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Secretaries of Pork? A New Theory of Distributive Public Policy
Journal of Politics (2009)
  • Anthony M Bertelli, University of Southern California
  • Christian R Grose, Vanderbilt University

Scholars have focused attention toward congressional influence over distributive grant allocations, though have less frequently examined the extent to which administrative agencies play a role in that process. We present a new theory of ideology-contingent executive decisionmaking within a multiple-principals framework to explain the geographic distribution of policy benefits. Our theory is novel in that it locates inter-branch ideological conflict and confluence at the center of bureaus' allocational strategies. Discretionary Department of Labor (DOL) grants and Department of Defense (DOD) contracts from 1991-2002 are examined to provide evidence that agencies deliver more grants to senators with proximate ideologies. To measure bureaucratic ideology, we generate comparable ideology estimates for cabinet secretaries, presidents, and members of the U.S. Senate via an item response model. Our findings suggest that ideological congruence between senators and DOL or DOD is associated with significantly larger amounts of grants or contracts respectively. These findings are important as they recast our understanding of distributive politics into ideological terms.

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Anthony M Bertelli and Christian R Grose. "Secretaries of Pork? A New Theory of Distributive Public Policy" Journal of Politics (2009)
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