Article
Policing, Undercover Policing and ‘Dirty Hands’: The Case of State Entrapment
Philosophical Studies
(2024)
Abstract
Under a ‘dirty hands’ model of undercover policing, it inevitably involves situations where whatever the state agent does is morally problematic. Christopher Nathan argues against this model. Nathan’s criticism of the model is predicated on the contention that it entails the view, which he considers objectionable, that morally wrongful acts are central to undercover policing. We address this criticism, and some other aspects of Nathan’s discussion of the ‘dirty hands’ model, specifically in relation to state entrapment to commit a crime. Using János Kis’s work on political morality, we explain three dilemmatic versions of the ‘dirty hands’ model. We show that, while two of these are inapplicable to state entrapment, the third has better prospects. We then pursue our main aim, which is to argue that, since the third model precludes Nathan’s criticism, a viable ‘dirty hands’ model of state entrapment remains an open possibility. Finally, we generalize this result, showing that the case of state entrapment is not special: the result holds good for policing practices more generally, including such routine practices as arrest, detention, and restraint.
Disciplines
Publication Date
2024
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02110-0
Citation Information
Attila Tanyi, Daniel J Hill and Stephen L McLeod. "Policing, Undercover Policing and ‘Dirty Hands’: The Case of State Entrapment" Philosophical Studies Vol. 181 (2024) p. 689 - 714 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/attila_tanyi/44/