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Article
Fiscal Consequences of Paying Interest on Reserves
Fiscal Studies (2013)
  • Marco Bassetto, University College London
  • Todd Messer, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Abstract

We review the role of the central bank's balance sheet in a textbook monetary model and explore what changes if the central bank is allowed to pay interest on its liabilities. When the central bank (CB) cannot pay interest, away from the zero lower bound its (real) balance sheet is limited by the demand for money. Furthermore, if securities are not marked to market and the central bank holds its bonds to maturity, it is impossible for the CB to make losses, and it always obtains profits from being a monopoly provider of money. When the option of paying interest on liabilities is allowed, the limit on the CB's balance sheet is lifted. In this case, the CB is free to take on interest-rate risk – for example, by buying long-term securities and financing those purchases with short-term debt that pays the market interest rate. This is a risky enterprise that can lead to additional profits but also to losses. To the extent that losses exceed the profits of the monopoly operations, the CB faces two options: either it is recapitalised by Treasury or it increases its monopoly profits by raising the inflation tax.

Keywords
  • Interest-rate risk,
  • quantitative easing,
  • monetary–fiscal interaction,
  • excess reserves,
  • central bank
Publication Date
2013
Citation Information
Marco Bassetto and Todd Messer. "Fiscal Consequences of Paying Interest on Reserves" Fiscal Studies Vol. 34 Iss. 4 (2013)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/bassetto/21/