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Scepticism and the Development of the Transcendental Dialectic
British Journal for the History of Philosophy (2012)
  • Brian Chance, University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Kant's response to scepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian scepticism and locate Kant's response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects of this response. The first is that Kant's response to Pyrrhonian scepticism is also a response to Hume. The second is that aspects of this response are decidedly positive. In particular, I argue (1) that Kant believed Hume's scepticism manifested important elements of Pyrrhonian scepticism and (2) that both Pyrrhonian scepticism and Hume had a significant positive influence on the development of the Transcendental Dialectic. DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2012.664025

  • Kant,
  • Hume,
  • transcendental dialectic,
  • Pyrrhonian scepticism,
  • critique of metaphysics,
  • transcendental illusion
Publication Date
April, 2012
Citation Information
Brian Chance. "Scepticism and the Development of the Transcendental Dialectic" British Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 20 Iss. 2 (2012)
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