Presentation as proof: The language of Arabic rhetoric

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PRESENTATION AS PROOF:  
THE LANGUAGE OF ARABIC RHETORIC 

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Abstract. This paper summarizes the results of a linguistic analysis of several persuasive texts in contemporary Arabic. The texts are characterized by elaborate and pervasive patterns of lexical, morphological and syntactic repetition and paraphrase. Repetition is shown to provide far more than ornamental intensification in Arabic prose; rather, it is the key to the linguistic cohesion of the texts and to their rhetorical effectiveness. In contrast to Western modes of argument, which are based on a syllogistic model of proof and made linguistically cohesive via subordination and hypotaxis, Arabic argumentation is essentially paratactic, abductive and analogical. It persuades by making its argumentative claims linguistically present: by repeating them, paraphrasing them, and clothing them in recurring structural cadences. I suggest that this mode of argumentation is a corollary to the cultural centrality of the lughan (the Arabic language) in Arab-Islamic society.

1. Introduction. I recently received a call from someone who had heard about my work on Arabic persuasive language and wanted to know more about it. My caller introduced himself with an Arab name, and although his English was fluent I could detect a slight Arabic accent. He began the conversation by mentioning who had referred him to me and describing his research in an area related to mine. Anticipating that he would want offprints and references but being unprepared for the call, I began slowly to phrase my response: his work sounded interesting, I was glad he had called, and I would be glad to . . . . But before I was able to continue, my caller began again. Once again he told me who had given him my name, and once again he told me how similar his work was to mine. Before the conversation ended with my giving him the references and agreeing to send him the things he wanted, he had rephrased his story several more times, and I was only with difficulty keeping myself from laughing — laughing not at him, but because of the wonderfully ironic nature of the whole interaction. His request for information about how Arabs convince people was a perfect example of how Arabs convince people: namely, by repeating. Metalinguistic remarks like "Listen, you're doing it yourself" have a way of bringing conversations to an abrupt end in embarrassed self-consciousness, so I said nothing about my observations. But if I had thought of it at the time, I would have liked to remind my caller of an Arabic proverb one of my informants told me. The proverb goes kieratu
al-takrār bi-taqlīm al-ḥimār, and what it means is *Enough repetition will convince even a donkey*.

In this paper I will examine this kind of persuasiveness. I will describe some of the linguistic and cultural factors that call forth and condition the sort of rhetorical strategy which my unwitting telephone informant used; the strategy of persuading by repeating, rephrasing, clothing and reclothing one's request or claim in changing cadences of words. I will call this rhetorical strategy *presentation*, and look at when and how presentation can be proof. In particular, I will talk about Arabic, a language in which even the most formal written discourse is characterized by presentation as proof.

The scholarly context of this study is in two areas of research in the ethnography of speaking: the study of rhetorical discourse in non-Western languages, and the cross-linguistic study of the nature and function of repetition. Research in the first of these areas includes, for example, Ethel Albert's (1972) study of Rundi "logic, rhetoric, and poetics" and Charles Frake's (1969) analysis of Yakan litigation. Studies of repetition include those by Fox (1971, 1974) on parallelism in Rotinese ritual language, Bricker (1974) on Zinecanteco semantic couplets, and Gossen (1974) on couplets and parallel syntax in Chamula speech. Scherzer (1974) discusses repetition in Cuna curing chants, and Sebeok (1960) notes the cohesive function of repetition in Cheremis poetry.

I will attempt to tie together these two areas of research — the study of rhetoric and the study of repetition — by examining the mechanism by which repetition can be used to persuade, and the linguistic and cultural context in which repetition is used rhetorically. Specifically, I will examine repetition in Arabic persuasive discourse. After describing the multiple and multi-level patterns of repetition by which this genre of discourse is structured, I will make use of the notion of rhetorical presentation to show how repetition works as a persuasive device. Finally, I will attempt to suggest why Arabs persuade by repeating, drawing on facts about Arabs' view of their language — the *lughah* — and the centrality of the *lughah*, the word, the form of discourse in the Arab ecology of speaking.

2. The texture of Arabic repetition. Inherent in any attempt to discuss linguistic research on long blocks of discourse is the problem of how to present the data, which is (a) usually lengthy and unwieldy, and (b) in many cases of little use anyway to an audience of people who do not know the language in question. This study is no exception. The Arabic texts on which my analysis is based comprise well over seven thousand words, and even an excerpt long enough to give the reader a sense of the texture of the prose would take several pages of transcription, glossing, and translation. I will try to make the best of this situation by including Arabic examples where they are not prohibitively long, and, for the rest, referring the reader to the longer study (Koch 1981) where the texts all appear in full, and
to his own imagination.

The texts in question are all in Modern Standard Arabic, the contemporary literary dialect. All were written in the second half of this century, and all are by writers who are widely known and widely thought to be lucid and persuasive. All but one are on political topics, specifically the topic of Arab nationalism, a hotly debated issue.

Linguistically, the first thing one notices about these texts is that they are highly and complexly repetitious. Repetition occurs on all levels and in a number of guises. The writers make frequent use of lexical couplets like al-ta'yīdu wa-al-musāradatu aid and assistance or al-wahmu wa-al-xayālu illusion and imagination: pairs of words coordinated with which are nearly or completely synonymous. Unlike English couplets such as "aid and abet" or "ways and means," Arabic couplets are the result of a still-productive rule, and many are nonce forms.

Many lexical couplets are also morphologically parallel; that is, they have in common one of the multitude of internal vowel, gemination, or prefixation patterns which characterize the Semitic root-and-pattern morphological system. Examples are yuhaddītu wa-yuqāṭittu defines and delimits (both Form II verbs from doubled roots), or al-taṣrīḥu wa-al-tadmīru destruction and demolition (both Form II verbal nouns). Morphological parallelism is also common in syntactically parallel constructions, where the morphologically parallel items may not be synonyms. Item (1) is an example.

(1) fī 'awāxirī al-qarnī al-ṭāmina ẓašara
    wa-'awā'īli al-tāsiṣa ẓašara
at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth

Here 'awāxirī end and 'awā'īli beginning share the same diptotic broken plural pattern.

Before returning to the sort of syntactic parallelism in which the parallel words in (1) are embedded, let me mention a second widespread kind of repetition on the morphological level. This is the repetition of morphological roots, such as is seen in examples (2) and (3).

(2) mimā yadullu dalālātan gāṭīsatan alā 'anna-hu...
    one thing which indicates a decisive indicating [indicates decisively that he...

(3) li-'anna al-'ahdāṣa al-siyāsīyya...hadaṣat...
because the political occurrences...occurred...

The underlined portion of example (2) is what is called a cognate accusative: a common construction in which a verb is modified by a phrase consisting of its own verbal noun plus an adjective. In example (3) the subject of the clause and the verb are both from the same root, ḥ-d-ṣ. There are many other examples of this kind of thing, which, incidentally, is something English writers are taught to avoid. (For example, the preceding sentence should probably be revised so as to avoid having "thing" and "something" so close.)
Turning to units larger than single clauses, we find once again both repetition of form and repetition of content: parallelism and paraphrase. The syntactic parallelism in the texts is of two kinds. Example (4) shows the kind of tight, exact parallelism throughout entire clauses which is characteristic of sections of the text which list examples or details. This I call "listing parallelism."

(4)  
ṣalla  al-ʿalmānu  munqasimīna  bayna  
remained  the Germans  divided  between
ṣaṣṭarāṭi  al-duwali  wa-al-duwaylāti  al-
tens  the states  and the small-states  the
mustaqillāti,  wa-ṣalla  al-ṭulyānu  
independent  and remained  the Italians
muwazzāṭa  ṣalā  ʿamāni  waḥadātin  siyāsīyyatin,  
distributed  among  eight  units  political
wa-al-būlūniyyūna  maqsūmīna  bayna  ʿalāmi  
and the Polish  divided  among  three
states  powerful  and the Yugoslavs
xāḍiṭān  īlā  ḥukmi  dawlatayni  ṣaṣṭīmatayni.  
subject  to  rule  two-states  great

The Germans were still divided among tens of states  
and independent  small states, and the Italians were  
still distributed among eight political units, and  
the Poles divided among three powerful states, and  
the Yugoslavs subject to the rule of two great states.

The other kind of parallelism seems to have a slightly different function. One example is the following:

(5)  
fa-kāna  min  al-ṭabīʿiyi  'an  tanṣāʾa  
so  was  among  the natural  that  arise
al-fikratu  al-qawmiyyatu,  wa-tattaraṣṭa  
the  idea  the  nationalistic  and  grow
wa-tataqawwāl  bi-surūṭi  kabīrati  fī  
and become-powerful  with speed  great  in
al-bilādī  al-ʿalmāniyyati,  baṣa  al-nakabāti  
the  lands  the  German  after  the  misfortunes
allatī  tawāllat  ṣalay-ha  xilāla  tilka  al-  
which  came  upon them  during  those  the
ḥurūbi.  wa-kāna  min  al-ṭabīʿiyi  'an  
wars  and  was  among  the natural  that
yantaṣira  fī-ha  "al-ʿīmānu  bi-wahdati  al-  
spread  in them  the belief  in unity  the
ʿummāti  al-ʿalmāniyyati,"  wa-kāna  min  al-  
nation  the  German  and  was  among  the
So it was natural that the nationalistic idea should arise and grow and become powerful with great speed in the German lands after the misfortunes which came upon them during those wars. And it was natural that "the belief in the unity of the German nation" should spread in them and it was natural that this belief should compel the intellectuals of Germany and her leaders to combat the regional tendencies...with all power and zeal.

While there is a great deal of similarity among the three elements following the three occurrences of kāna min al-ṭabīṣiyī, the parallelism is not as complete as that in example (4). Semantically, the three elements in (5) have a kind of cumulative effect. Each one builds on the previous one: the idea of nationalism arose and grew, this growth led Germans to believe in German unity, and this belief led them to combat regionalism. The passage is about the creation of intellectual momentum, and the parallelism and lexical echoing create a sort of momentum in the text which reflects its content. This sort of parallelism might be called "cumulative parallelism."

Paraphrase, or repetition of content, occurs at all levels throughout the text. We have seen examples, above, of single-word paraphrase in lexical couplets; one also finds paraphrased phrases and clauses. One particularly striking kind of paraphrase, which occurs frequently, is what I call "reverse paraphrase," or paraphrase in which the same action or event is described from two opposing perspectives.

Reverse paraphrase seems to be one of the most frequent and most basic mechanisms in the statement of an argumentative thesis, and it occurs even in the most stripped-down, summary arguments. Item (6) is an example of one such summary. In it, the author presents the argument of another writer, Antun Sa'ada, in order to later demolish it.

(6) 'inna al-miḥwara al-'asāsiyya allāsī ('inna) the axis the basic which
tadūru hawla-hu 'ārā'u 'anṭūn sa'āda
tadle 'around it opinions Antun Sa'ada
wa-taṭālīmu-hu, tartakīsū šalā al-zasmi
and teachings his rests on the claim
al-tālī: "al-sūriyyūna 'ummatur tammatur,
the following the Syrians nation complete
qā'imatun bi-nafsi-hā.”
standing by self its

"wa-al-'ummatu al-sūriyyatu laysat juz'an min
and the nation the Syrian is-not part of
al-'ummati al-'arabiyyati."
the nation the Arab

The basic axis around which revolve the opinions of
Antun Sa'ada and his teachings rests on the following
claim: "The Syrians are a complete nation, standing
by itself." "And the Syrian nation is not a part of
the Arab nation."

The two clauses in quotation marks are probably not direct
quotations; this author, like many, tends to use punctuation ac-
cording to very flexible rules, and there are no footnotes or
other attribution. It is most likely that the author is summar-
izing Sa'ada's argument. In any case, this is a very compact
statement of an argumentative thesis, by far the most compact in
the whole corpus of texts. Still, it consists of two clauses,
conjoined with and, which are paraphrastic. The first tells
what Syria is (a separate nation), the second what it is not
(part of the Arab nation). This is a prototypical example of
reverse paraphrase. Because it is maximally concise, it is
probably as close as possible to the template form for argument-
tative claims.

To summarize, then, the texts I have examined are charac-
terized by repetition on all levels: phonological, morphologi-
cal and lexical, syntactic, and semantic. We have seen both
repetition of form and repetition of content. The repetition
is cohesive, rhythmic, and rhetorical: persuasion is a result
as much, or more, of the sheer number of times an idea is stated
and the balanced, elaborate ways in which it is stated as it is
a result of syllogistic or enthymematic "logical" organization.
The discourse is highly paratactic and polysyndetic: ideas flow
horizontally into one another. To paraphrase a comment made by
Tannen (1980:7) about fiction, "(the discourse) has as its goal
not the convincing of the reader through logical argument, but
instilling in the reader a sense of identification with its
point of view."

3. Repetition and rhetoric: the creation of presence. In
almost all discussions of parallelistic, repetitive discourse,
referencé is made to the essentially "oral" nature of this way
of speaking. Walter Ong, who is identified with the oral-
literate distinction, correlates nonperiodic, "adding" style
with oral composition (1971:33), and says that "unsubstantiated"
claims are characteristic of the writing of students from oral
ghetto cultures (1978). Ochs (1979:73) points out the high de-
gree of parallelism in unplanned, spoken discourse. Turner
(1973:71) says that "early and popular writing in any country is
close to spoken style, with loose, paratactic sentences . . ."
But while the Arabic discourse we have examined has features that have been identified with orality (as opposed to literacy) and with speaking (as opposed to writing), it is neither oral nor spoken, even in an abstract sense. All of the authors of the corpus are highly literate, well-educated writers. One might argue that Arabic argumentative style has its roots in the oratory of an oral culture, and that it is therefore somehow "oral." However, by this criterion even the writing of Aristotle, whom Ong would probably consider the apogee of literateness, would have to be called "oral." Neither are the texts in the corpus spoken or unplanned; it is hard to imagine anyone producing the sort of balanced complexity or elaborate parallelism we have seen without careful planning.

Repetition and parallelism have also been identified with poetic discourse. Bauman (1977:16) says that parallelism is one of the features that have been found to "key" (establish the metacommunicative frame for) artistic verbal performance. Stankiewicz (1960:72-73) claims that poetic discourse is characterized, among other things, by its emphasis on form as opposed to content. Hymes (cited by Bright, 1981) has shown how the line and verse structure in Chinook poetic texts is correlated with introductory particles and parallelism.

The Arabic texts in the corpus are not poetry, however. While they certainly share certain features with texts in other cultures which have been labelled "poetic," and while they are historically related to the semi-poetic genre called saj, (the balanced, rhymed style of archaic Arabic oratory), they are not poetic in an emic sense. That is, no Arab would call them poetry; they are prose. As Bright (1981) has pointed out, it may in fact be begging the question to even use the categories "poetry" and "prose" in describing the discourse of another culture, since these may turn out to be Western, non-universal categories. Perhaps all literature in some cultures is poetic, or perhaps none is.

Yet there is a difference between argumentative discourse of the Arabic sort and Western argumentation, not only a formal difference but also a rhetorical one. If the classifications [oral vs. literate] and [poetic vs. non-poetic] are not the best ways of capturing this distinction, perhaps another approach would be more illuminating. Dichotomies of all kinds should be approached with the utmost caution; dichotomizing in itself is a rather Western thing to do, and certain dichotomies can be intellectually dangerous, as Said (1978) has demonstrated with respect to the dichotomy Oriental vs. Occidental.

Ultimately, argumentation has to do with truth; argument rests on established truths, and truth emerges through argument. But arguments can be related to truths in different ways. Some truths, in some situations, are clear, universally accepted (in the particular universe of discourse), and close to the surface. The purpose of argumentation in these cases is simply to convey the truth; to make a potentially available truth actually available to the hearer. This kind of argumentation can be called
presentation. In other cases, the truth is not clear or universal; argumentation begins in a situation of doubt about the truth, and the purpose of argumentation is to establish, or prove, the truth. Argumentation in these cases is proof. An attempt to prove a truth presupposes an admission that there is doubt about it, or that doubt is possible. For this reason, proof may in certain situations be counterproductive or even impossible. This is the case; for example, in some kinds of theological arguments: a person who is so deeply convinced that God exists that he sees no possibility of doubt about the matter cannot, by the very nature of proof, attempt to prove it to an agnostic. To do so would be paradoxical. The only thing the missionary can do is to attempt to present the truth, and he does this, in many cases, by simply saying it, again and again, in his own words and in the words of the Bible or other relevant texts.⁵

There are, then, certain universes of discourse — certain topics, intellectual climates, or societal environments — in which presentation is likely to be the dominant mode of argumentation, others in which proof is more often necessary. The argumentation of a deeply religious person about religion has been suggested as one example of a situation in which presentation is appropriate. Kennedy (1980:121 ff.,) speaks of the rhetorical qualities of the Bible in much the same terms. The primary mode of persuasion in the Old Testament, he says, is through assertion of authority, confirmed by miracle, rather than through "logical argument" (proof).⁶ Kennedy also notes that the New Testament term for preaching, kerusso, literally means "proclaim," and that "Christian preaching is thus not persuasion, but proclamation, and is based on authority and grace, not on proof" (p. 127). He says that allegory, which was common in Hebrew poetry, was not pervasive in Classical times but came to be an important rhetorical device through Christianity (p. 125).

Allegory and anecdote seem to be important persuasive devices for Jewish arguers, too, and not only in arguments about religion: Elie Weisel (1979:183-97) describes an encounter between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Golda Meir in which Kennedy finally gave in to Meir's request for weapons after she sketched, in broad strokes, the history of the Jewish people.

Another time and place in which presentation was the dominant mode of argumentation was Victorian England, as described by Holloway (1962). The "mode of utterance" of middle and late nineteenth century authors like Carlyle, Disraeli, and Matthew Arnold was one in which the "nerve of proof . . . simply cannot be traced" (p. 3). Truths "offer themselves to the imagination rather than logic" (p. 4). "Real assent" was thought to arise out of one's history through images that "bring belief to light." The authors discussed by Holloway used a style of writing characterized by figurative language and careful control of the meanings of the words they used. The object and the presentation of the object were one and the same: the actual words of the text gave the authors' view meaning, and "redefinition
Presentation is the dominant mode of argumentation in hierarchical societies, where truths are not matters for individual decision. In a democracy, there is room for doubt about the truth, and thus for proof; in a more autocratic society there is not. Perelman (1969:164) alludes to this in saying "... it would appear that certain linguistic structures are more suited to a society based on equality, on individual initiative; others would be more suited to societies with a hierarchic structure." One such society was Nazi Germany; Paechter (1944), in a study of Nazi rhetoric, points out that the "ideal sentence" is the slogan, like "Ein Reich, ein Volk, Ein Führer," in which the three nouns "suggest an order of the world" and "evokes acceptance of the structure laid out" (p. 6). Another example, unfortunately also negative, is the rhetoric of the People's Republic of China, as characterized in this somewhat facetious way by A. M. Rosenthal (1981:12, 14):

... the great intellectual weapon of the Communists is their superb ability, honed by decades of practice, to induce boredom. They say the same trite things over and over with such total conviction, with such sublime deafness to countervailing argument, that the opposing mind, debilitated by years of logic, retreats or succumbs.

Arabic argumentation of the sort we have examined is clearly argumentation by presentation, both in the general way described in this section and in the actual linguistic manifestation of this mode of argument described in 2. An arguer presents his truths by making them present in discourse: by repeating them, paraphrasing them, doubling them, calling attention to them with external particles. All of the things that have been associated with presentation in the discussions I have just summarized seem to be true of Arabic, the language and its discourse. Argument by presentation has its roots in the history of Arab society, in the ultimate, universal truths of the Qur'an and in hierarchical societies autocratically ruled by caliphs who were not only secular rulers but also the leaders of the faith, and, later and until very recently, by colonial powers. Arabic argumentation is structured by the notion that it is the presentation of an idea — the linguistic forms and the very words that are used to describe it — that is persuasive, not the logical structure of proof which Westerners see behind the words.

The centrality of the word and the form of discourse is a recurring theme in commentaries about Arabic and the Arab "mentality," both by Western scholars and by Arabs themselves. Since the pre-Islamic era, verbal art has been an important cultural institution. Not only the artistic use of language, but also the language itself is invested with special significance: Islam established Arabic as the language of God. The Qur'an was revealed in Arabic, and the actual Arabic words of the text are as important as their message. Thus the Qur'an cannot really be translated, although it is permissible to do so for the benefit of non-Arabs, and the language of the Qur'an has been almost
completely preserved as the literary dialect of Arabic. (A reader of modern standard Arabic can learn to read seventh century Arabic with very little trouble.) As Bateson puts it (1967:80-81):

Classical Arabic still retains the connotation which it has as a poetic koine of being more beautiful and more significant — indeed, this is often carried to the point where the elegant expression of an idea may be taken as evidence of its validity. [Classical Arabic] is the language in which important things are said . . . . The inflectional grammar of the written language is regarded as a work of art.

Specifically, the roots of Arabic prose are in "the most ancient Semitic literature" (Beeston 1970:112), which is characterized by "rhythmic balance between two (occasionally three) clauses which are also marked by a careful parallelism of sense." Archaic Arabic oratorical prose has this sort of balance, as well as rhyming between the final words of each member of the parallelism. This kind of discourse cannot be called poetry (ṣiṣr) in Arabic terms, because ṣiṣr involves a very well-defined formal structure, but it is given a special name: sajī, or rhymed prose. The sajī style exerts a tremendous influence on contemporary written discourse, both in its specific form and in its emphasis on form and words.

In the context of an increasingly democratic and increasingly Westernized world, rhetorical reliance on presentation — the tendency to persuade and be persuaded by form, elegance, repetition — no longer seem entirely appropriate. One of the main concerns of the reformers of the Arab nahḍa, or renaissance, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, was the need for a new Arabic rhetoric. Not only were there new things to talk about, but a new way of talking was needed to update the emphasis on linguistic virtuosity and traditional style, which created a "fixation on the past" (Berque 1978:35). "From the very beginning [of the nahḍa], almost, the need for more precision, more simplicity, and more information with fewer words was evident (as it still is) in the Arab world" (p. 36). But as Berque goes on to argue, and as this study has borne out, repetition and balance, synonyms and paradigms, are essentially and authentically Arabic. They are at the heart of the language, the discourse, and the rhetoric in a way which cannot simply be disposed of. As Berque puts it (pp. 36-37):

Let us nevertheless not forget that resort to the ancient keyboards of synonyms may be one means of self-affirmation. Like redundancy, it reveals not only a taste for affective nuances, but also, to talk like the linguists, the presence of paradigms in discourse.

The Arabic lughah, then, is not a tool for communicating non-linguistic or pre-linguistic "ideas." The classical rhetorical canons of invention, arrangement, and style — the framework for the Western idea that you think before you write, and for English admonitions like "Don't repeat yourself" — these three are one in Arabic. The ideas are the language, and persuasion is presentation, the bringing into the present of the oratorical and poetic history of the lughah.
WORKS CITED


NOTES

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2. The term "rhetoric" has come to have a variety of uses. Literary scholars like Kenneth Burke (1950, et passim), and ethnographers like J. Christopher Crocker (1977) who work in a Burkian framework, see all symbolic interaction as inherently rhetorical. I use the term here and throughout the paper, however, in the narrower, Aristotelian sense: rhetoric is persuasive discourse intended for a popular audience.

3. The texts, and their sources, are these:

4. My analysis of argumentation in terms of presentation and proof owes a great deal to discussions with Frederick J. Lupke and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., although this terminology is mine.

5. The basic incompatibility of presentation with proof means that communication between an arguer who is presenting the truth and a hearer who needs proof is impossible. One example of a communicative breakdown which is caused by such an incompatibility occurs in the dialog between the Ayatollah Khomeini and Oriana Fallaci, the Italian journalist, reported in the New York Times Magazine on October 7, 1979, which I have discussed elsewhere (Koch 1980).
6. If the rhetorical structure of the Bible is indeed characterized by presentation and the attendant necessity for repetition, one is led to wonder whether the new Reader's Digest condensation may not do more harm than good to the Bible's persuasive power.