Repairing (the Doctrine of) Irreparable Harm: Economic Analysis of Preliminary Injunctions

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Abstract

In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction courts compare the expected irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued to the irreparable harm that would result if the injunction is issued. An injury is considered irreparable only as far as it “cannot be cured by a remedy after trial.” This Article demonstrates that to maximize social welfare (“efficiency”) the definition of irreparable harm must be modified. From a social-welfare perspective, harms to one party which do not correlate to corresponding benefits to the other party are deadweight-losses, regardless of the availability of a remedy that may merely reallocate them from one party to another. Consequently, the implementation of the current doctrine, which allows courts to disregard losses that can be compensated for, leads courts to grant, in some cases, inefficient preliminary injunctions, and to reject, in other cases, applications for efficient ones. Deadweight-losses must be considered as “irreparable harms,” and should thus be taken into account in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, irrespective of the availability of an ex-post remedy.

The revised standard for determining irreparable harm would substantially mitigate the social costs associated with preliminary injunctions. The analysis also shows that these costs can be further reduced by an appropriate design of remedies for wrong preliminary injunctions. Efficiency-based considerations support the current practice of requiring the moving-party to compensate the defendant for only part of the harms inflicted due to the wrong preliminary injunction. Moreover, these considerations provide a firm support to the use of the remedy of restitution, which requires the moving-party to disgorge the benefits obtained at the expense of the defendant by the wrong preliminary injunction. This remedy, rather than compensation for harms, best fit for both minimizing irreparable harms and directing the plaintiff to avoid applying for preliminary injunction for improper purposes.

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INTRODUCTION

A preliminary injunction aims to prevent irreparable harms in the period of the trial. To achieve its goal, the preliminary remedy must be issued quickly, early in the course of the litigation, before all the evidence can be studied or even made available. In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction courts compare between the irreparable harm that the moving-party will suffer if the injunction is not issued and this party ultimately prevails on the merits, and the irreparable harm that the enjoined-party might suffer if the injunction is issued and this party wins at the end of trial. Harm is considered irreparable only when it “cannot be cured by a remedy after
As summarized by Judge Posner in *Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries*, harm suffered by the defendant as a result of the preliminary injunction is considered reparable, and thus irrelevant in deciding whether to issue the injunction, whenever it “can be either cured by the defendant’s ultimately prevailing in the trial on the merits or fully compensated by the injunction bond.”

We argue that efficiency entails that this “no available remedy” definition of irreparable harm is incorrect, as it disregards relevant social harms. In determining what harms should be considered as irreparable it is essential to distinguish between two types of harms that can result from the decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction. (1) A direct net loss of social welfare (deadweight-loss); and (2) an errant transfer of wealth from a party who is legally entitled to it to a non-entitled party (undeserved-wealth-transfer). For instance, assume that the plaintiff applies for a preliminary injunction to restrict the defendant from producing a drug due to its alleged violation of the plaintiff’s patent. As indicated, the court should compare between the irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued and the plaintiff ultimately prevails, and the irreparable harm if the injunction is issued and the defendant wins at the end of trial. Focusing on the latter factor, a “wrong preliminary injunction” may generate a loss of production and consumption of the drug (deadweight-loss); and it may enable the plaintiff to extract profits that would otherwise be obtained by the defendant (undeserved-wealth-transfer). These two types of harms differ in terms of their reparability by an *ex-post* remedy: the remedy can eliminate undeserved-wealth-transfers; but compensation for deadweight-loss merely reallocates the burden from one party to another, without eliminating the cost from a social perspective. Consequently, the traditional definition, which views irreparable harm as a “harm that cannot be cured by a remedy after trial” is correct only as far as undeserved-wealth-transfers are concerned. A deadweight-loss suffered by one party is *socially* irreparable even if this party’s private loss can be cured by a remedy after trial.

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2 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984).
3 Ibid, at 386.
4 The plaintiff may not always be the party requesting a preliminary injunction, but for simplicity of exposition throughout this article we refer to the party seeking preliminary injunction as the plaintiff.
5 The term “wrong preliminary injunction” does not necessarily imply that the court erred in issuing the provisional relief, given the available information at the stage of the preliminary proceedings. It only indicates that ultimately, after considering the plaintiff’s claim on its merits, the court decided in favor of the defendant.
An efficiency-based approach, which measures harms from a social, mandates defining such losses as irreparable, even if the party who bears them will be compensated for at the end of trial.

To illustrate, consider the following simple example: the irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not issued is $50; and the harm suffered by the defendant in case of a “wrong” preliminary injunction (i.e., if it is ultimately found that the enjoined party had the right to do the enjoined act) is $60. Assume, for simplicity, that each party is equally likely to win the case on its merits. According to the prevailing legal test, the decision whether a court should issue a preliminary injunction is based on evaluating what part of the defendant’s harm, $60, is reparable. Assume that if the defendant prevails on the merits, the plaintiff will be required to compensate the defendant for $40 out of the $60 loss. Under these assumptions, the court would issue a preliminary injunction: the court considers only the uncompensated loss of the defendant as irreparable, and would conclude that the irreparable harm from denying the injunction ($50) exceeds the irreparable harm from issuing it ($20). However, if the defendant’s harm represents a deadweight-loss, this outcome is inefficient since the expected social cost caused by the preliminary injunction, 0.5x$60, is higher than the social cost that it prevents, 0.5x$50.

Richard Brooks and Warren Schwartz have recently suggested that if the plaintiff assumes the risk of bearing the defendant’s harm in case of a wrong preliminary injunction, the court should not take into account the defendant’s harm in deciding whether to issue the preliminary injunction. Indeed, a rejection of the plaintiff’s request based on the court’s view that the preliminary injunction’s cost exceeds its benefit may seem as paternalistically protecting the plaintiff. However, this reasoning is inaccurate. As indicated, efficiency entails that the relevant consideration is whether an *ex-post* remedy can eliminate the *social* harm that the injunction inflicts. In some cases it can. This happens when the wrong preliminary injunction creates only undeserved-wealth-transfer, i.e. it enables the plaintiff to extract a profit that corresponds to a parallel loss of the defendant. However, a wrong preliminary injunction may also create a deadweight-loss, such as when the harm to the enjoined-party is not matched with a benefit that the moving-party obtains. Compensating the defendant for a deadweight-loss reallocates the burden of its cost from one party to another, but it does not eliminate the social cost.

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The immediate implication is that in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, courts should take into account harms that represent deadweight-loss in their entire amount (i.e., to consider them as irreparable), regardless of the availability of an *ex-post* remedy. Implementing this revision of the standard test would increase the likelihood that the court’s decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction will be the socially desirable one. It will minimize the probable irreparable harm from an erroneous assignment of entitlements at the preliminary stage.

The analysis also provides new insights regarding the choice of remedies for wrong preliminary injunctions. A preliminary injunction is issued with an explicit awareness of the possibility that it will be proved wrong. This awareness is reflected not only in the courts’ reluctance to issue such orders, but also in the demand from the moving party to post a bond that would cover the harms inflicted on any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. Liability for such harms can be imposed whenever “it is ultimately found that the enjoined party had… the right to do the enjoined act.” Yet, the plaintiff’s liability frequently covers only a fraction of the actual costs and harms inflicted by the injunction. In addition, courts award restitution only of money paid or specific property transferred in accordance with the preliminary injunction, but reject most claims for restitution of benefits gained by the plaintiff on the basis of the wrong preliminary injunction. We suggest that these practices are only partially justified.

The underlying aim of remedies for wrong preliminary injunction is two-fold: *First*, from an *ex-ante* perspective, the remedy should be designed to increase the likelihood that a preliminary injunction is issued only when it is expected to induce irreparable social harms that are lower than those expected if it is not issued. *Second*, from an *ex-post* perspective, the remedy can contribute to minimizing the irreparable social harms inflicted when a preliminary injunction is issued. We demonstrate that these considerations lead to two central conclusions: (1) courts should award the

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7 See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, *Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief*, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 197, 199 (2003) (pointing that at the preliminary injunction stage courts are typically uncertain about both the likely outcome on the merits and the harms facing each party).

8 Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc., 910 F.2d 1049, 1054 (2nd Cir. 1990). See also infra Section III.A.

9 See infra Section III.A.1.

10 See infra Section III.A.2.
remedy of restitution, which requires the moving party to disgorge all the benefits obtained at the expense of the defendant as a result of the wrong preliminary injunction; (2) courts should not compel the plaintiff to compensate the defendant for all harms inflicted by the wrong preliminary injunction.

The Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly discusses the aim of preliminary injunctions—minimization of the irreparable loss of rights resulting from an erroneous assignment of entitlements at the preliminary stage. Part II presents our first argument, that deadweight-loss should be considered as irreparable harm, irrespective of the availability of an *ex-post* remedy. The next two Parts present our second contribution, regarding the choice of remedy for wrong preliminary injunction. Part III starts with a summary of the law of remedies for wrong preliminary injunction. It surveys the doctrinal reasons for imposing on the moving party only partial liability for the defendant’s harms, and then presents the very limited availability of the remedy of restitution for wrong preliminary injunction under current law (III.A). It then analyzes the paths in which the remedy for wrong preliminary injunction can serve to minimize irreparable social harms (III.B), and shows that the remedy of restitution is better suited to achieve this aim (III.C). Part IV inquires the role of the remedy for wrong preliminary injunction in shaping the parties’ incentives in deciding whether to apply for a preliminary injunction, and shows the superiority of the restitutionary remedy in this aspect too.

I.

**AIM OF ISSUING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS**

It takes time, often months and even years, to decide a case and to provide an effective remedy for the protection of rights.\(^{11}\) During this period, irreversible events may make the legal remedy ineffective. Preliminary, pre-trial remedies are designed to ease this problem by

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\(^{11}\) For instance, the median time intervals from filing to disposition of civil cases in which trial was completed by U.S. District Courts during the 12-month period ending September 30, 2005 was 22.5 months. **LEONIDAS R. MECHAM, ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS** 204 (2005).
mitigating the risk of the occurrence of such irreversible events. Preliminary injunctions are issued on the basis of a hearing, but the hearing “is usually attenuated and much less than due process would require for a full trial.” It is widely recognized that to meet the due process requirements it is sufficient to offer the defendant a speedy, even if only rudimentary, hearing after the issuance of a restricting order, with the right to damages for wrongful injunctions.

The decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction thus raises an inherent difficulty. On the one hand, this relief is often an essential tool for protecting the plaintiff’s interests, given the legal system’s deficiencies in providing final remedies in due course and the prospect of irreparable harms. On the other hand, the fact that the relief is issued without a full inquiry into the merits of the case entails a substantial risk that the issuance of the preliminary injunction would unjustifiably harm the defendant, as well as third parties and the public interest.

The decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction should aim at minimizing the expected irreparable social costs that result from the delay in deciding the case on the merits. The required inquiry is which preliminary decision will “minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights” from an erroneous (preliminary) assignment of entitlements. Specifically, preliminary relief should be issued only if (1) the injunction is required to prevent an irreparable harm; and (2) this harm outweighs the expected irreparable harm imposed as a result of the preliminary injunction.

This general standard, known as the “Leubsdorf-Posner” error-minimizing formulation, is often (at least implicitly) applied by courts, along with the more traditional,

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12 The preliminary relief may also prevent the defendant from inflicting reparable harms during the trial and may thus save the plaintiff the litigation costs of suing for compensations for these harms and protect the plaintiff from the risk of judicial error of awarding insufficient compensations. See also infra note 21.

13 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 184 (2d ed. 1993).


15 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 13, at 187 (“The potential for abuse and error in injunctive orders is usually very large”).


17 Thus, it is immaterial whether the moving party seeks to preserve the status quo or to deviate from it. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 157-66 (2001) (arguing that the heightened standard in cases of preliminary injunction that upset the status quo is historically and theoretically unsound, and supporting a uniform standard).

18 This formulation was first suggested by Professor John Leubsdorf. Leubsdorf, supra note 16. It was later developed by Judge Richard Posner in his opinion in American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital
four-factor “balance of the hardships” test. The central question is what types of harm should be considered as “irreparable.” We now move to analyze this issue, and suggest that the current definition should be modified.

II. IRREPARABLE HARM

Some aspects of the “expected irreparable harm” concept were already analyzed extensively. Among these aspects: the debate about risk aversion as a possible reason for the inherent inadequacy of a pecuniary remedy to compensate for harms; and the concern that a delay in

*Products, Ltd.*, 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986) (a preliminary injunction should be issued “only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied, multiplied by the probability that the denial would be an error (that the plaintiff, in other words, will win at trial), exceeds the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted, multiplied by the probability that granting the injunction would be an error”). See also Richard A. Posner, *Economic Analysis of the Law* 595-96 (7th ed. 2007).


20 According to this test the relevant requirements are: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, (3) an evaluation of the balance of the hardships, and (4) an assessment of the impact of the injunction on the public interest. See, e.g., *Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S*, 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997). For a discussion of the different standards see, e.g., Morton Wolf, *Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards*, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173 (1984) (same).

21 See, e.g., *American Hospital*, 780 F.2d at 597 (“When a court speaks of damages as being ‘irreparable’ because they are difficult to measure it can mean only that confining the injured party to a remedy of damages creates a risk he may not like (because he is risk adverse...), even though the upside risk is as large as the downside risk.”); Cf. Douglas Lichtman, *Irreparable Benefits*, 116 YALE L.J. 1284, 1292 (2007) (“Most irreparable harms...are irreparable only in the sense that the harm at issue is difficult for a court to value.”).
providing a relief would result in a party’s insolvency.\textsuperscript{22} In this Part we discuss two other elements of this formulation.

The issuance of a preliminary injunction inflicts harm which is relevant to the decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction only if it turns out that the relief \textit{wrongly} enjoyed a party; respectively, the issuance of a preliminary injunction prevents relevant harm only if it turns out that it \textit{rightly} enjoyed a party. Therefore, the scope of the irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued should be discounted by the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the case, as evaluated at the pre-trial stage; and the amount of irreparable harm if the injunction is issued should be similarly discounted according to the defendant’s likelihood of success.\textsuperscript{23} Hence, the relevant comparison is between the \textit{expected value} of the irreparable harm of each of the possible decisions.\textsuperscript{24}

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\textsuperscript{23} For suggestions to refine this standard see Davis, supra note 19 (each party’s irreparable harm should be discounted according to the likelihood that the party is right, rather than the likelihood that the actual result of the trial will be in its favor, thus accounting for the court’s degree of confidence about the merits of a case); and Lichtman, supra note 7 (suggesting to take into account the court’s level of uncertainty about its estimates of the harms).

\textsuperscript{24} This formulation represents a “sliding scale” approach, which allows a party with less than a 50% chance of winning on the merits to succeed on the motion. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 193-96 (“The plaintiff with a less than 50% chance of success could still justly receive…pretrial assistance if it will prevent an enormous irreparable loss compared to a minimal loss for the defendant.”). For a critique see Linda J. Silberman, \textit{Injunctions by the Numbers: Less than the Sum of Its Parts}, 63 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 279, 304-7 (1987) (the formula deviates from “the traditional standard for issuance of preliminary injunctions” since it “does not suggest that any threshold amount of harm or probability of success is necessary.”); Denlow, supra note 20, at 538. \textit{See also} Centurion Reinsurance Co. v. Singer, 810 F.2d 140, 145 (7th Cir. 1987) (“No matter how strongly the balance of irreparable harms may incline in favor of the party asking for a preliminary injunction, it is error to grant the injunction if the party has …only a very slight chance of prevailing on the merits.”); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (“The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in the absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits.”).
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This approach is based on the notion that an “efficient” preliminary injunction is one that minimizes costs given a certain set of legal rights, i.e. given a certain distribution of entitlements. The underlying assumption is that legal rights have their merits. Disrupting the allocation structure they create is thus costly. For example, it may hinder incentives to invest. This “entitlement-sensitive” formulation is distinguished from an “entitlement-blind” approach, which is based solely on an evaluation of the aggregated effects of the preliminary injunction on social welfare. To illustrate, assume that the irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued is $100, and that the irreparable harm if it is issued is $80. The entitlement-blind approach calls for the issuance of a preliminary injunction regardless of the likelihood of the possible outcomes of the trial, as the assignment of the entitlement to the plaintiff in this case yields a higher value (a save of $100) than its alternative ($80). However, under the entitlement-sensitive formulation, it is inefficient to issue the preliminary injunction if the likelihood that the entitlement is assigned to the defendant is high enough (in this example, if this likelihood exceeds 56%).

Examining the justifications for adopting an “entitlement-sensitive” approach is beyond the scope of our inquiry. It suffices to state that requiring the court to be entitlement-sensitive in the present scenario is justified based on the public interest in confining public authorities to lawful actions, and on evidentiary difficulties, such as the complexity of assessing and providing full compensation. Accordingly, in the discussion that follows the term “efficient preliminary injunction” is used to denote an application of the entitlement-sensitive approach.

As indicated, the standard for issuing preliminary injunction should aim at minimizing judicial errors. Under an efficiency-based approach, the “costs” of errors are measured from a

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25 For a similar approach see John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 44 (2007) (“It would be better for courts to retain the law as their initial guide to deciding what conduct is socially undesirable, even at the interlocutory stage, rather than trying to evaluate efficiency on a case-by case basis.”)

26 An “entitlement-blind” approach is implicitly applied by Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 403-04.

27 According to the error-minimizing formulation, a preliminary injunction should be issued in this case only if: $100p > 80(1-p)$, where $p$ is the likelihood that the entitlement is assigned to the plaintiff. This inequality yields that a preliminary injunction should be issued only if $p > 4/9$, i.e., if $(1-p) < 5/9 \approx 56\%$.

28 Lichtman, supra note 21, at 1287 n. 3 (“The goal according to virtually every scholarly and judicial account [is to minimize deviations from what will be the ultimate ruling on the merits]”); ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 131 (2003) (defining “expected error cost”); POSNER, supra note 18, at 594-95 (discussing costs of error in civil cases); Jon O. Newman,
social, *ex-ante* perspective. The relevant harm of a decision not to issue a preliminary injunction is measured not only according to the plaintiff’s harm, but also according to the cost of the expected effect on future behavior of those in the plaintiff’s position. For instance, the social cost of denying a preliminary injunction to a patent holder includes the adverse effects of such a decision on incentives to invest in research.\[^{29}\] In terms of the formal doctrine, this aspect is taken into account under the “public interest” factor.\[^{30}\]

It is important to distinguish in this respect between two types of possible harms of a decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction: a direct net loss of social welfare (“deadweight-loss”), and an errant transfer of wealth from a party who is legally entitled to it to a non-entitled party (“undeserved-wealth-transfer”). Deadweight-loss is clearly a relevant social cost for determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction. Undeserved-wealth transfer is relevant too, as far as it adversely affects the underlying purpose of assigning the relevant legal entitlement, such as providing optimal incentives to invest in research and development.\[^{31}\]

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\[^{29}\] Lichtman, *supra* note 21, at 1289 (“[An errant denial of a patent holder request for preliminary injunction inflicts] a social cost because mistakes like this will over the long run dampen the ex ante incentive to pursue patent-eligible research, discourage patent holders from litigating even valid claims, and likely drive inventors to invest more heavily in costly self-help protections.”).

\[^{30}\] See, e.g., Roland Machinery, 749 F.2d at 387 (Posner J.) (in cases in which “granting or denying a preliminary injunction will have consequences beyond the immediate parties... those interests—the ‘public interest’ if you will—must be reckoned into the weighing process.”). Some scholars argue that harms to “non-parties” should not be considered in the decision whether to issue the preliminary injunction. Leubsdorf, *supra* note 16, at 549 (arguing that “to consider interests irrelevant to the final decision at the preliminary stage will only increase the cost of the litigation and undermine the substantive law.”); Denlow, *supra* note 20, at 539; Arthur D. Wolf, *Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards*, 7 W. NEW ENGL. L. REV. 173, 234-35 (1984); Lea B. Vaughn, *A Need for Clarity: Toward a New Standard for Preliminary Injunctions*, 68 OR. L. REV. 839, 848 (1989) (“In the midst of existing fact uncertainty, an unbounded consideration of public interest threatens to overwhelm the process”). However, the prevailing view is that third-parties interests are relevant. *American Hospital*, 780 F.2d at 594; Laura W. Stein, *The Court and the Community: Why Non-Party Interests Should Count in Preliminary Injunction Actions*, 16 REV. LITIG. 27 (1997); LAYCOCK, *supra* note 1, at 273 (the court should consider “the severity and the likelihood of such harm to each litigant and to the public if the requested relief is granted and if it is denied”); Orin H. Lewis, “*The Wild Card That Is the Public Interest*: Putting a New Face on the Fourth Preliminary Injunction Factor”, 72 TEX. L. REV. 849, 854, 874-82 (1994); Leubsdorf, *supra* note 25, at 41-43.

\[^{31}\] Thus, the relevant social cost in this case should be calculated based on the expected effect of such transfer of wealth on relevant incentives. As recently pointed out by Douglas Lichtman, a decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction that confers “errant irreparable benefits” on one party may inflict social harm even if the other litigating party does not suffer any loss. Lichtman, *supra* note 21, at 1289-90.
The distinction between these two types of social costs is essential since they differ in terms of their reparability by an *ex-post* remedy. The remedy can eliminate undeserved-wealth-transfers. In contrast, compensation for deadweight-loss merely reallocates the burden from one party to another, without eliminating the social cost. In this respect, the traditional definition of irreparable harm as a “harm that cannot be cured by a remedy after trial,” should be qualified. A deadweight-loss suffered by one party is *socially* irreparable even if this party’s private loss can be cured by a remedy after trial. The available remedies—both when the plaintiff prevails and a preliminary injunction was not issued, and when a wrong preliminary injunction was issued but the defendant prevails—determine only what undeserved-wealth-transfers should be regarded as relevant irreparable social costs.

To illustrate, assume, for simplicity, that the court evaluates that each side has equal chances of winning the case. Given this assumption, a preliminary injunction should be issued if and only if the social costs caused by allowing the defendant to continue with her conduct ($A$), exceeds the social costs inflicted by stopping her ($S$). To focus our attention on deadweight-loss, assume that any undeserved-wealth-transfer between the plaintiff and the defendant due to a wrong preliminary decision is recoverable through an appropriate remedy, such that all relevant harms ($A$ and $S$) represent deadweight-loss. Part of these losses may be compensated for too. Thus, only part of the plaintiff’s harm if the defendant is allowed to continue her activity during the trial (i.e., a preliminary injunction is not issued) cannot be cured by an ex-post remedy ($A_{uc}$), while the other part can be compensated for ($A_{c}$, where $A_{uc}+A_{c}=A$). Similarly, only part of the defendant’s harm from a wrong preliminary injunction cannot be compensated for by an ex-post remedy ($S_{uc}$), and some part of this harm too can be cured ($S_{c}$, where $S_{uc}+S_{c}=S$). The current doctrine of irreparable harm, that requires to take into account only the uncompensated parts of these harms ($A_{uc}$ and $S_{uc}$), may thus induce two types of inefficient decisions:

("Undeserved irreversible gains skew the defendant’s incentives with respect to the question of whether to litigate or settle. They also encourage the defendant to invest further in research…")

32 LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 113.

33 See infra Part III.

34 The division between compensated and uncompensated harms is determined by two sets of factors: exogenous factors, such as the portion of the harm that is suffered by third parties, and the scope of harms that cannot be cured by an *ex-post* remedy; and the legal rules that govern the availability and the scope of *ex-post* remedies. As demonstrated in Part III, efficiency considerations may well entail that each party will bear only part of the other party’s harms in case of a wrong preliminary decision.
(1) The Court does not issue an efficient preliminary injunction. This outcome is expected when a substantial portion of the harm from a wrong preliminary injunction is uncompensated ($S_{uc} >> S_c$), while the harms from not granting the preliminary injunction are divided more equally into compensated and uncompensated harms ($A_c \approx A_{uc}$). In such cases the court does not issue an efficient preliminary injunction because it takes into account only a small portion of the benefit from issuing a preliminary injunction. Consider the following case: $A_c$=$50; A_{uc}$=$50; S_c$=$10; S_{uc}$=$65$. Issuing a preliminary injunction is efficient. Yet the preliminary injunction will not be granted, since the uncompensated harm from the preliminary injunction, $65$, exceeds the uncompensated harm from denying the motion, $50$.

(2) The Court issues an inefficient preliminary injunction. This outcome is expected when the damage from the preliminary injunction is divided relatively equally between compensated and uncompensated harms ($S_c \approx S_{uc}$) but a substantial portion of the harm from not issuing the preliminary injunction is uncompensated ($A_{uc} >> A_c$). Here the problem is that the court does not take into account the full harm from issuing the preliminary injunction, because it considers only the uncompensated part of the harm. Consider, for illustration, the following figures: $A_c$=$10; A_{uc}$=$90; S_c$=$65; S_{uc}$=$60$. It is inefficient to issue a preliminary injunction, since its cost, $125$, exceeds its benefit, $100$. Nevertheless, the court would grant it, as the uncompensated harm from not issuing the order, $90$, exceeds the uncompensated harm from issuing it, $60$.

Both concerns are directly attributed to the current doctrine of irreparable harm, under which courts readily ignore parts of the harms that their decision may cause. The likelihood of inefficient judicial decision is higher the closer $S$ is to $A$.\(^35\)

In sum, deadweight-loss should always be considered an irreparable social cost, since compensation for it merely reallocates the damage but does not eliminate it. In contrast, undeserved-wealth-transfers should be so considered only if an ex-post restitutionary remedy is unavailable, either legally or practically (due to judgment proof problems).

\(^{35}\) In an accompanying Article we identify the cases in which the current definition of irreparable harm leads to inefficient denial or issuance of a preliminary injunction, and calculate the significance of these inefficiencies. We show that even when courts possess full information, the implementation of the current doctrine induces significant inefficiencies. Ofer Grosskopf & Barak Medina, Irreparable Harm (working paper, 2008).
III.
MITIGATING IRREPARABLE HARMs THROUGH REMEDIES FOR WRONG PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

As indicated above, even a careful application of the standard of issuing a preliminary injunction cannot exclude the possibility that the injunction will be proved wrong, given that it is issued before the court decides the case on its merits. According to Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the applicant for a preliminary injunction is required to give a security (a bond) “in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”36 On the basis of this provision courts impose liability upon the bond, to compensate the defendant for its costs and damages from wrong preliminary injunction.

In general, litigating parties are not held responsible for wrong judicial decisions, and thus need not compensate their counterparts for harms inflicted or disgorge profits generated by the reversed decision.37 Given this general rule, the puzzle is why is it justified to award a remedy in cases of wrong preliminary injunctions?

It should be noted that this puzzle is distinct from the inquiry of the rationale of the bond requirement. The primary function of the bond is to serve as a fund to ensure compensation to a wrongfully enjoined defendant and to facilitate the collection of the damages awarded.38 In addition, since the bond sets an upper limit to the plaintiff’s liability, it provides the plaintiff with information regarding the scope of its potential liability for wrong preliminary injunction.39 These aims are based on the assumption that liability is imposed, but do not justify it. Similarly, the argument that the plaintiff’s fulfillment of the bond provision should be viewed as consent to

36 Most states replicate Rule 65(c) with some minor changes. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 196.
37 Reverse judgments raise only a duty to restore direct benefits that one received from its counterpart in compliance with the revoked decision—money that has been paid thereunder or property that has been misallocated due to the judgment. See infra Section I.B.
39 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 13, at 197 (“The bond serves to warn plaintiffs the price they may be compelled to pay if the injunction is wrongfully issued.”); Morton, supra note 38, at 1870.
liability up to the amount of the bond, i.e., as the “price for the injunction,” does not explain why such liability is imposed in the first place. It is our aim to offer such reasons.

We suggest that the remedy for wrong preliminary injunctions serves the aim of minimizing irreparable harms. It can do so through three main paths. First, from an ex-post perspective, the remedy can serve to rectify the consequences of a wrong preliminary injunction and thus to lower the relevant social costs. Second, the remedy affects the amount of information that the court should consider before issuing a preliminary injunction. It can thus increase the likelihood that the decision at the preliminary stage will be the correct one. Third, from an ex-ante perspective, the remedy shapes the plaintiff’s incentives to apply for the preliminary relief, and the defendant’s motivation to object to it. We discuss the first two aspects in this Part, and the third one in the next Part.

We start with a brief overview of the current legal doctrines and practices regarding the two possible types of remedies for wrong preliminary injunction: compensating the enjoined party for its losses, and recovering the gains accruing to the plaintiff. We then move to evaluate these remedies in terms of the aim of minimizing irreparable harm.

A. The Law of Remedies for Wrong Preliminary Injunction

1. Compensation for Harms

As indicated, on the basis of Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts impose liability upon the bond, to compensate the defendant for its costs and damages from wrong preliminary injunction. Liability upon the bond may be imposed whenever the preliminary injunction has deprived the defendant of rights to which it was entitled. The defendant need not prove that the issuance of the preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion at the time it was

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40 See, e.g., Note, Recovery For Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(C), 99 HARV. L. REV. 828, 842-46 (1986) (the bond requirement and the remedy that is based on it can be seen as “a contract in which the court and plaintiff ‘agree’ to the bond amount as the ‘price’ of a wrongful injunction”); Morton, supra note 38, at 1870-71; Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 805 (3rd Cir. 1989).

41 See, e.g., Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2007) (“An injunction can be ‘wrongful’ for Rule 65(c) purposes even when the initial issuance of the injunction was proper. …[U]nder Rule 65(c), a party is wrongfully enjoined when it had a right all along to do what it was enjoined from doing.”); Slidell, Inc. v. Millennium Inorganic Chems., Inc., 460 F.3d 1047, 1059 (8th Cir. 2006). See also DOBBS, id., at 202-03; Note, supra note 40, at 836-42; Elizabeth Leight Quick, Comment, The Triggering of Liability on Injunction Bonds, 52 N.C.L. Rev. 1252, 1256 (1974).
The language of Rule 65(c), that requires a bond “in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained,” seems to indicate that the moving-party is required to fully compensate the defendant in the case of a wrong preliminary injunction. However, in practice the plaintiff often bears only part of the actual costs incurred and harms suffered as a result of the issuance of a wrong preliminary injunction. Three doctrines induce this outcome.

The trial court has the power—and perhaps even the duty—to consider the equities of the case before imposing liability upon the bond and awarding damages. This doctrine was set forth in the Supreme Court’s 1882 decision in *Russell v. Farley*, which reasoned that since “no Act of Congress, or rule of this court” compelled a court to require a bond before issuing a preliminary injunction, even in cases in which the court did require a bond it has “the power to mitigate the terms imposed [by the bond], or to relieve from them altogether.” Arguably, “[r]eliance on the *Russell* decision today is unwarranted because its reasoning is explicitly based on the absence of a rule such as Rule 65(c).” Nevertheless, the prevailing view is that courts retain their discretionary power to deny full, or even any, recovery on the bond.

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42 Difficult questions, which we do not discuss here, arise when the plaintiff prevails on the merits but only in part. For a discussion see, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 13, at 203 (“The cases suggest a wide range of possible solutions, but no real rationale.”).

43 *See, e.g.*, Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 278 U.S. 228 (1929) (the trial court may “refuse to allow recovery of any damages [on an injunction bond], even if the permanent injunction should be denied”); H & R Block, Inc. v. McCaslin, 541 F.2d 1098, 1099 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977) (“The awarding of damages pursuant to an injunction bond rests in the sound discretion of the court’s equity jurisdiction”); Monroe Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. De Bari, 562 F.2d 30, 33 (10th Cir. 1977) (“Equity comes into play in determining whether there may be recovery and the amount thereof.”); Kansas ex rel. Stephan v. Adams, 705 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 1983). (“[The] court is not bound to award damages on the bond without considering the equities of the case. …[A] court, in considering the matter of damages, must exercise its equity power and must effect justice between the parties, avoiding an inequitable result.”).


45 *Id.*, at 441.

46 *Note, supra* note 40, at 843.

47 *See, e.g.*, Page Communications Engineers, Inc. v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Rule 65(c) “was not intended to negate the court’s duty” to consider the equities of the awarding damages on the bond, as it “gives the court discretion to fix bond in a nominal amount; clearly the Rule does not contemplate that a defendant who is wrongfully enjoined will always be made whole by recovery of damages.”); *H & R Block*, 541 F.2d, at 1099. According to another view, followed by other Circuits, the
A second reason for partial liability is the value of the bond. Notwithstanding the language of Rule 65(c), the sum of the bond is often lower than the costs incurred and damages suffered by parties who were wrongfully restrained. The court sets the bond at an early stage of the litigation, when the defendant’s possible costs and harms are often under-estimated.\(^{48}\) Moreover, courts frequently set the bond amount on the basis of considerations such as the plaintiff’s financial means,\(^{49}\) or the public interest in the suit, which are not related to the defendant’s expected costs and harms.\(^{50}\) Given that the bond sets the upper limit for the defendant’s recovery,\(^{51}\) the plaintiff often bears only part of the defendant’s actual costs and harms.\(^{52}\)

Finally, the plaintiff does not bear the full cost of a wrong preliminary injunction, since is not liable for the injunction’s effects on third parties. The bond posted under Rule 65(c) does not cover the injuries inflicted on those who were not formally restrained but nevertheless suffered an
injury, such as suppliers and consumers who were harmed due to the preliminary injunction’s adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. Such third parties may have a cause of action in restitution for actual payments that they paid to the plaintiff, but they are not entitled to compensation for their damages.

The combined effect of these doctrines is that the plaintiff ends up assuming only part of the social harm caused by the wrong preliminary injunction.

2. Restitution of Benefits

In several decisions the Supreme Court has recognized the right to restitution of money paid in accordance with a judgment that was subsequently reversed. Article 74 of the Restatement of Restitution summarizes this line of cases by stating that “a person who has conferred a benefit upon another in compliance with a judgment, or whose property has been taken thereunder, is entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set aside.” This rule applies to wrong preliminary injunctions too, and the prevailing view is that such claims of restitution are not capped by the amount of the bond.

However, under current law the remedy of restitution for wrong preliminary injunction is very limited. It is available almost exclusively in cases in which a sum of money or a specific property had been transferred from the defendant to the plaintiff on the basis of the preliminary injunction, so that only “restitution in kind” is available. Indeed, all thirty-two illustrations

53 See infra Section III.A.2.
57 See, e.g., Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., 249 U.S. 134, 145-146 (1919); National Kidney Patients Association v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Chestnut Hill Gulf, Inc. v. Cumberland Farm, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 616, 622 (D. Mass. 1992) (“When a party has received money or property by virtue of an injunction subsequently reversed, he may be compelled to make restitution even in the absence of an injunction bond”). See also Dobbs, supra note 55, at 1136-37; DOBBS, supra note 13, at 199.
58 See, e.g., Tenth Ward Road Dist. No. 11 of Avoyelles Parish v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 12 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1926) (“In this case the appellee received under the restraining order only a delay in the
given by the Reporters of the Restatement of Restitution are cases in which “money has been paid” or “property has been transferred.” §59 This restriction is further emphasized in §17 of the draft of the Restatement of the Law (third) on Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, which explicitly limits restitutionary rights in the case of “judgment subsequently reversed or avoided” to “transfer or taking of property.” §60

Most preliminary injunctions do not order money to be paid or property to be transferred but rather freeze the status quo. Consequently, the narrow reading of the right to restitution for wrong preliminary injunction makes this remedy unattainable in most cases. §61 Moreover, even in the rare cases in which the court concedes that the remedy should be more freely available, the

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59 Restatement of Restitution, 1937, § 74, Comment b. For an award of a restitutionary remedy in such cases see, e.g., St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Consolidated Fuel Co., 260 F. 638, 640 (8th Cir. 1919) (defendant was ordered to supply coal to the plaintiff by a preliminary injunction. The court held that “[i]t would be a grave reproach to the administration of justice if, when a court has wrongfully taken the property of one party and given it to another, it should be powerless to make restitution. The law is otherwise.”); Bedell Co. v. Harris, 240 N.Y.S. 550 (S.C. N.Y. 1930) (preliminary injunction preventing the eviction of a tenant after the lease had expired); National Kidney Patients Association v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (allowing restitution from a health provider of Medicare payments made under a preliminary injunction that was vacated). Nonetheless, even in such cases the courts have equitable discretion to deny restitution. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. State of Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935).

60 The full text of §17 is as follows: “A transfer or taking of property, in compliance with or otherwise in consequence of a judgment that is subsequently reversed or avoided, gives the disadvantaged party a claim in restitution to the extent necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.” The comments and Illustration for this section deal with the transfer of money or property rights (Illustration 3 deals with the case of a wrong compulsory license). There is no reference to the case of preliminary injunctions, or to the case law that is henceforth mentioned.

61 See, e.g., FilmTec Corp. v Hydranautic, 67 F.3d 931, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (J. Newman concurring).
A similar reluctance to use restitution as a remedy for wrong preliminary injunction is evident in other common law countries. In the recent case of *SmithKline*, the English Court of Appeal rejected such a claim, stating that “it seems clear that both the United States and Australian courts have clearly decided that there is no general principle of restitution available to a party harmed by a ‘wrong’ court order.”63 In fact, to the best of our knowledge, only one common law jurisdiction, Israel, allows an expansive use of the restitutionary remedy in this context.64 The same approach applies to claims of restitution by non-parties. As observed by L.J. Jacob in *SmithKline*, in referring to the U.S. law, “if a restitutionary claim lay for every non-party who loses money or has to pay more as a result of a ‘wrongful’ injunction, whether interim or final, I would expect there to be masses of claims by way of class action run on a contingency fee basis. But no one has pointed to any such case.”65

Two paradigmatic cases demonstrate the courts’ reluctance to award restitution. The first involves benefits obtained by wrongfully restraining the defendant from competing with the plaintiff. It consists, for instance, cases in which a preliminary injunction was issued to protect a patent that is eventually declared invalid, thus providing the plaintiff with an unwarranted monopoly status during the litigation. Similarly, benefits are sometimes derived from postponing

62 See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. State of Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935); Greenwood County v Duke Power, 107 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1939); Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867 (1st Cir. 1995).
63 SmithKline Beecham plc v. Apotex Europe Ltd., [2007] Ch 71, 89 (C.A.). In this case the English Court limited the restitutionary remedy to cases in which the wrong judgment allowed the plaintiff to use the defendant’s property. In Australia, the Supreme Court of Victoria imposed a similar limitation. National Australia Bank Ltd v. Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd, [1991] 1 VR 386, 598 (Brooking J.) (“[T]he principle of Rodger’s Case allows no more than the passing back to that party of what has been taken from him.”).
64 The leading Israeli precedent on this matter is CA 280/73 Palimport Ltd v. Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 29(1) 597 (1975), in which the Israeli Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to sue for the profits made by the defendant due to a wrong restraint order that the latter received against the former in a previous litigation. For a discussion of this case see Friedmann, supra note 119, at 537-38; Daniel Friedmann, *Valid, Voidable, Qualified, and Non-existing Obligations: An Alternative Perspective on the Law of Restitution*, in *ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION* 247, 265 (A. Burrows ed., 1991) (describing the case as a “landmark decision.”). This Israeli case was also discussed in some length by LJ Jacob in the *SmithKline* decision, who summarized the discussion with the following observation: “Is there a real prospect that the Israeli case would be followed here? I have no doubt that it would not be so followed.” *SmithKline*, [2007] Ch at 96.
65 *SmithKline*, [2007] Ch at 90.
the completion of a project that would have adversely affected the plaintiff’s interests. The courts have systematically rejected defendants’ attempts to obtain restitution of such benefits. They reasoned that a plaintiff acting on the basis of a preliminary injunction is not considered as acting “wrongfully,” at least for the purpose of the law of unjust enrichment. It is often suggested that in such cases “[n]othing was taken from [the defendant] by the injunction and given to the plaintiff,” and that the defendant “is not in position to establish its own loss of any of the profits alleged to have been made by the [moving party].”

The second category of cases involves benefits generated by enjoining the use of the defendant’s powers, such as tax collection, or enforcement of price or wage control. In the famous 1919 case of *Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co.*, railroad companies obtained a preliminary injunction to keep state commissioners from enforcing certain railway freight rates. When the rate regulation was eventually upheld, the Supreme Court affirmed that the railroad companies were liable to refund those who purchased their services for the difference between the rates prescribed by the commission and those charged by the railway companies. The Supreme Court held that the railroad companies’ customers were entitled to restitution, even though they were not party to the original proceedings. The court noted that “during the time that those decrees remained unreversed the railway companies obtained the benefit of the injunction by exacting from [its customers] excess charges. It is a typical case for

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66 *See, e.g., FilmTec*, 67 F.3d 931; *United Motors Service Inc v Tropic-aire Inc.*, 57 F.2d 479, 483-84 (8th Cir. 1932); Glaxo Group Ltd v. Leavitt, 481 F. Supp.2d 434 (D. Md. 2007); *Smithkline*, [2007] Ch 71. The only exceptions we are familiar with are cases in which the preliminary injunction allowed the plaintiff to keep the defendant’s property or imposed the defendant to continue to provide a service for the plaintiff. *See supra* note 59.


68 *United Motors*, 57 F.2d at 484. *See also Greenwood*, 107 F.2d at 487 (the wrongfully restrained party “has lost nothing which the [moving party] has received.”).

69 *United Motors*, 57 F.2d at 488.

70 *Tenth Ward Road*, 12 F.2d 245.

71 249 U.S. 134, 145 (1919) (“A party against whom an erroneous judgment or decree has been carried into effect is entitled, in the event of a reversal, to be restored by his adversary to that which he has lost thereby. … [This] course of action … is one of the equitable powers, inherent in every court of justice…”).
the application of the principle of restitution."  

Subsequent cases followed this ruling.  

This outcome is consistent with the doctrine described above of awarding restitution to those who directly transferred sums of money to the plaintiff as a result of the preliminary injunction.

Interestingly, the *Arkadelphia* Court pointed out that "[t]he railroad commission, in defending the rate schedules against the attack of the railway companies, represented all shippers."  

This language may suggest that the regulator represents the customers not only in defending the rate schedules but also in collecting the plaintiff's unjust enrichment. However, courts mostly reject claims for restitution by regulators, on the basis of the equitable nature of this remedy.  

Among the few exceptions to this ruling is the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 1958 decision in *Mitchell v. Riegel Textile*, where the court allowed the Secretary of Labor to collect the profits made by employers from delaying the enforcement of a minimum wage order. The Court of Appeals noted that the difference between the wages paid while the injunction was in effect and the minimum wage which the Secretary had fixed was "the amount by which the plaintiffs were unjustly enriched at the employees' expense. Since separate suits by each employee would be unreasonably burdensome to the parties and the courts, the Secretary may recover as the representative of all employees."  

Therefore, while courts readily require the moving-party to assume (often partial) liability for the harms inflicted by a wrong preliminary injunction, they are much more reluctant to award a restitutionary remedy of disgorgement of profits.

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72 249 U.S. at 146. It should be further noted that in this case the preliminary injunction was issued under the explicit condition that the companies would refund their customers if the complaint is discharged. See id., at 138.


74 249 U.S. at 146.

75 See, e.g., *Texaco*, 60 F.3d 867 (affirming the denial of a restitutionary claim that was brought by the Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs against petroleum wholesalers who were shielded against its imposed price controls for several years by injunctions).

76 259 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

77 Id., at 955. The Court added that “[i]t is immaterial that the traditional word ‘restitution’ is not clearly applicable to these cases in which unjust enrichment has resulted from paying too little and not from collecting too much. Equitable principles are not confined by rigid formulas. As soon as the underpayments were made, unjust enrichment was complete.” Id., at 956.
B. The Role of Remedies for Wrong Preliminary Injunctions in Minimizing Irreparable Harms

Remedies for wrong preliminary injunction serve to mitigate the consequences of the wrongful restriction of the defendant. As suggested by Dan Dobbs, “[t]he main purpose of the bond requirement is to protect the defendant from reparable loss of rights due to a decision made before trial.” 78 However, since a deadweight-loss is socially irreparable, this rationale justifies only remedies that correct undeserved-wealth-transfer. 79

The remedy also affects the likelihood that the case will be decided on its merits. Social harms inflicted by a preliminary injunction can be reduced only if the proceedings continue until the dispute is resolved in a final judgment. However, if the defendant cannot expect to receive a remedy for wrong preliminary injunction even if it eventually wins the case, it may not have sufficient incentives to litigate the case after losing in the preliminary stage. Consider, for example, the case of a competitor who challenges the validity of a patent. If the patentee obtains a preliminary injunction, and the case is expected to be litigated for most of the period in which the patent is economically valuable, the challenger has no reason to continue litigating the issue any further, unless a remedy for wrong preliminary injunction is available. Therefore, an insufficient remedy discourages the defendant from litigating the case, and may thus prevent the mitigation of the social harm from wrong preliminary injunctions.

78 DOBBS, supra note 13, at 197. See also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 210 (3rd Cir. 1990) (protecting the defendant “is important in the preliminary injunction context, for ‘because of attenuated procedure, an interlocutory order has a higher than usual chance of being wrong.’”); Quick, supra note 41, at 1256 (“In order to protect the defendant from harm caused by the recognized need for a speedy determination of interlocutory injunctive relief, the properly fixed bond serves to minimize the drastic effect of this anticipatory relief on the enjoined party.”); Dobbs, supra note 55, at 1094 (the purpose of the remedy for wrong preliminary injunction is to compensate the defendant “who has been subjected to a process of law that does not meet the kind of standards ordinarily adopted.”).

79 A corrective justice perspective may yield a different result. However, it requires a more detailed analysis than we can provide here. It is easy to justify the assignment of responsibility to the plaintiff for the consequences of a wrong preliminary injunction when its behavior is blameworthy. But this is not the case with respect to an innocent, blameless plaintiff. The costs of issuing a pre-trial injunction—the harms inflicted by a wrong preliminary injunction—are the result of the inability of the legal system to quickly decide the case and provide an effective remedy for the protection of rights. Thus, when there is a bona fide controversy about the parties’ rights, and irreparable harms might be inflicted due to the delay in resolving the case, it is far from self-evident that it is the plaintiff who should be liable for the harms inflicted by a wrong preliminary injunction.
In addition, since the remedy determines what part of the harms is socially reparable, it defines what parts of the preliminary injunction’s expected social harms can be ignored in deciding whether to issue the preliminary injunction. Given the difficulties in accurately evaluating these harms, a remedy that enables the court to disregard certain types of harms may increase the likelihood of a correct decision. Again, since harm of the sort of undeserved-wealth-transfer is potentially reparable, it is justified to provide remedies that correct this type of harm, to make it irrelevant in deciding whether to issue the preliminary injunction. In contrast, the aim of improving the court’s decision process cannot justify the provision of remedies that compensate the defendant for harms which represent deadweight-loss.

Finally, the remedy also affects the threshold level of the probability that the plaintiff will win the case on its merits. To obtain a preliminary injunction the plaintiff is required to show that the probability that he’ll win the case on its merits exceeds some threshold that is set by the legal doctrine. An efficiency-based approach requires that this threshold is set according to the parties’ irreparable harms. According to the “Leubsdorf-Posner” error-minimizing formulation, the preliminary injunction should be issued only if $Ap > S(1-p)$, where $A$ is the irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not issued, $S$ is the irreparable harm from a wrong preliminary injunction, and $p$ is the probability that the plaintiff will win the case on its merits. This formulation yields that the threshold level of $p$ is determined by $p > \frac{S}{A+S}$. Thus, the larger the size of the irreparable harms from a wrong preliminary injunction ($S$), the higher the threshold. A remedy that reduces the defendant’s irreparable harm (by eliminating undeserved-wealth-transfers) increases the number of cases in which the plaintiff is protected from irreparable harms.80

Improving the court’s decision process at the stage of granting the preliminary injunction thus requires that the court will be able to disregard as much undeserved-wealth-transfers as

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80 For instance, assume that the socially irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not issued is $80; and the harm from a wrong preliminary injunction is $120, out of which $50 reflect a deadweight-loss and $70 represent undeserved-wealth-transfer. Absent a remedy for wrong preliminary injunction, a preliminary injunction would be issued only if the plaintiff’s likelihood of winning the case exceeds 60% (since according to the error-minimizing formulation, the preliminary injunction should be issued only if $80p > (70+50)(1-p)$, which yields that $p > 60\%$). In contrast, if the plaintiff must compensate the defendant for an undeserved-wealth-transfer, a preliminary injunction should be issued whenever the plaintiff’s likelihood of success exceeds 38.5% (since the preliminary injunction should be issued only if $80p > 50(1-p)$, which yields that $p > 38.5\%$).
possible. To achieve this goal the remedy should be tailored to eliminate all of the reparable wealth-transfers. There is no point in remedying deadweight-loss, since transferring deadweight-loss from the defendant to the plaintiff does not eliminate the court’s duty to take this element into account, as part of the social cost of granting the preliminary injunction. In the next Section we evaluate the two types of remedies for wrong preliminary injunction in light of these considerations.

C. An Evaluation of the Possible Remedies

1. Compensation for Harms

The purpose of minimizing irreparable social costs requires that the defendant be fully compensated for harms of the form of undeserved-wealth-transfer. The current practice of partial liability creates severe informational problems. It requires the courts to take into account not only the relevant deadweight-loss of each of the alternative decisions, but also undeserved-wealth-transfers that are left uncompensated. The need to take such additional information into account in deciding whether to issue the preliminary injunction increases the likelihood of error. This problem is of special importance due to the rule that while the bond sets the upper limit of the plaintiff’s liability, the decision whether to issue the preliminary injunction is made before the court determines the amount of the bond. Since the bond is often set based on factors that are unrelated to the defendant’s expected harm, the court cannot accurately assess, at the stage of deciding whether to issue the relief, what part of the wealth transfer from wrong preliminary injunction should be considered as an irreparable social cost. Even if one does not accept our argument in full, it is essential to decide whether to issue the preliminary injunction in light of a given size of bond, and not the other way around.

Compelling the plaintiff to assume full liability would not necessarily reduce the relevant irreparable costs as far as it does not differentiate between undeserved-wealth-transfer and deadweight-loss. Thus, this aim cannot justify a remedy that bases the plaintiff’s liability on the defendant’s harm.

81 See supra Section III.A.1.
Remedies for wrong preliminary injunctions that are based on partial or full compensation of the defendant’s harms are not tailored to advance the aim of minimizing irreparable harm. The plaintiff should bear only part of the defendant’s harms, and the scope of this liability should be limited to undeserved-wealth-transfers.

2. Restitution of Benefits

According to the rule under consideration, the plaintiff’s liability is limited to the benefit it gained from the preliminary injunction at the defendant’s expense. These benefits include the saved harms, profits gained due to the injunction’s effect on the plaintiff’s market share, and any other advantage that the plaintiff obtained as a result of the wrong preliminary injunction. Defining what benefits should be considered as obtained “at the expense of” the defendant is difficult. In related contexts courts usually employ the rather restrictive so-called “arithmetic subtraction” concept, according to which the plaintiff gained a benefit at the expense of the defendant if, and only if, the benefit corresponds to a parallel loss to the defendant. Accordingly, the remedy of restitution will provide the defendant with the benefit gained by the plaintiff or the defendant’s loss, the lower of the two.

The restitutionary remedy saves the court from the need to evaluate undeserved-wealth-transfers from the defendant to the plaintiff due to wrong preliminary injunctions. Indeed, the purpose of reducing the amount of information that the court is required to analyze in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction justifies precisely the remedy of disgorgement of benefits. As we explained, it is only this component of the social costs that can be mitigated by an ex-post remedy. The provision of a restitutionary remedy enables the court to focus on evaluating only the expected deadweight-loss (and irreparable wealth transfers) of wrong preliminary injunctions, and it thus increases the likelihood that the court would decide correctly.

82 See Dobbs, supra note 55, at 1140-42 (“The decisions… suggest not only that restitution will be denied unless the plaintiff’s gains are traceable to and identifiable with the defendant’s losses, but also that the gains must be directly traceable.”). For a discussion of the requirement of “corresponding loss” in the law of unjust enrichment in general see, e.g., Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment 78-86 (2nd ed. 2005). Interestingly, Fuller and Perdue employ the same notion in their definition of the “restitution interest” in the contractual context. See Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52, 53-55 (1936-7) (the object of protecting the “restitution interest” is “the prevention of gain by the defaulting promisor at the expense of the promisee.”).
Moreover, when a wrong preliminary injunction is expected to generate only a wealth transfer, the availability of the remedy of restitution makes it unnecessary to evaluate the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the case. Consider, for illustration, an upstream factory, which uses the same water as the downstream laundry. Assume that the factory cools the water to a degree that is harmful to the laundry business, but not to the environment or to anyone else. The laundry claims to have the right that the factory will not cool the water below its natural temperature, and is suing the factory. Assume also that the factory can prevent the harm to the laundry during the litigation, and that an *ex-post* monetary relief can eliminate both the harm to the laundry and the harm to the factory. Under these assumptions, if the laundry is required to disgorge all the benefit that it obtained at the expense of the factory from wrong preliminary injunction, the decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction should be based only on the decision which party is the “cheapest cost avoider.” There is no need to evaluate the parties’ relative merits at the time of issuing the preliminary injunction.

The aim of an *ex-post* minimization of the social costs from wrong preliminary injunctions clearly justifies a restitutionary remedy, which bases the plaintiff’s liability on the benefit that was unjustifiably taken by the plaintiff from the defendant as a result of the injunction. This remedy applies only to costs that are truly reparable from the social perspective. Moreover, the aim of minimizing social costs can support the provision of restitutionary remedy even when the benefits were not obtained at the expense of the defendant in the “arithmetic subtraction” sense. As recently suggested by Doug Lichtman, errant benefits, even when they are not accompanied

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83 Even if the parties do not face prohibitively high transaction costs they might fail to reach an agreement without a well defined initial allocation of the entitlement.

84 It does not follow from the last assumption that there is no concern of an irreparable social cost in this case. For example, if the factory does not prevent the harm during the litigation even though it is the “cheapest cost avoider,” the gap between the harm to the laundry and the factory’s cost of preventing this harm represents an irreparable deadweight-loss.

by a corresponding loss, might skew incentives and thus inflict social costs. In such cases, the remedy of restitution of benefits is the only possible scheme that can mitigate these social costs.

Consider in this context cases in which the benefit to the plaintiff is not accompanied by a corresponding loss to the defendant. Typical examples concern benefits that are higher than the defendant’s corresponding loss, and benefits that were derived at the expense of third parties, such as consumers or employees. The case of *Mitchell v. Riegel Textile* demonstrates the last scenario. The moving parties in that case, cotton mill owners, clearly benefited from the injunction, by being allowed to pay less than the minimum wage for the time of the litigation. Yet, their benefits were not accompanied by a corresponding financial loss for the defendant, the Secretary of Labor. In fact it was achieved at the expense of third parties—the moving parties’ employees. One way to justify requiring the plaintiff to disgorge its benefit in such a case is by showing that the mere errant gain creates a social loss, since it might skew the plaintiff’s incentives, and this harm can be reparable through restitution. If such social harm cannot be demonstrated, the defendant’s claim of restitution can be supported only if there is a real possibility that it will pass on its reward to the third parties, *i.e.* if it is actually suing on their behalf. If such a move is impractical, the remedy would not help to minimize social loss, and would thus not allow the court to disregard it in its initial decision. The only consideration that remains in force is that of preventing frivolous suits for preliminary injunction. If this consideration is important enough, then it might justify a restitutionary remedy. If not, for instance because litigation is costly and the chances of success in the litigation are high enough, benefits extracted from third parties should not be subject to restitution in the case of a wrong preliminary injunction.

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86 Lichtman, *supra* note 21, at 1289-90, 1297 (“If the patentee is mistakenly awarded preliminary relief, the patentee is… better off. But it would be surprising were society to applaud that error. Patent law is intended to award this patentee a certain payoff… designed to create particular incentives…. Any deviation from that baseline distorts those incentives…”).

87 However, not all preliminary injunctions that merely confer a benefit on the plaintiff inflict social harm. In some cases, the restitutionary remedy is only instrumental to making the plaintiff compensate the defendant. See Ariel Porat, *When Do Irreparable Benefits Matter? A Response to Douglas Lichtman on Irreparable Benefits*, 116 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 385 (2007), [http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/05/06/porat.html](http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/05/06/porat.html). Thus, if the plaintiff gained without imposing an equivalent harm on the defendant, a restitutionary remedy may not be justified in all cases.

88 259 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

89 *See supra* note 86 and accompanying text.
A difficult question, which we cannot fully address here, is whether third parties should be entitled to restitutionary claims for wrong preliminary injunctions. As was mentioned above, the Supreme Court recognized such a claim in *Arkadelphia Milling*, while the English Court of Appeal rejected it in *SmithKline*. The disparity can be explained by the fact that *Arkadelphia* dealt with third parties who directly transferred money to the losing plaintiff, whereas *SmithKline* was concerned with third parties who lost business to the plaintiff, such that the plaintiff’s benefits were only indirectly gained at their expense. Though we do not find this distinction relevant when the restitution claim is brought by the defendant, it may serve to limit the number of potential claimants, thus preventing nuisance claims against the plaintiff.

Arguably, an inherent difficulty with a restitutionary remedy is that of costs of proof. The basic concern is that whereas in a harm-based remedy the potential plaintiff is the victim (the party who was wrongly restrained), who possesses more information than the injurer (the moving party) does about its losses, in a restitution-based remedy the potential plaintiff possesses less information than the moving party. As a result, the enforcement of the latter remedy can be expected to be partial and entail high litigation costs. While this argument may have its merits in some cases, it is not a conclusive one. The arguably higher administrative costs of applying the restitutionary remedy do not necessarily surpass the above-mentioned benefits of this remedy. Moreover, even in terms of administrative costs, one should take into account additional factors in comparing between the two types of remedies. *First*, due to the uncertainty of the scope of the moving party’s liability under the harm-based remedy, it is inevitable to cap it to the amount of the bond. As a result, the upper limit of the defendant’s compensations is set at an early stage of the litigation, on the basis of a prediction of possible future harms, and subject to other constraints in setting the amount of the bond. The restitutionary remedy is free from these

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90 *See supra* note 71 and accompanying text.
91 *See supra* note 63 and accompanying text.
92 *See, e.g.*, Donald Wittman, *Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefits?*, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 57 (1984) (accentuating the role of the litigation costs entailed by the two different methods); Hanoch Dagan, *Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law Theory*, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 115, 142-44 (2000) (damages for breach is a superior remedy over disgorgement of benefit since the difficulties involved in proving the scope of the promisor’s profits entail high litigation costs and create uncertainty).
93 *See supra* note 39 and accompanying text.
94 *See supra* Section III.A.1.
limitations, as it is set at the end of trial, after the actual benefit was obtained. It seems reasonable to assume that this evidentiary advantage of the remedy of restitution more than offsets its above-mentioned difficulty. Second, the proof of the scope of benefits obtained may be easier than that of harms, as the latter entails a counterfactual analysis, whereas the former requires an evaluation of actual benefit obtained by the moving party.

In sum, the above discussion justifies the provision of a restitutionary remedy under the “arithmetic subtraction” sense of “at the expense of.” Consequently, courts should be encouraged to allow this remedy in all cases, without subjecting it to further limitation.

IV. DESIGNING THE LITIGANTS’ INCENTIVES IN PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS PROCEEDINGS

The remedy for wrong preliminary injunction shapes the plaintiff’s incentives to apply for the preliminary relief, and the defendant’s motivation to object to it. Indeed, liability for wrong preliminary injunction “deter[s] rash applications for interlocutory orders and thus avoid[s] wasting the court’s time with flimsy applications.” However, to be valid, this aim must be substantially narrowed. While it is true that without any remedy for a wrong preliminary injunction the plaintiff’s incentives to apply for it would be excessive, the attempt to use the remedial regime to direct the plaintiff to apply for a preliminary injunction only when its issuance is socially efficient is unattainable. It is therefore better to concentrate on the more modest aim of preventing frivolous motions while not over-deterring legitimate ones. The following discussion explains and establishes these three propositions. It shows that the plaintiff’s liability for wrong preliminary injunction should be limited to undeserved-wealth-transfers.

95 Morton, supra note 38, at 1867. See also Dobbs, supra note 55, at 1094, 1119 (“[I]t is desirable to discourage the harassing plaintiff by insisting that he risk something himself”); Calderon, supra note 50, at 133 (the purpose of liability for wrong preliminary injunction is “to deter plaintiffs from filing frivolous claims for relief.”); Edgar v. Mite Corporation, 457 U.S. 624, 649 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (the threat of liability insures that a party would apply for a preliminary injunction only when he is “confiden[t] in his legal position.”); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 211 (3d Cir. 1990); Coyne-Delany, 717 F.2d at 392; National Kidney Patients Ass'n v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (the threat of liability forces the plaintiff “to consider the injury to be inflicted on its adversary in deciding whether to press ahead”).
A. Making the Plaintiff Internalize the Effects of a Wrong Preliminary Injunction

The aim of preliminary injunctions is to maximize social welfare, such that the defendant would not continue her disputed behavior during the trial if, and only if, the social cost that the preliminary injunction would prevent exceeds the social cost that would be inflicted by the preliminary injunction. The likelihood that the efficient outcome will be achieved is determined not only according to the legal doctrine that the court applies in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, but also by the litigants’ behavior.

In the absence of remedies for wrong preliminary injunction, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining a preliminary injunction may exceed the social interest in issuing it, for two primary reasons. First, the plaintiff cannot be expected to internalize the deadweight-loss that would be inflicted on the defendant and on third parties in the case of a wrong preliminary injunction. In fact, the plaintiff may benefit from inflicting on the defendant to bear some deadweight-loss, since it may substantially strengthen the plaintiff’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the defendant in negotiations for settlements. Second, a preliminary injunction provides the plaintiff with a private profit—the opportunity to derive a benefit that is taken from the defendant or from third parties. In evaluating whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction is efficient, such benefits are taken into account (as far as they are irreparable if the injunction is not issued) only in a discounted value, which represents the likelihood that the plaintiff is entitled to derive them. In contrast, the plaintiff would consider the opportunity to derive these benefits even if it is not entitled to them, i.e. even in the case of a wrong preliminary injunction. Given the plaintiff’s

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96 See Josh Lerner & Jean O. Lanjouw, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J. L. & ECON. 573 (2001) (arguing that firms tend to request preliminary injunctions to impose financial stress on their rivals and thus to improve their bargaining position in settlement negotiations). See also Note, Injunction Negotiations: An Economic, Moral, and Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1563 (1975); Michael Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 Mich. L. REV. 110, 120-21 (1986) (target firm managers may file lawsuits against hostile bidders based on the “hope that the lawsuit will be a ‘show-stopper’… . Issuance of even a preliminary injunction often effectively kills a hostile tender offer, for it postpones indefinitely the bidder’s execution of the offer.”); Lichtman, supra note 21, at 1295 n. 19.

97 To illustrate, consider a case in which the plaintiff and the defendant compete in the same market, and the plaintiff claims that it is entitled to exclusivity. Assume that if a preliminary injunction is not issued, each party will obtain a profit of $50 by the time the case is resolved, and if the plaintiff wins, it can recover the defendant’s profit, $50; while if a preliminary injunction is issued, the plaintiff’s profits will increase to $120, as a result of its monopoly power. Assume that the likelihood that the plaintiff is entitled to exclusivity is 60%, and that no remedies for wrong preliminary injunctions are available. In this case, the irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is not issued is the difference between the plaintiff’s monopoly profits, $120, and the parties’ joint profits when they compete, $100. Therefore, the expected
excessive incentives to apply for a preliminary injunction, it is desirable to apply a remedial regime that would remove the plaintiff’s interest in using it.

Inasmuch as the remedy aims at directing the parties, one should consider its effect not only on the plaintiff’s incentives but on those of the defendant as well. While plaintiffs should be directed to act optimally in deciding whether to apply for a preliminary injunction, defendants should be induced to oppose a motion for socially inefficient preliminary injunctions and to consent to efficient ones. However, it is notoriously hard to induce both parties to act efficiently, due to the well-known “double responsibility at the margin” problem. Such an endeavor requires innovative legal mechanisms that are radically at odds with current law, such as obliging the moving party to pay damages into the hands of a third party rather than to the defendant. Investigation of such theoretical possibilities lies beyond the scope of our inquiry. It seems plausible to assume that ex-post remedies for wrong preliminary injunction have a more substantial effect on the plaintiff’s choice to apply for a preliminary injunction than on the defendant’s decision to resist it. This is because the defendant’s acquiescence in the preliminary injunction may be interpreted as signaling that its defense is weak. The defendant therefore has a strong incentive to oppose the injunction anyway. We will thus focus on the remedy’s effect on the plaintiff.

The expected value of the social benefit of issuing the preliminary injunction is represented by $20x0.6=$12. If the preliminary injunction is issued, the irreparable social costs include the defendant’s loss of profit, $50. The expected value of this harm is $50x0.4=$20. Thus, even before adding the harm imposed on the customers in the relevant market due to the preliminary injunction’s adverse effect on competition, it is clear that in this example it is socially undesirable to issue the preliminary injunction. However, absent remedies for wrong preliminary injunction the plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the interim relief. The plaintiff would disregard the social costs, and would derive a benefit that exceeds the social benefit—the opportunity to derive the extra profits of $70 in the case that its claim is unsubstantiated, i.e. in probability, 40%. It is obvious that under these conditions—not bearing the costs while receiving private benefits—the plaintiff will apply for a preliminary injunction in spite its social undesirability.

98 John Leubsdorf points out in this respect that “while the plaintiff must find a surety and post a bond in order to obtain relief, the defendant can avoid an injunction without ensuring that damages can be collected. Courts should…[require the defendant] to secure a bond …as a condition for the denial of an injunction.” Leubsdorf, supra note 16, at 559. He adds that “[r]estitution theory might also enable courts to transfer a defendant’s windfalls to the plaintiff in cases where the substantive law does not provide for damages.” Id.


100 See, e.g., Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002). An alternative mechanism is to impose liability on the “negligent” party, but it is unlikely that courts will apply the concept of negligence to the area of applying for or opposing to preliminary orders.
Richard Brooks and Warren Schwartz have recently suggested that the remedy should be set so as to shift the responsibility for the issuance of the preliminary injunction from the court to the plaintiff. In their view, once plaintiffs assume liability for the defendants’ full costs of compliance, courts should “freely allow preliminary injunctions.” Their underlying assumption is that the plaintiff is better informed than the court, at least at the early stage in which the hearings are made, about the merits of the case and about the possible irreparable harms. However, even if one accepts this assumption, we question the argument that the remedy should be designed to shift the discretion to issue a preliminary injunction from the court to the plaintiff.

One obvious reason is the prospect of irreparable harms. Brooks and Schwartz disregard the fact that a wrong preliminary injunction may inflict harms that cannot be cured by a remedy after trial. As discussed above, the court’s decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction may be based on quantification—possibly, in monetary terms—of the relevant irreparable harms. However, this quantification is distinct from the awarding of damages. The compensation is an ex-post means to mitigate the harm, which is subject to limitations such as verifiability and burden of proof. It is fundamentally distinct from the monetary value that is attached to such violation, in order to evaluate its justification.

One may advocate a policy of protecting all entitlements through “liability” rules, that is, measuring the (social) value of entitlements according to the amount of compensation awarded for their infringement. However, the currently prevailing legal policy is different, as it protects certain interests through “property”

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101 Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 409.
102 For a related argument see Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HARV. L. REV. 333, 334 (1959) (“The imposition of liability [on the moving party] can[not] be rationalized…on the ground that it is the plaintiff alone who is responsible for the consequences [of wrong preliminary injunction]”); DOBBS, supra note 13, at 197 (“The bond… is not a substitute for the high standards imposed to limit the grant of preliminary injunctions”).
103 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 13, at 189,197 (“By definition, irreparable harm cannot be measured in damages, but not all irreparable harm is equal. … it is useful to represent that harm in dollar figures, just as it is useful to represent pain and suffering in dollar figures.”). For a general discussion of the nature of compensation see Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993) (compensation can be conceived in a noncommodified way, as a symbolic action that reinforces our commitments about rights and wrongs, rather than signifying the harms as commodities).
rules, by determining that violating these interests inflicts irreparable harm.\(^{105}\) The harm is irreparable in the sense that the “social cost” of violating the protected interest is assumed to be higher than the compensations that can be awarded in the case of such violation.\(^{106}\)

Consider, for instance, Brooks and Schwartz’s argument that if the plaintiff assumes full liability for the defendant’s harms, a contracting party (the plaintiff) should freely receive a preliminary injunction that would restrain the other party (the defendant) from acting in a way that, the plaintiff argues, constitutes a breach of contract. This suggestion assigns the plaintiff the power to unilaterally compel the defendant to “sell” its freedom in matters that are not governed by the contract (as these are the matters in which the plaintiff would be required to assume liability). Similar concerns are evident in cases in which an employer seeks to enjoin an employee from leaving the job in breach of contract, and when a plaintiff applies for a preliminary injunction against defamation.\(^{107}\)

Moreover, even if one endorses the Brooks and Schwartz’s analytical framework, their argument fails due to its impracticability. It is rarely possible to make the plaintiff fully internalize the consequences of a wrong preliminary injunction. Often, a wrong preliminary injunction harms not only those who were wrongfully enjoined or restrained but also third parties. While in principle such third parties can also be compensated (for instance, through class action), in practice this outcome is difficult to obtain.\(^{108}\)


\(^{106}\) See also Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 36 (“Disregarding the legalities at the interlocutory stage … creates a disjunction between the rule applied then and the substantive law applied at the final stage. … If the lawmaker instituting the rule of law in question meant that people should be free to behave in a certain way—not just receive compensation when they cannot—that goal may be compromised.”). In response, Brooks and Schwartz suggest that “[s]ince the entitlement does not clearly belong to either party, the challenge of unjust nonconsensual appropriation through a preliminary injunction liability rule holds less weight than when breach of contract or constitutional infringement is clear.” Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 406. As argued in the text, this reply fails to distinguish between (judicial) quantification of each of the possible assignments of entitlements, given the legal uncertainty, and an \textit{ex post} compensation when an infringement is proved.


\(^{108}\) For a related argument see Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 41-43 (pointing at the problems of imposing liability for harms to third-parties, mainly when the defendant does not wish (or is not qualified) to litigate what amounts to a class action).
Finally, full liability may well result in over-deterrence. In the case of uncertainty about the defendant’s harms, compelling the plaintiff to assume full liability will introduce considerable uncertainty and may deter the plaintiff from seeking justified preliminary injunctions. This concern of over-deterrence is augmented by the fact that the plaintiff does not internalize some of the social benefits of issuing a preliminary injunction. The social benefit generated by a preliminary injunction includes all the deadweight-loss it saves. In contrast, the plaintiff’s benefit consists of only the harm it would have suffered absent the injunction. As a general matter, a party’s failure to seek a preliminary injunction does not preclude its obtaining monetary compensation when the case is resolved.\(^{109}\) Therefore, the plaintiff is expected to ignore the social benefit of preventing deadweight-loss generated by the defendant’s unrestrained activities during the trial so far as the plaintiff expects to receive compensations for this harm at the end of trial. In addition, from the social perspective, the relevant irreparable harms include harms to third parties, while the plaintiff benefits only from preventing those irreparable harms that it would suffer but for the injunction.

Absent remedies for wrong preliminary injunctions this externalization of some social benefits is immaterial, since applying for a preliminary injunction does not involve significant costs (besides for litigation costs). Therefore, it is sufficient that the plaintiff expects to derive some benefit from the preliminary injunction to provide the plaintiff with an adequate incentive to apply for it. However, once the plaintiff is required to assume full liability for the defendant’s harms in the case of a wrong preliminary injunction, the plaintiff might be deterred from applying not only for a socially inefficient relief but for efficient relief too. Thus, the mitigation of the concern of “under-deterrence” might come at the cost of increasing the likelihood of “over-deterrence.” The main problem is that the latter prospect raises a greater concern than the former. Socially inefficient preliminary injunctions can be avoided through the court’s discretion whether to issue the relief. In contrast, if the plaintiff is deterred from applying for socially efficient relief, the court does not get the opportunity to examine whether to issue such relief. In such cases the defendant may have an interest in voluntarily restraining itself, to avoid liability in case the plaintiff would win the case. However, such self-restraint can be expected to be insufficient, since

\(^{109}\) See, e.g., in the closely related context of appeal proceedings, *LiButti v. United States*, 178 F.3d 114, 121 (2nd Cir. 1999); *Fulton County Silk Mills v. Irving Trust Co. (In re Lilyknit Silk Underwear Co.)*, 73 F.2d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 1934).
the defendant cannot expect to receive, after winning the case, compensation for the harms suffered due to its self-restraint. Therefore, if the parties cannot agree on their activities until the dispute is resolved, due to reasons such as transaction costs, information asymmetry, or legal regulation such as antitrust law, the prospect of “over-deterrence” poses a substantial concern.

Thus, the proposition that imposing full liability justifies assigning the plaintiff the power to decide whether to issue the pre-trial relief cannot be sustained. Inevitably, courts should retain the discretion whether to issue an injunction. Notwithstanding our skepticism regarding Brooks and Schwartz’s proposal, we do agree that the remedy’s effect on the plaintiff’s ex-ante incentives is relevant. As argued below, the remedy can contribute to the removal of improper incentives to apply for a preliminary injunction while avoiding over-deterrence.

B. Removing Improper Incentives

The remedy can serve to eliminate the plaintiff’s incentive to apply for a preliminary injunction for the purpose of extracting a benefit from the issuance of a wrong preliminary injunction. This interest is clearly an illegitimate one, as it is derived in violation of the defendant’s legal entitlement.

Arguably, it is socially desirable to enable the plaintiff to obtain the benefit from wrongly enjoining the defendant, since this can offset the concern that the plaintiff does not internalize the full social benefit of issuing the relief. However, such reasoning is flawed. A scheme that motivates plaintiffs to apply for a preliminary injunction by allowing them to retain the benefits derived by a wrong preliminary injunction provides awkward incentives. It provides the plaintiff an incentive that is negatively correlated with the strength of the plaintiff’s case, since the expected value of the ability to retain these benefits is higher the lower the plaintiff’s chances of winning the case. It is thus a scheme that encourages plaintiffs to apply for preliminary injunctions for the wrong reason, and it works precisely in those cases in which it is against the social interest to issue a preliminary injunction.

We suggest that in terms of directing the plaintiff, the remedy should be designed to deter frivolous applications for preliminary injunction, that is, ones that are aimed at extracting the benefits of wrong preliminary injunction. At the same time, the remedy should not deter the plaintiff from applying whenever there are other, legitimate reasons for issuing a preliminary
injunction, i.e. the prevention of irreparable harms. In this way, the remedy should be designed to
discourage the plaintiff from applying for at least some inefficient preliminary injunctions, and
thus to assist in increasing the likelihood that a preliminary injunction is issued only when it
would minimize irreparable social harms.

The desired range of the remedy according to this approach can be determined using the
following notations:

\[ D_p \] the plaintiff’s harm (or lost benefit) if a preliminary injunction is not issued;
\[ \alpha \] the portion of the plaintiff’s harm (or lost benefit) which is, from the
plaintiff’s perspective, irreparable;\(^{110}\)
\[ p \] the probability that the plaintiff will win the case on the merits;
\[ R \] the remedy for a wrong preliminary injunction.

To remove the illegitimate incentive, the remedy should not be lower than the plaintiff’s
benefit from a wrong preliminary injunction. This benefit equals the plaintiff’s harm (or lost
benefit) if a preliminary injunction was not issued, \( D_p \). Therefore, the first condition that the
remedy, \( R \), should fulfill is this:

\[
(1 - p) R \geq (1 - p) D_p \quad \Rightarrow R \geq D_p
\]

At the same time, the remedy should be capped, to ensure that it does not deter the plaintiff
from applying for preliminary injunction when the provisional relief may serve legitimate
interests, namely avoiding irreparable harms. The expected value of the plaintiff’s benefit from
the preliminary injunction consists of two elements: (1) if the plaintiff wins the case, the
plaintiff’s benefit from preliminary injunction is the irreparable part of its harm, \( \alpha D_p \); and (2) if
the plaintiff loses the case, the benefit equals to the plaintiff’s entire harm if the preliminary
injunction was not issued, \( D_p \). Therefore, the second condition that the remedy should fulfill is
this:

\[
(1 - p) R \leq p \alpha D_p + (1 - p) D_p \quad \Rightarrow R \leq D_p [\alpha \left(\frac{p}{1 - p}\right) + 1]
\]

\(^{110}\) As explained above, the court’s decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction should be based on
an assessment of the “socially” irreparable harms. However, the plaintiff’s decision is based on an
assessment of the harms that are “privately” irreparable, i.e. harms for which the plaintiff cannot expect to receive sufficient \textit{ex-post} compensation.
In sum, to achieve the aim of removing the illegitimate incentive without over-deterring the plaintiff from applying for preliminary injunction to avoid irreparable harm, the remedy should be set in the following range:

\[ \alpha \left( \frac{p}{1-p} \right) + 1 \]

For instance, if \( \alpha = 0 \), such that all the plaintiff’s harms are reparable (pointless application), a remedy that is equal to the plaintiff’s harm (or lost benefit) if the preliminary injunction was not issued, \( D_p \), is sufficient to remove the plaintiff’s interest in applying for preliminary injunction. Similarly, if \( p = 0 \), such that the plaintiff has no chance to win the case (frivolous applications), the above remedy again deters the plaintiff from applying for preliminary injunction. Such a remedy does not deter the plaintiff if at least some of its harms are irreparable \( (\alpha > 0) \) and the plaintiff has some chance to win the case \( (p > 0) \). This set of conditions will serve us to evaluate different types of remedies.

C. An Evaluation of the Possible Remedies

1. Compensation for Harms

Requiring the plaintiff to bear only part of the actual costs may induce it to apply for inefficient preliminary injunctions. Whenever the plaintiff’s actual liability is lower than its expected benefit, the plaintiff is not deterred from pressing for even frivolous claims. As discussed above, it is similarly undesirable to impose full liability on the plaintiff. In general, optimal deterrence cannot be obtained, given the prospects of irreparable harms to the defendant and harms to third parties resulting from a wrong preliminary injunction.\(^{111}\) Sometimes, for instance in patent cases, even full liability would not deter frivolous suits, for the benefit to the plaintiff from a wrong preliminary injunction is higher than the full costs to the defendant.\(^{112}\) More importantly, in other cases full liability might deter the plaintiff from applying for socially efficient preliminary injunctions. Over-deterrence may occur because a rule of full compensation

\(^{111}\) See supra Section III.A.2.

\(^{112}\) For accentuating the importance of taking into account the concern of “errant gains” see Lichtman, supra note 21.
causes the plaintiff to internalize the entire harm generated by the wrong preliminary injunction, while the plaintiff does not internalize the full social benefit of issuing the preliminary injunction.

Over-deterrence may be avoided if the externalized social benefit does not exceed the private benefit that the plaintiff expects to derive from a wrong preliminary injunction. Thus, the concern of over-deterrence is acute in cases in which the preliminary injunction aims to protect mainly third parties. This reasoning justifies a rule that requires public interest plaintiffs to post only a nominal bond, which caps their liability for wrong preliminary injunction.

According to the more modest aim defined above, the plaintiff’s liability should be designed to deter frivolous applications for preliminary injunction, by denying the plaintiff the right to retain the benefit derived from a wrong preliminary injunction while avoiding over-deterrence. Specifically, as shown above, the scope of the plaintiff’s liability for wrong preliminary injunction should be limited to the following range:

\[ D_p \leq R \leq D_p\left[\frac{P}{1 - p}\right] + 1 \]

Recall that \( D_p \) denotes the plaintiff’s benefit from the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Thus, it is difficult, and may even be impractical, to ensure that this pair of conditions is met when the plaintiff’s liability is set according to the defendant’s harms rather than the plaintiff’s

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113 To illustrate, assume that the defendant’s behavior causes damage to each of two plaintiffs. The irreparable damage during the litigation is $200, equally divided between the plaintiffs. The defendant can take precautionary measures that would prevent the damage to both plaintiffs, but not to one of them only. The socially irreparable cost of taking these precaution during the litigation is $150. Assume that the likelihood that the plaintiffs are legally entitled to stop the defendant’s activity is 50%. A preliminary injunction is socially desirable, as its expected social benefit ($100) exceeds its expected cost ($50). However, if the plaintiffs do not collaborate, they will not apply for a preliminary injunction, since it is the party who applies for it that would be exclusively liable to compensate the defendant for a wrong preliminary injunction.

114 See Calderon, supra note 50, at 136 (“Frivolous claims are adequately screened out by the preliminary injunction test … and by the nearly insurmountable financial obstacles to public interest litigation.”); Morton, supra note 38, at 1869-70 (in environmental cases “courts are less worried about frivolous suits and more concerned with providing the judicial review Congress intended under the statute.”); id, at 1905 (“In noncommercial cases, the courts should … consider the effect of the bond requirement on the enforcement of the important federal right the plaintiff seeks to enforce”). See also Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978, 1000 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984) (“In order not to restrict a federal right unduly, the impact that a bond requirement would have on enforcement of the right should also be considered.”); Kansas ex rel. Stephan, 705 F.2d at 1270; Page Communication, 475 F.2d at 997; H & R Block, 541 F.2d at 1099.
benefit. Nevertheless, one can outline the relevant parameters that should be considered in setting the scope of the plaintiff’s liability, given the aim of directing the plaintiff.

The lower limit of the plaintiff’s liability should be its benefit from the issuance of the preliminary injunction, i.e., the plaintiff’s harms if the preliminary injunction had not been issued, $D_p$. This limit aims to mitigate the concern of under-deterrence. Thus, when the defendant’s harms are below the plaintiff’s benefits, it is justified to require the plaintiff to assume full liability for wrong preliminary injunction.

The upper limit of the plaintiff’s liability should be set as an increasing function of both $\alpha$, the portion of the plaintiff’s harm (or lost benefit) which is, from the plaintiff’s perspective, irreparable; and $p$, the probability that the plaintiff will win the case on the merits. The higher the values of these parameters, the lower the concern that imposing full liability would result in over-deterrence. Therefore, when the defendant’s harm exceeds the plaintiff’s benefit, the plaintiff should bear only part of the defendant’s costs. All else being equal, this portion should be smaller the lower the irreparable part of the plaintiff’s harm in the absence of the preliminary injunction, and the lower the probability that the plaintiff will win the case, as estimated at the preliminary stage. This result may seem counter-intuitive, as the lower $\alpha$ and $p$, the more probable it is that issuing the preliminary injunction is socially inefficient. Thus, apparently, in such cases the plaintiff’s liability should be more expansive, to deter plaintiffs from applying for socially inefficient preliminary injunctions. However, as indicated above, the assumption that the plaintiff’s liability should be designed to deter it from applying for socially inefficient preliminary injunctions is wrong. The above result is based on the incorporation of the concern of over-deterrence. The lower the irreparable part of the plaintiff’s harm if the preliminary injunction is not issued, and the lower the probability that the plaintiff will win the case, the smaller the plaintiff’s incentive to apply for a preliminary injunction. These are precisely the cases in which the plaintiff’s liability should be limited, to avoid over-deterrence.

2. Restitution of Benefits

Recall that according to the rule under consideration, the plaintiff’s liability would be limited to the benefit it gained from the preliminary injunction at the defendant’s expense. The restitutionary remedy does not deter plaintiffs from applying for socially efficient preliminary injunctions. This remedy does not impose on the plaintiff a cost for applying for a preliminary
injunction, and thus the concern of over-deterrence does not materialize. This result can be demonstrated through the pair of conditions defined above:

\[ D_p \leq R \leq D_h[\alpha(\frac{p}{1-p}) + 1] \]

As indicated, the amount of restitution, \( R \), is set as the minimum between the plaintiff’s benefit, \( D_p \), and the defendant’s harm. Thus the condition on the right-hand side is always fulfilled, since the remedy cannot exceed \( D_p \). The left-hand side condition is met only if the plaintiff’s benefit is lower than the defendant’s harm. Therefore, such restitutionary remedy will not over-deter legitimate claims, but it might under-deter frivolous suits. Notice, however, that under-deterrence will occur only in those cases where a harm-based remedy of compensation is also insufficient to prevent frivolous claims.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Assuming that courts are not systematically inclined to overestimate certain harms and to underestimate other losses, there is no good reason to instruct them to disregard true social losses just because they can be transferred between the parties. Therefore, in the case of deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction all harms in the form of deadweight-loss should be taken into account, regardless of the availability of an *ex-post* remedy.

More generally, the discussion demonstrates that when an actor (in the current case, the moving party) bears only part of the social costs, it is inefficient to divide the decision-power between the actor and a centralized decision-maker, by requiring the latter to take into account only the un-internalized part of the social harm inflicted by the actor’s behavior. In such cases, of which the issuance of a preliminary injunction is just an example, the centralized decision-maker must consider the entire social harm, including the part internalized by the private actor.

A second contribution of the analysis deals with restitutionary remedies. When a judicial decision is reversed or set aside, the dilemma which presents itself to the court is whether it

\[ ^{115} \text{Cooter and Porat (2000) offer a similar logic to criticize the exclusion of risk to oneself from the doctrine of negligence.} \]
should reassign harms inflicted and benefits gained as a result of the reversed decision should be reassigned. Courts traditionally prefer harm-based liability over benefit-based remedy.\textsuperscript{116} This inclination is followed in cases of wrong preliminary injunctions, as courts prefer (partial) liability for harms over disgorgement of the benefits obtained due to the wrong injunction. We suggest that the approach should be precisely the opposite. Courts should manifest a greater willingness to require the losing plaintiff to give up its benefits from a wrong preliminary injunction rather than oblige it to compensate the defendant for its losses. Restitution of benefits extracted without a true cause, rather than compensation for harm inflicted by the court’s order, better advances the aim of minimizing social harm.

For instance, the benefit extracted by a patent holder from obtaining a preliminary injunction is often higher than the loss suffered by the defendant, since the plaintiff is able to charge monopoly prices while the preliminary injunction is in force. In other words, the injunction causes wealth transfers from the defendant to the patentee. The main deadweight-loss that is caused by such an injunction is to third parties, such as consumers. Allowing a restitutionary remedy in this scenario, then, is desirable. It allows the court to focus on the irreparable losses suffered by the plaintiff and third parties. In addition, the restitutionary remedy helps minimize the social harm of the wrong decision, by turning part of the defendant’s loss into a reparable wealth transfer, and has no deterring effect on the plaintiff (except perhaps under-deterrence in certain situations). In fact, this view can be supported from a doctrinal perspective as well, assuming that the definition of property is extended to include the “right to conduct business,” a freedom of the defendant which was usurped by the plaintiff.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{116} See Wittman, \textit{supra} note 92 (arguing that there is asymmetry in the administrative costs of managing harms and benefits, which makes state agents prefer a baseline which defines those externalities they wish to address as harms); Saul Levmore, \textit{Explaining Restitution}, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985) (noting and explaining the “asymmetry between the law's treatment of harms and its treatment of benefits.”); Grosskopf, \textit{supra} note 119, at 1994-95 (one of the prominent products of the Anglo-American legal tradition is “the preference for harm-based remedies over benefit-based remedies, as far as protecting entitlement is concerned,” and arguing that this tendency need not be transferred to the case of protection competition rules); Porat, \textit{supra} note 118 (arguing that Anglo-American law is much more willing to deal with negative externalities (harms) than with positive externalities (benefits)).

\textsuperscript{117} Friedmann, \textit{supra} note 119, at 538 (“The [defendant’s] interest in doing business with his clients, though not a traditional property right, can be regarded as quasi-property. … [W]hen the other party appropriated this interest by a court decision that was later reversed, his enrichment was unjust even his suit was not tortuous”). \textit{Cf. SmithKline}, [2007] Ch, at 96-97 (rejecting the argument that “a mere freedom to trade” should be classified as property).
The analysis enriches our understanding of the variety of aims of restitutionary remedies. Two familiar aims are internalizing positive benefits, and deterring wrong behavior. The case of wrong preliminary injunction demonstrates a third possible aim of disgorgement of profits—the removal of improper motives to engage in an overall socially desirable behavior. Applying for judicial relief in general, and for preliminary injunction in particular, are socially desirable activities. One of the main instruments available to encourage disputants to turn to the judicial system is the grant of immunity from tortious liability for harms inflicted by a judicial decision. However, such immunity might invite misuse. Plaintiffs may turn to the court not only when they believe in their cause, but also to extract undeserved benefits. Establishing an expansive duty to disgorge profits derived from unsuccessful litigation can mitigate the threat of frivolous suits, without jeopardizing the principle of free access to the courts. The case of remedies for wrong preliminary injunctions can thus demonstrate that restitution can serve as a middle ground between the ideal, which drives us to confer rights and liberties, and reality, which forces us to be minded of their misuse.

118 See, e.g., William Landes & Richard Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (explaining the effect of restitutionary remedies on incentives to take part in rescue activity); Ariel Porat, Advocating A General Duty of Restitution (working paper, 2007) (arguing that the law should encourage the creation of positive benefits via restitutionary remedies).

119 Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 551-56 (1980) (examples of cases in which “consideration of deterrence and punishment, coupled with the basic idea that man ought not to profit from his own wrong, have led to the development of rules governing forfeiture of ill-gotten gains.”); Jeff Berryman, The Case for Restitutionary Damages Over Punitive Damages: Teaching the Wrongdoer that Tort Does Not Pay, 73 CAN. BAR REV. 320 (1994); Ofer Grosskopf, Protection of Competition Rules Via the Law of Restitution, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 2007-08 (2001) (restitution can advance the goal of effective deterrence against the breach of competition rules better than damages).

120 See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988). See also infra note 96.