paid in bribes is **$6.4 million**.

Indirectly, the level of corruption can be estimated from the level of trade between Moldova and Ukraine as well as estimates from businesses about their “bribe tax” (or the proportion of the value of their trade and/or sales) which is collected in the form of bribes – 20% of firms estimate that 2% of the value of their trade is subject to a “bribery tax.”

Given a base of $480 million in exports from Ukraine to Moldova, **$1.9 million** in customs is paid in bribes in Moldova for Ukrainian-origin goods. According to the World Bank (2005c), 15% of firms note that they pay an average of 1.5% of the value of their merchandise on a “bribery tax.” As also shown in Figure 3, for a base of $100 million in trade between the two countries, the amount of customs bribes is a minimum of **$225,000** in Ukraine for Moldovan-origin goods.

These estimates, however, underestimate the extent of corruption along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, because they do not take into account unreported activities (from persons crossing the border to the value of goods not reported in the official statistics). In order to estimate corruption involving these unreported activities, corruption “risk” needs to be calculated as the probability of each unreported event occurring multiplied by the number of times it occurs.

Taking Carasciuc’s (2005) estimates of the average bribe level for customs and border guard officials, and other estimates related to the proportion of under-valuation of goods at least **$30 million** in trade taxes is not collected by Ukrainian officials for goods from Moldova in route to Ukraine. Similarly, roughly **$110 million** in trade taxes is not collected by Moldovan officials for goods from Ukraine heading to Moldovan markets. The value of this bribe tax is much larger for Moldova than for Ukraine (which is a much larger economy) because Moldova imports much more from Ukraine than vice-versa.

Some corruption is most likely tied to illegal activity. Figure 9 provides a brief rough estimate of the scale of corruption tied to black market activities related to the traffic in narcotics, weapons, and humans. According to publicly available sources, the total estimated amount of heroine flowing through Ukraine in destination to Western

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14 See World Bank (2005b) for estimates for the bribe tax in Ukraine.

15 The higher level of bribes for Moldova, which is a much poorer country than Ukraine, may seem unusual at first. However, the higher level is due to the much larger absolute level of imports into Moldova from Ukraine. As a check, the estimated levels of corruption affecting Moldova and Ukraine were compared with other corruption estimates related the level of overall corruption to GDP – see Carasciuc (2004) for Moldova and Gorodnichenko and Peter (2006) for Ukraine.

16 The calculation involves the most basic math. A probability ($p$) of an event, such as someone paying a border guard officer to allow an illegal crossing across a green border can be estimated, however rudely. The estimated amount of money involved in a corrupt transaction can be denoted as $X$, multiplied by the probability of the occurrence $p$ results in a risk of a single unreported event as $pX$. For the reader with a background in mathematics, the computation of the total yearly risk is equal to the probability of an occurrence of corruption at any particular site is $\Sigma i \Sigma j (pX_i)$ where $i$=number of sites and $j$=the number of time periods or trails.

17 For a similarly minded (though more technically complicated) calculation of the size of bribery in Ukraine, see Gorodnichenko and Peter (2006) who estimate the total value of bribery in Ukraine at between 460 and 580 million USD.

18 The relationship between corruption and contraband is complicated – with several officials noting that no direct evidence of corruption related to contraband can be found: [http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/05f3742a-1c2d-4e1a-a57f-0e9780549795.html](http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/05f3742a-1c2d-4e1a-a57f-0e9780549795.html)
European markets is 23.1 metric tonnes at a market price of $78 per gram results (with roughly 1 million grams per ton) in a market value transited through Ukraine of $1.8 billion.\(^{19}\) If the bribery tax previously referred to covers illegal transit of narcotics, then the value of these bribes equals **$18 million**. With regard to arms, Figure 9 cites studies estimating that, in the 1990s, roughly $5.3 billion in arms left the Ukraine. If the same bribery tax applies to guns, then the value involved in arms-trade related corruption equals to $106 million. If the actual current value is even 10% of the 1990s value, then the likely value is **$10.6 million**.\(^{20}\)

**Figure 9: Contraband and Estimated Corruption Value**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contraband item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Price per unit</th>
<th>Total estimated</th>
<th>Estimated bribes to facilitate trade</th>
<th>Information source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs (heroin)</td>
<td>23.1 metric tons (transit)</td>
<td>$78 per gram</td>
<td>$1.8 billion</td>
<td>$18 million</td>
<td>Layne (2001) for amount and UN (2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$5.3 billion</td>
<td>$10.6 million</td>
<td>Kuzio (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources where cited. Estimated bribe revenue derives from World Bank estimates of the “bribe tax” previously mentioned in the text. Data are unavailable for Moldova.

The economic logic underpinning these specific calculations is described in Figure 11. However, the economic impacts are much larger in a number of ways. First, the reader having taken a course in international economics will immediately recognize that the bribe serves as a trade tax – decreasing wages in Moldova and the return of capital in Ukraine (assuming Ukraine is the relatively capital-intensive trading partner). Second, the reader versed in Keynesian macroeconomics – and particularly the Keynesian multiplier — will immediately recognize that a bribe which equals 5% of the value of the goods in any small closed economy (such as Moldova) will decrease overall economic activity by 20% or more (in the case of Moldova).\(^{21}\) Third, a reader versed in public economics will recognize that a 5% bribe will result in 25% loss in welfare in a particular market.

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\(^{20}\) Sources about contraband in Moldova provide much less reliable results. According to the UNODC (2005), roughly 0.1% of the Moldovan population uses cocaine (as opposed to 0.8% of the Ukrainian population). Given a population base of 4.5 million people, the average estimated number of people, using cocaine equals 45,000 individuals.

\(^{21}\) The economic distortion caused by a bribe tax naturally depends on the level of other taxes in the economy. The estimate provided in the text signifies that as the effective overall tax rate on Moldovan enterprises increases from 20% to 25%, the long-run value of goods and services produced in the economy is expected to fall by 20%. Because this is not a treatise in introductory macroeconomics, we do not specify further how these results are calculated.
Figure 10: An Economic Calculation of Corruption along the Transdnistrian Border

Estimates involving the value of corruption in international trade are always difficult to obtain because parties to corruption have little incentive to disclose their activities to third parties. However, approximations can be made.22 For example, as previously noted, survey data (from World Bank (2003), can reasonably reliably estimate the value of traders’ goods paid in bribes. A “bribe tax” (denoted by $b$) may affect a value of normal consumer goods flowing across a border in any particular year ($X_t$).23 The payment of bribes is an obvious economic harm to traders (though from an economist’s point of view, bribes often represent a simple redistribution of national income). Bribes are often paid, following economic incentives, to provide traders with an economic advantage – such as lower taxes which result from under-valuation or mis-categorising of goods. If $X_t$ represents the true value of goods and $X_r$ represents the reported value of goods, then the State budget clearly loses the tax ($t$ expressed as a percentage) of the difference between the reported value and the true value.24

However, the real harm to corruption at the border occurs for two reasons. First, the value of production may be affected as traders divert a fraction of their overall production into other activities ($\delta$) – as businessmen substitute out of activities where bribes are sought into other economic activities. Offsetting this loss are the gains from faster trade and lower taxes which encourage producers to increase by a fraction their production ($c$). Second, corruption in legal goods (like potatoes) often encourages – or at least occurs in parallel with — trade in illegal goods (like contraband). If $\theta$ represents fraction of contraband goods which are traded in relation to normal consumer goods, then the total loss to budget (as these goods are not taxes) is $\theta X_t$.25

Combining these terms results in an overall estimate for the loss due to corruption at:

$$\text{Corruption Loss} = bX_t + t(X_t - X_r) + (\delta-c)(X^*-X_t) + \theta X_t$$

Of course, this estimate does not incorporate the social and other harms often referred to by academics and policymakers.

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22 Rose-Ackermann (1999) represents a useful vade-mecum for the economic rationale behind corruption.
21 These normal consumer goods are contrasted with contraband goods. The previously given formula — $\sum \sum (p_i X_{ij})$ where $i$=number of sites and $j$=the number of time periods or trails — can be used as a micro-economic check on this, fundamentally macroeconomic estimate.
24 The bribe tax, and the undervaluation estimate, assumes that the civil servant knows the true value of goods. Such an assumption is obvious because if the civil servant did not know the true value, he or she would have accepted the value claimed by the trader and no need for a bribe would arise.
25 Indeed, the social harm is higher and can be calculated roughly as the value of earning lost for lives taken by guns and drug addiction.
Problems of Anti-Corruption Legislation and Action Planning

In Central and Eastern Europe, a large amount of activity has focused on the adoption of a comprehensive anti-corruption law which criminalizes bribery and facilitates the elaboration of a national anti-corruption Action Plan. Both Ukraine and Moldova have anti-corruption laws which criminalize bribery and have adopted multi-year anti-corruption Action Plans. In Ukraine the Ministry of Interior has been charged to elaborate an Anti-Corruption Action Plan covering the entire executive, for implementation by 27th of February 2007. Moldova has adopted a multi-year National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (until 2008) which covers all the major services. In both Ukraine and Moldova, customs and border guard services have been tasked with elaborating department specific instructions aimed at implementing the anti-corruption law and the national anti-corruption Action Plan.

A large amount of donor assistance has been committed by foreign donors – particularly USAID and the OECD – aimed at improving the quality of anti-corruption legislation in both countries. Judging the quality of legislation is difficult – particularly in the area of anti-corruption where no set of practices has been shown definitely to be more effective than other practices. However, an obvious metric by which to assess the quality of legislation and/or implementing regulation must depend on its purely technical aspects. Following Michael (2004), one way of assessing the quality of anti-corruption legislation and regulations depends on its specificity and relevance. Specificity refers to the extent to which legislation refers to concrete practices instead of abstract principles and answers the four journalist questions (who is affected, what is involved, when are actions to be carried out, and how are these activities to be undertaken). Second, in both the practitioner and academic literature, a very wide array of factors have been linked to the level of corruption in an administration (from the motivation of staff to national culture). Yet, some factors relate more directly to fighting corruption – as opposed to other areas of activity such as civil service reform – and thus are classified by their relevance to the anti-corruption programme.

Figure 11 provides an assessment of the national anti-corruption Action Plans. As shown, the quality of the actual legislation seeking to prevent corruption is relatively immaterial because the plans aiming to implement the law are highly non-specific and irrelevant. In the case of Ukraine, its national plan is significantly more abstract than Moldova’s plan. However, the international advisors previously working with these

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26 Indeed, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine has elaborated an Action Plan with monitoring mechanisms, actions to prevent corruption focused on the finance of political activity and the approximation of legislation to EU standards (which in this case revolves around compliance with the OECD and CoE conventions).

27 For the reader unfamiliar with administrative procedure, national laws passed by the parliament – and in some countries by Presidential degree — often give general instructions. Departments are subsequently responsible to devising internal regulations aimed at implementing these broad legislative projects.

28 Unlike other expert reports, this report will try to avoid to the extent possible a discussion of regulations – preferring to focus on actual work practices for two reasons. First, as noted by a recent OECD evaluation, “while Ukraine has a rich array of legal instruments and broad strategic documents, efficient coordination, implementation and enforcement remain insufficient” (2). Second, specific regulatory deficiencies and recommendations for improvement are being made directly with the counterpart agencies.

29 A number of authors bemoan the lack of success in anti-corruption work. See Kaufmann (2006) for an empirical treatment of the anti-corruption industry’s progress.
countries are partly to blame. As also shown in Figure 11, the recommendations for reform offered by organizations such as the OECD and the Asian Development Bank in their Action Plans for the region are also relatively general.\textsuperscript{30}

**Figure 11: Assessing the Quality of Anti-Corruption Action Plans**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Specificity</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB-OECD</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD/Istanbul</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author. (one is the lowest score and five is the highest). See Michael (2004) for a detailed computation of these scores and a further discussion of the methodology.

An obvious – though wrong – implication of this discussion is that anti-corruption legislation and implementing regulations need to be strengthened. However, the adoption of anti-corruption conventions and work on national anti-corruption programmes do not correlate to more effective action against corruption. Stevens and Rousso (2003) – using econometric analysis – investigate whether the adoption of anti-corruption legislation affects the level of corruption in country (as proxied by individual’s perceptions of the level of corruption). They specifically define three variables aimed at measuring the legislative environment surrounding the fight against corruption. First, they measure the adoption of “omnibus” activities (the adoption of a national anti-corruption plan which involved NGOs and multiple branches of the executive), the development of a national anti-corruption Action Plan, and the creation of an anti-corruption agency. Second, they measure the ratification of legal frameworks, specifically a civil service law, a financial disclosure law for civil servants and/or politicians, a freedom of information law, a law on political party finance, and an anti money laundering law. Third, they measure membership to international conventions including the Stability Pact, the OECD Convention and the Council of Europe’s four conventions against corruption. Figure 12 shows some of the many variables in their analysis – pointing to the fact that legal adoption has a statistically significant correlation with reductions in perceived corruption — though the adoption of national Action Plans or work in international consultative committees does not.

\textsuperscript{30} Michael and Bowser (2005) cover the problems with the OECD’s work in the area as part of its Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies. Most advisors in the region have indicated that the OECD’s working methods, in the cover of the Network, have resulted in expensive and ineffective assessment. The work of the Network will certainly either be devolved to SIGMA (also in the OECD), to the EU or discontinued.
Such results are worrisome because the adoption of national anti-corruption laws, especially those which criminalize corruption offenses as recommended by conventions promulgated by the OECD and the Council of Europe are often used as a measure of the strength of anti-corruption legislation. These conventions call for the establishment of criminal rather than simply administrative or civil liability for corruption offenses by civil servants. Ostensibly, the more severe criminal remedies — proposed by model laws such as the OECD Convention — provide greater deterrence for engaging in corruption. While implementation of the criminal responsibility foreseen in the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention (and thus the *acquis communautaire*) is laudable, criminal responsibility for corruption may reduce the incentive to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption in Ukraine and Moldova for two reasons.31

However, the adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by Ukraine and Moldova poses problems.32 First, the Ukrainian and Moldovan Ministries of Justice can not be relied upon to successfully prosecute criminal cases of corruption given severe resource constraints and corruption endemic within their own services.33 Second, as superiors are legally and administrative responsible for the corrupt activities of their subordinates, they have been unwilling to strenuously investigate – in order to avoid prosecution themselves! Third, the level of proof required for a successful criminal conviction reduces greatly the range of cases which may be pursued. Administrative sanctions against corruption based on “balance of probabilities” standard for successful conviction can – in certain circumstances – provide greater deterrence against corruption than the ostensibly strong criminal standard which requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”34

In both Ukraine and Moldova, administrative sanctions should be strengthened against corruption – starting with work on teaching civil servants to recognize corruption

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31 EU Member States in adopting the *acquis communautaire*, ratify legislation aimed at fighting corruption. However, the *acquis* only requires EU Member States to ratify the OECD Convention on Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions and the Council of Europe Conventions (ETS 173 and ETS 174 which establish criminal and civil liability for corruption offenses).

32 While the adoption of the criminal sanctions embodied in the OECD Convention may negatively impact on Ukraine and Moldova’s ability to detect and prosecute corruption cases, the existence of the Convention itself will certainly help both governments fight corruption. Under the OECD, businessmen from OECD countries who bribe Ukrainian or Moldovan officials are committing a crime in their home countries.

33 The weaknesses in the judicial systems of both countries is covered in the literature previously cited.

34 In most EU countries, the accuser of a corruption offense has the burden of proof. In the UK, the burden of proof is reversed – namely the civil servant has the duty to show he or she did not participate in corruption. While the reversal of the burden of proof for allegations of administrative corruption are not appropriate to Ukraine and Moldova, the UK experience shows that reducing the required standard of proof may serve to deter corruption.
offenses. Figure 13 provides an administrative test which may help civil servants work on
the difference between corruption and gift-giving.

**Figure 13: The Definition of Corruption and the “Contract Test”**

The definition of corruption has been debated. While in the 1990s, the standard
definition of corruption was “the (mis)use of public power for private gain”, more recent
definitions – particularly promulgated by the international non-governmental organization
Transparency International — have encapsulated “the misuse of entrusted power” either in the
public or private sector. Such a definition has gained a large amount of credibility in policy
circles given Transparency International’s large PR activity and close relationship with a number
of international organizations and national governments.

Such a definition of corruption should be avoided for three reasons. First, such a wide
definition of corruption subsumes every possible form of deceit, deception, or conflict between
persons – thus providing no definition at all! Second, the nature of the principal-agent
relationship is completely different in the public as opposed to private sector. A civil servant is
delegated authority by the entire society, through a political process – making infractions crimes
against the *body politic*. A private individual enters into a formal or informal contract in a
company or NGO, whereas the agent serves one or more principals – making infractions torts
against private persons. Third, a definition of corruption should serve a specific legal function.
Adequate legal definitions exist for the misuse of entrusted power in the private sector – as
defined under fraud, theft, and other tort and/or criminal offenses. Until the mid-2000s, the field
of anti-corruption focused on matters relating to the use of public power for private gain; while
the field of corporate governance focused on issues relating to the misuse of entrusted resources
in a private setting.

If corruption is defined as the use of public power for private gain, the obvious question
is whether gift-giving does (or should) constitute a corruption offense. In developing countries,
gift-giving is an entrenched part of many types of interactions between civil servants and private
individuals. Such gift-giving can help augment low civil servant salaries and provide incentives
for more efficient service delivery (in a highly regulated civil service environment where civil
servants often have few high-powered incentives to work hard). In order to help civil servants
move away from a dogmatic definition of corruption, a simple test may help civil servants – and
the members of an Internal Security Department or Ombudsman institution – define the
difference between a gift and a bribe. The test consists of two parts:

1. Has an extra payment been made for the quantity, quality, speed, friendliness and
   informativeness of a service which the service user has an administratively defined right to?

2. Was the *ex-post* delivery of the public good or service made on the *ex-ante* expectation of an
   extra-payment?36

If the answer to both questions is affirmative, then the transaction involves corruption and if the
answer to both questions is negative, then the transaction involves a legitimate gift.

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35 See Amundsen (2000) for more on the definition and the various manifestations of corruption.
36 This test roughly, though in much more simplified form, corresponds to the British standard as defined in
the recent UK Fraud Act of 2006 (article 321 on corruption transactions with agents).
Absolute Integrity and Risk Management

The response to fighting corruption in many countries has been to increase the amount of anti-corruption regulations. These regulations increase the amount of reporting which civil servants do – creating an “audit culture” which serves to demonstrate probity instead of supply of public goods and services.37 Both Moldovan and Ukrainian border guard and customs services have adopted a wide range of measures to fight corruption including the dissemination of rules against taking bribes, psychometric testing of staff to test for psychological pre-dispositions toward corruption, bans on pocket money and the use of a personal mobile phone during working hours, and increased oversight of all staff by newly formed departments for Internal Security. With anti-corruption aid to both countries from the United States (of almost $50 million!), the amount of control will increase dramatically.

Yet, the pursuit of “absolute integrity” in Anechiarico and Jacobs’ (1996) words, may harm the public administrations of both countries more than it helps them. First, each regulation increasingly distorts the action of civil servants and creates incentives to contravene these regulations. Second, these regulations cost money to create and to enforce – resulting in an often repeated case where grants of equipment and regulations (“developed through consensus with key stakeholders in order to promote participation and build political will”) lie unused after the donor team returns to headquarters. Third, regulations of this kind of deincentivise staff – resulting in work effort losses which are greater than the harms from petty bribery. Simply put, an anti-corruption regulation should be put in place when:

| marginal loss from corruption | > | marginal creation of rents | + | marginal cost of enforcement | + | marginal reduced work effort. | 38 |

Instead of seeking to establish rigid rules, a system of guiding principles (such as the “contract test” previously referred to) and a system of random audit should be conducted for four reasons. First, controlling all goods goes against the basic tenants of economics (particularly those involving the gains from trade) as well as the principles enshrined in the European treaties. Second, a properly designed random audit will detect the same proportion of offenses as 100% inspection. Third, random audit frees up resources to be used for investigation. Indeed, an inverse relationship normally exists between inspection breadth and quality – namely the higher the percent of people or goods inspected, the lower is the quality of the inspection.39 Fourth, (as previously mentioned), regulations potentially result in the creation of rents – thus reductions in regulations often result in decreases in incentive to seek bribes.

37 See Michael (2004b) for a further description of the audit culture and its impacts on public sector service delivery.
38 Foreign aid to Moldova and Ukraine aimed at fighting corruption will significantly distort the incentives for right-regulating against corruption as both governments will be paid to implement a number of punitive measures against corruption which will make the programme benefit in the short-term higher than the cost imposed by efficiency reducing regulation.
39 For an easy to understand instruction sheet for implementing a risk analysis approach in customs, see World Bank (2005).
Such a stratified random sampling procedure divides people or goods into similar groups representing similar risk levels — for example all consignments from Russia may have a statistically significantly different level of risk of under-valuation than those from France. Usually initial random sampling is used to arrive at these estimates. Repeated sampling results in probabilities changing as the underlying risks change. Such a random audit balances the expected gains from searching one group of people or goods versus randomly inspecting another group – or strata. Figure 14 shows the logic of differential random sampling. As shown in the graph, the first inspections of group A will have a significant benefit as obvious cases of under-valuation or contraband are found. As more inspection occurs, these marginal costs decrease. A similar logic applies to the inspection of group B – thus both marginal benefit curves slope downward. Clearly inspections could occur on group A to the point where the expected return to search group B (defined as the probability of detection multiplied by the value of the contraband or legal infraction found).

In order to detect cases of corruption, service staff can also undergo stratified random sampling and audit. As shown in Figure 15, the border guard or customs service staff may randomly audit differing strata of border crossers. Similarly, the Internal Security department may randomly audit service staff – based on the expected probability that they might be involved in corruption offenses. Naturally, the risk of service staff being corrupt is tied in some way to the probability that the individuals they are controlling are involved in legal infractions. Thus, the two tiered system described in Figure 15 addressed both regulatory risk as well as corruption risk.

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40 Current data, based on 100% inspection is probably unreliable due to poor inspection quality concomitant with large-scale checking.
41 For more on this approach, see UN (2004).
42 While not discussed in this article, the careful reader will immediate observe that a hazard function for corruption for each civil servant can be roughly estimated by the sum of the expected risks of legal infraction multiplied by the rent (or $bX_t$ as discussed previously).
Such a risk management approach is increasingly common practice in the European Union. However, as government efficiency is higher in other countries, Ukraine and Moldovan Internal Security services need to play a developmental as well as supervisory function – by auditing for better performance as well as investigating for the possibility of corruption...as an Internal Security Department which seeks only to control corruption will have difficulties generating enough public value to continue.43 Such activities could include Ombudsman’s functions, the regular conduct of service delivery surveys and training.

The Optimal Location of Anti-Corruption Authority in an Executive Agency

Since the late 1990s, the international donors have financed work on the establishment of anti-corruption co-ordinating councils or agencies in a number of countries including Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Kenya and others. These Anti-Corruption Co-ordinating Councils (and in many cases anti-corruption agencies) were created because of the often complex nature of corruption cases. Figure 16 shows the process of a corruption case.

43 Because of the increasing adoption of New Public Management concepts in government, public audit is seen like private audit. In a private company, an audit department must frequently show that its activities result in a greater cost reduction or reduction in business risks than the audit ties up in staff and other costs. In the same way, an internal audit in a public sector organization should aim at creating more public value than it costs to conduct the audit.
Yet, the large variation we observe around the world in centering anti-corruption activity suggests that the optimal organizational structure for fighting corruption remains an open question. Figure 17 shows the various possible organizational forms for fighting corruption – and stylized facts do not point to the efficiency of one form over another.

**Figure 17: Various Anti-Corruption Organisational Arrangements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead Ministry</th>
<th>Work as Lead</th>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>In many countries, investigators are responsible for ensuring successful prosecutions of corruption</td>
<td>Strong competencies in enforcement, can ensure case management</td>
<td>Excessive law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Inspired by Italian experience, the courts and judges as main bulwark against corruption</td>
<td>Can change laws and prosecute cases as own-competence</td>
<td>Excessively legalistic perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Economy/Development</td>
<td>Responsible for overall framework and incentives</td>
<td>Ensures root economic incentives for corruption removed</td>
<td>No competencies in investigation or prosecution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Prez/VP</td>
<td>In corruption ridden administrations, president’s office takes AC as political promise and ensures clean government</td>
<td>Ensures co-ordination and senior level political will</td>
<td>Work is politicized and changes with each administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Army upholds the interests of the State even when the Government is weak</td>
<td>Strong power potentially independent of the government</td>
<td>History of human rights violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each service responsible for self</td>
<td>Each service, often with Internal Security department, ensures own integrity</td>
<td>Each service responsible for self, knows own problems best and can tackle at the lowest level</td>
<td>Significant duplication of resources and overlap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>These bodies centralize work on AC and look only at public servants</td>
<td>Ensures centralization of AC knowledge and competencies</td>
<td>Shifts responsibility to “someone else”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordinating structure</td>
<td>Consists of representatives of several agencies meeting together regularly</td>
<td>Balances specialization with integration</td>
<td>Everyone (thus noone) responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private company or NGO</td>
<td>Works as an “island of integrity” completely outside of a corrupt government</td>
<td>Can ensure integrity when whole public service corrupt</td>
<td>Authority delegated by government…no legitimacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, theory provides a guide for thinking about the optimal organization structure for anti-corruption work.\textsuperscript{44} Transaction cost economics argues that integration should occur between organizations – or organizational units – as the cost of writing, performing on and enforcing contracts between organizational units increases.\textsuperscript{45} Such an effect militates for organizational integration because marginal benefits increase (to a point) as the centralization of anti-corruption activity occurs – cases do not need to cross departments or ministries and information can be shared more easily. Such an effect is shown as an upward sloping line in Figure 18a and labeled as a transactions cost effect.\textsuperscript{46} On the other hand, several salient results from organizational theory point to the benefits from specialisation of labour and tasks. Authors such as Kogut and Zander (1992) representing this tradition argue that integration serves only to combine competencies – and the development of these competencies in themselves should be left to specialized organizational units. In this view, as anti-corruption work becomes more integrated, the specific learning from each ministry decreases and the marginal benefits of such integration decrease as integration occurs. As shown in Figure 17a, such a capabilities effect is traced as a downward sloping line. The degree of integration of anti-corruption work should be at the point at which the marginal benefits from integration equal the marginal benefits from decentralization results in the optimal organizational structure for anti-corruption work.

\textsuperscript{44} This section covers two very extensive literatures very quickly. The reader unfamiliar with these academic approaches should consult the relevant citations given in this paper for a further background.

\textsuperscript{45} Transaction cost economics originally concerned itself with the question of why firms integrated instead of using arms-length contracts (Williamson (1985). Later work – particularly Jenson and Meckling (1990) – using a similar logic, sought to derive the optimal number of departments in an organisational unit.

\textsuperscript{46} As Acemoglu (2003) notes, political transactions costs often represent a determinant transaction cost – particularly within a public sector context. Such political transactions costs – or the costs of obtaining settlements over differing views of public sector activity – are usually large relative to the cost of ‘contracting’ across organizational boundaries in the public sector.
Naturally the factors underlying these transaction costs and competencies effects may change over time – or vary from country to country. Changes to the marginal benefits of integrating anti-corruption work (as underlying factors change) result in changes in the optimal degree of centralisation of anti-corruption activity. Figure 17b shows the results when underlying conditions change/differ. For example, if transactions costs change (political factionalism increases or a data protection act is passed which hinders the sharing of data across departments), then anti-corruption work should become more centralized. If competencies effects change – such that each department becomes better at developing and using anti-corruption knowledge), then the optimal amount of anti-corruption activity integration decreases.

While Figures 17 and 17b are purely illustrative, they provide intuitions needed to solve the problem of organisational structure in Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine has relatively fractious and highly politicized services, prone to centralized corruption. Thus, concentration of anti-corruption activity in a corruption free ministry is preferred to creating an anti-corruption agency or centralizing work in the office of the President or Prime Minister. Given extreme weaknesses in all law enforcement bodies, co-ordination of relatively efficient anti-corruption work across services would not be likely. Moldova having primarily disarticulated corruption has a co-ordinating committee – probably the most efficient organizational structure given existing costs and benefits of fighting corruption.47 Given this model, over time the optimal anti-corruption structure will probably be a cross-border informal anti-corruption committee – covering border guard and customs services -- in which representatives from each service (as well as external donors and advisors) would meet. Ukraine and to a lesser extent Moldova already have

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47 As an aside, this model explains other countries. Turkey’s public sector is extremely politically fractured, possessing a range of political and institutional interests – explaining why Turkish anti-corruption work has remained decentralized. In Bolivia, the transactions costs are extremely high for co-operating between under-funded ministries and few competencies existed in each service. However, instead of centralizing anti-corruption authority in the office of the Vice President (as the World Bank recommended and funded in 1997), work should have been concentrated in an independent anti-corruption unit.
such a structure at the national level. In support of the national anti-corruption coordinating committee, a similar structure should be established for border guard and customs to review activity against corruption.

Conclusions and Unresolved Questions

In some ways the experience over the last 20 years in Central and Eastern Europe provided useful cases of what not to do in Ukraine and Moldova.\textsuperscript{48} The design of an anti-corruption programme on the Transdnistrian border can not rely on more Action Planning and the adoption of international conventions by Ukrainian and Moldovan governments. A new system of anti-corruption regulations at the departmental level are also contra-indicated. Instead, standard remedies from public sector reform offer the greatest remedy against administrative corruption on the Transdnistrian border. The implementation of a system of risk management and a coherent organisational form which is able to investigate and successfully prosecute corruption remains the bulwarks of effective anti-corruption. In Ukraine and Moldova, the border guard and customs services are relatively autonomous entities which can enact reform quickly.

Yet, the Transdnistrian issue poses a particularly new situation for anti-corruption programme design for two reasons. First, the literature lacks models of public administrations in which one or two services can achieve dramatic decreases in corruption when the entire public sector management environment is corruption-ridden. Thus, work on the Transnistrian border will provide a useful case study for further work looking at department-specific dynamics of corruption. Second, the literature lacks convincing models of corruption which spills over from foreign territories – as corruption appears to do from the Transdnistrian region into both Ukraine and Moldova. The “import” of corruption is a tragically under-researched topic in the anti-corruption literature.

Bibliography


\textsuperscript{48} See Anderson and Gray (2006) for an overview of the successes and failures of anti-corruption over the last 10 years.


Trade and Transport Facilitation in Southeast Europe Program (TTFSE). Available at: http://www.seerecon.org/ttfse/index.html


