Contingent Judicial Deference: Theory and Application to Usury Laws(2018)
Legislation is less likely to be enforced when courts disagree with it. Building on this premise, we propose a model of Bayesian adjudicators that use their own prior knowledge to evaluate the appropriateness of legislation. The model yields a non-monotonic relation between written rules and effectively enforced rules. Hence the enactment of legislation prohibiting something raises the probability that courts will allow related things not expressly forbidden. Moreover, legal uncertainty is greater with legislation that commands little deference from courts than with legislation that commands none. We discuss examples of e§ects of legislated prohibitions (and, in particular, usury laws) that are consistent with the model.
- interest rate cap
Publication DateJanuary, 2018
Citation InformationGUIMARÃES, Bernardo; SALAMA, Bruno Meyerhof. Contingent Judicial Deference: Theory and Application to Usury Laws , 2017. Disponível em: https://works.bepress.com/bruno_meyerhof_salama/126/. Acesso em XX.XX.XXXX. __________ Guimarães, Bernardo; Salama, Bruno Meyerhof. Contingent Judicial Deference: Theory and Application to Usury Laws, 2017. Available at: https://works.bepress.com/bruno_meyerhof_salama/126/. [Accessed Day Mo. Year]