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Article
Workers' Applications to Social Insurance Programs When Earnings and Eligibility Are Uncertain
Journal of Labor Economics (1998)
  • Brent E. Kreider, University of Virginia
Abstract
A worker’s decision whether to apply for public transfers may depend not only on his expected level of forgone labor earnings but also on his degree of uncertainty about such earnings. This article provides theory and evidence about the effects of earnings and eligibility uncertainty on participation decisions. The application rate to the Social Security Disability Insurance program is estimated to be about 15% higher than it would be in the absence of earnings risk. As an application to tax policy, optimal marginal wage tax rates may be higher than indicated in previous analyses involving wage uncertainty.
Publication Date
October, 1998
DOI
10.1086/209908
Publisher Statement
This article is from Journal of Labor Economics Oct 1998 16(4); 848-877. Doi: 10.1086/209908. Posted with permission.
Citation Information
Brent E. Kreider. "Workers' Applications to Social Insurance Programs When Earnings and Eligibility Are Uncertain" Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 16 Iss. 4 (1998) p. 848 - 877
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/brent-kreider/2/