The politics of names among Chinese Indonesians in Java

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Many Chinese Indonesians under the age of 45 in Java have names that are instantly recognized by Indonesians as distinctively Chinese Indonesian. Such names, e.g., Nick Wijaya, commonly consist of a first name that is English or European and a family name that “sounds Indonesian,” was coined after 1965, and contains a syllable from a traditional Chinese surname. Distinctively Chinese Indonesian names are explained in terms of state and ethnic politics in Indonesia during the second half of the 20th century. A specific attribute of proper names that we call their “duality of meaning”—they are fixed to a person like a label at the same time that they continue to signify as more general linguistic signs—makes them particularly potent for social-identity negotiations. Giving Western first names and using newly coined surnames containing Chinese elements has served both as a form of resistance to discriminatory Indonesian state assimilation policies and as a form of boundary-marking for ethnic Chinese, who make up less than four percent of the Indonesian population. Western names connote cosmopolitan educational and socioeconomic aspirations for many Chinese Indonesians, characteristics that they value highly and perceive as distinguishing themselves from many other (non-Chinese) Indonesians. [Chinese Indonesian, names, identity]

Prologue

Mr. Min Wen Lie and his wife Mrs. Li Lie of Jakarta, Indonesia welcomed their firstborn child, a daughter, in 1978. Their daughter was born jaundiced, so she was kept in an incubator where she could be treated with artificial UV light for a week after her birth. Mrs. Lie’s teenaged sister Patricia visited the newborn in the hospital, and after seeing the child brightly illuminated by the lights, proposed naming her “Sunny,” inspired by the 1976 international disco hit song of the same name. Mrs. Lie liked the idea of naming her daughter after the sun. After all, the child was a baby who needed sunlight. Although Mrs. Lie and her husband did not speak English and were born and raised in Indonesia, the thought of naming their daughter “Matahari,” the Indonesian word meaning ‘sun’, did not cross Mrs. Lie’s mind. Neither did Mr. and Mrs. Lie, whose grandparents or parents had migrated from China to Indonesia in the early 1900s, consider naming their daughter with the Chinese word for sun, “Tai Yang.”

When Sunny’s younger brothers were born, they also received names that were neither Indonesian nor Chinese. Her first brother was named “Dannies” (pronounced
like “Dennis”) and her second brother “Nelson.” Mrs. Lie retrieved both names from an English-language baby-naming book. “Dannies” is adapted from the name Dionysus, the Greek god of wine, and “Nelson” means ‘son of a champion,’ a loving reference to her husband.

Until 1999, Sunny and her two brothers had only their given names listed on their passports and Indonesian school records. When Dannies studied abroad in California during the 1990s, the U.S. college required first and last names, so he became “Dannies Dannies” in U.S. college administrative records. After 1999, Indonesian authorities added the name “Lie,” a Dutch-colonial romanization of the Chinese family name “Li,” to Sunny and her brothers’ passports.

Introduction

The preceding anecdote is part of the story of how Sunny Lie, coauthor of this article, and her two brothers received their first names and experienced state restrictions on public use of their family name. Her family was not the only Chinese Indonesian family in Jakarta to give their children Western names during the 1970s and 1980s. When Sunny attended a high school that was 98 percent ethnic Chinese, she had many more classmates with names like Robin, Jackson, and Holly than with common Indonesian names such as Putri, Angga, or Ayu. And even though her school was 98 percent ethnic Chinese, only about three percent of her classmates had identifiably Chinese given names such as Tzuli and Kinyang. Like Sunny, the students with Western names were born in Indonesia and spoke Indonesian as their first and typically only language, but were the descendants of Chinese immigrants. Like Sunny, many were administratively recorded by first names only, before adding family names to records starting in 1999. Many were recorded under distinctively Chinese Indonesian family names that had been invented in the 1960s.

Personal names are a cultural universal (Alford 1988:2), but the types of names that are given, the ways in which they are bestowed or changed, and the meanings that they carry all vary with the culture and politics of a time and place. Goodenough (1965:275), in an analysis of contrasting naming patterns in two Oceanic societies, concludes that naming is an agentive form of identity negotiation:

Different naming and address customs necessarily select different things about the self for communication and consequent emphasis. . . In any event, it will be something about which people are concerned, something about their own identities or the identities of others that they want to emphasize. What it will be depends on the nature of the identity problems their social circumstances prevalingly create for them.

The nature of Chinese Indonesian naming practices in Java since the 1960s directly reflects the group’s particular history and social circumstances, including the forced assimilation policies of Suharto’s 1966–1998 reign.

Personal and family names can provide a window onto struggles over power and identity among individuals, ethnic groups, and the state (Pina-Cabral 1994; Aceto 2002; Garrioch 2010; Spitzer 2010). Just as people negotiate identities through language more generally (Bucholtz and Hall 2005; Bailey 2007a, 2007b), through naming, people say something about who they are, who they are not, and what their aspirations for their children are. The attempts by the Indonesian state under Suharto to regulate Chinese Indonesian names and Chinese Indonesian resistance to such discrimination through distinctive names—as well as their ongoing use of names to mark ethnic boundaries—illustrate the social and political force that names can carry.

In this article, we first analyze ways in which proper names bear meaning, proposing the concept of duality of meaning: 1) proper names refer to individuals by the fact of their proper bestowal, such as through a baptismal event and ongoing use (Putnam 1975), and 2) proper names simultaneously bear meaning through denotation, social association, and other semiotic processes of signification that are characteristic of linguistic signs more generally (Peirce 1985). We propose that the bestowal
of names and their semiotic meanings are linked to issues of power. To understand power relations and naming in Indonesia, we give historical background on the racialization of Chinese in Indonesia and Suharto’s 1960s legislation and policies, which severely restricted Chinese linguistic and cultural expression. We then contrast a set of 100 names from a class at a (Chinese) Christian Indonesian secondary school with a set of 100 names from a high school class that had few Chinese students. These names—given to children in the 1970s and 1980s and recorded at the schools in the 1980s and 1990s—differ strikingly by ethnicity on a number of dimensions. Finally, we describe the local logic of ethnic-boundary maintenance in Indonesia and use interview data on contemporary motivations for naming, from both Chinese Indonesians and non-Chinese Indonesians, to highlight and explain the Chinese Indonesian tendency to give Western names.

**Duality of Meaning and Power in Names**

Philosophers have long recognized that the ways in which proper names relate to their objects and produce meaning are different from the ways in which other nouns refer to their objects. In the Platonic dialogue *Cratylus* from the fourth century B.C.E., for example, Hermogenes and Socrates discuss whether a name can be “true” or “correct” in its reference to an individual or whether names are simply fixed to an individual through “convention and habit of the users” (Plato 360 B.C.E.; cf. Bodenhorn and Vom Bruck 2006:5). When Hermogenes argues that it is simply convention that fixes the name, Socrates challenges him: “[S]uppose that I call a man a horse . . . you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me . . . ?” This example captures two seemingly contradictory ways in which names mean: a) proper names refer to their objects through convention and use, often grounded in a proper bestowal such as a baptismal event, and b) names carry semiotic meanings—e.g., denotation or social associations—that may be relatively independent of the fixing of that name to an individual. To follow Socrates’s example, the person named or called “horse” can be properly referred to in that way, but each utterance of “horse” is also likely to invoke mental images of a four-legged equine species for some speakers and hearers. We call this characteristic the **duality of meaning** of proper names.

The duality of meaning overcomes the false dichotomy suggested in the Socratic dialogue above and puzzled over by linguists and language philosophers. Formal approaches to reference, for example, have emphasized the fact that person-reference of proper names does not work the same way as the reference to objects of common nouns. According to Mill (1843:38), for example, the meaning of common nouns, such as cat, can be thought of as equivalent to a conventional description of the thing to which the noun refers, such that the “meaning” of cat is “a particular type of small, furry, carnivorous mammal.” Because proper names cannot be defined in terms of generic characteristics of the thing to which they refer, Mill (1843:40) concludes that “proper names denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals.” Mill’s conclusion is only partially accurate, however. It is accurate in that the name “Shorty” for a tall person represents a false proposition in that the name does not (truthfully) indicate any attribute of the individual. His conclusion is inaccurate in that proper names regularly do imply attributes of a person. The proper name “Shorty” does imply, or bring to mind, a certain height. While the primary reference of “Shorty” may be a certain person, the name simultaneously signifies “short stature.” The fact that people regularly remark on whether or not the bearer of such a name exhibits the traits denoted by the name shows that both of these types of meaning are active at the same time.

The fixing of reference between a person and a proper name is achieved through the social act of bestowal (Putnam 1975; Bean 1980; Kripke 1980). Such bestowal—whether through a “baptismal event” or filling out a birth certificate—is a performative communicative act (Austin 1962). The name of a person becomes linked to the
person through the declaration of the fact (“I hereby name you . . .”) under the proper felicity conditions. That link is maintained through ongoing, socially recognized use of the name.

The fixing of a name to a person through bestowal, however, does not eliminate the other ways in which proper names, as linguistic signs, signify. Thus, proper names can additionally signify as symbols (literal, denotive meanings), as indexes (social associations), or as icons (in which the sign bears some physical resemblance to the object that it represents) (Peirce 1985). For the current study, indexical meanings are the most significant because they are a function of social history and memory. According to Peirce (1985:12–13),

[An index is] a sign, or representation, which refers to its object . . . because it is in dynamical (including spatial) connection both with the individual object, on the one hand, and with the senses of memory of the person for whom it serves as a sign, on the other hand. . . .

Thus, for many people, “smoke” is an index of “fire.” Their experience of relationships between smoke and fire makes them think of fire when they see only smoke. This same indexical principle explains why many Americans currently associate the names Jake, Connor, Molly, and Claire with White American identities, and the names DeShawn, Darnell, Shanice, and Jasmin with African American identities (Fryer and Levitt 2004). This association with racial identities comes from individuals’ experience and memory of the distribution of these names by racial groups, not from any literal or iconic meanings of any of these names.

Finally, the choice and bestowal of names are intimately associated with power at various levels. The very convention of surnames in Europe, for example, is linked to the development of state administrations, starting in the 14th century, which needed to distinguish (male) subjects for taxation, conscription, and property rolls (Scott et al. 2002:8). In the 18th and 19th centuries, European states required Jews seeking state citizenship to take on permanent surnames from restricted lists of names (Scott et al. 2002:16–17). At the more local level, power rests in criteria and procedures, akin to Austin’s (1962) felicity conditions for naming: who provides names for the individual and through what ritual and bureaucratic practices? When one group dominates and names members of another group, no fit between name and person is sought, and names, themselves, become injurious labels. Benson (2006:189, 191), for example, describes how African slaves in English households in the 18th century often received mocking names of Imperial Roman origin such as Scipio, Caesar, Nero, and Pompey. The grandeur of such names was a source of humor for their masters because of the discrepancy between the slaves’ names and material conditions. The power of names is also seen in Black Nationalists’ urging African Americans, beginning in the 1960s, to discard their “slave names,” i.e., family names taken from slave-era masters, leading “Malcolm Little,” for example, to become “Malcolm X” (Benson 2006:195).

Finally, in many societies, the names themselves are seen to contain power, e.g., through bringing luck or protecting the bearer from supernatural forces (Alford 1988).

These characteristics of names—they are fixed to an individual through bestowal, they carry detachable, semiotic meanings, especially indexical ones, that operate independently of their person-reference function, and they are related to power relations—are all important to understanding the seeming puzzle of Chinese Indonesian names. While denotive meanings—“Sunny” for a newborn who needs sun or “Nelson” as praise for a boy’s father—play a role in name choice, it is these names’ social associations with the West and the group pattern of Western-name choice that is socially significant here. In fixing Western names to their children, a practice that breaks from both Chinese and Indonesian traditions, Chinese Indonesians are making significant statements about how they see the world and their positions in it. The statements they are making are intimately tied to state discrimination, to their understandings of their positions in Indonesian society, and to the indexical
meanings that Western names carry for them. Such names carry associations of modernity, education, resistance to state discrimination, and difference from non-Chinese Indonesians, all of which relate to the specific identity issues faced by this group in the second half of the 20th century.

**Chinese in Indonesia and Suharto’s Anti-Chinese Naming Legislation**

Immigrants from China have been settled in Java since at least the 1600s. Their numbers, as traders, merchants, and laborers, grew under Dutch colonial rule such that there were at least 10 thousand Chinese in the city of Batavia (present-day Jakarta) by 1740. Many ethnic Chinese served as middlemen minorities in the colonial economic system. A common organization of colonial wealth extraction was for cash crops such as coffee, tea, cacao, tobacco, and rubber to be cultivated by Javanese peasants, collected and traded by Chinese intermediaries, and sold overseas by European merchants.

Like other colonial rulers, the Dutch used divide-and-rule tactics—distinguishing among the population in ways that would discourage political alliance–building—in order to maintain control over their lucrative colony. In 1825, for example, the Dutch Governor-General introduced a resolution that would forbid “foreign Asians in Java,” such as ethnic Chinese, from living in the same neighborhoods as “the native population” (Phoa 1992). The Dutch *Regeeringsreglement* of 1854 (and its successor, *Indische Staatsregeling* No. 163 of 1925) legally sanctioned and institutionalized inhabitants into ethnic groups, each with distinct legal statuses and rights: 1) Europeans or Westerners, 2) Foreign Easterners (Chinese-, Indian-, and Arab-descent), and 3) Indigenous people. Chinese-descent Indonesians were considered “Foreign Easterners” despite the fact that, by 1900, over 90 percent of the 274,000 Chinese in Java were Indonesian-born (Reid 2010:60). The Dutch maintained this classification system, which included, at times, pass laws that controlled movement and residence for each group, until the end of colonial rule in 1949. This racial classification system provided a template for distinguishing between Chinese-descent Indonesians and other Indonesians after independence. The Dutch colonial administration coined the term *pribumi* ‘sons of the soil’ to differentiate between longer-term natives of the islands and other residents of the islands as part of its divide-and-rule administration. The term and category were maintained by the government of the independent Indonesia, which continued to use it to draw “a line between native (*pribumi*) and non-native (*non-pribumi*) instead of between Indonesians and non-Indonesians” (Hoon 2008:34), enacting legislation in the 1950s that limited where Chinese Indonesians could live and required them to apply for Indonesian citizenship, regardless of how many generations they had lived in Indonesia (Wilmott 1961; Purdey 2006).

In 1965, a coup attributed to members of the Indonesian Communist Party was suppressed by the national army under the command of a young general named Suharto. Hundreds of thousands were killed in the purges following the attempted coup, and Suharto would go on to become one of the world’s longest-reigning dictators. During more than three decades of Suharto rule, Chinese Indonesians, despite being a small percentage of the population, were made to play a distinctive role of Other in the constitution of Indonesian-ness and the maintenance of Suharto’s regime (Aguilar 2001).

Suharto’s “New Order” government immediately began forced-assimilation policies in 1966 in order to suppress expression of Chinese ethnic, cultural and religious identity (Hoon 2008:37). All Chinese-language schools were closed down, with children of Chinese descent being required to enroll in Indonesian-language schools (Dawis 2009). Presidential Instruction No. 14/1967 on Chinese Religion, Beliefs, and Traditions effectively banned any Chinese literature and expression of Chinese culture in Indonesia, including public display of Chinese characters. Cabinet Presidential Circular 6 of 1967 ordered that ethnic Chinese be referred to by the term...
“Cina,” considered a highly derogatory term by many Chinese Indonesians, rather than the terms “Tionghoa” or “Tiongkok,” which were used by ethnic Chinese themselves. Importing materials in the Chinese language was restricted, falling “under the category of prohibited imports like narcotics, pornography and explosives when entering Indonesia” (Heryanto 1999:327).

Cabinet Presidium Decision 127 of 1966 established regulations for “name changing for Indonesian citizens who use Chinese names.” Although ostensibly an executive order to establish a particular bureaucratic procedure, it began with a political and ideological prelude stating that the “process of assimilation of Indonesians of ‘foreign descent’ (keturunan asing) must be accelerated” and that “replacing the names of Indonesians of foreign descent with names which conform to indigenous Indonesian names will assist in assimilation” (Coppel 2002). The Decision did not state that Chinese Indonesians must change their names but presented itself, in the Orwellian language of authoritarian rulers, as a resource being provided for the ethnic Chinese population:

Indonesian citizens who still use Chinese names, and who wish to change their names to conform to indigenous Indonesian names, need to be given the fullest facilities by implementing a special procedure.

President Suharto, in his Decision No. 240 (Article 4) of 1967, was more direct about what ethnic Chinese should do with their names: “Indonesian citizens of foreign descent who still use Chinese names are urged to replace them with Indonesian names pursuant to current legislation.” Although promulgated in the name of assimilation, required name-changing did not erase one’s “Chinese-ness” in the eyes of the state: ethnic Chinese who changed their names still needed to record and declare their former Chinese names whenever they dealt with government bodies (Heryanto and Kahn 1998:104).

As described by Goodenough (1965:275) above, naming customs of a group depend “on the nature of the identity problems their social circumstances prevailingly create for them.” Chinese Indonesian naming practices in Java over the last 60 years reflect the particular social circumstances and identity issues that their historical positions and Suharto’s 1966–1998 reign created for them.

Names at Two Jakarta High Schools in the 1990s

In order to examine naming patterns from the Suharto era empirically, we compared names of 100 high-school 12th-graders from a Jakarta school that was about 98 percent Chinese Indonesian with the names of 100 high-school 12th-graders from a Jakarta school that was more representative of the overall Indonesian population, i.e., over 90 percent Muslim and with no more than a few percent Chinese Indonesians. Although this is not a large or statistically representative sample, the patterns we identify are consistent with consultants’ experiences, with the patterns that can be seen in names of public figures in Indonesia more generally, with personal narratives published in the media, and with practical guidelines published by the U.S. government for evaluating refugee and asylum cases. Names were drawn, in the order listed, from the initial three to four homeroom rosters at each school until 100 names from each school were recorded. These 200 individuals were born and named between 1978 and 1986, during the period of Suharto’s New Order rule. Both high schools were prestigious, academic schools. The school that was 98 percent Chinese Indonesian was a private Christian school, while the other school was a public or “state” school.

Lists of names were coded by the authors and two Indonesian graduate students (Muslim and natives of Java) who were living in the United States. Each discrete name was coded as a) Western, b) Indonesian, c) given name, d) family name, e) patronym, or f) distinctively Chinese Indonesian name (see Table 1 below). Names with salient ethnic or religious connotations were also noted.
We enumerate and analyze observable differences between these lists of names below. In all cases, numbers of names with particular characteristics are out of 100 student names.

**Single names**

The most common structure for person names in Indonesia is one or more given names with no “last name” or “family name” (Sulistyo-Basuki 2003; Rony 1970). Traditionally, many Javanese went by a single name. The first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, and his successor, Suharto, both had only a single name. The U.S. journalistic convention of noting, after referring to such individuals, “who like many Indonesians goes by one name,” suggests that this is a relatively foreign practice for U.S. readers.

Most Javanese now go by multiple *given* names (with no “last names”). The name of the current Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, exemplifies this pattern. To Western audiences, the form of his name appears to fit a pattern of first, middle, and last names, and he is regularly described as “Mr. Yudhoyono” or “President Yudhoyono” in English language press, as if “Yudhoyono” were a last name. However, all three of his names are given names, with none of them related to his parents’ names: Raden Soekotjo and Siti Habibah.

Twenty students at the Chinese Indonesian school were listed on class rosters with a single name, e.g., “Audrey” or “Silawaty,” while only two students at the public school were listed under a single name. Sixty-four of these public school students are listed with two names, thirty-two with three names, and two with four names. Informants suggest that giving a single name is relatively uncommon now, occurring primarily among less-educated people in rural areas of Java. It is unlikely that such students and their families, as urban, economically successful Chinese Indonesians, were following a tradition associated with rural Javanese peasants, particularly since three-quarters of these single given names—Jackson, Audrey, and Freddy, for example—are European rather than Javanese. Neither is it a Chinese tradition to go by a single given name. Chinese names typically consist of a monosyllabic family name and a one- or two-syllable given name. Even in relatively informal interaction, it is customary in China to address a person by family name, rather than just by a single given name (Blum 1997:365).

The fact that these 20 students were *listed* only by single given names does not mean that they did not *have* family names. Coauthor Sunny Lie, for example, was listed by the single name “Sunny” in this school roster even though she had the family name of Lie. She can also specify family names for a number of her classmates who were listed by single names. Like Sunny, these individuals had family names—e.g., Tan and Wong—that were unambiguously Chinese. Only one out of the 100

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### Table 1

Characteristics of names at two schools in Jakarta in the 1990s.

All numbers are out of 100.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chinese Indonesian Christian School</th>
<th>Indonesian Public school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Listed by single name</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed with surname or family name</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed with at least one Western name</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed with distinctively Chinese Indonesian family name</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed with patronym</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>At least 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
students listed an unambiguously Chinese surname, “Lie” (no relation to coauthor Sunny Lie), in these rosters. As many as 20 students may have been avoiding the public recording of Chinese family names because of Suharto-era suppression of Chinese cultural and linguistic expression.

Family names

The naming pattern that is perceived as natural by many Westerners, [given name(s) + last name], is common only among a few minority ethnic groups in Indonesia, none of whom make up more than four percent of the overall population. Ethnic Chinese, for example, tend to maintain patrilineal family names, following Chinese tradition, as in the name Sunny Lie. Chinese patrilineal family names are central to identity, representing one’s ancestry and place in a line of descent of generations stretching from the past into the future. The Bataks in North Sumatra use first names and distinct clan (marga) names that resemble Western family names, e.g., “Andreas Simatupang.” The Minang people in Western Sumatra, traditionally followed a matrilineal system in which titles and clan names were handed down through the female lineage, e.g., “Anisa Chaniago.”

The majority of the students at the Chinese Indonesian school, 56, were listed on the roster with family names, or surnames, while only one student at the non-Chinese school (with a characteristic ethnic Batak clan name) was listed with a surname. Assuming that a number of the 20 Chinese Indonesian students listed under single names actually have telltale Chinese last names that they are choosing not to record in school rosters, the difference between the two schools in terms of use of last names is even more pronounced.

Western names

At the Chinese Indonesian school, 56 students had at least one Western name, e.g., Linda, Ryan, or Samuel, while only 18 of the 100 students at the public school had at least one Western name. If the use of Western names were a pan-Indonesian fad (e.g., driven by U.S. popular culture and economic might), one would expect similar percentages of Western names at the two schools. Instead, the Chinese Indonesian students had Western names at over three times the rate of students at the other school. The motivations for this phenomenon—the high rate of giving children names that are neither Chinese nor Indonesian—is analyzed below.

Chinese Indonesian family names

Approximately 37 of the students from the Chinese Indonesian school had last names that Indonesians consider distinctively Chinese Indonesian, such as Wijaya and Sutanto, while none of the students at the public school had such surnames. These names are not the same as Chinese names. Retaining explicitly Chinese names under Suharto immediately identified one as ethnic Chinese, resistant to government mandates, and disloyal, in the eyes of many, to Indonesia. At the same time, giving up one’s family name could be experienced by many Chinese as giving up an important part of one’s identity and family.

The solution for many Chinese Indonesians in the 1960s was to coin novel multisyllabic Indonesian-sounding family names built around their single-syllable Chinese surname (Kwee 1998:53). They were thus able to preserve their patrilineal family names at the same time that they could be seen as complying with government mandates to give up their Chinese names in favor of Indonesian ones. Adding a Javanese prefix Su- and a suffix of -o or other vowels to a monosyllabic Chinese family name was a common way to “Indonesianize” a name. Thus, the Chinese surname Tan might be Indonesianized as Tanto, Hertanto, Hartanto, Tanoto, Tanu, Tanutama, or Sulanto, with many other variations possible. Names that incorporated elements
associated with Islamic or Javanese traditions—traditions seen as essentially “native Indonesian,” in contrast to Chinese traditions and identities—were particularly useful for making a name “sound Indonesian” rather than Chinese. Sioe Liong Liem, for example, who migrated from China to Indonesia in the 1930s at age 20 and went on to become one of the richest men in Indonesia, adopted the Javanese-sounding given name “Sudono” and the Arabic—and Islamic—family name of “Salmi.” One of the most stereotypical Chinese Indonesian names, Wijaya (also spelled Widjaja), incorporates the common Hokkien and Teochew surname 黃 (pronounced wee). Wijaya was also the name of a Javanese king revered for his defeat of an invading Mongol army and navy in 1293. Thus the name Wijaya could simultaneously incorporate a Chinese family name and pay homage to an historical Javanese leader and hero.

**Patronymics**

The final typical Indonesian naming pattern in our data is [given name(s) + patronymic]. Patronymics come from a father or other male ancestor’s given name, and may include suffixes meaning ‘son of’ (-putra in Indonesian) or ‘daughter of’ (-putri). The president of Indonesia from 2001 to 2004 was Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of first Indonesian president Sukarno. Her given name is “Megawati,” and her patronym is “Sukarnoputri,” which means ‘daughter of Sukarno.’ Rony (1970) traces this pattern to Arabic (via Islam), where patronymics (marked, for example, with bin, as in “Osama bin Laden”) are common. Patronymic names in Indonesian are not necessarily explicitly marked with –putri or –putra, so a patronymic may be indistinguishable in form from an additional given name among males.

We found no patronyms among the names from the Chinese school, and we found no patronyms with explicit marking (-putra or -putri) in either school. We identified five females with patronyms at the public school, however, by noting characteristically male given names appearing as a final name after one or more female names. Thus, a female named “Devi [feminine name] Taufieq [masculine name]” can be identified as having the patronym Taufieq. This method did not allow us to identify patronyms among male students. Indonesian consultants said that patronyms were equally common for male and female children, so we estimate that a number of male students (roughly equivalent in number to the five female students in our sample with patronyms) would have such patronyms.

**Other identity-related differences in names**

The lists of names differed in a number of additional ways related to ethnicity and religion. The Chinese Indonesian list included three recognizable Chinese given names, while the other list had none. The public-school list included at least five recognizable Sundanese (West Javanese) names and one name with the abbreviation “R.,” which stands for the Javanese royal honorific “Raden.” The public-school list included over a dozen names derived from Sanskrit or Hindu mythology, such as “Devi,” “Bima,” and “Krisna” (reflecting the 1,000-year period of Hindu kingdoms in Java), while the Chinese Indonesian list had none. There were dozens of Arabic and Islamic names in the public-school list, including three instances of “Mohammed” and three instances of names based on “Ramadhan,” often used for babies born during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. There were no Arabic or Muslim names among the 100 students at the Chinese Indonesian school.

**Experience and construction of ethnic boundaries**

While some of these naming patterns—the Indonesianizing of family names and hiding of telltale Chinese family names, for example—can be directly explained by Suharto-era naming legislation, other aspects of these data, such as the high rate of Western names, are better explained through local, subjective experiences of ethnicity.
and difference in Indonesia. Budiman (1999) describes Chinese Indonesians as a “triple minority,” distinguishable from the surrounding majority population in terms of 1) religion, 2) ethnicity and race, and 3) socioeconomic status. In terms of religion, 90 percent of Chinese Indonesians are Buddhist or Christian, while over 87 percent of the national population is Muslim (Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar 2008). In terms of race and ethnicity, Chinese Indonesians are associated with origins in China and Chinese cultural and language practices, although the extent of such practices diminishes rapidly across generations, such that the second and, especially, third and fourth generations, born and raised in Indonesia, are much more similar to other Indonesians than to mainland Chinese in terms of language and culture. Regardless of cultural assimilation across generations, however, Chinese Indonesians are understood to be distinct from other Indonesians in terms of appearance, marked by fairer skin and a distinctive eyelid shape.

In addition to their religious and ethnic/racial distinctiveness, Chinese Indonesians as a group are much wealthier, on average, than other Indonesians. Since colonial times they have been a highly visible ethnic minority as retailers and traders (Toer 1998). After independence in 1949, Chinese Indonesians were excluded from political and military office despite relatively high levels of education and economic achievement, and they are still underrepresented in those arenas. As described by Weber (1958), such exclusion encourages a community and its most capable members to focus resources on economic pursuits. Chinese Indonesians have been disproportionately successful in the expanding national and global economy since independence. A 1995 study, for example, found that Chinese Indonesians owned 68 percent of the top 300 conglomerates in Indonesia. The enormous wealth of a small number of Chinese Indonesian tycoons, typically cronies of political leaders, reinforces inviolable stereotypes of ethnic Chinese as extravagantly wealthy, even though the vast majority of ethnic Chinese are professionals, small shopkeepers, and traders, not business magnates (Soebagjo 2008:142). At the same time, many Chinese Indonesians take pride in their relative economic success and attribute it to what they see as cultural values of frugality, hard work, and education. Seeing their economic success as culturally grounded encourages them to maintain a sense of proud cultural distinctiveness and thus to maintain ethnic boundaries between themselves and non-Chinese Indonesians.

Although constructed as a monolithic racial Other by Dutch colonial rulers and Suharto’s New Order, there is huge variation in who can count as “Chinese Indonesian” (Allen 2003). The category “Chinese Indonesian” can include first-generation immigrants who arrive as adults from China or other Chinese communities as well as nth-generation immigrants whose grandparents, great-grandparents, and beyond were Indonesian-born and -raised. The cultural practices and distinctiveness of communities vary by generation, by regional origins in China, and by regional communities within Indonesia (Tan 2001; Hoon 2008). Historically, there have been peranakan ‘descendant’ communities that exhibited various degrees of assimilation as well as centuries of Chinese-descent Indonesians marrying outside the Chinese community and losing any distinctive Chinese identity across generations. In this article, we focus on second- through fourth-generation Chinese Indonesians in Jakarta who are linguistically assimilated to Indonesian but who have maintained distinctively Chinese Indonesian identities through the intertwined forces of discrimination from the wider society (including Suharto-era legal obstacles to intermarriage) and voluntary patterns of residential segregation, in-group social, business, and religious association, and in-group marriage.

The actual contextual use of names varies by generation, community, and context (cf. Suzman 1994; Aceto 2002). In heavily ethnic Chinese communities outside of Java such as Singkawang, West Kalimantan (40 percent Chinese) or Medan, North Sumatra (over 10 percent Chinese), which are both closer geographically to Singapore than to Jakarta, many third- and even fourth-generation children may speak some Hakka or Hokkien at home, and their varieties of Bahasa Indonesian shows
effects of their bilingualism. In such communities, Chinese names are regularly used in the home and private spheres, with non-Chinese names used in official documents, schools, and workplaces. Many Chinese Indonesians in these communities regard more assimilated Jakarta-raised Chinese Indonesians as having lost their Chineseness. For those in Jakarta who are more assimilated into mainstream Indonesian society, the giving of Chinese names (in addition to the non-Chinese ones) may simply be a formality. Coauthor Sunny Lie, for example, was given the Chinese name Hui Zhen at birth by her paternal grandfather but feels little connection to that name:

“Hui Zhen” is a name I do not identify with in any way. I know how to write it in Chinese. I know what it means. But if someone were to call me by that name on the street, I wouldn’t react to it spontaneously as I would if they called me “Sunny.” It might as well be someone else’s name. Relatives in Singkawang, as well as relatives in Jakarta from older generations who aren’t as assimilated as me and my cousins, refer to me not by the name “Hui Zhen” but by a Hakka pronunciation of “Sunny” as “San Ni.” This is also what my parents call me at home.

In contrast, Sunny’s mother Li, who adopted the name “Lily” in 1972 in order to apply for citizenship with a non-Chinese name, identifies less with her adopted English name. When asked how she had chosen her name, she replied, “[I]t didn’t matter to us what our English names were because they were just a formality, not our real names.” Although she goes by Ibu Lily ‘Mrs. Lily’ outside of the home, in her family and among friends, she is known by her Chinese name.

Contemporary Chinese Indonesian naming motivations

In order to examine contemporary Chinese Indonesian naming motivations, we questioned nine Chinese Indonesians and four non-Chinese Indonesians who named children between 2005 and 2012. These individuals had grown up during the Suharto era but were naming their children during the post-1998 Reformasi (Reform) period, as anti-Chinese legislation was revoked piece by piece and newly legal public displays of Chinese culture and language began to appear. Despite the end of Suharto’s forced-assimilation policies, however, the Chinese Indonesians continued to favor names that were neither Chinese nor Indonesian, but Western. These nine subjects continue to link this preference for Western names to ethnic-boundary maintenance, intertwined with a modern orientation to education and socioeconomic mobility. We contrast the nine Chinese Indonesians’ expressed rationales for giving Western names with the motivations described to us in interviews with the four non-Chinese Indonesians. Three of these non-Chinese Indonesians, two Muslims and one Christian, cited religion as a primary influence in their naming decisions, and the fourth gave his daughter two Arabic names, which are closely associated with Muslim identities in Indonesia.

These 13 interviews were conducted via internet instant messaging (n=7) and email (n=6) by coauthor Sunny Lie and a non-Chinese Indonesian graduate student from Jakarta who was studying in the United States. Interview subjects were a convenience sample of Jakarta-based friends and acquaintances of the two interviewers who had children or were considering children. The interview subjects represent a highly educated and economically mobile group relative to the broader Indonesian society. Subjects ranged in age from 27 to 40 and all had at least a bachelor’s degree. Questions focused on the names given to children, the ways in which they came to those names, and whether they considered Chinese, Indonesian, or Western names. Questions were written in Indonesian; answers were primarily in Indonesian, with some code-switching into English.

Many of the Chinese Indonesian subjects interviewed explained their preference for Western names over Indonesian names in terms of taste or fit. For example, Wendy, a 34-year-old from West Java who named her children Steven, Clement, and William, explained,
Despite being born and raised in Indonesia, Wendy says that she is unable to find an Indonesian name that fits her Indonesian-born children. Wina, a 33-year-old Chinese Indonesian from Jakarta who named her son Scott, explains:

Kenapa ngga milih nama Indo ya? Hmm . . . mungkin soalnya ga ada yang bener-bener suka dan kita ga ngerti arti-arti nama Indo/Jawa . . . tapi ya itu, berhubung kita ga ngerti . . . ya lucu kedengarannya.

‘Why didn’t I choose an Indonesian name? Hmmm . . . maybe because I didn’t really like any of them and we don’t understand what those Indonesian/Javanese names mean . . . that’s the thing, since we don’t understand . . . it just sounds kind of funny.’

Despite being born and raised in Indonesia, she claims a lack of understanding of the meaning of Indonesian names. In saying that “we don’t understand them” (in an interview with a fellow Chinese Indonesian), she constitutes a we/they distinction between a Chinese Indonesian “we” and a non-Chinese Indonesian “they.” The fact that a discussion of names leads to the constitution of a we/they distinction suggests the centrality of a boundary-marking function of naming. Wendy and Wina cite an inability to find an Indonesian name that “fits” or that one “likes” and “understands,” but such claims about fit and taste may be experience-near (Geertz 1974) expressions of sociological processes of boundary maintenance between Chinese Indonesians and other Indonesians.

Diana, a 32-year-old from Jakarta, explains, ‘It never really occurred to me to use Indonesian names. I’m not really fond of them. Although I have to say that some names do sound very patriotic . . .’ Like Wendy and Wina, Diana does not like Indonesian names but doesn’t articulate what she finds unattractive about them. She is, however, able to articulate a positive characteristic of them: some sound very patriotic. Diana is indirectly articulating the popular ideology that pribumi or “native” Indonesians, in contrast to ethnic Chinese Indonesians, are loyal to Indonesia and responsible for its independence from the Dutch colonizers and World War II Japanese occupiers. Thus, names common among “native” Indonesians can connote national patriotism and loyalty in ways that names common among Chinese Indonesians do not.

Several interview subjects described stereotyped Indonesian names in ways that illustrated negative indexical meanings of such names for them. They associated these stereotypical Indonesian names with low education and socioeconomic achievement and therefore saw them as incompatible with what they saw as Chinese Indonesian values of education, planning for the future, and socioeconomic mobility. Wina, who had said that she didn’t like Indonesian names and didn’t know what they meant, also explained her choice to give a non-Indonesian name (Scott) to her child in essentialist cultural terms:

mungkin ada factor budaya kali ya? Masak namanya Joko tapi sipit? Lucu juga hehehehehe

‘maybe there’s a cultural factor to it? How could someone named Joko be slant-eyed? That’s kind of funny hehehehehe’

The Javanese name “Joko,” literally ‘young man,’ sounds like a rural, uneducated, and outdated name to many Indonesians. For Wina, the juxtaposition of a racially Chinese (“slant-eyed”) individual with a Javanese peasant name is humorous because she sees the two as incongruous, creating a benign violation of social reality (McGraw and Warren 2010). The essential characteristics of a Chinese Indonesian individual are assumed to contrast with the essential nature of such a stereotyped peasant. The fact that Wina gave her child the European name “Scott,” however, suggests that it is not
specifically phenotype-racial incongruity that makes the image of a “slant-eyed” Joko humorous. Europeans are as distinct in appearance from Chinese as non-Chinese Indonesians are, but the idea of a “slant-eyed” Scott is not humorous for her. It is differences in cultural and behavioral orientations, rather than physical appearance, that lead her to see a Javanese peasant name as incompatible with a Chinese Indonesian identity.

Rusmini, a 34-year-old born and raised in Jakarta, named her son Daniel Edric Ricardo. She directly declares traditional, stereotypical Indonesian names to be provincial-sounding. When asked whether she had considered giving her children Indonesian names, she replied,


‘What would be an example of an Indonesian name? Joko? Amir? Haha . . . feels so hillbilly!’

Like Wina, Rusmini laughs at the notion of a Chinese Indonesian having a stereotypical, traditional Indonesian name. “Joko” and “Amir” sound to her like names for an uneducated villager. Amir, derived from a common noun in Arabic meaning ‘prince’ and frequently used as a title for a high-ranking official in the Muslim world, also indexes Indonesia’s dominant Islamic character, which many Chinese Indonesians see as antithetical to their Buddhist, Confucian, or Christian orientations and a symbol of difference between Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians. Many Chinese Indonesians associate their Chineseness with a cosmopolitan approach to education and planning for the future that lead many to seek education abroad and engage in international business. The stereotypical peasant “Joko” or “Amir,” in contrast, is poor, uneducated, and unable to see beyond the limited spheres of rural Indonesian life. Rusmini herself had suffered in her Chinese Indonesian peer group because of the Indonesian-sounding name her parents had given her. Her peers had teased her during her childhood and teenage years, saying she had a “maid’s name,” i.e., a name for a rural individual who came to the capital to work as a domestic. Many of her friends ended up calling her by nicknames in order to avoid saying the name Rusmini, with its negative connotations (within their socially mobile ethnic Chinese peer group).

Vina explained her preference for English over Indonesian names by arguing that such names are more international and easier on upwardly mobile children who might seek education abroad: “why english name? it’s international. the rich people all go abroad for school. it’s easier on the kids than to have names like siti or wati.” Like Wina and Rusmini, Vina cites stereotypical Indonesian names that she associates with rural, uneducated identities. “Wati” is a common female name and an Indonesian suffix marking ‘female name,’ while “Siti” means ‘noble woman.’ Vina does not specify why such names might create difficulties for children studying abroad. Although not familiar names for Europeans, the two names are easy for speakers of Western European languages to spell and pronounce. These two names may not represent linguistic or orthographic problems for children who study abroad, but rather, identity and aspirational problems for the families who might give such names. These names carry Muslim connotations for Chinese Indonesians, and they know that Muslim identities, since 2001, have complicated travel and study in the West. Additionally, for Chinese Indonesians, such names as Siti, Wati, Joko, or Amir represent a traditional Indonesian world of limited educational and socioeconomic aspirations and limited life chances. Giving such a name to a child would represent a lack of economic and educational aspiration, which is at odds with the ambition and resources required for a child who might seek education abroad.

**Religion and naming**

The relatively high rate of Christianity (about 35 percent) among Chinese Indonesians may influence Christian Chinese Indonesians to give their children biblical
names, making it difficult to differentiate between names motivated specifically by religious orientation and names motivated by cosmopolitan educational and socio-economic aspirations. In our interviews, however, only two out of the eight Christian Chinese Indonesians mentioned religion as a source or motivator of names, and only after giving other sources for the names chosen. In contrast, three out of four non-Chinese Indonesians, both Christian and Muslim, described religion as a primary motivator for their names, and the fourth gave explicitly Arabic names, which are associated with Muslim identities in Indonesia. Although the number of interviews is small, the ways in which members of the two groups talked about the role of religion were notably different, with non-Chinese according religion a more central role.

Cahya, a 33-year-old from Jakarta and one of two Christian Chinese Indonesians to mention religion in his account of naming, named his two children Nicole Larissa and Marina Bella. When asked how he named his children, he initially cited pop culture and personal experiences as sources of the names:

Utk anak pertama, kita namain Nicole, karena istri g nge-fans sama Nicole Kidman while watching Golden Compass (when’s the sequel, anyway? LOL) Larissa? Biar LARIS. LOL. Utk anak kedua, Marina kn gue inget salah seorang temen SMA g . . . dia kayak foto model . . . Marina also means “the sea”. Bella, itu nama gk disengaja. Nyari nama yg rada2 rhymes sama Larissa, nama kakaknya. It turns out that Belle, in french, means “beautiful”. Thus, Marina Bella = beautiful sea.

‘For our first child, we named her Nicole, because my wife is a fan of Nicole Kidman while watching Golden Compass (when’s the sequel, anyway? LOL) Larissa? So she’d be LARIS. LOL.10 For our second child, Marina because I remember a high school friend of mine . . . she looked like a photo model . . . . Marina also means “the sea.” Bella, that was unintentional. We were looking for a name that rhymes with Larissa,11 her elder sister’s middle name. It turns out that Belle, in French, means “beautiful.” Thus, Marina Bella = beautiful sea.’

Later in the same chat interview, he claims that he did not consider traditional Indonesian names for his children, but used biblical names as a starting point:

Actually we didn’t start out choosing English/Western names, but more like biblical names. . .when my wife was pregnant with Nicole, we bought a baby’s names book that’s based on the Bible, and we based our children’s name choices from there (apart from the story I told you before).

Although Cahya and his wife initially used a baby-naming book based on the Bible, the names they chose for their children are not familiar biblical names. Although Cahya cites religion as a source of his children’s names, the relationship appears indirect, and Western popular culture and personal encounters appear to be more direct sources.

Four non-Chinese Indonesians interviewed, a Christian and three Muslims, describe religion as a more central influence on their naming decisions. Dewi, a Muslim who had spent her elementary-school years in the United States, gave birth to a son in Japan, where her husband was completing an advanced degree. She gave her son a Japanese first name, Kenshou. For a second name, she needed an Islamic name, “since we know according to Islam that a baby’s name is a prayer for that baby, and that the name/prayer should be a good one, we also decided to give him an Islamic name as well.” For the second name, she consulted an Islamic name book. She and her husband had briefly considered the common Islamic Indonesian name “Mohammmed,” but rejected it for being too common and too morally weighty. They chose the name “Athallah,” meaning ‘gift from Allah’, which “sounded right to our ears, not too old-school but not too extreme either.”

Another Muslim Indonesian, 27-year-old Imam Mohammed, did not specifically cite religion in explaining his choice of names, but two of the three names he chose for his daughter were from Arabic. He said that the literal meanings of names were
important to him and his wife, so he consulted a baby-naming website that allowed him to input the meanings “success,” “usefulness,” and “improvement” and then pick from names in a variety of languages that matched those meanings. They chose two Arabic names, “Fawzia Mufiida,” and a Western name, “Emily,” as the third name, which Imam described as being from “Irish.”

Aini, a 28-year-old, and her husband considered Javanese names and what they called “international” names, but ended up giving their son three Arabic-based names, “Muhammed Daifa Faiza.”

Kita akhirnya memutuskan ke islam . . . untuk mendoakan si anak lewat namanya (pengaruh keluarga gua yg megang banget kalo nama itu doa).

‘We eventually decided to give him a Muslim name. . . . to give a prayer to our child through his name (this is my family’s influence who really upholds the belief that a name is a prayer [for the child]).’

Nini, an ethnic Toraja-Dayak Catholic Indonesian, who named her daughter Clara Angelica, described her child’s given names in terms of Christian mandates and perspective.


‘The first name is/must be a Baptism name (a name of a holy person). . . . We named our daughter Clara. Clara is the name of a saint who was very generous to the poor. We hope our daughter can live up to her name.’

The name “Angelica” was inspired by the angel-like fairies that Nini saw while under anesthesia during the birth of her daughter.

Although about one-third of Chinese Indonesians are Christian, and eight of the nine Chinese Indonesians interviewed for this study are Christian, religion was only mentioned by two of them in interviews about why they chose the names that they did. Chinese Indonesian Imogene, a Buddhist who had given herself and her adult sisters Western names in the early 1970s so they could apply for citizenship and get passports, was direct about the lack of connection between religion and names for her: “We’re Buddhists but we use foreign names . . . there’s no connection to religion. We just prefer using foreign names.” In contrast, three of the four non-Chinese interviewees in this sample, one Christian and three Muslims, cited religion as shaping their naming practices in central ways, and the fourth gave his daughter two Arabic names.

**Conclusions**

To name a child is an act of identity (LePage and Tabouret-Keller 1985). In giving their children names that are Western rather than Chinese or Indonesian, Chinese Indonesians are responding through the symbolic medium of names to their particular social and historical circumstances. Names are a particularly rich symbolic means for this negotiation because of a) their semiotic properties and b) their linkages to power. Unlike other linguistic signs, names “mean” in two distinct ways: 1) Person-reference is their primary meaning or function. Proper names are fixed to a person through bestowal and ongoing use, and it is this proper bestowal and use, rather than any characteristic of the name, that links it to the person. 2) Simultaneously, names signify in the ways that signs more generally signify, i.e., by denotation, by social association, or by iconic relation (Peirce’s [1985] symbols, indexes, and icons, respectively). These represent a secondary level of meaning or function in names that is active simultaneously with the person-referencing function of names.

It is this duality of meaning that makes names so potent for identity negotiations. In naming, we draw from a reservoir of linguistic signs with myriad meanings, and
we attach these signs, with their attendant meanings, to an individual. When the
names (linguistic signs) are conventional for a cultural context, their use seems
unremarkable. However, names are detachable (Bodenhorn and Vom Bruck 2006:4),
and they can be brought from distant cultural, geographic, or historical contexts,
bringing with them meanings that are then fixed to a person.

Names and naming are also intertwined with issues of power. Family surnames
became common in Europe only when states required them as a means of surveil-
 lance and control, and many states around the world have regulated naming choices
of their inhabitants. Historically, masters have named not only themselves, but also
their slaves, while slaves have not had a say in their own names. The names them-

selves can even be seen as powerful, bringing good fortune or protecting their bearers
from evil, whether social or supernatural.

The social significance of Western names among Chinese Indonesians is not found
in the etymological, referential meanings of the names, but rather in the choice to
bestow names from far away that are neither Chinese nor Indonesian. In turning to
non-Indonesian names for their children in the 1960s, Chinese Indonesians resisted
Suharto’s forced-assimilation policies that prohibited or discouraged Chinese names.
Naming a child Agnes, Andrew, or Robin made a child sound less Chinese—an
ostensible goal of the Suharto-era legislation—but it did not make the child sound
more Indonesian. In coining Indonesian-sounding surnames built around their
monosyllabic Chinese family names, Chinese Indonesians complied with naming
regulations while preserving both their names and their tradition of family surnames.
In addition to resisting state mandates, these distinct naming practices reconstitute an
ethnic boundary between Chinese Indonesians and the larger Indonesian population.
Many Chinese Indonesians see themselves as different from the larger population,
and distinctive naming practices are a way of symbolically marking and maintaining
this difference.

The Chinese Indonesian choice of Western given names to mark intra-Indonesian
difference is not arbitrary but is linked to specific indexical meanings that such names
carry for many. Such names index an orientation toward education and socioeco-
nomic mobility that many Chinese Indonesians value and see as characteristic of
themselves. Crucially, many see these valued characteristics as less common and less
valued among the larger Indonesian population. Thus, Western names simulta-
neously index 1) what many Chinese Indonesians see as their own positive cultural,
economic, and educational orientations and 2) their basic differences from the larger
population.

Much has changed in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto in 1998. Anti-Chinese
legislation has been repealed, there are public displays of Chinese language and
culture, and Chinese Indonesian politicians have participated in elections and taken
office. Elimination of state discrimination may encourage more Chinese Indonesians
to identify first and foremost as Indonesian and give their children names that are
seen as traditionally Indonesian. At the same time, China has transformed into a
world economic power, with a concomitant rise in global prestige for Chinese lan-
guage, culture, and identities, which might encourage the use of Chinese names,
within Indonesia and beyond.12

Our interviews on contemporary naming (albeit limited in number) do not show
evidence of either of these trends. The characteristics that Indonesians use to differ-
entiate between Chinese Indonesians and other Indonesians—physical appearance,
religion, and relative income—remain in place. The May 1998 attacks targeting
Chinese Indonesians, including arson, murder, and rape, are fresh in memory (Gie
1998; Yang 2001; Nyoto 2002; Purdey 2006). Not surprisingly, many Chinese Indo-
nesians continue to mark boundaries between themselves and the larger population.
Names, with their duality of meaning and links to power, are a rich resource for
such identity work, and Western names, with their associations of modernity, edu-
cation, and economic development, continue to be used for this boundary-marking
function.
Notes

1. The masculine associations of tai yang in Mandarin would also make it inappropriate as a girl’s name.
2. For example, Olympic gold medalist badminton players Susi Susanti and Tony Gunawan, as well as tennis champion Angelique Widjaja and chess grandmaster Ruben Gunawan—all Chinese Indonesians born between the 1960s and 1980s—illustrate the pattern of [Western first name + Chinese Indonesian last name]. The United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration services, in a practical guidebook for adjudicating refugee and asylum cases among Chinese Indonesians, notes, “Today, ethnic Chinese Indonesians often, but not always, have ‘Christian’ first names, such as Rudy or Mary, but then have long ‘elaborate-sounding Javanese’ surnames. For instance, William Soeryadjaya, Leo Suryadinata, Franz Winarta, Harry Chan, and Mely Tan are actual names of prominent ethnic Chinese Indonesians” (United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Indonesia: Information on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, 23 July 1999, IDN99001.ZNY, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6a 334.html [accessed 3 January 2013]).
3. Suharto closed all schools that were specifically Chinese or Chinese-language during the 1960s. Christian schools were allowed, as Christianity was one of five state-recognized religions. For many Chinese Indonesians, whether Christian or not, private Christian schools became a means of keeping children in a predominantly ethnic Chinese school environment, even though Chinese language was not used or taught in school.
4. The family surname “Huang” in Mandarin.
5. There is also great linguistic and cultural diversity among non-Chinese Indonesians, but our Chinese Indonesian subjects did not distinguish among these groups in interview data. Sunny Lie reports that distinct accents and Christian religion (dominant among Bataks and Manados, who are not from Java) are common markers of non-Javanese (and non-Chinese) Indonesian identities.
6. Reid (2010:79) suggests that the very term “Chinese” in English or “Cina” in Indonesian is an obstacle to legitimation of Chinese Indonesians as cultural citizens: “That term is used to cover too many contradictory things, including a minority which is patently Indonesian in every respect, as well as a foreign language, culture and polity often seen as a threat.”
7. Peranakan is currently used to refer to culturally assimilated Chinese Indonesians. Historically, it was often used to refer specifically to individuals or communities of mixed Chinese and Indonesian ancestry. It is often contrasted with totok (literally ‘new’ or ‘pure’), which refers to unassimilated, first-generation immigrants.
8. The Marriage Law Number 1 of 1974.
9. “Edric” is an Old English name.
10. “Laris” means “popular” or “in demand” in Indonesian, and in this particular usage can refer to marriageability. By capitalizing “LARIS” and adding the internet chat abbreviation “LOL” for “laugh out loud,” Cahya calls attention to this humorous meaning.
11. His desire to give his children rhyming middle names may reflect the Chinese generation naming practice of zìbèi, or bāncì, in which children of a generation share a common generation name in addition to their given name.
12. At the local level, the low status of newly arriving labor migrants from China who are less educated and have fewer resources may outweigh any prestige accruing to Chinese identities from the global rise of China.

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