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Article
Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (2016)
  • Steve Miller, university of Minnesota
  • Bruno Nkuiya, University of Alberta
Abstract
A system can undergo rapid regime shift in which the growth of natural resources suddenly and
permanently declines. We examine how the threat of such a shift alters the strategic management
of a common pool renewable resource. We consider exogenous and endogenous threats and examine
their eects on both incentives to join a coalition and harvest decisions. We nd that an exogenous
threat of reduced resource growth may cause the coalition to grow in size, and, perhaps of most
interest, we identify conditions under which members of the stable coalition reduce harvest while
non-members increase harvest in response to the threat. In contrast, an exogenous threat of total
stock collapse may destabilize coalitions, resulting in higher harvest from former members, but
reduced harvest by non-members. When the threat of either type of shift is endogenous, the threat
of regime shift can induce stable coalitions with more than two members. In particular, we identify
cases in which the rst best (full cooperation) is sustained as an equilibrium outcome. Finally, we
nd that the relation between the magnitude of the shift and the size of stable coalitions may be
negative.
Publication Date
Summer June 3, 2016
DOI
doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2016.05.001
Citation Information
Steve Miller and Bruno Nkuiya. "Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Vol. 79 (2016) p. 189 - 207
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/bruno-nkuiya/5/