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Presentism and the Objection from Being-Supervenience
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2007)
  • Brian Kierland
  • Bradley Monton, University of Colorado at Boulder

In this paper, we show that presentism—the view that the way things are is the way things presently are—is not undermined by the objection from being-supervenience. This objection claims, roughly, that presentism has trouble accounting for the truth-value of past-tense claims. Our demonstration amounts to the articulation and defence of a novel version of presentism. This is brute past presentism, according to which the truth-value of past-tense claims is determined by the past understood as a fundamental aspect of reality different from things and how things are.

Publication Date
September, 2007
Citation Information
Brian Kierland and Bradley Monton. "Presentism and the Objection from Being-Supervenience" Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 85 Iss. 3 (2007)
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