Past attempts to create collective security, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, have failed. This article argues that this is because the anarchic structure of the international system does not permit a top-down approach to the problem. It is argued that the solution is to create a collective security model that is bottom-up rather than top-down. This article proposes a model of collective security that uses positive feedback generated by network effects to trigger the bottom- up emergence of a global collective security organization. Driven by fear and self-interest, weak states join this fledgling organization, increasing its value as a provider of security, which in turn draws in states of progressively greater military capability until a critical mass is achieved and it becomes rational for all states in the international system—even a hegemon—to join. Once the international system is consolidated, the possibility of rational aggression by any single state is eliminated. Employing a formal analysis, the article then examines whether the model could stabilize the present U.S. dominated unipolar system and a bipolar system dominated by the U.S. and China. The article concludes that system stability is possible in both cases, and that the model in fact grows more robust as the system becomes less unipolar. Thus, it is argued, China’s ascendency as a global power—and the friction this will likely produce— represents an opportunity to unify the international system and help lay the scaffolding for true global governance.