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Article
Sensibilism, Psychologism, and Kant’s Debt to Hume
Kantian Review (2011)
  • Brian Chance, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Abstract

Hume's account of causation is often regarded a challenge Kant must overcome if the Critical philosophy is to be successful. But from Kant's time to the present, Hume's denial of our ability to cognize supersensible objects, a denial that relies heavily on his account of causation, has also been regarded as a forerunner to Kant's critique of metaphysics. After identifying reasons for rejecting Wayne Waxman's recent account of Kant's debt to Hume, I present my own, more modest account of this debt, an account that seeks to unite the two very different pictures of Kant's relationship to Hume sketched above. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1369415411000185

Disciplines
Publication Date
September 28, 2011
Citation Information
Brian Chance. "Sensibilism, Psychologism, and Kant’s Debt to Hume" Kantian Review Vol. 16 Iss. 3 (2011)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/brian_chance/1/