Article
Solving the Tragedy of the Commons
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law
(2016)
Abstract
According to neoclassical welfare economics, there are two solutions to the tragedy of the commons. The first is top-down regulation and the second is privatization of the resource. However, both falter on the international level. The fragmented structure of the international community precludes solving the tragedy of the commons using regulation as it is deployed in the domestic realm. The second solution—privatization—is a radical concept fraught with serious logistical, not to mention normative challenges. This article suggests a new way to approach the problem. The proposal is this: governments contribute an upfront deposit to an international regulatory body—the Commons Management Fund—with the understanding that their contribution will be forfeited if they fail to honor their treaty commitments. The idea is deceptively simple, however. The focus is in fact not the penalty but rather the opportunity for governments to credibly signal commitment. In game theory, credible signaling can prevent a tragedy of the commons from forming by generating confidence that everyone will stick to their commitments.
Keywords
- law,
- governance,
- treaties
Disciplines
- Law and
- Environmental Law
Publication Date
Winter 2016
Citation Information
Bryan H. Druzin. "Solving the Tragedy of the Commons" Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law (2016) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/bryan_druzin/33/