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Article
The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements
Dynamic Games and Applications (2012)
  • Bruno Nkuiya, University of Alberta
Abstract
This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. At the initial date, numerical simulations reveal that as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the incentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements.
Keywords
  • International environmental agreements; Global pollution; Stock pollution; Dynamic games
Publication Date
Fall September 7, 2012
DOI
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-012-0056-5
Citation Information
Bruno Nkuiya. "The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements" Dynamic Games and Applications Vol. 2 Iss. 4 (2012) p. 411 - 430
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/bruno-nkuiya/10/