The Zionist Model as an Ironically Workable Diplomatic Strategy for Post-Mubarak Egypt

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THE ZIONIST MODEL AS AN IRONICALLY WORKABLE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY FOR POST-MUBARAK EGYPT

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The fundamental question for post-Mubarak Egypt, and central focus of this comment, is whether the 2011 revolution will retune Egypt as a transcending advocate of democratic principles for countries undergoing similar transformations; or lead Egypt down the theologically repressive path toward failed statehood. Within the context of this question, this article further examines the interplay between the shortcomings of international human rights law, former President Hosni Mubarak’s politically oppressive regime and the development of civic-minded communal groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood that give Egypt the best chance for sustainable self-governance.

This article proposes that by applying the early 20th century Zionist campaign’s diplomatic strategy as a model infrastructure for the Muslim Brotherhood, the Brotherhood’s quest and capture of domestic political power can concurrently lead to international legitimacy. The proposed model introduces a concept of sociopolitical hybridity in which the Brotherhood formally aligns their vision of Egypt with the diplomatic aims of an internationally influential western superpower—building the Islamist Republic they have long sought to create while forging lasting, strategic partnerships.

INTRODUCTION

An Israeli F-16 broke the sound barrier above the Nitzana communal settlement in southwestern Israel, generating a roaring crescendo that echoed between the sandstone dunes of the Negev Desert and thundered through the narrow corridor adjacent to our sleeping barracks. Within seconds, a tired South African accent grumbled unintelligibly, and the movement of dozens of stirring bodies caused the rusted, low-squatting, iron bed frames to squawk like a crowd of chattering birds. As the unrest steadily calmed, the room of novice student-soldiers was once again filled with the dull humming of a rotating floor fan.
Just as my breathing began to slow, the metallic clamoring of an AK-47 popped in the distance; followed by muted cheers in Egyptian Arabic and the distinct whining twinge of Middle Eastern music. The variety of late night activity seemed peculiar—and oddly symbolic. Israeli jets were zipping above well lit watch towers, hugging the Egyptian border before turning north—belching sonic booms into Egypt. And across the fence, standing on the same chalky Earth, Egyptians boisterously celebrated the birth of a child, or a wedding, or some religious event—defiantly sending the sounds of gunfire into southern Israel.

The next morning, I wandered to the chain-link perimeter fence and pressed my face against it; aligning my left eye with one of the diamond shaped openings. A road that was decipherable only by its slightly darker tint of worn, compacted sand snaked along the Egyptian border, jutting up the hilly landscape and into view. The only other sign of civilization was a curiously placed street sign that leaned in the cracked earth, adorning curvy Arabic script instead of the angular Hebrew letters that were customary to my upbringing. The land was the same, and the street-sign stood as a mere dissimilarity. But as you moved further south into Egypt, or further north into Israel, the way we worshipped, buried our loved ones, consecrated marriage and welcomed a newborn could not be more disparate. It was these differences that thickened the border—and in the wake of the 2011 uprising—it was these differences that could keep Egypt’s answer for future sustainability on the Israeli side of the fence.

The fundamental question for post-Mubarak Egypt, and central focus of this comment, is whether the 2011 revolution will retune Egypt as a transcending advocate of democratic principles for countries undergoing similar transformations;¹ or lead Egypt down the well beaten and theologically repressive path toward failed statehood. Part I of this article provides a

contemporary background for this question, and examines the interplay between the shortcomings of international human rights law, former President Hosni Mubarak’s politically oppressive regime\(^2\) and the development of civic-minded communal groups,\(^3\) namely the Muslim Brotherhood; that give Egypt the best chance for sustainable self-governance following the counter-government revolution. Part I further supplements this question’s contextual basis with an explanation of the mechanics of the Brotherhood’s emerging political power in the wake of Mubarak’s regime, and offers potential solutions for pacifying growing mistrust from nations vital to Egypt’s long-term interests.

Part II will discuss, from a historically ironic context, Israel as an apposite paradigm for Egypt’s transition from interim military rule to a sustainable government. By stripping the Zionist\(^4\) campaign\(^5\) of its theological underpinnings and applying its diplomatic strategy as a

\(^2\) David S. Sorenson, *The Dynamics of Political Dissent in Egypt*, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 207 (2003). Sorenson explains that:

[i]nsecure governments may also view their options as either repression or co-optation of dissenters, perhaps in the hope that co-optation might strengthen their position. This was apparently the view of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi after he took power in Iran in 1953. He tried such co-optation through economic reform, though his reforms ultimately alienated far more of Iranian political society than they co-opted, and the Shah’s shift to violence against dissent paved the way for the 1979 Islamic revolution.

*Id.* at 210.

\(^3\) See *id.* at 208 (providing a generalized background for the causes and repercussions of anti-government behavior). Sorenson notes that:

[c]itizens engage in dissenting behavior for a variety of reasons involving both the nature of the cause and the nature of their government. Dissent may spring from authoritarian or semiauthoritarian governments refusing to allow more than token opposition to its policies and practices. Dissent, though, also forms when the position of the dissenters is so distant from established political norms that there is little possibility that society would adapt and accept the values of the dissenters. For them, no action of the government will deter them from pursuing dissent. Anarchists and religious extremists, for example, are likely to be dissenters in almost any society.

*Id.*

\(^4\) See generally David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (Henry Holt and Company LLC 1989) (discussing the development of the relationship between British and Zionist leadership in the late 19th and early 20th century. The ability of key Zionist leadership to court the British power elite in the early 20th century allowed the Zionists to move toward their nationalistic goals while helping the British meet their strategic objectives in the Middle East); see also Thomas L.
model infrastructure for the Muslim Brotherhood in post-Mubarak Egypt, Part II introduces a concept of sociopolitical hybridity in which an Islamist Egypt aligns its national interests with that of an internationally influential western superpower. Part II further discusses an Egypt that simultaneously builds the United States’ confidence in renewing vital military and economic developmental assistance while convincing the population that Islamic nationalism does not have to equate to diplomatic and economic isolationism.

On its face, the overwhelming majority of Egyptians would dismiss the above proposals as nonsensical sacrilege. Yet, when looked at mechanically—removing the names, ideologies, and previous dealings among the parties—the Zionist diplomatic strategy is a historically workable model for the transition from non-state actor to sustainable Middle Eastern republic. Egypt has the opportunity to be more than an ephemeral spark of solidarity in the region. However, their success will depend on the incoming government’s ability to effectively manage the empty geopolitical canvass with which they have to work.

Regardless of the ingenuity of self-stylized Middle East scholars; their words, like mine, beg the question as to how to influence specific foreign actors on the ground to implement theoretical models that fringe more on being hypothetical than practicable. Part III of this comment highlights this dilemma, and suggests that the fate of Egypt relies more on the

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6 See Sorenson, supra note 2, at 217 (highlighting the conflict between the Egyptian people’s insatiable want for international economic independence and the practical benefit of receiving annual developmental aid from the United States).
diplomatic aptitude, creativity and charisma of its individual political leadership than the words on this page or any other. Nevertheless, Part III offers a time-tested alternative to the continued use of unsophisticated means to solve complex problems, and predicts that without (1) offering an exclusive strategic advantage to an economically and militarily endowed western nation as leverage for furthering Egypt’s own cause; (2) gaining legitimacy through recognized, legal, international doctrine; and (3) supplanting religious fanaticism with a dedication to nation-building during its transitional phase, Egypt will fail. Furthermore, the Brotherhood must build a lobbying structure in the United States that creates mutual economic and strategic interests with the Americans, while also providing transparency as to the source of their funding. Forthrightness is the key to the Brotherhood’s success, as gaining the trust of the international community will be vital to the Brotherhood’s fight for legitimacy.

**PART I: SHORTCOMINGS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DEFINING AND PROTECTING POLITICALLY REPRESSED GROUPS IN HOSNI MUBARAK’S EGYPT**

A. HOSNI MUBARAK

As the United States’ conciliatory liaison to diplomatic efforts in the Middle East, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak used his careful, moderate and bureaucratic deportment to prompt his greatest western ally to turn its head and empty its pockets. Unhesitant to dangle Egypt’s geostrategic importance in the face of American Presidents, Mubarak exploited the

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7 See Charles Robert Davidson, *Reform and Repression in Mubarak’s Egypt*, FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 75, 75 (2000) (explaining how the same qualities that allowed Mubarak to steer Egypt through the unrest following Anwar Sadat’s regime also made him an attractive ally for the United States).

8 *Id.* at 76 (stating that Egypt has “historically played a pivotal role in the political life of the Middle East and North Africa”).
United States’ insatiable appetite for involvement in the region—guiding America’s foreign relations machine towards multiple and often conflicting national interests.\(^9\)

Mr. Mubarak introduced a model of political lassitude that curbed Egypt’s economic potential, expanded the executive, repressed political opposition,\(^1^0\) and predictably fell out of favor amongst government-wary Egyptians. The result, however, was not so humdrum. Thousands of Islamist, civil service-providing societies\(^1^1\) sprouted from repression and matured into an organically sweeping revolution—blanketing Egypt within weeks and subsequently toppling Mubarak’s regime.\(^1^2\)

In 2005, six years prior to the uprising, the United States asked Mr. Mubarak to implement measures that would increase competition in Egypt’s presidential electoral process.\(^1^3\) Mubarak obliged, but refused to allow impartial international monitors to oversee the

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\(^9\) Dennis Ross, *Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World* 306 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2007) (discussing the difficulty the United States was faced with in maintaining a working relationship with Mubarak while also trying to promote the rights of groups that Mubarak repressed and disenfranchised).

\(^1^0\) See Davidson, *supra* note 7, at 81 (explaining how Mubarak’s “absolute executive domination of the political arena”)

\(^1^1\) In response to the modern era of Egyptian rule:
Voluntary civil society organizations, particularly professional syndicates, such as those comprised of lawyers, doctors and journalists have been of growing political importance particularly since the liberalization schemes heralded by Sadat in the 1970s. These organizations, which today total more than 25,000, have played key oppositional roles, using their relative independence from the control of the state as a platform for constructive—but still restricted—debate and criticism of government political and economic policy.

*Id.* at 84.


\(^1^3\) Dennis Ross & David Makovsky, *Myths, Illusions & Peace: Finding a New Direction in the Middle East* 304 (Penguin 2010); *but cf.*, Frank Richardson, *An Elusive Panacea*, IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT 21-22 (April 2011) (explaining how the United States failed to establish a workable rule of law program in Iraq because of the lack of understanding of Iraqi culture. This is particularly relevant in drawing similarities between the United States’ inability to effectively restructure the Iraqi Judicial system and their inability to influence material change in Egypt’s electoral system). Richardson writes:

The US military had a rule of law building [program] which involved dispatching US judicial experts, with little knowledge of Iraqi culture and even less experience in the Arab world, to advise on the hasty reconstruction of an Iraqi legal system that lay in ruins. Responding to the abject failure of the rule of law that followed, US observers concluded, with classic understatement, that a far greater emphasis on strengthening the rule of law should have preceded the nation-rebuilding project.

*Id.*
election\textsuperscript{14}—a transparent decision that unsurprisingly led Mubarak to victory. Shortly after the election, Mubarak was back to his old ways—imprisoning political opponent Ayman Nour on frivolous charges\textsuperscript{15} and silencing judges who drew attention to the illegitimate nature of the elections.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite uncovering an exhaustive list of Mubarak’s political improprieties, the 2005 election was indicative of a more systemic problem for future United States’ relations with Egypt. The difficulty for the Americans moving forward was their ability to engage with the Egyptian authorities on how to foster the development of liberal institutions that could promote important elements of democracy, such as a free judiciary, more rights for women, and free media. These sorts of institutions create both mechanisms of accountability and stronger internal advocates for political reform.\textsuperscript{17}

While Mubarak’s prohibition of political dissidence excluded potentially radical theocratic Islamists,\textsuperscript{18} it also barred liberal Arabs who believed in pluralism and neutrality\textsuperscript{19}—precisely the ideals necessary for a sustainable democracy. The U.S. was willing to turn a blind eye to Mubarak’s conduct for reasons seen in the democratic elections in Gaza a year later—as Hamas defied the predictions of political pundits by achieving democratically-elected party status.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{14}See id. (explaining that while Mubarak implemented some of President Bush’s recommendations, he did so on his own terms by following up measures at promoting competition with restrictions that effectively nullified the short term changes that he made).

\textsuperscript{15}See id. (providing a specific example of Mubarak’s conduct following the 2005 elections; and highlighting his ability to do so without the fear of reprimand from the U.N.).

\textsuperscript{16}See Ross, supra note 9, at 298.

\textsuperscript{17}See Ross & Makovsky, supra note 13, at 305 (describing how the lack of political reform in Egypt can be attributed to the repression of certain key institutions of democracy).

\textsuperscript{18}See Davidson, supra note 7, at 84; see also Ross supra note 13, at 305 (describing the collateral consequences of Mubarak’s election day conduct).

\textsuperscript{19}See Ross & Makovsky, supra note 13, at 305.

\textsuperscript{20}This predicament was symptomatic of a larger issue within both the Obama and Bush administrations: Islamist ascendance has created confusion in the Bush administration about the desirability of Islamist participation in the political process. Fear of being accused of hypocrisy may have created a bizarre situation in which, as noted above, President Bush both praised the
Although the United States was not willing to formally pressure Mubarak’s regime on human rights issues, there is evidence to suggest that Mubarak felt pressure from the growing dissidence within Egypt’s borders.\textsuperscript{21} In a letter addressed to the U.N. General Assembly on February 19, 2009, Egyptian Ambassadors to the U.N. Hisham Badr and Maria Nazareth Frarani Azevedo wrote:

As you are aware the world is facing global economic and financial crises, in which despite the fact that some will suffer more than others, all will be affected. In this context we would like to highlight the following:

1. Recent studies point to slowdowns and recession in major economies and emerging countries. There is a general understanding that global economic growth will fall; exports volumes and revenues will decrease; foreign direct investment would adversely be affected; unemployment will rise and incomes will fall. Human rights would thus be negatively affected by these crises.

2. As the main human rights body of the United Nations, the Human Rights Council must have a say on the issue from its own perspective and contribute positively to the ongoing international and multilateral efforts, in order to contribute positively and realistically to the ongoing international and multilateral efforts, in order to avoid that these crises become also a human rights crisis.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21} Id. at 306; see also \textsc{Gordon Thomas, Gideon’s Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad} 580-83 (Thomas Dunne Books 2007). Thomas illustrates the questions that were raised among the Israeli power elite following Hamas’s 2006 victory:

How had everyone not foreseen what has happened? How had anyone not understood that Hamas had shown itself on poll day to be a disciplined organization able to turn out the faithful in huge numbers to vote? Why had noone discovered the preparation that had gone into creating the enormous green banners now being hung on public buildings? How had Hamas’s Qassam Brigades, its military wing, marching across the television screen, firing their guns in the air, their usual masks discarded, been so well rehearsed without attracting suspicion?

Mubarak deflected responsibility for Egypt’s economic woes by blaming the sluggish economy solely on the widespread global economic downturn.\(^\text{23}\) Perhaps more importantly, the letter stated that the global economy would pose a threat to human rights—not so subtly suggesting that human rights issues in Egypt were the result of forces beyond Egypt’s control. Much like Mubarak’s efforts to swindle the electoral process,\(^\text{24}\) the letter’s appearance of benevolence was subverted by a calculated undertone.

**B. INTERNATIONAL LAW**

International law is a decentralized procedural maze, often complicating multipart disputes among international entities with a mesh of unenforceable laws and directionless litigation.\(^\text{25}\) The behavior of state and non-state actors is reflexively shaped by existing forces of the geostrategic landscape; relying little on the protection or punishment that international law provides.\(^\text{26}\) In addition to lacking in muscle, many of the international covenants fail to clearly distinguish human rights and humanitarian law as distinctly independent systems.\(^\text{27}\) As a result, United Nations’ (UN) human rights bodies have created “doctrinal confusion”\(^\text{28}\) by

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\(^{23}\) See, eg., Davidson supra note 7, at 75 (suggesting that Egypt’s economic woes existed well before the global economy plummeted in 2008; and were conversely the result of Mubarak’s repressive economic policies); Davidson writes:

Long-standing emergency legislation and its progeny have criminalized many forms of political expression, chilling any impetus to greater political activism on the part of civil society and other public interest organizations. The draconian government response, while apparently successful in quelling the Islamic Group's paramilitary challenge, has entailed a further erosion of civil and political rights for all Egyptians and has surely fueled greater anti-government sentiment among new segments of the population.

\(^{24}\) Eg., Ross & Makovsky, supra note 13, at 304.


\(^{27}\) Id. at 119 (stating that traditionally, the two systems have been viewed as complimentary mechanisms of the same ideology).

\(^{28}\) Id. at 120 (referring to the U.N.’s practice of espousing resolutions that contradictorily address different complex issues. Dennis compares the resolutions adopted by U.N. human rights bodies during the first Gulf War with their mere instruction “to abide strictly by their obligations under international humanitarian law” during the second Gulf
inconsistently adopting resolutions that fail to separate protections of civilians during wartime from human rights standards in times of peace.  

These deficiencies, while markedly incoherent when confronted with conflict between established states, are even more disjointed when introduced to the human rights issues associated with the “Arab Spring” of 2011. As citizens of suppressive theocracies broke away from their respective governments, questions concerning how to classify those participating in the uprisings and how to gauge the appropriateness of the sitting government’s response were answered more succinctly by the political interests of large individual nations than by any governing body of international law.

The meaning associated with the term “terrorism,” for example, is largely amorphous and suggestive of the international community’s inability to agree on a universal definition. The Geneva Convention of 1937 defined terrorism as:

> criminal acts directed against a State or intended to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons, or the

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29 See id.

30 The “Arab Spring” has exploited the shortcomings of existing international law; raising poignant questions on how to move forward:

Do the protections provided by the international human rights treaties normally apply extraterritorially, outside the government-governed relationship? If so, what is the precise relationship between the protections provided under human rights instruments and international humanitarian law (the law of war) in cases of armed conflict or military occupation? Does the relationship between the two bodies of law differ, depending upon whether one is considering civil and political rights or economic, social, and cultural rights?

Dennis supra note 26, at 122.


33 The League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism in 1937, Nov. 16, 1937, League of Nations Doc. C.546M.383 1937 V (1937) (This convention failed to gain international support mainly because of its inability to yield a fixed definition of terrorism).
general public . . . [where] the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.\textsuperscript{34}

This definition is particularly problematic in the context of contemporary Egypt.\textsuperscript{35} While the revolution was mainly centered on the expansion of social and economic freedoms and fueled by a theological coalescing of suppressed civil society organizations,\textsuperscript{36} a strong distaste for Mubarak’s perceived pro-western tilt and clemency towards Israel was also firmly embedded in the Egyptian majority’s collective psyche.\textsuperscript{37} However, under the U.N.’s expansive definition of terrorism, and Mubarak’s couching of the opposition as such,\textsuperscript{38} was the uprising anything other than a collective act of terrorism? Was it not an attempt to “compel a Government . . . to abstain from” denying the people of political and economic freedom?\textsuperscript{39}

While any notion that the revolution in Egypt was a collective act of “terrorism” is trumped by conventional thought, the Egyptian uprising shed light on the delegitimized state of international law and the fickle nature of how the international community labels non-state actors. The prime example of this dilemma in Egypt was the repression and subsequent rise of the Muslim Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{34} See Galicki, supra note 32, at 744 (explaining the evolution of the term “terrorism” from the Geneva Convention of 1937 to present. “Since [1937], the question of defining international terrorism remains the most difficult and unsatisfactorily solved for all engaged in the process of elaboration of antiterrorist treaties, either universal or regional”).
\textsuperscript{35} See Richardson, supra note 12, at 21.
\textsuperscript{36} See Davidson, supra note 7, at 75.
\textsuperscript{37} See id.
\textsuperscript{38} Mubarak’s attempt at marginalizing his political opposition was evident in the passing of reactionary legislation and in his public characterization of such groups:
For instance, of the Muslim Brotherhood-- generally considered the most moderate and innocuous of Islamist groups--he has stated, “They say they are moderates (but) they are not moderates. They are working ... to support violence in this country,” cautioning that should Islamists come to power--through whatever channel--an Iran-like state might result. Id. at 85.
\textsuperscript{39} See Galicki, supra note 32, at 744.
\textsuperscript{40} See Davidson, supra note 7, at 88. Davidson states:
[B]y the late 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood had firmly established itself on Egyptian university campuses, providing much needed assistance to students in the underfunded and understaffed institutions. [FN51] Outside of the universities, the Islamic organizations
However unworkable a fixed definition for non-state actors like the Brotherhood may be, the U.N.’s inability to follow its own self imposed mandate to uphold the expansion and improvement of human rights—the UN Charter (hereinafter “Charter”))—has strangely been more troubling. Article 55(c) of the Charter specifically states, “the United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.” This “constitutional mandate” is further outlined in Article 1(3), explicitly providing the U.N.’s duty to promote human rights. Despite these provisions, Mr. Mubarak barreled forward with legislation that politically and economically repressed the Egyptian people without any material recourse from the U.N. Mubarak further defied the U.N. by habitually tampering with Egypt’s constitution and manipulating the electoral process over the span of several decades.

C. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Originally founded in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 on the credence of one day fashioning a Koran-based, theocratic state. While the Brotherhood’s influence has steadily grown over the past century, the counterbalance of Mubarak’s regime has proved themselves to be an important independent sociopolitical force—particularly in the poor quarters of Cairo and rural Upper Egypt-unreceptive to Sadat’s attempts at cooptation in his struggles against the pro-Nasser political forces.

Id.

42 U.N. Charter art. 55 para. C.
43 See Paust, supra note 41, at 2.
44 U.N. Charter art. 1 para. 3.
45 See supra text accompanying note 3.
46 See Ian Black, Egypt’s Constitution is at the Heart of any Change, THE GUARDIAN, February 7, 2011 available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/07/egypt-constitution-hosni-mubarak-power (explaining the need for changes to Egypt’s constitution—specifically provisions pertaining to the power of the Presidency).
47 See supra text accompanying note 23.
48 See Ross & Makovsky, supra note 13, at 258 (discussing the history and motivation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the first half of the 20th century).
led to a meteoric rise in the Brotherhood’s recruitment efforts. Unlike preceding and concomitant Islamic parties, the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has renounced violence as a means for their progression—however; renouncement and dissociation are two very different things. While the benefits of publicly condemning radical Islam and terrorism are obvious, the Brotherhood’s sincerity is less evident and has elicited more skepticism than applause.

What good are elections when the fundamental democratic institutions that give elections their credibility are absent? From the American vantage point, the answer to this question is complicated by an even thornier question: what good are elections when the party most likely to prevail poses a threat to diplomatic stability in the region?

In the wake of Mubarak’s thirty-year regime, the Brotherhood, who was second in size only to the Egyptian military, emerged from political repression as a well-organized and mobile unit. The Brotherhood had slipped through the cracks of international human rights

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49 See Ross, supra note 9, at 293.

50 Id. Ross raises several questions as to the veracity of the Brotherhood’s political aspirations:

Could they be a model for other Islamists who say they seek Islamist states but are prepared to coexist with others? Could they be partners in undermining the radical Islamists? Ask Khairi Abaza and Hala Mustafa, two genuine Egyptian reformers, what they think and they will say it is all a charade. So long as the Muslim Brothers are unable to supplant the Egyptian regime, they will seek common cause with others. But for both Abaza and Mustafa, the Brotherhood’s purpose remains that of creating an Islamist state, with no room for secular law, multiple parties, or tolerance for minority rights, much less respect for women’s rights.

51 The latter is of more substance for the political sustainability of the Brotherhood moving forward.

52 See Ross, supra note 9, at 182.

53 See Ross & Makovsky, supra note 13, at 306 (raising further concerns as to what the Brotherhood’s intentions truly are. Ross uses the word “genuine” in describing Abaz and Mustafa both to emphasize their credibility and to implicitly question the Brotherhood’s stance on reform).

54 See Ross, supra note 49, at 298 (While trust in the electoral process was obviously lacking, “the problem in Egypt was not just about elections. The Egyptian government has been unwilling to allow dissidence. Although individual dissidents are treated harshly, the regime is most afraid of Islamist Ideology”).

55 See generally Ross supra note 13, at 306 (distinguishing the Brotherhood from less organized Islamist groups; and providing insight into the shear size, appeal and mobility of the group).
protections—largely because of their unknown level of radicalization—\textsuperscript{56} but has nonetheless used their repression as an effective recruitment tool. Regardless, the inability of international law to succinctly categorize the Brotherhood has hampered both the United States’ ability to develop foreign policy—\textsuperscript{57} as well as the Brotherhood’s ability to achieve legitimacy.\textsuperscript{58}

For the democratic proponent, the overarching concern is that the Brotherhood will use the democratic process as a means to undermine democracy.\textsuperscript{59} The issue is not whether the incoming political party in Egypt will be elected through democratic means—that has already been established. The issue is whether the incoming party will be tolerant of political competition in subsequent elections.\textsuperscript{60} Is the Muslim Brotherhood, after decades of political repression, ready to fight tooth and nail for a system that would allow others the right to openly criticize and defeat their ideology?\textsuperscript{61} History answers this with an emphatic “no.”\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{56} See id. (explaining that while the Brotherhood’s level of radicalization is unknown, “when they cross the threshold and repudiate having a militia, they need to be accommodated, at least in terms of the right to participate in politics and compete in elections”).

\textsuperscript{57} See Megret, supra note 31, at 305-06 (providing two rationales behind the United States involvement in the middle east). Megret writes:

The first story is that of international law, of the century-old ambition of regulating interstate relations by means of law, and of the purported transmogrification of international law into a law also encompassing a fundamental concern for human rights and well being . . .

The second story is that of what may broadly be characterized as the evolution of the Middle East from the tutelage of western interference and influence into an area gradually absorbing the shocks of nationalism, modernization, and globalization.

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{58} See Ross & Makovsky, supra note 13, at 306; contra id. at 307 (arguing that the United States should fund non-state actors in addition to providing aid to developing parts of sovereign Middle Eastern countries; but see supra text accompanying note 20 (explaining the conflict that arises when providing monetary support to non-state actors without the ability to monitor where the money is spent or the direction the group will take)).

\textsuperscript{59} See id. (noting that the Muslim Brotherhood is unlikely to relinquish any power or allow room for dissidents to Islam should they play a role in Egypt’s newly formed government. If democracy threatens their ability to maintain an Islamic state, one would expect they would fall into the trap of becoming the very thing they sought to overthrow).

\textsuperscript{60} See Ross, supra note 9, at 293.

\textsuperscript{61} E.g., Ross & Makovsky, supra note 13, at 306-07.

\textsuperscript{62} See, e.g., IRAQ STUDY GROUP (U.S.), JAMES ADDISON BAKER, LEE HAMILTON, LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT (Vintage Books 2006) (stating that following the fall of longtime Sunni leader Saddam Hussein, formerly repressed Shiite Muslims were reluctant to relinquish power within the newly formed government to their Sunni adversaries).
In the 1980’s, the Reagan administration was aware of the Muslim Brotherhood’s radicalization through Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) human intelligence (HUMINT) operations in Cairo and Damascus. While the United States was reluctant to allow their case officers to pursue operational relationships with members of the Brotherhood, the United States cautiously proceeded with their mouth closed and their ears open. The Egyptian Brotherhood attempted and failed to assassinate Egyptian President Abdul Nasser—and the offshoot of the Brotherhood in Syria botched several attempts to eliminate Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad.

The Brotherhood’s checkered past has failed to inspire confidence in future sustainability. Like many social service-providing societies in northeast Africa and the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood’s growing influence among the Egyptian populous was

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63 See generally ROBERT BAER, SEE NO EVIL: THE TRUE STORY OF A GROUND SOLDIER IN THE CIA’S WAR ON TERRORISM (Three Rivers Press 2002).
64 See id. at 96 (providing an example of one of Bob Baer’s encounters with a member of the Brotherhood).

One night in a heart to heart talk, he confessed he was a Muslim Brother. He explained to me the group’s ideology – its commitment to changing any Muslim leader who had fallen away from Islam. He agreed the Egyptian Jihad, an offshoot of the Muslim Brothers, was legally justified in murdering Anwar Sadat.

65 See Baer, supra note 63, at 91-92. Baer states: The really bad guys—the ones capable of doing great harm for or against our side, depending on which way God is talking to them that day—don’t just go away. It was better, I always figured, to have a line into them, even if it meant keeping our hands a little dirty in the process.

66 See Thomas, supra note 20, at 438 (providing background for the rift between the Brotherhood and Nasser).

Gordon writes:

In Egypt there followed agitation against British colonialism. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, became a potent political force; and when Gamal Abdel Nasser staged a coup in 1952, he succeeded with their help. But Nasser soon saw the Brotherhood’s extremism as a threat and banned the movement. Its members were exiled, jailed, or hanged. Many found refuge in monarchies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

67 See id. at 298 (stating that regardless of the benevolent outward intentions of Islamic communal groups, it remains unwise to simply categorize them as such. “[T]here is a lack of consistency among the Islamist parties themselves. So it is crucial that we not fall into the hypocrisy trap set by critics, namely, defending the right of inclusion of all Islamist groups when they themselves clearly fit into different categories.”)
originally based on providing sustenance to politically and economically marginalized Muslims.\textsuperscript{70} The Brotherhood would soon realize, however, that while providing services placed them in good favor amongst the masses; it was not a base-rallying platform with which to muster political clout.\textsuperscript{71} In light of the changing political climate in Egypt, the Brotherhood looked to capitalize on a rare opening for political legitimacy. With this in mind, the Brotherhood took to a sort of ideological gerrymandering—widening their policy spectrum to include anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric. However disconnected from their original purpose this tactic may have been; its lack of originality was superseded by its success in broadening their political appeal. The Brotherhood’s short-sighted new approach may have ceilinged as a mere flash in the pan had it not been for former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak’s uncanny ability to fan the flames of political dissidence.

As a prerequisite to power, if the Brotherhood is truly concerned with providing civil services to Egyptian Muslims, they must dismiss openly anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric as useless distracters.\textsuperscript{72} Burning American flags and throwing Molotov cocktails at the Israeli embassy in Cairo\textsuperscript{73} will not make the economy better. The advantages, if any, are stale and

\textsuperscript{70} See Davidson, supra note 7, at 88.
\textsuperscript{71} See, eg., Ian Black, \textit{Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is a Force the World can no longer Afford to Ignore}, THE GUARDIAN, February 6, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/06/egypt-muslim-brotherhood. Black further acknowledges that:

Like other Islamist movements, its popularity is based on a reputation for not being corrupt and charity work in clinics, nurseries and after-school tutoring. Volunteers fill gaps left by a state that has seen illiteracy rise and services fail as liberal economic reforms enriched business close to the [Mubarak] regime. It is known for its ability to mobilize supporters. In 2006 Suleiman, then Mubarak’s intelligence chief, described the Brotherhood as “neither a religious organization, nor a social organization, nor a political party, but a combination of all three”—though the regime exaggerated its importance to present itself as a bulwark against extremism.

\textsuperscript{73} See id. (stating that thousands of Egyptian protesters stormed the Israeli Embassy in Cairo on September 9, 2011, forcing Israeli diplomats and other Foreign Ministry personnel to evacuate).
transient—and would dwindle in the absence of much needed American aid.\textsuperscript{74} While the United States would like to establish ground rules\textsuperscript{75} with the Brotherhood, the threat of removing economic aid would only be as strong as America’s ability to track the backchannels of Brotherhood activity after their promises have been made.\textsuperscript{76}

The Bush Administration realized this very problem in the mid 2000’s; when it launched a Middle East Partnership Initiative that divvied funding disproportionally in favor of governments over their civic-minded NGO counterparts.\textsuperscript{77} In the case of Egypt, this reflected the rationale that the United States would rather err on the side of funding organized, predictable and moderate governments instead of throwing billions of dollars at politically repressed groups with unknown ties and lesser known intentions.\textsuperscript{78} This is precisely the gauntlet that Mubarak led the United States into—fund a government that has repeatedly undermined the democratic process for geostrategic purposes—creating a greater potentiality for the radicalization of minority political groups; or fund the potentially radicalized minority political groups without knowing the future impact on American national security.\textsuperscript{79} Either way, the United States’ multibillion dollar investment in Egypt yielded a mere choice between the lesser of two evils.

Who can the United States trust? The rate of change for present-day Egypt’s vacillating political climate is quicker than America’s ability to answer this question with any confidence or

\textsuperscript{74} See U.S. Dept of State Electronic Information and Publications, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm; see also Sorenson supra note 2, at 217 (explaining the need for Egypt to follow the Camp David Peace accords in order to continue to receive much needed funding from the United States).

\textsuperscript{75} See eg., Ross, supra note 9, at 182.

\textsuperscript{76} See supra text accompanying note 65.

\textsuperscript{77} See Ross & Makovsky, supra note 13, at 307 (highlighting the dilemma in choosing between providing economic aid to state actors or non-state actors).

\textsuperscript{78} Id. at 258 (explaining how the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, evolved into violent group in Gaza in the 1980’s).

\textsuperscript{79} See id.
accuracy. Even if the United States could foster a working relationship with the Brotherhood, how could the Americans be assured that the Brotherhood’s political objectives would remain linear? 

PART II: ISRAEL AS A MODEL OF SUSTAINABILITY

A. BACKGROUND

The philosophy of Jewish nationalism first appeared in pockets of unaffiliated communities spanning Europe in the 1860’s. Zionism, as the movement would later be named, benefited from a wealth of eclectic leadership, who unbeknownst to each other simultaneously began steps at formalizing the nationalistic ideology. By 1891, prominent Arabs in Jerusalem heard grumblings of the precursors to Zionism in Eastern Europe, and responded by petitioning the Ottoman establishment in Constantinople to bar Jewish settlers from making land purchases in Palestine. In 1896, unaware of the Russian Pogroms’ immigration to Palestine, Austrian

80 See Baer, supra note 63, at 89. For example, in the 1980’s the Brotherhood’s fanaticism made them potential surrogates for furthering the United States’ covert interests in Lebanon and Syria. While President Reagan chose not to intermeddle with the group—a decision that would prove wise as the Brotherhood’s intentions later surfaced—the prospects of using the Brotherhood were at one time a potential option.

81 See Ross & Makovsky, supra note 13, at 258 (explaining that unbeknownst to the United States, at the same time CIA case officers were engaging Brotherhood members in Egypt and Syria for potential covert operations in the 1980’s, the Brotherhood spread into Gaza and gave rise to what is now present-day Hamas. This is a prime example of why it is difficult to form partnerships and provide funding to non-state actors. The Brotherhood lacked the ability to monitor its own growth, therefore making it impossible to give assurances to the United States that they could act in the United States’ best interest). Ross and Makovsky write:

In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood officially stated its opposition to violence as a means to reach a theocratic state. But when it was established in Gaza in the 1980’s, the group would evolve. At first it was dedicated to establishing a theocratic Islamic state that would span Israel, the West bank, and Gaza. Palestinians are fond of pointing out that Israel welcomed Hamas in its earliest years, believing it would serve as a counterpoint to Palestinian nationalism. But as Hamas became violent, Israel turned against the group very quickly.

82 See DENTON ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE 16 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2004) (stressing that the Zionist ideology formed in various locations in Russia without a coordinated effort to spread the ideology).

83 See id. at 16-17 (noting influential Zionist leaders like Chaim Weizmann, Ahad Ha’am and Nahum Sokolow); see also id. at xi (describing Theodor Herzl’s contribution to the Zionist movement).

84 See id. at 16.

85 See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM xi (Random House 1990) (highlighting both the Arabs’ distaste with the large scale Russian migration to Palestine and the Ottoman Empire’s inability to stop the momentum of the Jewish settlements).
Journalist Theodor Herzl authored *The Jewish State*; contending that the widespread repression of Jewish communities in Europe could be defused through the development of a Jewish state in Palestine.\(^8^6\) Instinctively, Russian immigrants began instituting structurally unifying measures as well, reintroducing Hebrew as a national language amongst the Jewish people.\(^8^7\)

A year later, as Russian Jews continued to move into Palestine, Herzl added to the unremitting amalgam of Jewish activity by organizing the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland.\(^8^8\) The Zionists had arrived as a recognizable nationalist movement, and perhaps more importantly for their future, became an ally for the British in partitioning the Middle East following its victory over the Ottoman Empire in World War I.\(^8^9\) In 1916, Britain, France and Russia signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, effectually giving Britain control over Palestine, and France direction over what is now Syria and Lebanon.\(^9^0\) Jewish Militias had helped the British fight the Turks out of Palestine towards the end of the war, creating a strategic partnership between the parties and opening the door for Zionist leadership to the inner circles of the British political elite.\(^9^1\)

**B. DEALINGS WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND THE BALFOUR DECLARATION**

In 1914, Chaim Weizmann, a Russian Chemist and leading proponent of Zionism, settled in England and fortuitously befriended C.P. Scott, the Editor in Chief of the *Manchester Guardian*.\(^9^2\) Scott was a political idealist and trusted confidant of Lloyd George, a prominent

\(^{8^6}\) See id.

\(^{8^7}\) See Ross, supra note 82, at 16 (providing an example of the Zionists ability to identify and implement potential unifying measures unique to the Jewish people).

\(^{8^8}\) See Friedman, supra note 85 at xi (providing an example of how Zionist leadership took measures at creating government-like institutions prior to gaining statehood).

\(^{8^9}\) Eg., id.

\(^{9^0}\) See Ross, supra note 82, at 16.

\(^{9^1}\) See Ross, supra note 82, at 16 (discussing how the Jewish militias in Palestine during WWI paved the way for Zionist leaders like Chaim Weizmann).

politician and statesman—and future Prime minister of the United Kingdom. Both Scott and Herbert Sidebotham, the Guardian’s military correspondent, fervently took to Weizmann’s vision for Jewish Statehood—immediately recognizing the political and military advantages of a trustworthy ally in one of the world’s most volatile and nebulous regions. The once “Messianic vision” of a Jewish return to Zion had arrived at the doorstep of a great western superpower.

In 1902, twelve years prior to Weizmann’s encounter with Scott, Theodor Herzl met with the “father of modern British imperialism,” Colonel Secretary Joseph Chamberlain. Much like Scott’s response to Weizmann, Chamberlain met Herzl’s proposition for British-backed Jewish statehood empathetically; agreeing that the only solution to the “Jewish problem” was a parcel of land that the Jews could call their own. Herzl sought legal representation in his dealings with Chamberlain, hiring none other than Lloyd George’s London based firm to handle the negotiations. Prime Minister Arthur James Balfour shared Chamberlain’s enthusiasm in striking a deal with Herzl, and gave George the nod to draft a formal charter outlining the

93 See id. (explaining that like Herzl, Weizmann’s long-sighted approach toward Zionism help create partnerships which proved to have fruitful impacts on the movement).
94 Id. (explaining that both Scott and Sidebotham viewed Weizmann’s proposition for Jewish statehood as an opportunity to further Great Britain’s interests in the region).
95 See id. at 271 (highlighting Zionism’s transformation from wide-spread ideology to a narrowed material strategy for statehood).
96 See id. at 273 (showing Weizmann’s ability to network his way into the British power elite and push Zionism as a complementary component of the British imperialist strategy).
97 Id. Fromkin further describes Herzl as a man who:

[K]new how political business was transacted in the Europe of his time and began by establishing a Zionist organization. He then commenced negotiations on its behalf with officials of various governments. Only after he had come into working contact with other Jews, and with Jewish organizations that for years had been fostering settlements in the Holy Land, did he come to recognize the unique appeal of the country that the world called Palestine—the land of the Philistines—but that Jews called the Land of Israel.

98 See id. (explaining that Herzl’s decision to retain George’s firm was shrewd both because of George’s familiarity with Chamberlain and the inter-workings of England’s foreign relations machine; but also to develop a professional relationship with a rising political star in Britain.)
prospective Jewish settlement.\textsuperscript{99} The charter impliedly provided the first official statement of national status for the Jewish people\textsuperscript{100} and would soon be recognized as the first draft of the Balfour Declaration.\textsuperscript{101}

In November of 1917, the efforts of Weizmann, Herzl and countless others culminated in a formal British recognition of the Zionist quest for national autonomy. As the second Draft of the Balfour Declaration was finalized,\textsuperscript{102} what had started as a Jewish-nationalist ideology quickly became a “contemporary political program”\textsuperscript{103} The Zionists did not gauge success by how the media portrayed them; or by the shock value of wildly unorganized and unsophisticated attacks on their enemies. The Zionist leadership was an educated, structured and relentless assembly of professional nation-builders who did not settle for the mere words of the Balfour Declaration. Perhaps David Ben-Gurion, a celebrated Zionist Leader and eventual Prime Minister of Israel put it best:

\begin{quote}
Britain has made a magnificent gesture; she has recognized our existence as a nation and has acknowledged our right to the country. But only the Hebrew people can transform this right into a tangible fact; only they, with body and soul, with their strength and capital, must build their national homeland and bring about their national redemption.\textsuperscript{104}
\end{quote}

At its outset, the movement was unapologetically “secularist, socialist, and egalitarian to its core”\textsuperscript{105}—but it was organized—and fueled by an uncompromising Eastern European temperament. Strength came not from carrying out suicide bombings or firing rockets from one

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{99} Id. at 274.
\textsuperscript{100} Id (explaining that the first draft of the Balfour Declaration did not provide an explicit acknowledgement of their sovereignty, but rather provided an acknowledgment of the Zionist’s right to sovereignty).
\textsuperscript{101} See id.
\textsuperscript{102} See Ross, supra note 82, at 16.
\textsuperscript{103} See Fromkin, supra note 92, at 270-71.
\textsuperscript{104} See Ross, supra note 82, at 17.
\textsuperscript{105} See id. (stating that the Zionist movement was not democratic at its outset and that its socialist roots were instrumental in creating cohesiveness—and was not a permanent fixture of Israel’s future).
\end{flushright}
populated civilian neighborhood into another, only to cry victim at later retaliation. The Jews did what countless others have since failed to do—stay unified.

In 1947, the U.N. voted to divide Palestine into two independent states, making Jerusalem the dual capital of both the Palestinian and Jewish people. The decision was agreed upon by the Zionist leadership, but met with disdain in the Palestinian camp. In 1948, as Britain withdrew from Palestine, the Palestinians joined forces with surrounding Arab nations in an effort to prevent the establishment of the Jewish State. Israel eventually prevailed, though Jordan occupied the West Bank and Egypt occupied Gaza. Israel’s willingness to abide by the U.N.’s partitioning plan proved wise. After thousands of years, the last ninety of which were spent formalizing their nationalist movement, the Jews had carved out a home for themselves in the heart of the Middle East. For the Muslim Brotherhood, a formerly repressed theocratic group, the Zionist diplomatic strategy is particularly appropriate.

PART III: APPLICATION OF THE ZIONIST DIPLOMATIC MODEL

A. RECOMMENDATION

Libraries across the western hemisphere are filled with ideas of former Middle East envoys, esteemed academics and celebrated spiritual leaders; most suggesting, in some form or another, a way of untangling a knotted dilemma in the Middle East. Most, if not all, beg the question as to how to practically suggest, interject, or even impose their strategy on nations

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106 See Friedman, supra note 85, at xii.
107 See eg., id. (providing a chronology of events following Israel’s declaration of independence in 1948).
108 See id.
109 See Ross supra note 82, at 16 (explaining that while the Zionists were pleased to have any land at all, the Zionist themselves were divided into two camps: “[t]hose trying to reclaim a Jewish land had little patience with political niceties; those trying to win international favor internationally felt compelled to be patient and not overplay their hand”).
without strong centralized governments or capable leadership in place to receive or enact any proposed alternatives. Alternatively, this model involves an unknown individual, or group of individuals within the Egyptian Brotherhood, who chooses to discontinue the use of unsophisticated means to solve complex problems of governance and diplomacy; and who opts to charismatically rally their base toward following an established and regionally specific model. Egypt is at the mercy of its own leadership. The Brotherhood has occasion to provide this leadership, and has more in common with late-19th century Russian Jews then they would care to admit. To deny this fact would also be a denial of one of the few proven models of sustainability in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{110}

Israel provides the United States with a trustworthy, clandestinely talented\textsuperscript{111} and geographically valuable ally in curtailing radical Islam; and in turn, the United States provides Israel with hefty economic and military arms support, and a likeminded partner in stifling Iran’s nuclear program.\textsuperscript{112} As such, both parties have not been shy in using their individual capacity as aid providers in leveraging their dealings with one another; and both parties have been largely successful in obtaining returns for their role in the partnership.

\textsuperscript{110} See Richardson, supra note 12, at 21. Ironically, Israel is not as fervent in supporting democracy in Egypt as the United States. Richardson writes:

\begin{quote}
[T]here are widespread concerns that the toppling of Mubarak could lead to a domino effect similar to Eastern Europe in 1989 with the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This could upset current regional stability and bring about the rise of fundamentalist Islamic groups. Indeed, Silvan Shalom, Vice Prime Minister of Israel, overtly opposes the establishment of democracy in Egypt, on the basis that it 'could have dire consequences.'
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{111} See Thomas, supra note 20, at 438 (providing a detailed history of Israel’s revered intelligence agency).

\textsuperscript{112} See Ewen MacAskill & Harriet Sherwood, \textit{Is the US Heading for War with Iran?}, \textsc{The Sydney Morning Herald}, November 4, 2011 available at \url{http://www.smh.com.au/world/is-the-us-heading-for-war-with-iran-20111103-1mxks.html} (quoting Iran’s Military Chief, Hassan Firouzabadi, on a potential air strike by the Israelis on Iranian soil, “The Zionist regime's military attack against Iran will inflict heavy damages to the US as well as the Zionist regime.” Mr. Firouzabadi’s comment, other than being inflammatory towards the United States, further supports that Israel and the United States have a strong partnership—particularly in both nations’ stance on Iran. While the United States is unlikely to encourage Israel to take military action in the form of airstrikes toward Iran—largely because of the United States’ own military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan—the partnership remains strong.
As stated in the previous section, following WWI, and well prior to their contemporary affiliation with the United States, the Zionists leveraged Great Britain into backing their nationalist movement.\textsuperscript{113} Instead of fighting a losing battle against Britain’s large-scale imperialist efforts in the Middle East, the Zionists fashioned a strategic niche within Britain’s theater-specific plan.\textsuperscript{114} Whatever the Zionists may have sacrificed in ideology by fostering a partnership with England, they gained for the future of Israel.

The Muslim Brotherhood must opt to sacrifice short term popularity for long term success, and forge strategic partnerships similar to the ones Weizmann and Herzl created. The Brotherhood’s overarching theocratic goals\textsuperscript{115} may remain the same, but the order in which they try to achieve those goals must change. Like the Zionists, efforts at legitimizing a secular statehood must be precluded by the diplomatic recognition of a western superpower, and religious zealotry must be secondary to a centered, calculated approach at nation building. Like the Zionists, whatever the Brotherhood sacrifices in ideology by rearranging their priorities, they will gain in sustainability. The Brotherhood’s original goal in 1928 was not to punish Israel or denounce the United States. Rather, the Brotherhood’s goal was to create an Islamic State that provided for its citizens both materially and religiously. Their adeptness at organization and providing services for their followers is strikingly similar to the Zionists’ foundationally egalitarian principles. As such, the Brotherhood’s answer for future sustainability lies in a diplomatic model that allows its future global partnerships to further its original domestic goals.

Egypt’s ability to offer an exclusive strategic advantage to the United States still exists if their future government exudes the requisite competence to offer it. Northeast Africa;

\textsuperscript{113} See supra Part II.
\textsuperscript{114} See Fromkin, supra note 92 (explaining Chaim Weizmann’s relationship with British Colonel Secretary Joseph Chamberlain).
\textsuperscript{115} See supra Part I.C. (stating that the Muslim Brotherhood’s original intentions involved creating a non-violent, Koran-based Islamic state).
specifically Libya, Somalia and Uganda, comprise the newest frontier in the swell of radical Islam. President Barack Obama has already ordered troops to Uganda\textsuperscript{116}; Libya is in a state of transition following the rebels’ ousting and subsequent killing of Moammar Qaddafi\textsuperscript{117}; and Somalia has lacked a centralized governing body since 1991\textsuperscript{118} and is widely regarded as having the most volatile and unstable capital in the World—Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{119} The United States’ ability to address these issues could be as strong as Egypt’s ability to provide intelligence, diplomatic aid, and military support to United States if necessary. Regardless of whether the Brotherhood is successful in the upcoming Egyptian elections, they should address these issues with the United States immediately, and offer the Americans a seat at their table in exchange for continued economic support.

The Brotherhood is also fighting an uphill battle with the American media; the very country they will rely upon in rebranding themselves to the international community.\textsuperscript{120} The modern version of gaining legitimacy through recognized international doctrine is gaining the sympathy of the 24-hour news cycle in the United States—which the Brotherhood has failed to do. The Brotherhood can help alleviate international concern by establishing a lobbying structure in the United States that not only furthers their own economic goals, but also provides transparency to the same. If courting American lawmakers and the American media is not on the


\textsuperscript{117} See Kareem Fahim, \textit{Violent End to an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya}, NEW YORK TIMES, October 20, 2011 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/qaddafi-is-killed-as-libyan-forces-take-surt.html?pagewanted=all (detailing the events leading to and subsequent of former Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi’s death).


\textsuperscript{119} See id.

\textsuperscript{120} See \textit{supra} Part I.C. (explaining that the Brotherhood has eluded human rights protections and failed to receive direct economic aid because of their unknown level of radicalization); \textit{see also} Ross & Makovsky, \textit{supra} note 13, at 306.
menu for the Brotherhood’s leadership, then 83 more years at the back of the line might be coming right up.

**B. CONCLUSION**

The Zionist model, when considered as a solution for Post-Mubarak Egypt, is patently ironic because it requires aloofness to conventional understanding of contemporary Middle East conflict, and gives full credence to a blatantly divergent ideology as the controlling answer. But, as previously stated, religion is of little recourse in the actual implementation of this model; as the religious undercurrents associated with Zionism exist because Jewish-Israel was the upshot of Zionist efforts and Israel happens to sardonically share a border with Islamic-Egypt. Theodor Herzl was admittedly both Jewish and a Zionist; but he was an entirely unreligious man.\(^{121}\) Herzl felt compelled to make Zionism his life’s work not because of a dogmatically Jewish impulse; but because of the plight of the Jewish people.\(^{122}\) Perhaps the greatest irony of this model is that the Zionist strategy had absolutely nothing to do with religion and everything to do with sovereignty as a shield from further persecution.

If nothing else, this model promotes an understanding that the stigma associated with the Israeli-Arab conflict keeps nations from sharing ideas, and allows the collective pride of governments to deny their people of fuller, more prosperous lives. The Middle East scholar’s fallacy is that the United States can force two hands to shake. The solution conversely lies in the millions of people represented by each hand, and their newfound ability to organize and hold their leadership accountable. If the Egyptian people can unite to create a historically swift revolution, they can summarily change their ideological course as well. Islamic nationalism need not equate to diplomatic isolationism.

\(^{121}\) *See supra* text accompanying note 97.

\(^{122}\) *See id.*