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Not “Politics as Usual”: A Hypothesis for Why Doctrine Matters in Judicial Decisionmaking

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Not “Politics as Usual”: A Hypothesis for Why Doctrine Matters in Judicial Decisionmaking
By Brett Waldron

I. Introduction

Explaining how judges decide hard cases, esteemed scholar and jurist Richard Posner has forthrightly stated that the Supreme Court “is in fact a political court.” Over time, a vast scholarly literature has emerged suggesting that judicial application of legal doctrine is informed to a great extent by political preferences. At first blush, this seems to be an appealing line of argument for it gives due consideration to Holmes’s notion that judges have an affirmative duty to grapple with the political consequences of their decisions (at least in common law adjudication). Given the institutional justifications for the Court’s existence, however, we must be extremely careful to avoid the conclusion that law is politics. Taking Alexander Hamilton seriously in The Federalist No. 78, the judicial branch garners institutional legitimacy, in part, precisely because of its non-political nature. Indeed, Hamilton writes that the “independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals.” As a means of ensuring that this independence is put to meritorious ends, Hamilton envisions a

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1 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 41 (2008). I recognize that Posner uses the term “political” in a very precise sense. In that regard, I use his statement only as an instructive tool. Moreover, Posner himself would not subscribe to the view that doctrine never matters. However, Posner does seem to think that the Supreme Court, especially when deciding constitutional cases, “is largely a political court.” Id. at 8.

2 Although I go into some detail about the literature in Part II, I give a brief flavor of it here. For a work of political science that serves as a common citation by articles in this field, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUdINAL MODEL (1993) (asserting that the justices’ political ideologies play an instrument role in deciding cases). Numerous articles in the legal academy further suggest that politics is intertwined with judicial decisionmaking. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) (arguing that partisanship influences when a court will defer to an agency); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (arguing that ideology “significantly influences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit,” especially when a judge’s vote is examined in light of the political composition of the panel).

3 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897) (writing that judges have “failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage”).

4 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

5 Id. at 392 (Kessinger Publishing, 2004) (emphasis is mine).
judiciary bound by legal rules and precedent. In the vein of Hamilton’s political theory, another body of legal scholarship has developed to emphasize the role that legal doctrine plays in judicial decisionmaking and to dispel any claim that Posner’s observation exhaustively captures what judges do.

The overall thrust of this note resides with the Hamiltonians. The contribution of this note lies in its ability to provide a new way for thinking about why doctrine might matter in judicial decisionmaking and thus fashion another analytical weapon, albeit a modest one, to combat wholesale allegiance to Posner’s claim. More specifically, this note creates a hypothesis that aims to explain why the formality of judicial scrutiny matters in light of judicial consideration of non-legal sources. In brief, the hypothesis suggests that a formalized standard of review that uses technical vocabulary, as tiered scrutiny does, constrains judges in importing social science sources into their legal analysis at the outset. This constraint occurs because the formalized standard of review’s “code words,” words such as “compelling purpose” and “narrowly tailored,” can only be defined by more legal doctrine which, in turn, generates additional legal rhetoric that the social science literature must acknowledge if it is to enter the opinion.

In order to put the hypothesis to work and show how it can be applied to a particular area

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6 See id. at 394.
7 To parallel footnote 2, some representative works of this scholarship are presented at this stage. For a theoretical analysis of how legal doctrine guides judicial decisionmaking, see Frederick Schauer, Does Doctrine Matter?, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 655 (1984). For empirical counterparts, see Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 Am. Pol. Sci Rev. 369, 371 (2008) (finding that legal principles influence the decisions of Supreme Court justices); Ward Farnsworth, The Role of Law in Close Cases: Some Evidence From the Federal Courts of Appeals, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1083, 1095 (2006) (claiming that in routine cases, the expression of policy preferences may be precluded by the relevant text or precedent).
9 I borrow this word from Siegel. See Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2339, 2344 (2006) (maintaining that judges use these “code words” to sort out the easy cases from the hard ones).
of jurisprudence, I focus on two distinct forms of equal protection scrutiny. The first and most familiar form, deemed tiered scrutiny, employs different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on the precise governmental classification at hand.\textsuperscript{10} The second and probably less familiar form, revolving around Professor Andrew Siegel’s interpretation of Justice Stevens’s approach to the Equal Protection Clause, asks judges to grapple with the words of the Constitution directly and without the use of mediating doctrine.\textsuperscript{11} As Professor Ryan has noted, “social science evidence can influence the outcome of a court decision if the \textit{relevant legal standards} allow some consideration of such evidence.”\textsuperscript{12} The object of the hypothesis in this note, then, is to provide a method for understanding how this dynamic takes hold given these two forms of equal protection scrutiny.

To explore this dynamic in more detail, this note undertakes a case study of racial classifications in lower education by comparing how the articulation of scrutiny, or lack thereof, affected judicial consideration of social science data in the Supreme Court cases of \textit{Brown v. Board of Education}\textsuperscript{13} and \textit{Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1}.\textsuperscript{14} This study comes in two parts. First, as a baseline for comparison, I argue that the articulation of scrutiny significantly changed as we move from \textit{Brown} to \textit{Parents Involved}. That is, while \textit{Brown} can plausibly be read as involving “the unmediated application of judicial judgment to the constitutional text,”\textsuperscript{15} Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion and Justice

\textsuperscript{11} Siegel, \textit{supra} note 9, at 2340.
\textsuperscript{12} James E. Ryan, \textit{The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases}, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1659, 1678 (2003) (emphasis is mine).
Thomas’s concurrence in *Parents Involved* applied traditional strict scrutiny analysis.\(^\text{16}\) Second, I contend that the difference in the doctrinal formality of scrutiny played a role in influencing the choice of social science sources that the justices used to address the harms of racial segregation.\(^\text{17}\) On the one hand, *Brown’s* reluctance to articulate any formally cognizable standard of review\(^\text{18}\) allowed the Court to consult various sources depicting the harms of segregation without filtering those sources through any additional doctrine above and beyond the standard of review. On the other hand, the articulation of strict scrutiny in Roberts and Thomas’s opinions in *Parents Involved* prompted these two Justices to define the racial harm that the school districts could remedy in terms of de jure and de facto segregation.\(^\text{19}\) Since the social science literature itself does not make this distinction,\(^\text{20}\) the two Justices’ adoption of the de jure/de facto construct served to filter the types of social science sources that they found relevant to their opinions. As we will further see, Justice Breyer’s dissent in *Parents Involved* provides a wrinkle to this analysis.

The blueprint of the note is as follows. In Part II, I lay the foundations for the hypothesis. I first provide broader context to the law/politics debate in judicial decisionmaking by exploring the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of each side. I then provide an overview of the

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\(^{19}\) See Frankenberg & Garces, *supra* note 17, at 710 (stating that this threshold question determined how the justices approached the social science data); see also Ansley T. Erickson, The Rhetoric of Choice: Segregation, Desegregation, and Charter Schools, DISSENT, Fall 2011, at 41, 42 (arguing that both the plurality opinion and Justice Thomas’s concurrence used the de jure/de facto distinction to define what harms could be remedied).

\(^{20}\) See Frankenberg & Garces, *supra* note 17, at 712.
doctrine that the hypothesis will work with to enter that debate, which comes in the form of equal protection scrutiny and the Brown and Parents Involved decisions. In Part III, I describe the hypothesis in detail and begin to substantiate it with an in-depth case study. The case study observes the interplay in Brown and Parents Involved between the types of social science sources consulted and the type of scrutiny applied. Should this note prove to be convincing in any way, Part IV concludes with a respectful challenge to scholars to corroborate my note on a larger scale.

II. Laying the Foundations For the Hypothesis: Why it Matters and the Doctrine It Will Work With

A. Why it Matters: The Law/Politics Divide in Understanding How Judges Decide Cases

The hypothesis is embedded in a broader project to understand precisely how judges decide cases. As briefly stated in the introduction, the structure of judicial decisionmaking has been embroiled in a debate over whether politics or legal doctrine largely controls how judges behave. Furthering this debate in an intelligent manner holds fundamental importance for both the general public and academics in two ways. First, this debate serves as a practical tool for structuring how we talk about the judicial branch.21 In a recent article examining public perceptions of judicial decisionmaking, James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira assert that, “[t]he American people know that the justices of the Supreme Court exercise discretion in making their decisions.”22 Thus, gaining a better understanding of what processes constitute this “discretion” will help us speak more accurately about what judges actually do. Second, there appears to be a subtle disconnect between the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court in theory and the

21 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 180 (1986) (describing the concepts of “legal formalism” and “legal realism” as playing a prominent role in legal thought).
22 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 213 (2011).
legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the public. In the realm of theory, a principal justification for the existence of the judicial branch is that judges are to be disciplined by legal principles in adjudicating cases. Yet, Gibson and Caldeira have found that the American people both believe that judges are influenced by ideology and base the legitimacy of the Court on the justices’ ability to apply that ideology in a principled manner. It would seem, then, that attempting to align the theoretical justifications for the Court with its current popular perception is a laudable goal. If this is correct, gaining a firmer grasp on the debate between law and politics in judicial decisionmaking might allow for that alignment to occur.

i. Political Explanations for Judicial Decisionmaking

A logical starting point for structuring an argument that contends that the political leanings of judges influence judicial decisionmaking might begin with an appreciation of the school of thought known as legal realism. In general, the realists were primarily concerned with understanding how judges actually reasoned through cases. That is, if, as Holmes said, law is “the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,” the realists aimed to uncover the types of sources and reasoning that lawyers should consider if they want to take part in this prophetic exercise. A mainstay of legal realism was its proclamation that sources and reasoning relying solely upon legal doctrine have limited value in explaining how courts operate. This is so, the realists maintained, because legal doctrine, such as interpreting common law precedents and

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23 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25 (1997) (writing that, “[t]he rule of law is about form … Long live formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and not of men”) (emphasis in original); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (contending that the main component of judicial decisionmaking is a “genuinely principled” analysis).

24 See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 22, at 214.


26 Holmes, supra note 3, at 460-61.

27 See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 25, at 164.
employing tools of statutory construction, embodies self-contradiction. Taking up this contention, Karl Llewellyn famously proposed that there are opposing canons of statutory construction applicable for every point of argumentation. Consequently, the realists argued that there are various factors other than legal rules at play in determining the outcome of cases. For example, a majority of realists recognized the particular personality of the judge as a significant motivating force in crafting judicial opinions.

Exploiting the realist position, some scholars have emphasized that legal doctrine services, rather than constrains, the justices’ political persuasions. A prominent work in this regard is that of Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, which asserts that the outcomes of Supreme Court cases are heavily influenced by the justices’ political attitudes. Attacking the view that precedent constrains the justices’ political preferences, Segal and Spaeth claim that precedent serves to merely rationalize a preordained outcome. Mirroring Segal and Spaeth’s discussion of stare decisis, Julie Margetta Morgan and Diana Pullin attest that the use of social science data in legal analysis has been thought to justify a judicial determination only after the fact.

In addition, other scholars have taken a more empirical approach in establishing that judicial decisionmaking is substantially influenced by ideology, psychology, and politics. To illustrate, Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller conclude that a court’s willingness to defer to agency

28 See id. at 165.
30 See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 474 (1988) (stating that, for the realists, law is based on considerations outside formal logic, such as human experience and policy).
31 See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 25, at 165.
32 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 255.
33 See id. at 66.
policy is guided by the alignment of that policy with the political outlook of the court. Cross and Tiller suggest that the political component of agency deference has caused minority judges to point out the majority’s abdication of legal doctrine to higher courts. Other studies by law professors further support the idea that politics greatly determines legal outcomes.

Giving due consideration to this field of scholarship, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that politics plays but one role in judicial decisionmaking. At this point, it may be a foregone conclusion. What proves to be disturbing to readers wishing to see the judicial branch approximate something like Alexander Hamilton’s outlook, however, is the suggestion that politics plays an exhaustive and absolute role in determining how judges decide cases. Fortunately for these readers (and myself), a distinct body of scholarly literature exists to ensure that this suggestion does not morph into an incontrovertible given. It is to this literature that we now turn.

ii. Legal Explanations for Judicial Decisionmaking

On February 14, 1989, Justice Scalia gave the Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture at Harvard University. In that speech-turned-essay, Scalia argues, “[t]hat the Rule of law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question allows.” If that is Scalia’s ultimate thesis, he arrives at it through two crucial statements. First, he writes, “that we should recognize that, at the point where an appellate judge says that the remaining issue must be decided on the

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35 See Cross & Tiller, supra note 2, at 2169.
36 See id. at 2173.
38 This is not a straw-man argument. Consider the backdrop against which these scholars are writing. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 1 (prefacing his argument with the proposition that, “[i]f changing judges changes law, it is not even clear what law is”); Schauer, supra note 7, at 656 (responding to the thesis that, “doctrine does not matter and that a change in personnel on the Court will produce decisions unfettered by the developed principles of previous courts”).
40 Id. at 1187 (emphasis in original).
basis of the totality of the circumstances . . . he begins to resemble a finder of fact more than a
determiner of law.” 41 Almost immediately after this sentence, Scalia states that if judges employ
“totality of the circumstances” tests when they are not absolutely necessary, “predictability is
destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage is impaired.” 42 In order to
resurrect this “judicial courage,” scholars have discerned two constraining roles for legal
document in determining cases.

The first constraining role for doctrine is theoretical. In simple terms, doctrine is the
language of judicial reasoning and supplies a vocabulary for judges to converse with judges in
the same jurisdiction who are no longer alive and who have yet to be born. 43 In other words, if
judges are constrained “by the necessity of justifying their decisions in written opinions,” 44
document serves as the primary ground where judges look to understand the form of reasoning that
they must employ in the opinion. Indeed, Professor Charles Fried explicitly folds doctrine into
the judicial reasoning process because doctrine allows judges’ holdings to transcend the
particular case at hand and structure future behavior. 45

The second constraining role for doctrine is institutional. Whereas the theoretical role
focuses on the judicial decision-process itself, the institutional role locates that decision-process
within a larger institutional context that provides external constraints on judicial
decisionmaking. 46 More specifically, legal doctrine can be said to limit the choices that justices
make because institutional norms may foster a duty or obligation on the part of justices to ground

41 Id. at 1182.
42 Id.
43 See Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1140, 1157 (1994) (asserting that doctrine assures
that judges will be mindful of how courts have ruled in the past).
44 Schauer, supra note 7, at 663.
45 See Fried, supra note 43, at 1148.
their decisions in law. Perhaps the clearest example of a rules-based institutional constraint comes in the form of precedent, or *stare decisis*, which is the notion that previous rulings should guide current decisions. While a complete discussion of precedent lies beyond the scope of this note, a short discussion of three scholarly works offers some empirical evidence for the constraining influence of precedent on judicial discretion.

First, in analyzing the continuity between the Warren and Burger Courts, Professor Vincent Blasi and other scholars conclude that adherence to precedent helps explain why the Burger Court, arguably at ideological odds with the Warren Court, perpetuated, rather than dismantled, the doctrinal underpinnings of the Warren Court. With a hint of irony, scholar Anthony Lewis notes that the conservative nature of the Burger Court prompted it to abide by the judicial precedent set by the Warren Court, even though the policy preferences of the Warren Court were not in direct harmony with those of the Burger Court. Second, in response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement’s contention that rules are used to legitimate judicial preferences only after the fact, Judge Alvin Rubin (then Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit) concludes that, “legal doctrine is a real force, judges follow it, and they decide all but a small fraction of the cases that come before them in accordance with what they perceive to be the controlling legal rules.”

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47 See Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, *Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court*, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 370 (2008) (asserting that these norms may arise from law schools and the broader legal community); Schauer, *supra* note 7, at 664 (stating that, given the internalization of the constraining force of doctrine in society and law school, it should come as no surprise that Supreme Court Justices are constrained by rules.).
50 See Lewis, *supra* note 49, at viii.
to precedent that allows for some sort of continuity in rulings across the panels.\footnote{See id. at 310-11 (1987).} Finally, Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman rely on a sample set of 842 Supreme Court cases from the period of 1977 until 2003 to show that precedent played (and still plays) an influential force in the decisionmaking of thirteen Supreme Court Justices.\footnote{See Bailey & Maltzman, supra note 47, at 374-77.}

B. The Doctrine That The Hypothesis Will Work With: Equal Protection Scrutiny and the \textit{Brown/Parents Involved} Opinions

A possibility of utilizing a particular area of jurisprudence to situate the hypothesis within the aforementioned debate emerges through a case study of the \textit{Brown} and \textit{Parents Involved} opinions. While the research design of that case study is mapped out in the following section, the benefits of choosing this case study in the first place are obvious. In general, constitutional cases at the Supreme Court level allow us to most readily explore the interplay between judicial discretion and the purported constrains of legal doctrine.\footnote{See POSNER, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that while the constitutional context invites judges to be “legalists,” it also is an area “where the decisional guidance provided by the orthodox legal materials is weakest”).} This is the reason that this note focuses on equal protection scrutiny. In particular, Professor Scott Brewer has labeled \textit{Brown}, “a remarkable culmination of the legal realist project of taming abstract legal propositions with the whip of social science.”\footnote{Scott Brewer, \textit{Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process}, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1553 (1998).} Regardless of whether Brewer is correct, his characterization of \textit{Brown} in those terms invites the use of opinions that employ social science to investigate broader theoretical and doctrinal trends. This is the reason that this note focuses on \textit{Brown} and \textit{Parents Involved}.

i. Equal Protection Scrutiny: The Contemporary Debate Over Tiered Scrutiny and Justice Stevens’s Unmediated Approach

On its face, the traditional approach to equal protection scrutiny is relatively easy to
Having roots in the infamous footnote four of *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*, equal protection scrutiny purports to embrace a tiered form that governs when specific types of legislation are to be declared presumptively invalid. On the one hand, courts employ rational basis review when a piece of legislation does not burden a fundamental right or rely on a suspect classification. Granting Congress a presumption of legality, courts will uphold legislation if it has some rational relation to a legitimate governmental end. On the other hand, when a piece of legislation burdens a fundamental right or relies on a suspect classification, such as race or national origin, courts presume that Congressional judgments cannot pass constitutional muster. Invoking a test of strict scrutiny, legislation can overcome this presumption of illegality if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental purpose. Resting in between these two extremes lies a form of equal protection scrutiny deemed intermediate scrutiny. When Congress utilizes a quasi-suspect classification, such as gender, in legislative enactments, courts uphold such enactments if they are substantially related to the accomplishment of an important governmental purpose.

What proves to be extremely more difficult to understand, however, is the precise operation of tiered scrutiny within the course of litigation. This query has prompted many scholars to rethink both the theoretical and practical viability of using a formalized tiered framework to adjudicate equal protection disputes. While a comprehensive overview of the

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56 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (contending that, “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
59 See id.
60 See Massey, supra note 57, at 949.
62 See Massey, supra note 57, at 950.
63 See Ewing, supra note 58, at 1413 (maintaining that tiered scrutiny has been criticized since its inception); Siegel, supra note 9, at 2343 (commenting that tiered scrutiny remains the subject of sustained criticism).
criticisms leveled at tiered scrutiny lies well beyond the scope of this note, it is beneficial to recognize where the current literature stands. While scholars will differ in making generalizations from this literature, current critiques of tiered scrutiny can plausibly be read as taking two forms. First, tiered scrutiny has been criticized from a normative viewpoint, focusing on its inability to confront constitutional norms. More specifically, commentators have suggested that the tiered form constrains the ability of judges to grapple with the normative demands of the Equal Protection Clause by making potentially important factors to the constitutional analysis legally irrelevant. Second, tiered scrutiny has been criticized from a descriptive viewpoint, focusing on the inconsistency of its application across and between different levels of review.

A critical analysis of the tiered framework has, in turn, produced numerous proposals for doctrinal reformation, which have ranged from reworking the tiered framework to parting ways with the tiered form altogether. Yet, what has remained relatively consistent is that “academic critics of modern equal protection doctrine tend to treat the writings of Justice Stevens (and Justice Marshall) as prophetic and inspirational.” Ever since Justice Stevens famously declared that “[t]here is only one Equal Protection Clause,” his approach to equal protection

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64 For a more directed discussion of these critiques, please see Siegel, supra note 9, at 2343-46 (laying out three standard criticisms of tiered scrutiny review); see also Ewing, supra note 58, at 1413-16 (stating general critiques of modern Federal Equal Protection Doctrine).
65 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2344-45; see also James E. Fleming, “There is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2302 (2006) (explaining that Justice Stevens views the tiered framework as hindering the ability of judges to make normative judgments about constitutional norms).
66 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481, 513-14 (2004) (discussing the inconsistency of rational basis review); Massey, supra note 57, at 945 (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions have undercut the ability to rely on tiered scrutiny for consistent application).
67 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2346 (noting the wide range of reforms). For examples of particular reform projects, see Goldberg, supra note 66, at 491-92 (advocating a single standard with three inquiries); Massey, supra note 57, at 992-93 (arguing that a possible reform includes a value-selection approach where justices openly articulate what values are protected by the Constitution).
68 Siegel, supra note 9, at 2347.
jurisprudence continues to be applauded as a plausible alternative to tiered scrutiny. Within the midst of this praise, however, the exact posture of Justice Stevens’s approach has not been conclusively resolved. To be sure, his methodology is viewed under a variety of lenses.\textsuperscript{70} One such lens strikes me as particularly enlightening. In what is arguably one of the most rigorous analyses of Justice Stevens’s equal protection jurisprudence, Professor Andrew Siegel, who served as a clerk for Justice Stevens, suggests that Justice Stevens advances an unmediated interpretive theory.\textsuperscript{71} Describing what an unmediated approach might look like, Siegel writes:

In rough form, an unmediated approach to equal protection jurisprudence would begin by ascertaining in a largely nonlinguistic way a vision of the "equality" promised by the text. It would then proceed to frame every inquiry into the constitutionality of governmental action around the question whether that vision is thwarted by the regulatory scheme in question. In ascertaining the appropriate answer in any given case, a judge applying such a methodology might—\textit{and probably should}-ask a variety of questions about the challenged statute, its impact on individuals, and the various overlapping contexts in which it emerged, but such a jurist would not be compelled to ask any particular set of questions in any given case or to reach a particular conclusion based on the matrix of answers he or she receives to those questions.\textsuperscript{72}

More recently, Professor William Araiza has confirmed this interpretation of Justice Stevens’s equal protection jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{ii. The \textit{Brown}/Parents Involved Opinions: Judicial Scrutiny and Social Science}

\textit{Brown} represented a firm denial of state-sponsored racial segregation in the context of

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{See} Ewing, \textit{supra} note 58, at 1416-17 (classifying Justice Stevens’s approach as a modified form of rational basis review); Fleming, \textit{supra} note 65, at 2311 (analogizing Justice Stevens’s approach to Justice Marshall’s “spectrum of standards” approach).

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{See} Siegel, \textit{supra} note 9, at 2351. Professor’s Siegel’s argument finds support in another piece of scholarship focusing solely on Justice Stevens. In a 1987 student note, the author writes that, “Justice Stevens' method . . . permits advocates directly to address the issue concerning the Court: whether the classification in its context violates a norm of equal protection.” \textit{Note}, \textit{supra} note 10, at 1160-61.

\textsuperscript{72} Siegel, \textit{supra} note 9, at 2352.

Responding to *Plessy v. Ferguson*’s contention that social differences between the races mandated separate, yet equal, treatment, *Brown* stated the following: “We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”76 Two themes permeated the Court’s decision.77 First, Chief Justice Earl Warren stressed the changing status of public education in the South during the middle of the twentieth century.78 Indeed, he wrote that, “[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments . . . [i]t is the very foundation of good citizenship.”79 Second, and most important for our purposes, the Court recognized, in footnote eleven,80 the harmful psychological impact that segregation had upon black children.81 In that footnote, the Court cited to research conducted by Dr. Kenneth Clark82 that used a doll test to conclude that segregation impeded the development of black children’s personalities.83 While that study has been a main talking point in analyzing the Court’s reliance on social science data,84 it should be noted that footnote eleven contained other non-legal sources, such as *An American Dilemma* by Gunnar Myrdal and *The Negro in the United States* by E. Franklin Frazier.85

After *Brown*, legal doctrine in the area of dismantling segregation relied on a distinction

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77 These themes are taken from the work of Sanjay Mody. See Mody, *supra* note 74, at 796-802.
78 See *id.* at 798 (stating that when the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, public education did not occupy an important place in the South).
79 *Brown*, 347 U.S. at 493.
80 *Id.* at 494-95 n.11.
81 See Heise, *supra* note 17, at 293-96.
82 *Brown*, 347 U.S. at 495 n.11.
84 See Heise, *supra* note 17, at 294 (arguing that Dr. Clark’s research is a primary reason that footnote eleven has come under sustained scrutiny).
85 *Brown*, 347 U.S. at 495 n.11.
between segregation resulting from intentional governmental actions, called de jure segregation, and segregation resulting from actions outside the purview of the government, called de facto segregation.\textsuperscript{86} De jure segregation refers to a school system’s deliberate design to segregate students on the basis of race as a result of local ordinances or state statutes.\textsuperscript{87} In turn, this type of segregation constitutionally necessitates a remedy by the government.\textsuperscript{88} In contrast, de facto segregation refers to the presence of a racial imbalance brought about by housing patterns or other forms of societal inequalities not caused by direct governmental action.\textsuperscript{89} Due to the fact that this type of segregation is not unconstitutional, a court cannot order a school district to implement a desegregation policy.\textsuperscript{90}

\textit{Parents Involved}, an opinion that relied on the de jure/de facto distinction, presented the question whether it was constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause for school districts to consider race as a factor in voluntarily assigning kids to specific schools in order to foster racial and ethnic heterogeneity.\textsuperscript{91} On the facts of the case, school districts in Seattle and Louisville had used race as a factor in determining “whether a student could attend the school of his or her choice.”\textsuperscript{92} Between the two districts, however, different policies were employed. They varied both in terms of the number of schools the policy applied to and the desired racial composition of each school in reference to broader racial patterns of the school district as a whole.\textsuperscript{93} The policies did converge on one point: that a racially diverse learning environment was a moral

\textsuperscript{87} See id. at 496.
\textsuperscript{89} See id. at 39.
\textsuperscript{90} See Fischbach, Rhee, & Cacace, supra note 86, at 504.
\textsuperscript{92} Browne & Yi, supra note 91, at 658.
\textsuperscript{93} See Entin, supra note 91, at 924-25.
good and, consequently, a compelling state interest.\textsuperscript{94}

In anticipation of the case study, I use two observations to frame how different justices approached the case. First, the justices differed in their reading of desegregation doctrine and the fate it held for these policies in terms of the law.\textsuperscript{95} Second, they differed in their interpretation of the relevant social science literature.\textsuperscript{96} For the sake of making the upcoming case study as clear as possible, I focus only on the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer and exclude those of Justices Kennedy and Stevens.\textsuperscript{97}

Applying strict scrutiny\textsuperscript{98} and emphatically relying on the history of \textit{Brown}, Chief Justice John Roberts, joined in full by Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas,\textsuperscript{99} struck down the assignment policies as violating the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the laws.\textsuperscript{100} Two themes undergirded the Chief Justice’s opinion. First, Chief Justice Roberts made it painstakingly clear that he believed \textit{Brown} to require elementary schools to adopt a colorblind attitude in assignment policies, even if the purpose of the policies was to foster racial integration.\textsuperscript{101} To be sure, Roberts wrote the following:

Before \textit{Brown}, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again . . . The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on

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\textsuperscript{94} See \textit{Love}, supra note 16, at 131.


\textsuperscript{96} See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 17, at 717.

\textsuperscript{97} I do not believe this exclusion renders my hypothesis any less forceful. Rather, by focusing my analysis on these three Justices, I am able to present the case study’s variables, that of judicial scrutiny and use of social science data, in the clearest light.

\textsuperscript{98} See \textit{Love}, supra note 16, at 132.

\textsuperscript{99} This is a plurality opinion with Justice Kennedy concurring in part. \textit{Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1}, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Parents Involved}, 551 U.S. at 748.

\textsuperscript{101} Browne & Yi, supra note 91, at 658.
the basis of race. Second, Roberts did not explicitly cite to any social science data. While Roberts did make reference to the social science data cited in the amicus briefs, he did not give the social science literature a causal role in the outcome of his opinion.

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he seemed to take Justice Roberts’s reasoning to its logical conclusion. That is, Thomas analogized arguments made in favor of the policies to arguments made by segregationists during the era of Brown. For Thomas, race served no legitimate role in classifying students in the context of public education. Invoking strict scrutiny, Thomas asserted that, “[a]s these programs demonstrate, every time the government uses racial criteria to ‘bring the races together,’ . . . someone gets excluded, and the person excluded suffers an injury solely because of his or her race.” Regarding social science data, Thomas subscribed to the view that he need consider only evidence of de jure segregation. Since, for Thomas, mere racial imbalance “is not segregation,” evidence of de facto segregation held no relevance in assessing the constitutionality of the race-based programs at issue in the case.

Justice Breyer filed a forceful dissenting opinion. Mirroring both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer purported to apply traditional strict scrutiny analysis. However, unlike those Justices, Justice Breyer concluded that the school board plans of Seattle

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103 Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 17, at 732-33 (arguing that Roberts’s extraordinarily strict criteria for allowing social science data into the opinion probably rendered many applicable studies irrelevant).
104 See Morgan & Pullin, supra note 34, at 521.
106 See Browne & Yi, supra note 91, at 675.
107 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 759 (Thomas, J., concurring).
108 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 17, at 715.
109 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring).
110 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 17, at 715.
111 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
and Louisville were permitted under the Constitution.\textsuperscript{112} A handful of key interpretive moves on the part of Justice Breyer may make clear why his opinion came out the way it did. Justice Breyer’s application of strict scrutiny analysis seemed to be informed by a contextual approach that took into account the benign purpose behind the race-conscious policies.\textsuperscript{113} To be sure, Justice Breyer opined that, “[t]he context here is one of racial limits that seek, not to keep the races apart, but to bring them together.”\textsuperscript{114} As a result, Justice Breyer did not think that the de jure/de facto distinction controlled “what a school district is voluntarily allowed to do.”\textsuperscript{115} In turn, Justice Breyer considered evidence of de facto segregation relevant in framing the segregation that the school districts could constitutionally correct.\textsuperscript{116}

III. A Hypothesis For Why Doctrine Matters: The Brown/Parents Involved Case Study

This section directly enters the debate over judicial decisionmaking by supplying a hypothesis that serves to counteract any talismanic enchantment with a purely political explanation for Supreme Court decisionmaking. The proposed hypothesis treads carefully. While it aims to illustrate that doctrine matters in some nontrivial way throughout the course of judicial decisionmaking, it does not pretend to prove that doctrine is all that matters. In other words, the hypothesis is in line with Frederick Schauer’s proposition that legal doctrine helps to structure, rather than consume, the thinking of judges.\textsuperscript{117} Therefore, as seen in Part A below, the hypothesis contextualizes Schauer’s proposition within the Court’s use of social science data.

In order to instill the hypothesis with explanatory power in the equal protection context, I analyze the Brown and Parents Involved opinions by asking the following two questions: first,

\textsuperscript{112} Id.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{See} Love, \textit{supra} note 16, at 133-34.
\textsuperscript{114} Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 835 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{115} Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 844 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{See} Frankenberg & Garces, \textit{supra} note 17, at 714.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{See} Schauer, \textit{supra} note 7, at 664.
was there a change in how judicial scrutiny was articulated in *Brown* as opposed to *Parents Involved* and second, did that change matter in terms of the types of social science data used in the two opinions? I answer both questions in the affirmative. In Part B, I argue that while the *Brown* opinion can be plausibly viewed as adopting something like Justice Stevens’s unmediated approach,\(^{118}\) each opinion in the *Parents Involved* decision employs some form of strict scrutiny analysis.\(^{119}\) In Part C, I then argue that this difference animated how specific types of social science sources became relevant to the legal issue at hand by prompting, or failing to prompt, the justices to filter their choice of social science data through additional legal doctrine beyond the standard of review.\(^{120}\)

A. The Hypothesis in Detail

At times, the formality of legal doctrine can call for the use of “elaborate technical vocabularies.”\(^{121}\) Indeed, Professor Victoria Nourse has recognized a scholarly consensus that doctrine has been employing a more formalized vocabulary over time.\(^{122}\) Moreover, Professor Daniel Farber has described the Court’s rhetoric as “a combination of the bureaucratic and the academic.”\(^{123}\) Given the tenor of these statements, it does not seem outrageous to suggest that the technical vocabulary that these scholars had in mind looks something like strict scrutiny’s use of the terms “compelling purpose” and “narrowly tailored.”\(^{124}\) The hypothesis seeks to understand the effect of this technical vocabulary, as enunciated in the standard of review, on

\(^{118}\) See Siegel, *supra* note 9, at 2352.


\(^{120}\) I must give credit to Professor Siegel for acknowledging that the mere existence of a complex doctrinal framework may have a “distortive or transformative effect, building substantive content into the body of constitutional law.” Siegel, *supra* note 9, at 2346.


\(^{124}\) See Siegel, *supra* note 9, at 2345 (noting that the rhetoric of strict scrutiny might qualify as a “complicated doctrinal test”).
judicial consideration of social science sources.

The hypothesis of this note contends that judges feel more legitimated in interacting with a broader range of non legal-sources when they apply a less formal standard of review that contains little, if any, technical words because they do not need to ensure that the social science literature appreciates a technicality unique to the legal arena. However, when judges employ a formalized judicial scrutiny that relies heavily on a technical vocabulary, as strict scrutiny does, judges feel more comfortable giving initial meaning to that vocabulary by citing to more legal doctrine. As a result, this limits the types of social science sources that enter the opinion to those that can comport with the rhetoric of this additional doctrine.

B. A Closer Look at the Articulation of Judicial Scrutiny in Brown and Parents Involved

A satisfactory evaluation of judicial scrutiny employed in an opinion should focus on the language of the opinion itself in addition to how scholars have categorized that scrutiny. Both methods of analysis are adopted here in examining the type of judicial scrutiny applied in Brown and Parents Involved. The argument here is as follows: while Brown can be interpreted as adopting Justice Stevens’s unmediated approach,125 Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer implemented some version of strict scrutiny analysis in Parents Involved.126

i. Brown’s Unmediated Standard of Review

Any discussion of judicial scrutiny used in Brown should be informed by the fact that strict scrutiny was first enunciated as applying to racial classifications in cases involving Japanese Americans challenging their internment in the midst of World War II.127 To be sure, Professor Greg Robinson and Toni Robinson maintain that, “the most decisive contribution of

125 See id. at 2352.
the Japanese Americans to the legal struggle for civil rights was in laying the foundation for the doctrine of strict scrutiny on which Brown and the other cases were based.\textsuperscript{128} The 1944 Supreme Court case of Korematsu v. United States\textsuperscript{129} serves as a case in point. In that case, Toyosaburo Korematsu, who was an American citizen, was convicted for remaining in an unauthorized military zone in California.\textsuperscript{130} Justice Black began the opinion by declaring the following:

\begin{quote}
It should be noted . . . that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.\textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

Given this strong language, commentators awaiting the Brown decision ten years later could reasonably have assumed that Chief Justice Earl Warren would cite to Korematsu or other Japanese internment cases in striking down segregation in public education. Indeed, the segregation at issue in Brown was arguably a restriction which burdened “the civil rights of a single racial group.”\textsuperscript{132} However, the Brown opinion is devoid of any such citations.

If Brown was not decided under a doctrine of strict scrutiny laid down during the Japanese internment cases, what type of judicial scrutiny did Chief Justice Warren apply? The language of Brown itself is instructive. Chief Justice Warren acknowledged from the outset that every District Court in this case, other than Delaware,\textsuperscript{133} and six previous Supreme Court cases decided after Plessy applied the “separate but equal” doctrine.\textsuperscript{134} He went on to say that the

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{128} See id. at 30.
\textsuperscript{129} Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
\textsuperscript{130} Id. at 216.
\textsuperscript{131} Id.
\textsuperscript{132} Id. Perhaps an answer can be found if we allow for the possibility that lower school education does not constitute a “civil right” within the meaning of the Korematsu language. I find this highly unlikely, though, due to Chief Justice Warren’s detailed discussion of the importance of public education. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
\textsuperscript{133} See Brown, 347 U.S. at 488.
\textsuperscript{134} See id. at 491.
\end{footnotes}
“separate but equal” doctrine itself had not been challenged in previous cases involving public education. After proclaiming that the equality of educational facilities must take into account intangible factors, Chief Justice Warren phrased the question presented to the Court as follows: “[d]oes segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?” In what can be plausibly read as the holding, Chief Justice Warren stated that, “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place” and that, “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”

Given the absence of any explicit language recognizing a form of judicial scrutiny, it is difficult to pinpoint the precise form of scrutiny in the case. Chief Justice Warren was simply not clear in articulating the doctrinal grounds on which the case rested. What I wish to suggest, though, is that Justice Stevens’s unmediated approach to constitutional interpretation inspired Chief Justice Warren’s framing of the legal question presented. Recall, Justice Stevens’s approach “[i]nvolved nothing more and nothing less than the direct and unmediated application of the Constitution’s guarantee of ‘equal protection of the laws.’” While Chief Justice Warren did not use the phrase “equal protection of the laws” in presenting the legal question at hand, he nonetheless asked whether segregation deprived “children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities.” In my mind, Chief Justice Warren’s phrasing is as close as one

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135 See id.
136 See id. at 492 (stating that the Court’s decision “cannot turn on a comparison of these tangible factors).
137 Id. at 493.
138 Id. at 495.
139 Id.
140 See Jack Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1564 (2004) (stating that when Brown was handed down, the import of the opinion was unclear).
141 Siegel, supra note 9, at 2351.
142 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
can get to applying the actual language of the Fourteenth Amendment to a concrete fact pattern.

At first blush, one could offer a retort by making the argument that the case was decided in light of the mediating doctrine of “separate but equal.” Indeed, some scholars have made that argument. However, this reading seems unlikely for two reasons. First, a case cannot be decided on a ground that is explicitly rejected in the opinion itself. Applying this to Brown, if the “separate but equal” doctrine was ultimately rejected in the context of public education, the decision could not possibly have turned on this doctrine alone. There must have been some broader constitutional principle at play, presumably the phrase “equal protection of the laws,” that provided Chief Justice Warren with criteria for determining whether the “separate but equal” doctrine was appropriate for the case at bar in the first place. Second, after stating the holding, Chief Justice Warren wrote that, “[w]e have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.” With that sentence, Chief Justice Warren gave us a first-hand account of what he thought Brown stood for. And, of course, the “separate but equal” doctrine is nowhere to be found.

Since the language of the opinion can be interpreted as containing ambiguity, the writings of two scholars investigating Brown in more detail may offer some insight into the judicial scrutiny employed. Stating that the negative implications of Brown must be appreciated, Professor Parker posits that, “while the facts presented in the case included a suspect classification, state legislation and an equal protection challenge, the Court failed to refer to the traditional strict scrutiny test.” Although Professor Parker does not give a positive account for

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143 See Edward J. Erler, Still Separate But Equal, CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS 47, 48 (Summer 2004) (arguing that although the Warren Court could have overturned the “separate but equal” doctrine, it chose to perpetuate it throughout the opinion).
144 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
145 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
146 Parker, supra note 15, at 227.
what standard of review was employed, Professor Frank Read does. In an article that surveys
desegregation doctrine in the wake of Brown, Professor Read writes, “the opinion in Brown I is,
at its essence, a straight-forward legal interpretation of the equal protection clause.”147 This is
probably the clearest corroboration for the idea that Justice Stevens’s interpretive theory inspired
Chief Justice Warren’s decision.

ii. Parents Involved and The Variants of Strict Scrutiny

Any description of the scrutiny used in Parents Involved is visibly easier to construct than
that of Brown primarily because the three Justices that I focus on in Parents Involved were
explicit about the standard of review they subscribed to. With that being said, there is a key
difference in how the standard of review was invoked between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, on the one hand, and Justice Breyer, on the other. Mirroring the analysis of Brown, the
description of judicial scrutiny in Parents Involved begins with the language of the opinion itself.

At the beginning of the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts made it clear that he
believed that strict scrutiny must control the case.148 That is, Chief Justice Roberts stated that,
“the school districts must demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications in the
assignment plans here under review is ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government
interest.”149 Throughout the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts dismissed the idea of applying a
different standard of review to racial classifications that serve praiseworthy, rather than
destructive, ends by stating that “all racial classifications must be reviewed under strict
scrutiny.”150 Justice Thomas’s concurrence, which was written to address several arguments

147 Read, supra note 18, at 9.
149 Id. (citing Adarand Constructors Inc., 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1999)).
150 Id. at 741.
made by Justice Breyer,\textsuperscript{151} did not contest Chief Justice Roberts’s invocation and application of strict scrutiny. Like Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas dismissed the idea that a different standard of review should attach when programs use racial classifications to advance a benign purpose.\textsuperscript{152}

On its face, it would seem that Justice Breyer’s dissent did not depart from his colleagues on the issue of judicial scrutiny because he insisted that he was applying strict scrutiny.\textsuperscript{153} Indeed, Justice Breyer stated that he will conduct his inquiry as follows: “I shall consequently ask whether the school boards in Seattle and Louisville adopted these plans to serve a ‘compelling governmental interest’ and, if so, whether the plans are ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve that interest.”\textsuperscript{154} However true that may be, it is also true that Justice Breyer was informed by a “contextual approach to scrutiny”\textsuperscript{155} that appreciated the distinction that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas were quick to condemn, that of using race to exclude as opposed to include.\textsuperscript{156} To be sure, Justice Breyer wrote that, “the ’fundamental purpose’ of strict scrutiny review is to ‘take relevant differences’ between ‘fundamentally different situations . . . into account’\textsuperscript{157} and that, “the law requires application here of a standard of review that is not ‘strict’ in the traditional sense of that word.”\textsuperscript{158} Nevertheless, Justice Breyer acknowledged that some sort of rigorous review was called for as “the judge would carefully examine the program's details to determine whether the use of race-conscious criteria is proportionate to the important ends it serves.”\textsuperscript{159} While indeed purporting to apply the strictures of strict scrutiny, one must

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{151} Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
\item \textsuperscript{152} Id. at 758 (Thomas, J., concurring).
\item \textsuperscript{153} Id. at 837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{154} Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{155} Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{156} Id. at 834-35 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{157} Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Adarand Constructors Inc., 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1999)).
\item \textsuperscript{158} Id. at 837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{159} Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\end{itemize}
wonder to what extent this “contextual approach” actually structured Justice Breyer’s application of strict scrutiny.

Turning to academic commentary, it is relatively clear that there is no serious contestation that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas applied, or thought they applied, strict scrutiny review. Instead, the more interesting debate revolves around the type of scrutiny that Justice Breyer utilized. Nicole Love explicitly addresses Justice Breyer’s contextual approach to strict scrutiny. Love tends to believe that not only did the “contextual approach” inform Justice Breyer’s application of strict scrutiny (as I do), but that it also supplanted strict scrutiny review altogether. Paralleling Love, Professor Brad Snyder has recognized another area where Justice Breyer’s purported application of strict scrutiny departed from the plurality. Specifically, he points out that Justice Breyer concluded his opinion “with a Holmesian plea for deference to elected officials.” Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas chide this grant of deference as being adverse to traditional strict scrutiny principles.

C. The Effect of Scrutiny on Judicial Consideration of Social Science in *Brown* and *Parents Involved*: Filtering Social Science Sources Through Additional Legal Doctrine Above and Beyond the Standard of Review?

Once the difference in the articulation of scrutiny employed in *Brown* and *Parents Involved* has been established with some level of precision, the next task involves understanding whether that difference holds any power in explaining how different types of social science sources made their way into these opinions. In the words of Julie Margetta Morgan and Diana Pullin, “if *Brown* raised the possibility that judges might use social science in decision making,

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160 See Browne & Yi, supra note 91, at 674 (stating that the plurality opinion denied the fact that a more lenient standard than strict scrutiny should control the case); Love, supra note 16, at 133 (noting that Justice Thomas endorsed strict scrutiny).
161 See Love, supra note 16, at 133-34.
162 See id. at 133 (stating that Justice Breyer employed a “contextual approach” to scrutiny without qualification).
163 Snyder, supra note 105, at 905.
164 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 744-45 (plurality opinion).
165 See id. at 774 (Thomas, J., concurring).
it also gave rise to enduring questions of how and why particular research was selected. In this section, the research selection in Brown and Parents Involved is evaluated in light of the specific type of scrutiny applied.

The argument runs as follows. On the one hand, Brown’s adoption of Justice Stevens’s unmediated approach to judicial scrutiny granted the Warren Court great flexibility in deeming certain types of social science sources relevant to the legal issue at hand because a direct application of the constitutional text did not prompt the Court to filter those sources through any additional legal construct. On the other hand, the articulation of strict scrutiny in Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion and Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Parents Involved inspired these two Justices to rely on the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation to define the legally relevant harm that could be voluntarily remedied. In turn, that distinction served to filter the type of social science sources that these two Justices found relevant to the legal question at hand. Because, as we have seen, Justice Breyer’s application of strict scrutiny differed from that of both the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, his legal reasoning did not appear to be constrained by the de jure/de facto distinction and, therefore, did not rely on that construct to filter the social science literature.

i. Brown: Social Science Unfiltered By Additional Legal Doctrine

Recall that in the Brown opinion, Chief Justice Warren dropped a footnote that cited to various social science sources documenting the psychological harm that segregation imposed on

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166 Morgan & Pullin, supra note 34, at 515.
167 See Read, supra note 18, at 9 (arguing that Brown applied the constitutional text of the Fourteenth Amendment directly to the legal issue presented).
168 See Browne & Yi, supra note 91, at 673.
169 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 17, at 710.
171 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 17, at 714.
black children. Over time, footnote eleven has generated much controversy that has found expression in the form of two distinct debates. Although “Brown’s overall legacy will likely remain a subject of vigorous debate in the future,” it would serve us well to understand the general tenor of those debates so that we can see how this note departs from them. To be clear, the discussion here is not meant to advance either of these two debates for my inquiry does not, at this time, purport to involve normative questions of institutional competence or descriptive questions of how particular social science sources are used to supplement legal reasoning once included in the opinion.

The first debate is extremely broad in scope and centers on the propriety of using social science to validate normative judgments about the Constitution. This debate asks whether courts are institutionally competent enough to not only sift through complex social science studies to determine which ones are persuasive, but also to integrate those studies into legal reasoning. Critics of the Court for relying on this interdisciplinary approach have stated that, “attaching constitutional meaning to scientific opinion . . . condemns the Constitution to fluctuations in meaning as scientific knowledge changes.” The work of prominent legal theorist Ronald Dworkin has been read to further suggest that the social sciences are an inadequate foundation to rest constitutional rulings on. On the other side of the debate, some scholars have applauded the Court’s willingness to cite to social science sources as a way of

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173 I acknowledge Michael Heise’s work in helping to frame where the current literature about footnote eleven stands. See Heise, supra note 17, at 294 (laying out two general attacks against the use of footnote eleven in the Brown opinion).
174 Id. at 296.
175 See Brewer, supra note 55, at 1562.
176 See id. at 1562-64.
178 See id. at 569; see also Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights—The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L & EDUC. 3, 5 (1977).
ensuring that constitutional decisions are not at the mercy of “arbitrary judicial biases.”

The second debate is narrower in scope and attempts to understand whether the Warren Court’s citation of social science sources in footnote eleven actually influenced the outcome of the case. This debate has produced an enormous literature, to the point that Professor James Ryan has qualified the debate as a “tired” one, and, as a result, I can only touch on it here. In general, two camps of scholars have participated in this debate. In the first camp, scholars who subscribe to the view that the Court should look to social science sources for guidance in making constitutional judgments tend to assume that the Warren Court did in fact rely on footnote eleven in determining the outcome of Brown. In contrast, the second camp, including scholars such as Herbert Wechsler, Charles Black, and Robert Bork, asserts that it is doubtful that the Court was influenced in any significant way by footnote eleven. Recently, Sanjay Mody argues that footnote eleven should be seen as a legitimacy-enhancing tactic that attempted to anchor Brown in the social science community amid legal controversy.

What both of these debates have in common is that they tend to focus on the doll study conducted by Dr. Clark as adequately embodying the intellectual essence of the other sources cited in footnote eleven. That is to say, a majority of the articles that have been instrumental in the previous two debates focus almost exclusively on Dr. Clark’s doll study as representing the

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180 For an article that nicely structures the debate and attempts to move it in a new direction, see Mody, supra note 74, at 796.
181 Ryan, supra note 12, at 1660.
182 I note that I categorize these two camps differently than Sanjay Mody. See Mody, supra note 74, at 804.
183 See id.
184 See Wechsler, supra note 23, at 33 (noting that it is hard to think that Brown “turned upon the facts.”).
185 See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 (1960) (stating that the footnote can be seen as supporting intuition).
187 See Mody, supra note 74, at 794.
188 For an overview of that study, see Brewer, supra note 55, at 1558.
intellectual integrity of the other types of sources consulted in footnote eleven. 189 For example, in Edmond Cahn’s famous critique of the Warren Court’s reliance on social science, he focuses exclusively on Dr. Clark’s work. 190 After reading Professor Cahn’s work, it would seem that footnote eleven contained only one source, as opposed to the seven actually cited. Furthermore, in noting that the social science sources in footnote eleven suffered from serious limitations, Professor Scott Brewer also seems to equate “the studies on which the Court relied” 191 with Dr. Clark’s research.

When looked at more carefully, however, footnote eleven is found to contain citations to An American Dilemma by Gunnar Myrdal and The Negro in the United States by E. Franklin Frazier. 192 In An American Dilemma, published in 1944, Myrdal undertakes a comprehensive study of race relations in the United States during the period leading up to Brown. Utilizing a multidisciplinary approach, Myrdal concludes that problems of “racism, discrimination, denial, and violence” 193 permeated encounters with the black population. In turn, Myrdal’s book played a central role in the “sociological and historical attack upon segregation.” 194 What is most important for our purposes is that Myrdal’s study of race relations was not confined to the public education context. To be sure, Myrdal writes that, “social segregation and discrimination is a system of deprivations forced upon the Negro group by the white group.” 195 To add content to this observation, Myrdal observes the inner-workings of segregation within the context of

189 See Heise, supra note 17, at 313 (reducing footnote eleven to the work of Dr. Clark).
191 Brewer, supra note 55, at 1557-58.
churches, schools, public transportation, and the theater. In *The Negro in the United States*, Dr. Frazier’s general objective is to examine how the black population had assimilated into a culture colored by white privilege. In the words of Leon Epstein, Dr. Frazier “examined the life of the Negro under the slave regime, the accommodations of the Civil War and Reconstruction period . . . and the present problems of adjustment in the United States.” Like Myrdal’s work, *The Negro in the United States* held (and might still hold) implications for understanding the harms that segregation produced in contexts beyond that of public education.

At this point, recall that the legal question at issue in *Brown* arose in the context of public education. At first glance, it is not at all obvious how a legal issue confined to this specific context could be informed by a citation to sources comprising such breadth and depth. Indeed, perhaps one of the reasons scholars choose to focus solely on the work of Dr. Clark is because his study of black schoolchildren was directly tied to the public education context. However, a possible answer becomes clear once we recall how Chief Justice Warren framed the legal issue: “[d]oes segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?” In framing the issue as a direct application of the Equal Protection Clause, it becomes imperative to define what “equal” means in any given circumstance. Yet, this is no easy task. Where might one go to even begin to define how that term operates in a specific segment of society?

Comprehensive studies such as *An American Dilemma* and *The Negro in the United States* might be a perfectly logical and acceptable starting point. For the Warren Court, these

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196 Id. at 22-23.
198 Id. at 674.
200 See Read, supra note 18, at 9.
works may have provided broader social context to segregation so that the Court could even begin to think about what “equal educational opportunities” might look like in a society riddled with racial inequality. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren wrote that, “[w]e must consider public education in light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.” This statement suggests that Warren was not merely concerned with the public education context per se, but also with the interaction between education and other areas that constituted “American life.” Accordingly, it is not implausible to propose that Warren utilized sources such as *An American Dilemma* and *The Negro in the United States* to make an initial determination about the harmful impact of segregation on the black population in general. Contextualizing this determination to the case at hand, Warren then found that the public education context amplified this impact in a manner that he could not condone.

Overall, by asking whether such segregation was “a denial of the equal protection of the laws,” Chief Justice Warren did not use additional legal doctrine above and beyond this language to discipline his engagement with social science sources. Given his ultimate rejection of the “separate but equal” doctrine, he could not. Instead, the unmediated standard of review at play in *Brown* gave Chief Justice Warren the necessary discursive flexibility to consult the social science sources that he did while simultaneously disciplining that flexibility by asking

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201 *Brown*, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
202 I use the term “implausible” here because some will reply that this is an overstatement because judges inherently know that segregation is wrong and thus do not need to be presented with evidence displaying the harms that segregation can cause. *See Dworkin, supra* note 177, at 5 (asserting that “we just know” that segregation is wrong). I think that this characterization is too generous. If judges are inflicted with the same biases that permeate a majority of the human population, social science may serve to resist those biases in some instances by highlighting how harmful they actually are. Harmful biases do not become any less harmful simply because they are popular.
203 *See Brown*, 347 U.S. at 494 (stating that a consideration of the intangible qualities of educational institutions applies with “added force” to lower education).
204 *Id.* at 495.
205 *Id.*
Warren to use those sources to help define what “equal protection of the laws”\textsuperscript{206} might look like in the context of public education.

Had Chief Justice Warren articulated a more exacting standard of review that relied on language different from the Constitutional itself, it is less clear that sources like Myrdal’s \textit{An American Dilemma} and Frazier’s \textit{The Negro in the United States} make it into the opinion. Had different language been articulated, especially language unique to judicial discourse, it is unclear whether Warren would have given dispositive weight to precedent in giving content to that language.\textsuperscript{207} As a result, the legal rhetoric employed in that precedent could have caused Warren to look for only non-legal sources that complied with that rhetoric. If, for example, that rhetoric focused squarely on the context of public education, it becomes harder to imagine that lengthy social science sources that surveyed other contexts would have been useful in decoding, with specificity, what the standard of review demanded in the realm of public education. When, however, Warren applied the broad mandate of “equal protection of the laws,”\textsuperscript{208} social science sources had just as legitimate a claim as precedent in defining what that language required.

\textbf{ii. \textit{Parents Involved}: Social Science Filtered Through the De Jure/De Facto Construct}

A different dynamic seems to be at work as we move to \textit{Parents Involved} because, unlike \textit{Brown}, additional legal doctrine above and beyond the standard of review played a powerful role in filtering the social science sources that made their way into the opinion. In order to observe how this dynamic takes hold in the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer, the argument is divided into two parts. First, the way that each Justice framed how strict scrutiny should be applied to the facts of the case influenced whether the Justice used

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{206}U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
\item \textsuperscript{207}Without footnote eleven, I think Warren could still have comfortably achieved the desired outcome based on precedent alone. \textit{See Brown}, 347 U.S. at 493.
\item \textsuperscript{208}U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
\end{itemize}
the construct of de jure and de facto segregation to define the legally relevant racial harm that could be remedied by the school districts. 209 Second, the force with which each Justice abided by that construct determined the breadth of the social science literature that the Justice found relevant to the legal question at hand. 210

As previously stated, Chief Justice Roberts applied traditional strict scrutiny analysis by asking whether the school districts could show that their use of racial classifications served a compelling governmental purpose and was narrowly tailored to further that purpose. 211 In determining what constituted a compelling purpose, Chief Justice Roberts noted that, "the harm being remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that 'the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more.' " 212 Criticizing Justice Breyer’s interpretation of the compelling purpose prong, Chief Justice Roberts made his reliance on the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation at this stage of the analysis explicit. 213 Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts opined that, “[t]he distinction between segregation by state action and racial imbalance caused by other factors has been central to our jurisprudence in this area for generations." 214 The reason that the school districts could not adopt their plan, in the mind of Chief Justice Roberts, was because there was no evidence that they were currently subject to state policies of segregation or contained traces of segregation from previous state policies. 215 Thus, from the outset, Chief Justice Roberts made clear that he defined the term “compelling purpose” by referencing additional legal doctrine above and

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209 For a concise summary of how each Justice approached the de jure/de facto distinction, see Wells, supra note 170, at 1030-31.
210 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 17, at 714-15.
213 See id. at 736.
214 Id.
beyond the standard of review.

Due to Chief Justice Roberts’s broader outlook on constitutional theory, it comes as no surprise that he made little mention of social science sources.216 Yet, Chief Justice Roberts hinted at the types of social science evidence that he might consider persuasive in a case involving a school district’s desire to achieve racial diversity.217 After surveying the evidence presented by expert witnesses, he stated that the evidence should be “working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits”218 and not aiming to achieve a racial balance.219 This statement provides convincing evidence that Chief Justice Roberts would use the de jure/de facto construct, a construct that is invoked within the course of a strict scrutiny analysis, to determine the relevance of social science sources to the legal question presented.

Paralleling the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas also employed strict scrutiny analysis.220 As in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, the invocation of the term “compelling purpose” generated the presence of additional legal doctrine. To be sure, Justice Thomas cited to his opinion in *Grutter v. Bollinger*221 to define “compelling purpose” as one that remedies past discrimination for which the government is responsible.222 At that moment, Thomas’s reliance on the de jure/de facto construct becomes obvious. To find the adoption of this construct within the explicit language of the opinion itself, one need look no further than Thomas’s statement that the school districts’ plan could not survive strict scrutiny given that “Seattle has no history of de jure

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216 See Morgan & Pullin, *supra* note 34, at 521.
217 See id.
218 See *Parents Involved*, 551 U.S. at 729.
219 See id.
220 See id. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring).
222 See *Parents Involved*, 551 U.S. at 771 (Thomas, J., concurring).
segregation.” 223

While Justice Thomas referenced social science sources to a greater extent than did the Chief Justice, 224 he ultimately relied on the de jure/de facto construct to refine his view of the social science literature. Given Justice Thomas’s strong language surrounding the type of segregation that would permit the school districts’ plans under the Constitution, it is almost certain that Justice Thomas did not, and would not, entertain evidence of de facto segregation. 225 In fact, Erica Frankenberg and Liliana Garces make that exact argument when they maintain that Justice Thomas’s opinion “allows him to ignore social science evidence that demonstrates how structural inequalities and governmental policies in non-educational arenas perpetuate segregation.” 226 Overall, for both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, it would be hard to see citations to such voluminous social science sources as *An American Dilemma* and *The Negro in the United States* to shed light on the broader social consequences of school segregation. Given their reliance on the de jure/de facto distinction, a distinction made relevant by the “compelling purpose” language of strict scrutiny analysis, they had already determined that some social consequences could not possibly obtain legal relevance before canvassing the social science literature.

In conversation with my analysis of *Brown*, one might inquire as to what these two Justices would have done with an unmediated standard of review. Of course, retroactive predictions of judicial decisions are always difficult in construction and uncertain in application. What I wish to suggest, though, is that the articulation of an unmediated standard of review could have changed the Justices’ approach to the social science literature, even if it would have not

223 *Id.* at 753 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
224 See Morgan & Pullin, *supra* note 34, at 521.
225 See Frankenberg & Garces, *supra* note 17, at 715.
226 *Id.*
changed the outcome of their opinions. To begin, an unmediated approach would have asked the Justices to start their analysis by understanding what “equal protection of the laws”\textsuperscript{227} would require in this case.\textsuperscript{228} This, obviously enough, would require the Justices to employ tools of interpretation. Chief Justice Roberts has given us a firsthand account of what types of tools he considers important by stating the following: “I have a copy of the Constitution on my desk and the first thing I do when I have a case involving the Constitution is read what it says. I also have a copy of the \textit{Federalist Papers}.\textsuperscript{229} While I cannot surmise what weight he gives to sources like the \textit{Federalist Papers}, Roberts is clear that he resorts to interpretive tools beyond the “orthodox legal materials of text and precedent.”\textsuperscript{230} Conceding that sources like the \textit{Federalist Papers} are appealing to Roberts probably because of their unique connection to the Constitution, the structure of Roberts’s thinking is enlightening because it suggests that he uses non-legal sources to inform his interpretation of constitutional text at a very early stage in decisionmaking.

It does not seem out of place to suggest that a direct application of the constitutional text would have caused Roberts, and justices like Roberts, to be more rigorous in using non-legal sources as interpretive tools because there may be no precedent exactly on point in applying such a broad mandate to novel situations. Arguably, as the standard of review abstracts to a higher level of rhetorical generality, it becomes more difficult to apply that generality to the factual nuances of the case at hand solely in terms of precedent.\textsuperscript{231} In the absence of a formalized

\textsuperscript{227} U.S. CONST, amend. XIV.
\textsuperscript{228} Recall Siegel’s description of the unmediated approach. \textit{See} Siegel, \textit{supra} note 9, at 2352.
\textsuperscript{230} Posner, \textit{supra} note 8, at 1179.
\textsuperscript{231} Richard H. Fallon, Jr. argues that there is a distinction between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” cases in the Supreme Court. On the one hand, “ordinary” cases involve the direct application of precedent to resolve the controversy. On the other hand, “extraordinary” cases inspire justices to rely on a guiding principle before applying doctrine. \textit{See} Richard H. Fallon, Jr., \textit{The Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution},
standard of review, then, the Justices’ decision could have been supported by a wider breadth of social science sources than that which was actually cited in order to more efficiently structure the application of more generalized rhetoric (even if their decision had been made during oral argument).

A wide breadth of social science sources, however, did make its way into Justice Breyer’s opinion because he took a unique approach to strict scrutiny that avoided reliance on the de jure/de facto construct. Although purporting to apply strict scrutiny in line with the plurality, Justice Breyer seemed to be influenced by a “contextual approach”\textsuperscript{232} that appreciated the distinction between using race to increase diversity and using it as a form of exclusion.\textsuperscript{233} In broad strokes, this approach allowed Justice Breyer to define what a compelling purpose was by referencing “three essential elements”\textsuperscript{234} that were couched in rhetoric that could not be reduced to legal doctrine. Consider the first element, that of remedying the historical injustice of segregation.\textsuperscript{235} In the paragraph describing what this element embodies, one will search in vain to find a single citation to a case or doctrine.\textsuperscript{236} The other two elements, namely an educational element and a democratic element, are defined in much the same way.\textsuperscript{237} Undeniably, citations to social science sources and the use of non-technical language dominated Justice Breyer’s discussion of the “compelling purpose” prong.

In turn, the “contextual approach” allowed Justice Breyer to declare that, “the distinction between de jure segregation (caused by school systems) and de facto segregation (caused, \textit{e.g.},

\textsuperscript{111}HARV. L. REV. 54, 106-07 (1997). What I am suggesting here is that a move to an unmediated standard of review may shift a case from an “ordinary” case to an “extraordinary” one. In turn, this leaves more flexibility for justices to use non-legal sources in articulating the guiding principle that undergirds application of doctrine.


\textsuperscript{233}See Love, \textit{supra} note 16, at 133.

\textsuperscript{234}Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 838 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{235}See \textit{id.} (Breyer, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{236}See \textit{id.} (Breyer, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{237}In Justice Breyer’s initial discussion of these three elements (up until the paragraph that starts, “[m]oreover, this Court from \textit{Swann}”), I can find only two citations to Court precedent. See \textit{id.} at 838-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
by housing patterns or generalized societal discrimination) is meaningless in the present context.\textsuperscript{238} The scholarly literature further corroborates Justice Breyer’s disenchantment with the de jure/de facto distinction.\textsuperscript{239} By applying the “contextual approach,” Justice Breyer was able to avoid reliance on this distinction because the non-technical language that he used to define the composition of a “compelling purpose” could be drawn out by non-legal sources. That is, the use of this construct became dispensable for Justice Breyer because his application of strict scrutiny did not rely on rhetoric that had to be given meaning by citing to more legal doctrine. Had Justice Breyer never mentioned the “contextual approach,” it is less clear that he would have categorized that distinction as embodying an element of “futility”\textsuperscript{240} because he might have been forced to deal more intimately with Justice Thomas’s observation that the traditional rhetoric of strict scrutiny only allows a school district to voluntarily remedy past discrimination by a governmental unit.\textsuperscript{241}

In light of his strict scrutiny analysis, Justice Breyer took a holistic approach to the social science evidence\textsuperscript{242} that did not rely on the de jure/de facto distinction to serve as a buffer between the legal question and the social science literature. Instead, Justice Breyer cited empirical data that confirmed the view that there was a real fear “of a return to school systems that are in fact (though not in law) resegregated.”\textsuperscript{243} In stark contrast to Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer considered evidence of de facto segregation relevant to the

\textsuperscript{238} Id. at 806 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
\textsuperscript{239} See Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The Post-Parents Involved Challenge: Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 1015, 1024 (2008); Wells, supra note 170, at 1031; see also Comment, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1: Voluntary Racial Integration in Public Schools, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 98, 102 (2007).
\textsuperscript{240} Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{241} See id. at 754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
\textsuperscript{242} See Morgan & Pullin, supra note 34, at 521.
\textsuperscript{243} Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 806 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
harms that the school districts could remedy. What helps to explain this difference, I think, is Justice Breyer’s “contextual approach” to strict scrutiny. As I have aimed to show, this approach provided him with discretion to render certain social science material relevant that otherwise might have remained untouched had he relied more heavily on technical vocabulary in applying the “compelling purpose” prong. To come full circle in this case study, then, the “contextual approach” to strict scrutiny did for Justice Breyer indirectly what the unmediated standard of review did for Chief Justice Warren directly in terms of generating flexibility for dealing with social science sources. Viewed in this way, Justice Breyer’s dissent had a majority all along.

IV. Conclusion

In a famous dissent, Holmes writes that our Constitution is “an experiment, as all life is an experiment.” At its heart, that is precisely what this note is. This note has experimented with the possibility that the enunciation of technical vocabulary in the standard of review constrains judicial consideration of social science sources. If this note proves to be successful, it will provide the Hamiltonians with further ammunition to duel with the Posner’s of the world.

As should be apparent, this note is greatly limited in scope. This note serves as an initial talking point and nothing more. If this hypothesis is worth pursuing in the future, I respectfully call upon scholars (who inevitably will have more time, resources, and brain power than I) to help me corroborate it in a more comprehensive fashion. Within the context of school desegregation cases alone, this note needs to be supported by an analysis of how other opinions have dealt with social science evidence. Further, if this note’s hypothesis is to encompass classifications beyond that of race, analysis will need to be done that investigates how both

244 See Frankenberg & Garces, *supra* note 17, at 714.  
rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny constrain, or enable, a court’s ability to engage with the social science literature. If, however, this hypothesis is not worth pursuing for whatever reason, I seek refuge in the words of Herbert Wechsler: “Those of us to whom it is not given to ‘live greatly in the law’ are surely called upon to fail in the attempt.” 247

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247 Wechsler, supra note 23, at 35.