Field Marshal Harold Alexander: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography

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FIELD MARSHAL HAROLD ALEXANDER: A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Field Marshal Harold Alexander was one of the most prominent Allied generals of the Second World War. After serving in the campaigns in France and Burma, Alexander commanded British and Allied forces in the victorious campaigns in Africa and Italy. At war’s end he was Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean and took the unconditional surrender of all German forces in Italy. Despite commanding large forces in battle and winning outstanding successes, Alexander’s reputation has been mixed, both among his contemporaries as well as historians. Often described as an ‘enigma’, Alexander’s handsome appearance, courage, modesty, and charm won him the admiration of such notables as Winston Churchill, Harold Macmillan, and General Dwight Eisenhower. Others, however, such as Field Marshal Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, and Admiral Andrew Cunningham, doubted Alexander’s abilities and were scathing in their criticism.

Since the end of the war an extensive literature has accumulated on Alexander’s life and military campaigns. In the literature, contemporaries and historians have disagreed on Alexander’s generalship, his method of command that relied upon persuasion and suggestion, and his intelligence. Critics have faulted him for a detached method of command, failing to grip his campaigns, and for possessing a shallow intellect. Supporters, on the other hand, have praised him for a method of command ideally suited to leading Allied armies, possessing immense common-sense and battle experience, and exercising great calm in a crisis.

This article will present a biographical sketch of Alexander followed by a selected annotated bibliography.

Biography
Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander was born in London on 10 December 1891. After attending Harrow and Sandhurst, Alexander was commissioned in the Irish Guards in 1911. During the First World War Alexander served in France and won an outstanding reputation. Twice wounded, he was decorated and promoted to Acting Lieutenant-Colonel. In 1917–18 Alexander commanded the 2nd Battalion, Irish Guards.

Between the wars, Alexander led the Baltic Landwehr in Latvia in 1919, commanded the Irish Guards at Constantinoople, attended the Staff College and the Imperial Defence College, and held staff appointments at the War Office and Northern Command. In 1934 he took command of the Nowshera Brigade in India and led it in the Loef Agra campaign and the Mohmand Campaign. In 1937 Alexander was promoted to Major-General. At 45 years old, he was the youngest Major-General in the British Army.

Alexander added to his reputation for courage and imperturbability in two early campaigns of the Second World War. In France he commanded the British
rear guard at Dunkirk for the final three days of the evacuation. Displaying characteristic coolness, he oversaw the embarkation of the remaining British soldiers and a sizeable number of French troops. He was the last British soldier to leave the beaches at Dunkirk. In 1942 Prime Minister Churchill sent Alexander to take command in Burma. Arriving in Rangoon on 5 March 1942, Alexander found an almost hopeless situation that he would be unable to retrieve. After being nearly trapped by the Japanese in Rangoon, he conducted a desperate retreat to India.

Being associated with two disastrous defeats did not cost Alexander his career. Instead in August 1942 Churchill and Chief of the Imperial General Staff Brooke agreed to his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. Under his theatre command, Montgomery and the Eighth Army won the decisive victory at El Alamein and advanced across North Africa to Tripoli, which was captured in January 1943.

In February 1943 Alexander became commander of the 18th Army Group under Eisenhower. He reorganized his allied force and directed the defeat of the German and Italian forces in Tunisia taking a quarter of a million prisoners. The campaign in Sicily followed. Alexander's two armies, Montgomery's Eighth Army and General George Patton's Seventh U.S. Army, conquered the island in 38 days. The Germans and Italians, however, were able to withdraw from Sicily to the Italian mainland. In September 1943 Alexander's Army Group invaded Italy with the Eighth Army crossing at the Straits of Messina and American General Mark Clark's Fifth U.S. Army landing at Salerno. The ensuing Italian campaign was a protracted, brutal affair fought over difficult terrain. As Italy had become primarily an operation intended to tie down German forces, Alexander regularly had divisions and equipment withdrawn from his command. Despite Italy becoming a distinctly secondary theatre, he attempted to retain forces under his command and advocated the Ljubljana gap strategy.

As Army Group commander in Italy, Alexander directed the battles of Monte Cassino, the landing at Anzio, Operation Diadem and the liberation of Rome, and the attacks on the Gothic Line. During the breakout from Anzio one of the great controversies of the Italian campaign occurred with Clark ignoring Alexander's plans and redirecting the Fifth U.S. Army to advance on Rome.

Promoted to Field Marshal in 1944, Alexander became Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean in December of that year. Immediately upon taking up the appointment, he was confronted by a crisis in Athens. Under his general direction the final offensive of the Italian Campaign was launched in April 1945. This operation brought about the German surrender in Italy with one million prisoners taken.

After the war, Alexander was Governor-General of Canada and then served as Minister of Defence in Churchill's government. Created a viscount in 1946, he was advanced to earl in 1952. Alexander had married in 1931 and had four children. Excelling at athletics as a young man, he was also an avid painter. He died at Slough on 16 July 1969.

Selected Annotated Bibliography
This bibliography examines the extensive body of literature on Field Marshal Alexander. The literature comprises monographs, official histories, memoirs, articles,
published papers, despatches and reports, and bibliographies. The bibliography, selective rather than comprehensive, is composed of materials necessary for the study of Alexander. Representative titles have been selected for each relevant subject. Each item is accompanied by brief annotations reviewing its relevance to Alexander. The bibliography is arranged alphabetically by author.

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Alexander’s reminiscences appeared in a seven part series which ran each week from 19 February 1961 to 2 April 1961. Although entitled ‘Alexander’s Own Story’, the articles were written on his behalf by Major John North, his friend and collaborator. To prepare the articles, Alexander accompanied by General Richard McCreery, Field Marshal John Harding, and John North, toured the former battlefields in Africa and Italy.

*Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Greece 12th December 1944 to 9th May 1945* (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, (HMSO) 1949).

Alexander’s despatches and campaign reports were written after the war while he was serving as Governor-General of Canada. Under his general direction, David Hunt, one of his wartime staff officers, wrote the despatches on Africa, Sicily, and Italy and thoroughly revised the one on Greece. Nigel Nicolson calls Alexander’s despatches ‘among the great state-papers of our military history’.

Alexander writes in the report dealing with Greece that at the time of his first visit to Athens the British were facing a disaster, which could only be averted by immediate and energetic measures. He used British troops against the Greeks with very great reluctance.


A controversy arose in 1962 over the despatch on the African Campaign after Alexander revealed in his memoirs that Montgomery had altered the text when a draft was submitted to the War Office for comment prior to publication.


Strangely organized, brief, and superficial, Alexander’s memoirs are very poor. Like *The Sunday Times* articles, the book was ghost written by John North. The memoirs consist of the largely unaltered text of the newspaper articles enlarged to include a series of battle summaries. The memoirs cover only the Second World War. Basil Liddell-Hart feared the poor quality of the memoirs would hurt Alexander’s reputation. David Hunt later claimed Alexander preferred to be judged on the basis of his despatches.

A major controversy of the campaign is avoided in this despatch with Clark’s change of direction towards Rome merely noted without comment. The diversion of strength from Italy to undertake Anvil, the invasion of southern France, is discussed.

The Battle of Tunis (Sheffield: University of Sheffield, 1957).

In this lecture Alexander said that victory at Tunis depended on the front line soldiers and that after fighting in two world wars and on other battlefields his ‘proudest thought is that I, too, have been a Front Line soldier’.


The despatch covers the planning, invasion, and conquest of Sicily. Alexander notes that he was ‘anxious’ about Patton’s reaction to the recasting of the invasion plan.


The final offensive in Italy is recounted in the despatch. Alexander claims the Italian campaign successfully fulfilled its strategic mission of drawing off German strength and holding the maximum number of enemy divisions in the theatre.


This book presents 47 plates of Alexander’s works, painted from 1939 to 1967. In the introduction, Edward Seago comments on Alexander as a painter and writes that Alexander would have been amused at the idea of a book of his pictures being published.


Allen is critical of Alexander in this study and includes Lieutenant-General Francis Tuker’s caustic comment that he was ‘the least intelligent commander I have ever met in a high position’. The withdrawal from Burma bears the sub-heading, ‘The longest retreat: Slim improves on Sir John Moore’. Allen calls Alexander’s statement that he received only one directive from Wavell during the campaign to be untrue.


Foreword by Alexander. Anders commanded the Polish Corps in Italy and writes very favourably about Alexander’s character and qualities as a soldier.


Lieutenant-General Anderson’s despatch as commander of the First Army, including the period after he came under the control of Alexander’s Army Group.

This book includes a summary of the famous 1910 cricket match between Eton and Harrow, known as Fowler's Match, in which Alexander played.


This work has a historiographical essay and a 413 item bibliography.


This work has a historiographical essay and a 504 item bibliography.


In this study of the influence of Ultra on the Mediterranean campaign, Bennett writes that Alexander paid close attention to intelligence, particularly Ultra. Based on examples of Ultra intelligence being used at Anzio, Diadem, and the final offensive in April 1945, it is difficult to overrate the assistance Ultra gave to Alexander.


Lemnitzer served as Alexander's Deputy Chief of Staff in Italy and regarded him as a mentor. He considered Alexander and Eisenhower the war's outstanding Allied commanders.


A history of the Italian campaign in 1944–45.


This account of the campaign of 1940 in France includes the operations of Alexander's 1st Division in the retreat and his command at Dunkirk, including the disagreements with the French and his appeal to Eden for instructions. Alexander underestimated the French ability to hold the perimeter.


Montgomery is the great showman and Kenneth Anderson the plain cook in this account of the North African campaign from Alamein to Tunis.


Blumenson concludes that Alexander failed at Anzio. The Anzio concept was daring, but he 'was too much the gentleman to make it work'.


The failure of Alexander to exert control over Clark at important moments in the Italian campaign is cited in this biography. Also in evidence are Clark's poor opinion of Alexander and the British, his conviction that the British were at every turn trying to deny him credit, and his vast ambition.

U.S. Official History. The volume covers from Salerno to the close of the third battle of Cassino.


Bradley praises Alexander's character and abilities, but claims the fighting in Tunisia could have been concluded sooner by adopting a bolder strategy. Alexander held American soldiers in low esteem. In Sicily there was no master plan and Alexander accepted Montgomery's plan which would have relegated the U.S. Army to a supporting role.


Brookes served in the Irish Guards under Alexander during the First World War before becoming a monk. In the Second World War Alexander appointed Brookes chaplain at his headquarters in Italy.


Relevant materials from this book include the Alexander-Montgomery correspondence, Montgomery's diary entries, and other letters and reports by Montgomery which discuss Alexander.


The wartime diaries and post-war autobiographical notes of Alanbrooke were edited and published in two volumes by Bryant. In this volume Brooke writes in a post-war note that the appreciation he formed of Alexander and Montgomery during the campaign in France resulted in his selection of the two to command in Egypt two years later.


In common with other portions of the diaries, Bryant dubiously selected and edited the entries dealing with Alexander. Bryant entirely excised all of Brooke's criticism of Alexander that can be found in the complete version of the diaries published in *War Diaries* edited by Danchev and Todman. For example, Bryant skips over Alanbrooke's disparaging comments on Alexander in the diary entry of 11 April 1944. Bryant's version reads, 'In the afternoon Alexander turned up to see me, back from Italy. Discussed plan of attack with him', while the *War Diaries* version of the entry reads 'In the afternoon Alexander turned up to see me, back from Italy. Whenever I meet him again my first impression is one of marveling at what a small caliber man he is! He just shatters me, he is floating in the ether with very little realization of what he is doing. And yet the PM has never realized what a small caliber man he is. I discussed Alexander's plan of attack with him'.

Butcher was Eisenhower’s naval aide. The relationship between Alexander and Eisenhower is illustrated, including Eisenhower’s insistence that the Americans be given a substantial role in the final phase in Tunisia. Also included are Eisenhower’s impressed comments after first meeting Alexander in 1942, ‘That guy’s good! He ought to be Commander-in-Chief instead of me!’


Alexander is assessed in this study of British generalship. Callahan writes that Alexander has been and remains an enigma with both his supporters and detractors. A consensus on his reputation may be long in coming. It is easy to produce a caricature of Alexander as a charming lightweight. While Alexander contributed to the command failure at Anzio, Callahan believes no other British general could have done better than Alexander in Italy. The denigration of Alexander by Brooke and Montgomery has affected subsequent writing. On commenting on the literature on Alexander, Callahan writes that a new study of this general is needed.


Harding was Alexander’s chief of staff in 1944–45. Alexander is described as being at his best in critical situations. Alexander, not a great intellect, would evolve his plans from discussions and then leave his chief of staff to translate the plan into orders.


Nigel Nicolson contributes the chapter on Alexander for this volume.


Eisenhower’s papers include letters written to Alexander as well as documents in which Alexander is mentioned.


Relevant volumes are *Road to Victory 1941–1945*, which covers the Churchill-Alexander relationship during the war, and ‘*Never Despair*’ 1945–1965, which includes Alexander’s term as Minister of Defence. Although occasionally frustrated with Alexander, such as at Anzio, Churchill remained his great supporter.


Relevant volumes include *The Hinge of Fate, Closing the Ring*, and *Triumph and Tragedy*. In a study of this title, David Reynolds writes that Alexander and Montgomery emerge as the ‘military heroes’ of the memoirs.


Alexander fulfilled the American image of what a British general should be. The author faults Alexander for supporting a flawed Anzio concept and for being
typically conciliatory with Clark in the breakout rather than putting him firmly in his place.

Clark chose not to reveal his disdain for Alexander and the British in his memoirs. Instead, he writes that Alexander was extremely considerate of his views. Clark terms the bombing of the monastery at Monte Cassino a tragic mistake and writes that his army ‘deserved’ the honour of capturing Rome. He dismisses Alexander’s plan for the Anzio breakout by saying he doubted the manoeuvre would have trapped a large number of Germans.

Clarke, Rupert, *With Alex at War: From the Irrawaddy to the Po, 1941–1945* (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000).
Clarke was an aide to Alexander from 1941 to early 1945 and accompanied him on all of his campaigns. This personal memoir provides a unique perspective on Alexander. Clarke admired Alexander and writes that his staff loved to work for him. An appendix contains letters Alexander wrote to his children from Italy. The book is heavily illustrated with photographs of Alexander.

Field Marshal Templer served under Alexander in Britain and Italy. He thought Alexander was lazy, but also that he was able to delegate and rely upon his staff. Alexander’s visit to Templer at Anzio is described.

Gort commanded the British Expeditionary Force in France.

Colville writes that Churchill placed Alexander, ‘at the centre of his Pantheon of heroes’.

A vigorous defence of Alexander’s predecessor in the Middle East, with the chapter on Auchinleck’s dismissal titled ‘Scapegoats in Cairo’.

Underestimating the Japanese, Wavell’s orders to Alexander upon his arrival from England were to hold Rangoon. Adhering to these instructions almost led to Alexander being trapped and forced to surrender. After Alexander had escaped Rangoon, Wavell accepted he had been wrong and Alexander had acted correctly.

A volume of biographical sketches of the 17 Governor-Generals up to 1952. The chapter on Alexander outlines several of his activities while he held the office and has a short sketch of Countess Alexander.
Recounts the advance of the New Zealand division to Trieste and the Allied confrontation with Tito.

In the unexpurgated version of his diaries, Brooke is biting in his criticism of Alexander in both his diary as well as post-war autobiographical notes. He dismisses him as ‘palpably devoid of any real ideas of his own’. For all of Alexander’s qualities, Brooke thought there was ‘such a ghastly void behind it all’.

De Guingand, Montgomery’s wartime chief of staff, writes that he was impressed with the way Alexander worked with Montgomery in Africa.

In this and his other works, D’Este is very critical of Alexander, whose reputation he describes as highly overrated. In a chapter titled ‘Alexander: The Great Enigma’, the author refers to the ‘myth’ of Alexander as a great military leader and is critical of his command style. D’Este’s Alexander possessed a ‘delightful outer façade’, but was intellectually lazy with a shallow intellect. Alexander was detached from the planning of Husky, failed to impose an overall plan on the campaign, exhibited poor leadership, and made decisions that led to the campaign’s dreary ending. Alexander’s biographer, William Jackson, believed D’Este’s assessment of Alexander relied too heavily on Montgomery’s views.

D’Este writes that Eisenhower admired Alexander above all other British officers and seeks to explain why he identified with Alexander. Alexander is an ‘unfathomable enigma’ whose admirers included frontline soldiers, generals who served under him, and politicians. Alexander could have been ‘the poster boy for the ideal commander of a large multinational force’ but for his ‘laissez-faire style of command’.

D’Este heavily criticizes Alexander’s generalship in this study. In his portrait sketch he includes a divisional commander’s accusation that Alexander was ‘bone from the neck up’. Clark’s change of direction in the breakout was a misguided blunder. While Clark deceived him regarding his intentions, Alexander did nothing to prevent the problem from developing. Alexander’s command style is called detached and his understanding of his enemy is branded ‘shockingly deficient’.

Skeptical about the abilities of Americans, Alexander relegated the Americans to a secondary role in Tunisia and Sicily. An infuriated Patton ‘outfoxed’ Alexander in Sicily. Patton thought poorly of Alexander and noted in his diary, ‘I found out that he has an extremely small head. That may explain things’.

Deutsch re-examines the performances of selected generals, including Alexander, in light of their utilization of intelligence. Alexander had a keen sense of intelligence and there was a close link between intelligence and operational decisions. However, he ignored intelligence in his decision-making regarding Anzio.


Moscow correspondent for the *New York Times*, Durany includes a brief but informative sketch of Alexander at the time he was commanding the *Landwehr*.


Upon Alexander assuming command of the Army Group in Tunisia, Eisenhower writes that he had great respect and admiration for Alexander’s soldierly qualities, and that he preferred him to Montgomery for Overlord.


A critical survey of Allied generalship in Europe and the Pacific. Alexander’s final offensive in Tunisia lacked flair; Sicily was a ‘mishmash’ of unco-ordinated pushes, and the pursuit phase after Cassino was muffed by deploying an unwieldy *corps de chasse*.


As Alexander allowed the Germans to make a measured retreat, Cassino and the fall of Rome are ‘at best hollow victories’. Diadem was flawed in both its conception and execution. Alexander’s generalship is faulted on several points, such as for making an overcrowded advance up the Liri Valley.


British Official History. The volume includes a chapter on the completion of the evacuation at Dunkirk under Alexander’s command.


U.S. Official History. This volume covers from Diadem to the German surrender in Italy. Alexander’s command relationship with Clark is discussed and Fisher records that in a 1948 interview Clark claimed he told Alexander that he would not only refuse to permit the Eighth Army to participate in the capture of Rome, but ‘would fire on any Eighth Army troops who tried to do so’.


In the foreword, Alexander writes that his ambition as a boy was to become an Irish Guardsman.
Fraser, David, *Alanbrooke* (New York: Atheneum, 1982).
Alanbrooke was ambivalent about Alexander and thought him out of his depth in some situations. Fraser writes that Brooke perhaps showed insufficient appreciation of Alexander's many qualities.

Freyberg commanded the New Zealand division in Africa and Italy and the New Zealand Corps at Cassino. The bombing of the monastery is discussed.

U.S. Official History. The volume discusses the planning of the invasion, Alexander's scepticism about the Americans, and the lack of a specific plan for the conquest of the island. Alexander is faulted for allowing Montgomery to change the Eighth Army's plans on 12 July 1943 when the Allied armies were in position to finish the entire campaign quickly.

In the second of his memoirs, De Gaulle describes meeting Alexander in Italy and characterizes him as a 'great leader, of lucid mind and firm character'.

British Official History. Relevant volumes for Alexander are Volume 3 which includes Burma in 1942 and volumes 4–6 which cover Mediterranean Strategy, the Casablanca conference, the end in Africa, the decision to invade Europe, the Italian surrender, the role of the Italian campaign, the debate over Anvil, and victory in Italy.

A study of the British painter who was Alexander's friend and painting companion. Seago thought that had Alexander devoted his life to painting he could have been a very good artist.

Gort, John, 'Second Despatch (Covering the period from 1st February, 1940, to 31st May, 1940)', *Supplement to the London Gazette*, (17 October 1941), 5906–5934.
Gort's campaign summary includes his handing over to Alexander at Dunkirk and the instructions he gave him. Alexander's brief report, written in June 1940, on his command at Dunkirk is included as an appendix. His discussions with the French commanders are outlined and his own incorrect view that the front could not be maintained after the night of 1st/2nd June is stated.

Graham and Bidwell are highly critical of Alexander's generalship. As Army Group commander Alexander did not impose his will on his army commanders, most especially on Mark Clark. He is faulted for allowing an unsound plan for Avalanche to proceed, temporizing with Clark and thus failing to reap the full
benefits of Diadem, and for botching the attack on the Gothic Line. Alexander’s failure is attributed to his willingness to compromise on approved plans rather than impose them on his subordinates. Alexander was malleable and therefore attractive to politicians.


The relevant chapters from this volume are ‘General Lucas at Anzio (1944)’ and ‘General Clark’s Decision to Drive on Rome (1944)’.


Grigg was Secretary of State for War from 1942 to 1945. Reprinted in the appendix to these memoirs are the articles he wrote for the *Sunday Times* on six British generals, including Alexander. William Jackson called Grigg’s article an invaluable description of Alexander by one of his contemporaries. Despite having known him longer than any other soldier, Grigg wonders if he really knows Alexander at all and calls him inscrutable.


Gunther, a correspondent, interviewed Alexander while covering the Mediterranean theatre in 1943.


Throughout this massive three volume biography, Hamilton is extremely critical of Alexander. Hamilton writes that Alexander was too weak-willed to sack Anderson in Tunisia, was too in awe of Montgomery to take charge in Sicily, and in Italy provided neither an objective nor coherent strategy. Quotes from Montgomery’s papers include his comment that Alexander’s planning, grip on the battle, and conduct of the war had been ‘a complete failure’.


Hamilton dismisses Alexander as the most ineffective Minister of Defence of the twentieth-century, who had his despatches ghost-written by one of his intelligence officers.


In trying to explain the relationship between Alexander and Montgomery, De Guingand’s view is quoted that having been taught by Montgomery at the Staff College, Alexander always looked on him as his military superior.


A recounting of the bombing of the monastery. Tuker and Freyberg requested the bombing which Clark had the authority to approve or deny without consulting Alexander. However, Clark referred the issue to Alexander who took the responsibility and made the decision to bomb after possibly consulting with the theatre commander, General H. M. Wilson.

In the Lee Knowles lecture for 1959, Harding calls the diversion of forces from Italy to the south of France a 'mistake' from a military point of view.


An admiring personal profile of Alexander by his former chief of staff.


This book includes the author’s meeting with Alexander in Italy during the war and his post-war interviews with Mark Clark, Richard McCreery and Wladyslaw Anders.


British Official History. This volume covers the occupation of Italy as well as the French entry into Italian territory in 1945 and negotiations with Tito.


Alexander’s papers are listed as being held at the Public Records Office [since renamed The National Archives] with other materials held at the National Archives of Canada and in family possession.


A summary of the final offensive in Italy.


This history of the Salerno battle includes Clark’s comments about his command relationship with Alexander.


A popular account of Alexander’s life and military career at the time he was Minister of Defence. The approach is uncritical and the tone hagiographical. A reviewer declared the book not worthy of the subject.


British Official History. Relevant volumes of the title include volume 2 which covers the influence of intelligence in Africa, while volume 3 covers Sicily and the Italian campaign. Volume 5 studies deception in the Mediterranean including at Alamein, Diadem, and Operation Mincemeat.


The first volume of the official biography studies Macmillan’s period as minister in the Mediterranean during the war. It discusses his friendship with and high
esteem for Alexander. The volume includes Alexander’s role in Italy and Greece, the confrontation with Tito, and the repatriations. Horne writes that although Alexander intervened to halt the repatriations, there is no evidence that he would have acted differently than Macmillan in proceeding with them.


A Corps commander in Africa and Europe, Horrocks observes that Alexander had a distant personality and that he was unable to get to know him.


In this consideration of the Mediterranean strategy, Operation Anvil and the Ljubljana Gap strategy are examined.


U.S. Official History. Alexander’s unfavourable estimate of the Americans, formed in the wake of Kasserine, lingered and led to him specifying the scope of each operation undertaken by Patton’s corps.


In the foreword, Alexander writes that as Hunt served on his staff from 1942 to 1945 there is no one more knowledgeable about the war from the headquarters view. In the foreword to the 1990 edition, Hunt writes that since the first edition was published in 1966 Alexander’s reputation has suffered. Hunt writes that Alexander had a ‘fantastically active mind’ and was ‘interested in everything under the sun from the sciences to the arts’. This claim prompted Nigel Hamilton to assert that Hunt was trying to invent a portrait of genius for Alexander.


A favourable profile of Alexander by his former staff officer.


In a second volume of memoirs, Hunt describes working on the campaign despatches with Alexander in Ottawa after the war.


This account of the crisis in Greece makes references to Alexander’s role in the British intervention.


This military study of Alexander, rather than a full biography, is favourable towards its subject. Jackson’s Alexander possesses great charm, personal integrity, was self-effacing, and possessed unrivalled military experience and proven military judgment. His command by suggestion rather than orders, however, was apt to be misunderstood. Jackson credits Alexander with taking charge at Dunkirk, maintaining cohesion during the retreat from Burma, and being the best possible
superior for Montgomery. Tunis was his victory alone, Salerno was won by him, and the last battle in Italy in 1945 was a masterpiece. Alexander made no determined effort to ensure his instructions were obeyed by Clark at Anzio as he felt constrained in dealing with the American general. Jackson finds Alexander was ‘no Napoleon’. His campaigns lacked inspired operational concepts, but were instead founded on sound commonsense and his battle experience.

Foreword by Alexander. Jackson concludes that the Italian campaign fulfilled its strategic purpose and continues his positive evaluation of Alexander’s generalship. Alexander outwitted Kesselring before each major Allied offensive, but Kesselring was able to recover and prevent a breakthrough or collapse.

In this survey, Jackson describes Alexander as being ‘as easily at home in palaces as slit-trenches’. Alexander’s two-handed strategy is discussed.

Jackson calls Diadem a great masterpiece of generalship. Clark’s change of direction and the slowness of the Liri Valley advance are just ‘minor facets’ of the battle. Jackson credits Alexander with a brilliant deception plan and inspired handling of his mixed Allied team. Challenging Clark’s change of direction would have sown ‘dissension and hence disaster in an Allied team’.

In his chapter on Alexander, Brian Holden Reid declares him ‘the spiritual heir of Marlborough and Wellington’ who upheld ‘the very best traditions of British generalship’. Reid suggests those who demanded he display more grip in Italy failed to understand the difficulties of commanding an international force.

A newspaper interview with Lady Alexander, in which she discusses life being married to Alexander.

A detailed regimental history written by Kipling, whose son died serving with the Irish Guards at Loos. Kipling concludes the second volume with a tribute to Alexander, declaring he had an undeniable gift for handling men and in the worst crises would ‘somehow contrive to dress the affair as high comedy’.

British Official History. This volume includes the fall of Burma and discusses the attempt to hold Rangoon and Alexander’s efforts to work with the Chinese and the outspoken Stilwell. Kirby questions certain of Alexander’s decisions including ordering Burcorps to undertake offensive operations on the Irrawaddy front on 28 March 1942.
Leeper, Reginald, *When Greek Meets Greek* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1950). Leeper was British ambassador to Greece during the crisis in 1944–45.


Lewin, R., *Ultra Goes to War: The Secret Story* (London: Hutchinson, 1978). In this study, Lewin asserts that with the thousands of Ultra signals made available to him, ‘no previous commander was informed so extensively and so accurately as Alexander’. His interest in Ultra was personal and direct.


Liddell Hart, Basil (ed.), *The Rommel Papers* (London: Collins, 1953). The papers of the German general who was specifically named in the directive Churchill issued to Alexander upon his assumption of command in Cairo.

Lunt, James, *A Hell of a Licking: The Retreat from Burma, 1941–2* (London: Collins, 1986). Alexander was a master of putting a ‘good face on things’. During the campaign Alexander’s only major decisions were to evacuate Rangoon and then at the end of April to retreat to India. Lunt finds Alexander’s decision to hold Taungdwingyi in the name of Allied unity difficult to justify. The author believes Alexander was a remarkably lucky general.

Macksey, Kenneth, *Crucible of Power: The Fight for Tunisia, 1942–1943* (London: Hutchinson, 1969). In this study of Operation Torch and the Tunisian campaign, Macksey questions Alexander’s judgment of Anderson and believes he may have overstated the deficiencies of the American forces. In Tunisia Alexander did not attempt bold and ambitious strokes, but hammered away with ‘frontal pushes’.


Macmillan, Harold, *The Blast of War, 1939–1945* (London: Macmillan, 1967). In his memoirs Macmillan records he was very much impressed by Alexander and describes him as very remarkable and the ‘Marlborough of this war’. Nigel Nicolson commented that Alexander was the hero of the volume and that Macmillan’s portrait of him was the most attractive ever drawn.
Referring to Alexander’s retirement from the Cabinet in late 1954, his colleague Macmillan writes that Alexander seemed relieved to be leaving politics.

In his diaries, Macmillan details his high opinion of Alexander and of how they worked quite closely together. Macmillan was impressed by Alexander’s method of command, which he called most interesting and extremely effective.

By a former Conservative Member of Parliament, this book studies the confrontation with Tito in 1945 and the repatriations to Yugoslavia. Although Alexander was perturbed by the reports of the repatriations he began receiving, the author does not believe he had been ignorant of the fact that they were taking place.

McCreery, Alexander’s chief of staff in 1942–43, is critical of Montgomery in this article. Of Alexander, however, McCreery writes that he was ‘par excellence the man for the great occasion’, wonderful to work for, and was able to inspire great confidence.

Montgomery refrained from criticizing Alexander in his controversial memoirs. Instead, he writes that he liked and respected him. Montgomery asserts he recommended Alexander to Gort at Dunkirk, that all plans for Alamein were made at Eighth Army without comment from Alexander, and that he suggested Alexander reinforce the First Army at Tunis. The invasion of Sicily is faulted for lacking a master plan with the two Army commanders left to develop their own plans. The conduct of the Italian invasion was even worse than Sicily with no attempt made to co-ordinate the crossing at Messina with the Salerno landing.

In his diaries Churchill’s doctor recounts the admiration and affection the Prime Minister felt for Alexander. After the war Churchill told Moran, Alexander was the ‘best we had, better than Monty’.

An examination of Alexander’s role as the ‘father’ of modern battle-drill.

Alexander’s staff officer in France describes the operations of the 1st Division and the evacuation at Dunkirk as well as providing observations on Alexander’s character and work methods.

This volume of the study of the United States Navy in the war covers the invasion of Sicily and landings at Salerno and Anzio.


This study of the Salerno landing includes Alexander's role in the battle.


Canadian Official History. The Canadian Corps served in the Italian campaign until February 1945 when it was moved to Northwest Europe.


In this 'accredited' biography, Nicolson was granted access to Alexander's papers by his widow. This sympathetic treatment was generally well-received and reviewer Ronald Lewin wrote that no further account on Alexander was now required. In explaining Alexander's great success, the author places great emphasis on his courage, calm, tact, and charm. The emphasis on charm prompted Alun Chalfont to write in a review that everyone Alexander met apparently found him charming. David Hunt thought the stress on his charm was overdone with not enough credit given to Alexander's 'strategic genius'. Nicolson believes Alexander reached his professional peak as a brigade commander and as the forces he commanded became larger his limitations became more apparent. Although he cites instances when Alexander did not insist on a strategy he knew to be right, Nicolson nonetheless approves of Alexander's method of command that relied upon persuasion.


Part III covers the Loe Agra Campaign and the Mohmand Campaign.


Alexander's original plan to use both Allied armies to storm the centre of the Gothic Line was altered at the request of Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese.


A history of the amphibious landing on Sicily.


A chapter-length profile of Alexander by Cyril Falls.


British Official History. Relevant volumes are volume 3 which includes the appointment of Alexander in the Middle East, volume 4 which covers from El Alamein to Tunis, and volume 5 which studies the conquest of Sicily and invasion of Italy. Volume 6 completes the Italian campaign. In the final volume,
written by William Jackson, Alexander is placed among the great commanders of the war. He can be considered an enigma unless his background of extensive battle experience is understood. Alexander was exceptionally brave, not easily ruffled, and always reserved, but with great personal charm. He possessed outstanding tactical flair, but was weaker as a strategist. With his dislike of paperwork, Alexander always needed a good chief of staff.


Porch criticizes Alexander’s generalship in this study. While his personality ‘qualified him to suffer the tantrums of prima donna generals’, Alexander lacked the intellectual stature and force of character to mediate between his generals. In Sicily and Italy Alexander failed to grip the battle or co-ordinate the two Allied armies. Alexander was ill-equipped to deal with Clark’s ambition.


Official History of the Indian Armed Forces. The 17th Indian Division formed part of Burcorps during Alexander’s Burma campaign.


This work has a historiographical narrative and a 1613 item annotated bibliography.


Alexander’s chief staff officer as Minister of Defence, Jacob thought Alexander had high courage, a fine appearance, and a fund of commonsense, but lacked the ‘equivalent mental equipment’ and did not have any original ideas.


This short laudatory book provides anecdotes and personal stories about Alexander by his family and friends.


U.S. Official History. This volume includes the retreat from Burma. The allied command situation is studied and the authors find that despite winning Chinese agreement for his overall command in Burma, Alexander was unable to exercise command over the Chinese forces.


British Official History. Volume 3 includes the invasion of Sicily, the landing at Salerno, and the landings at Anzio.


Leese commanded the Eighth Army in Italy in 1944.
Seago, Edward, With the Allied Armies in Italy (London: Collins, 1945).
Foreword by Alexander. In 1944 at Alexander’s invitation, Seago joined Alexander’s headquarters in Italy as his unofficial artist of the campaign. This book has 103 of Seago’s paintings including a portrait of Alexander.

The author briefly describes Alexander’s role at Dunkirk including his disagreements with the French over the evacuation.

This study of Churchill’s second government concludes that while always a ‘tremendous public figure’, as Minister of Defence Alexander’s ‘deficiencies far outweighed his merits’.

As First Sea Lord, Cunningham objected to Alexander’s appointment as Supreme Commander, Mediterranean. Cunningham thought Alexander possessed ‘no opinions of his own’ and had ‘no knowledge of the sea and little of the air’.

In Italy Alexander always succeeded in surprising the enemy, but Kesselring always managed to recover.

Slim’s memoirs are the best by a Second World War general. While recognizing that holding Burma was an impossible task with the means provided, Slim is critical of the failure to formulate a definitive directive on the campaign’s overall objective. Slim declares the British were outmanoeuvred and outgeneraled.

Alexander had an ideal temperament for soldiering, was a fine strategist, and splendid handler of troops in battle. However, he required a good staff as he gave them the maximum amount of responsibility.

Smyth concludes that, although the most difficult to assess, Alexander should rank with Montgomery and Slim as the great British battle leaders of the war.

In this study of the British disasters in the first months of the war against Japan, the author credits Alexander for a realistic plan to withdraw as slowly as possible and illustrates his attempts to establish Allied unity with the Chinese. Alexander and Slim are cited for errors that made the retreat to India more difficult.

A sympathetic account of Alexander's campaigns in the Second World War that contends that Alexander has rarely received the credit he deserves for his achievements. Those who made highly critical comments about Alexander, such as Slim and Cunningham, 'did not understand Alexander's character or did not appreciate the nature and extent of Alexander's responsibilities.' As Alexander guarded his privacy it should not be surprising that his personality was a mystery to many. His one real weakness was 'a reluctance to cause hurt or offence to anyone.'


Verney, Peter, *The Micks: The Story of the Irish Guards* (London: Peter Davies, 1970). In the foreword Templer calls Alexander a 'remarkable man' and the 'ideal of a beau sabreur'. Alexander's leadership is credited by the author for holding the battalion together during the difficult period of Ireland's independence.


Wavell, Archibald, 'Operations in Burma, from 15th December, 1941 to 20th May, 1942', *Supplement to The London Gazette,* (11 March, 1948), 1667–1712. Wavell writes that the battle at the Sittang River sealed the fate of Lower Burma and that his own instructions to Alexander to hold Rangoon nearly led to the British being cut off. Wavell credits Alexander with inspiring leadership during the campaign. Wavell's despatch includes Alexander's report on Burma, which was written in May 1942. Alexander writes it was too late to save Rangoon when he arrived in Burma and the loss of the city virtually decided the outcome of the campaign. Alexander observed there was no unity of command in Burma and recommends that such unity should be achieved in all theatres of war.

Robertson was Alexander's chief administrative officer in Italy.


Wilson was Supreme Commander, Mediterranean from January to December 1944.


Written by a former intelligence officer, this book contained the first revelations of Ultra. Winterbotham writes that Alexander was fascinated with the Ultra story and credits him with being the 'supreme user of Ultra in the Mediterranean'.