Introduction:

Working on a paper regarding South Asia and Genocide is treading on very shaky, mostly uncertain territory that has only limited scholarly exploration. Genocide as we know and understand it as a grave crime that threatens peace and security of a country or region and becomes a serious concern to the international community as a whole\(^1\) is not a phenomenon that has been experienced by the South Asian region – or so the debate would be. Then the question would be why talk about a region that is free of the evil and why not hail it as a model to pursue? Simply because it is not. The argument made in this paper is that South Asia is a boiling pot of violence, conflicts, targeted clashes, which center around incessant identity hostilities and aggression. Take any country in the South Asian region (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) the conflicting/clashing parties and contributing factors might change but the violence is still centered on group – cultural, religious, ethnic, nationalistic – identities. As a prominent Indian journalist, Siddharth Varadarajan, clearly states in his paper on the need for transitional justice in South Asia demographic cleansing (as he calls it) is rife in the region\(^2\). This includes forced migrations, internal displacement and targeted violence and killings on massive scales either instigated by state or non-state actors. Within this context, the need to study the probability and vulnerability of the region to Genocide or genocidal incidents becomes clear; especially in the light of the theme of the conference – ‘Responding to Genocide before it’s too late: Genocide Studies and Prevention’.

Most of the South Asian region has witnessed the colonization of their land and people. This part of the world, with its diverse cultures and even more diverse people, has experienced violence over the centuries, decades and years not only at the hands of their colonizers and conquerors but also at the hands of its own State and/or its own people. Violence has left its imprint in the form of massive craters in the histories of all South Asian countries. Till date, it has consumed our present and will continue to form our future because of the way our histories and societies have been formed and re-formed over the years. Taking one look around the South Asian region, primarily speaking from an Indian perspective, violence, conflict and war is rife all around the subcontinent.

\(^1\) The phrases “grave crime” and “serious concern to the international community as a whole” is mentioned in the preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Pakistan is struggling to keep alive the little it has in the form of democracy. And to date, neither Pakistan nor India has been able to wash away the stains of the bloody partition of 1947. Six decades later, Kashmir is still a disputed territory between these neighbours hanging like a Damocles sword over their socio-political conscience. Burma, Bangladesh and Nepal are striving to create democracy and in the process, various groups – ethnic, religious, nationalistic – are vying to create a space for their identities in a prospective state. Sri Lanka has not seen peace in last three decades irrespective of a ceasefire, an undeclared war and several attempts at peace talks. Meanwhile, the sub-continental giant – India – herself is collapsing under several battles (national and international) on various fronts. Ironic, under the circumstances, that India is often comprehended or even seen synonymously with the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence. As perhaps Shashi Tharoor (1989) noted in his book ‘The Great Indian Novel’, “India is not an underdeveloped country, but a highly developed one in an advanced state of decay.”

These above mentioned are just some of the conflicts that are plaguing the region. Conflicts and violence in the South Asian region are mostly centered on the issue of identities – clashes of cultures and of people belonging predominantly to one identity or group. And though this is the core of what explains Genocide, whether this region or even individual countries have experienced Genocide is a question of much debate, scholarly opinion and argument. This paper will further explain the relevance and significance of the concept and underlying notions of identity in the context of violence in the South Asian region and its relevance to Genocide studies and prevention in later sections. However, the many incidents of violence in this region are, more often than not, not referred to as Genocide. They are mostly referred to as riots, communal outbursts or, to take it to a higher degree, pogroms. It is only in a sensationalized context or for that purpose alone, that ethnic/communal violence in the South Asian region is ever referred to as Genocide and most often by the media and few schools of the academia. Like senior journalists, Siddharth Varadarajan and publisher Urvashi Butalia, agree the G-word is most often used loosely by the media – both print and electronic – and even abused without fully comprehending the import of the word – legal or social. Most often because of the misuse of the word and the import of its political ad historical baggage, the sensationalism is ignored. The frenzy of the news and media apart, the debate is still ongoing as to whether our history has been stained by the blood of mass killings on a genocidal scale. This paper would argue that in fact countries in South Asia have experienced Genocide but perhaps unlike on the scale or intensity of incidents in Europe or Africa. Does that make it any less an incident of Genocide or worse yet, genocidal?

There have been incidents bordering on Genocide (genocidal) in the South Asian region – 1947 India-Pakistan partition, 1956 and 1983 anti-Tamil riots in Sri Lanka, 1971 Bangladesh war, 1984 Sikh riots (India), and even in contemporary India in 2002 during the Gujarat riots. Then there have been incidents that are outright Genocides: Famines of 1942 in the present state of West Bengal during Britain’s colonial rule, the Nellie massacre of 1983 in eastern state of Assam. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect about

---

4 Views and opinions were stated in separate interviews with the writer. S. Varadarajan is an Associate Editor of the Indian national daily The Hindu. U. Butalia founded the publishing house Kali for Women.
some of the incidents of violence in this region is that it has taken place at times of peace. Whether genocides or genocidal, there are concerns and issues in categorizing these bloody incidents, which in turn point at the issues and flaws in the international law on Genocide that will be discussed in following sections.

This paper is an attempt at expressing a grave concern of genocidal mentalities prevalent in the South Asian region. It is also an attempt at formulizing and exploring ways and means of prevention. In doing so, it questions the capacity of the present state of international or national law and conventions to display the foresight required in being able to prevent violence, war and/or conflict be it on the scale of genocide, mass slaughter or ethnic cleansing. It would be fitting to quote MK Gandhi here who quoted in a letter to the Times of India in 1918 that “…prejudices cannot be removed by legislation…” (Fischer 1951, pg.67)⁵. The paper refers to prejudices here because violence has a history, an underlying current and does not erupt in a vacuum. This history is sewn into the fabric of society and forms the very standards and mindsets by which our society trudges along today. In this light, in the final sections, the paper explores a few ways in which the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) can be the watchdog in a highly fragile and fissiparous region such as South Asia.

South Asia is Genocidal:
Genocidal refers to a state of mind in which a person or a group will not hesitate if given an opportunity to exterminate or marginalize to the degree of extinction another group ethnically, religiously, nationally and/or culturally distinct. Within this reference, to say that South Asia is genocidal would be considered by many as an extreme interpretation of the current situation in the region. However, as this paper will later argue, waiting longer to comprehend the intensity of today’s reality and then to take even longer to give it a name might be too little too late for any law, association or even person to bare its milk-teeth and say “we could have prevented that”.

There are historical reasons for stating that South Asia is genocidal – a boiling pot that can be cooled down. This history starts from who we are and where we belong that has been imbibed into our body and soul the day we are born. Whether, it is in India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Nepal, we are not born only a boy or girl, more importantly, we are born a Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sinhalese, Tamil, Buddhist or into the numerous sub-sects, castes or sub-castes. Together with the history of “who we are”, the history of “who we are not” – the history of “the other” – is more acutely and fatally inculcated into our mindset. This is not to say that we do not belong to multiple categories and identities simultaneously, as Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (2006, pg. xv) quite rightly reiterates in his book ‘Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny’.

“…The art of constructing hatred takes the form…of some allegedly predominant identity…The result can be homespun elemental violence or globally artful violence and terrorism.”⁶

---

⁵ Fischer, L (1951), ‘The Life of Mahatma Gandhi’, London: Jonathan Cape
These lines in the preface to Sen’s book, also aptly explains the intensity and history of violence and conflict in the South Asian region. It clearly asserts that it is not the multiple identities that are the cause for concern but the predominance of a single identity. The most telling words in the above lines lie in the very beginning, “the art of constructing hatred…” These words bring to mind the bloody history of identities as that of the Rwandans – Hutus and Tutsis – where the only difference between these socially-engineered groups is how they experienced colonialism at the hands of Belgium. Similarly, they are a clear interpretation and comprehension of the violence that has plagued South Asia before the colonial era, in the colonial reign and past the days of the empire in the contemporary present – Muslims against Hindus, upper-caste Hindus against their own lower-caste brothers, Shias against Sunnis Sinhalese against the Tamils, Dravidians against the Aryans and the list is endless. We have had numerous incidents that fall within these broad identity conflicts. Even wars in South Asia, like the one that is ongoing in the island nation of Sri Lanka for close to three decades now, are conflicts of identities. Anti- Tamil riots in 1915, 1958, 1977, 1981 and then in 1983 killed thousands. These riots occurred when the island was not in the grip of the violent conflict that plagues the country since 1983.

Studying a piece of any of these violent histories will unveil that neither incidents are isolated events but were rather consequences of the past. But re-witnessing these violent pasts in the present instigated by similar factors and fought by the same groups begs the question of how and why. It is a well-accepted fact that these conflicts that center on identities feed on political patronage – a symbiotic relationship which benefits the group and the political patron; but more beneficial to the political leaders than the people. Most often violence in the South Asian region erupts in an attempt to consolidate the support of ethnic, religious or other culturally marked groups (Brass 2002) or merely to appease these groups. This is a commonality in the democratic framework of governance in South Asia. In an attempt to represent varying identities and interests, the multi-party structure that prevails in most countries in the region makes it conducive to maintaining identities and feeding their interests even at the cost of opening old wounds and flaring communal, ethnic, religious or nationalistic passions. Including the political divides that are intensive, identity also forms a crucial aspect of an individual’s social and economic existence. However, it needs to be pointed out here that almost all cases of Genocide, whether we accept those incidents to be Genocide or not, are clashes and conflicts of identities. It may be difficult to argue that all clashes of identities are Genocide but the debate this paper is trying to raise is that they are definitely genocidal. This is the crucial element of the discourse because from here flows the link to the debate on prevention. This implies that inferring the susceptibility of the region does not lie in only foreseeing Genocide. Prevention is most effective when patterns of genocidal events can be deciphered. It is perhaps morbid to conceive of every minor clash between different groups as genocidal but that feeling of hatred for one person/family of a particular group can transform into the will and intent to eradicate an entire group or community given the right circumstances and the right political opportunity. These enabling factors are

---

omnipresent in the region. Though this may seem simplistic, it has to remembered that prevention cannot come at too early a stage

Prevention is not Punishment:
By pointing out the enabling dynamics making the region vulnerable to a grave atrocity such as Genocide, this paper is not promoting preventive mechanisms that begin at uprooting multi-party democratic systems and identity politics. It is merely indicating that because of these existing frameworks, identifying the possibility violent inter-group clashes makes cessation of these hostilities easier. For instance, the right political opportunity can be best explained by the incidents in Ayodhya in the state of Uttar Pradesh in India on December 6, 1992. The right-wing Hindu fundamentalist (though the party would like to be called nationalistic) Bharatiya Janata Party (hereafter, the BJP) had set the stage and had been building the right atmosphere in the years, months and weeks leading up to December 6 for the biggest political moment in the history of the BJP and unfortunately, a scar that will never heal from the pages of the contemporary history of the country. One of the party’s most fanatic leaders, LK Advani, in a bid to gain political points (votes), took out a journey across north-western India – staring from the Somnath Temple in the western state of Gujarat to the Ayodhya – arousing Hindu and mostly anti-Muslim sentiments in the cities and towns that he swept through. The journey was planned following the then central government headed by VP Singh’s decision to implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission (Guha 2007, pg.635), which involved measures of affirmative action for the backward and marginalized religions and castes of society – including several lower-caste Hindu groups. Attempting to earn political cookie points8, the BJP manipulated the situation to make the decision seem like the appeasement of the backward castes, significantly the Muslims. Religion became the eye of the storm and this led to the demolition of the Ayodhya Mosque on December 6, 1992. It was to be replaced by a temple devoted to Lord Ram, which to date has not taken place. This is nothing short of a massacre of a group’s faith and therefore of a group – in this case the Muslims of India. Following in its aftermath was large scale communal rioting and killing of Hindus and Muslims across the country for months following the demolition of the mosque – 246 in Gujarat, 120 in Madhya Pradesh, 100 in Assam and 201 in Uttar Pradesh9.

The Ayodhya incident is a case in point for prevention vs. punishment. The then government of VP Singh and later of Prime Minister PVN Rao could have taken pre-emptive steps as events and incidents were building up to culminate in Ayodhya. Perhaps, while the BJP leader LK Advani went around in his throne on wheels and aroused communal sentiments, defying the law and the authorities and dared arrest, he should have been arrested. The fear of a communal backlash or loss of political leverage saw the Centre sit back and wait for events to unfold. Even after the situation took a turn for the worse, action was not taken. The question then is who should be punished. This question would have been easy to answer if it had not been for the planned finale, which was merely a prayer ritual that was to be conducted at the site outside the Mosque on December 6. To this day, no one is certain if the demolition of the mosque was planned

9 Ibid
or spontaneous. The masterminds themselves, including LK Advani, were taken aback. If razing the mosque was not part of the plan then, the incident begs the question of what prompted the people to this frenzy without prior orders or instructions to that effect.

The events leading up to December 6 and the aftermath are all telling of the flaws in law – both national and international – and its weaknesses, therefore, in becoming a watchdog. To many in the academic, socio-political and media circles the incidents before, during and after Ayodhya may not amount to Genocide. On the contrary, it should be considered a page in the history of Genocide because it has to be remembered that Genocide does not occur in a vacuum. It is the consequence of events whose foundation has been laid years and centuries ago. Genocide is not an event; it is an act – a multitude of acts – aimed towards one single purpose. These acts could have taken place over several hundred years. Ayodhya is only the tip of the iceberg and what lies beneath are years and years of hatred between Hindus and Muslims in India, which has not been quenched even today. Is the state to blame? Is the state to blame only for Ayodhya or for the years of hatred between the two communities? Of course, the punitive question is not blurry enough to lack an answer. Political leaders and other officials should be made responsible for the unfolding of Ayodhya as it was an event planned to cause communal disharmony. Even the State and Central governments who sat back and watched the events unravel since the 1980s should bear a slice of the responsibility. However, this still leaves us with a small piece of the puzzle missing. We are left wondering if the leaders would have been able to execute their plan had there not already been deep-rooted prejudices between the two groups.

This brings us to the question of what is prevention. What are we trying to prevent? Yes, we are trying to prevent events such as Ayodhya but the primary goal is to stop such incidents in the effort to ameliorate a situation, which would otherwise proliferate to become something bloodier. Prevention must be seen as a process – a means to an end – not merely an end in itself. To enable this process, it is imperative to study and comprehend the underlying history – the foundational building blocks – that lead up to an event – this history does not only involve months but years – because prevention becomes a difficult task when history is not taken into consideration or events prior to that which leads up to the act of Genocide is not considered genocidal. As the journalist from Bangladesh, Afsan Chowdhury, says history has already set the path of things to come.

Prevention as a Process:
Picking out a single event in the bloody history of Hindu-Muslim relations in India was to show that it was an event that could have been controlled by the State and/or Central authorities if not stopped all together but the culmination of that day in the demolition of the mosque was unforeseen and beyond the capacity of law. To understand the mindset of the hundreds of kar sevaks with the support of hundreds of other Hindus that brought down the 500-year old mosque how far back would we have to go? The Mughal-period monument was manipulated to symbolize the centuries of slavery and oppression Hindus had to endure under the rule of the Mughals in India. This elitist argument has formed

---

10 Afsan Chowdhury spoke to the writer in during his visit to India in June 2007
Despite the fact one of the greatest rulers of India hail from this period – Akbar – who made big leaps for the country with respect to secularism and religious tolerance by laying the foundations of a secular legal structure and religious neutrality of the state. His tolerance, as Dr. Sen (2005, pg.18)\textsuperscript{11} rightly points out, extended to his political decisions also where he insisted on filling his court with non-Muslims – intellectuals, artisans, advisors and even the general of his armed forces (Raj Man Singh, a former Hindu King who was defeated by Akbar).

So, would we have to go back to the Mughal period in India and study the socio-historical impact of their rule on the Hindus? Or would it suffice to explore the historiography of the India-Pakistan partition, which witnessed large-scale killings, displacements and forced migrations in the hundreds of thousands. Outbursts of violence in the partition phase following the independence of India and then newly-formed Pakistan were perhaps the largest in number of peacetime deaths\textsuperscript{12}. As Sikh and Hindu groups were massacring Muslims in the East Punjab, Muslim mobs made their way through Sikh and Hindu communities and villages in West Punjab in an attempt to force each side to move to their religious side of the newly formed borders. As Paul Brass points out most of these attacks were planned. Women of the “other” community were raped as a sign of dishonoring their men. These events have telltale signs of genocide but many authors and academics in India do not consider it so because the violence was restricts to the two Punjabs and was not an all India phenomenon. Another reason is that observers cannot draw a clear distinction between the perpetrators and victims in most instances. Conflicting groups are both equally involved in the atrocities with attacks and counter-attacks. As one leading academic in Sri Lanka, Muttukrisha Sarvananthan\textsuperscript{13} observes that it is difficult to consider any of the anti-Tamil riots as Genocides, firstly, because of the small number of casualties in these riots. Secondly because the non-state conflicting party in the Sri Lanka crisis, the Tamil rebel outfit LTTE has also murdered Sinhalese people in border villages in the East intermittently throughout the conflict. Besides, the LTTE has also murdered over one hundred Muslim (also Tamils) worshippers at two mosques in Ampara district, southeast Sri Lanka, in 1990.

However, the ultimate goal is that the situation should not escalate to Genocide. Labelling an incident is not what makes it Genocide therefore, that is not the concern. And violence is also not the primary concern because as Hannah Arendt said “Violence is by nature instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need of guidance and justification through the end it pursues. And what needs justification through something else cannot be the essence of anything.”\textsuperscript{14} These words clearly signal the need to look beyond quelling violence but the job at hand is not as simplistic as it sounds.

\textsuperscript{13} Sarvananthan, M, Principal Researcher, Point Pedro Institute of Development, Colombo, Sri Lanka. M.Sarvananthan’s views were corresponded to the writer through mails
It would be a daunting task to flag genocidal incidents in an effort to signal to the authorities and the people of the situation to come. However, would we be able to connect these unhealed wounds to the events of today? Can we trace the scars of hatred to the killing of over 3000 immigrant Assamese (Bangladeshi Muslims) in 1983? Would we be able to link the razing of the mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 to the Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002 following the death of 58 kar sevaks, returning from Ayodhya through Gujarat, in a train fire?

The process is not all about tracing the history and flagging the exact points in history when the escalation of the situation could have been stopped. In the South Asian context, the concept of prevention is not only about foreseeing the future through a study of the past but also a process of healing the past. The historiography of identities that pass on from generation to generation can only be changed and re-formed through a healing process. One way would be to initiate a process of justice – transitional and transformatory – irrespective of how late justice is achieved. The want of an effective legislative framework is a commonality in South Asia, as Siddharth Varadarajan states. Identity clashes, which as stated earlier also commonplace in South Asia15, will recur in this region that is defined and determined by identities if scabs are left untended and vulnerable to further inflammations; as seen in the case of India.

Role of the IAGS: Expanding into South Asia
(i) IAGS as the watchdog
This is where a forum such as the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) plays an important role. The IAGS is a scholarly forum. In this aspect, it is two-dimensional. It provides a forum for research and debate. Its profile and mandate can be extended to a third dimension of policy formulations and advocacy. In this avatar, the IAGS could use its academic prowess to pro-actively engage states and governments in adhering to international conventions and more importantly to ensure that domestic laws are enacted to protect its people in accordance to the many international conventions and statutes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>Signed (1977); not ratified</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Asia consists of seven countries as per the association of South Asian regional cooperation (SAARC). Of these, most of them have signed, ratified or are part of the conventions mentioned in the matrix above as a few examples and more. However, their effectiveness as legal instruments in the domestic context is limited since necessary legislation has not been undertaken as required by international law. In the case of India, who was among the first signatories of the Genocide Convention has to date not enacted any legislation that would give teeth to the international law within the territory of the country. This is not to say that the lack of legislation invoking international law into the domestic sphere that has caused the breakdown of the justice system in the country during the anti-Sikh riots in 1984, the Hindu-Muslim riots of 1992-93 across the country and 2002 Gujarat riots and many more such incidents. Laws prohibiting the promotion and instigation of communal disharmony are clearly stated in Indian Penal Code (Article 153). Nevertheless, instances of communal disharmony, to say the least, have been repeated on Indian soil. And Article 153, as a journalist and senior editor of the Indian national daily Indian Express Pamela Philipose argues, has been more effective in banning scholarly writing on communalism than checking communal disturbances. To give more teeth to laws hiding in the dark alleys of the justice system, a draft bill was formulated in 2004 to check incidents of communal disharmony and violence. Though a watered down version was passed by the Lok Sabha or the lower house of the Indian parliament, the bill is pending with the upper house or the Rajya Sabha to date. There is a lot of pressure from activist groups, non-governmental organizations and civil-society organizations to enact this law and international pressure may help the process. At a regional level, the starting point for the IAGS could be to get into a formal arrangement with the SAARC Secretariat that works on a regional level on socio-economic, legal and political issues. Through its presence on a regional platform, the IAGS can pressurize individual governments or the regional cooperation as a whole to legislate measures that, most importantly, protect the rights of groups and identities.

(ii) Educational Advocacy

However as this paper has displayed in previous sections, prevention is not entirely regarding legislation, law and its effective employment. There are elements of violence that are beyond the instrumentality of violence itself. The question still remains as to how much can the law foresee, control and prevent? Of course the spirit of the law was to ensure that acts of crime were not repeated. As Plato said over 2,500 years ago:

…When anyone makes use of his reason in inflicting punishment, he punishes not on account of the fault that is past, for no one can bring it about that what has been done may not have been done, but on account of a

---

16 Article 5 of the Genocide Convention 1949 states that The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III
fault to come in order that the person punished may not commit the fault, that his punishment may restrain from similar acts those persons who witness the punishment.\(^{18}\)

But if that were true, crimes as heinous as Genocide would not have been repeated before our very eyes time and time again. To paraphrase Pamela Philipose\(^{19}\), laws are instruments of the state and they are only as effective as the institutions that deploy them. Therefore, other methods have to be devised. Moving away from the legal sphere, there needs to be a shift to a more people-centric approach – educational advocacy. This will be an extension of what the IAGS presently does best – research and debate. The research and debate dimension needs to be promoted further in region, such as South Asia, where genocide studies is of minimal academic interest.

By increasing academic interest for the subject, aspects and elements that are lacking in the international (primarily Western) understanding and discourse of Genocide can be brought to the forefront – complexity of identifying the victim groups or the dynamics of the stress on intent. The crux of educational advocacy does not lie in research alone; the discourse has to be brought down to the grassroots level. This involves enabling dialogues – political, social, legal, and economic – between varying sensitive or conflicting groups helping them understand “the other”. Very often genocide studies and academic ventures center on the need to comprehend the process of Genocide in an attempt to label it and, more importantly, label the perpetrators. This often perpetuates the hatred between the conflicting communities as they do not have any other means of cathartic outlet. There needs to be a balance, which can form the one dimension of the dialogue process. This element involves a healing process. Involving the media of a particular country or region is also vital in any attempt to connect with its people. Sensitizing the media – print and electronic – means they are also part of the process informing people accurately and not using words and visuals to merely sensationalize news.

Conclusion:

South Asia is an extremely diverse region of varying identities, rich cultures and a wealthy heritage with underlying interconnections and commonalities. It is a difficult task to put it all down in an essay. Nevertheless, the attempt of the paper was to address the concern of unabated violence in the region that is centered on identity and identity politics. Some of these incidents have been on massive scales as consequences of historical events and even bordering on genocidal. It is not entirely easy to label the violence and crimes in the South Asian region as Genocides because in most instances it is difficult to draw a clear line and identify the victim and the perpetrator. The violence would seem like a mad frenzy of irrational and unplanned acts. However through the façade of madness, there is planning and intent but only not grave enough to be labeled Genocide. The argument this paper tried to put forth is that we should not wait as long as to place the Genocide label but that prevention lies in flagging “genocidal” incidents and transforming mindsets than merely stopping the violence, which is only instrumental.


\(^{19}\) Ibid
As an international forum, the IAGS can assume this role of dealing with genocidal mentalities and genocidal intent through educational and policy advocacy and not merely legal and scholarly exploration.