In recent work, Eric Watkins has argued on philosophical, textual, and historical grounds that the account of causation in the first Critique should not be read as an attempt to refute Hume’s account of causation. In this paper, I challenge the philosophical and textual arguments for Watkins’ claim. Specifically, I argue (1) that Kant’s philosophical commitments, even on Watkins’ reading, are not obvious obstacles to refuting Hume and (2) that textual evidence from the “Disciple of Pure Reason” suggests Kant conceived of his account of causation as such a refutation. For those sympathetic to Watkins’ reading of the Analogies of Experience, the upshot is that this reading is more consistent with traditional readings of Kant’s relationship to Hume than Watkins believes.
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/brian_chance/2/